CHUNG-YING CHENG: CREATIVITY, ONTO-GENERATIVE HERMENEUTICS, AND THE YIJING

Abstract

The hermeneutical dimensions of Chinese philosophy from the Changes of Zhou (the Zhouyi《周易》) through its Confucian, Daoist, and contemporary developments have been a creative inspirational source and guiding intellectual thread in the thought of Chung-ying Cheng. Cheng’s extensive engagement with the Classic of Changes (the Yijing易經), its role in the formation of the Chinese philosophical tradition and its comparative interconnections with occidental philosophies, has disclosed its deep hermeneutical orientation. The Yijing encompasses processes of empirical observation, empathetic feeling, and self-reflection in the generation of “images,” or prototypical models that are “form-objects” or “process-events,” which performatively enact a comprehensive ontological and situationally appropriate understanding of nature, society, and one self. I examine three issues in outline arising from Cheng’s works in this situation: (1) to what extent Chinese philosophy is hermeneutical with respect to (2) modern European understandings of hermeneutics, and (3) the possibility of the distinctive “onto-generative hermeneutics” that has been articulated for over forty years in the context of Chinese and Western thought in Cheng’s prolific works concerning the Yijing.

I. Introduction

The hermeneutical and interpretive dimensions of Chinese philosophical discourses from their roots in the Changes of Zhou (the Zhouyi周易) through its classical Confucian (rujia儒), Daoist (daojia道家), Neo-Confucian (xin rujia新儒家) and modern Confucian (xian dai xin rujia現代新儒家) developments have been a creative inspirational
source and guiding intellectual thread in the extensive and comprehensive oeuvre of Chung-ying Cheng who stressed the degree to which “Chinese philosophy is strongly hermeneutical from the very beginning.”

Cheng has been at the forefront of bringing Chinese philosophy to the West through his founding and organizational activities with the Journal of Chinese Philosophy and the International Society for Chinese Philosophy and through his philosophical works that demonstrate its philosophical character and intercultural possibilities. Cheng’s intellectual and personal journey with the Classic of Changes (the Yiijing) in particular, and its formative role in the formation of the Chinese philosophical tradition and its comparative interconnections with strategies of thinking evident in Western philosophies, has disclosed the deep hermeneutical orientation of Chinese discourses. As Yang Chengyin (杨成寅) noted, Chung-ying Cheng’s has interpreted the Yiijing, which is primarily a philosophy of change (yi易) and the timeliness or temporal appropriateness of moments (shi时), as the principal orientating point of Chinese philosophy and how the generative-temporal modes of thinking stemming from the Yiijing allow for a new intercultural articulation of philosophy in the context of the spacing between Western and Chinese conceptions of the philosophical domain.

The Yiijing cannot be appropriately interpreted if it is construed only as a written text. Nor is it adequately interpreted if it is only seen as a work concerning divination. It encompasses—in its historical and philosophical development—much more than this: it functions as an interpretive and reflective practice and art that allows us to encounter the changing world; that is, it indicates a hermeneutical encounter with the happening of the world that is distinct from Western accounts of “hermeneutics” as the art (that is, form of practice) and theory of interpretation.

The Yiijing as an interpretive practice encompasses and integrates processes of empirical observation, empathetic feeling, and self-reflection in the dialectical generation of concrete indicative “images” (xiang象). Images are necessary to the interpretive practice of the Yiijing. They do not operate as mere abstract symbols. Imaging inspired by the traces of heaven, earth, and humanity form prototypical models that are “form-objects” or “process-events.” These image-situations allow interpreters to performatively enact a comprehensive ontological and situationally appropriate understanding of nature, society, and the self through the art and practice of the Yiijing.

Despite significant affinities with Western understandings of hermeneutical philosophy, the onto-generative interpretive practices implicit in the Yiijing and its philosophical interpretations cannot be
limited to confirming or illustrating these Western approaches. It makes available, as Cheng’s works have demonstrated, a significant alternative and correction to Western approaches to understanding and interpretation and a rich way of modeling the multifaceted and dynamic temporally formed relations between self and world.

I will approach in this paper in outline three issues arising from Cheng’s philosophical project concerning the *Yijing* and its philosophical reception: (1) in what senses and to what extent Chinese philosophy can be depicted as hermeneutical with respect to (2) modern occidental understandings of hermeneutics from Schleiermacher and Dilthey to Heidegger and Gadamer, and (3) the possibility and scope of the distinctive “onto-generative hermeneutics” that has been articulated for over forty years in the context of Chinese and Western philosophies in the extensive and comprehensive oeuvre of Chung-ying Cheng.

II. THE ONTO-GENERATIVE HERMENEUTICS OF BENTI 本體

“Hermeneutics” stems from the Greek word ἑρμηνεύω and is commonly thought to be associated with Hermes as the messenger of the gods, translating and mediating between the divine and human realms. It refers in the modern Western milieu to the art of interpretation in general and its methodological, theoretical, and philosophical elaboration. There is, as Cheng notes, no hermeneutics in the narrow sense of a strict discipline or autonomous definitive interpretive methodology in Chinese intellectual history. Philosophical hermeneutics in Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur has challenged such a limited conception of hermeneutics. As Cheng notes, there are in the Chinese context arts of interpretive practice and a preeminently “philosophical hermeneutics” in understanding the interpretive character of reality. According to Cheng, both aspects of hermeneutics are apparent in the creativity expressed in the reception, adaptation, and employment of the *Yijing* in Chinese intellectual and philosophical discourses.

A basic tendency of Chinese styles of thinking—in their beginnings in the sources of the *Zhouyi*—does not presuppose a bifurcated division between reality and appearance, the transcendent and the immanent, or “the word” and mere words. Instead, it holds that reality simply consists, in Cheng’s words, in “the incessant and constant change of all things.” Chinese thought does not abstract one fixed image and reify it as a form separated from the dynamic dialectical logic of the plural relations of particulars for which the *Yijing* presents multiple interpretive models. In the singular-plural indicative hermeneutics of the *Yijing*, one finds—at least sixty four and infinitely more models—indicative models that present variations on the interactive
onto-generative character of reality. What does onto-generative mean? As will be further elucidated throughout this contribution, Cheng’s key expression “onto-generativity” refers to the shengsheng buxi 生生不息 (ceaseless generation) of benti 本體 (the root-body).

Onto-generative hermeneutics, as Cheng designates the implicit logic of the Yijing and the Chinese philosophical traditions that emerged from and explicated it, is a fundamentally temporal one. Cheng maintains in this situation that the general difference between Western and Chinese philosophical discourses reveals two distinctive experiences of temporality in which one sets being and the ideal against time and the other perceives their temporally changing mutual interdependence: “In separating reality from appearance … the ancient Greeks sought the immutable and unmoved as the essence of the real and the objective. In contrast, to speak schematically, the ancient Chinese from the beginning recognized and accepted change and transformation as irreducible attributes of the world.”

Whereas Greek thought pursued the unmoved mover unaffected by all other things, the forms of things and a thinking that only thinks itself, the source is perceived as spontaneous and receptive mobility itself in the thinking stemming from the Zhouyi.

In works such as Yixue Benti Lun 易學本體論, which could well be translated into English as “Generative Ontology in the Philosophy of Change,” Cheng employed the expression “onto-generativity” to refer to and explicate dynamic correlational structural concepts such as benti 本體 (root-body) and yinyang 阴阳. Conceptual constellations such as benti and yinyang indicate both the “origination and embodiment of being and becoming.” Benti is not so much to be conceived as an essence or substance in a static or disembodied sense. It is the continuous, integrative process occurring through things and in their onto-hermeneutic interpretation.

The generative ontology of benti lun 本體論 in Chinese philosophical discourse points toward the concrete, dynamic, interconnected, and transformative embodiment of the person amidst things. It offers consequently an alternative—once it enters into a relation with Western discourses—to the Heideggerian notion of “ontology” as the doctrine of beings and the notion of an ontic/ontological difference as it is articulated in the idea of a monolithic tradition of Western philosophy from its classical Greek origins through Western modernity.

III. THE HERMENEUTICAL AND THE ONTO-GENERATIVE CIRCLE

Chinese and Western hermeneutics are not the same because a different kind of circle is involved than either the hermeneutical circle
central to the typical European philosophical understanding of hermeneutics or the speculative circle operative in Hegel’s dialectical system. This movement is explicated in Cheng’s earlier works on the basis of the *Yijing* and its Chinese philosophical reception as an infinitely variable and generative onto-hermeneutical circling.¹³

According to Cheng’s account, onto-hermeneutical circling is used: “in the sense of building the network of meaning by relating various experiences and ideas and indicates the dynamic integral movement between experience and the image, on the one hand, and reflection and the idea, on the other hand.”¹⁴ Such processes are infinitely expansive and relationally encompass objective structures of being with subjective experiences of sense and signification.¹⁵

Cheng further developed this approach in subsequent works as onto-generative interpretation to emphasize both its ontological and cosmological dimensions.¹⁶ Onto-hermeneutics is, tracing and responding to the transformations of things, “the fundamental way of thinking in Neo-Confucian philosophy.”¹⁷ By retrieving Chinese traditions of interpretation, Cheng can depart from the over-prioritization of subjective and intersubjective meaning that is characteristic of modern Western hermeneutics.

The formative hermeneutical movement is fundamentally a creative one in relation to the ceaseless repetition of things in returning to and transformationally reiterating and deepening what has come before. With reference to Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 *Reflections on Things Close at Hand (Jinsi Lu 近思錄)*, Cheng elucidates the creative generativity of the hermeneutical movement suggested in the thinking associated with the *Yijing*: “As human experiences always are open and fresh for an individual, and as hermeneutical circling is an indefinitely refreshing and creative process for any thinking mind, the right way to achieve philosophical understanding is to continually cultivate oneself and do so not only on a daily basis but in reference to the commonest affairs of daily life.”¹⁸

Cheng has described in a variety of ways in his works how: “Neo-Confucianism became methodological and metaphysical as a result of thinking by way of and on the basis of the *Yijing*. Of course, the relation between Neo-Confucianism and the philosophy of the *Yijing* again is onto-hermeneutical; that is, the *Yijing* became a methodology and a metaphysics because of the Neo-Confucianists’ responses to it…”.¹⁹ Cheng has articulated a unique intercultural hermeneutics drawing on and creatively appropriating Chinese and non-Chinese sources. In pursuing this comprehensive interpretive strategy in his writings on the *Yijing*, Cheng clarifies the relationship between the *Yijing* as an inspirational source and its ensuing, in particular Neo-Confucian, philosophical interpreters.
One case study of the key relationship between the *Yijing* and Song-Ming Confucianism (*Song Ming lixue* 宋明理學) is developed in Cheng’s analysis of the Neo-Confucian discourse of patterning principle (*li* 理) and dynamic vital energy (*qi* 氣). Neo-Confucian discourse draws on the *Yijing* while giving it a specific limited interpretation that itself—pace Cheng—can be critiqued from the more dynamic perspective of the *Yijing*. The *Yijing* not only operates as a historical source and inspiration for Chinese philosophical discourses in Cheng’s renewed philosophy of *yi*, it offers a way of assessing their scope and limits with respect to the formative “onto-generativity” of nature that is specified in concepts such as the movement of ceaseless generativity (*shengsheng buxi*), return and renewal (*fu* 復), and reversal, opposition, and return (*fan* 返).

**IV. The Onto-Generative Image**

聖人有以見天下之賾, 而擬諸其形容, 象其物宜, 是故謂之象。聖人有以見天下之動, 而觀其會通, 以行其典禮。繫辭焉, 以斷其吉凶, 是故謂之爻。言天下之至賾, 而不可惡也。言天下之至動, 而不可亂也。擬之而後言, 議之而後動, 擬議以成其變化。「鳴鶴在陰, 其子和之, 我有好爵, 吾與爾靡之。」

Interpretive understanding oscillates between experiencing and the experienced, the personal encounter with the world and the objective disclosure of the world, and the overlapping interpretive circling of understanding and ontological circling of disclosure.

To consider one example, one manifestation of hermeneutic circling is the onto-generative image found in *Xici* 系辭 I: 8 and related passages. The ancient sages, it is said, “were able to survey all phenomena under heaven and, considering their forms and appearances, creatively and concretely imagined and indicated (*xiang* 象) things and their appropriate attributes. These were accordingly called images or ‘forms’ (*xiang*).” The word *xiang* here can mean: image, symbol, figure, or a pictorial configuration of meaning. To form and generate “forms” is, in Cheng’s analysis, the creative, generative, and originating (*qian*). The commencing beginnings of the *Yijing* in *qian* and *kun* 坤 signify the fundamental relational dynamic of creativity and receptivity for its entire structured-structuring unfolding in relation to the occurrences of the world that require observation, reflection, and interpretive understanding.

The word *xing* 形 appearing in *Xici* 系辭 I: 8 is frequently rendered as “appearance” in English. *Xing* can signify appearance, shape, form, figure, or body. In this context, *xing* can be interpreted not merely as a becoming visible, or the semblance of the real, as an idol or shadow of
reality, but as the material manifestation that is the interpretive encounter with reality itself. Cheng commented in clarification how the reflective empirical investigation of things, which embodies a “concrete rationality” or a logic of embodied universals, stems from the *Zhouyi*.

The observational-empirical and hermeneutical-interpretive dimensions of the *Yijing* is evident in statements recommending empirically encountering the world by looking above to observe heaven, looking below to observe the earth, and witnessing all things.

The empirically and reflectively generated images of the *Yijing* situate both self-examination and a reflective observation of the natural world through perception, relational and responsive feeling, and situated mindfulness. The empirical ontic tendencies present in Chinese thinking were stimulated by and in turn informed observation of and research into astronomical, geographical, and meteorological phenomena, among others. That is to say, the onto-hermeneutical oscillation or circling movement described by Cheng occurs through natural worldly phenomena and the reflective or interpretive image that is more indicative than symbolizing. This vibrant motility can be obscured in the language of isolating or atomistic abstract ideas and symbols, as Chinese thought has promoted the preeminence of the good and the practical (ethics) over indifferent and neutral ontological knowledge and theory.

In light of Cheng’s hermeneutical articulation of the onto-generative circle, a situating articulation of the whole as whole is generated through the particularity of phenomena and a situated grasp of the phenomenon as phenomenon occurs through understanding the whole in its dynamic interconnected processes. Moreover, the interpretive philosophy of the *Yijing* has a significant phenomenological dimension in the practice of: (i) comprehensive observation (*guan* 观); (ii) objective reference (*wu* 物); and (iii) perception, reflection, and memory (*gan* 感).

The *Yijing*’s indicative orienting images play a crucial role in these processes. They are dynamically and relationally interpreted in the enactment of the *Yijing*, and serve as points of inspiration and orientation of the self who attentively observes (*guan* 观) itself and the circumstances and conditions in which it participates from the dimension of the local and the ordinary to that of the universe and the ultimate (*taiji*) as a dynamically generative structuring-differentiating whole.

V. The Chinese and Western Beginnings of Philosophy

One should note here once again the variance between the visible as an arena for a detached and independent observer, who seeks to
neutrally contemplate and reconstruct a pregiven reality in art or in ideas, and the visible as an interactive dynamic field of forces for an involved and moved participant in the flow of the generative or embodied constitutive forces of reality.

The qualitative experientially rooted participant perspective with its capacities for creative renewal becomes evident in Chinese thinking. Just as Chinese philosophy or art can exist in its otherness from Greek philosophy or art, in a resonance and tension of non-identity without either coercive assimilation or exclusion, Chinese philosophy can be—to think through and beyond Martin Heidegger’s conception of the history of Western philosophy as the history of being (Seinsgeschichte)—an “other beginning” (der andere Anfang) in confrontation with its “first” Greek beginning (der erste Anfang). As the recently published Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte) disclose, Heidegger primarily understood this other beginning nationally as a uniquely German one in contrast with Cheng’s corrective and reorienting argumentation that challenges and oversteps the boundaries of Heidegger’s hermeneutics.

One model of a Chinese image of beginning occurs in the “Appended Statements” (Xici) I: 11. The text expresses how the supreme ultimate (太極 taiji) in the beginning of the universe is both the original element and matter. The Yiijing arises with taiji and it is taiji that generates heaven and earth or yin and yang; these generate the four forms or images that in turn generate the eight trigrams (“易有太極，是生兩儀，兩儀生四象，四象生八卦”). Cheng has depicted how taiji is benti: “the firm and the soft are that which establishes the root of things. Hence, when we speak of the benti we mean this ultimate source of reality, or the Great Ultimate.”

The cosmos appears through the mediating process of dialectical images that generatively return the embodied participatory interpreter or observer to taiji, the whole, through things or phenomena themselves in their own dynamic benti. Such an understanding of human sensibility, feeling, and creative responsiveness has significant consequences for practical life, including how humans interact with their environment and ecological sustainability.

In the formation of the relation between the “Greek” and the “other” beginning—which when articulated by Heidegger means first and foremost the Germanic repetition and renewal of the Greek origin—there is an opening formative-generative space for both boundless reversal and creative and imaginative transversal as Cheng’s philosophy reveals in contrast with Heidegger’s Greek-German axis. Oriented by the guiding creative thread of the correlational transformational thinking suggested by the reflective practice of the Yiijing, there cannot be an unconditioned and static difference between philosophy and non-philosophy or between Western and Chinese
thinking. The encounters between them are not the futural event to be merely prepared for or anticipated; such intercultural encounters have long been underway (such as, for instance, in the Chinese encounter with and Neo-Confucian response to Buddhism) and continue to be ongoing as Cheng’s own prolific authorship powerfully illustrates.

VI. Conclusion

The words, images, and interpretive strategies of the *Yijing* are not calculative and self-interested, which are features of divination highlighted by its detractors, as their logic and import are onto-cosmological, aesthetic, and ethical. The *Yijing* demands that its practitioners practice self-reflection and interpretation in relation to their natural, social, and individual worlds. In the constant change and infinite variety of the world, it indicates its dynamic harmony (*he 和*) and the individual’s interpretive co-agency in this balancing and rebalancing of the world.34

Cheng’s systematic elucidation of the continuing philosophical and reflective significance of the *Yijing* is a vital contribution to contemporary intercultural philosophy. The *Yijing* has long been identified with learning from nature in its changes. The legendary sovereign Fu Xi 伏羲 is said to have drawn the eight trigrams based on observing heaven and earth. What is encountered through the use of the *Yijing* is the cosmos employing models and patterns—observationally adopted from nature—for encountering and responding to changing conditions and circumstances. The *Yijing* is not an abstract theory about the cosmos and nature as an objective external theoretical object. As Cheng’s works have illustrated, it is performatively enacted in and with nature, as its interpreters are called to interpret, recognize, and appropriately respond to the seasonality and temporality of things, others, and the self from out of the particular configuration of their own conditions and circumstances. This receptivity and responsiveness to the contextual whole of life, which has its own distinctive causality, is not only conceptual but affective, drawing on the whole individual in the particularity of her or his life.35

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ENDNOTES

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5. For instance, “《易》者，象也；象也者，像也。” *Xici (系辭)* II: 3. The dialectical character of the image indicates the inappropriateness of Hegel’s judgment about the *Yijing*, and the Chinese language, as imagistic and non-conceptual. Concerning Hegel’s interpretation of the *Yijing*, see Eric S. Nelson, “The *Yijing* and Philosophy: From Leibniz to Derrida,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 38, no. 3 (2011): 377–96.


15. Ibid., 49.

16. For example, see Cheng, “The *Yijing*: The Creative Origin of Chinese Philosophy.”


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 50.


34. Cheng argues that Chinese conceptions of harmony are more complex and mediated than the common portrayal contends. On the dynamic dialectical role of harmony in