

## Chapter 5

### CARE AS INVENTION: A TRIBUTE TO BERNARD STIEGLER

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To Stiegler's notion of *pansable* (curable), a word that recalls the *différance* so dear to his mentor Jacques Derrida, one might also need to add that *penser* (to think) relates to the Latin *penso*, the frequentative of *pendo*, to hang, suspend. The *pansable* (that which can be healed) is as much the *pensable* (that which can be thought) and the *suspensible* (that which can be hung). Stiegler's final act revealed that which was always already there: an unhealed pharmacological shadow that preceded him.<sup>1</sup> While he entered philosophy with the argument of technics as the *impensé* (unthought) of continental philosophy,<sup>2</sup> he concluded in a final acting out, an *impansable* (uncurable) that ended his life. He, who believed that life is about cultivating *rêveries* and protentions capable of promise.<sup>3</sup> Protention means both a capacity to invent and an ability to project oneself into the future through the practice of imagination and desire. He, who pondered about the retentions we have and the various forms of memory they take, and how to make them become the true modes of being-in-the-world.<sup>4</sup> I know now that his fatal transgression is as much an accident as a departure, an emotional ceasefire and a bifurcative ending. Somehow, he found a way to remain faithful to the originary beginning of his thinking *in act*.

His last act interrupted a long and painful series of repetitions. Stiegler referred to his first accident, the one that forced him to spend five years in jail, as a social suicide. He saw in his armed robbery a form of suicide that not only caused him to be incarcerated but forced him to investigate such a separation from the social world as the necessary default that pushed him to invent a new technique of self-care. Such a social suicide gave the impetus for thinking about the disaffection of individuals in societies where capitalized power has become the rule of law. During his incarcerated time, he was in his cell like a fish out of the water. It created an *epochè*, a suspension, and invented a new relation to this locality through discipline.<sup>5</sup> The cell required him to produce new realms of signification in order not to go crazy.<sup>6</sup> A few decades later, the *epochal* dimension of thinking one's condition together with the local dimension of relating to one's immediate

environment found its uncanny symbol in the flying fish, the symbol of Stiegler's school.

In the school *Pharmakon.fr* launched in 2010, the flying fish is the allegory of the noetic soul, a spirit intermittently suspended above water, enacting forms of distant and associative gathering to transform the milieu in which it evolves. Through the intermittence embodied in the flying fish, Stiegler highlighted both the condition of *noēsis* and its function in life.<sup>7</sup> As a condition, intermittence allows the individual to cultivate a phasic relationship to oneself, what Simondon calls a *déphasage* and what Stiegler calls a bifurcation. The function of *déphasage* consists in the opening of a mode of becoming that is both processual (at the level of the structure) and phasal (at the level of its operation). *Déphasage* and *bifurcation* imply the restructuring of operation in the process of transindividuation. During his seminars and conference presentations, one could see a specific shape coming handy to explain such a transindividuating process. Stiegler used the shape of the spiral to show how an individual reactivates their becoming by taking a leap, by bifurcating, and thus reinventing forms of both psychic and collective belonging. The process of transindividuation operates as a structural suspension that activates new phases of being, new modes of existence. The spiral helped visualize alternative forms of becoming: forms that escape today's increased codifications, linearities and abstractions central to computational capitalism. To him, transindividuation was about the improbable bifurcation that an individual cultivates to transform her/himself. This bifurcation stood against the pervasive probabilities of algorithmically run capitalist automation.<sup>8</sup> In this context, the discretization of space and time by the digital challenges the process of individuation.

To Bernard the tension between the different temporalities of the discrete and the processual create the metastable milieu suitable for a new critique of our cultural and political condition. Today capitalism is based on the mathematical and industrial exploitation of the drives and the mimetic atavisms that underlie them.<sup>9</sup> To overcome the flattening and synchronizing tendencies of what he later calls *soft* or *fluid* capitalism, Stiegler's philosophy embraced a 'rhythmic attitude'<sup>10</sup> that is an intermittent force, one that cultivates rhythms of localities.<sup>11</sup> This force admits that an individual is a being in tension: their capacity to act, care, think, heal, share is always fluctuating according to ever-changing sets of internal and external limitations. I see the rhythmic intermittence embodied in the symbol of Stiegler's school as the condition for the development of anything that gives life a flavour, that which makes life worth living.<sup>12</sup> The intermittence of the noetic living being is a complex system in tension between process and phase. Bifurcation intervenes in this system by opening signification the possibility to emerge from the transductive and complementary mediation between operation and structure.

In a sense, and because the human was never a granted category, Stiegler's philosophy implied a humility regarding the limit of mankind. To him, the human (he would say the non-inhuman) is a noetic living subject defined by the invention of technique to supplement its originary *défait*.<sup>13</sup> Embracing the *défait* as much as the promise of our human condition is the force of Stiegler's philosophical project: one that requires not to neglect our lacuna and not to be lured by the ideological

promise of technological determination. In other words, it is a project dictated by and dedicated to attentional forms of both psychic and collective care, a project that understood desire as the intensification of individuation.<sup>14</sup> I believe that, in Stiegler's philosophy, care is both a healing and inventing category. It operates from the retentive trace of the past (the *pensable*) and the protentional field of the future (the *suspensible*). Care as invention transforms the *impansé* (uncured) into the *pensable* (that which can be thought). For Stiegler, our intermittent capabilities are supplemented by our desire to act and take care. It is in the organology of desire for a collective future that the late philosopher attempted to take care, by paying attention to the disruptive forces that finally pushed him to take his own life.

Suicide is an act of transvaluation, inasmuch as it implies acting out according to a new belief that is both a secret wish and an act of care. As such, it is important not to neglect the suicidal dimension of his departure because of the transvaluation that such an act represents. For someone who spent most of his life questioning the pharmacological dimension of technique it would be a mistake not to include his departure as the symptom of a malaise. Such a malaise is a *mal-être*, a profound pain that functioned as a shadow in his work, intermittently feeding the strength and the fear of not doing enough to cure the societies we live in. I would then like to write about the memories I have and share the improbable protentions (as dreams and desires) we might have the audacity to invent in a collective gesture of thinking (*penser*), healing (*panser*) and suspending (*pendre*) the modes of existence of the spirit or *nous*, that inhabits us all. Such spirit requires thinking, healing and suspending outdated forms of belief, structure of discourse and collective symbols of hegemonic power in order to invent new modes of belonging.

The *nous* is the *spirit understood as the care taken of the objects and subjects of individual and collective desire*.<sup>15</sup> Care, spirit, desire and *nous* are the operative pillars of noeticity, that is, the spirituality which is life in potential, and which requires relational localities of care to be actualized. As such, *nous* is that which gives direction to our being, that which gives meaning and sense of purpose to our life. Purpose, sociality and orientation are increasingly lost in late capitalist societies. *Nous* refers to the complexity of the relationship of the spirit with itself; it is both a pre-individual and a trans-individual force and as such a mode of sensing the world and of belonging to it intuitively.<sup>16</sup>

Contrary to the increasingly cybernetic governance of our living practices, *nous* is a pilot that is not ruled by computational machines and technologies of control, but by techniques of care. Only care, as an intersectional practice of overcoming hegemonic power, can guide the making of new significations and new singularities. Caring is inventing what matters in the present to significantly shape the future. Caring means inventing a relational modality of belonging otherwise in the world: it is giving significations to things so they can matter, materialize, be actual and acknowledged as such. Caretaking is nootechnic<sup>17</sup> as it is psychic and collective: it finds agency in the technics we forge in relation to localities and remains a guiding force to navigate amongst increasingly disruptive technologies of power. In other words, care is an inventive category of knowledge (*savoir, savoir-faire, savoir-être*) that takes the spirit as its main axiom of becoming.

For Stiegler, a society is a system of care that relies on the production of attention.<sup>18</sup> *Attendere*, to shift one's attention, is to take care. To be careful, to be attentive and to care for something or someone is to pay attention. Yet, since the second tome of Bernard Stiegler's *La technique et le temps*<sup>19</sup> the late philosopher warned against the disorienting and disrupting effects of technological advancement, underlining the procedures and conditions of programmatology (as seen in calendars, cardinality and synchronized structures of tertiary memory). This technological advancement has created systemic delays mainly provoked by newly engendered technogenetic structures onto traditionally anchored sociogenetic operations. In other words, technogenesis structurally pre-empts forms of sociogenetic relations.

Let me recall a memory I have of the summer schools of the *École de Philosophie d'Épineuil-le-Fleuriel*. Since 2010, our conversations were based on the shared understanding that the place where dreams are shaped is an organological scene that calls for a taking care of our capabilities to project ourselves beyond our current environment. Hence the symbol of the flying fish, always enacting various bifurcative forms of belonging. During these summer schools, knowledge was the transitional object of our infinite discussions. Once a year, a very small village in the middle of France's countryside was populated by activists, artists and intellectuals who could dream to change the world, even if it meant embracing the possible limits of such a wish. We gathered to jointly create protentions, understood as forms of collective desire for the future.<sup>20</sup> These moments offered a relational mode of building common *savoirs/saveurs* based on desire as a product of social bonds. These bonds inhabited our souls long after the end of this utopian school.

In 2014, our meeting had a welcoming message: '*sogno dunque sono*', I dream therefore I am, and aimed to rethink the oneiric condition necessary for the production of knowledge. Knowledge was understood in the sense of *sapere* as that which accounts for the flavour of life. With '*sogno dunque sono*' Stiegler gave Descartes's *cogito ergo sum* a twist and invited his guests to collectively invent the stage from which one creates protentions. The task was to interrogate how computational capitalism digitally implements disruptive tendencies (as seen in an individual's lack of trust in themselves and others, the spread of misinformation, uniformity of behaviour, increased fascism, impunity, etc.). The goal was to address the way in which algorithmic governmentality was not only governing conducts but fundamentally shaping how law, rules and norms breed obedience.<sup>21</sup> Our concern was that protentions, which are produced by our capacity to suspend outdated beliefs and stereotypes, were being hijacked by the operative realm of everyday computational machines. The disruptive dimension of technologically driven societies was central to our interrogations and to our will to somehow, at our own scale, change the world. As such, the challenge was to address the tendential fall of our affective capacity for taking care of ourselves and others in a milieu driven by disruptive technologies.

That year, Kant's critique of the faculty of judgement was re-evaluated in light of Plato's understanding of knowing (*connaître*) as always being an acknowledging (*reconnaître*). Our reading of the Socratic dialogue *Meno* helped highlight that

to develop knowledge (*savoir*) a certain disposition is required to cultivate, with care, that which gives flavour to our understanding. Such a cultivation of the place of knowing is the activation of what Simondon calls the transindividual, namely the relation between both a psychic and a collective individual as well as the relation between non-individuated realities, or pre-individual realities, within the individuated subject.<sup>22</sup>

What inspired me the most in 2014 was the understanding that the transindividual is made of spiritual realms of affective exchange. This spiritual realm, as I understand it, is both a process of transindividuation that highlights the operative circuits between the I and the we, between what Stiegler calls traumatypes and stereotypes,<sup>23</sup> and a mediation between pre-individuated and individuated beings. Understanding the principle of individuation as mediation and the circuits or relations that operate in the transindividual, allowed to discover *anamnēsis*, that which is produced in a dialogue with oneself or with the other, leading to a reminiscence of knowledge. In a world where dominant technologies implement necrotic programmes, the capacity to remember and to recall seemed as urgent as the capacity to suspend disruptive operations. Somehow, by focusing on the transindividual dimension of knowledge, I found a way to remember and recall, much like I am doing today as I type these words.

In 2014, dreaming replaced thinking as the condition and mode of *existing individually* but also *consisting collectively*. Dreaming became both a practice in collective envisioning and a tool in anti-entropic knowledge making. Much like Jonathan Beller, Jonathan Crary and Don Ihde, Stiegler warned us against the pervasive tendency of imaging technologies<sup>24</sup> which infiltrate the most intimate space of thought, hence shaping the organicity of machines, as well as the machinic organization of human beings.<sup>25</sup> For Stiegler, dreams are not just sleep and what is at stake is not simply the end of it.<sup>26</sup> Dreams are a condition of possibility for noetic life: the dignity of living according to non-inhuman conditions.<sup>27</sup>

In the system of Stiegler's school of philosophy, the spiritual economy of the people gathered in time and space facilitated the production of knowledge, with respect and dignity. The act of dreaming was psychic, collective and nootechnical: it aimed to be realizable according to the conditions of sufficient reason but also according to relations of force that are political, economic and ecological.<sup>28</sup> Imagination and interpretation became central categories of knowing, as we adopted Kant's transcendental imagination in Stiegler's organological interpretation of it, taking into account the technical exteriorization, while we updated it with the visionary invention of Simondon's cycle of image formation.<sup>29</sup> Together, imagination and interpretation became categories of the individual and collective desire to know and thus to take care.

The anthropotechnic capacity of knowing, central to Stiegler's philosophical project, is anchored in an *oneirology*.<sup>30</sup> Dreaming is a radical modality of engaging the increasingly entropic dimension of the world, it is an act of negentropic valuation. Because a technical life is a noetic life that realizes its dreams,<sup>31</sup> the intermittence central to the oneiric condition is the driving force of an epochal mediation which refuses the short-circuiting of societies imposed by disruptive

technologies of machinic governance. Only a new noetic dream can become the epochal mediation necessary to interrupt and transvaluate the economic and ecological order imposed by machinic computation. Here, I cannot but think of Bernard's suicide and the last noetic dream he might have had the audacity to envision as he interrupted his own life.

The memories I have of the summer schools, the seminars and other adventures we created with Bernard since 2010 are intermittently inhabiting the knowledge I continue to forge and cultivate. This knowledge as memory is the yet-to-be-remembered as the always-already-known. In light of Stiegler's departure, the *pharmakogenesis* of care is a practice in anticipating what needs attention and requires healing. Much like individuation, healing occurs in a spiral where categories of time, space and their correlative speeds function via a different regime of expansion, extension, tension and relief. What needs healing imposes a temporality that cannot be subjugated to other priorities. While care is invention, that is, an anticipation of what needs attention – we could say a form of protention as much as a protection – healing is an intervention that is an act of repair and repatriation. Care is to healing what the transindividual operation is to the structure of individuation: an inventing force that adopts new bifurcative modes of existence.

If nothing else, the Anthropocene is a time when earth claims that it can no longer thrive in its *puissance* without collective effort for healing. If caring comes short, healing is required. The taking care (*être attentif*) of our healing practices (*pratiques de soin*) resides in a modality of being that is fundamentally transgenerational and ancestral. The layers of self we peel off to further engage in a history that matters, reveal the intricacy and connectedness of both living entities and disruptive systems of power. This relation appears as both a correlative dimension and structure of being-in-tension and being intentional about the caring and healing values one cultivates. The affective process of healing takes for its anchor the formative dimension of taking care, one that shapes the phenomenon that needs attention. The ontogenesis of care is the genesis of the active investment in caring about the non-inhuman and inhuman dimension of life. In other words, I believe that care is invention: a relational mediation that cultivates resonances endlessly shaping the system where the operation and structure of individuation take place. As such, care is as much an economic and political issue as it is a psychic and collective challenge.

To think about the ontogenesis of care is to ask about the genesis of thought, projection, wishes, desires ... for care has been the forgotten notion of a continental philosophy rather busy with questions of power over dichotomies (body/soul, form/matter, inside/outside). The ontogenesis of care implies an organology of dreams, wishes and desires and as such it stands as a spiritual economy.<sup>32</sup> Such an economy requires a critique of both psychic and collective forms of attention and needs the development of nootechnics. Nootechnics takes the digital as an amplifying structure of reticulation, meaning that digital technologies must develop processes in which new relational modalities toward technics are deployed.<sup>33</sup> This reticulation defines the temporality of individuation and is based

on the expansion, sharing and care of transductive unities. As a vital operation of reticulation, transduction needs to be addressed from different points of view: institutions, governments and power dynamics of modulation as seen in racial and gender-based discrimination.<sup>34</sup> In this context, the governance of memory, behaviour and invention is key to understanding our political and cultural condition in an era of anthropogenic disruption, an era that annihilates capacities and the necessary intermittent fluctuations of operations of thoughts and long-term circuits of investment.

Finally, if 'the reality of disruption is the loss of reason',<sup>35</sup> the reality of the Anthropocene is the loss of a common noetic dream capable of transvaluating our current condition. This noetic dream is not one that resists, but a dream which can overcome disruptive energies and their system of oppression. That is certainly one of the most difficult lessons of Bernard's departure. He might have known it from the beginning, but he dreamed of a *différance* and tried most of his life to enact it, to actualize it in various modes of existence. What we know now, is that the claim that one needs to take care of oneself prior to taking care of others, is a reduction of the complexity of the emergence of care. Care, much like attention, is granting signification to that which matters and as such, it is a process of valuation.

Attention does not exist outside of processes of care, much like signification does not exist outside of attention. The value of attention and the care I have for something is that which gives its valuable significance. Much like care, invention needs to be wanted, anticipated and conceived by its agent.<sup>36</sup> Invention in Stiegler is very much influenced by the operative category of the image found in the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon. Invention may generate something else than what might be intended, much like art and science do. But contrary to innovation, invention implies cultivating its pharmacological ambivalence through a technique of care.<sup>37</sup>

For Stiegler, it is within this constant friction and confrontation between innovation and invention, between technogenesis and sociogenesis, that one can find the resources to address the *malaise* of our times, which he defined as being created by the disruptive divorce between computational understanding and reason. Today, to counteract the technological rule of law, one might have to ponder the philosophical question of the dream in the age of disruption, an age defined by the systemic dismantling of the condition of possibility to create collective protentions. Scenes of disruption imply that, in order to critically change our epoch and transform the lack of it into a memorable event, we need to create a distance, the same distance that theory shares with theatre (*theatron*: the place from which actions are seen). In bearing witness to tragic announcements of anthropogenic disruption, one also cultivates a noetic intermittent distance, where the value of bonds (*liens*) can replace capitalist goods (*biens*).

To sustain alternative forms of investment and localities (understood as culture and care), I draw attention to the immensely unpredictable force of dreams: its capability to transduce knowledge into operations of sustainable, collaborative and innovative changes. In order to build localities of becoming, where forms of existence are valued and exceed forms of subsistence. Let me end on a last

hypothesis. To form dreams, one has to engage in the organological structure of our times, while developing pharmacological operations that can unleash the power (as in *puissance*) to revolutionize our present condition. This implies that there will be another day, another night and another journey around the sun. It is between the earth and the sun that Bernard concluded his last acting out, his bifurcation.

### *Post-script*

I would like to dedicate this text to a hand-crafted fish I gave to Bernard Stiegler after my dissertation defence in 2016. He hung it above his desk in the moulin d'Épineuil-le-Fleuriel. He named it an exception, an *ange poisson*, because it flies without coming down and called it a fetish because he considered it inhabited by a spirit. In August 2020, that fish must have been petrified by the shared suspension of the standstill, as only death by hanging can achieve such a vertical ataraxy. This image of hanging is the mental supplement I have of an act that occurred prior to its unfolding. The announcement of the suicide preceded Bernard's act. Much like in a tragedy, we saw it coming. Yet, knowing what was going to happen did not prevent such an announcement to be less of a shock. Throughout the years, I had secretly cultivated the wish that for once the Pythia was going to be wrong. And such a wish was my form of care.<sup>38</sup> The image of such a scene is both a projection and its *survivance*, meaning that it is a reminiscence, for *anamnēsis* is both a performative fiction and the creative realm of present and future significations. The mental image I have of the petrified fish – petrified because of its stupor and its incapacity to act, but mainly because of its interrupted intermittence – is an *epochal* scene where the madness of our times exceeded the realms of the *pansable* (curable): 'for *penser*, to think, previously meant *soigner*, to care, to treat.'<sup>39, 40</sup>

### *Notes*

- 1 On the *pharmakon* as shadow, see Bernard Stiegler, *États de choc: Bêtise et savoir au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris: Éditions Mille et une nuits, 2012, 58; Bernard Stiegler, *States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century*, trans. Daniel Ross, Cambridge (UK): Polity Press, 32–3.
- 2 Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. Richard Beardsworth & George Collins, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, ix.
- 3 Stiegler, *États de choc*, 28; Stiegler, *States of Shock*, 12.
- 4 Bernard Stiegler, *Passer à l'acte*, Paris: Galilée, 2003, 42; Bernard Stiegler, 'How I Became a Philosopher', in Bernard Stiegler, *Acting Out*, trans. David Barison, Daniel Ross, and Patrick Crogan, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, 1–35, 19–20.
- 5 Stiegler, *Passer à l'acte*, 47; Stiegler, *Acting Out*, 21.
- 6 Stiegler, *Passer à l'acte*, 33; Stiegler, *Acting Out*, 14.
- 7 Bernard Stiegler, 'Elements of Neganthropology', in Bernard Stiegler, *The Neganthropocene*, ed., trans., and with an introduction by Daniel Ross, London: Open Humanities Press, 2018, 76–91, 79.



- 8 Anaïs Nony & Bernard Stiegler, 'Bernard Stiegler on Automatic Society, As Told to Anaïs Nony', *The Third Rail Quarterly* 5 (2018): 16–17.
- 9 Bernard Stiegler, 'What Is Called Caring? Thinking beyond the Anthropocene', in Stiegler, *The Neganthropocene*, 188–270, 201–2.
- 10 Souleymane Bachir Diagne, *African Art as Philosophy: Senghor, Bergson and the Idea of Negritude*, trans. Chike Jeffers, Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2011, 84.
- 11 Sara Baranzoni & Paolo Vignola, 'Rhythms of Locality. A Travel through Caribbean Performances and Literature', *La Deleuziana: Online Journal of Philosophy* 10 (2019): 160–77.
- 12 Bernard Stiegler, *What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology*, trans. Daniel Ross, Cambridge: Polity, 2013.
- 13 Bernard Stiegler, *La technique et le temps 1: La faute d'Épiméthée*, Paris: Galilée, 1994, 196 and passim; Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, 1, 188 and passim.
- 14 Bernard Stiegler, *Pharmacologie du Front National*, suivi du *Vocabulaire d'Ars Industrialis* par Victor Petit, Paris: Flammarion, 2013, 193.
- 15 Bernard Stiegler, *Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individual. Disbelief and Discredit, Volume 2*, trans. Daniel Ross, Cambridge: Polity, 2013, 6.
- 16 Etienne Balibar, 'Âme', in *Vocabulaire européen des philosophies*, ed. Barbara Cassin, Paris: Editions du Seuil / Dictionnaire Le Robert, 2004, 80.
- 17 Anaïs Nony, 'Nootechnics of the Digital', *Parallax* 23/2 (2017): 129–46, 130.
- 18 Patrick Crogan & Bernard Stiegler, 'Knowledge, Care and Trans-Individuation: An Interview with Bernard Stiegler', *Cultural Politics* 6/2 (2010): 157–70, 165.
- 19 Bernard Stiegler, *La technique et le temps 2: La désorientation*, Paris: Galilée, 1996.
- 20 Stiegler, *Pharmacologie du Front National*, 160.
- 21 Antoinette Rouvroy & Bernard Stiegler, 'The Digital Regime of Truth: From the Algorithmic Governmentality to a New Rule of Law', trans. Anaïs Nony & Benoît Dillet, *La Deleuziana: Online Journal of Philosophy* 3/1 (2016): 6–29.
- 22 Gilbert Simondon, *L'individuation à la lumière des notions de formes et d'information*, Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Millon, 2013, 246–7.
- 23 Bernard Stiegler, 'The Organology of Dreams and Arche-Cinema', in Stiegler, *The Neganthropocene*, 154–71, 156.
- 24 Don Ihde, 'Visualizing the Invisible. Imaging Technologies', in *Postphenomenology and Technoscience: The Peking University Lectures*, ed. Don Ihde, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009, 45–62.
- 25 Jonathan Beller, *The Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy and the Society of the Spectacle*, Lebanon: Dartmouth College Press, 2006, 38.
- 26 Jonathan Crary, *24/7: Late Capitalism and the End of Sleep*, New York: Verso Books, 2013.
- 27 Bernard Stiegler, *Dans la disruption: Comment ne pas devenir fou? suivi d'un Entretien sur le christianisme* [entre] Alain Jugnon, Jean-Luc Nancy et Bernard Stiegler, Paris: Les Liens qui Libèrent, 2016, 39; Bernard Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption: Technology and Madness in Computational Capitalism*, followed by *A conversation about Christianity with Alain Jugnon, Jean-Luc Nancy and Bernard Stiegler*, trans. Daniel Ross, Cambridge: Polity, 2019, 18.
- 28 Stiegler, 'Elements of Neganthropology', 80.
- 29 Personal notes from Stiegler's class on 30 November 2013.
- 30 Stiegler, *Dans la disruption*, 413; Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption*, 289.
- 31 Stiegler, 'Elements of Neganthropology', 76.
- 32 Bernard Stiegler, *Ce qui fait que la vie vaut la peine d'être vécue: De la pharmacologie*, Paris: Flammarion, 2010, 28; Stiegler, *What Makes Life Worth Living*, 12.

- 33 Nony, 'Notechnics of the Digital', 129–46, 131.
- 34 Anaïs Nony, 'Technology of Neo-Colonial *Episteme*', *Philosophy Today* 63/3 (2019): 731–44, 739.
- 35 Stiegler, *Dans la disruption*, 71; Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption*, 38.
- 36 Gilbert Simondon, *L'invention dans les techniques: Cours et conférences*, établie et présentée par Jean-Yves Chateau, Paris: Seuil, 2005, 21.
- 37 Simondon distinguishes the verb *to generate* from the verb *to invent*; the first action belongs to the category of the living (*le vivant*) and the second to the category of the technical object (*l'objet technique*).
- 38 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010, 188: 'Ontologically, wishing presupposes care.'
- 39 Bernard Stiegler, 'What Is Called Caring? Thinking beyond the Anthropocene', trans. Daniel Ross, *Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology* 21/2–3 (2017): 386–404, 398.
- 40 The author would like to thank Erika Weiberg, Eliana Vagalau, and the editorial team for their comments and supportive feedback.