Intercultural Philosophy and Intercultural Hermeneutics: A Response to Defoort, Wenning, and Marchal

Eric S. Nelson
Division of Humanities,
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
hmericsn@ust.hk

I. Introduction

Carine Defoort, Mario Wenning, and Kai Marchal offer three ways of engaging with Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought and the philosophical, hermeneutical, and historical issues it attempted to articulate and address. This work is historical with a contemporary philosophical intent: to reexamine a tumultuous contested epoch of philosophy’s past in order to reconsider its existing limitations and alternative possibilities. One dimension of this book is the investigation of constellations and entanglements of historical forces and concepts for the sake of articulating critical models and alternatives for the present. In the book, I contested the modern self-image of philosophy as exclusively and intrinsically Occidental by genealogically tracing how philosophy is already intercultural through a series of case studies focusing primarily on early twentieth-century German philosophy in its broader historical context.

This critical genealogy of the intercultural conditions of the formation of modern philosophy is evidenced not only by considering “positive” influences and appropriations, as in Martin Buber, Martin Heidegger, or Georg Misch’s interpretation of Daoist sources such as the Zhuangzi (chapters 4 and 5), but also in the constructions of the autonomy and purity of modern Western philosophy through its reactions against, and exclusion and subordination of, its “non-Western” others (chapters 1, 5, and 6). The book does not represent a purely Western history or narrative insofar as I draw on a variety of argumentational and hermeneutical strategies from Chinese and other discourses to reverse and transform Western prejudices and perspectives. Two important examples of contesting and transforming Western perspectives in the text can be mentioned here. First, I examine the Confucian analysis of resentment in chapter 3 in response to the identification of the Chinese people and Chinese thought with resentment. The Confucian discourse in many ways offers a more nuanced and systematic analysis of the moral psychology of resentment than Western philosophical analyses.

Second, in chapter 5, I draw inspiration from the Zhuangzi, and Misch’s interpretation, in pursuing a strategy of undermining and undoing fixations by exposing the limitations of false claims to truth and universality through a
series of historical examples focused on early twentieth-century interactions between Chinese and German thought.3 “The Autumn Floods” (Qiushui 秋水) chapter of the Zhuangzi, which fascinated Misch as an image of “breakthrough” (Durchbruch) and breaking-out from an unreflective natural attitude, depicts how the great river is shocked by its own smallness when entering the sea. The second passage of Qiushui speaks of the frog in the well that cannot glimpse or comprehend anything beyond its limited perspective.4 Leaping out of one’s well is challenging if not impossible. While the ethnocentric skeptic can deny that a genuine leap outside the well and change of perspective has ever occurred, we can ask how he/she knows it has not occurred.

Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought was composed as a philosophical history in which we ourselves are participating. It is a deeply hermeneutical project insofar as it calls on its author and readers to practice what it analyzes (undoing fixations) and reflect on itself as part of its object of inquiry (the current polycultural hermeneutical situation).

II. Decolonizing Philosophy, Modernity, and the Lifeworld

The hegemonic idea of philosophy as disinterested theory, pure reason, and rigorous science, progressing from its presumed ancient Greek origins to Western modernity, is a derivative development of this history. The teleological narrative of the philosophy of history was constructed not only by prominent canonical thinkers such as Hegel and Husserl, who are frequent targets of multicultural criticism, but in the submerged sedimented discourses from which they emerged. Well-intentioned multicultural philosophers miss an important point in the debate when they argue that it is only an issue of the particularities of Western vis-à-vis “non-Western” cultures, since the most hegemonic discourses of the primacy of the West do not directly appeal to race or premodern Western cultures. It is the idea of Western modernity and Occidental rationalization that deadlocks debates about Eurocentrism and multiculturalism inside and outside of philosophy. Hegel and Husserl are two good examples of this tendency. Husserl, to speak schematically in ways that are more carefully discussed in chapter 6 of the book, in his last major work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, which attempted to challenge the racism and culturalism of fascist Europe with Europe as an infinite ideal of universal humanity, maintained the preeminence of universal humanity as a normative idea through its universal and infinite aspirations for all humanity and its development of cultures of science, reason, and freedom that are portrayed as transcending the anthropological particularities in which other cultures remain absorbed.5

Communication, interaction, and other forms of mediation constitute discourses that become fixated and sedimented and in turn shape
communicative practices and forms of social and cultural life. These processes have been interpreted in relatively monocultural ways by thinkers such as Edmund Husserl and Jürgen Habermas. Rather than reject their thought as merely Eurocentric, however, I propose an intercultural reinterpretation that concurrently contextualizes and intensifies their own universalistic aspirations. The concept of the “intercultural”—which is better described as the interaction of lifeworlds instead of cultures—refers to how these practices and processes occur across a multiplicity of cultural systems and lifeworlds, even within one specific lifeworld that is structured by its relations to its others. This argument entails provincializing the idea or undoing the fixation of Europe or the West, which continues to be construed as the unique bearer of genuine humanity, individual freedom and subjectivity, and philosophy as a systematic theoretical discourse.

This intercultural strategy does not signify eliminating the universal aspirations and normative impulses of Western modernity identified by Husserl and Habermas. Rather it requires a more radical realization of these aspirations—in which the abject and repressed come to define themselves and speak for themselves—by “breaking through” sedimented lifeworlds and limited provincial constellations of discourse and power that are assumed to be natural. As I trace in chapter six, this reconceptualization breaks with Husserl’s teleological interpretations of culture, history, and spirit while being deeply in accord with Husserl’s definition of transcendental inquiry as occurring in the breakthrough (Durchbruch) that places in question the assumed (taken for granted) presuppositions of the natural unreflective attitude in the phenomenological investigation of their constitution. As examined in chapter 6, Husserl recognized this transcendental moment to be at work in Buddhism in the mid-1920s, although he denied it to non-European discourses in The Crisis in 1935/1936. As argued in chapter 5, Misch’s work on the multiple origins of philosophy offers a suggestive way for developing a more comprehensive and adequate conception of philosophical reflection.

Another example of reinterpreting Eurocentric philosophy with and against itself can be seen in the critical theory of Habermas. If his commitments to a developmental history of Occidental reason were decentered, Habermas’ identification of rationality with the communicative potential, interaction, and reproduction of the lifeworld can be “decolonized” in an intercultural reinterpretation that recognizes the specific form of rationality at work in each lifeworld. As explored in chapter 2 of my book, the New Confucian (xin rujia 新儒家) philosopher and political theorist Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (Carsun Chang) endeavored to specify forms of rationality embedded and practiced in the Chinese historical world and expressed in reflective intellectual and philosophical discourses.

This book concerns the intercultural in relation to German philosophy. On the one hand, it does not provide a Chinese perspective on German
philosophy or an intercultural history of Chinese philosophy that other authors will hopefully write. Insofar as it briefly pursues Chinese philosophy and Sinological analysis, it is global and intercultural rather than “Sinocentric.” On the other hand, its primary point is to interculturally reorient “Western” philosophy and hermeneutics. It would be insufficient to give another internal self-critique of philosophy as metaphysics, logocentrism, or totality that refuses exposure to alterities beyond its Western borders.9

Another feature of this book is accordingly to follow the twofold path of an internal immanent critique of Western philosophy, drawing on its own motivations, aspirations, and arguments in relation to its encounters, misencounters, and non-encounters with the alterity of Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist discourses and forms of life. Given that this history is predominantly one of missed and non-encounters, and entangled with colonial and racial regimes, one might be skeptical that a genuine intercultural encounter is possible.

The anti-intercultural skeptic takes for granted the impossibility of understanding and presupposes an intractable “ethnocentric a priori” governing each lifeworld. The relativistic skeptic concludes that there is only the incommensurability and conflict of forms of life and worldviews without inquiring into their constitution. First, such arguments preclude the breakthrough in critical reflection (Besinnung) on self and world articulated in the hermeneutical and phenomenological tradition of Dilthey, Misch, and Husserl.10 Second, the idea of an inescapable ethnocentric a priori (even if interpreted in its most liberalized contingent form as with Rorty) presupposes a racial, cultural, or linguistic essentialism and consequent incommensurability. Contrary to the assertion of such an intractable incommensurability, which is taken to signify the impossibility of philosophy as the practice of reflection and critique, the intercultural is operative in different senses: the “intercultural” is already operative in Western philosophy in the sense of (1) an intersecting referentiality (that was described in the book through Julia Kristeva’s notion of “intertextuality”) even if it were the case that it never can be achieved (2) a genuine encounter, recognition, or mutual understanding (“intersubjectivity”) due to (3) hegemonic forms of power and privilege. Given the complexity of this nexus and its material dimensions, which function not merely at the level of culture and communication, intercultural philosophy is a significant, yet not the only, element of a contemporary critical social theory and ethics of material life.11

III. The Very Idea of Philosophy

Defoort, Wenning, and Marchal each address topics related to (1) the idea of philosophy, (2) intercultural encounter, communication, and hybridity, and (3) the practice of intercultural interpretation.

The question of the scope of the concept of philosophy has been insightfully contextualized and addressed in the writings of Carine Defoort
over the last two decades, and the analysis in my book was informed by these works. In them and in her comments included above in this issue, Defoort has clarified the ways in which the Chinese masters (zi 子) are and are not philosophical given a broad pluralistic conception of philosophy. In addition to opening up Western philosophy, one needs to avoid imposing Western discursive and interpretive norms onto discourses that have their own norms and forms of interpretation and argumentation. Defoort articulates a number of tactics for negotiating the relations between modern Western and Chinese philosophical discourses without abandoning their own specificity and claims. Defoort’s discussions provide a rich account basis for a nuanced and sensitive conception of philosophy and intercultural hermeneutics.

Defoort notes how I pursue the issue of the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy from the back side (that is, the non-philosophical side) of the question. The critique of both the idea and the social function of philosophy is called for as Western discourses that have defined and delimited the concept and scope of philosophy. Tracing and reconstructing the shifting conceptions of philosophy that occur through the Western debates over the very idea of philosophy allows one to recognize the pathways that have led to the exclusion of other forms of philosophical reflection from its modern Western idea. Philosophy is constructed as a discourse of freedom, individuality, and science, and as primarily Western in relation to the globalization of European hegemony in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The recognition that philosophy is a mediation of diverse cultural elements and insights was recognized to an extent by Greek, Medieval Christian, and early Modern philosophers. Diogenes Laërtius narrates arguments for and against the position that philosophy can only be Greek. Christian philosophers read and debated with their Middle Eastern peers, as the Islamic transmission of philosophy played a central role in its revival in Europe. Early modern thinkers like Leibniz openly engaged with Chinese discourses in philosophical ways.

Diogenes Laërtius, in the opening passages of his Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, described Greek debates over whether barbarians (that is, non-Greeks) have philosophy. He narrated how, on one side, arguments that the “love of wisdom” as a uniquely Greek expression are not found in other languages that only speak of “wisdom.” The various peoples of the world have sages, legislators, prophets; they do not use the expression “love of wisdom,” which distinguished the philosophers from others who claimed a different form of authority. The Greek conception of philosophy is described in Diogenes also as the pursuit of wisdom for the sake of understanding nature and self and, more importantly, how one ought best to live one’s life. Diogenes also presented arguments for why philosophy is practiced among diverse cultures. First, the Greek philosophers claimed to have learned various forms of argument and analysis, and not simply borrowed ideas,
from the Egyptians, Babylonians, Indians, and so on. Second, it is evident that the peoples of the Middle East pursued the knowledge of nature, mathematics, and moral life, and thus could be well described as engaging in philosophy. Given the interpretation presented by Diogenes, it could be argued that it is modern Western philosophy that is not philosophy due to its abandonment of the love of wisdom and care of the self that are at the heart of Greek, Chinese, and other forms of philosophical life.

In the book, I focused on one stage of the formation of the idea of philosophy and argued for its belatedness and modernity. The modern marginalization of “non-Western” discourses that continues to shape the contemporary practice and institutionalization of philosophy is a fairly late and modern reconceptualization of philosophy, in opposition to the wisdom pursued by its lovers inside or outside Greece, according to an anachronistic history of the European spirit that presumes itself to be “world-spirit.”

In response to Defoort, Wenning, and Marchal, we agree that the question of the idea of philosophy is itself a highly philosophical question that concerned the philosophers discussed in our essays. While Hegel or Husserl conceived of philosophy as systematic and rigorous sciences, which excluded expressions of wisdom and worldviews from the proper discipline of philosophy, others from Herder to Dilthey and Misch perceived the potential practice of philosophical thinking in all human cultures. Dilthey and Misch did not reduce philosophy to the mere uncritical and unreflective expression of opinions, psychological states, and worldviews, identifying it rather with a fundamental “metaphysical need” that leads to the breakthrough of critical self-reflection in diverse cultural milieus. The need for critical reflection on the conditions of one’s life is not the totality of philosophy, as it developed into systematic structured discourses in a range of cultural contexts such as the Chinese, Greek, and Indian historical worlds. Critical reflection on life is, however, philosophy’s origin, and the reflective engagement with life its aim, Misch argued, in China and India as much as in Greece. Misch’s arguments related philosophy back to its life-contexts without dissolving it there. This is a helpful correction to more limited conceptions of philosophy depicted by Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and their heirs without abandoning the idea that philosophy encompasses reflection, critique, and implicit and explicit forms of argumentation.

IV. Hybridity and Hermeneutics

Wenning in his essay provides a description and analysis of culturally hybrid conceptions of philosophy in twentieth-century German thought and extends his analysis to Karl Löwith’s efforts at intercultural philosophizing in Japan during his exile from Nazi Germany. I am sympathetic with Wenning’s comments and transformations, as he explicates intercultural encounter, communication, and hybridity. As chapter 2 briefly considers in regard to
figures such as Rudolf Eucken, Hans Driesch, and Richard Wilhelm, concepts of fusion, merging, and hybridity were expressions deployed in Weimar intercultural discourses that would be rejected as degenerate under National Socialism. For the former, hybridity was a creative merging that formed new forms of thought and life, whereas National Socialist ideology negatively identified hybridity with one of its definitions, the inability to reproduce.

Creolization is the mixing of previous forms to produce new ones. Rather than being the exception, processes of hybridization and creolization are the norm as new discourses, languages, communities, and peoples are formed. Hans and Margarete Driesch, in their accounts of East-West relations and Jewish-German relations, noted this process of fusion in forming new forms of thought and new communities, prefiguring an intercultural conception of philosophy and society.

Defoort and Wenning directly and indirectly consider the asymmetrical power relations in the colonial and postcolonial encounter between “East” and “West.” The authority of Western philosophy permitted it to place the entire burden of proof exclusively on “non-Western” discourses to demonstrate their philosophical worth. “Non-Western” philosophies can be selectively celebrated and appropriated in Orientalist fixated forms and treated as the raw materials for Western theorizing.

In response to the hermeneutical concerns articulated by Defoort, Wenning, and Marchal, one should distinguish between situations of “first contact” and the initial pursuit of understanding from its developed form. Comparative philosophy is often discussed as if it were still at the first stage, when it had been already practiced and theorized as an initial encounter, where principles of interpretive charity (as in Leibniz’s discourse concerning China) perceived the other’s discourse as rational or, in an earlier context in which Chinese were confronted with interpreting Buddhism, of geyi 格義, the “categorizing concepts” that systemically categorized concepts in a foreign discourse (Buddhism) with those of a native discourse (Daoism).

More fundamental than charity and geyi as the systematic categorization of previously unconnected concepts is the asymmetrical responsibility for the other in its alterity, and systematically developing the “foreign” discourse in its own terms in one’s “native” language as in the Chinese formation of its own forms of Buddhist thought and practice.

These hermeneutical considerations are also part of an intercultural critical social theory. Walter Benjamin considered the redemptive task of philosophy in remembering the dead and forgotten. Ernst Bloch returned to the repressed voices of the aspirational movements of the past. This task is described as “reviving the perished and restoring the broken”—an expression adopted from the Chunqiu 春秋—by the new Confucian philosophers Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, and Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) in their common manifesto later identified as “New Confucian.”

Eric S. Nelson 253
V. The Manifesto and Intercultural Philosophy

The “New Confucian Manifesto” is an exemplar of a hybrid intercultural philosophical reflection. Its publication marked a transition point in the revival of Confucianism (often dismissed in the West and attacked from the May Fourth Movement to the Cultural Revolution in China) as a viable contemporary philosophical perspective and discourse. The manifesto analyzes the limitations of two interpretive strategies: (1) an external application of the universal to the particular that lacks the familiarity and intimacy that is necessary for genuine understanding, and (2) an absorption in a particular discourse and way of life that prevents critical reflection and insight into the broader significance of that form of thought and life.

New “hybrid” interpretive models are required that would be appropriate for recognizing the universality and rationality that to varying degrees is explicit and implicit in “non-Western” traditions while calling them to rethink and transform themselves under altered conditions. It is in this sense that they could elucidate a “new” Confucianism in the context of colonialism, modernization, Westernization, communist revolution, and the need for Chinese democracy. These issues remain contemporary.

Their call of “reviving the perished and restoring the broken” informs my project in two ways: (1) recalling the Chinese and Asian philosophical models that the normative or “high” Western philosophical tradition has marginalized and excluded by (2) returning to European thinkers who have transgressed these boundaries, despite their imperfect understanding, in order to engage in dialogue and exchange with Asian philosophical discourses. As an alternative to both the “Eurocentric” conception of philosophy and the rejection of philosophy as a merely ethnocentric construct, this book exhibits how intercultural philosophizing is already under way and how its past teaches lessons for the present.

A compelling moment in classical Chinese philosophy is the destabilization and transformation of limited perspectives in the Zhuangzi discussed above. This Zhuangzian strategy becomes intercultural and contemporary in the present work in weaving together threads from varied and contradictory discourses to respond to our hermeneutical situation, which is characterized by conflict, negotiation, and coming to an understanding between culturally diverse individuals and groups. This volume accordingly advocates, in a historically contextualized way, the emerging intercultural turn in contemporary philosophy in contrast to both ethnocentric absorption and coercive universalism. Insofar as we are participating in the intercultural turn, and debating its prospects, it is worthwhile to note how this work’s intercultural strategy diverges from other efforts to persuade academic philosophy to transform itself along with the phenomena that it would interpret. The conventional Western universalist approach threatens to reduce “non-Western” philosophical discourses to a questionable notion.
of globalized modern Western universality, understood typically through scientific naturalism and conventional capitalist liberalism. The Western multiculturalist posits a variety of isolated forms of particularity, which are in danger of reification as unified cultural types and narratives of national identity closed off from one another.

Recalling the “New Confucian Manifesto,” and its advocacy for the continuing relevance of renewing and re-appropriating Chinese cultural forms and models while critiquing absorption and reification in limiting essentialist notions of what it signifies to be Chinese, philosophers cannot forsake a critical sensibility in being confronted by claims about the essence of a culture (whether their own or another), whether it be articulated in ethnocentric or racialized Western discourses or under conditions of nationalist self-promotion for the sake of consolidating a sense of the Chinese people and Chinese philosophy as expressions of national identity or essence.

The present hermeneutical strategy stresses the “inter” as the non-identity between the universal and the particular. The oscillation occurring between two poles, which cannot be finalized, through the effort and play of intercultural encounter, exchange, and dialogue signifies the transformation and unfolding of new discourses and communities through which multiple pasts and voices are appropriated anew. Instead of identifying hermeneutics with the hermeneutics of identity (whether in a universal or particular form), the ongoing intercultural turn in philosophy indicates the need for a hermeneutics of non-identity.18

VI. Intercultural Thinking between the Particular and the Universal

Finally, we should consider Marchal’s noteworthy questions for the future of intercultural thinking and his concern to separate Chinese discourses and their Sinological study from philosophy. On the one hand, he expresses concern with the problem of relativism, in which there can be no generalizable criterion of assessment between different cultures, and with preserving the particularity of cultures and discourses against the universalism and commensurability of discourses implied by the concept of the “intercultural.” An adequate conception of the intercultural, given these two demands, would need to be able to make judgments across cultures, regarding justice for instance, and at the same time recognize and respect cultural uniqueness and value.

First, philosophy occurs within creolized spaces of fusion and hybridity, even in its reaction against them. It arises in relation to its lifeworld in the critical reflection that occurs in breaking through the unreflective natural attitude. It occurs as critical reflection, which can become a systematic discourse, questioning and assessing the constitution and generation of the significance of its conditions and circumstances. This definition of philosophy is advanced by interculturally reinterpreting philosophers such as Buber,
Heidegger, Husserl, and Misch. An adequate intercultural philosophy should justify three dimensions: the recognition of differences, their mediation and transformation, and the diagnostic critique of existing conditions.

Second, this potential dilemma presupposes a cultural essentialism that is contested in my work. The intercultural in my account refers to intertextual referentiality and intersubjective communication across lifeworlds. The cultural essentialist and relativist presuppose rather than demonstrate that such referentiality and communication are impossible. The intercultural refers to the inevitability of cultural mediation, and thus contests the possibility of accessing either the bare particular or the pure universal.

We must beware of the questionable identification of hermeneutics and phenomenology with arbitrary assertions made in the first-person perspective. My work modifies interculturally while remaining committed to hermeneutic phenomenology. Hermeneutics concerns understanding and interpreting the intersubjective and communicative processes between the first and second person in which others are disclosed and in which we are already participants, while phenomenology is the elucidation of the constitution of the world as disclosed in the first-person perspective.

Philosophy is no doubt not merely its history and should not be reduced to a variety of philosophical positions; yet history is crucial for a philosophy that would diagnose its present situation, and the plurality of philosophical perspectives presents a reality that any adequate practice of philosophy must encounter and confront. The “primacy of interpretation” does not refer so much to the relativity and incommensurability of worldviews and perspectives as it does to the necessity of tracking the mediations and disclosures that are more than our subjective constructions without being static objectivities.

Another difference in interpretation between us concerns my brief discussion of the Yijing 易經, a composite text that has been almost infinitely redeployed in Chinese, East Asian, and global discourses according to the imagination of its interpreters. My argument here sought to indicate a Chinese response to a Western argument much like the discussions of resentment in Confucianism and transformation of perspectives in the Zhuangzi. The Yijing, as interpreted by Wang Bi 王弼 among others, indicates multiple transformative models that allow one to reflectively and imaginatively be attuned and respond to changing conditions and circumstances. This moment in Wang Bi’s interpretation of the Yijing offers a provocative critical model (in Adorno’s sense) for philosophical reflection in contrast to relying on one invariant method or hermeneutical ideal.19

I appreciate these three thoughtful responses to my work. There is no doubt that the analyses and arguments of Defoort, Wenning, and Marchal demonstrate the vibrancy of contemporary debates and reflections concerning intercultural philosophy as well as the transformative potential of the polycultural turn.
Notes


2 – Kai Marchal compared this strategy to Dieter Henrich’s constellation research above. My approach is informed by its earlier uses in the critical social theory of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno.

3 – Misch 1926. See the discussion of Misch’s reading of the Zhuangzi and its implications for intercultural hermeneutics in Nelson 2017, chap. 5.


5 – Husserl 1970.


7 – For an attempt to rehabilitate Hegel’s vision of history in less ethnocentric terms, see Pinkard 2017.

8 – On the movement of “New Confucianism,” see Rošker 2015.

9 – In addition to Nelson 2017, this argument is worked out in relation to Derrida and Rorty in Nelson 2011, pp. 377–396.


11 – I develop this ethics of material others in Nelson 2020. On critical theory and intercultural philosophy, also see Wenning 2011, pp. 50–71.


16 – Misch 1926. See the discussion of Misch’s reading of the Zhuangzi and its implications for intercultural hermeneutics in Nelson 2017, chap. 5.

On the ethics and hermeneutics of alterity and non-identity, see Nelson 2020.

For an extended consideration of the Yijing’s philosophical import, see Nelson and Yang 2016, pp. 267–288.

References


