

## EXPERIENCE AND EXPRESSION: THE INNER-OUTER CONCEPTIONS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA

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### 1. The Concept of Expression

Expression is an integral part of our human activity. Generally, we express ourselves through words, tone of voice, behaviors, and other forms of expression. According to Schulte, "In Wittgenstein's considerations it (expression) plays a decisive role, in particular in such phrases as 'immediate' or 'primary expression'<sup>1</sup>. There is however, yet another context where Wittgenstein deals with the concept 'expression', namely the context of aesthetic appraisal, criticism, or description. The connection between this use and the employment of phrases like 'expression of a sensation', 'expression of an experience' or 'expression of pain' is not obvious but it will gradually become apparent."<sup>2</sup> Here, Schulte indicates that by 'expression' Wittgenstein does not mean the linguistic expression only. The term 'expression' means both linguistic expression and immediate or primary expression. For example, 'I am in pain' is the linguistic expression that I express in my speech and 'groaning' is the immediate or primary expression of 'pain'.

Again, Schulte writes, "Immediate expression and linguistic expression – these are the elements which Wittgenstein tries to use in order to grasp how it is possible to get a conceptual hold on the subjective."<sup>3</sup> We express our emotions, sensations, intentions, doubt, etc., both in our language and through bodily behavior. And at the same time an expression reaches into our social lives. This lies in conceiving of the human body and human bodily behaviour as the expressive of

mind. Following this, Overgaard says, "The notion of 'expression' is both intended to convey something more than a merely contingent relation between mind and body, and to reflect a certain inaccessibility of the mental lives of others."<sup>4</sup> Here, by establishing an expressive relationship between mind and body, Overgaard tries to show that the mental life of other is not something completely inner or something completely outer. And he claims that through the notion of expression, Wittgenstein also tries to establish a close relationship between the mind (inner) and the body (outer).

In relation to the above point Schulte said, "there is something that can be regarded as mediating between the subjective and the objective, between the inner and the outer, namely our characteristic expressive behavior."<sup>5</sup> But it is important to note here that the notion of expression is not merely a link between the inner and the outer but through the notion of expression we can also make the distinction between the expressive behaviour (that we can see) of a person and the thing (like joy, pain, anger, etc.,) that appears in our perceptual experience. Thus, the statement 'I am so sorry' functions not only as an expression (of a person's emotional state) that directly presents the emotional state of the person but it also reflects a certain kind of cognitive accessibility (of other's) about the person's emotional state. Therefore, the notion of expression can help us in the understanding of others' mental lives. And from a Wittgensteinian point of view, with a firm grasp of the notion of expression (retaining some sort of inaccessibility) we can understand the difference between the expressive behavior of a person and the way his mental lives appear in perception. Now the most general question is: Can we explain an expression?

**1.1 Can an 'expression' be explained?** "What is an expression?" seems to be a deep philosophical question. For Wittgenstein, instead of asking 'what is an expression?' one should ask 'what is the explanation of an expression?' because asking 'What is the explanation of an expression?' has two advantages. First the explanation is the meaning of 'expression' and the second advantage is, the 'explanation of expression'. Wittgenstein clarifies this in his *The Blue and Brown Books* and said,

"Roughly: 'let's ask what the explanation of meaning is, for whatever that explains will be the meaning.' Studying the grammar of the expression 'explanation of meaning' will teach you something about the grammar of the word 'meaning' and will cure you of the temptation to look about you for some object which you might call 'the meaning'.<sup>6</sup> However, if one wants to understand the meaning of 'expression' he/she ought to understand the meaning of 'explanation of expression'. Thus, Wittgenstein equates meaning of 'expression' with the explanation of an expression. As he writes, "The meaning of a word is what is explained by the explanation of the meaning'. I.e.: if you want to understand the use of the word 'meaning', look for what are called 'explanations of meaning'.<sup>7</sup>"

In the similar way, let us first investigate the 'explanation of expression' in order to understand the concept of expression. The 'explanation of an expression' takes place within the frame work of our language or forms of life. This language or forms of life would never be private rather used only in the context of public. Following this, Ashen rightly said, "... explanations must consist in something publicly accessible. When the explanation reaches a 'terminus' (See *Zettel* Remarks No. 315), or as Wittgenstein calls 'come to an end' (See *On Certainty* Remarks No. 34), there lies the action, a form of life or the language-game, being played and this is publicly accessible."<sup>8</sup> Wittgenstein discusses this point very clearly in *Zettel* and writes, "Why do you demand explanations? If they are given you, you will once more be facing a terminus. They cannot get you any further than you are at present."<sup>9</sup> Therefore, explanations of an expression in the final analysis 'come to an end'.<sup>10</sup> And by turning our eyes towards the explanation of 'expression', we can bring the question 'what is an expression?' and also understand 'the concept of expression'. Now the question is : How can we explain an expression?

**1.2 How can an expression be explained?** : According to Wittgenstein, what a philosopher discovers will never be new

facts, but the significance of our so familiar facts. We can find the essence of those familiar facts in its particular examples. Thus, we can say exemplification is one of the important ways of explaining an expression. Therefore, we can explain an expression by using examples and it is the most effective ways of explaining an expression. Exemplification can provide us models for a subject's expressive activities that show how subjects display their individual concern. It does not require the speculation of the chains of inner experiences but it offers us exemplary attitudes of the subject. For example, 'I am in pain' like moans or crying provides a model of the subject's expression of pain.

In his later philosophy, we find that Wittgenstein distinguishes between two kinds of clarifications about an expression: clarification of explanation and clarification of description. Explanation tells why something is the way it is while description tells how it is perceived by one or more of the five senses, i.e. how it is. According to Gert, "Sometimes an attempt is made to explain what a language-game is, or which uses of terms should be described, but usually it is assumed that this is more or less self-evident, or that the details do not matter; what is important is that Wittgenstein advocated description over explanation."<sup>11</sup> Thus, when one says 'I am in pain' the detail about the notion of pain not matter rather what the statement describes is important for Wittgenstein. As he writes, "We must do away with all *explanation*, and *description* alone must take its place."<sup>12</sup> Here, Wittgenstein rejects explanation and shows interest towards description for the understanding of an expression.

Pears<sup>13</sup> begins his discussion on description by asking a question like what kind of explanation Wittgenstein rejects and he goes on to ask why Wittgenstein is so interested in description. As Pears writes, "What exactly does he mean when he says that 'we must do away with all *explanation*, and *description* alone must take its place'?"<sup>14</sup> But, he does not say anything about what does Wittgenstein mean by 'description'. Gert<sup>15</sup> highlights two related suggestions that Wittgenstein has made regarding description. According to him, one is general and another is

very special for Wittgenstein. The general suggestion mentions that the job of a philosopher is not to explain rather to describe. When he talks about description in a general sense he is talking about descriptions of language. And the very specific suggestion is about what we are to describe.

According to Gert, in Wittgenstein's later writings, we find his specific suggestion about descriptions that philosophers should investigate or describe descriptions. To know about Wittgenstein's specific suggestion about descriptions here is a sampling of passages from Wittgenstein's writings where Wittgenstein discusses about various kinds of descriptions like, description of a facial expression, descriptions of what is seen, description of sensations, description of an attitude and so on and so forth.

"Think how many different kinds of thing are called 'description': description of a body's position by means of its co-ordinates; description of a facial expression; description of a sensation of touch; of a mood."<sup>16</sup>

"What we call '*descriptions*' are instruments for particular uses... Thinking of a description as a word-picture of the facts has something misleading about it: one tends to think only of such pictures as hang on our walls: which seem simply to portray how a thing looks, what it is like."<sup>17</sup>

"And now look at all that can be meant by 'description of what is seen'. - But this just is what is called description of what is seen. There is not *one genuine* proper case of such description - the rest being just vague, something which awaits clarification, or which must just be swept aside as rubbish."<sup>18</sup>

"What is the description of an 'attitude' like?"<sup>19</sup> "It is possible to describe a painting by describing a painting by describing *events*; indeed that's the way it would be described in almost every instance. 'He's standing there, lost in sorrow, she's wringing her hands...' Indeed, if you could not describe it this way you wouldn't understand it, even if you could describe the distribution of color on its surface in minute detail."<sup>20</sup>

"The question 'what do you see?' gets for answer a variety of kinds of description - If now someone says 'After all, I see the aspect,

the organization, just as much as I see shapes and colours' – what is that supposed to mean? That one includes all that in 'seeing'? Or that here there is the greatest similarity? – And what can I say to the matter?"<sup>21</sup>

In the above passages, Wittgenstein has not discussed about the descriptions of language at all rather he has discussed about descriptions of a facial expression, description of a sensation, description of paintings, and description of things that we see and so on. Then Gert raises the question, "How can Wittgenstein insist that it is the job of philosophy to focus its attention on language, while he writes about descriptions of so many different things?"<sup>22</sup> Replying to this question Gert said, "The answer to this question is that all descriptions are in language, and therefore to talk about descriptions, whether or not they are descriptions of language, is to talk about language. And to describe descriptions is to describe language, no matter what those described descriptions describe."<sup>23</sup> Therefore, according to Gert, in the above passages Wittgenstein does not talk about descriptions of facial expressions, sensations, mood or attitude; or the words used for facial expressions, sensations, mood, or attitude; rather he asks us to compare descriptions of facial expressions, mood, attitude or sensations.

Following Wittgenstein's specific suggestion about descriptions, Gert describes descriptions of pain and says, let's "see what we can learn from describing descriptions of pain."<sup>24</sup> For him, in describing individual pain, one would not make any philosophical observation. "But, if we look at your description and take it, along with other descriptions of other pains, as the things to be studied, perhaps we can learn a little more."<sup>25</sup> By making the comparison of various descriptions of pain we might say more about how it (pain) affects one's behaviour. Looking at descriptions of pain we can classify pains according to the causes of pains. Illustrating this point Gert said, "A burning pain is a pain that feels like the pain that is commonly caused by burning; a sharp pain is like the pain that is often caused by something sharp, etc."<sup>26</sup> But classifying pain on the basis of actual causes is different from classifying them on the basis of what they feel like.

In the above counterfactual situation regarding the classification of pain (on the basis of actual causes or on the basis of what people feel like), Gert has tried to point out that there are no facts that will make the either way of taking the classification is right or wrong. By paying our attention to how we describe pain, we can also learn something about the privacy of pain. We will discuss about the privacy of pain in the subsection (Inner as Private) of the Section 'Myth of Inner'. And by making the distinction between descriptions of a stone's location and descriptions of the location of pain, Gert also points out Wittgenstein's views regarding whether or not the term 'pain' refers to something. According to Gert, Wittgenstein rejects "the idea that 'pain' is a referring term or that pains are objects."<sup>27</sup> As Wittgenstein writes, " 'And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing.' – Not at all. It is not a *something* but not a *nothing* either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here."<sup>28</sup>

Again, according to Wittgenstein, psychological terms have both first-person expressive and third-person descriptive uses. Despite having both these different uses they are univocal. As he writes, "One may have the thought: How remarkable that the single meaning of the word 'to feel' is compounded of heterogeneous components, the meanings of the first and of the third person. But what can be more different than the profile and the front view of a face; and yet the concepts of our language are so formed, that the one appears merely as a variation of the other."<sup>29</sup> Here, both the profile of the person and the front view of a face combine the meaning univocally with both expressive and descriptive uses.

Let us consider two statements:

1. "A description is a representation of a distribution in a space."<sup>30</sup>
2. "If I let my gaze wander round a room and suddenly it lights on an object of striking red colour, and I say 'Red!' – that is not a description."<sup>31</sup>

Here, the first statement occurs in a discussion on description and what cannot be included in such distribution can be displayed. What can be displayed is discussed in the second statement. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, the second statement is an expression rather than a description. In this regard Altheri writes, in the second statement "The exclamation 'Red!' does not *describe* anything because attention is not focused on the object. Rather, the statement *exemplifies* what Wittgenstein calls 'the dawning of an aspect' and so calls attention to a state the subject experiences in relation to how the object appears."<sup>52</sup> Thus according to Wittgenstein's expressionistic account of mental states, self-ascriptions express rather than describe the mental states indicated by their psychological terms. Hence, my utterance of 'I believe that P' expresses rather than describes my belief. Similarly, the statement 'I am disgusted in pain' is an expression of my disgust rather than a description based on inward observation.

As we have seen in the above (second) example, in order to show the situation that shown in the activity of the person's observation, Wittgenstein discusses the exclamation 'Red!' in terms of the person's attitude towards the object. And taking a clue from Wittgenstein Altheri writes, "The expression characterizes the person because, here, the property red is subsumed under properties involving surprise and wonder. That the scene evokes a label red need not entail any specific affective response. But that the scene invokes an exclamation projects this red as affording a site where the agent gets to express something about himself or herself. Moreover, as an exclamation, "Red!" suggests that there are shades of the color that have hitherto not been noticed or not used in this conjunction with other color tones. Exemplification now bears the force of an expression."<sup>53</sup> Here, Altheri claims that the above (second) example does not invite the description of the person rather it exemplifies an aspect of the person. And the speaker's state of mind cannot be explained simply by the scene rather the exclamation is the means to take the person's state of mind as a distinctive feature of the scene.

However, expression and description are two functions or uses of an utterance. According to Altheri, in the above two examples

Wittgenstein makes a border line between expression and description. "Wittgenstein wants to make the point that what is being expressed *cannot* be described. What is being expressed can only be exhibited – largely because it establishes in public something that is not observable except through the speaker's utterance. Expression does not invite description of the person but exemplifies an aspect of the person."<sup>54</sup> For example, 'smiling' is an expression and pleasure is exhibited in smiling. Therefore, pleasure is not the description of a person rather it exemplifies one of the aspects of the person.

While describing a feeling to others, according to Wittgenstein 'I tell him 'Do this and then you'll get it,' and I hold my arm or my head in a particular position."<sup>55</sup> Here, Wittgenstein tries to show that 'Do this and then you'll get it' is not a description of the feeling rather it is an expression of a particular language-game and the feeling is observable in public through the expression (like, I hold my arm or my head in a particular position). As Wittgenstein writes, "Our interest in a 'feeling' is of a quite *particular* kind."<sup>56</sup> Again, according to Wittgenstein, "But here is the problem : a cry, which cannot be called a description, which is more primitive than any description, for all that serves as a description of the inner life. A cry is not a description. But there are transitions. And the words 'I am afraid' may approximate more, or less, to being a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be *far* removed from it. But if 'I am afraid' is not always something like a cry of complaint and yet sometimes is, then why should it *always* be a description of a state of mind?"<sup>57</sup> Describing a state of mind is something to do in a particular context and this description is indirectly the expression of the state of mind.

## 2. The Concept of Experience

According to Wittgenstein, "The concept of experience : like that of event, of process, of state, of something, of fact, of description and of statement."<sup>58</sup> And the term 'experience' is not only used in the discourse of philosophy but also meaningfully used by the common people who do not have any knowledge about philosophy. In his book<sup>59</sup>, Hinton makes the distinction between 'the very general notion of an experience' and 'the special philosophical notion of an experience'. Here

Hinton takes some examples of experience those illustrate the very general notion of the word 'experience'. For example, I have the experience of swimming river, No prior experience is required for the posting of a house keeper, I had many strange experiences etc. These are the examples of ordinary experiences which different people have experienced in different circumstances.

Now the question is: what is the special philosophical notion of an experience? According to Hinton, if I and you both have the experience of swimming river, then there are two experiences, yours and mine. Therefore, it is the special philosophical notion of an experience that experiences are particulars. The subject who does have experience of something cannot be mistaken about the justification for his or her assertions or judgements. For example, I have some assertions or judgements about those I do not have any justification, then we will assume that those assertions are based on illusion or any form of errors. It happens because I might not have any other evidential basis what the assertions require. In respect to this, Malcolm Budd said, "...there appears to be one subject-matter about which I always have, and cannot but have, the perfect justification for my judgements or sincere assertions and about which I cannot be mistaken: (the simple properties of) the intrinsic character of my present sensuous experience- my present sensations, sense-expressions, images and related phenomena."<sup>40</sup> Therefore, my judgements or assertions about my present sensuous experiences do not go beyond the evidence upon which they are based. And we cannot be mistaken about our present sensuous experiences because we have the perfect justification about them.

Let us see Wittgenstein's views about the self-ascription of present sensuous experiences and the above remarks about the intrinsic character of sensations, sense-impressions and images. According to Budd, the set of ideas that we cannot be mistaken about our present sensuous experiences, we have perfect justification for believing what we do about their intrinsic character and the associated internal picture of sensations, sense-impressions and images, are the principal targets of the sections (that are concerned with the concepts of sensations, sense-impressions and images) in *P.I. (Philosophical Investigation)*.

According to Schulte, "The chief motive and focus of Wittgenstein's considerations regarding the concept of experience is the question of what it means to say that one can see a certain object or figure at one time as this and at another time as that, e.g. the figure  $\neq$  as an F and then as the mirror-image of an F (Wittgenstein calls this a mirror-F)."<sup>41</sup> In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of aspect-experiences particularly in relation to visual experiences. He refers to these experiences sometimes as 'seeing-as' and sometimes as 'seeing an aspect' or 'aspect seeing'.

Wittgenstein illustrates the concept of 'seeing-as' with the famous 'duck/rabbit' picture.



(Picture No. 2)<sup>42</sup>

The above picture is a simple drawing that can be seen either as a duck or as a rabbit depending on how one sees it. According to Wittgenstein, we can use the word 'see' in two different ways.<sup>43</sup> Firstly, we can straightforwardly refer to the object (a pattern of colors and shapes, physical behaviors and a bare sound) that we see. For example, if I say I see a goat means I see the goat not as a goat. According to the second use of 'see', we can see something as something. This way of using the word 'see' deals with the objects depicted a psychological state or process and a meaningful sound. Wittgenstein's example of the picture of duck/ rabbit is an example of this second use of the word 'see'. According to this use, we can see this picture either as a duck or as a rabbit, but we cannot see it as both simultaneously. If I have seen the picture as a rabbit then I don't say I am seeing it as a picture rabbit but I will simply say 'this is a picture-rabbit'. Here, I am reporting not interpreting my perception and my perception i.e., what I see is the picture-rabbit not of its color and shape. And someone else might say of me that 'he is seeing the picture as a picture-rabbit'.

Now the question is: Is 'what I see' an inner picture? The answer of this question will be negative. Because if we take 'what I see' is just an inner picture then I see the same thing while seeing the both aspects, that is, the rabbit and the duck aspects of the duck/rabbit picture. But I cannot see the same thing while seeing the both aspects. Here, a picture of 'what I see' is an incomplete description of the picture. It does not make clear what I am seeing. There is no inner picture to justify our expression of what we see. There is simply the case that how we describe it and the concept that we bring to a picture forces itself upon us without any interpretation. In order to experience certain objects as such, the experience of seeing certain objects as certain other objects requires a kind of knowledge or mastery of a technique. For example, to see the above two aspects of the duck-rabbit I must be familiar with the ducks and rabbits. Otherwise I cannot distinguish one aspect from the other. Therefore, our knowledge about certain concept determines the kinds of experience that we have. But it is not the case that our visual experiences changes or our thought changes when we see the duck-rabbit picture.

However, when we see an aspect of the picture that is not in the picture itself, it is in relation to the picture. This means we are more inclined to say that we see a different aspect instead of interpreting the picture differently. If we compare Wittgenstein's use of 'see' with that of sense-data theorists' then we will find that they misuse the words like 'see' and 'interpret'. Thus Wittgenstein argues their views that all we see are sense-data and we interpret these sense-data as certain kinds of objects in the world. For Wittgenstein, while seeing a fork first we did not see the sense data of the fork then interpret it as a fork. First of all, we do not see sense data. Secondly, there is no act of interpretation involves here. Let us see the first point through Wittgenstein's duck/rabbit picture. Someone is unaware of the rabbit aspect but is just saying 'I see a duck' is as justified as someone who says 'I see a fork'. Another person is similarly unaware of the duck aspect is as justified in saying 'I see a rabbit'. Here, the two persons have the same sense data but they are seeing two different things, one rabbit and another one duck.

Similarly, regarding the second point that 'seeing involves an act of interpretation' Wittgenstein points out that we can interpret a picture but we cannot do it always. We also cannot claim that different mental act is going on in the person seeing the rabbit and in the person seeing the duck. A person who has never seen a duck has no mental capacity of seeing the picture as a duck and similarly a person who has never seen a rabbit has no capacity to see it as a rabbit. For Wittgenstein, it is not the person's mental or visual problem, it is simply the problem about the person's experience. Following Wittgenstein, Pradhan said, "By experience we mean ... the cognitive experience of the world, i.e., our knowledge of the world."<sup>44</sup> If the person does have the experience or knowledge of both the aspects, he may see the picture either of the two.

As we have seen that in the case of the picture of duck/rabbit, Wittgenstein introduces the notion of aspect that the aspect of perception regarding the rabbit or the duck is closely related to the picture. If someone does not have any knowledge about the rabbit or duck how he or she will make the distinction one from the other. Therefore, the aspects of duck and rabbit help us in making the confusion. If one has only knowledge about duck aspect, he or she will see the picture as a duck not as a rabbit. Similarly, if one has the knowledge or experience about rabbit aspect then he or she will take that picture as the picture of a rabbit.

When a person sees the duck/rabbit picture and exclaims it as a rabbit or seeing as a rabbit, he does not observe something purely visual. His perception seems to be more of an interpretation than a perception and his perception does not really result from an interpretative process. For Wittgenstein, this makes a paradox that one presumes that 'seeing as' is either as a matter of observation or a matter of interpretation but cannot be anything between the two. Wittgenstein investigates the paradox and tries to show that aspect perception has not only perceptual content but also cognitive component. We also cannot reduce either of them.

Again Wittgenstein writes, "And if the play of expressions develops; then indeed I can say that a soul, something inner is

developing. But now the inner is no longer the cause of the expression.<sup>45</sup> Here, Wittgenstein argues that the outer is not the secondary to the inner. He also claims that the inner itself is in some sense an acquired phenomenon issuing from the upbringing that a person received. Moreover, by the means of the notion of aspect, Wittgenstein makes the interrelation between the inner and the outer concepts of the duck/rabbit picture. For him, it is not the case that the picture is the outer and my visual experience is the inner concepts those are in the two different domains. Rather both are intrinsically connected to each other.

### 3. Myth of the Inner

"The concept of the inner is both familiar and mysterious."<sup>46</sup> It is familiar because it is very much related to psychological concepts. And it is mysterious because it is not possible to explain either scientifically or philosophically. Because it is argued that mind cannot be related as a spatio-temporal entity; it must be a supra-sensible entity. And this explanation on mind suggests that mind contains the myth of the inner. Now the question is, what is the inner? Literally speaking, inner is not something inside the individual mind. When we attempt to explain the concept of inner, it creates further problems related to the nature of mind. Although inner experience is the very essence of human life but, it is impossible to describe or define it. Following this, Pradhan says that "Wittgenstein's main contention is that there are a lot of misunderstandings created by philosophers regarding the nature of mind because the language of mind has been systematically misinterpreted, that is, the grammar of the expressions of mental activities has been so construed that mental activities appear as if they are mysterious processes somewhere located in the inner chamber of the human mind."<sup>47</sup>

According to Johnson, we can observe the manifestation of the inner not the inner itself. As Wittgenstein writes, "If you go about to observe your own mental happenings, you may alter them and create new ones, and the whole point of observing is that you should not do this."<sup>48</sup> Here, it seems impossible to study the inner either from the inside or from the outside. Again, he said "the science of mental phenomena has this puzzle: I can't observe the mental phenomena of others, and I can't observe my own, in the proper sense of 'observe'."<sup>49</sup>

And all these explanation seems to be something mysterious about thinking and about the inner in general. This shows that inner is indescribable. Let us find out why inner is indescribable.

**3.1. Inner as Indescribable :** Wittgenstein's rejection of the possibility of knowing that one is in pain depends upon 'I am in pain'. Here, 'I am in pain' looks like the description of the inner state 'pain'. For him, it is not a description of 'pain' because if it will be the description then 'I doubt whether I am in pain' may be senseless in the same way as 'I doubt whether I ouch (expression of pain)'. Therefore, we could not describe our experiences, thoughts or sensations but they can only be expressed. The attempt to describe their inner content creates further problems. Hence, we do not describe what pain feels like or what green looks like. We do not describe the pain but we merely express the pain by behaving in a certain ways. Therefore, the idea that the experiences or sensations (inner) can be described is the mistaken idea like one can have the idea of a private language. Thus for Wittgenstein, like the notion of language, the term 'description' will not be applicable in the case of privacy or inner.

According Wittgenstein, it is a philosophical confusion that a mental concept stands for an inner process and it is opposite to the outer. In this context, Wittgenstein says, "The 'inner' is a delusion. That is : the whole complex of ideas alluded to by this word is like a painted curtain drawn in front of the scene of the actual word use."<sup>50</sup> Therefore, Wittgenstein regards the inner as a picture and this picture is embedded in our language or form of life. There could be no language or form of life without the mental states. We apply it's predicate to others on the basis of some external criteria and what is going on inside other's we need to know something more. That something does not reside inside the inner that is the inner itself. Here, the distinction between 'the inner' and 'what is inside him' is made logically or grammatically in the sense that we could not describe something mental; we can only ascribe the mental concepts. While we ascribe them we take some public criteria as the basis of our ascription. At this point, Wittgenstein says, "It is only in particular cases that the inner is hidden from me, and those cases it is not hidden because it is the inner."<sup>51</sup>



Now the question is, what Wittgenstein means when he says in particular cases the inner is hidden and it is not inner when it is not hidden? Perhaps Wittgenstein means that "The inner is hidden from us means that it is hidden from us in a sense in which it is not hidden from him. And it is not hidden from the owner in this sense: *he utters it* and we believe the utterance under certain conditions and there is no such thing as his making a mistake here. And this asymmetry of the game is brought out by saying that the inner is hidden from someone else."<sup>52</sup> Thus, the inner is not necessarily hidden and it is only hidden unless and until it is revealed. Hence, the inner is not hidden and it is only revealed in our language.

Moreover, Wittgenstein does not take the inner as the hidden version of the outer but he treats the inner as a completely different concept but the concept of inner is tied up with the outer expression. In relation to this point, Wittgenstein makes a distinction between two types of game e.g., 'tennis without a ball' and 'tennis'. As he says, "Imagine *this* game – I call it 'tennis without a ball': the players move around on a tennis court just as in tennis, and they even have rackets, but no ball. Each one reacts to his partner's stroke as if, or more or less as if, a ball had caused his reaction. (Manoeuvres.) The umpire, who must have an 'eye' for the game, decides the questionable cases whether a ball has gone into the net, etc., etc. This game is obviously quite similar to tennis and yet, on the other hand, it is *fundamentally* different."<sup>53</sup> Here, Wittgenstein shows that the set of conceptual relations in the case of 'tennis' is completely different from that of 'tennis without a ball'.

Johnston<sup>54</sup> claims that in the above example, Wittgenstein takes the game 'tennis without a ball' as an inner game. While playing this game, players have to form certain images about the movement in the tennis game and accordingly they will play the (tennis without a ball) game. According to him, the most important point is the question regarding the inner move of the players in the game. To illustrate the status of the 'inner move' Wittgenstein writes, "What sort of move is the inner move of the game, what does it consist in? In this- according to the rule- he forms as image of ...? – But might it not also be said:

*We do not know* what kind of inner move of the game he performs according to the rule; we only know its manifestations? The inner move of the game is an X, whose nature we do not know. Or again: here too there are only external moves of the game – the communication of the rule and what is called the 'manifestation of the inner process'.<sup>55</sup> According to Johnston, here Wittgenstein gives three descriptions of the inner move. The first description is that one compares the inner move with a move in an ordinary sense and the second one is about the rejection of the move. Again, by saying 'The inner move of the game is an X' Wittgenstein compares the inner move with an action which happens in secret and the nature of that action is only known to the agent.

As we have seen in the above example, Wittgenstein tries to show that there are three descriptions of the same reality. Agreeing with Johnston, we claim that there is no problem with the above descriptions of the inner move of the game. But the problem is in the phrase 'the inner move of the game'. It misinterprets the concept of the inner and produces confusion. Therefore, Wittgenstein's aim is neither to deny nor to accept the inner, but he tries to clarify the nature of the concept of the inner. Following this Johnston says, "That we use the concept of the inner (wonder what is going on inside someone's head, talk of inner-most thoughts and feelings, etc.) cannot be denied, what needs to be clarified is the particular grammar of this type of concept. The exact philosophical terminology that we use to clarify the inner is not important- as Wittgenstein said elsewhere 'say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts' (P.L., Para. 79). What does matter, however, is clarity, for the difficulty is that we misinterpret our own concepts."<sup>56</sup>

Regarding our misinterpretation of the concept of inner for example, the concept of pain, Gert said, "One might believe that it is merely a contingent fact that we do not feel one another's pain...the fact that in the actual world the physical pain of one person does not cause the physical pain in another. But we must be careful not to confuse this fact with the fact that pain is private. It is possible to imagine a world in which a person can experience physical pain as the result of toughting

a painful spot on another person's skin. But that would not be a world in which pain is public.<sup>57</sup> Here Gert tries to clarify an objective view of the pain, and according to him, from objective point of view pain is public. This kind of description is different from the description of pain of the person who is experiencing the pain. According to Gert, if both descriptions of pain are correct and one description is not compatible with the other description then they do not describe the same thing. From this point, we can draw the concluding remark about the descriptions of pain what I will describe is mine and what you will describe is yours. If this will be the case then we regard pain as essentially private.

**3.2. Inner as Private :** We take the inner as private. It is so, because nobody knows what is going on in one's mind, or what is secret behind someone's laugh or cry. In two aspects, the inner states or experiences might be private. In one aspect, they are privately owned and in another aspect, they are epistemologically private. The second one we have already discussed in second chapter. Here, we shall discuss the first aspect (of the private linguist) that the inner (experience) is privately owned by him and no one else can have my pain. At most other people can have a pain that is similar to mine. As Wittgenstein puts it, "The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have *this* or something else."<sup>58</sup> In relation to this, Pradhan points out that "The experience of 'pain' is taken to be a paradigm of such inner experience."<sup>59</sup> One may argue that whatever one feels or thinks or experiences are private and the sensation 'pain' is private for me in the sense that one cannot have my pain and at most others can have also similar kind of pain.

In relation to the above statement, Glock says, "No one else can have my pain, or know what I have when I am in pain – this is the inner/outer picture of the mind. It follows immediately that no one else can know what I mean by 'pain'. Moreover, if ideas, impressions or intuitions provide not just the evidence for all our beliefs, but also the content of all our words – a view shared by representationalists and idealists, rationalists, empiricists and Kantians – our whole

language is private in this sense."<sup>60</sup> Therefore, for the supporter of privacy, there would be no problem regarding what he/she says to him/herself. Again, it is also the case that what he/she says to him/herself is intelligible to him/her, not to others. Hence for him/her, there is a place of the inner speech and thought, and one can think or calculate or does something in one's mind. The private experiences are expressed by one's utterances, which might not be intelligible to others. Therefore, there is the possibility of a private language and one can maintain a private language in which the inner thoughts and experiences are carried out.

Wittgenstein develops an argument against the private linguists' views in support of possibility of a private language. According to him, there is no possibility of a private language and if possible, we cannot account for its meaning as a rule governed activity. Hence, he means that a private language as, "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language."<sup>61</sup> Here, the words of this language stands for the immediate sensations of the speaker and except him, no one else can use these words. Nevertheless, in a private language, it might not be possible to refer to one's sensations because there is no rule, which may constitute such a referring to sensations. Thus, Wittgenstein argues that our inner experiences are conceived and expressed by our public language.

Now, the question is how the inner will be private? In Wittgensteinian way, we would say that the inner need not be private at all. The private linguist might argue in relation to this point that he can know the same sensation, which he had in the past. Again, the question might arise how the private linguist will know or identify the sensation with the past and it's not possible within the private language. According to linguistic rules, we can give names to our sensations because in our public language we have the concept of 'sensation'. In our language, we have the various names for sensations and we can use them for the reference to our sensations. However, according to our linguistic rules, we might differentiate or identify one sensation from the other sensations.

It is important to point out that our language has a fixed use and within the domain of language use, we follow linguistic rules. The rule following is an activity or practice and this rule following is just like playing games in accordance with rules. This analogy of rule-following implies that the concept of rule makes sense where there is a practice of following rule and a practice is necessarily public. Therefore, to follow rules means to perform an action and thereby it becomes 'public'. Here, the term 'public' is not ordinarily used rather it gets into its technical status within the framework of Wittgenstein's conception of 'rule-following'.

The most important point is that there should be strong distinction between 'following a rule' and 'thinking that one person is following a rule'. For Wittgenstein, this distinction is possible only through the publicly observable procedures. These procedures are nothing but the established ways of determining whether something is done in accordance with rules or not. As Wittgenstein says, "Nothing I can do in myself can make it a rule. Perhaps if I concentrated my attention, I'd better be able to learn some sort of rule. But if it were a private rule it would have to be public. Being a rule means being an instrument that is checkable, and by an agreed technique."<sup>62</sup> Therefore, this kind of distinction is impossible for the private linguistic communication.

Again, the private linguist might claim that he has set up rules which can give him the justification for using a word. Let us take an example, he has some sort of chair in his imagination and when he is experiencing the sensation of a 'chair', he compares the sensation with his memory of sensation, and applies the word 'S' when the two cases become same. But, now the question is, how can he determine that he is remembering S correctly? The private linguist might answer that I believe that it is S. We could answer him "Perhaps you believe that you believe it."<sup>63</sup> According to Wittgenstein, a check in imagination is also not a real check at all because "... justification consists in appealing to something independent."<sup>64</sup> Therefore, we could justify the possibility of an inner state (e.g. whether someone is in pain or not) through our language.

In relation to the above point, Pradhan says that the notion of privacy as we know from Wittgenstein's private language argument does not apply to the inner in the sense that the inner are intersubjectively intelligible and that they are available for inter-personal communication. This shows that the inner in spite of being private, are not private at all.<sup>65</sup> Here, Pradhan tries to explain that for Wittgenstein, our inner (experiences) are expressible in our language and therefore, they are communicable to others. As he writes "according to Wittgenstein, in so far as the experience is expressed or expressible in language, it is not at all private and incommunicable. The concepts like 'pain' and 'toothache' which the private linguist takes to be referring to private sensations are words in our public language."<sup>66</sup> Thus, Wittgenstein does not reject the inner but, he tries to show the crucial importance of the relationship between our language and the inner for understanding the role of the inner in our lives.

#### 4. Relationship between the Inner and our Language

Wittgenstein said, "I go for a walk in the environs of a city with a friend. As we talk it comes out that I am imagining the city to be on our right. Not only have no conscious reason for this assumption, but some quite simple consideration was enough to make me realize that the city lay rather to the left ahead of us. I can at first give no answer to the question *why* I imagine the city in *this* direction. I had *no reason* to think it. But though I see no reason still I seem to see certain psychological causes for it. In particular, certain associations and memories. For example, we walked along a canal, and once before in similar circumstances I had followed a canal and that time the city lay on our right. — I might try as it were psychoanalytically to discover the causes of my unfounded conviction."<sup>67</sup>

In the above passage, Wittgenstein's main target is to show the relationship between language and the inner lives. He also rejects the possibility of the inner objects which helps in knowing the meaning of our inner lives. For him, the inner could not describe an independent entity through our language; rather language itself is the basis for talking about our inner states. In the phrase 'the city lies on our right' Wittgenstein talks of his feeling that corresponds to the phrase. This

does not mean that he shows how the phrase is connected with the feeling rather he shows that how our use of the phrases/sentences are the basis of expressing about our feelings. Therefore, the language does not just represent the world but also expresses the inner world.

Moreover, expression is a central concept of the inner. And the inner is reflected in the expressions and these expressions are the verbal or nonverbal behaviors. Here, the inner concept emotion or emotional experiences are reflected in emotional expressions. Emotional expressions are nothing but the verbal and nonverbal behaviors that communicate emotional experiences. Bodily expressions or gestures, facial expressions, behaviors and linguistic expressions all are expressions of emotional states. These expressions provide the evidence for someone's emotional experiences. The statement 'I am so sorry' functions as an expression of a person's emotional state, it is not the description of his emotional experience. We cannot describe emotional experiences. As Pradhan points out, experiences are only in the sense of a semantical concept, i.e., a concept referring to the representational relation of language to the world. Experience as we have it for philosophical analysis, is, for us, above all a grammatically articulated cognitive relation to the world, it is presented to us in the moulds of our language.<sup>68</sup> Thus, the emotional experiences gain their meanings through the criteria that are represented in the public.

The expressions of emotions can be natural or cultural. In some way, natural emotional expressions are cultural but cultural expressions are not natural. If we discuss only the natural expressions of emotions then the cultural expressions of emotions will be excluded. Wittgenstein has given emphasis on the cultural expressions of emotions and these expressions are the learned behaviors that include attitudes, behaviors, facial expressions, and the tone of voice, etc. These expressions are conventional in nature and different from natural expressions. In *The Brown Book*, Wittgenstein discusses about four different cases where our expressions are more or less natural, or artificial. These cases are, "a) weeping, b) raising one's voice when one is angry, c) writing an angry letter, d) ringing the bell for a servant you wish to scold."<sup>69</sup>

Sometimes one can use these four natural expressions as artificial means to let others know that he/she feels a certain emotion. As Wittgenstein says, "Possibly one could be sad because he is crying, but of course one is not sad that he is crying. It would after all be possible that people made to cry by application of onions would become sad; that they would either become generally depressed, or would start thinking about certain events, and then grieve over them."<sup>70</sup> There is no more distinction between the natural expressions and using the natural expressions as the artificial means of giving the impression that one feels a certain emotion.

Therefore, the natural expressions like weeping, groaning, trembling and so on are only the rough indications for our understanding of other's emotions. The mere fact of crying or weeping is not indicative of the emotion sadness. Weeping does not tell us whether the person is crying from sadness or joy or grief. According to Schulte, "In order to understand what they express we need to know more, either about the history of the person in question or about his present state. Knowing about his' history and telling on the basis of that and the natural expression observed would amount to telling a plausible causal story. But if this type of knowledge is unavailable or insufficient we shall have to know more about the other person's present state."<sup>71</sup> This 'more' might be the person's attitudes, behaviors, facial expressions, gestures, the tone of voice etc.

Similarly, Johnston points out, "Wittgenstein urges us to recognize that we are interested in peoples' utterances not as reports on mysterious occurrences about which we are for some reason curious, but as expressions of what the individuals' concerned feel. We are interested in them not because they are accurate reports on inner processes but because they are what the individuals are inclined to say."<sup>72</sup> For Wittgenstein, our experience about the inner is not private but it is expressible. The real mystery lies not in the inner but in how the inner finds expression in our language. But the relation of the inner with our language is not as straightforward as it appears. In his later works, Wittgenstein tries to show that our language is not just the spoken or equivalent to written symbolism; it is also a development of instinctive

sounds and reactions. Therefore, the role of our language is not only to express our inner lives but it also helps us to learn the names of various inner states.

It is a general view about learning the names of inner states that there must be natural expressions or behavioral expressions for each type of inner state to which we give some name. In *PI*, Wittgenstein makes one of the statements in relation to the question 'How do we learn the names of inner states?' Like, "How do words refer to sensations?"<sup>73</sup> In the same remarks again he writes, "This question is the same as : how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? — of the word 'pain' for example."<sup>74</sup> And he also answers the question, "Here is one possibility : words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour."<sup>75</sup>

Let us first understand Wittgenstein's purpose of raising the question 'How do words refer to sensations?' Here, Wittgenstein does not seem to mean that words refer to sensations but in some way, his purpose might be to show the importance of the practice of using (sensation) words. This means, (sensation) words do not refer to sensations until and unless they are practiced by the person. He might want to inquire about the necessary preconditions for saying a word refers to a sensation. Again, inquiring about the necessary preconditions seems to be possible by asking how a sensation word is practiced by a person. Moreover, a person could be a participant if he knows the meaning of the sensation words. Therefore, Wittgenstein's purpose of asking the question how people learn the names of sensations is in some sense hidden behind the question 'how do words refer to sensations?'

Let us now come to his part of answering the above question. In the answer part, Wittgenstein points out that he is presenting one possibility about how one learns the names of sensations. His use of the phrase 'one possibility' is so confusing for a reader. Therefore, one might raise the question whether Wittgenstein uses the phrase (one possibility) to mean 'one possibility about how pain is learned' or 'one

possibility about how any name of a sensation could be learned'. Another thing is, there is also no indication that Wittgenstein means to deny the view 'names of sensations can be learned in variety of ways'. Therefore, in order to understand Wittgenstein's position in relation to learning the names of sensations, we are supposed to understand his underlying purpose of giving one possible answer to the above question.

Wittgenstein's illustration of one possibility seems to indicate that for learning of the names of inner states, one needs something more than what Wittgenstein illustrates in the above example. For him, a child could learn the name of a sensation from books, vocabulary lists at school or through conversations with his friends and family members. But, it does not help us to understand how a word refers to a name of sensations. According to Rembert, "this case does not shed any particular light on the question of how it is possible to have a practice in which words are used to refer to inner states."<sup>76</sup> For him, Wittgenstein wants to explain the necessary preconditions of such a case of practice (for saying a word refers to a sensation). For this purpose, Wittgenstein might take the example of a child's ways of learning to express his pain sensation. Here, one might raise the question, how this example could solve the problem of 'how words refer to sensations'.

According to Wittgenstein, the connection between a word and an inner state is established when one learns to use the word for the natural expression of that inner state. Against this view, one might argue that if it is the case then why Wittgenstein uses the phrase 'one possibility' about how the names of sensations are learned. In relation to this Rembert says, "I believe Wittgenstein means in part to illustrate what may well be the first way in which a person learns the names of sensations. There are other ways to learn such words, to be sure, but these other ways often come later when a person already possesses some minimal ability to refer to his sensations. I believe Wittgenstein means to illustrate how a person might learn to do this when he does not already know how."<sup>77</sup>

In *PI*, Wittgenstein takes the example of a child who does not know any language and the child is just learning to utter a word. Here,

the natural reaction of the child is only to cry and he could not react verbally when he hurts. According to Wittgenstein, at his early stage, the child cannot understand any word through language or through other words. If we try to teach him to express his pain then we try to teach the child the right word in the appropriate circumstances. Perhaps after learning a language, the child can learn new names of sensations from the vocabulary lists, books or from other people. As he grows, he can discuss his sensations with other people instead of only expressing them. However, the initial learning of names of sensations that Wittgenstein describes can be taken as the foundation for learning the later forms of learning the names of sensations. For him, that is not the only way to learn sensation words. But, Wittgenstein does not reject that names of sensations can be learned in variety of ways.

### 5. The Possible Link between 'Inner' and 'Outer'

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein's private language argument investigates the possible link between the inner and the outer, and for him, 'criteria' is a technical term in making the possible link between the two concepts. For example, a person's expression of pain is a criterion for his being in pain. Here, the relationship between the concept of 'pain' and its criteria is internal. Therefore, we could take the relationship between the inner and the outer as a criterial relation.

Wittgenstein's earlier thought was that there are three different structures irrespective of three different kinds of propositions. First, there are genuine propositions those are verifiable (either true or false) by reference to reality. They are sense-datum statements that describe immediate sense experience. Secondly, there are hypotheses.<sup>78</sup> These propositions are not verifiable (neither true nor false) with reference to experience. They are not propositions in the same sense as genuine propositions. But, they are rules for the construction of genuine propositions. "... hypothesis is a logical structure."<sup>79</sup> And a proposition which gives support to a hypothesis Wittgenstein calls a symptom. For him, a hypothesis is a rule for deriving symptoms and a symptom provides confirmation for a hypothesis. The third kind of propositions was the mathematical propositions. These propositions cannot be

compared with reality at all. For Wittgenstein, a mathematical proposition neither agrees nor disagrees with the reality.

By 1932-3, Wittgenstein had realized that what he had earlier 1932-1933 taken as genuine propositions and they are verifiable in reference to reality. In the true sense, they are not verifiable and involve no comparison with reality. Therefore, he abandoned the distinction that he made between genuine propositions and hypotheses. According to him, it is nonsense to ask someone, 'how do you know that you have pain?' In this way, his conception of hypothesis is disappeared. "As a result, the relationship between a hypothesis and its 'criteria'. Like was replaced by that between a proposition and its 'criteria'. Like symptoms, criteria are grounds or reasons fixed by grammar, not experience."<sup>80</sup> Therefore, Wittgenstein takes criteria as the grounds that people accept, introduce and use or apply for their use of certain expressions.

Expressive behaviors are the criteria for the third person utterances of inner states. Our language could not describe the inner world, it can only be expressed through our language. Therefore, one could not describe but ascribe an inner state to oneself and also to others on the basis of criteria. Criteria determine the meaning of words or propositions they govern. The connection between the criteria and meaning is established through justification. And the inner is justified by reference to the public manifestations of the inner. The manifestations of inner are the criteria, not inductive evidence for getting the meaning of inner. For Wittgenstein, the inner gets meaning through the outer criteria. As he says, "An inner process stands in need of outward criteria."<sup>81</sup> Therefore, an inner state for example a sensation of 'pain' cannot be legitimately justified without public criteria for identifying it. It is important to point out that by means of considering the general meaning of various linguistic expressions Wittgenstein has shown that there can be no inner states without the public criteria.

Let us take an example of the sensation 'pain' as an inner state. For Wittgenstein, pain behaviour is not just evidence or a symptom of the mental state pain, it is a criterion. Thus, pain behaviour is in a certain way as the sufficient evidence for giving the justification that

someone is in pain or not in pain. In *The Blue Book*, Wittgenstein held the view that "When we learn the use of the phrase 'so-and-so has toothache' we were pointed out certain kinds of behaviour of those who were said to have toothache. As an instance of these kinds of behaviour let us take holding your cheek."<sup>82</sup>

Now the question is, how do we know that one has got toothache when he holds his cheek? One of the possible answers of this question might be that, "I say, he has toothache when he holds his cheek because I hold my cheek when I have toothache."<sup>83</sup> This answer might not be the suitable answer of the above question. Again Wittgenstein says, "But what if we went on asking: - 'And why do you suppose that toothache corresponds to his holding his cheek just because your toothache corresponds to your holding your cheek?' You will be at a loss to answer this question, and find that here we strike rock bottom, that is we have come down to conventions."<sup>84</sup> Here, Wittgenstein tries to point out that all the signs of the sensation 'pain' are not mere symptoms, some are criteria. Otherwise, we would have no basis for the application of the concept 'pain'.

Let us now make clear about the two confusing terms 'criteria' and 'symptoms'. "To the question 'how do you know that so-and-so is the case?' We sometimes answer by giving 'criteria' and sometimes 'symptoms'.<sup>85</sup> In *The Blue Book*, Wittgenstein makes a distinction between 'symptoms' and 'criteria'. Here, he takes symptoms as empirical evidence and criteria is the ground for the truth of a proposition 'p', not in virtue of empirical evidence but of grammatical rules. Therefore, an inflamed throat is a symptom and the presence of the bacillus in the patient's blood is the criterion of angina.

In *P1*, Remarks no. 354 Wittgenstein also draws a similar kind of distinction between criteria and symptoms. As he says, "Experience teaches that there is rain when the barometer falls, but it also teaches that there is rain when we have certain sensations of wet and cold, or such-and-such visual impressions."<sup>86</sup> Here, what Wittgenstein says is that there are different kinds of evidence for rain like 'there is the falling of the barometer' and 'there are also the visual impressions of rain'. And there is an important difference between the two evidences, for the

first is merely symptomatic and the second is criterial. What this suggests is that X is a criterion for Y if and only if X's status as evidence for Y is a matter of convention or definition.

According to Wittgenstein, criteria are the observable features that are directly connected to an expression by its meaning and symptoms are the features or empirical evidences that are indirectly connected to the expression by being associated with the criteria in our experience. Thus, we would like to take the symptoms of an inner concept as natural expressions and criteria as cultural learned expressions.

Let us take an example, 'giving smile indicates happiness' is the natural expression of the mental state 'happiness'. Hence, 'Giving smile' is one of the symptoms of feeling happiness. But that does not mean that when one is smiling he/she is happy. It might be the case that someone is smiling but really he/she is not happy. Similarly, if one looks hungry by the paleness is in his or her face and when asked by someone 'Are you hungry?' answers 'Yes', we might say that 'paleness' is the symptom of hunger; that does not mean that whenever we find paleness in one's face that will be caused by hunger. One's face could look pale because of some other reasons such as, fear or lack of sleep or for any other reasons. Therefore, we will learn the technique of the distinction of the various uses of the expression 'paleness' in different language-games.

Nevertheless for Wittgenstein, the outer criteria of an inner state are the expressions in terms of which the inner states characterized but the particular relation of the inner with the outer might differ from one case to another case. Therefore, the characteristics of each emotional word are different from another. For example, anxiety and sorrow are similar because of the similarities in their grammar not because we feel the same in both cases. If one says his or her experience of anxiety is similar to that of joy rather than sorrow then we would not mean that he/she experiences the emotion differently from us. But, we might say that she or he means the word 'anxiety' differently from us because he/she misunderstood the grammar of the word 'anxiety'.

To understand the grammar of anxiety implies to know how the word 'anxiety' is used in different ways in different language games.

For each language game, there are specific ways of using words in that language game. Let us take two language games like, the language games of 'sadness' and 'eye irritation'. One feels sadness after hearing about one's relative's death, but not after cutting onion. But, eye irritation happens after cutting onion, not after one's relative's death. In both cases, tears might flow one's eyes and thus 'crying' is the common expression within the sets of cutting onion and one's relative's death. In the case of one's relative's death, the expression 'crying' is viewed as the 'behavior of sadness' and in the case of cutting onion, it becomes the 'behavior of eye-irritation'. In this way, a language game provides the context within which a behavior or an expression is connected with the related concept. Therefore, eye irritation is related to cutting of onion and a relative's death is related to the concept of sadness. In terms of language games, we can say a relative's death made me sad and cutting of onion irritates my eyes.

One might accuse Wittgenstein of reducing inner in terms of outer and according to them, Wittgenstein's position is a behavioral position. But, so far as our above discussion is concerned, Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist. He rejects behaviorism and according him, behaviorism reduces the mental to human behavior that it describes as purely in physical terms. Glock in this context wrote, "Wittgenstein's attack on the inner/outer dichotomy is often accused of reducing the inner to the outer, and thereby ignoring the most important aspects of human existence. Ironically, Wittgenstein in turn accuses the inner/outer conception of mistakenly assimilating the mental to the physical. It construes the relationship between mental phenomena and mental terms 'on the model of material object and designation', and thereby turns the mind into a realm of mental entities, states, processes and events, which are just like their physical counterparts, only hidden and more ethereal."<sup>77</sup>

From the above discussion, we found that Wittgenstein does not reject the inner-outer conception of mental phenomena but he criticizes it. His criticism to the dichotomy of 'inner' and 'outer' undermines the traditional approach to the inner-outer problem. He repudiates the possibility of private language on the ground

that there is no publicly observable procedure for the correctness of the private language. Through the repudiation of private language, Wittgenstein attacks the view that the inner is privately knowable. His attack on the notion of 'inner' does not imply that only the outer matters or only the outer realm is knowable. Rather, he claims that if one knows what inner is from his own case then the learning of the meaning of the word 'inner' will be impossible. Therefore, it will be impossible to generalize the meaning of the word 'inner' in the same sense as in the case of other people. However, Wittgenstein does not reduce the inner to the outer. Rather he tries to bring out the true nature of utterances or expressions and the language game we play with the utterances. It implies that we are not just interested in behavior we are also interested in person's account of what lies behind the behavior. As Wittgenstein says "Our criterion for someone's saying something to himself is what he tells us and the rest of his behaviour; and we only say that someone speaks to himself if, in the ordinary sense of the words, he can speak."<sup>78</sup> Therefore, the outer and inner are intrinsically related to each other. From this perspective what one says or does need not be purely external and the sentence like 'he is over the sun' can be taken genuinely describe the state of mind that another one is in.

### Notes and References

1. In the footnote of his book entitled *Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology* page No. 37 Schulte writes, "By a primary expression Wittgenstein means an utterance or a description of an experience (or an account of a dream, for instance) which is essentially based on conceptual connections that have not been learnt."
2. Schulte, Joachim, *Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, P. 37.
3. *Ibid.*, P. 36.
4. Overgaard, Soren, "Rethinking Other Minds: Wittgenstein and Levinas on Expression", *Inquiry*, Vol. 48, 2005, P. 256.
5. Schulte, Joachim, *Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology*, P. 36.



6. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *The Blue and Brown Books*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, P. 1.
7. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigation*, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, Part-I, Remarks No. 560.
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11. Gert, Heather J., "Wittgenstein on Description", *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 88, No. 3, 1997, P. 221.
12. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *P.I.*, Part-I, Remarks No. 109.
13. Pears, David, *The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, Vol.2, Oxford University Press, New York, 1988, Chapter 9.
14. *Ibid.*, P.202.
15. Gert, Heather J., "Wittgenstein on Description", *Philosophical Studies*, P. 221.
16. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *P.I.*, Part- I, Remarks No.24.
17. *Ibid.*, Remarks No.291.
18. *Ibid.*, Part-II, P.200.
19. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Zettel, Remarks No.204.
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