BOOK REVIEW

The Varieties of Consciousness

By U. KRIEGEL

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By ‘the varieties of consciousness’ Uriah Kriegel means the varieties of phenomenology. A traditional list of the varieties of phenomenology – the phenomenology of sensations, emotions, pains and pleasures – is rather short. Recently, there has been debate about making a number of additions to this list. The phenomenology of thought, agency, volition are all examples of proposed additions. It’s in this context that Kriegel puts forward a general question: ‘how many types of sui generis, irreducible, basic, primitive phenomenology do we have to posit to just be able to describe the stream of consciousness?’ (1). This is the central question of his book.

The book is very rich. Kriegel summarizes discussions on non-sensory types of phenomenology and makes new contributions to their characterizations. He suggests a general framework for mapping out the structure of consciousness but there is more than mapping of structure in the book. Considering emotional phenomenology, Kriegel suggests a ‘new feeling theory’ of emotion. Examining moral phenomenology, Kriegel provides support for Tamar Gendler’s distinction between belief and what she calls ‘alief’ drawing on dual-process architecture in the cognitive system. These are just two examples of the numerous contributions that Kriegel makes.

To give an answer to the general question Kriegel studies five putative non-sensory types of phenomenology – cognitive, conative, the phenomenology of entertaining, emotional and moral phenomenology – devoting a chapter to each of these types. The phenomenology of perception and algedonic phenomenology (of pleasure and pain) are not however examined. The explanation for this is that both are already accepted by mainstream philosophy. Kriegel takes it for granted that both of them are phenomenal primitives. In conclusion, he considers the phenomenology of imagination, which is also a sensory type but traditionally is considered as not categorically different from perception. Kriegel argues against the traditional view.

Kriegel’s answer to the general question is that there are six types of phenomenology that are sui generis, irreducible, basic, primitive phenomenology. As a result, he avows three sensory (perceptual, imaginative, algedonic) and three non-sensory (cognitive, entertaining, conative) primitive types of phenomenology. Emotional and moral phenomenologies, according to him, are not primitive but are reducible to other types of phenomenology.

In the Introduction, Kriegel lays out the metaphysical and methodological foundations of his phenomenological framework. To any type of putative phenomenology, according to Kriegel, three positions are available: eliminativism, reductivism and primitivism. The choice between these three positions is presented as an inconsistent triad. For example:

(1) There exists cognitive phenomenology (phenomenology of thought).
Cognitive phenomenology is irreducible to perceptual and algedonic. Perceptual and algedonic phenomenology ultimately exhaust all phenomenology. The eliminativist about cognitive phenomenology denies (1), the reductivist denies (2) and the primitivist (3).

This triad generalizes for all types of phenomenology. On the basis of a generalized triad Kriegel constructs a procedure for identifying primitive phenomenology. First, we produce a list of putative types of phenomenology, and then pass each item from this list through the generalized triad. Thus, we divide the set of putative phenomenology into two sets—primitives and non-primitives. We can then pass non-primitives through the generalized triad and get a list of derivatives and ‘mere putatives’. How do we do all this? By introspection. Kriegel argues that introspection has above-chance reliability.

Kriegel claims that this procedure ‘structures the phenomenal realm along an important dimension, presenting all phenomenal properties and all reduction or “grounding” relations among them’. He considers his project as a kind of metaphysics of phenomenology. What grounds what in phenomenology? ‘Which phenomenal truths are scrutable from which?’ Which phenomenal properties reduce to which?

However, it may be objected that these questions presuppose that there are grounding or reducibility relations among phenomenal properties but it is not obvious that there are. But Kriegel does not see any threat to the procedure in this objection. ‘If there are no grounding and reducibility relations among phenomenal properties, then there are no derivatives’ (245, n. 6). But if there are no reducibility relations between phenomenal properties, no arguments are needed to prove the irreducibility of any type of phenomenology—all are irreducible, basic and primitive. Diverse elements of consciousness, combined together, form our rich experience and we are able to discern patterns of our experience and conceptualize them. The relation between a complex phenomenon and its elements—elements of consciousness—does not involve generation of higher-level phenomenal properties by low-level phenomenal properties. At least this is an open question.

Kriegel’s project of distinguishing types of phenomenal primitives is in fact a taxonomy of phenomenal properties. He has to appeal to the genus/species relation, because he is interested in types, not tokens, not even in species of primitive phenomenology (9).

A correct taxonomy of phenomenal properties, I think, is necessary for their reduction. If phenomenal properties are vehicles of conscious representation, then it is important for cognitive neuroscience to distinguish their primitive types—plausibly different types of phenomenal elements might have different neurophysiologic implementation. But Kriegel is not interested in the reduction of experience: ‘…What needs reconciling is no longer neuroscience and lived experience but a functionalist framework for making sense of ourselves in terms of perception, belief, desire and action and a phenomenological framework in terms of paradigmatic conscious experiences characterized by distinctive attitudinal features’ (203).

The functionalist picture of mind puts emphasis on strictly third-personal understanding that avoids introspective insight. Alternative self-understanding, proposed by Kriegel, is the first-person, experiential, phenomenological approach. ‘Insofar as some mental phenomena are introspectively observable, there is a kind of insight into their
nature that is available to us and that goes beyond that provided by the functionalist framework’ (202).

In his first-personal inquiry into the mind, Kriegel is striving for a public and informative characterization of phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology is characterized by the phenomenal attitudinal feature of presenting-as-true; conative phenomenology by the phenomenal attitudinal feature of presenting as good; entertaining phenomenology by that of mere presenting; imagination by presenting-as-non-existent; perception as presenting-as-existent. These characteristics seem to me rather arbitrary. Besides I doubt the necessity of introducing a new type of phenomenology – phenomenology of entertaining. Mere presenting can pertain to perceptions as well.

To obtain a more specific characterization that would allow us to distinguish species in types, for example, judging and suspecting (both belong to cognitive type of phenomenology) Kriegel proposes to use phenomenological Ramsey sentences (they cite only phenomenal features). He constructs a Ramsey sentence for making a judgement that $p$, including 20 phenomenological platitudes. For example, the first platitude is:

Making a judgment that $p$ involves a creedal feeling of committing to truth or falsity of $p$.

A conjunction of all 20 platitudes will give us a Ramsey sentence:

There is an $x$, such that $x$ involves a creedal feeling of committing to truth or falsity & there is a felt difference between $x$ and mere entertaining & creedal feelings attitudinal phenomenal feature of $x$ & ... (70)

Kriegel does not deny that ‘we can truly grasp the phenomenology of making a judgement only through direct acquaintance with it. But if we want a theoretical account of it … a Ramsey sentence is our best bet’ (70). However, phenomenal Ramsey sentences seem to lack any explanatory force, because the direct acquaintance makes them redundant. It is doubtful whether such a theory can help us to better understand ourselves.

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