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LIFE AND WORLD

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1. Introduction

This chapter offers a systematically oriented and historically informed examination of the notions of “life,” “world,” and “worldview” as they are articulated in classical hermeneutical thinking, particularly in relation to its intellectual context in the works of Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger. I focus on the contrast and tensions between life explained as a naturalistic physical and biological phenomenon, life as felt and intuited directly through the self, and life understood as an interpretive social-historical enactment; and between world as factually, empirically, and immediately given and world as constituted and generated through relational contexts of sense and meaning that call for indirect processes of explication and communication to be appropriately enacted and understood.

In addition to examining life and world in their own senses, I consider the interactions between life and world in hermeneutical and phenomenological conceptions of lived-experience (*Erlebnis*), worldview (*Weltanschauung*), lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*), world as horizon (*Welthorizont*), and truth as world-giveness, world-formation, and world-disclosure. These interpretive conceptions are central from earlier hermeneutical thought to the contemporary situation and task of hermeneutics in the early twenty-first century. Such conceptions and the experiences they address help illuminate epistemic and ontological questions of the subjectivity, shared intersubjectivity, and objectivity of life and world that serve as orienting questions for this survey.

2. Life as natural, socially mediated, and subjective

The ordinary German words for life (*Leben*) and world (*Welt*), much like their English equivalents, have taken on an equivocal range of meanings that are not altogether compatible. This dissonance of sense is evident in their intellectual uses and interpretations of life and world.

In the case of world, for instance, discussants accentuate either the naturalness of the world, which Husserl described as the “naïve” acceptance of the world as given in the “natural concept of the world” (*natürlicher Weltbegriff*), or the constituted and

mediated formation and sedimentation of meanings into a world, which the later Husserl called “lifeworld” (*Lebenswelt*).¹ World can be identified with the worlds of natural, social, and subjective life, as in the early Heidegger’s distinction between self-*(selbst-)*, with-*(mit-)*, and environing-*(um-)* worlds.

Life likewise can refer to the factuality of an objectively explainable natural biological process (e.g. “the life of amoeba”) or to a symbolically and socially mediated form or way of life of a biographical individual (e.g. “the life of Goethe”) or group of humans (e.g. “the life of the German working class”). There is a third more subjective personal sense of life, disseminated in individualistic forms of nineteenth-century Romanticism, life-philosophy, and existentialism, in which my or another’s life appears to be so singular and unique that a life transcends the general conditions and features of natural and social life such as – perhaps most radically – in Søren Kierkegaard’s indirect communications concerning a “non-numerical” and irreducibly singular individual in its interiority.²

In the writings of the nineteenth-century hermeneutical philosopher Dilthey, who plays a crucial role in the history of the concepts of life and world in hermeneutics and phenomenology, one finds side by side multiple senses of life in discussions of organic and bodily life, cultural, historical, and national life, and a personal life too complex to be reduced to its physical and social conditions. The dictum of Dilthey’s incomplete multivolume biography of Friedrich Schleiermacher running into thousands of pages is accordingly “the individual is ineffable.”³ Dilthey’s inexpressible individual diverges, however, from a transcendent incomprehensibility or irrational singularity: “each life has its own sense.”⁴ Immanent ineffability points toward the complex and infinite task of tracing and interpreting the mediations of natural and social life in an individual life: “The infinite richness of life unfolds itself in individual existence because of its relations to its milieu, other humans and things. But every particular individual is also a crossing point of contexts which move through and beyond its particular life.”⁵

“Life” is thoroughly relational and holistic in Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Dilthey rejected a model of holism that relied on the image of a self-identical biological organism due to his methodologically prioritizing individual persons. His structural relationality concerning the external organization of society did not presuppose the real existence of collective entities. Life is hermeneutical according to Dilthey: the practical effective nexus of life (*Lebenszusammenhang*) in its facticity is concurrently the point of departure, the medium, and the purpose of intersubjectively oriented understanding (*Verstehen*) and interpretation (*Interpretation* or *Auslegung*). Dilthey recommends interpreting the “lived-experience” (*Erlebnis*) and pre-theoretical reflexively felt and aware “feeling of life” (*Lebensgefühl*) of individuals through their expression (*Ausdruck*) and their products and artifacts. The modes of human life are explicated out of their own worldly comportments and from their “being-there-within life” (*Darinnensein im Leben*).⁶

Traditional hermeneutics focused on the clarification of the historical, linguistic, and psychological conditions of Biblical and classical sources. Understanding and interpretation are gradually more associated – to a lesser extent in Schleiermacher, and more overtly in Dilthey – with the autobiographical participant perspective of personally inflected lived-experience.⁷ The first-person life-perspective informs and orients social-historical and epistemic reflectiveness (*Besinnung*) and those sciences

that cannot bracket the triple hermeneutic of inquiry into the “human world.” The human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) remain empirically oriented, methodologically generated, and systematically structured even as they presuppose, utilize, and interpret a concrete nexus of life.

Informed by multiple senses of “life,” modern central European intellectual traditions have explained life as a naturalistic physical and biological phenomenon, perceived life as vitally felt and directly intuitable in the living present, posited life as a historical realm to be transformed through praxis or as a higher realm of meaning, value, and validity, and understood life as an already interpretive social-historical reality. Dilthey approached life as an acquired relational nexus of signification reflexively felt and practically interpreted with reference to the first person autobiographical perspective. Dilthey’s non-theistic personalism is evocative for the non-naturalistic discourses of life and lifeworld unfolded in subsequent hermeneutics, phenomenology, and critical social theory.

The language of life-philosophy was also significant for the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle when it described its wider concerns. Rudolf Carnap was concerned in the 1920s with defending a scientific lifestance (*Lebenshaltung*) and life-conception (*Lebensauffassung*) in the midst of the menacing growth of irrationality and totalitarianism.⁸ In the life-philosophical conclusion to the program of the Ernst Mach Society (*Verein Ernst Mach*), jointly published in 1929 by Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath, and dedicated to Schlick in honor of his remaining in Vienna, science and life as well as knowledge and affectively rooted worldview are affirmed to be complementary forces in a scientific-oriented life-conception. The love of science is rooted in an emotional disposition toward knowing the world and furthering practical life: the scientific lifestance is dedicated to serving life and in response is taken up by life.⁹

3. World as given and as constituted

The German word for world (*Welt*) likewise has an ambiguous range of meanings. The world can signify this particular world or the singular-plural world as such; it can be the world in its facticity, givenness, and thereness or the world as it is “given to me” or “there for me” to use Dilthey’s expressions. The world is not just any world; it is a “constituted” world in Husserl’s phenomenology and “disclosed” in Heidegger’s thinking of truth.

World-constitution need not entail the strong idealistic thesis that the world is mentally dependent or originated. Husserl’s argument concerns instead the active and passive intentionality of a conscious and bodily subject and its constitution of meaning.

World is in a fundamental sense “my” experiential world within an intended universal world-horizon (Husserl’s *Welthorizont*) or it is in each case “my own” (*jemeinig*) world disclosed through my way of “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger).¹⁰ Husserl maintained that “my world is the opening in which all experience occurs.”¹¹ The “I am” is the “primordial intentional foundation of my world” (“*der intentionale Urgrund für meine Welt*”); there is nothing that appears outside of the horizon of “my world” or the first person perspective of the “I am.”¹² World is generated,

constituted, and sedimented through relational contexts of sense and meaning that presuppose an “I.” This is the transcendental dimension of the “I” or subjectivity of the first-person perspective that bodily and mentally orients and forms the world.

The word “*Lebenswelt*” has a long history prior to Husserl, who did not systematically use the expression until the late work *Crisis of the European Sciences* published in 1936.¹³ Like the word *Umwelt* (environing world), earlier usage of the expression “lifeworld” referred to the environment. Both phrases referred to either a natural setting or a historical cultural milieu in the context of nineteenth-century German thought. But there is continuity between the two senses as both were interpreted as relational and interactive. The organism reacts to and acts on its enviring lifeworld. It is the co-relational sense of the constitution and disclosure of the world to the intentional subject and being-there that Husserl and Heidegger in the 1920s are drawing upon. The fluctuation in the experience and concept of world is evident in the variations on “world” in hermeneutics and phenomenology such as in Dilthey’s lifeworld, Husserl’s lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*), and Heidegger’s enviring world (*Umwelt*).¹⁴

4. Life as world picturing

In the following sections, I will explore the problematic of world in the context of Dilthey’s philosophy of worldviews.

“Worldview” (*Weltanschauung*) is a concept with roots in German Idealism. It functions in Fichte and Schelling as an organizing depiction of life.¹⁵ A worldview is the formation of life through the perception or picturing (*anschauen*) of a world. The idealistic account of worldview is rejected by Dilthey in support of a hermeneutical one. A historically situated and self-reflexive life interpretively pictures and forms a world for itself and expresses and communicates this world in myriad ways throughout its life. This picturing of world (*Weltbild*) does not transpire through the self-intuition or self-assertion of a self or subject. Its world is formed in the self’s interactive cogiveness with the exteriority of things and others revealed in phenomena such as resistance and misunderstanding. As others make the self-interpretation and individuation of my life possible through processes of learning and socialization, one’s world is primarily a “human world” for Dilthey, understood through historically constituted “life-views” (*Lebensanschauungen*) that often attempt to transcend merely human perspectives.

A plurality of life- and world-perspectives emerge as humans are constituted in social-historical worlds shaped by natural forces, biological drives, practical interests, sedimented customs and traditions, the reproduction of powerful structures and institutions, normative-spiritual strivings, and communicative and self-reflection. Given their varied sources, the sciences of the human world need to be multifaceted. Unlike the natural sciences that abstract from and bracket their basis in human life, the human sciences cannot escape from their own reflexivity and the need to self-reflectively engage the human world in which they transpire, as knowledge of the human world occurs within that world.¹⁶

As worldly embodied life is molded by sentiments and habits, exteriority and facticity, self-understanding and interpretation cannot be purely conceptual

processes.¹⁷ They involve all dimensions and “faculties” – cognitive and affective – of human existence. The human sciences can modify but not abolish the passions and interests of human life that enter into the study of that life. The internally given world of the self to itself indicates the initial givenness from the first-person perspective of co-agents or participants of meaningful social-cultural structures and processes. The “inner world” refers to the first-person life-context, which is intrinsically bodily, perceptual, and worldly as well as social-historical, in which objects are pre-conceptually and conceptually understood. The “internal” human world is constituted through social-historically formed practical goods, interests, norms, purposes, and values.¹⁸

The “outer” or “external world” refers to the abstraction of objects from their life-nexus in the third-person perspective of observation and explanation characteristic of the modern natural sciences and associated with worldviews such as naturalism and materialism.¹⁹ Such worldviews remain metaphysical in affirming one conclusive picture and truth about the world. Dilthey construes metaphysics as representing the world through a unified point projected beyond the world in order to theorize the world as a translucent organized whole.²⁰

Metaphysical statements presuppose a perspective outside of any possible worldly perspective and conflict with modernity and its skepticism concerning cognizing the world through the transcendent. Dilthey articulates this claim from the conflict between the historical consciousness of the present, and its awareness of difference, with every metaphysics taken as science.²¹ The aporia between reason and history is due to reason extending beyond itself and claiming definiteness about the indefinite, cognitive clarity about what is a product of an affective mood (*Stimmung*) and historical life nexus.

The historical consciousness of difference stimulates possibilities for skepticism and relativism. After the end of objective metaphysics, including positivistic programs of a unified science, to what extent can value, validity, and truth arise in the multiplicity and relativity of human experiences? Without the metaphysical integration of one world, which has fallen into paradox and aporia for Dilthey, we are confronted with myriad incommensurable sources. As Heidegger remarked, being (*Sein*) is absent in beings (*Seiende*); the world has vanished in a plurality of worlds, and the ontological difference disappears in interminable ontic differences.²²

Dilthey described how ontic and empirical multiplicity cannot be joined into one fixed and stable world-picture or sublimated (*aufgehoben*) in one integrated external world.²³ Rather than avowing the ultimate coherence of the world and knowledge, Dilthey unfolded a non-reductive pluralistic empiricism and moderate life-oriented skepticism in relation to “one world.”

The validity of relativism and skepticism rests in the therapeutic adjustment of overgeneralized perspectives that reify the established contemporary type of human being as the natural and universal standard of all forms of life.²⁴ Given the commonalities of human existence, understanding and interpretation are not random but conditional in the life-contexts which they respond to and transform. The individuality of things does not make any possible interpretation permissible, as it calls the interpreter to be experientially receptive and responsive to the other phenomenally and immanently from out of itself and in its own empirical situation. Insofar

as we are concerned with universal validity and facticity, commonality and singularity, a morphological-comparative strategy that elucidates individuality in relation to its context and its others is methodologically appropriate. It requires an epistemic strategy that includes all ontic and empirical aspects of human existence, and above all psychology and history.²⁵

5. Living within the historical world

It is erroneous to assert that “[f]or Dilthey, the task of human understanding is to liberate the social from the empirical” and, as if world-picturing and the empirical were disconnected categories, it is “an image of the world, a *Weltbild*, [that] determines the value of life.”²⁶ Values are not superimposed on life from the outside, even though they can be coercively applied, since it is life immanently valuing itself that forms a world-picture, which in turn orients and disorients that life in the tension between value and facticity. A *Weltbild* is a dynamic experientially shaped understanding and picturing of a world rather than a static and immutable “cosmic picture.”²⁷ Instead of being underway from a doctrinal principle, originary source, or self-evident intuition to the phenomena, experience and worldview interact and inform one another as particular and general between part and whole. Dilthey’s consequently prioritizes the empirical (*Empirie*), including the appearance of the unexpected that fractures or reorients a world, while resisting reductive conceptions of empirical explanation.

Heidegger suspects that Dilthey’s notion of subjectivity remains beholden to a modern conception of the epistemic and psychological subject that needs to be overcome.²⁸ This criticism should be seen in relation to Dilthey’s thinking of subjectivity through embodied worldly life. Subjectivity cannot be isolated in a monadic interiority; it is bound up with feelings and cognitions responsive to its environing world and life-context. It consists of interpreting the self’s contextual historicity, which permits and requires developmental and comparative strategies of description and analysis.

Dilthey introduces the notion of types in this context that he employs in his morphology of world-pictures. Types have a preliminary heuristic character that allows them to open up and articulate the singular in relation to its contexts.²⁹ Types are not irrevocable constructs or irreversible prejudices. Types are the researcher’s hermeneutical anticipations that can be transformed through research just as the self’s anticipations about the other should be revised in encountering the other.³⁰ This is not only a methodological issue, as a world-picture is rooted in and expresses a life.³¹ Dilthey’s comparative morphology of life- and world-pictures leads to the elucidation of their living nexus and experiential context.³²

This comparative coordinating strategy also informs Dilthey’s response to the question of relativism. The antinomies within a scientific world-picture and the contradictions between world-pictures are not resolvable by conceptual theorizing because they are expressions of human life in its diversity and perspectivity.³³ The self-interpretation of a world-picture leads Dilthey to judge metaphysical and cognitive-theoretical propositions to be an expression (*Ausdruck*) of life and lived-experience. Metaphysics, or “philosophy” including Dilthey’s hermeneutical experientialism,

cannot resolve the conflict of worlds; life and world stances and their conflict are constitutive of the dynamics and perspectives of life itself.³⁴ The resolution of the antinomy in a projected systematic totality is to suppress the differences constitutive of life.³⁵ Instead of a systematic totality that suppresses what is thought to be contingent, Dilthey appeals for an epistemic humility.³⁶ Dilthey identifies with the cultivation of a tragic sensibility that is an openness to the world and the irresolvable differences and conflicts of life.³⁷

Dilthey affirms preserving key insights from German idealism while rejecting the idealist priority of consciousness over embodied worldly life. Life not only projects and forms a world out of its own consciousness, or self-existence, its world is always already there (*da*) for it.³⁸ The world is inevitably present and there as a whole for the self in one way or another.³⁹ The self is not constituted in self-reflection alone but in consciousness, and reflection is a response to its exteriority, facticity, and worldliness.⁴⁰ Life becomes a world through the irremovable experience of resistance and reversal.⁴¹

Georg Misch contrasted Dilthey's "thereness" in the midst of life and Heidegger's transcendental and impersonal "it worlds." Thereness is not a "worlding of the world" that absorbs the individual, but the formation of an individual reality and individuation of a world for a co-relational self.⁴² This formation of a world for a life centers on the feeling, thought, and will of the individual and the relation of the body to its world rooted in the senses and the bodily feeling of life.⁴³ Dilthey describes here the traumatic emergence of the self through its differentiation from the world in resistance and the exposure to facticity of its receptive spontaneity and vitality.

Dilthey argued for the crucial role of receptive spontaneity in contrast to the dichotomy between active spontaneity and passive receptivity. Receptivity and spontaneity are a continuum, conditional, and presuppose each other.⁴⁴ Therefore, life is first there in the tension of non-identity, in the reflexive awareness of the self in its feeling of something exterior and resistant to itself.⁴⁵ Self-feeling and self-consciousness arise and presuppose resistance and the externality of an environing world.⁴⁶ The "internal" human world is accordingly not an ideational or spiritual construct. It is constituted through social-historically formed practical goods, interests, norms, purposes, and values.⁴⁷ A world is mediated through material, social, and symbolic relations. A world is felt and lived and not merely a conceptual, ideational, or representational object.⁴⁸ Life interestedly cares about and understands its own life from out of itself and in response to others. It is structured in part by human activities and purposiveness and yet Dilthey's "lifeworld" has no teleological determination in an unfolding of an ultimate end or purpose in his philosophy of history.⁴⁹

History and biography are the most suitable means for expressing and provoking the self-reflection of life. All sciences have an element of art in being practices, but some are more thoroughly artistic, employing all of our spontaneity and responsiveness. Poetry and the other arts provide the most powerful and moving insights into life and the individual's formation of a world-picture. Art and literature are nearest and most expressive of the self-presentation of life in its fullness and complexity.⁵⁰ Art-works do not only express life, they amplify and enhance it and disclose its further possibilities that often remain unseen and unheard in the course of daily life. Art is the richest articulation of the forces of the imagination. It is the

imagination that approaches the singular without eradicating it in a non-coercive juxtaposition of singulars.⁵¹

The worlds experienced in art, religion, and philosophy involve the transformation – through extension and intensification as well as abridgement and impoverishment – of the feeling of life. The “internal” feeling of life is confronted by exteriorities that resist, threaten, and undermine it, including the irreducible exteriority and facticity of death.⁵² Endeavors to systematically comprehend and organize the world as a whole must lead to aporia because of the finite and horizon-bound character of human life. Dilthey concluded his philosophy of worldviews with the proposal that philosophy can only be personal and individual in the end even while expressing what seems impersonal and universal.⁵³ A world is not an organized system of abstract concepts; a world is formed and experienced through a fundamental mood (*Grundstimmung*) and disposition (*Gemütsverfassung*), which conceptualization and reflection can in turn effect.⁵⁴ Moods affectively orient the picturing of the world as it is formed and individualized in its epochal and generational contexts.⁵⁵

6. The plurality and conflict of worlds?

Another conception that emerged from Dilthey’s hermeneutics is the idea that there is a fundamental conflict (*Streit, Widerstreit*) between worldviews, life-tendencies, and interpretive orientations. Heidegger maintains that Dilthey did not comprehend this conflict decisively enough. Heidegger expounded his most adamant critique of Dilthey in his lecture course *Introduction to Philosophy*. Heidegger here reasons against understanding the world and world-picturing through the multiplicity of ontic differences for the sake of a more originary ontological difference. He problematizes the ontic differences of the empirical expressed by Dilthey.⁵⁶ A worldview is not an observational interpretive response to multiplicity for Heidegger; it is primarily world-intuition (*Welt-anschauen*) and a factually gripped being-in-the-world.⁵⁷

Observation and empirical inquiry presuppose encountering and confronting the world, but the encounter can repeat, miss, or be transformed in the encounter such that the empirical ontic dimension should not be dismissed. This encounter prior to inquiry is understood as intuition in traditional thought. Dilthey stressed the interpretive formation of worldviews, whereas Heidegger emphasized their being intuited. Heidegger returns to a phenomenological intuition quite different than Dilthey’s empirical interpretive strategies. Heidegger describes intuition as deferred through not grasping rather than an immediate grasping.⁵⁸

Heidegger contends that a worldview is not formed out of multiple and heterogeneous aspects and elements. It is not of “diverse provenance” but an originary unified phenomenon in the transcendence of *Dasein* in its nothingness and eccentric and ecstatic lack of bearing.⁵⁹ *Dasein* is in each case betrayed and threatened in its transcendence-in-the-world, or in “the each time of the facticity of transcendence.”⁶⁰ *Dasein* does not primarily ontically observe and inquire, it is ontically involved because it primordially understands and “intuits the world.”⁶¹ Human existence, understood as being-there (*Da-sein*), is each time an intuiting of world. It is a having and not having of the world that it itself is. Worldview is often reified into

something objectively present, as a fulfilled possessing of the world. Opposing popular tendencies to reify dynamic world picturings into static ideological “viewpoints,” Heidegger shows how worldview expresses the lack of bearing of being-there. To have a world is equally to be decentered into the world.⁶²

Worldview is further misinterpreted for Heidegger in the idea of a “natural worldview.” There can be no one natural worldview upon which a historically formed worldview is then additionally grafted, as little as there can be a *Dasein* that would not be the *Dasein* of the self and thereby dispersed in relations of self and other (*Ich-Du*).⁶³ Heidegger’s denial of a natural worldview extends beyond Dilthey’s analysis, as Dilthey interprets naturalistic world-picturing to be an expression of life (*Lebensäußerung*). As the manifestation of a form of life, instead of a theoretical grasping of it, naturalism has its own cogency that cannot be disproved. Dilthey concluded that naturalism is one expressive possibility of life among others, even if there can be no one unified natural worldview shared by all humans. Naturalism is one expression and enactment of the truth and only untruthful when it overextends itself and takes on a dogmatic totalizing metaphysical form. A worldview is essentially historical for Dilthey and Heidegger, but for Dilthey this entails that it is irreducibly individual and worthy of recognition for itself.

The empirical ontic multiplicity of worldviews is pertinent to any given picturing of the world, which is confronted by and recognizes or disavows other ways of picturing the world. Dilthey noticed that the historicity of worldviews entails that there is no master worldview from which to neutrally rank others. Persons are confronted with the incommensurability, difference, and conflict of worldviews that make a unified thinking of being impossible and undesirable, because they are inevitably participants in and party to agonistic life. That is why, notwithstanding their affinity, Heidegger increasingly sided with the hermeneutic conservatism of Graf Paul Yorck von Wartenburg and his drive toward ontology against Dilthey’s “liberal” and “tolerant” hermeneutics with its ontic pluralism born of interpretive humility and charity.⁶⁴

7. Conclusion: a plural world

Heidegger interpreted modernity and globalization as a historical event of Being in “The Age of the World Picture” (1938). Modernity occurs as a questionable leveling and totalizing of a consolidating and enframing (*Ge-stell*) “world-picture.” By contrast, Dilthey showed how there is inevitably indeterminacy in and resistance to the pre-determined and totalized. There is, he argues, no pre-given or pre-established determinate system or universal concept that can sublimate all individuals, affairs, and situations. There is no “one” or “the” world but a multiplicity of overlapping, intersecting, and conflicting worlds. A world-picture is not a constant self-same identity unmoved by experience and conflict, as feeling, experience, and encounter historically transform world-pictures in relation to each other. There can as a result neither be one beginning, teleology nor end of history.

It could be asked in conclusion: Can there be then a world-formation and world-cultivation (*Bilden, Bildung*), centered in the “already known” (*Erkannte*) of local traditions and cultures, and nonetheless creative and responsive to the new and

alternate? Can there be a “global” transnational community – as a pluralistic and multicultural *sensus communis* or *Gemeinschaft* – originating from the interplay, conflicts, and reflection of particular forms of life and world-pictures that are open and responsive to one another? Is a formation of life possible that brings diverse individuals and communities affectively and reflectively into shared relations in which individuality and communities can flourish? Such questions cannot be adequately addressed here.⁶⁵ But it might well be the case that a thoroughgoing reconstruction of Dilthey’s hermeneutics is more appropriate for encountering and engaging the diversity of life and plurality of worlds necessary in the contemporary world than the ontological hermeneutics that dominated the twentieth century.

Notes

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- 1 See Moran, D. (2013). “From the Natural Attitude to the Life-World,” in L. Embree and T. Nenon (eds.), *Husserl’s Ideen*, Dordrecht: Springer, 105–24.
 - 2 Kierkegaard, S. (1998). *‘The Moment’ and Late Writings*, trans. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 143.
 - 3 Dilthey, W. (1970). *Leben Schleiermachers: Auf Grund des Textes der 1. Auflage von 1870 und der Zusätze aus dem Nachlaß*, ed. M. Redeker, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, GS 13/1: 1. References to Wilhelm Dilthey’s works are to: *Gesammelte Schriften*, 28 vols. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1914–2011; English translations, when available, are from Makkreel, R. A. and Rodi F. (eds.), (1985f). *Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 - 4 *Gesammelte Schriften* 7: 199 / *Selected Works* III: 221.
 - 5 Dilthey, W. (1959). *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften: Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte*, ed. B. Groethuysen, 4th edition, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, *Gesammelte Schriften* 1: 51 / English Translation: Dilthey, W. (1989). *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, ed. R. A. Makkreel and F. Rodi, Princeton: Princeton University Press, *Selected Works* I: 101; Dilthey, W. (1957). *Die Geistige Welt: Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens. Erste Hälfte: Abhandlungen zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften*, ed. G. Misch, 2nd edition, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, *Gesammelte Schriften* 5: 60; Dilthey, W. (1956). *Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, ed. B. Groethuysen. 2nd edition, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, *Gesammelte Schriften* 7: 135.
 - 6 Dilthey, W. (1960). *Weltanschauungslehre: Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, ed. B. Groethuysen, 2nd edition, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 99.
 - 7 *Gesammelte Schriften* 1: 65 / *Selected Works* I: 115. Compare Makkreel, R. A. (1985). “The Feeling of Life: Some Kantian Sources of Life-Philosophy,” *Dilthey-Jahrbuch* 3: 83–104.
 - 8 See Nelson, E. S. (2012). “Dilthey and Carnap: Empiricism, Life-Philosophy, and Overcoming Metaphysics,” *Pli: Warwick Journal of Philosophy*, 23: 20–49; Nelson, E. S. (2013). “Heidegger and Carnap: Disagreeing about Nothing?” in F. Raffoul and E. S. Nelson (eds.), *Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, London: Bloomsbury Press, 151–6.
 - 9 Neurath, O., Carnap, R. et al. (2006). “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung,” in M. Sto?ltzner (ed.), *Wiener Kreis Texte zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung*, Hamburg: Meiner, 27.
 - 10 Husserl, E. (1950). *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke: Formale und transzendente Logik*, Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 243. Compare Gander, H.-H. (2006). *Selbstverständnis und Lebenswelt: Grundzüge einer phänomenologischen Hermeneutik im Ausgang von Husserl und Heidegger*, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 137.
 - 11 Husserl, 1950, 243. Compare Lawlor, L. (2002). *Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 163.
 - 12 Husserl, 1950, 243.

- 13 Føllesdal, D. (2009). "The Lebenswelt in Husserl," in D. Hyder and H.-J. Rheinberger (eds.), *Science and the Life-World: Essays on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 27.
- 14 Makkreel, R. A. (1985) "Lebenswelt und Lebenszusammenhang," in E. W. Orth (ed.), *Dilthey und Philosophie der Gegenwart*, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 381–413.
- 15 The following discussion draws on my more extensive discussion of world and worldview in Dilthey and Heidegger in Nelson, E. S. (2011). "The World Picture and its Conflict in Dilthey and Heidegger," *Humana Mente*, 18: 19–38. Also see Nelson, E. S. (2013). "Heidegger and Dilthey: A Difference in Interpretation," in François Raffoul and E. S. Nelson (eds.), *Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, London: Bloomsbury Press, 129–34; and Nelson, E. S. (2013). "Dilthey, Heidegger und die Hermeneutik des faktischen Lebens," in G. Scholtz (ed.), *Dilthey's Werk und seine Wirkung*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 97–110.
- 16 *Gesammelte Schriften* 1: xvii / *Selected Works* I: 50.
- 17 *Gesammelte Schriften* 1: xvii / *Selected Works* I: 50.
- 18 *Gesammelte Schriften* 1: 9 / *Selected Works* I: 61.
- 19 *Gesammelte Schriften* 1: 9–10, 15 / *Selected Works* I: 61–62, 67.
- 20 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 38, 96.
- 21 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 3.
- 22 Heidegger, M. (2001). *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, ed. Ina Saame-Speidel, *Gesamtausgabe* 27, 2nd edition, Frankfurt: Klostermann: 344–68.
- 23 *Gesammelte Schriften* 1: 9–12 / *Selected Works* I: 61–4.
- 24 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 5, 75.
- 25 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 9.
- 26 Horowitz, I. L. (1989). *Persuasions and Prejudices: An Informal Compendium of Modern Social Science, 1953–1988*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 28–9.
- 27 Naugle, D. K. (2002). *Worldview: The History of a Concept*, Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 87.
- 28 *Gesamtausgabe* 27: 346–7.
- 29 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 86, 99.
- 30 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 99–100.
- 31 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 78.
- 32 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 8.
- 33 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 8. On human diversity, see Marom, A. (2013). "Universality, Particularity, and Potentiality: The Sources of Human Divergence as Arise from Wilhelm Dilthey's Writings," *Human Studies*, 36, 3: 1–13.
- 34 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 98.
- 35 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 24.
- 36 The idea of "epistemic humility" has been developed by Langton, R. (2001). *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. On Dilthey's hermeneutical reformulation of Kantian epistemic humility, see Nelson, E. S. (2014). "Language, Nature, and the Self: The Feeling of Life in Kant and Dilthey," in F. Schalow and R. Velkley (eds.), *The Linguistic Dimension of Kant's Thought: Historical and Critical Essays*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 263–287.
- 37 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 71.
- 38 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 16.
- 39 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 43.
- 40 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 39.
- 41 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 16–18.
- 42 Misch, G. (1931). *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie: Eine Auseinandersetzung der Dilthey'schen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl*, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 247; Compare *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 79.
- 43 Dilthey, W. (1977). *Die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte: Vorarbeiten zur Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1865–1880)*, ed. H. Johach and F. Rodi, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, *Gesammelte Schriften* 18: 175.
- 44 *Gesammelte Schriften* 5: 84; *Gesammelte Schriften* 18: 156.

- 45 *Gesammelte Schriften* 18: 157–8.
- 46 *Gesammelte Schriften* 18: 166.
- 47 *Gesammelte Schriften* 1: 9 / *Selected Works* I: 61.
- 48 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 17.
- 49 Compare Beiser, F. C. (2011). *The German Historicist Tradition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 356. Also compare Heidegger's quasi-teleological meta-narrative of the philosophy of history discussed in Nelson, E. S. (2014). "Heidegger, Levinas, and the Other of History," in J. E. Drabinski and E. S. Nelson (eds.), *Between Levinas and Heidegger*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 51–72.
- 50 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 26.
- 51 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 26–7. On the exemplary role of aesthetics for Dilthey, see Makkreel, R. A. (1986). "Tradition and Orientation in Hermeneutics," *Research in Phenomenology*, 16: 73–85.
- 52 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 45–6, 53, 79, 81.
- 53 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 32.
- 54 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 33.
- 55 *Gesammelte Schriften* 8: 35, 82.
- 56 Compare Friedman, M. (2000). *A Parting of Ways*, Chicago: Open Court, 140–2.
- 57 *Gesamtausgabe* 27: 344.
- 58 *Gesamtausgabe* 27: 344.
- 59 *Gesamtausgabe* 27: 354.
- 60 *Gesamtausgabe* 27: 358, 367.
- 61 *Gesamtausgabe* 27: 367–8, 382–90.
- 62 *Gesamtausgabe* 27: 344–5.
- 63 *Gesamtausgabe* 27: 344–5.
- 64 See Gadamer, H. G. (1995). *Hermeneutik in Rückblick*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 9 and 186.
- 65 I discuss such issues of intercultural hermeneutics in Nelson, E. S. (2012). "Heidegger, Misch, and the Origins of Philosophy," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 39, Supplement: 10–30.