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## WHY MATERIALISM AS A THEORY FAILS ?

RAJAKISHORE NATH

Materialism denotes a group of doctrines concerning the nature of the world, which gives a primary position to matter and accords to mind a secondary status. But extreme materialism asserts that the real world consists of material things and nothings else. We are here concerned with such extreme materialist views. According to the materialists, the world is a clock-work mechanism of bodies, which push each other like cogs-in-the machine. The old materialistic version of materialism holds that men are machines.

Many modern philosophers, especially U.T.Place, J.J.C. Smart and D.M.Armstrong call themselves "materialists" thereby giving the term "materialism" a meaning which differs from its earlier meaning. These philosophers arrive at materialism as a theory of mind because of their scientific conviction that human beings are physical bodies.

Philosophers have differed among themselves over issues such as what constitutes a body, what states and relationships a body may enter, and over whether every material entity is a body. By "materialism" we mean the theory that there is nothing in the world over and above those entities which are postulated by physics. This means everything in the universe, can be explained in terms of matter. At one point materialist holds that nothing exists but only matter. The mind (spirit, consciousness and soul) is matter. However, at another point, it is believed that mind does exist but is caused by material things and is completely dependent upon matter; so mind has no causal efficacy, nor is it necessary to the functioning of the material universe. Thus, materialism attempts to explain a class of phenomena by appeal to physical conditions only.

However, any materialist theory of mind denies the idea that the world includes both mental and material substances. Rather it holds that

every substance is material in nature. Minds are fashioned from the same material from which rocks, trees and stars are made. If we take the fundamental particles that contribute to the make of inanimate objects, and arrange them in the right way, the result would be a creature with a mind. The mind is not a separate, non-material entity; it is only matter, suitably organised. According to this theory, whatever happens in the mind is a result of the events that occur in the body, and the mind is utterly powerless to affect the body in any way. Therefore, materialism denies the independent existence of mind.

## I

The theory of materialism has a long history. Democritus describes the world as a fleeting arrangement of atoms floating in the void. Democritus held that, "nothing exists, but material atoms and the void, and the everything in the world is nothing but the interaction of these atoms as they move through the void."<sup>1</sup> This doctrine embraces the following theses: "Nothing exists but atoms and empty space. Nothing happens by chance everything occurs for a reason and of necessity. This necessity is natural and teleological."<sup>2</sup> Nothing can arise out of nothing; nothing can be destroyed. All changes are new combinations or separations of atoms. The atoms are infinite in number and endlessly varied in form. This is their natural state and this requires no more explanation. All bodies are formed as a result of commotion among the atoms. In consequence, heavy atoms move to the centre, and light ones to the periphery. The vortex continually embraces new atoms which come closer to it in their random motion and it thus begins a world.

Hobbes and La-Mettrie regard mental phenomena as nothing more than mechanical interactions of material components. Hobbes said, "No part of the universe contains no body."<sup>3</sup> For him, the universe is a system of bodies. Whatever change in the universe is the motion of bodies, and nothing can cause a motion, but contact with another moving body. He says that the substance of anything is body. Incorporeal substance is, therefore, a contradiction in terms. Hobbes thereby disposes of angels, the soul and the God of theology. He departs from strict materialism in his introduction of 'conatus' and 'impetus' (which are not physical properties) into his account of the initiation of motion and measurement acceleration.

Nowadays, materialism of one type or another is in vogue. It explains

everything in physicalistic terms. For materialists, mental states such as desire, wish, pain, and so on, are nothing but physical states. For them, only the physical universe exists with all the physical properties. Then the question arises, what are thoughts, feelings, wishes, and the other so-called mental phenomena? Here the most radical answer, supported by very few, would be that such terms have no real meaning at all, and should be dropped from the language.<sup>4</sup>

However, another account of materialism explains that expressions referring to thoughts, feelings, wishes, and the like, do have meaning, but their meanings can be expressed in purely physicalistic terms. Here, one may ask, what are physical terms? The most plausible answer is that physical terms are those that refer to physical behaviour. This behaviouristic version of materialism has had a strong appeal for philosophers over the years. It allows sentences containing mentalistic terms to have meaning and, in contrast with the avowal theory, it allows these to be either true or false in the situations in which they are used by using the concept of disposition to behave. Such dispositional sentences are true even where the person is not, at that moment, behaving in any particular fashion. Yet, by tying meaning to behaviour, the theory allows sentences with mentalistic terms to be testable by observation in an open and public way. We have to determine whether someone has a headache only by seeing if, under suitable conditions, he/she behaves in relevant ways. As we know that J.B. Watson is regarded as the founder of behaviourism. He opines, "a thought is nothing but an incipient movement of the larynx and an emotion is nothing but an internal pattern of bodily adjustment."<sup>5</sup> In the same way B.F. Skinner writes, "I don't believe that there is a world of mentation (i.e., mental happenings) or subjective experiences... thinking is simply behaving and may be analysed as such."<sup>6</sup> It looks as if he thinks that there are no thoughts and believes that there are no beliefs. He says that all feelings, including fearing and wanting, are bodily acts, not mental acts.

Moreover, Ryle says that mental life consists of dispositional behaviour. There are some dispositions which always actualise in one way. For instance, the disposition of smoking always actualises in the act of smoking. But there are many dispositions whose actualisation is not one. They may actualise in diverse ways. Intelligence, for example, is one such disposition which actualises in a variety of intelligent activities. It may take

various activities. All psychological concepts can be explained on the lines of 'intelligence' as given above. They primarily refer to dispositions or tendencies to behave. But there is nothing mysterious or ghostly about dispositions. There is nothing categorical about dispositions. Dispositional statements are always hypothetical. They always involve 'if then'. Again the question is, why affirm causation in the first case, and deny it in the second? Interactionists affirms causation in both cases, parallelists in neither case. Is not the epiphenomenalist stuck up with worst of both the cases?

'Functionalism' may be defined as the theory that explains mental phenomena in terms of the external input and the observable output. It explains the mind as a complicated machine. Functionalism arose as a result of the meteoric rise of interest in computing machines and artificial intelligence. The functionalists say that mental processes are computational processes realized in a machine. The point is that minds bear a relation to their material embodiments analogous to the relation computer programmes bear to the device on which they run. Perhaps every program is 'embodied' in some material device or the other. In the same vein, we might suppose that every mind has some material embodiment, although minds may have very different kinds of material embodiment. In case of human beings, our brains constitute the hardware on which our mental software runs.

According to Churchland,<sup>7</sup> the essential or defining feature of any type of mental state is the set of causal relations it bears to environmental effects on the body, other types of mental state and bodily behaviour. For example, pain characteristically results from bodily damage; it causes distress, annoyance and practical reasoning aimed at relief, and it causes pain blanching, and nursing of the traumatized area.

Functionalists have regarded identity theorists as narrow-minded reductionist philosophers who aim at reducing the mental to the physical. But functionalism is antireductionist. In this way, functionalists reject the identity theory.

Functionalists also reject behaviorism. According to behaviorists, to be in particular state of mind is to respond to stimuli in a particular way. To be in pain is to respond to certain sorts of stimuli in familiar ways or at least to be disposed to respond. Functionalism rejects the very notion of causal stimuli. It interprets mental states as functional states of the human organic

system.

The term 'Physicalism' stands for the doctrine that all meaningful statements can be translated into the language of physicalism which requires only that the events and states, to which they are the dispositions, be identical with physical events and states. Thomas Nagel says,<sup>8</sup> physicalism is the thesis that a person with all his psychological attributes, is nothing over and above his body, with its physical attributes.

T.E. Willkerson<sup>9</sup> opines that, in the physicalist sense of 'person' the proposition "Persons are merely physical organisms" is analytically true. Again, he says that bodily identity is a necessity and is sufficient for [personal identity at the same time. According to Teichman,<sup>10</sup> the word 'physicalism' was coined by Rudolf Carnap as a synonym for 'behaviorism', and was later used by J.J.C. Smart. But post-Carnapian physicalism was propounded by Smart and by Armstrong. Physicalism is also called the Identity theory or the Contingent Identity theory. Smart believes that the sciences of chemistry and physics can encompass everything in the world, and that everything is explicable in terms of physics.

D.M. Armstrong, a materialist, points out that mental states are identical with purely physical states of the central nervous system. If the mind is thought as 'that which has mental states, then we can say that the mind is simply the central nervous system or the mind is simply the brain.' Armstrong says, "Central-state materialism holds that when we are aware of our mental states what we are aware of are mere physical states of our brain. But we are certainly not aware of the mental states as states of the brain."<sup>11</sup> Now the central-state theory explains that, between the stimulus and the response falls physical process in the central nervous system, and nothing else at all. In addition, the central state theory of materialism maintains that the processes involved are the physico-chemical working of the central nervous system. Thus, according to Armstrong, men are material bodies. Then, the question is, what is consciousness, that is the very essence of man? Armstrong says, "Consciousness is a self-scanning mechanism of the central nervous system."<sup>12</sup>

The question here is, what meaning of 'identical' is involved here? Firstly, when we say that this pen is identical with that pen, we mean that the two pens have the same characteristics. Here the term 'identical'

means 'exactly the same.' Secondly, when we say, "A is identical with B", we mean numerical identity. For example, the ancients thought that the 'morning star' was different from the 'evening star' but we now know that they are one, because both refer to the planet Venus. Therefore, the morning star and the evening star are identical; they are one and the same object. The mind-body identity theory says that mental state and physical brain state are numerically identical.

There are several identity theorists. They have explained the identity theory in many different ways. In "Is Consciousness a Brain Processes"? U.T.Place gives scientific explanation of the mind-body identity theory. He suggests that we could identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity. He does not argue that when we describe our dreams, fantasies, and sensations we are talking about processes in the brain. But he is not saying that statements about sensations and mental images are reducible to those about brain processes, in which cognition statements are analyzable into statements about behaviour. Saying that statements about consciousness are statements about brain processes is a false idea. U.T.Place asserts that the statement,<sup>13</sup> "Consciousness is a process in the brain although is not necessarily true is not necessarily false. That consciousness is a process in the brain is, in his view, neither self-contradictory nor self-evident. It is a plausible hypothesis in the way that the statement "Lightening is a motion of electric charges" is a reasonable scientific hypothesis.

Like U.T.Place, J.J.C. Smart also presents the mind-body identity theory in his article "Sensation and the Brain Processes". According to Smart, in saying that sensation is a brain processes or that lightning is an electric discharge, he is using 'Is' in the sense of strict identity. He says, "I say that the successful general is the same person as the small boy who stole the apples, I mean only that the successful General I see before me is a time slice of the same four-dimensional object of which the small boy stealing the apples is an earlier time slice."<sup>14</sup>

J.J.C. Smart says, "By materialism I mean the theory that there is nothing in the world over and above those entities which are postulated by physics."<sup>15</sup> He points out that energy counts as matter for his purposes. In modern physics, energy and matter are not sharply distinguishable. Nor does he hold that materialism implies determinism. If physics is

indeterministic at the micro-level, so must be the materialist's theory. He holds that materialism is compatible with the conception of matter energy. For example, if matter and energy consist of regions of special curvature of an absolute space-time, with "worm holes" and what not, this is still compatible with materialism.<sup>16</sup> We can argue, according to Smart, that in the last resort the world is made up entirely of the ultimate entities of physics.

According to Smart, there are no irreducible laws or properties of biology, any more than there are those in electronics. Given the natural history of a super heterodyne, only a physicalist would be able to explain, using only laws of physics, its modes of behaviour and its properties. Just as electronics provides a physical explanations of the working of super heterodyne, biology lays out physical and chemical explanations of the working of organisms. Thus the biologist requires natural history just as the engineer needs wiring diagrams, but neither of them need non-physical laws. Therefore, Smart denies that, in this world there are non-physical entities and non-physical laws. In particular, he wishes to deny the doctrine of psycho-physical dualism.<sup>17</sup>

However, sometimes theologians argue against materialism by saying that 'you cannot put love in a test-tube.' In a sense, love cannot be put in a test-tube. But we cannot even put gravitational field in a test-tube. Smart replies, "there is nothing incompatible with materials love may elude test-tube, it does not elude materialistic metaphysics. Since it can be analyzed as the for this behaviour."<sup>18</sup> However, a dualist may say that love is an internal state whereas a materialist will perhaps say that is soul state of the soul.

But now the question is, what is an internal state of consciousness? Can we interpret the event of having an after-image or a painful sensation as something material, a brain state or brain process? To say that an image or sense-datum is green is not to say that the consciousness of having the image or sense-datum is green. Apples and unripe bananas can be green, but not the experience of seeing them. An image or a sense-datum can be green in a derivative sense, but that need not cause any worry. It is because, according to Smart, images or sense-data are not the constituents of the world, though the processes of having an image or a sense-datum are actual process in the world. He, therefore, says that the experience of

having a green sense-datum is not itself green, but is a process occurring in grey matter.

It may be objected that, in admitting that apple and unripe bananas can be green, Smart also admitted that colours are emergent properties, not reducible within a physicist scheme of thought. In reply to the above objection, Smart says, "colours are elucidated in terms of the discriminatory reactions of normal percipients, and the notion of a normal colour is defined without recourse to the notion of colour."<sup>19</sup> Therefore, there are no one-to-one relation between colour and wavelength, since on infinite number of different mixtures of wave length correspond to the same colour.

When we are reporting that a lemon is yellow, we are actually reacting to the lemon. But, when we are reporting that the lemon looks yellow, we are reacting to our internal state. But a dualist would report these goings-on as those in an immaterial substance, whereas a materialist would report these as taking place inside our skull.

We can talk about immediate experiences as derivatives from the language that we use to describe physical objects. A stabbing pain is that sort of going-on which is like what goes on when a pin is stuck into us. Here, one can notice, Smart is still denying that we introspect any non-physical property such as an ache. To say that a process is an ache is simply to classify it with other processes that are felt by us. Materialism as a theory has been a realism against the theory that postulates internal states of the mind.

## II

This section sets out to examine the difficulties of the materialistic theory of mind. According to materialism, consciousness, belief, desires, etc., are nothing but physical phenomena. That is to say, all these mental phenomena that can be ascribed to a person are derived from physical phenomena. According to the materialists, mind does not exist independently of a body. Therefore, persons who are mental beings are reduced to material bodies by the materialist.

According to some critics, materialism fails because materialistic theses contradict a large number of theological assertions. In a materialistic theory, there are no necessary beings and no supernatural interventions in the course of nature. For the materialists, claims to the existence of God and the occurrence of miracles are established neither by experience nor

by argument, and may be considered as based on unscientific beliefs. The materialists urge that, in explaining our experience of the world, there is no sufficient reason for deserting the natural for the supernatural. They also argue that there is no reason to believe in the survival of bodily death or in the reincarnation of the human soul.

The materialist doctrine of mind fails to explain the mental phenomena such as sensations. For example, there are sensations like the feeling of pain, and so on. Such sensations are the inner states of the human mind as they occur in the inner life of man. The language of inner states is common and familiar. The inner states are, therefore, our introspection. So the materialists are wrong in denying the inner life of man. The sensations included in the inner life are not bodily states at all. Intentions, desires and motives have physical counterparts. Thus, the materialist approach to mental concepts is not adequate.

Therefore, it can be said that the paranormal phenomena are a serious embarrassment to materialism. It proves that there is something called parapsychology; which is impossible to be explained scientifically. The parapsychological phenomena are real, and cannot be denied. Therefore, it is wrong or spurious to say that there is no mind at all beyond the human body. Hence materialism is false as a doctrine.

Another fact is that materialism explains reality only within the limits of empirical investigation; it cannot look beyond the horizon of material bodies. There are phenomena beyond the human body which need recognition by philosophy. These phenomena are not part of the nervous system, and yet they constitute a part of the psychological make-up of man. Physical events are only a fragment of the total human reality.

Keith Gunderson has recently revived an argument of Descartes to the effect that men are not machines, nor even cybernetic machines, and therefore, are not merely material.<sup>20</sup> A skill of a machine and that of man are to be explained in different ways. That is to say, man is not any kind of a machine. A peculiarity of many mental states is their essential connection with an object. In intending, we may intend something and, in hoping, we must hope for something. The thing intended or the thing hoped for may or may not have any real existence. Thus, intentions and hopes can be real mental states having as an essential part an object with no physical existence.<sup>21</sup> Materialism cannot explain how this is possible. It cannot

explain how mental states can have an object as their referent even if it is unreal. Therefore, materialism cannot be true.

As we have seen, according to Democritus, nothing exists but material atoms and the void and everything in the world is just the interaction of these atoms as they move through the void. On the contrary, according to the mental theory, along with the atoms, there is the spirit, the consciousness, the soul, etc., that can exist without the material body. Therefore, Democritus must be wrong in reducing the entire world to atoms and void.

The most systematic dualistic theory is the one that the French philosopher Descartes has presented. He held that the subject of consciousness is the mind and the mind is a thing or entity, separate and distinct from the body. The body is a thing whose essence is occupying space. However, on the other hand, the mind is completely different in its nature. It is non spatial, and has neither size nor shape. Its essence is simply having consciousness; that is, having thought, feelings, memories, perceptions, desire, etc., and is opposed to the body.

Descartes says that minds and bodies are distinct kinds of 'substance'. The qualities of our conscious experiences appear to be nothing like those of material objects. Indeed they seem to be unlike the qualities of any conceivable material object. The natural conclusion is, therefore, that mental qualities are not qualities of material objects, as they differ in their nature from material qualities. There is also an epistemological distinction between the mind and the body. The knowledge of our own states of mind is directed and unchallengeable in a way that our knowledge of material objects is not.

In the *Second Meditation*, Descartes has given a suitable explanation of the nature of the mind and how it is better known than the body. Descartes says, "Everything what I see is spurious and what my memory tells me is false... I have no senses. Body, extension, movement, etc., are imaginary things."<sup>22</sup> For him, everything may be false except our thinking.

Again, a question may be raised, "Who am I? If I am not a body, and if there is absolutely nothing in the world, no bodies, no sky, then does it follow that I do not exist?" For Descartes, I certainly exist to think of this. If I conceive of myself as being something then I exist. From this we

can conclude that, according to Descartes, "I am, I exist" is necessarily true whenever it is conceived in my mind. However, for him, there are certain things which can only think, that is, they can exist without a body. Here, he goes against materialism and says that this thinking thing is I, that is, our mind as distinct from our body. This mind or intellect is distinct from all material objects in this universe.

In *Sixth Meditation*, Descartes says that "I am a simple thinking thing, and not an extended thing; and on the other hand, I have a distinct idea of the body which is an extended and non-thinking thing. Consequently, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body and can exist without it."<sup>23</sup> He says that there is a great difference between the mind and the body. He says that the mind is public, individual, eternal, etc., but all these qualities are not found in the material body. In this way, Descartes criticises the materialist theory of mind. As Searle<sup>24</sup> rightly pointed out, the essential feature of the mind is intentionality, which is not a material at all. Therefore, Searle argues that materialism has failed to account for the intentional mental phenomena.

E.J.Lowe offers an argument against eliminative materialism. He says, "It mischaracterizes 'folk psychology' in describing it as a would-be scientific theory."<sup>25</sup> Again, he says that when we ascribe beliefs and desires to people and attempt to understand their behaviour in terms of their possession of such mental states, we are not doing anything that is analogous to what scientists do when they explain the movements of massive bodies by reference to the forces acting upon them. The terms 'beliefs' and 'desires' are rational, in which we explain why people act in the ways they do by reference to their putative reason for acting so. Therefore, folk psychology is not a theory of human behaviour. We cannot compare the theory of mind with the theory of matter. What the materialist argues is wrong, and therefore, it fails as a theory of mind.

Behaviourists hold that assertions concerning states of mind can be translated into statements about behaviour or disposition to behave. That is to say, behaviourism tries to give an account of my mind in terms of observed behaviour. But the question is: What is the term 'observed' doing here? The word 'observe' is a mental word; and if we use it in favour of behaviourism, then it would defeat the behaviourist theory of mind. According to behaviourism, the mind is a matter of behaviour, actual or potential. It is a fact about this behaviour that it is readily accessible to

observation. But, it may be argued that certain mental activities are accountable observation. This argument will apply to all other sorts of thinking to oneself, and other forms of mental activity such as forming an intention, feeling an emotion, having a perception or a mental image, and so on. In all these cases, the mind plays a vital role and these are all examples of mental activity. It is wrong to say that they are bodily activities. In another case, for example, if somebody is reading a book and, at the time, thinking about anything else, it is impossible to say whether he is reading or thinking. But our perception may tell us that he is reading. We can never perceive his mental events. We can know the bodily behaviour because it is different from mental acts.

Searle's objections to behaviourism can be divided into two kinds - common sense and more or less technical objections. On the one hand, a common sense objection is that the behaviourist seems to leave out the mental phenomena in question. There is nothing left for the subjective experience of thinking or feeling in the behaviourist account. However, the technical objection is that the behaviourist has never succeeded in completely clarifying the notion of a 'disposition'. None has ever succeeded in providing a satisfactory account of what sorts of antecedents there would have to be in the hypothetical statements to produce an adequate dispositional analysis of mental terms. Another objection to behaviourism is that it leaves out the causal relations between mental states and behaviour. For example, by identifying pain with the disposition to pain behaviour, behaviourism leaves out the fact that pains cause behaviour. Similarly, if we try to analyze beliefs and desires in terms of behaviour, we are no longer able to say that beliefs and desires cause behaviour. According to Searle, "The contradiction of behaviourism lies in the fact that it denies the existence of any inner mental states in addition to external behaviour."<sup>26</sup> For this runs dead counter to our ordinary experience of what it is like to be a man. Searle says that for this reason, behaviourists were sarcastically accused of "feigning anesthesia", and were the target of a number of bad jokes. One can easily imagine an actor of superior abilities, who could perfectly imitate the behaviour of some one in pain, even though the actor in question has no pain; one can also imagine a superpartan who would be able to endure pain without expressing any sign of being in pain.

Behaviourism is sometimes called 'reductionism' because it holds that propositions about mental states and happenings of every kind are

reducible to propositions about publicly observable behaviour. In this view propositions or statements containing such words as 'seeing', 'thinking', 'consciousness,' 'feeling' and 'wishing' are only meaningful if and so far as they can be translated into statements about publicly observable bodily happenings. This is the dogma, which Hare<sup>27</sup> objects to. He says that what behaviourists say is superfluous. Hare says, "If anyone says he cannot understand what I am talking about, I do not know how I can help him. All the same, I do not think he thinks he really needs any help. It seems to me that everyone already knows for himself what it is to be aware of things."<sup>28</sup> Everyone knows that being aware of something is different from any kind of bodily happening. Though it may have all sorts of causal connections within bodily happenings.

Epiphenomenalists hold that mental phenomena are by-products or side-effects of a complex physical system. In addition, they say that there is a one-way causal relation, that is the relation of the body to mind or matter to mental. Nevertheless, the nature of material to mental causal relations is not too clear. We know that many philosophers accept the idea that causal relations exist among events. The epiphenomenalist argument that some material events cause mental events, but mental events cause nothing, is wrong. There would be no harm in allowing that mental events could themselves cause mental events, so that some mental events would events would have a life of their own. However, it is the essence of epiphenomenalism that mental events are by-products of material events.

As Heil<sup>29</sup> argues, we must suppose, then, that mental events, although themselves causally inert are caused by material events. 'Dead-end' causal relations of this sort differ from ordinary causal relation. He says that, in the case of ordinary material causation, events are both effects and causes. Therefore, causal transactions that include mental events appear to be very different from those encountered elsewhere in the universe. It is merely a consequence of the epiphenomenalist's conception of mental events.

Of course, there is no guarantee that the world is a simple plane. As Heil<sup>30</sup> says, we can think of Ockham's Razor not as a principle that tells us how the world is organised, but as one that encourages us to place the burden of proof on proponents of 'less simple' theories. If an alternative to epiphenomenalism avoids 'dead-end' causal relations, then the burden is on the proponent of epiphenomenalism to convince us that epiphenomenalism nevertheless affords a better account of the phenomena.



According to the identity theory, minds are material entities; brains and mental properties are, as a matter of empirical fact, material properties of brains and the nervous system. The identity theorists are not clarifying merely that mental properties are properties of material bodies. One may think on this basis, that mental properties are quite different from non-mental ones. However, the identity theorists argue that every mental property is identical with a physical property. For them, dualism of language does exist in the identity theory, but not dualism of entities.

But the question is : Do we merely have a dualism of language and no other sort of dualism ? Shaffer says, in the case of Venus, it refers to the 'morning star' and the 'evening star'. One star appears in the evening and the same one appears in the morning, which are different appearances. If that object did not have these two distinct aspects, it would not have been a discovery that the morning star and the evening star were indeed one and the same body, and there would be no point in referring to it in different ways.

The difficulty with the identity theory is that, if mental events are to be identical with physical events, then they must fulfill the conditions of co-existence in time and space; the question here are: Do they ? Where do thoughts, feelings and wishes occur ? Do they occur in the brain ? For example, in direct stimulation of an exposed part of the brain during surgery, since only a local anesthetic is necessary, in most of such cases, the patient may well be fully conscious. Then, as the surgeon stimulates different parts of the brain, the patient can report the occurrence of mental events, memories and thoughts. The question here is, do the physical events in the brain and the mental events occur at precisely the same time ? It is not possible to say that they do; so it is proven that physical events are not identical with the mental events. According to Shaffer<sup>31</sup>, it is very difficult to see how the existence of so brief a time-period could be established. And even if it were so, what would it prove? Only that the mental event was not identical with that physical event. It would not prove it was non-identical with any physical events.

Descartes, in his *Second Meditation*, shows that there is a real distinction between the mind and the body. He says that the mind is a thinking, unextended thing, which is distinct from the body. The essence of body is extension, which is opposed to the mental. Therefore, there is no identity between the body in extension, which is opposed to the mental.

Therefore, there is no identity between the body and the mind. John R. Searle offers a 'technical' objection to the identity theory. He says, "It seems unlikely that for every type of mental state there will be one and only one type of neurophysiological state with which it is identical."<sup>32</sup> Again, Searle says that even if my belief that Denver is the capital of Colorado is identical with a state of my pain, it is expected that everyone who believes that Denver is the capital of Colorado must have an identical neurophysiological configuration in his or her brain. If it is true that in all human beings pain is identical with human neurophysiological events, we do not want to exclude the possibility that, in some other species, there might be pains that are identical to some other type of neurophysiological configuration.

A 'technically' more serious objection to the identity theory is derived by Searle from Leibnitz's law. Searle says, "Two events are identical only if they have all of their properties in common. Then it seems that mental states cannot be identical with physical states, because mental states have certain properties that physical states do not have."<sup>33</sup> In reply to this objection, the identity theorists pointed out that the unit of analysis is really the experience of having pain and that experience takes place in the central nervous system.

J.J.C. Smart, in his article, "*Sensations and Brain Processes*", attempts to show that sensations are identical with the brain process. That is to say that sensations are brain process as a matter of scientific fact. Smart does not claim that 'sensation' means, or can be translated as, 'brain process.' Secondly, Smart's use of the word 'is' in his statement 'A sensation is a brain process' is like the use of 'is' in 'The table is brown'. The use of 'is' here is functional and is not an analytic truth. According to Stevenson, when one says that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an electrical discharge, one is using 'is' in the sense of strict identity. However, what does it mean to say that X is strictly identical with Y ? A clear meaning is given to this expression by Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles as formulated in standard logic textbooks:

$$(X=Y)=df (f) (fx=fy)$$

That is to say, X is strictly identical with y if and only if every property of X is a property of Y, and converse.

However, Smart's claim is that 'sensation' is not synonymous with

'brain process'. It is only a case of factual identity and not the identity of meaning.

According to Smart, the morning star is strictly identical with the evening star; they are one and the same thing, namely, the planet Venus. But the 'morning star' does not mean the same as 'evening star' is different from the 'morning star'. The latter connotes several properties, including one which can roughly be expressed as appearing in the morning; whereas the evening star connotes, among other things, appearing in the evening. However, we can notice that the morning star has precisely the same properties as the evening star; the morning star not only appears in the morning, but also appears in the evening; and the evening star not only appears in the evening, but also appears in the morning. If the morning star is strictly identical with the evening star, this implies that the evening star has all the properties of the morning star, including the defining properties for the 'morning star'. Therefore Stevenson concludes that Smart's argument has no advantage over one ordinary form of dualism.<sup>34</sup>

Now we will examine the reasons for believing that physicalism cannot be true. Thomas Nagel says, "I mean by physicalism the thesis that a person, with all his psychological attributes, is nothing over and above his body, with all its physical attributes."<sup>35</sup> There are various theories and their claims may be classified according to their identities, which they allege between the mental, and the physical.

It is not clear whether every physicalist theory must assert the identity of each person with his body, nor is the connection between this identity and that of psychological with physical states easy to describe. Nagel says that physicalism violates Leibnitz's law, which requires that, if two things are identical, they have all their non-intentional and non-modal properties in common. It may be objected that sensory impressions, pains, thoughts, and so on, have various properties which brain states lack, and vice versa. He says that a person is identical with physical bodies as mentioned by physicalism. But this is not so because a person has some accidental attributes like the body. The most important objection to physicalism has to do with location. Brain process is located in the brain, but a pain may be located in the chin, and a thought has no location at all. The location of physical events is different from the location of mental events.

There is also a philosophical view that physicalism is impossible. According to Nagel, it expresses itself crudely as the feeling that there is a fundamental distinction between the subjective and the objective, which cannot be bridged. He says, the feeling is that I cannot be a mere physical object, because I possess my mental states; I am their subject in a way in which no physical object can possibly be the subject of its attributes. I have a type of internality which physical things lack; so in addition to the connection, which all my mental states do admittedly have with my body, they are also mine. That is, they have a particular self as their subject, rather than merely being attributes of an object.<sup>36</sup> Since any mental state must have a self as subject, it cannot be identical with a mere attribute of some object such as a body, and the self, which is its subject, cannot, therefore, be a body.

According to functionalism, the system of the robot-plus-109 unit brain could instantiate a relevant functional organization and would be the subject of mental states. However, it is urged that the complex states that play the functional roles of pain, pleasure and sensations of color would not have intrinsic qualia as ours, and would be a foil to genuine mental states. Therefore, functionalism seems to be, at best, an incomplete account of the nature of mental states.

But the central idea of functionalism is that the mental phenomena are defined in terms of the external input and the observable output. It admits a network of interrelated mental states and processes which constitute the natural history of the mind. Again, they say that mental states and processes are functional kinds. Earlier, we saw that functionalism developed with the advent of computing machines. Think of minds as devices running software on complex chunks of hardware in the case of human beings. But Ned Block attacks functionalism from another direction, arguing that any functional definition of mental states will be either too liberal or too partial. Functionalists argue that man is a machine and it performs like a machine. Nowadays the computers and robots are doing the same work that man does.

Ned Block argues the functionalism is too wide because, in mental states and process it included arrangements of matter, which no one would describe as mental. In support of this, he has invented a thought experiment,

which is supposed to prove that functionalism will classify mind with logically possible entities, which we know, are no minds. John R. Searle has given a common-sense and technical objection to functionalism. According to him,<sup>37</sup> the common-sense objection is that the functionalist seems to leave out the qualitative subjective feels of at least some of our mental states. And the technical objection of functionalism is that functionalism so defined fails to state in material terms what constitute mental phenomena.

Therefore, materialism fails as a theory mind because mind is more than an assemblage of atoms. If we understand human beings properly, we cannot do without the concepts of perception, belief, intelligence, action, decision, choice, motive, etc. We also need to look into the aspects of consciousness and self-consciousness is the essence of man. A human mind is basically a self-conscious being. It is not the material constituents that make a person. It is mind that identifies human being but not matter.

## NOTES

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