



CHAPTER 12

Dilthey and Carnap: The Feeling of Life, the Scientific Worldview, and the Elimination of Metaphysics

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INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will propose a reinterpretation of the early Vienna Circle’s project of radical empiricism by reconsidering it in light of its under-appreciated Continental sources. After briefly discussing recent challenges to the standard view of logical positivism, such as its social-political context in “Red Vienna,” I examine the impact of “life-philosophical” thinkers such as Nietzsche and—in particular—Dilthey on the thought of Rudolf Carnap. Dilthey’s modernistic advocacy for empirical scientific inquiry and his far-reaching critique of metaphysics as reflecting a conceptually unjustifiable and indemonstrable perspective expressing a “feeling of life” and interpretively (affectively, pragmatically) articulated in a “worldview” was embraced, via Dilthey’s student and Carnap’s teacher Herman Nohl (1879–1960), in Carnap’s pre-physicalist writings of the 1920s and the Vienna Circle’s 1929 manifesto. Such

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20 works announced the task of overcoming metaphysics and defending the
21 scientific life-stance (*Lebenshaltung*) against its authoritarian, metaphysi-
22 cal, and religious detractors.

23 The argument developed here concerns the philosophical and
24 social-political nexus of life, science, and metaphysics in Dilthey and
25 Carnap. Popularized or “vulgar” expressions of what came to be called
26 *Lebensphilosophie* often served a reactionary role in Germanic culture in
27 conservative cultural critics such as Ludwig Klages and Oswald Spengler.
28 Nonetheless, concepts such as the feeling of life, life as expression and
29 art, worldview, and life-stance were critically deployed against traditional
30 authorities, beliefs, and institutions in order to prioritize lived and scienti-
31 fically comprehended experience (*Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung*) and a more
32 critical and experimental scientific and artistic spirit.¹ Dilthey has been
33 inaccurately connected at times with the “irrational” traditionalist and
34 idealistic response against modernity and the Enlightenment. His works
35 reveal a moderate liberal or progressive positivist dimension—one criti-
36 cized by Heidegger and Gadamer²—and a proponent of the sciences,
37 liberal modernity, and their enlightening pedagogical significance for
38 practical life.

39 Carnap assimilated argumentative strategies, primarily through indi-
40 rect influences such as Nohl, from Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics as a
41 discourse lacking cognitive validity, and combined positivist, logicist, and
42 “life-philosophical” argumentative strategies to demonstrate its cogni-
43 tive and conceptual senselessness. Carnap’s positive references to Dilthey
44 and his under-appreciated sensitivity to a logic of the singular and the
45 cultural during the 1920s shed a different light on his positivist project.
46 These interpretive elements indicate that Carnap’s early thinking can be
47 construed as a logical empiricist hermeneutics dedicated to interpret-
48 ing meaning. Rather than constituting a simplistic and one-dimensional
49 reductionism, a caricature presented by his critics, Carnap’s positivist
50 project belongs to the larger task of the pragmatic formation, cultivation,
51 and education (*Bildung*) that furthers life by clarifying and elucidating
52 it. In the conclusion, Carnap’s ultimately more restrictive logical posi-
53 tivism is contrasted with Dilthey’s unrestricted hermeneutical empiricism
54 (“*unbefangene Empirie*”) that embraces the empirical while rejecting
55 doctrinal empiricism (“*Empirie, nicht Empirismus*”).³



THE VIENNA CIRCLE'S PLURALISTIC CONTEXTS

56

57 “Positivism” signifies a shifting, diverse, and contested collection of
58 philosophical and scientific tendencies typically concerned with the
59 advancement of scientific inquiry and making philosophy scientific. This
60 diversity of orientations, contexts, and arguments also applies to the
61 logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. Its members and associates were
62 more widely informed by and engaged in the context of early twentieth-
63 century European thought than is characteristically acknowledged in
64 their Anglo-American and analytic reception that tends to bracket this
65 context as merely cultural and social-historical rather than of philosophi-
66 cal concern.⁴

67 An early example of the acultural, ahistorical, and depoliticized recep-
68 tion is found in the work of A.J. Ayer, which the history of early ana-
69 lytical philosophy is increasingly problematizing by providing a more
70 nuanced and complex picture. After studying with the circle in Vienna,
71 Ayer imported the Vienna Circle’s radical critique of metaphysics in
72 *Language, Truth, and Logic* without the pedagogical-vocational and
73 social-political orientation with which it had been earlier associated.⁵ The
74 standard dominant account of the Vienna Circle in the last century inter-
75 prets it as primarily pursuing a synthesis of Austro-British empiricism and
76 the new formal logic while (properly or improperly) ignoring issues of
77 culture, history, and politics as well as engagement with other varieties of
78 philosophical discourse.

79 This narrative was already normative in “continental philosophy”—
80 whose major figures from Heidegger to Gadamer and Habermas were
81 hostile to empiricism—and it became the dominant one within “analytic
82 philosophy” due to the influence of Kuhn and the inspiration of the later
83 Wittgenstein and Quine. Yet this decontextualized history, with which
84 many philosophy of science courses continue to begin, is problematic.
85 The Vienna Circle’s logical positivism developed in a context dominated
86 by the waning of neo-Kantianism and the emergence of new philosophi-
87 cal movements from Husserl’s phenomenology to the critical theory
88 of the Frankfurt School. Scholars of early analytic philosophy, such as
89 Michael Friedman, Gottfried Gabriel, and Thomas Uebel, have pursued
90 this contextualization further by reconsidering the sources, writings, and
91 import of the Vienna Circle, revealing how the differences within the
92 Circle and the philosophical and social contexts of these figures are more
93 multifaceted.



94 The standard view did not develop in Vienna but retrospectively in
95 the UK and USA of the early Cold War period. After the rise of National
96 Socialism, the murder of Schlick, and exile, Carnap and others found
97 themselves in American exile. Under the scrutiny of the FBI and anti-
98 communist intellectuals such as the prominent pragmatist Sidney Hook,
99 they were compelled to de-emphasize the cultural, pedagogical, and
100 political aspects that crucially defined their earlier project.⁶ Multiple
101 figures associated with the Vienna Circle (including Carnap, Herbert
102 Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, and Edgar Zilsel) were
103 involved in or supported democratic socialist political and pedagogical
104 activities. Even its politically more moderate “right-wing” (Moritz
105 Schlick, Friedrich Waismann) was more cautious yet still politically pro-
106 gressive in its orientation.⁷ These social-political interests, and the soli-
107 darity they perceived with progressive cultural movements in modernistic
108 atonal music, Bauhaus architecture, and *die neue Sachlichkeit*, are deci-
109 sive elements not only to understanding the context and culture of the
110 Vienna Circle but its philosophical program and especially its polemical
111 character.⁸

112 More surprisingly, and the issue that will be at stake in this chapter,
113 is the appearance of unexpected formative figures in the early history of
114 the Vienna Circle such as Nietzsche, Husserl, Hans Driesch, and Dilthey.
115 The “life-philosophers” Dilthey and Nietzsche are unexpected sources
116 for the early Vienna Circle insofar as they were associated by scientific
117 and leftist detractors with the separation of the human and natural sci-
118 ences (Dilthey), the prioritizing of the aesthetic and the psychological,
119 and an irrational and perhaps vitalistic *Lebensphilosophie*. This historical
120 association is no doubt mysterious as long as their thought is errone-
121 ously reduced to an anti-Enlightenment “life-philosophy” that the early
122 Vienna Circle opposed. It is not as unexpected if we consider how both
123 figures advocated broadening and intensifying scientific inquiry and
124 engaged in their own extended critiques of metaphysics and religion.
125 Nietzsche and Dilthey criticized traditional and contemporary metaphys-
126 ics for its reification and forgetting of lived experience, and articulated
127 a hermeneutical experimentalism or empiricism in determining scientific
128 inquiry’s interpretive character.

129 Nietzsche is the one “metaphysician” who Carnap is willing to
130 praise as nearest to science and art without metaphysics. Philipp Frank
131 maintained that Nietzsche and Mach shared the same spirit of radi-
132 cal Enlightenment and were the joint point of departure for genuinely



133 (i.e. radically anti-metaphysical) positivistic thought.⁹ Dilthey appears less
 134 openly as an implicit source for a number of Carnap's terms and argu-
 135 mentative strategies.¹⁰ There are, nonetheless, passages that evoke in par-
 136 ticular Dilthey's thought in Carnap's *The Logical Formation of the World*
 137 (*Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, 1928), his critique of metaphysics and
 138 Heidegger in "Eliminating Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of
 139 Language" ("Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der
 140 Sprache," 1931), and—the less appreciated yet significant text for draw-
 141 ing out this critique's implications—"Theoretical Questions and Practical
 142 Decisions" ("Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen,"
 143 1933–1934).¹¹

144 Dilthey's critical hermeneutics of historical life is significant for the
 145 Vienna Circle's development, since Carnap and others did not exclu-
 146 sively articulate an internal account of logic and the sciences, as it
 147 might appear retrospectively. As the complete name adopted in the
 148 1929 manifesto "Vienna Circle of the Scientific World-Conception"
 149 (*Weltauffassung*) indicates, Neurath, Hahn, and Carnap promoted the
 150 broader cultural and educational legitimation of the scientific worldview
 151 (*Weltanschauung*) or, as Carnap and Neurath designated it to distinguish
 152 it from the popularized vulgar notion of worldview, "world-conception"
 153 (*Weltauffassung*).¹² The character of this scientific world-conception was
 154 itself a matter of dispute, since it could mean either the extra- or non-
 155 scientific defense of science in practical life (Carnap in the 1920s) or the
 156 expression of the unity of science as a system (Neurath and later logical
 157 positivism).¹³

158 In particular, the Circle's "left-wing" presented the Circle's activities
 159 as a living exemplar of a more cooperative (socialistic), open, and rational
 160 approach to the world, just as they interpreted themselves as being in
 161 solidarity with the progressive, artistic, educational, and social-political
 162 movements of the time as noted in the first preface to Carnap's *Aufbau*
 163 and the Vienna Circle's manifesto.¹⁴ In the life-philosophical and affirm-
 164 ative conclusion to the program of the *Verein Ernst Mach*, published in
 165 1929 by Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath, and dedicated to Schlick in honor
 166 of his remaining in Vienna: "The scientific world-view serves life, and
 167 life receives it."¹⁵ Two years later, Neurath still depicted the unity of sci-
 168 ence—the ultimate form of reductive scientism for its adversaries—in
 169 life-philosophical terms as the work of a "generation," and a tool of suc-
 170 cessful prediction and hence of "life."¹⁶



THE PROBLEM OF LIFE FROM DILTHEY TO CARNAP

171

172 Life-philosophical references and terminology are evident in the works
 173 of Carnap, Neurath, and Schlick. All three adopt to an extent the lan-
 174 guage of Dilthey's "life-philosophy," employing words such as life-stance
 175 (*Lebenshaltung*), life-intensification (*Lebenssteigerung*), life-formation
 176 (*Lebensgestaltung*), worldview, world-stance, world-conception, and
 177 lived-experience (*Erleben*) as distinct from *Erfahrung* and *Erkenntnis*,
 178 reliving (*nacherleben*), and "feeling of life" (*Lebensgefühl*).¹⁷ Carnap
 179 introduced in 1921 the dichotomy between the cognitive and non-
 180 cognitive in the language of life-philosophy, stating that "the intuit-
 181 ive feeling of life as a totality (*Lebensgefühl*)" cannot be conceptually
 182 determined.¹⁸

183 A number of expressions related to "life" were in common usage in
 184 ordinary central European thought by the 1920s. Words and phrases
 185 from—to use the categorization developed by Max Scheler—the so-
 186 called *Lebensphilosophie* of Bergson, Dilthey, Nietzsche, and Simmel were
 187 often popularized in the service of conservative and reactionary cultural
 188 critique (*Kulturkritik*).¹⁹ Although popular *Lebensphilosophie* could have
 189 this reactionary and anti-intellectual role in Germanic culture in these
 190 vulgarized forms, such as Spengler's *Decline of the West* and the biologis-
 191 tic vitalism that fed into National Socialism, at least three "founding fig-
 192 ures" (Bergson, Dilthey, and Simmel) were modernistic liberal thinkers
 193 as regards culture, education, and politics.

194 If at first glance the connection between Dilthey and the Vienna
 195 Circle seems indirect and obscure, a more systematic study of the works
 196 of Schlick, Neurath, and Carnap show a familiarity with Diltheyian con-
 197 cepts and arguments. This is the case with Schlick, who explored issues
 198 of the "sense of life" and ethical life-wisdom in relation to Nietzsche and
 199 Dilthey.²⁰ Schlick credits Dilthey with the distinction between theoret-
 200 ical scientific knowledge and practical life involving feeling and expres-
 201 sion grounded in a feeling of reality (*Wirklichkeitsgefühl*).²¹ Although
 202 Dilthey never separated theoretical science and practical life as radically
 203 as the Vienna Circle, he is a significant source for their emotivism: the
 204 thorough separation between knowledge (*Erkennen*) consisting of cogni-
 205 tive propositions and the non-epistemic expression (*Ausdruck*) of lived-
 206 experience (*Erleben*) and feeling (*Gefühl*) that lacks cognitive validity.²²

207 The early Carnap was acquainted with Dilthey's thought; apparently
 208 not directly through the study of many of Dilthey's works, but most



209 likely orally transmitted through his teacher Nohl. As Gottfried Gabriel
 210 describes, Carnap adopted concepts and strategies from Dilthey, rede-
 211 deploying them from his bracketing of metaphysics in the 1920s to his
 212 more radical confrontation with metaphysics and Heidegger's ontol-
 213 ogy in the early 1930s.²³ This adaptation is significant for revealing the
 214 broader contexts, concerns, and stakes of Carnap's early thought, which
 215 is more philosophically nuanced and historically informed than com-
 216 monly imagined by advocates and detractors.

217 To engage the question of why Dilthey might be significant
 218 for Carnap, it is helpful to distinguish Dilthey's thought from
 219 "intuitionism," "irrationalism," and the Romantic and vitalistic reaction
 220 against the Enlightenment with which *Lebensphilosophie* was later popu-
 221 larly associated.²⁴ Dilthey's thought has two primarily methodological
 222 axes, the empirical and the interpretive. In addition to empirical research,
 223 he argued for an interpretive—via symbolic mediations and social objec-
 224 tifications—expression and articulation of life in art, science, and self-
 225 narratives such as autobiography. Dilthey rejected, as already involving
 226 language and history, the intuition of spirit or life found in German ideal-
 227 ism, Husserl's phenomenology, or Bergson's life-philosophy.²⁵

228 Georg Misch, Dilthey's student, wrote his dissertation on the devel-
 229 opment of French positivism (1900–1901).²⁶ Misch described in 1947
 230 how Dilthey's position constituted a "positivism of life" in contrast
 231 with phenomenology and logical positivism.²⁷ Dilthey's vision of a non-
 232 reductive, pluralistic, and hermeneutical positivism aimed at a "non-
 233 prejudicial and uncoerced empirical inquiry" ("*unbefangene Empirie*"),
 234 in order to embrace the *empiria* without the truncation of empiricist
 235 dogmas ("*Empirie, nicht Empirismus*"), contrasts with the more elimi-
 236 native and restrictive interpretations of experience unfolded in classical
 237 empiricism and positivism.²⁸ In his elucidation of the typology of world-
 238 views, Dilthey interpreted the positivism of his epoch as a contemporary
 239 manifestation of one of the three basic varieties of worldview, naturalism,
 240 which has its own legitimacy and scope as an expression of life and way
 241 of understanding reality.²⁹

242 It is evident from Dilthey's works as well as his critics—Heidegger
 243 and Gadamer who criticize Dilthey for being a modernistic, positivistic,
 244 and "scientistic" epistemological thinker lacking the perspective of
 245 ontology³⁰—that Dilthey advocated scientific inquiry, liberal modernity,
 246 the Enlightenment, and their educational importance. He did this in a
 247 historically aware form under the altered intellectual and social-political



248 conditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Dilthey
249 is habitually described in philosophy textbooks as maintaining a drastic
250 separation between the natural and human sciences. This distinction was
251 not ontological or metaphysical but methodological. But even as Dilthey
252 methodologically distinguished the natural and human sciences, as each
253 science has its own objects and ways of approaching them, his new phi-
254 losophy of the human sciences presupposed a disenchanted and natu-
255 ralized world as disclosed in natural scientific inquiry and reflection.³¹
256 Dilthey's distinction was not primarily an ontological or metaphysi-
257 cal one between two distinctive realms of being; it is rather a meth-
258 odological one deployed in order to interpret appropriately the unique
259 reproductive, reflexive, and reflective structures and processes of the
260 social-historical world.

261 Informed by his historical transformation of Kant's critique of meta-
262 physics, Dilthey opposed traditional and contemporary metaphysics as
263 self-deception. Instead of providing truth, historical analysis demon-
264 strates an indemonstrable attitude rooted in and expressing a "feeling
265 of life" that is articulated as a "worldview" and "lifestance." A number
266 of figures—including Hans Haeberli, Arne Næss, and Günther Patzig—
267 noted in the 1950s and 1960s the resonances between Dilthey's and
268 Carnap's thinking.³² When Carnap was queried in the late 1960s about
269 his relation to Dilthey, he expressed surprise at these connections. He
270 even denied at this late point having read Dilthey's works, despite the
271 multiple citations of him and use of his language in his works during the
272 1920s.³³ There are citations of Dilthey in the *Aufbau* and "Eliminating
273 Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language" that indicate a
274 familiarity with his arguments and ideas. In Jena, Carnap studied with
275 and was good friends with Nohl, a student of Dilthey's known for his
276 writings on Nietzsche and promotion of pedagogical reform. In this
277 stormy period of war and revolution, Nohl and Carnap belonged to the
278 progressive socialist oriented side of the *Wandervögel*, a movement of
279 younger Germans advocating a return to a more simple primitive way of
280 life and extended sojourns wandering in natural environments.³⁴

281 Carnap repeatedly evoked feeling and a feeling of life in the 1920s,
282 and these play an important role even in the collective statement of the
283 Vienna Circle's shared project. It is not merely the metaphysicians and
284 irrationalists who feel and have needs, Carnap remarked:



285 We too, have “emotional needs” [*Bedürfnisse des Gemüts*] in philosophy,
 286 but they are filled by clarity of concepts, precision of methods, responsible
 287 theses, achievement through cooperation in which each individual plays his
 288 part.³⁵

289 Carnap speaks in passages such as this of *Gemüt* and *Gesinnung*; of affective
 290 dispositions oriented towards clarity and lucidity. Nonetheless—as
 291 with Dilthey’s emphasis on both rationality and its limits in relation to
 292 the affective and contextual character of life—this articulation of the
 293 emotional and affective basis of practical life does not negate the reality
 294 that the generative nexus of life can never quite be comprehended:
 295 “*die nie ganz durchschaubare Verflechtung des Lebens.*”³⁶ As in Dilthey’s
 296 writings, and unlike the endorsement of “the mystical” in Wittgenstein’s
 297 *Tractatus*, Carnap refuses to identify the ineffability and mystery of that
 298 which appears immanently within the structured and open life-nexus, as
 299 practical problems of meaning and interpretation, with the transcendence
 300 that surpasses and steps beyond that life and the world. The question of
 301 the world cannot be sensibly answered in the world for Wittgenstein.
 302 Carnap’s reading of the *Tractatus* rejects its ostensible advocacy of “the
 303 mystical” by interpreting questions of the meaning of the whole and the
 304 world as practical issues of life.³⁷

305 DILTHEY, CARNAP, AND THE QUESTION OF EMPIRICISM

306 The title of Carnap’s *The Logical Formation of the World* (1928) appears
 307 to play off the title of Dilthey’s last major work *The Formation of the*
 308 *Historical World in the Human Sciences* (1910). One work appears to be
 309 about the logical constitution of one aspect of the world to the next, and
 310 the other the self-interpretive practices of historically conditioned indi-
 311 viduals and groups. Although at opposite extremes at the level of theory,
 312 there is a practical family relation between these two works. In the
 313 case of the early Vienna Circle, most evidently in Neurath but also in
 314 Carnap, there is a pedagogical enlightening task to his epistemic-logical
 315 project.³⁸ There is a basic orientation (*Grundeinstellung*) and life-feeling
 316 that resonates with contemporary movements of life that are responding
 317 to the questions of life. It is a thesis of Dilthey, also deployed by the
 318 Heidegger in his early “hermeneutics of factual life,” that life responds
 319 to and articulates itself. This thesis is not vague if it is understood to be
 320 a claim about immanence, self-reflexivity, and self-reflection. This latter



321 dimension is lost in Carnap, as it is in Heidegger as well, although it
322 lingers in the hermeneutical and practical dimensions of his thought.

323 Carnap's "external" pragmatic justification of the place of the sciences
324 in life in the 1920s occurs in this hermeneutical and practical context.
325 This justification would be contradictory if the positivist ideal of sci-
326 ence consisted only of conclusions and theories that are required to be
327 only cognitively valid and consequently value neutral even about science
328 itself. Yet, significantly, the latter dimension of objectivity and neutral-
329 ity belongs to Carnap's portrait of the "internal" conceptual character
330 of the sciences. The "external" non-scientific practical justification of
331 scientific and logical languages remains a hermeneutical-interpretive,
332 affective-dispositional, or pragmatic concern and decision for Carnap.
333 The decision for science can inform and orient practical life even as it
334 is not itself a scientific claim. While the results of scientific inquiry are
335 to be value free through rigorous examination and re-examination with-
336 out requiring commitment to one theory or ideology, which is the very
337 power of science in contrast with religion and metaphysics, science itself
338 is not value-neutral in the context of life. Carnap's pragmatic justification
339 of science would become stronger in later works such as *Meaning and*
340 *Necessity* and make him a precursor to the post-positivist arguments of
341 Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.³⁹

342 Scientific inquiry is itself based in and oriented by a feeling of life,
343 an affective-practical disposition, and life-stance. This life-stance is
344 expressed and cultivated in virtues such as clarity, coherence, simplicity
345 with fecundity, and sobriety, and it proceeds through experimentalism
346 and explanatory hypotheses open to revision. The significance of value-
347 neutral scientific inquiry is then an educational and progressive one in
348 relation to life akin to movements in other realms of life mentioned by
349 Carnap—and discussed more thoroughly by Neurath—such as art (new
350 objectivity), architecture (Bauhaus), music (atonal), education (school
351 reform), social life (the labor movement), and politics (social democracy
352 and anti-fascism).

353 The reductive program of Carnap's *Aufbau* is misconstrued if its
354 mode of explication of meaning in the context of education is neglected.
355 Carnap did not eliminate "reduced" objects such as those of the social-
356 cultural domain and the individual; they are maintained through an
357 elucidation of meaning in relation to more primitive elements and con-
358 texts. In Sect. 12 of the *Aufbau*, Carnap argues that structural rela-
359 tional descriptions would also address the question of a "logic of the



360 individual” seen in Dilthey and neo-Kantianism. While the English
 361 translation adopted the neo-Kantian expression “cultural sciences,” the
 362 German term Carnap used was *Geisteswissenschaften* (human sciences)
 363 closely associated with Dilthey and his students.⁴⁰

364 The affinities between Carnap and Dilthey were criticized by his
 365 colleague Neurath. Carnap described in his diaries from 1928–1929
 366 how Neurath condemned the “idealism” of his account of the
 367 *Geisteswissenschaften* in the *Aufbau* with reference to Dilthey.⁴¹ Carnap
 368 maintained a Dilthey-influenced conception of the human sciences and
 369 explicitly identified psychology, as a science of individuals, as a human
 370 science in the *Aufbau*. Dilthey’s position was controversial as it was
 371 opposed by the positivist and neo-Kantian classification of psychology
 372 as a natural science. Further, in Sect. 23, Carnap concludes that “since
 373 Dilthey” the objects of the human sciences have their own autonomy
 374 and their own methodological and object-theoretical uniqueness. The
 375 constitution or reduction system leads classes of statements back to their
 376 experiential basis without eliminating their autonomy and uniqueness.

377 Here we can confront the myth of the hyper-reductionistic nature of
 378 Carnap’s project. Carnap’s reduction system does not imply, as Merleau-
 379 Ponty and the prevailing tendencies of subsequent “Continental philoso-
 380 phy” contend, that propositional classes are undifferentiated or that their
 381 significance is lost in elemental sensations. It is instructive that Merleau-
 382 Ponty’s critique of logical positivism—to take one example determinant
 383 for later Continental thought—would not recognize Carnap’s early reli-
 384 ance on gestalt psychology and meaning-holism, instead associating the
 385 Vienna Circle’s “reductionism” with a reduction to bare atomistic sen-
 386 sual elements.⁴² It is revealing that Merleau-Ponty contrasted the direct
 387 access of consciousness to itself in Husserl’s phenomenology with the
 388 indirect access proceeding through linguistic and logical mediation in
 389 logical positivism. Merleau-Ponty thus intimated the hermeneutical char-
 390 acter of meaning in the Vienna Circle and opposes it through an appeal
 391 to a direct intuitive bodily self-access.⁴³

392 Carnap’s positive references to Dilthey as well as his sensitivity to
 393 a logic of the singular and the cultural during this period indicate the
 394 possibility of articulating his project as a logical empiricist hermeneu-
 395 tics rather than the naive reductionism of his analytic and Continental
 396 critics. Without metaphysical certainties or foundations, as Dilthey and
 397 Nietzsche already argued, thought is inherently hermeneutical as there
 398 are no facts or data independent of interpretive processes. It is impossible



399 to eliminate the hermeneutical situation of a context of interpretation,
400 even if interpretation is identified with the pragmatically justified yet
401 fairly rigorous criteria of logical coherence, empirical verifiability, and
402 explanatory power. This later identification distinguishes Carnap's early
403 logical construction and reconstruction of the world from the aesthetic
404 orientation of interpretation in Dilthey and Nietzsche.

405 A noteworthy aspect of Carnap's context that connects him with
406 Dilthey and the expressive tradition in German thought is the idea of
407 the non-cognitive emotive character of forms of expressive life. Both seek
408 to avoid reifying the non-cognitive dimensions of human existence and
409 turning them into irrational idols. As with Wittgenstein's proposition 6.5
410 in the *Tractatus*, "the riddle does not exist" ("*Das Rätsel gibt es nicht*"),
411 Carnap maintains that there are no "riddles of life" that are conceptually
412 or scientifically answerable questions. They are not questions with appropriate
413 metaphysical answers; they concern life-issues that are only about
414 practical situations:

415 *the "riddles of life" are not questions, but are practical situations.* The "rid-
416 dle of death" consists in the shock through the death of a fellow man or
417 in the fear of one's own death. It has nothing to do with questions which
418 can be asked about death, even if some men, deceiving themselves, occa-
419 sionally believe that they have formulated this riddle by pronouncing such
420 questions.⁴⁴

421 The riddles and questions here are practical and expressive, even existen-
422 tial in a non-cognitive emotive sense. They are not conceptual or theo-
423 retical questions for science or philosophy but with how ordinary people
424 go about life and what decisions they make. The absence and impossibil-
425 ity of genuine metaphysical questions points towards "the mystical" of
426 what cannot be expressed in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*; it points towards
427 life-questions being primarily questions of practical life in Dilthey and
428 Carnap. Metaphysical propositions, including those concerning moral
429 and aesthetic values and norms, are not false or uncertain. They are cog-
430 nitively and epistemically if not expressively senseless.⁴⁵

431 Carnap argued in 1934 that theoretical knowledge and science
432 can and should inform and educate but cannot replace the duty of
433 practical position-taking that individuals in the end must make for
434 themselves—potentially for the worse.⁴⁶ Theory can inform yet under-
435 determines practice; enlightenment through theory can prepare



436 individuals for choice through education but it does not prove or replace
 437 the non-conceptual practical decision (*Entschluß*).⁴⁷ As in the *Aufbau*,
 438 practical life does not pose questions that can be theoretically resolved.⁴⁸
 439 It is governed by pragmatic decisions that are often determined by
 440 unconscious motives and ideological forces that theory can at best
 441 expose and explain.⁴⁹

442 The radical critique of “superstition, theology, metaphysics, tra-
 443 ditional morality, the capitalist exploitation of the workers, etc.” has a
 444 pedagogical function of clarification and education against “distraction
 445 and mystification” (*Ablenkung und Vernebelung*). Such “narcotics” are
 446 to be excluded as theoretically senseless rather than rejected as concep-
 447 tually false. Instead of producing indifference, Carnap concludes that
 448 theoretical enlightenment over the empirical sources and functions of
 449 the narcotic and “appeal, education, example” are taken up by practical
 450 life—which cannot be affectively or value neutral in relation to itself—
 451 for its own sake in how it lives and makes decisions.⁵⁰ Practical life—for
 452 Carnap as much as Dilthey—is a conflict of views or languages, of life-
 453 positions and expressions of the feeling of life that cannot be resolved by
 454 theoretical and scientific knowledge. The function of science, logic, and
 455 philosophy is pedagogical and the question is whether, how, and to what
 456 extent they are taken up in life.

457 Reflecting his commitment to an Enlightenment model of self-for-
 458 mation (*Bildung*) in the context of human mortality, Carnap continued
 459 to stress in his “Intellectual Autobiography” (1963) the importance of
 460 personal education, self-development, and the self-interpretation of finite
 461 mortal life in cultivating a sense of autonomy and personhood:

462 The main task of an individual seems to me the development of his per-
 463 sonality and the creation of fruitful and healthy relations among human
 464 beings. This aim implies the task of co-operation in the development of
 465 society and ultimately of the whole of mankind towards a community in
 466 which every individual has the possibility of leading a satisfying life and of
 467 participating in cultural goods. The fact that everybody knows that he will
 468 eventually die, need not make his life meaningless or aimless. He himself
 469 gives meaning to his life if he sets tasks for himself, struggles to fulfill them
 470 to the best of his ability, and regards all the specific tasks of all individuals
 471 as parts of the great task of humanity, whose aim goes far beyond the lim-
 472 ited span of each individual life.⁵¹



473 CARNAP'S LOGICAL AND DILTHEYIAN CRITIQUES OF HEIDEGGER

474 In his “Eliminating Metaphysics” essay, Carnap diagnosed Heidegger’s
 475 analysis of the nothing in “What is Metaphysics?” as a confusion that
 476 substantializes the logical operation of negation by erroneously posit-
 477 ing and reifying “nothing” as an object. Negation is the reversal of an
 478 existential proposition that cannot be interpreted as affirming existence
 479 or an existent.⁵² Negation derivatively and immanently denies the factual
 480 and logical propositions that it depends on for its significance. It has no
 481 further cognitive meaning, nor an objective referent, such as—accord-
 482 ing to Carnap—when Heidegger states: “Nothing nothings” (*das Nichts*
 483 *nichtet*). According to Heidegger, the verbal “nothing” (*Nichts nichtet*)
 484 is neither a thing nor a meaningless null. Nothing is the performative
 485 condition for the negativity that makes human thought and practices
 486 possible, including all positivity.⁵³ For Carnap, the statement that “noth-
 487 ing nothings” has no actual cognitive content that can be conceptualized
 488 and validated even if it expressively evokes feelings akin to poetry.

489 Carnap concluded from this inquiry, and his previous analysis of more
 490 traditional metaphysical utterances in “Pseudoproblems in Philosophy”
 491 (1928), that metaphysical utterances senselessly reify logical operations
 492 such as the assertion of being and nothing. The published version retains
 493 echoes of Carnap’s earlier lecture in which metaphysics was criticized
 494 through logical analysis and through a genealogical tracing of the his-
 495 tory of words from meaningfulness to meaninglessness. Primary exam-
 496 ples of this for Carnap are words such as soul and God as well as words
 497 such as life, existence, and being when taken as metaphysical. Their con-
 498 tinuing power rests in their lingering earlier sense and in their affective
 499 aura. Such discourses have an ideological instead of a clarifying function.
 500 Logical analysis is not purely theoretical, as in later language analysis, as
 501 it serves an emancipatory function for scientific thinking and for life by
 502 breaking our absorption in the magic and mania of reified words. Carnap
 503 is concerned—akin to Adorno and Levinas in their more explicitly ethi-
 504 cal-political assessments—with Heidegger’s “idolatry of words.”

505 In addition to applying formal logic to Heidegger’s assertions,
 506 Sect. 7 of “Eliminating Metaphysics” suggests the depth of Carnap’s
 507 debt to Dilthey. Carnap develops the argument from Dilthey that met-
 508 aphysics is a transition stage lacking validity and contemporary neces-
 509 sity. Metaphysics is no longer myth and not yet art. The priority of art
 510 and aesthetic lived experience (*Erlebnis*), a sensibility that lingers in



511 Carnap's praise of music over metaphysics, contrasts with the standard
 512 understanding of Auguste Comte's paradigmatic account—which was
 513 modified to prioritize art at the end of his life—of the hierarchy of
 514 developmental stages: (1) theological (2) metaphysical, and (3) posi-
 515 tive (scientific).⁵⁴ Metaphysical systems are, Carnap argued in accord
 516 with Dilthey's position, at best impoverished replacements for art, lit-
 517 erature, and music in being an expression (*Ausdruck*) of the "feeling of
 518 life" (*Lebensgefühl*).⁵⁵ As Carnap notes in accord with Schopenhauer,
 519 Nietzsche, and Dilthey, music is perhaps the feeling of life's purest
 520 expression. This feeling of life is not a mystical or elemental force, how-
 521 ever. Both Dilthey and Carnap are careful to distinguish this feeling from
 522 a metaphysical or vitalistic force that would underlie life.

523 Heidegger responded to Carnap indirectly by modifying his approach
 524 to the nothing, including in later additions to his criticized essay "What
 525 is Metaphysics?" and more notoriously in his lecture courses after the
 526 Vienna School's exile in 1935 in which Heidegger celebrated their
 527 exile. Heidegger linked positivism with other forms of modernity such
 528 as Russian communism, Americanism, and the technological devastation
 529 of the natural world.⁵⁶ Heidegger identified positivism with modernistic
 530 socio-ecological developments exemplified by the collapse of the fourfold
 531 (*Geviert*): human "massification," the gods' flight, the sky's darkening,
 532 and the technological domination of nature.⁵⁷ In contrast, Adorno and
 533 Horkheimer diagnosed positivism as symptomatic of the failed dialectic
 534 of modernity due to its failure to unfold the critical potential of rational-
 535 ity and claimed that logical positivism and Heideggerian ontology were
 536 two sides of one political attitude: one that resigns itself before the pre-
 537 vailing world-order.⁵⁸

538

BETWEEN PLURALITY AND UNITY

539 Notwithstanding the affinities between Carnap and Dilthey indicated in
 540 this chapter, Dilthey retained a more comprehensive interpretation of
 541 rationality as historically embodied in multiple forms of life and remained
 542 the more radically pluralistic empiricist.⁵⁹ Dilthey would presumably, and
 543 legitimately, have extended his critique of the reductive positivism that
 544 forgets the heterogeneity of phenomena and the self-undermining of sci-
 545 entific inquiry in its metaphysical totalization from Comte's sociology
 546 to both Heidegger's ontology of originary Being (*Sein*) and the Vienna
 547 Circle's project of a unified science:



548 My attack on sociology thus cannot be directed against a discipline of this
549 sort [i.e. the study of society], but is rather aimed at a science that seeks
550 to comprehend in one science everything which occurs de facto within
551 human society. Such comprehension would be based on the following
552 principle: Whatever occurs within human society in the course of its his-
553 tory must be integrated into the unity of one and the same object.⁶⁰

554 Dilthey was a controversial philosopher for the Vienna Circle. Neurath in
555 particular appealed to the project of a unified science in repeatedly criti-
556 cizing Dilthey's differentiation of interpretive understanding (*verstehen*)
557 and causal explanation (*erklären*) as the primary methods of the human
558 (*Geisteswissenschaften*) and natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*).⁶¹
559 Neurath rejected such distinctive Diltheyian concepts as dualistic and
560 as the remnants of metaphysics and theology.⁶² However, Dilthey inter-
561 preted the project of a unified totalizing science as being more indebted
562 to metaphysics and theology than the experiential differentiation of the
563 sciences, according to their objects and ways of accessing objects, which
564 he encouraged.

565 Næss and Gabriel contend that Dilthey and Carnap's anti-metaphys-
566 ical appeals to worldview and world-conception are as totalistic as the
567 metaphysics that they reject. This argument is unconvincing insofar as
568 feelings of life and their expressions in worldviews in Dilthey's concep-
569 tion are inexorably manifold and pluralistic. Their incommensurability
570 and agonistic conflict (*Widerstreit*) does not allow the possibility of a
571 final resolution into one systemic totality.⁶³ Carnap noted the plurality of
572 feelings of life and their aesthetic expression in contrast to the sciences'
573 conceptual unity. Carnap and Neurath justify the world-conception prag-
574 matically in relation to life, yet both diminish the pluralistic and agonistic
575 dynamic described by Dilthey as the conflict and contest of worldviews
576 (*Widerstreit der Weltanschauungen*).⁶⁴ Dilthey's arguments for funda-
577 mental pluralism at the level of affects and concepts indicate his distance
578 from Carnap's program of unitary science based on a heuristic physical-
579 ism. Despite his commitment to the idea of unified science, pluralism
580 cannot be claimed to be non-existent in Carnap given his pragmatic con-
581 siderations concerning meaning that culminated in the principle of toler-
582 ance unfolded from *The Logical Syntax of Language* (1934) to *Meaning*
583 *and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic* (1947/1956).⁶⁵

584 Even if the unity of science is understood as a totalizing project, it
585 is not a task that Dilthey advocated. Dilthey rejected Comte's vision of



586 a unified science, and Neurath would repeatedly point out that *Dilthey*
 587 *and his apparent influence on Carnap were obstacles to the idea of a uni-*
 588 *fied science.*⁶⁶ According to Dilthey, there are at most temporary unities of
 589 *experience and thought that cannot eliminate the differences and tensions*
 590 *of things and of discovering and inventing the most appropriate approaches*
 591 *to them.* Neurath upheld that the nonsensical assertion of essence or
 592 substance (i.e. essentialism) is the source of the distinction between the
 593 human and natural sciences, and the psychological and the physical.

594 Dilthey argued for anti-essentialism from the opposite claim of the
 595 difference and plurality of things and human stances toward things.⁶⁷
 596 While there is no ultimate metaphysical distinction between mind and
 597 matter or spirit and world in Dilthey's works, there are distinct and mul-
 598 tiple compartments and ways in which humans engage in and compre-
 599 hend their embodied, worldly, and immanent existence. But whether a
 600 unified totality is organized through one transcendent supernatural or
 601 immanent worldly principle, both are equally metaphysical for Dilthey.
 602 Such tendencies are expressions of a life-configuration (*Lebensgestaltung*)
 603 that overextend the principle of identity by imposing it upon the con-
 604 tingent plurality of the experienced world's contexts and conditions.
 605 Accordingly, whether one unitary system is understood as feeling of life
 606 or poetic expression, as affective-practical worldview or unified scientific
 607 world-conception: "one objective, determinate, *integral system* of reality
 608 that excludes other possible ones is not demonstrable."⁶⁸

609 Dilthey's "principle of phenomenality" and the early Carnap's
 610 employment of phenomenality in the *Aufbau* reflect an attention to
 611 addressing experience in its "internal" or experiential immanence, its
 612 holistic relationality, and its linguistic formation and interpretation, even
 613 as both refused to endorse phenomenism as a metaphysical doctrine
 614 about being. This tendency in Carnap can be seen in his earlier adapta-
 615 tion of a quasi-phenomenological life-philosophical description of lived-
 616 experience in the proto-*Aufbau* sketch "Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit"
 617 ("From Chaos to Actuality") in 1922.⁶⁹ The logical constitution
 618 of reality presupposes a non-logical primary experiential world (the
 619 chaos of lived-experience) that can only be cognized through rational
 620 reconstruction.

621 Forsaking his earlier quasi-phenomenology, the phenomenal and
 622 methodological solipsistic autopsychological point of departure intro-
 623 duced in the *Aufbau* can only be methodologically and heuristi-
 624 cally maintained according to Carnap, who would eventually abandon



625 this overly subjective point of departure a few years later in favor of a
626 methodological physicalism inspired by his colleague Neurath. Carnap's
627 diaries reveal how Neurath rejected the methodological solipsism and
628 individualism of Carnap's *Aufbau* in favor of collectivism and material-
629 ism.⁷⁰ The methodological materialism of the 1930s need not, they
630 argued, assume a metaphysical or ontological materialism that their elim-
631 ination of metaphysics precluded. In Dilthey's case, phenomenism—or
632 what he described as the principle of phenomenality that indicates the
633 co-givenness of self and worldly phenomena independent of any essence,
634 process, or substance—is interpretive rather than metaphysical, connect-
635 ing the first person perspective of “inner experience” with the imma-
636 nence of the “principle of phenomenality.”⁷¹

637 Despite the mutuality of lived-experience and interpretive language,
638 as well as the appropriation of non-atomistic holistic gestalt psychol-
639 ogy in the *Aufbau that would place psychology closer to Dilthey's concep-*
640 *tion of psychology as a human rather than a natural science*, Carnap and
641 Dilthey did diverge over the significance of the interpretive character of
642 language and consequently of how to express and even what to count
643 as experience.⁷² That is, whereas both are concerned with interpretation
644 and explication, interpretation is construed as either primarily linguistic,
645 as understood through the model of modern formal logic in Carnap, or
646 as consisting of the full array of questions and strategies associated with
647 hermeneutics and the lived life-nexus (*Lebenszusammenhang*) in Dilthey.
648 Whereas Dilthey carefully portrayed how the life-nexus has its own struc-
649 tures and rationality, a theme later taken up by Husserl and Habermas,
650 Carnap abandoned the rationality life-world to being an affective realm
651 that could only be inspired and reformed by the model of rationality evi-
652 dent in the sciences. Rationality is increasingly identified exclusively with
653 science and logic in logical positivism, which undercuts the pragmatic
654 enlightening function that was emphasized in the 1920 s' program of a
655 scientific world-conception.

656 In “Theoretical Questions and Practical Decisions,” Carnap starkly
657 distinguishes cognitive sense and theoretical science from the non-
658 cognitive and practical. Carnap's account of the latter is in danger of
659 lapsing into the irrational and eliminating the critical role of reason in
660 aesthetic, ethical, and political reflection. Dilthey's works suggest a
661 more liberal and tolerant conception of historically embodied reason,
662 as he traced the differences, tensions, and the continuities between
663 non- or minimally cognitive expression and theoretical cognition and



664 knowledge. This is evident in their usage of the term *Aufbau* (formation
665 or construction), a key term for Dilthey and Carnap. It principally signi-
666 fies historical formation of the multiplicity, range, and richness of human
667 experiences in Dilthey, and logical construction in Carnap. The plural
668 character of historicity and temporality entails the necessity of experien-
669 tially and experimentally engaging with the world. This open and plural-
670 istic empiricism is not only found in Dilthey. Kuno Fischer distinguished
671 *empiria* as the experiential fullness and manifoldness of life from empiri-
672 cism, which posits experience as a basic epistemic principle and hence is
673 experientially impoverished.⁷³

674 CONCLUSION

675 As argued in this chapter, the early Carnap construed the critique of met-
676 aphysics as a crucial part of legitimating and ideologically and polemical-
677 ly defending the scientific life-stance (*Lebenshaltung*) against its critics.
678 Dilthey's critical assessment of traditional and contemporary metaphysics
679 included what he considered to be the implicitly metaphysical charac-
680 ter of Comte's positivism as well as nineteenth-century materialism.
681 Diltheyian suspicions and fears of latent metaphysics led Carnap and
682 Neurath to posit a methodological rather than ontological materialism
683 as the basis of scientific inquiry. Dilthey's analysis of metaphysical systems
684 as expressions and articulations of a "feeling of life" (*Lebensgefühl*) in a
685 worldview (*Weltanschauung*), which are more akin to works of art and
686 poetry than cognitively oriented logic or science, shaped the anti-metaph-
687 ycal strategies expressed by Carnap in the 1920s and that culminated
688 in his critique of Heidegger's ontology of being and nothing. Heidegger
689 shared this tendency with Dilthey and Carnap to the extent that he inter-
690 preted his own ontology as overcoming traditional metaphysics and its
691 "forgetfulness of being." Heidegger's way of overcoming metaphysics
692 appeared to Carnap as its reaffirmation in an existential-ontological dis-
693 guise, and a way of thinking with problematic political associations.⁷⁴

694 Carnap and Heidegger increasingly abandoned the Diltheyian dimen-
695 sions of their early thinking. Heidegger shifted away from his earlier her-
696 meneutics of factual life, a model influenced by Dilthey and closer to the
697 sciences and empirical life than his later thinking, while Carnap turned
698 toward a pragmatic-semantic account of language and physicalist inter-
699 pretation of the sciences that was no longer explicitly conceived as part
700 of a broader practical program of enlightenment and education. Unlike



701 its earlier social-critical formulation, the elimination of metaphysics
 702 appeared more dogmatic, exclusionary, and restrictive than critical and
 703 demystifying for later philosophers.

704 Carnap's cultural and political commitments cannot be cleanly separ-
 705 ated from his scientific and logical works. His early philosophy of sci-
 706 ence and hermeneutics of explication are integral parts of a wider project
 707 of formation, cultivation, and education (*Bildung*) that furthers life
 708 through clarifying it. Scientific inquiry and education are interconnected
 709 with critical reflection and accordingly at least indirectly with social trans-
 710 formation. Carnap's early project can be interpreted as a deeply social-
 711 political project formulated in a language affirming value-neutrality and
 712 objectivity as primary characteristics of the scientific stance that should
 713 inform and reorient social-political life. This value-neutral discourse was
 714 therefore itself interpreted as political, modernistic, and socialistic by
 715 right-wing opponents of the Vienna Circle and by its philosophically
 716 anti-foundationalist, life-expressive, non-cognitivist, and socially progres-
 717 sive "left-wing": Carnap, Neurath, Hahn, and Frank.⁷⁵

NOTES

718

- 719 1. On the significance of the "feeling of life" in Dilthey, see Rudolf
 720 A. Makkreel (1985) "The Feeling of Life: Some Kantian Sources of Life-
 721 Philosophy," in Frithjof Rodi and Otto F. Bollnow (eds) *Dilthey-Jahrbuch*
 722 *für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* 3 (Göttingen:
 723 Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), 83–104; and Eric S. Nelson (2014)
 724 "Language, Psychology, and the Feeling of Life in Kant and Dilthey," in
 725 Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (eds) *The Linguistic Dimension of*
 726 *Kant's Thought: Historical and Critical Essays* (Evanston: Northwestern
 727 University Press), 263–287.
- 728 2. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1985) "Wilhelm Dilthey nach 150 Jahren:
 729 Zwischen Romantik und Positivismus," in Ernst W. Orth (ed.) *Dilthey*
 730 *und die Philosophie der Gegenwart* (München: Verlag Karl Alber),
 731 157–182; and (1995) *Hermeneutik in Rückblick* (Tübingen: Mohr
 732 Siebeck), 9 and 186. On Heidegger's reception of Dilthey, see Eric S.
 733 Nelson (2016) "Heidegger and Dilthey: A Difference in Interpretation,"
 734 in François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (eds) *Bloomsbury Companion to*
 735 *Heidegger* (London: Bloomsbury Press), 129–134; Eric S. Nelson (2015)
 736 "Heidegger and Dilthey: Language, History, and Hermeneutics," in
 737 Hans Pedersen and Megan Altman (eds) *Horizons of Authenticity in*



- 738 *Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Moral Psychology* (Dordrecht: Springer
739 Netherlands), 109–128.
- 740 3. See my discussion of the priority of the empirical and experiential in
741 Dilthey in Eric. S. Nelson (2008) “Interpreting Practice: Epistemology,
742 Hermeneutics, and Historical Life in Dilthey,” *Idealistic Studies* 38, 1, 2,
743 105–122.
- 744 4. Michael Friedman (2000) *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer,
745 and Heidegger* (Chicago: Open Court), 15; Gottfried Gabriel (2004)
746 “Introduction: Carnap Brought Home,” Steve Awodey and Carsten
747 Klein (eds) *Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena* (Chicago: Open
748 Court), 3–20.
- 749 5. Alfred J. Ayer (1952) *Language, Truth, and Logic* (New York: Dover
750 Publications). Ayer further helped codify what came to be the “standard
751 view” with his anthology (1959) *Logical Positivism* (Glencoe: Free Press).
- 752 6. See George A. Reisch (2005) *How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy
753 of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University
754 Press); John McCumber (2001) *Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy
755 and the McCarthy Era* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press).
- 756 7. See Andrew Bowie (2003) *Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant
757 to Habermas* (Cambridge: Polity), 167; Hans-Joachim Dahms (1994)
758 *Postivismusstreit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), 38–39; Friedman, *A Parting of
759 the Ways*, 16–18.
- 760 8. Despite these political activities and sensibilities, skepticism continues
761 about the philosophical importance of this social-political context; see
762 Sarah S. Richardson (2009) “The Left Vienna Circle, Part 1. Carnap,
763 Neurath, and the Left Vienna Circle Thesis,” *Studies in History and
764 Philosophy of Science Part A* 40, 1, 14–24.
- 765 9. See Aldo Venturelli (1984) “Nietzsche in der Berggasse 19. Über die
766 erste Nietzsche-Rezeption in Wien in Internationales Nietzsche-Seminar
767 (Berlin, 1982),” *Nietzsche-Studien* 13, 448–480; William J. MacGrath
768 (1974) *Dionysian Art and Populist Politics in Austria* (New Haven: Yale
769 University Press).
- 770 10. Rudolf Carnap (2004) “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische
771 Analyse der Sprache,” in Thomas Mormann (ed.) *Scheinprobleme in der
772 Philosophie und andere metaphysikkritische Schriften* (Hamburg: Meiner),
773 81–109, 107; Philipp Frank (2006) “Die Bedeutung der physikalischen
774 Erkenntnistheorie Machs für das Geistesleben der Gegenwart,”
775 in Michael Stöltzner (ed.) *Wiener Kreis: Texte zur wissenschaftlichen
776 Weltauffassung* (Hamburg: Meiner), 111–113. On his continuing interest
777 in Nietzsche, as a critic of metaphysics and advocate of the sciences,
778 note Philipp Frank (1941) *Between Physics and Philosophy* (Cambridge:
779 Harvard University Press), 51–53; *ibid.* (1949) *Modern Science and Its*



- 780 *Philosophy* (New York: G. Braziller), 75–77; *ibid.* (1998) *The Law of*
 781 *Causality and Its Limits* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers),
 782 265–266.
- 783 11. Rudolf Carnap (1998) *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (Hamburg: Meiner);
 784 *ibid.* (2004) “Überwindung der Metaphysik,” 81–109; *ibid.* (1934)
 785 “Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen,” *Natur und*
 786 *Geist* 2, 257–260; and republished (1975) in Hubert Schleichert (ed.)
 787 *Logischer Empirismus - Der Wiener Kreis: Ausgewählte Texte mit einer*
 788 *Einleitung* (München: Wilhelm Fink), 173–176.
- 789 12. On notions of world, world-view, and world-conception in Dilthey and
 790 related figures, see Eric S. Nelson (2015) “Life and World,” in Jeff
 791 Malpas and Hans-Helmuth Gander (eds) *Routledge Companion to*
 792 *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (London: Routledge), 378–389.
- 793 13. See, for example, Otto Neurath (2006 [1931]) “Soziologie im
 794 Physikalismus,” in Stöltzner (ed.), *Wiener Kreis: Texte zur wissenschaftli-*
 795 *chen Weltauffassung*, 269–271.
- 796 14. Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*; Verein Ernst Mach (2006 [1929])
 797 “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis,” in Stöltzner (ed.),
 798 *Wiener Kreis: Texte zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung*, 3–29.
- 799 15. Verein Ernst Mach (2006 [1929]) “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung,”
 800 27.
- 801 16. Neurath, “Soziologie im Physikalismus,” 270 and 275.
- 802 17. For a discussion of Carnap’s early uses of *Lebensgefühl*, for example,
 803 see André W. Carus (2007) *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought:*
 804 *Explication as Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
 805 123 and 140.
- 806 18. Quoted in Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought*, 140. Rudolf
 807 Carnap (1921) “Analyse des Weltbildes,” April, unpublished MS,
 808 RC-081-05-06.
- 809 19. Max Scheler (1972) “Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens. Nietzsche-
 810 Dilthey-Bergson,” in Max Scheler, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 3 (Bern:
 811 Francke), 311–339.
- 812 20. Moritz Schlick (2006) *Lebensweisheit. Versuch einer Glückseligkeitslehre*
 813 *und Fragen der Ethik*, Gesamtausgabe Abt. I, vol. 3 (Wien: Springer).
- 814 21. Moritz Schlick (2009) *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*, Gesamtausgabe Abt. I,
 815 vol. 1 (Wien: Springer), 446.
- 816 22. In contrast with the previous work cited, Schlick radicalized this distinc-
 817 tion in the Vienna school period; for example, in Moritz Schlick (2006
 818 [1926]), “Erleben, Erkennen, Metaphysik,” in Stöltzner (ed.), *Wiener*
 819 *Kreis: Texte zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung*, 174. On Carnap’s
 820 emotivism and “life-philosophy,” compare Thomas Mormann (2007)
 821 “Carnap’s Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism,”



- 822 *Journal for General Philosophy of Science* 38, 1, 127–146. On the practical
 823 orientation of practice for theory and practice in Dilthey, see Nelson,
 824 “Interpreting Practice,” 105–122.
- 825 23. Gabriel, “Introduction: Carnap Brought Home,” 3–20.
- 826 24. Another context for the understanding of positivism in both thinkers is
 827 the “Leipziger ‘Positivisten-Kränzchen,’” with which, through Wilhelm
 828 Wundt, Dilthey came into conflict over the question whether psychol-
 829 ogy is primarily a natural or human science. On Leipzig positivism,
 830 compare Erich Rothacker (1920) *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*
 831 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]), 199.
- 832 25. See Eric S. Nelson (2007) “Empiricism, Facticity, and the Immanence of
 833 Life in Dilthey,” *Phi: Warwick Journal of Philosophy* 18, 108–128.
- 834 26. Georg Misch (1969) *Zur Entstehung des französischen Positivismus*
 835 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft).
- 836 27. Georg Misch (1947) *Vom Lebens- und Gedankenkreis Wilhelm Diltheys*
 837 (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag G. Schulte-Bulmke), 14.
- 838 28. These expressions occur respectively in Wilhelm Dilthey, GS 1: 81 and
 839 GS 19: 1; Note R. Makkreel’s analysis of Dilthey’s empirical orien-
 840 tation in his introduction to SW I: 8. In the remainder of this chapter
 841 the following abbreviations for Dilthey’s works are used: GS = Wilhelm
 842 Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vols 1–26 (1914–2006) (Göttingen:
 843 Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, current Publisher): GS 1 (1959) *Einleitung*
 844 *in die Geisteswissenschaften: Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium*
 845 *der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte*, ed. B. Groethuysen, 4th edn; GS 2
 846 (1957) *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und*
 847 *Reformation*, ed. G. Misch, 5th edn; GS 8 (1960) *Weltanschauungslehre:*
 848 *Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, ed. B. Groethuysen, 2nd
 849 edn; GS 19 (1997) *Grundlegung der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der*
 850 *Gesellschaft und der Geschichte*, ed. H. Johach and F. Rodi, 2nd edn; GS
 851 23 (2000) *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1900–1905*,
 852 ed. G. Gebhardt and H.-U. Lessing; SW I = Wilhelm Dilthey, *Selected*
 853 *Works*, vol. 1, *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, ed. R. Makkreel and
 854 F. Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
- 855 29. Compare Dilthey’s statements on naturalism and positivism in GS 2: 312;
 856 GS 8: 152, 244; GS 23: 146. On Dilthey’s attitude towards naturalism,
 857 see Eric S. Nelson (2013) “Between Nature and Spirit: Naturalism and
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- 866 32. Gabriel, "Introduction: Carnap Brought Home," 5 and 17; Hans
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868 (Bern: P. Haupt), 109.
- 869 33. Gabriel, "Introduction: Carnap Brought Home," 17.
- 870 34. On its influence of the German youth movement on the young Carnap,
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- 873 35. Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, xv.
- 874 36. Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, xvi.
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- 879 38. Thomas Uebel (2004) "Education, Enlightenment and Positivism: The
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- 882 39. Rudolf Carnap (1956) *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and*
883 *Modal Logic*, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- 884 40. On the difference between the *Kulturwissenschaften* and the
885 *Geisteswissenschaften*, see Rudolf A. Makkreel (1969) "Wilhelm Dilthey
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887 and the Kulturwissenschaften," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 7, 4,
888 423–440.
- 889 41. Rudolf Carnap, *Tagebücher 1908 bis 1935*, 45: 12-1928 bis 12-1929, Do
890 19. Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Carnap
891 Papers. RC-XX-XX. Manuscript transcribed by Brigitta Arden and
892 Brigitte Parakenings.
- 893 42. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002) *The Phenomenology of Perception* (London:
894 *Routledge*), xvi, 27.
- 895 43. Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, xvi–xvii.
- 896 44. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1984) *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung*, in
897 *Werkausgabe*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), 84, 6.5: "For an answer
898 which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed. The
899 riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can also be
900 answered." Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, 260–261. English tr.:
901 "the 'riddles of life' are not questions, but are practical situations. The
902 'riddle of death' consists in the shock through the death of a fellow
903 human being or in the fear of one's own death. It has nothing to do with
904 questions posed about death."



- 905 45. Wittgenstein, 1984, 6.522; Carnap, “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch
906 logische Analyse der Sprache,” 81 and 103.
- 907 46. Carnap, “Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen” (repub-
908 lished), 174; for a nuanced approach to the issue of theory and practice in
909 the Vienna Circle, see Uebel, “Education, Enlightenment and Positivism:
910 The Vienna Circle’s Scientific World-Conception Revisited,” 41–66.
- 911 47. Carnap, “Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen” (repub-
912 lished), 174.
- 913 48. Ibid., 173–176; for a nuanced approach to the issue of theory and prac-
914 tice in the Vienna Circle, see Uebel, “Education, Enlightenment and
915 Positivism: The Vienna Circle’s Scientific World-Conception Revisited,”
916 41–66.
- 917 49. Carnap, “Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen” (repub-
918 lished), 176. See the argument about Kelsen in Chap. 7 of this volume.
- 919 50. Carnap, “Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen” (repub-
920 lished), 176.
- 921 51. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 8–9.
- 922 52. Carnap, “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der
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- 924 53. Martin Heidegger (2004) *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann),
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- 926 54. For the context of Comte’s German reception, see Eckhardt Fuchs
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- 930 55. Carnap, “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der
931 Sprache,” 106–107.
- 932 56. Martin Heidegger (1983) *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Frankfurt
933 am Main: Klostermann), 228. I further discuss Carnap’s critique of
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935 (2016) “Heidegger and Carnap: Disagreeing about Nothing?” in Raffoul
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- 937 57. Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 29 and 34.
- 938 58. Compare Dahms, *Postivismustreit*, 94–96, and Thomas Wheatland
939 (2009) *The Frankfurt School in Exile* (Minneapolis: University of
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- 941 59. On Dilthey’s ontic pluralism, and Heidegger’s rejection of it in favor of
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943 “Heidegger and Dilthey: Language, History, and Hermeneutics,”
944 109–128.
- 945 60. Dilthey, GS 19: 421/SW I: 498.



- 946 61. Neurath, “Soziologie im Physikalismus,” 283–287; compare Thomas
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- 951 62. Neurath, “Soziologie im Physikalismus,” 283–287.
- 952 63. Paolo Parrini, Wesley C. Salmon, and Merrilee H. Salmon (eds) (2003)
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