

explanation does not entail that the explanans is true, only that the two propositions are related such that the explanandum would explain the explanans, should the explanans be true.

What makes weak deflationism a weak version of deflationism is that while truth for propositions is deflationary, truth for sentences, utterances, beliefs, and other non-propositional truthbearers is inflationary. 'If one is willing to inflate meaning, one can give an account of truth for non-propositional entities that recognizes explicitly a dependence on meaning, but which remains deflationist about truth for propositions. Truth for non-propositional entities will be analyzed in terms of expression of true propositions' (39). Although the weak deflationist's ontology is 'inflated' by recognizing propositions as meanings, the correspondence relation in which sentences participate is simply the relation of expression. This is not a relation of correspondence which will satisfy a correspondence truth theorist. Hence, weak deflationism is thoroughly deflationary; it does not lie between deflationism and correspondence theory.

Weak deflationism is presented and defended in chapters 2 and 3. In chapter 1 McGrath discusses and argues for realism about propositions and properties. Chapter 4 defends Platonism about properties and propositions against modal realist challenges. Chapter 5 discusses the relation of the truthmaker project to correspondence theories and to weak deflationism. Throughout, McGrath's discussions are detailed and interesting.

A more serious problem addressing weak deflationism is addressed in chapter 6: the Liar Paradox. To his credit, McGrath does not endorse restricting the central truth equivalence, i.e., (E) or (FMT), to non-paradoxical instances, on the grounds that such a move is *ad hoc*. His solution is based on 'an (almost) general account of truth' according to which both ordinary and strengthened Liar sentences (L) are ungrounded, and consequently neither true nor false. However, his (almost) general account does not permit $\langle\langle L \text{ is neither true nor false} \rangle \text{ is true} \rangle$ to be asserted, since it is ungrounded; hence, the account is unduly restrictive, albeit not *ad hoc*. Another problem facing this account is the ordinary Liar sentence, which poses a more tenacious paradox than the strengthened Liar sentence.

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