Forgiveness and Moral Repair
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Forgiveness has enjoyed an intensity of scholarly interest since the 1980s, and the literature continues to expand. As I outline below, the boom in forgiveness studies can be traced in part to the publication of a few particularly influential works. The state of the field today is one of a literature so vast that no survey can be comprehensive. A minimalist notion must do for our purposes; most accounts surveyed below explore dimensions of forgiveness understood as, very briefly, a motivated foreswearing of the fullness of the blame that one could otherwise hold against wrongdoers. However, the nature of that foreswearing, the operations that constitute foreswearing (as opposed to dropping, ignoring, forgetting, or excusing) the fullness of blame, the reasons or justifications for it, and the identities of wrongdoers and forgivers are all matters of dispute in the study of forgiveness.

In what follows, I provide a very short historical overview, because appreciating the legacies of strands of scholarship in forgiveness and moral repair clarifies the reasons for the different priorities of scholars as they identify basic features of forgiveness. Then I identify themes in the moral psychology of forgiveness and appeal to examples in selected works, with an emphasis on those relevant to the moral psychology of forgiveness in the 21st century, rather than attempting to do full justice to the many related threads of scholarship on forgiveness.

I draw attention to emerging scholarship that reflects Cheshire Calhoun’s (2015) description of moral philosophy as concerned with two aims, including “getting morality right”— the “capital-M conception of morality” — and “practicing it with others,” that is, the social practices of morality (p. 6). This is an apt characterization of two streams in the literature on forgiveness; especially in the early stages of the boom in the literature of the 1980s and 1990s, theorists were often occupied with conceptual analyses in the interests of getting forgiveness right, sorting out what morality requires (Calhoun, 1992; Govier, 2002; Haber, 1991; Holmgren, 1993; Murphy & Hampton, 1988) and what relationship forgiveness has to other moral virtues (Griswold, 2007; Pettigrove, 2012). Another stream, especially in more recent scholarship, attends to how to practice forgiveness with others, that is, to the differences in material and social situations, including forgiveness in contexts of oppression (Cherry, 2017; Malcolm, DeCourville, & Belicki, 2008; Norlock, 2009), after hate crimes and mass violence (Brunning & Milam, 2018; Carse & Tirrell, 2010; Minow, 1998), and in criminal justice and restorative justice contexts (Holmgren, 2012; Jacobs, 2017; Radzik, 2009), as well as in social and political spaces involving whole groups struggling to live together after serious harms and atrocities (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003; Krog, 2008; Metz, 2007; Tutu, 1999). Reconciliation as a form of moral repair that may include forgiveness (Emerick, 2017; Radzik, 2009) or not (Murphy, 2012; Watkins, 2015) also emerges as a major part of this second focus.

I conclude with some attention to dual-process theories of moral reasoning in order to suggest that the debates in forgiveness that reflect the dual topic-streams described above are not at odds so much as they may be aligned with the different moral aims of moral and mental processes that differ in kind. I argue that dual topic-streams in the literature and dual-process theories of moral reasoning

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1 My thanks to Lucy Allais for encouragement and comments on an early draft of this chapter.
support my view that the moral aims of forgiveness are multiple; I take the approach of scholars who maintain a multidimensional account of forgiveness with a focus on the functions of forgiveness in relationships and the importance of forgiveness to its practitioners rather than a unified definition or justification that applies to all moral occasions (MacLachlan, 2017; Norlock, 2009; Pettigrove, 2012). With Margaret Urban Walker (2006), I, too, “have come to find it odd to think of there being a single, correct idea of forgiveness,” (p. 152) and it seems more productive to go beyond justifications of definitions and instead “ask what it means for individuals, or for a group or society,” to declare something forgivable or unforgivable (p. 187). As I discuss below, recurrent issues in the literature reveal uncomfortable consequences of attempting to avoid the complexities of our moral psychology by devising accounts of forgiveness that are incompatible with hard feelings, recurrent memories, or slippages of commitment to change one’s relationships. Those consequences include either dismissing lay understandings of forgiveness or failing to account for their differences from philosophical accounts. As Alice MacLachlan (2017) says, “A philosophical account should distill those features and functions that are central to the concept as it emerges from everyday practices and develop a rational or regulative ideal that best reflects them. If these cannot be unified into a single, universal paradigm, it is better to sit with complexity than to deny the phenomenology of moral experience” (p. 138).

Before I further draw out the psychological themes, however, a quick history of the literature on forgiveness is in order. As readers will see, elements of interest to moral psychologists recur in that history, including concerns as to the emotional obstacles to forgiveness, the demandingness of ethics that endorse forgiveness in light of the changes in mental states that forgiveness seems to require, the moral motivations of forgivers to consider it and of wrongdoers to request it, and the limits of the comprehensibility of it to a human mind struggling to take in the enormity of great harms.

A very short history of forgiveness and moral psychology

Having said that the history of the field is a rather recent story, I add that of course, rich and relevant literature predates the 1980s. Theologians and philosophers of religion were attentive to psychological complexities of forgiveness long before the boom in academic attention. Andrew Fiala (2012) suggests that the most substantial source for thinking about forgiveness is Christian ethics, not because it has the simplest answers, but in part because it “demands too much while also making things too easy” (p. 498); Jesus’s injunction that we each ought to forgive our wrongdoers “seventy times seven” times (Matthew 18:22) is an example of Fiala’s point and a recipe for early caution as to how to understand the moral emotions and motivations that justify so much forgiveness. The Christian tradition takes forgiveness to be central to religious practice, and the moral motivation of either a god or a man to forgive is a matter of some mystery that concerned early thinkers.

Augustine’s famous recommendation that we ought to separate the sin from the sinner is a demonstration of attention to the complexity of identification of a person with wrongdoing, especially if, as Augustine makes clear, the quality of the person’s will has changed since the errant act. “No matter how great our crimes, their forgiveness should never be despaired of,” Augustine (1955, p. 377) says, but that forgiveness is contingent on repentance. “In the act of repentance,” he adds, “We should not consider the measure of time as much as the measure of [a wrongdoer’s] sorrow,” a clear expression, historian Ilaria Ramelli suggests, of the dependence of forgiveness on affective repentance (Augustine,
1955, p. 377; Ramelli, 2011, p. 43). Note, for our unfolding purposes, that Augustine seems to discuss forgiveness as a matter of how a human forgiver might treat an offender, rather than how the forgiver feels about the offender, since “the sorrow of one heart is mostly hid from another” (Augustine, 1955, p. 377) and our forgiveness is aspirational with respect to our future relationship; this is consistent with Christian Biblical tradition. After all, Jesus’ injunction above was in response to a disciple asking how often to forgive an offender, not how often to feel; Ramelli points to the recurrence in the four gospels of a “repentance-forgiveness sequence” and the occasional translation of forgiving as forebearance from imputation (2011, p. 31, p. 33). If anyone’s feelings are to be attended to, it is the relevant sorrow of the wrongdoer. Augustine’s work is relevant to the moral emotions involved in asking for forgiveness (his most well-known work is Confessions, after all), a perspective from the point of view of a wrongdoer that is neglected in contemporary philosophy.

Augustine’s insistence that only the Church forgives (1955, p. 377) may be a bit more puzzling to contemporary readers; Thomas Aquinas clarified Augustine’s view, explaining that while God forgives one for sinning against God, interpersonally, humans may negotiate their relationships on the basis of beliefs and moral motivations such as the presumption that a wrongdoer is likely to be repentant in the future (Ramelli, 2011, p. 44). In sorting the difference between God’s and humankind’s forms of forgiveness as one distinguished by perfect knowledge on the part of God and imperfect knowledge on the part of ordinary persons, Aquinas demonstrated an attentiveness to the opacity of the mental and emotional states of a forgiven person that is reflected in scholarship today. Yet whether we are transparent or not, we are evidently capable of much anger; Bishop Joseph Butler, whose influence on the current state of the literature is discussed in more detail below, appreciated that “a strong feeling of injustice and injury” (Butler, 2017, p. 11) would make forgiveness more difficult and yet thereby important to good lives in a shared world, in which resentment that leads to revenge unchecked “would propagate itself so as almost to lay waste the world” (p. 79). Alert to the vicissitudes of such emotions, Immanuel Kant both wrestled with the possibility of divine grace and argued for the justice of retribution while endorsing forgiveness as needed and as a curative of emotional passions such as hatred (Kant 1996, 1991); Claudia Blöser (2018) advances a case for Kant’s duty of forgiveness as a wide, imperfect duty.

Western philosophical efforts, after Kant, to reflect on the moral psychology of forgiveness unfortunately forked; theologians and philosophers of religion continued to attend to the importance of forgiveness to moral life, while philosophers of morality concerned with secular treatments of ethics all but abandoned the topic. Perhaps this was helped along by Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1989) urging the revaluation of traditionally Christian virtues including forgiveness; Nietzsche mentions the usefulness of forgiveness in the psychological manipulation of those in whom one wishes to incur a sense of guilt and to put in one’s emotional debt for release, a form of slavish revenge appropriate to characters that merely react rather than create anew or shake it off (p. 39), in contrast with the more “beautiful” virtue, mercy (p. 73). By mid-twentieth century, P.F. Strawson was able to lament with accuracy “that the topic of forgiveness was ‘a rather unfashionable subject in moral philosophy’” (Strawson, 2013, p. 67; qtd. in Warmke, 2016, p. 687).
Twentieth-century influences on contemporary debates

Scholars writing post-World War Two set the stage for renewed consideration of forgiveness. The brief appearance that forgiveness plays in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals is creatively reversed in Arendt’s short yet widely cited chapter, “Irreversibility and the Power to Forgive,” in The Human Condition (1958). Arendt argues that while revenge may be automatic, cyclical, and uncreative, human capacities including forgiveness do something new, willful and powerful: “In contrast to revenge, which is the natural, automatic reaction to transgression ..., the act of forgiving can never be predicted; ... Forgiving, in other words, is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven” (pp. 240-41). Arendt’s statement of the moral motivation for forgiving adheres to the Augustinian tradition of separating sin from sinner: “Forgiving and the relationship it establishes is always an eminently personal (though not necessarily individual or private) affair in which what was done is forgiven for the sake of who did it” (p. 241); respect, Arendt argues, “independent of qualities which we may admire or of achievements which we may highly esteem” (p. 242), is sufficient to provide us with moral motivation to forgive for the sake of the wrongdoer. Psychological impossibility for the forgiveness of great evils is implied in her statement, in this same essay, that “men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish and that they are unable to punish what has turned out to be unforgivable” (p. 241). She further raises the possibility of the epistemic opacity of self-knowledge, in describing “the deepest reason why nobody can forgive himself; here, as in action and speech generally, we are dependent upon others, to whom we appear in a distinctness which we ourselves are unable to perceive. Closed within ourselves, we would never be able to forgive ourselves any failing or transgression because we would lack the experience of the person for the sake of whom one can forgive” (p. 243).

The note, in Arendt’s post-war work, that we are unable to forgive what we cannot punish is echoed in two important works that were both published in France not long after, but which would only see great influence upon their re-release decades later. In 1967, Vladimir Jankélévitch wrote Le pardon, which would not be available in English until 2005 (as Forgiveness, translated by Andrew Kelley); a French philosopher, the son of Russian Jewish parents and a member of the French resistance, Jankélévitch wrote in cautious praise of the value of forms of unconditional forgiveness. In a later essay, however, he wrote that forgiveness “died in the death camps,” and that crimes against humanity are “inexpiable,” impossible to punish (Jankélévitch, 1996, p. 567). “Get ahead of one's victim, that was the thing; ask for a pardon,” Jankélévitch added, emphasizing the callousness of the expectation that victims forgive, and the suspect moral motivations to psychologically manipulate another behind appeals to forgive (1996, p. 567). (His work influences Jacques Derrida (2001), an early agent in bringing Jankélévitch to Anglophone scholars’ attentions as he sorts out the alteration in Jankélévitch's thinking.) In 1969, Holocaust survivor Simon Wiesenthal published The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness, an account of his experiences with a dying Nazi soldier asking Wiesenthal to forgive him for war crimes; the symposium of respondents included in the book raise psychological and moral complications for forgiving someone for crimes done to others or crimes of an enormity too great to understand or amend. Wiesenthal’s account was published in English in 1976, and the revised second edition in 1998 included an expanded symposium of respondents; the evident wide interest in this later edition coincided with the surge
In uptake of the generative work of Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton in 1988, *Forgiveness and Mercy*.

Eric Schwitzgebel (2018) has observed that with remarkable consistency, discussion of new concepts and jargon in philosophy “peaks about 15-20 years after a famous introduction event” and it is interesting to see the extent to which something similar is true of the work by Murphy and Hampton, specifically Murphy’s extension of what he takes to be Joseph Butler’s accounts of resentment and forgiveness. In *Forgiveness and Mercy*, Murphy argues that “forgiveness is a matter of how I feel about you, not how I treat you,” and he argues for right resentment of injury to oneself as the feeling that must be overcome for moral reasons in order for forgiveness to be “justified” (1988, p.21, p. 23). Setting the stage for debate for years to come, Murphy adds that how forgiveness is justified cannot be distinguished from what forgiveness is, adding, “We cannot define forgiveness and then ask what moral reasons make it appropriate...Forgiveness is not the overcoming of resentment *simpliciter*; it is rather this: forswearing resentment on moral grounds” (p. 23). The resentment-overcoming understanding of forgiveness would come to predominate, literature on it doubling in the 1990s and doubling again in the 2000s; although Murphy later modified his own view to include other emotional responses, Anthony Bash (2007) would, squarely in the timeframe that Schwitzgebel’s analysis predicts, refer to the resentment-overcoming account of forgiveness as “received orthodoxy” (p. 161).

As Paul Hughes and Brandon Warmke (2017) point out, however, the attribution to Murphy of a point of view reflective of Butler’s is contentious. Although Butler’s “interpreters have often attributed to him the view that forgiveness is the forswearing or overcoming of resentment,” in fact Butler’s recommendation was that we prevent the bad consequences of excesses of resentment; since “resentment itself is natural and innocent,” we need only “prevent resentment from leading us to seek revenge” (Hughes & Warmke, 2017). They note Ernesto Garcia’s (2011) suggestion that for Butler, “forgiveness seems to require no emotional change at all” (Hughes & Warmke, 2017, citing Garcia, 2011, p.17). What might forgiveness require instead?

*Contemporary trends in forgiveness and moral psychology*

Recall that for Augustine and Aquinas, forgiveness seemed to be presented in terms of how one treats the wrongdoer rather than how the forgiver feels, and note the contrast with Murphy’s wording above in outlining the resentment-overcoming account, asserting that forgiveness is a matter of how a forgiver feels, not how they treat a wrongdoer. Garcia (2011) maintains that “on Butler’s view, forgiveness is” both, “not just a matter of ‘how we treat one another’ but also ‘how we feel’” (p. 6), because Butler’s theory of emotions contributes to a “highly realistic” account of forgiveness as a virtue requiring both public and private activities, feelings, and expressions (p. 7).

We come to the point in the story of the philosophical literature at which two streams more often diverge. For scholars who endorse or offer modifications of a resentment-overcoming or emotional-transformation account, forgiveness requires reflection upon a change in one’s own internal emotional states. One could hold that forgiveness requires a change of heart that integrates the information about the wrong into a wider story about the wrongdoer (Calhoun 1992) or one could hold that forgiveness requires a change in one’s affective disposition to a
wrongdoer (Allais, 2008; Garrard & McNaughton, 2010, Milam 2018). The latter include accounts holding that emotional-transformation forgiveness is incompatible with continuing to have hostile feelings towards the perpetrator with respect to the wrongdoing (Allais 2008, 37), and accounts delineating negative emotions that may be compatibly present with forgiveness as long as they are not hostile, that is, as long as they are not incompatible with good will (McNaughton and Gerrard 2017). More narrowly conceived emotion-centered accounts entail moral justification for an internal transformation to count as forgiveness; as said above, Murphy (1988) does not distinguish between what forgiveness is and what makes it justified. Discussions of justifiable forgiveness on the part of emotion-centered authors may therefore be occupied with the extent to which one might know whether one is appropriately resentful of an actual moral wrong (Murphy, 1988), is self-aware enough of one’s self-respect in order to have resentment (Holmgren, 1993; Holmgren, 2002; Murphy, 2002; Murphy, 2003), or has achieved emotional transformation enough to have overcome all of one’s resentment, an epistemic challenge requiring robust self-knowledge of one’s affective tendencies (Scarre, 2016); one must at least accomplish a sufficient amount of emotional transformation if resentment’s overcoming is the ultimate goal (Griswold, 2007). The forgoing set of concerns usually involves individualized attention to mental states and changes in beliefs.

For scholars who diverge from the tradition of emotion-essential accounts, responsiveness to social situations more often surfaces as the central aspect of forgiveness, perhaps to help a wrongdoer (Jaeger, 1998, p. 12), to make a difference in oneself or another by reaching out to the wrongdoer (Card, 2002, p. 187), to commit oneself to relational repair (MacLachlan, 2009), and alter the norms of interaction (Warmke, 2016), to settle wrongs in the past and take forward-looking interests in moral repair of a community (Walker, 2006) or to reframe one’s own self-conception of the person one will be post-transgression (Moody-Adams, 2015).

The two-streams sketch is a rough one, however, and some philosophers (Garcia, 2011; Pettigrove, 2012) hold compound views of forgiveness as both emotional transformations and acts in thick social contexts. Similarly, Herbert Morris (1988) holds that emotions including (and not limited to) resentment are necessary but not sufficient for forgiveness; Morris includes as essential a re-acceptance of the offender, a renewal of a relationship that, if not conducted on the same terms as previously, at least offers “something like a welcoming back with open arms” (p. 17) in intimate and interpersonal relationships. Marilyn McCord Adams (1991) seems to share Morris’s commitments to forgiveness as having multiple stages, and characterizes forgiveness as a process of ongoing responsiveness to socially mediated understanding of harms; she rejects requirements that one can only forgive a “responsible wrongdoing” which is transparently immoral, or proceeding from a bad quality of the will, saying, “forgiveness involves a series of re-evaluations of the situation…. Things may be better than they seem and/or worse than they seem, but they will always be more complicated than at first they seem” (p. 293).

The greater attention to relational and social contexts on the part of 21st-century authors tends to include interest in arguing for a more expansive set of those with the standing to forgive; where emotion-centered accounts often argue that only victims forgive, philosophers who prioritize the functions of forgiveness as a mechanism of responsiveness and release in social situations are more likely to argue for the power of communications of forgiveness and refusals to forgive on the part of third parties (Pettigrove, 2012), groups (MacLachlan, 2012), proxies and
indirect victims (Warmke, 2017). Arguments that a forgiver’s beliefs may be socially upheld or undermined, say, in one’s ability to commit to forgive or to trust in the future worth of the offender, gain some support from interdisciplinary literature. Historian Tobin Miller Shearer notes that in Islamic and Jewish traditions, forgiveness unfolds in front of and within a community and “is not a solitary endeavor” (Shearer, 2016; see also Mullet & Azar 2009). Cultures differ in practices of direct and indirect expressions, and as psychologist C. Ward Struthers notes, direct expressions of unforgivingness and indirect expressions of forgivingness may be more likely to yield apology from an offender (Struthers et al 2017, p. 29).

Relatedly, Walker (2013) accounts for the “social scaffolding” involved in forgiveness, as “being validated and vindicated by others can reasonably affect the victim’s decision whether to relinquish further demands on the offender” (p. 506), and “can free the victim to be more generous or hopeful, allowing the victim to feel free to forgive. Third parties can also contribute to the victim’s and the offender’s understanding of the wrong and its consequences” (p. 507). Not coincidentally, Walker joins authors who reject the resentment-centered conception: “I prefer to describe forgiveness not as ‘overcoming resentment’ but as the victim’s making a practical commitment (either deliberate decision or by stages) to release the wrongdoer from further grievance, reproach, and direct demands to which the victim may yet be entitled” (2013, p. 510; see also Walker 2006, pp. 151–90).

Caring, Reasoning, and Moral Remainders

I said at the outset that the dual streams in forgiveness, of literature that centers on the emotional transformation involved in forgiveness and literature that prioritizes the social contexts permitting or impeding exercises of forgiveness, reflects Cheshire Calhoun’s (2015) description of moral philosophy as concerned with two aims, including “getting morality right”—the “capital-M conception of morality”—and “practicing it with others,” that is, the social practices of morality (p. 6). Of course, every author aims to get something about forgiveness right, but in the early stages of the forgiveness boom, readers were more likely to find emotion-centered accounts that argued against attention to social contexts and practical effects as relevant to morality at all, and more often divorced the beneficial consequences of forgiveness in social contexts from “genuine” (Hampton, 1988, p. 39), “real” (Haber, 1991, p. 49), or “true” forgiveness (Holmgren, 1993, p. 342). At a time when research in psychology was rapidly expanding and advancing arguments for the positive consequences of forgiveness for personal health (Enright and Fitzgibbons, 2000) and relational well-being (McCullough & Worthington, 1995; Worthington 2003), philosophers including Joram Haber and Jeffrie Murphy argued against considerations of the needs of relationships, the mental health of the forgiver, or the aims of political communities as instructive of the moral appropriateness of forgiveness, saying the beneficial results to forgivers “are largely irrelevant from a moral point of view” (Haber, 1991, p. 108) and rejecting “trendy forgiveness boosterism” (Murphy, 2003, p. 17).

Depending on which authors one read at that time, one could get the impression that forgiveness as a topic of interest in psychology is entirely separate from forgiveness as a matter of morality, especially since psychologists often start from ordinary-language uses of forgiveness and
worked backward from people’s reported needs, whereas philosophers often start from principled considerations of justice and self-respect requiring resentment, then worked forward, testing “folk” uses of the term against this stream of philosophical conceptual analysis. Macalester Bell’s (2008) work is an example of the more recent shift away from the perceived split between folk- and moral-forgiveness from within an emotion-centered account, upgrading what may be “merely prudential” reasons to forgive from the category of the morally irrelevant to the status of the “morally suspect” (p. 640); she adds, “Given the ubiquity of prudential reasons to forgive in the popular discourse concerning forgiveness, I think it would be disingenuous to claim that those who overcome an emotion for these sorts of reasons do not really forgive the offender. We can, with the folk, refer to this activity as forgiveness,” even sharing in moral forms of forgiveness, although not the ideal form that she argues merits high praise (p. 640, footnote 32).

In short, the praiseworthy form has been the subject of emotion-centered accounts of forgiveness, because such accounts tend to explicitly begin from questions as to what morality requires, with an eye to identifying good and justifiable forms of forgiveness. The interest on the part of authors of social-context centered conceptions more often take, as a starting point, individuals’ and groups’ reports, especially in contexts of oppression and violence, of human needs or social purposes of forgiving (King 2015, p. 62; Welch, 2015; p. 210), reservations regarding forgiveness (Cherry 2017; Thomas 2003), or seeking alternatives to forgiveness (Jeffery 2008; Minow 1998). It is my aim, in the next section of this chapter, to advance a view for holding that dual-process theories of moral reasoning suggest the two streams of forgiveness literature are not really in opposition to each other so much as they are occupied with different modes of moral understanding of related phenomena. To outline that in more detail, I provide a quick sketch of dual-process reasoning next, and its relationship to scholarship in moral emotions.

In a discussion of moral emotions and moral motivation for prosocial behavior, Jesse Prinz and Shaun Nichols (2010) observe, “The term ‘moral motivation’ is ambiguous between motivation to act in a way that (as a matter of fact) fits with the demands of morality and motivation to act in a way because one judges that morality demands such action… But helping because you care is different from helping because you think it is what morality demands. Both forms of motivation should be distinguished” (p. 113), and neither is exclusively the province of morality. The latter motivation, acting on the basis of beliefs as to what morality demands, draws upon deliberations akin to Calhoun’s “capital-M Morality,” as an agent relies upon principled considerations of morality’s demands to come to decisions as to what to do in particular situations. The former motivation, acting because you care, reflects a different form of moral thinking, or rather, moral action that does not rely on processes of justifications based on reflections regarding one’s principles, and instead seems underpinned by pre-reflective values.

I characterize the two modes of moral thinking this way in accordance with Lisa Tessman’s (2015) description of moral reasoning as involving dual processes, one involving a more automatic, intuitive mode of moral response and the other involving a more controlled reasoning process that is less dependent on context, more effortful, and voluntary (Haidt, 2001; Tessman; 2015). In some moral situations, controlled reasoning processes regarding what morality requires are inapt to the moral context, such as in Bernard Williams’ famous case of a man having “one thought too many” who sees his wife and a stranger drowning and engages in deliberation as to whom impartial morality demands that he save (Tessman 2015, p. 91; Williams, 1981, p. 18). Indeed, controlled reasoning processes may be not
just inapt but out of the picture in moral situations that set off internal alarm bells, basic emotions including anger that serve as prescriptive dispositions in advance, such as the sense that a gross injury or injustice to oneself ought not be. Tessman likens such “automatic, intuitive” reasoning processes to Nel Noddings’ notion of the natural impulse to care, the “I must” (Tessman, 2015, p. 149; Noddings, 1984), Tamar Gendler’s conception of “aliefs,” automatic associations in contrast to beliefs (Tessman, 2015, p.75; Gendler 2010), and Prinz’s “prescriptive sentiments” or “oughtitudes” (Tessman, 2015, p. 79; Prinz 2007).

Two things are important to note in applying dual-process theory to the literature on forgiveness. First, dual-process theorists indicate that “most moral judgments are arrived at through the affect-driven, automatic-intuitive process” (Tessman, 2015, p. 62, quoting Haidt 2001, 818, cf. Greene & Haidt 2002, p. 517), rather than the controlled reasoning process. Note the relationship of this preponderant tendency in moral judgments to the moral motivation that Prinz and Nichols mentioned above, to act because you care rather than because it is what morality requires. That the affect-driven responses may also be moral judgments casts “folk” or “prudential” reasons to forgive for the sake of harmony, peace, or personal well-being in a rather different light. Bell (2008) included among the reasons to forgive “most often cited in the popular press” the example that a “forgiver might decide to forgive so that she is able to move on with her life without the burden of harboring unpleasant emotions such as contempt or resentment” (p. 640). Jean Hampton (1988) argued that a woman who forgives a boorish father-in-law to maintain family peace during his visit is an example of forgiveness that is not “genuine” because to do so would “drop that” controlled, reasoned “judgment,” that his boorishness is morally wrong, an injustice to the woman, “and the angry feeling it engenders” (pp. 39-40). In most studies of common conceptions of forgiveness, the main motivations that people identify are to secure the forgiver’s emotional well-being and to maintain a relationship with the forgiven; it is rarely the case that lay people mention, as a primary motivation, doing what they believe morality requires. In other words, the affect-driven, relational and social reasons that people cite for forgiving or for having obstacles to forgive may not be irrelevant to morality so much as a compelling form of moral response that does not depend on controlled justifications, instead bearing out basic values.

The second thing to note in applying dual-process theory to the literature on forgiveness is that these two processes of moral reasoning can inform, influence, and agree with each other, but they can also be brought into conflict (Tessman, 2015, p.59). Occasions for forgiveness provide excellent examples of such conflicts; a righteous response to injury can be intuitive, automatic, and usually negative, a corollary of Noddings’ “I must” that in the cases of victims of wrongdoing can take the form of “No! They must not!” The more controlled consideration of reasons to forgive can feel quite at odds with justified anger at one’s injuries. Both modes of moral reasoning involve cognition and emotion, but the mental activities that each engage can result in what might seem like impossible contradictions, including the presence of a well-justified commitment to forgive and the recurrence in the same mind of hard feelings. Tessman’s attention to dual-process theory helpfully fills out why, post-transgression, what we care about in morally apt ways and what we think morality demands of us to do differently can feel incompatible and irresolvable in a way that continues well beyond the time period of the wrong done; on occasion, resolving the felt conflict in favor of either moral process “does not resolve the moral conflict” (p. 85), because the two modes of moral reasoning are not always resolvable by rationalizing one away with the processes involved in the other. Evidence suggests that the dual moral reasoning processes engage different areas of the brain, conducting different kinds of thinking; therefore, it is not
the case that the deliberative faculty can simply discharge the automatic, intuitive process with conscious arguments with oneself that one is irrational, and that one should instead obey one’s more rational thoughts, as if the clear positive value of one outweighs the disvalue of the other in a cost-benefit analysis conducted on the same scale; instead, dual reasoning process theory points up a conflict in one’s qualitatively different scales of values.

Tessman describes distinctive psychological features of some moral situations as inevitably including the feeling that “part of you is going to be dissatisfied” (2010, p. 85) and her insight is reminiscent of Claudia Card’s that “moral remainders” can linger after harm, that is, “rectificatory responses of feeling rather than action” (2002, p. 170). Forgiveness, Card suggests, can address remainders or be an alternative to them, “a way of addressing negative remainders that perpetrators are unable to address adequately themselves” (p. 174), although not in a way that discharges the feelings involved. In describing post-transgression “emotional residues” (p. 169) as moral remainders, Card appeals to Bernard Williams’ observation that “moral conflicts are neither systematically avoidable, nor all soluble without remainder” (Williams, 1973, p. 179); Card recognizes that “for Williams, remainders are not our lingering emotional responses but unexpiated wrongs themselves, the things inevitably not made right. I find it natural, however, to think of emotional and attitudinal responses to such moral facts as also remainders” (Card, 2002, p. 169). I extend the insights of dual-process moral reasoning to Card’s conception of emotional moral remainders, in order to show that dual moral processes can yield remainders at those times when the automatic-intuitive system of moral thought generates the negative response to injury and the controlled reasoning system generates the belief that forgiveness is more morally appropriate. On this understanding, it is not simply that one has a feeling counter to morality. It is rather the case that both the intuitive, negative affect against forgiveness and the deliberative, justified judgment in favor of forgiveness are the products of distinct moral processes, neither of which is incorrect, and the resolution of which will have the result that moral remainders such as the recurrence of negative feelings even after forgiveness are, at a minimum, unpredictable, and may even be unavoidable.

Although Card does not explicitly embrace the dual-process theory of moral reasoning, she does seem to adopt the dual conception of forgiveness as both emotional and social, when she says, “forgiveness is no antidote to speechlessness, horror, nausea, and the like. But it is a possible antidote to blame and thus to condemnation” (p. 176), a moral act compatible with the recurrence of negative feelings. She declines to prescribe forgiveness as a matter of moral obligation and instead describes it as a moral power, with the relief of the wrongdoer the main point of the moral act (p. 174). Maclachlan (2009) argues that conceiving of forgiveness as a moral power achieves a shift in focus, “away from valuing forgiveness itself, and toward the value of our capacity to choose forgiveness (or not)” (p. 152). She adds that Card’s framework, “describing forgiveness as one of a set of moral powers, implies that our capacity to grant or refuse forgiveness depends as much – indeed, perhaps more – upon the moral context in which we find ourselves as the nature of the wrong and wrongdoer we face” (p. 153).

Taken in combination, the insights of Tessman and Prinz and Nichols, that we may employ multiple modes of reasoning and have different moral motivations, combined with Card’s attention to the aftermath of wrong as having moral remainders, may go some way to resolve recurrent debates in forgiveness, such as whether one really forgives if one has recurrent feelings of anger. If forgiveness was singly defined as the complete overcoming of the last drop of resentment, then it would be an
indefinitely receding point, an achievement one could not be confident in until one died, since one can never know if hard feelings will recur in one’s future. But dual-processing theory suggests a better answer. The moral psychology of forgiveness turns out to be a study in the multiplicity of our moral aims that yields the understanding of conflicting aims’ coexistence in a rational agent. Forgiveness may be the result of a controlled, reasoning process that cannot always discharge the negative assessment of an automatic, intuitive moral position that one was unjustly wronged, because our controlled reasoning processes are not in control of our automatic and intuitive moral cognitions. Forgiveness may also be motivated by the automatic and affect-driven aspects of ourselves, pursued because one cares about oneself or about one’s relationships or the relata, in a way that does not appeal to justifications as to what morality requires. What many philosophers refer to as the sort of forgiveness in which “the folk” engage, that is, forgiveness for the sake of preserving a relationship or for harmony within a family, is not merely prudential on this account. Instead, it is the product of the more intuitive and less deliberative moral reasoning process, well-grounded in values but not in ratiocination. Since forgiveness may be the product of controlled deliberation that conflicts with intuitive automatic-morality, or the product of intuitive automatic-morality, it is reasonable to conclude that the functions of forgiveness may be moral, and may be reparative of relationships, yet plural rather than limited to one function of overcoming resentment, or reducing personal anger, or making possible a future with a reconciled citizenry.

If my vision of forgiveness as plural is correct, then the dual streams of the literature in forgiveness focusing on getting the internal emotional state right on some analyses, and on the needs of groups or individuals in concrete social contexts in other analyses, no longer seem so divorced in their endeavors. Conceptual analyses and emotion-centered accounts get to something important about forgiveness just as do accounts concerned with social practices, so I am not saying that every author ought to advance a multidimensional model of forgiveness. But my version of the story does mean that some approaches to the moral psychology of forgiveness are mistaken when they aim for exclusive accounts of forgiveness as a question of getting morality right in a way that is not responsive to the means by which most people practice morality with others. As I discuss in the final section, even conceptual analyses of forgiveness that merely seek to distinguish it from related moral concepts may be unsettled by blurrier boundaries between forgiveness and reconciliation than previously considered.

Moral Repair: The Debated Interrelatedness of Forgiveness and Reconciliation

Forgiveness and reconciliation are interrelated concepts, although contemporary philosophers of forgiveness have often proceeded as though reconciliation is an afterthought to the project of getting accounts of forgiveness correct. Like many philosophers, when I first came to the topic of forgiveness, I averted questions about the implications of forgiveness for reconciliation with the breezy dismissal that forgiveness is not the same as reconciliation, and that we could discuss the former wholly separately from the latter. I was disconcerted, therefore, to read of psychologists’ finding that “the thought that forgiveness can be cleanly separated from reconciliation ... does not represent most people’s views” (Belicki, Rourke, & McCarthy, 2008, p. 179). This is demonstrable in conceptions of forgiveness in what the authors call “collectivist cultures,” but they note that even in their own, more individualistic, North American context, subjects of studies asked, “Is reconciliation a necessary part of forgiveness?” are far more likely to respond with yes or maybe than no; affirmative answers alone were fifty percent of the
In at least one study, the same psychologists said that forgiveness was a strong predictor of reconciliation. Certainly evidence from psychology should move philosophers of forgiveness to take into account that much ordinary understanding of forgiveness assumes its interrelationship with reconciliation.

In emerging and recent scholarship, philosophers have more carefully engaged with the complexities of the interrelationship of forgiveness and reconciliation. The nature of their relationship is a topic of debate, and some of the authors discussed below go so far as to say that one can reconcile without forgiving at all. However, I note that even scholars of reconciliation address the subject of forgiveness in some depth in order to reject its necessity for reconciliation.

Barrett Emerick (2017) correctly observes that forgiveness has received far more attention in philosophical circles than has reconciliation (p. 123). He argues for a view of forgiveness as unilateral whereas reconciliation is bilateral and entails a degree of forgiveness; reconciliation “requires (1) that you and I reach adequate understanding of the wrong, (2) that we be properly oriented towards each other attitudinally and affectively,” including an attitude of recognition on the part of both that what one did to another was a wrong, “and (3) that we have repaired or are in the process of repairing morally the damage done to our relationship. Like forgiveness, reconciliation is both a practice and an accomplishment – both an action that you undertake and an outcome that you achieve” (p. 125), and more robust in these respects than toleration or collaboration (p. 124). In arguing for the necessity of some forgiveness in order to have interpersonal reconciliation, Emerick stresses that the requirement does not work in the other direction; “forgiveness does not entail reconciliation” (p. 128). In arguing that they are not mutually dependent activities, Emerick notes that his account differs from Antjie Krog’s (2008) view of forgiveness and reconciliation as inseparable concepts, two steps in the same journey toward repairing and appreciating the “interconnectedness-towards-wholeness” that characterizes ubuntu, a shared humanity with others (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2011, p. 551).

Jeremy Watkins (2015), while arguing for “forgiveness-based reconciliation” (p. 32), gentles the relationship of participants’ affects to forgiveness, such as repentance on the part of wrongdoers or even, as Emerick would have it, acknowledgement of a wrong done. Watkins suggests that forward-looking perpetrators of past harms may believe past contexts, especially those involving mutual predation, are sufficiently dissimilar; a position that reconciliation requires repentance or even recognition of past wrongdoing “ignores the possibility that a person might be committed to liberal democratic values going into the future whilst insisting they were unsuited to the conditions of the past” (p. 29).

Whatever their differences, Emerick, Krog, and Watkins maintain a view of forgiveness as a route to reconciliation that promotes the possibility of reconciliation, providing moral motivations for the common understanding of forgiveness and reconciliation as related. They note, however, that some political philosophers express skepticism of the necessity of forgiveness for a victim to believe in future possibilities or engage with others in reconciliation. “Forgiveness should not be a requirement for relational repair in transitional contexts,” Colleen Murphy says (2017, p. 23); the context matters, because the normative expectations of victims of serious harm are so altered after armed conflict. In “normal personal relationships,” Murphy says, “wrongdoing is the exception or aberration, not the rule,” and so in ordinary interpersonal interactions in contexts of relative safety, forgiveness may be appropriate because the acknowledgement of the harms a victim has suffered are realistically possible,
sufficiently comprehensible, with a beginning, a middle, and hopefully an end. “However, in transitional contexts the conception of a prior normal acceptable political relationship that has been ruptured by wrongdoing does not pertain” (p. 166). Assuming the resentment-overcoming model of forgiveness to be the one at work in calls for political forgiveness, Murphy argues that “rather than being reasonable and appropriate, urging forgiveness and the overcoming of resentment in contexts where wrongdoing is systematic and ongoing seems at best naïve and at worst a form of complicity in the maintenance of oppression and injustice” (p. 166).

Colleen Murphy is eloquent in reasons for finding forgiveness ill-suited to reconciliation on a large scale. However, Watkins suggests that it is sufficient to forgiveness-based reconciliation that “(i) the recipient isn’t liable to re-offend; (ii) is committed to liberal democratic values going into the future; and (iii) isn’t apt to take the insinuation of wrongdoing as an insult. Notice that this analysis puts most of the emphasis on the perpetrator’s attitude towards the future” rather than the perpetrator’s perception of past actions as wrong or associated with guilt or repentance (p. 31). Watkins, Emerick, and Krog develop conceptions of forgiveness as moral attitudes that may provide moral motivation to consider forms of moral and relational repair; victims of serious harm who forgive thereby permit, inwardly, possibilities for thinking differently about how to carry on with the heavy knowledge that one has been wronged in ways that cannot simply be made right. Those possibilities can include considering reconciliation, a disposition to regard offenders as persons worthy of one’s moral attention, even if that attention is not actually to be directed toward reconciliation.

References


