


NASS MONOGRAPHS

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- #5 (1997): *Spinoza Bibliography: 1991-1995*, edited by Steven Barbone and Lee Rice.
- #6 (1997): Gideon Segal, *Ideas, Affects and Causality*; Steven Barbone and Lee Rice, *Spinoza Bibliography: 1990*.
- #7 (1998): Frank Lucash, *Ideas, Affects and Causality: Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza*; Tammy Nyden-Bullock, *Salvation in a Naturalized World: The Role of the Will and Intellect in the Philosophies of Nietzsche and Spinoza*.

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NASS MONOGRAPH #7 (1998)



Ideas, Affects and Causality: Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza

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Salvation in a Naturalized World: The Role of the Will and Intellect in the Philosophies of Nietzsche and Spinoza

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Claremont Graduate School

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Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza

Frank Lucash
University of Nevada

In *Ethics* 2P40S2 Spinoza tells us what he thinks is the nature of intuitive knowledge or what he calls knowledge of the third kind.¹ He says "This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things." He repeats this with slightly different wording in E5P25D: "The third kind of knowledge proceeds from the adequate idea of certain of God's attributes to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. . . ." According to these statements we must have intuitive knowledge of God or his attributes (the attributes constitute the essence of God) before we can have intuitive knowledge of other things.² But is this the only way intuitive knowledge proceeds? Can't we

1. I am using the following translations: *Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Understanding, and Selected Letters*, tr. Samuel Shirley (Hackett Publishing, 1992; *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, tr. and ed. by Edwin Curley (Princeton University Press, 1985); *Spinoza: The Letters*, tr. Samuel Shirley (Hackett, 1995); *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, tr. Samuel Shirley (Leiden: Brill, 1989).
2. Spinoza does not say that in the procedure of intuitive knowledge that there is no reasoning or inference involved. What he is saying here is that with the third kind of knowledge we have an adequate idea of the essence of certain attributes of God before we have an adequate idea of the essence of other things. Curley in "Experience in Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge" in *Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1973), p. 58, states, but does not accept the rationalist interpretation, that reason always involves an inference from a premise, and the ultimate premise is supplied by intuition. Intuition itself is noninferential. G. H. R. Parkinson and Filippo Mignini disagree with this interpretation. They think that intuition or a certain kind of intuition involves inference. Parkinson, in *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 183-184, says that intuitive knowledge involves inference because it proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things. Mignini in "In Order to Interpret Spinoza's Theory of the Third Kind of Knowledge: Should Intuitive Science Be Considered *Per Causam Proximam* Knowledge?" in *Spinoza: Issues and Directions*, ed. by Edwin Curley and Pierre-François Moreau (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), pp. 137-138, thinks that deducing the essence of particular things from the essence of God involves inference, but knowing the essence of things directly does not. Reason or the second kind of knowledge proceeds from effect to cause. Intuition or the third kind of knowledge proceeds from cause to effect. Knowledge of God is immediate, but knowledge of other things is not.

**Salvation in a Naturalized World:
The Role of the Will and Intellect
in the Philosophies of Nietzsche and Spinoza**

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Recently, there has been an increasing interest in studying the philosophies of Spinoza and Nietzsche in relation to each other. Nietzsche scholars are slowly beginning to take note of Spinoza's importance as a precursor to Nietzsche. Spinoza scholars are beginning to see Nietzsche as a key to understanding the enormous but sorely neglected impact of Spinoza's legacy on Western thought. Such a trend could not come too soon. I am of the opinion that it would not only greatly enrich both areas of scholarship, but would also provide a much needed examination of some residual issues of modernity. This paper could not hope to handle such a weighty task. Instead, I hope to indicate how fertile such study would be by focusing on the role of the intellect and the will in the paradox that is the Spinoza-Nietzsche relationship.

It is clear that the intellect plays a fundamental role in the philosophy of Spinoza and that will is a central concept for Nietzsche. However, what may not be as clear is that Spinoza's intellect and Nietzsche's will play a very similar role. In their respective attempts to achieve a higher form of human existence. Both Spinoza and Nietzsche explain and advocate a movement from passivity or reactivity to activity in terms of an egoistic, psychological drive to increase one's power. In this sense, their project is the same: to achieve human freedom within a completely naturalized world by capitalizing on a very basic drive that we humans share with the rest of existence. However, there are some obvious differences between Spinoza's and Nietzsche's philosophies. In fact, they seem as different as two philosophies can be. In the following, I hope to show that their projects are in fact the same, while, at the same time, accounting for some of their major differences.

The heart of Spinoza's and Nietzsche's project is an egoistic drive to increase one's power of activity.¹ Spinoza calls this drive the conatus

while Nietzsche calls it will to power. Both Spinoza and Nietzsche believe that a higher form of human existence is achieved by capitalizing on this drive. For this reason, both philosophers produce a substantial psychological account to be used for this purpose. However, Spinoza gives this account in terms of the intellect, while Nietzsche gives it in terms of the will. As we will see later, this difference in approach accounts for many of the major differences in their philosophies. This difference might lead us to believe that Spinoza considers the intellect more important than the will, and that Nietzsche considers the will more important than the intellect. However, one of the things that makes Spinoza and Nietzsche different from most other philosophers is the fact that they do not distinguish between the will and the intellect. And so we are left with two important questions. What do Spinoza and Nietzsche have to gain by collapsing the will and the intellect into one? And, if the will and intellect are ultimately the same thing, then how is it that their different approaches yield such different looking philosophies?

Traditionally, modern philosophers have made a distinction between the will and the intellect in humans. It is this very distinction that has allowed modern philosophy to separate humanity from a transcendent, more powerful being. For example, Descartes considers God to have infinite will and intellect and therefore considers will and intellect to be the same thing in God. However, in humans, while will is infinite, the intellect is not. And so what distinguishes humans from God is this separation of will and intellect. On the other hand, what makes humans more like God than other creature is that they have will and intellect.

And so the distinction of will and intellect serves two basic functions: to distinguish humans from a more powerful God, and to distinguish humans from a lesser physical world. Since, as I will show in the next

1. Some might object to considering the conatus a drive to increase one's power of activity. However, I think it is an accurate description of what the conatus does. Spinoza defines the conatus as that with which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being (E3P7). Since, according to Spinoza, nothing can be destroyed except through an external cause (E3P4), the way to preserve oneself is to be as resistant as possible to destructive outside forces. In other words, the conatus strives to be as active, as opposed to passive, as possible. To be active is to be the cause of one's ideas and actions. Therefore, activity is power, the power to be determined by one's own essence rather than by that of other things. Hence, it is fair to consider the conatus as a drive to increase one's power of activity.

section, Spinoza and Nietzsche both reject a transcendent God and the idea that humans have a place above the rest of nature, they must also reject the distinction between the will and the intellect.

By making the will and the intellect one, Spinoza and Nietzsche naturalize the universe and human existence within that universe. Humans are part of nature and are subject to the necessity of the world in the same way as all other natural beings and objects. In naturalizing human existence, both Spinoza and Nietzsche reject several tenants of traditional modern philosophy, for example, the belief in freedom of the will, teleology, a moral world order, an unegoistic perspective, and the existence of good and evil. In fact, it is these similarities with Spinoza that comforted Nietzsche from his philosophical loneliness, as he expresses in the following postcard to Overbeck:

I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted. I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza: that I should have turned to him just now was inspired by 'Instinct'. Not only is his over-all tendency like mine - making knowledge the most powerful affect - but in five main points of his doctrine I recognize myself, this most unusual and loneliest thinker. Is closest to me precisely in these matters: he denies the freedom of the will, teleology, the moral world order, the unegoistic, and evil. Even though the divergences are admittedly tremendous, they are due more to the difference in time, culture, and science. In summa: my solitude, which, as on very high mountains, often made it hard for me to breathe and made my blood rush out, is at least a dualitude.²

As Nietzsche suggests, both he and Spinoza deny freedom of the will.

2. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, *Reading Nietzsche*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 92.

In other words, they think that human beliefs and choices are not determined by some mental or spiritual entity separate from the physical world. Rather, they are determined by the world itself. For Spinoza, the soul, or mind, is nothing more than an awareness of the body.³ In being so, the order and connection of ideas is the same as that of things.⁴ One idea is determined by another idea in the same way that one body is determined by another. Ideas are not separate, autonomous entities. Rather, they are part of the interconnected world understood through the mode of thought. As he says in Part 11 of *The Ethics*:

In the Mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the Mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity.⁵

Nietzsche also naturalizes the soul. He rejects the traditional concept of a soul as a non-physical entity separate from the world and free to act on and in the world as it so chooses. Such a view is a mere superstition that arises out of the troublesome subject and ego superstition.⁶ Nietzsche denies the individual a special subject/object relationship to the universe. People are not discoverers of the universe in itself, rather, they are creators of worlds within a chaotic universe. As humans, we create world views. However, the world views we create determine our will. Our ideas, beliefs, desires, and fears within our world view determine what we believe, disbelieve, and fear. In other words, just because humans create world views does not mean that humans are free to affirm or deny as they please. There is a necessary relation between all parts within each world view. We, as beings incapable of living outside our own created world view, are also subject to that necessity.

At this point, some readers may become concerned and point out that Spinoza understands a rational world to determine the will while

3. *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, vol. 1, *The Ethics*, (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1985), E2P13, 457.

4. *Ibid.*, E2P7, 451.

5. *Ibid.*, E2P48, 483.

6. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), Preface, 1.

Nietzsche understands a perspectival, constructed world view to determine the will. I do not in any way wish to downplay this difference. It is extremely important and will help us understand the role of the intellect and will in their respective philosophies. However, we must not let these differences obscure the fact that both thinkers see the individual as part of nature; a part that has no special status over the other parts within nature.

The second consequence of naturalizing human existence is the denial of teleology. Both philosophers reject the view that a benevolent creator made the universe for human use. As Spinoza explains in the Appendix of Part I of *The Ethics*, the universe is indifferent to the wants of humans.

For the perfection of things is to be judged solely from their nature and power; things are not more or less perfect because they please or offend men's senses, or because they are of use to, or are incompatible with, human nature.⁷

The reason people tend to attribute teleology to the universe is because they are born ignorant of the causes of things. People are aware of their wants and desires. However, they are unaware of the causes of these wants and desires. For this reason, humans always act with an end in view, that end being their advantage. Further, they notice that many things in the natural world can act towards their advantage. Because they did not provide these things for themselves, but found them in nature, they assume that nature provided them for their advantage.

Nietzsche agrees that we should not measure or describe the universe in relation to humanity. As he says in section 109 of *The Gay Science*:

But how could we reproach or praise the universe? Let us beware of attributing to it heartlessness and unreason or their opposites: it is neither perfect nor beautiful, nor noble, nor

7. Spinoza, E1App, 446.

does it wish to become any of these things; it does not by any means strive to imitate man.⁸

Not only do Spinoza and Nietzsche say that the universe is not ordered *for* or in the image of humanity; they also claim any order found in the world is a human construct. Nietzsche maintains that the universe is chaotic. It is only out of our need to survive that we create orderly worlds:

The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos – the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms.⁹

Spinoza also thinks order is a human construct.

And since those things we can easily imagine are especially pleasing to us, men prefer order to confusion, as if order were anything in nature more than a relation to our imagination.¹⁰

As will become clear in the later discussion of reason, Spinoza also views this construct as a means of survival or self-preservation.

At first, readers may be concerned with the difference in Nietzsche's and Spinoza's characterizations of the universe. Nietzsche is associated with an order-less universe, while Spinoza tends to be associated with rationality and order. However, Spinoza makes it clear that the universe as *Natura naturans*, i.e., nature conceived through itself, is not ordered, nor can we ascribe any characteristics to it. In this sense, Spinoza's Universe is somewhat like Nietzsche's, it is beyond human description and knowledge.

8. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of songs*, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), #109, 168.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Spinoza, E1App, 444.

Although both Nietzsche and Spinoza deny order in any ontological sense, they both allow for an order of necessity on a different level. When considering Nature from the point of view of a particular, singular mode, Spinoza invokes an elaborate order involving necessary relationships of cause, containment, and entailment. For example, there are certain necessary relationships between human emotions. However, we must refrain from thinking that these relationships exist somewhere in nature. In reality, the necessary relationships between human thoughts, emotions, etc., have nothing to do with the universe itself and everything to do with a perspectival relationship that humans have with the rest of nature as a particular mode within that whole.

In a similar way, Nietzsche allows for necessity within created world views. On Nietzsche's view, there is no order to the universe itself. However, for humans to survive, they must create order. Therefore, through an act of will, each person creates her own world view. Necessity exists as fate within these world views. Every event, thought, desire, etc., is necessitated by the one that preceded it, and so on. In other words, one could not change anything in the past without changing what one is today. Nietzsche sums up this concept in his challenge of the eternal return. Completely affirming one's fate requires the ability to desire to repeat one's past over and over again to infinity. In other words, to affirm what one is now, one must affirm their entire world view. Such affirmation requires the understanding that one's past states completely determine one's present states. Nietzsche is similar to Spinoza in that they both allow for necessity on the level of singular perspectives within the universe.

On the other hand, Spinoza's account differs from Nietzsche's in an important way. The order that is discussed in terms of *Natura naturata* follows from the nature of the particular mode whose perspective is in question, that nature being its conatus. Since all humans need the same things to survive, in that we share the same basic physical make-up, we have the same conatus. In contrast, Nietzsche takes an existentialist approach to human nature. He believes that individuals create their own essence. For this reason, Nietzsche's philosophy allows for limitless world views, or interpretations of the universe. Spinoza, on the other hand, is limited to one correct understanding of the universe from the human perspective, which is achieved through reason. He views any other human interpretation as errors stemming from the imagination.

The fact that Spinoza and Nietzsche naturalize the universe has important consequences on their moral views as well. Morality does not follow from any moral world order inherent in the universe. After all, there is no such order. When philosophers claim to discover natural moral law what they are actually doing is imposing the laws of their doctrine onto nature.¹¹

Instead, Nietzsche and Spinoza understand morality in terms of power. Since everything has the drive to increase its power, every individual seeks what is to her advantage. If a person perceives something as advantageous, she calls it good. If she perceives it as harmful she calls it evil. In this way, nothing is good or evil in itself. The universe as a whole is devoid of moral content. In other words, both Spinoza and Nietzsche reject the unegoistic perspective. The terms good, bad, and evil do not reflect anything about the object to which they are applied. Rather, they describe a relationship between the object and the speaker. Let us summarize up to this point. Both Spinoza and Nietzsche naturalize human existence by denying free-will, teleology, the moral world order, unegoistic perspectives, and the existence of good and evil. In doing so they differ from most modern philosophers who have traditionally placed humans between a transcendent God and its material creation. This view is traditionally supported with the idea that the will and intellect are distinct in humans. Therefore, denying the distinction between will and intellect will be helpful to their project of naturalization. We are now ready to ask the second question: if the will and intellect are ultimately the same thing, then how is it that their different approaches yield such different looking philosophies? To answer this question, it will be helpful to look at the second part of their overall project: to find a higher form of human existence within a naturalized world. Both Spinoza and Nietzsche use psychology to describe human activity within a naturalized world as well as to give a normative account for how some humans might achieve a higher form of existence. In this way, psychology becomes a way of understanding and achieving a type salvation within a naturalized world. As mentioned earlier, Spinoza characterizes his psychology in terms of the intellect

11. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #9,15-16.

A good deal of *The Ethics* is concerned with defining, describing, and cataloguing the affects or passions. In doing so, Spinoza is doing much more than providing a handbook of the human psyche. He is also providing a method of becoming a more powerful human being. Through becoming aware of the causes of the emotions, meaning the way one mental event necessitates another mental event, humans can become relatively more active and self-determined, i.e., more powerful. Our ideas naturally become more adequate, thus increasing the power of the intellect, as we attain a higher awareness of our motives and desires.

Spinoza's emphasis on knowing the cause of the affects is one of the things that truly makes him stand out in the history of Western Thought. We can definitely see him as an early precursor to Freud's concept of the unconscious mind. As Spinoza himself points out, his treatment of the emotions is strikingly different from his predecessors and contemporaries.

Most of those who have written about the Affects, and men's way of living, seem to treat, not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but of things which are outside of nature. Indeed they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion. For they believe that man disturbs, rather than follows, the order of nature, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined only by himself. And they attribute the cause of human impotence, not to the common power of nature, but to I know not what vice of human nature, which they therefore bewail, or laugh at, or disdain, or (as usually happens) curse. And he who knows how to censure more eloquently and cunningly the weakness of the human Mind is held to be Godly But no one, to my knowledge, has determined the nature and powers of the Affects, nor what, on the other hand, the Mind can do to moderate them.¹²

The moderation of the affects is extremely important to Spinoza because it is a necessary condition for making the intellect more active, and therefore for human liberation. In fact, he defines human bondage as the lack of power to moderate and restrain the affects.¹³ In order to understand what the moderation of the affects has to do with human freedom, we must first understand Spinoza's distinction between active ideas and passive ideas. Active ideas, or what he also calls adequate ideas, follow from the necessity of our nature alone, that is our conatus. In this sense, we are the proximate cause of these ideas and therefore active. Passive ideas are not related to our nature except insofar as we conceive things inadequately. They are not defined by human power, but by the power of things that are outside us.¹⁴ By replacing our passive ideas with active ones, we become more powerful. Hence, the perfection of the Intellect is the road to human freedom.

In life, therefore, It is especially useful to perfect, as far as we can, our intellect, or reason. In this one thing consists man's highest happiness, or blessedness. Indeed, blessedness is nothing but that satisfaction of mind that stems from the intuitive knowledge of God. But perfecting the Intellect is nothing but understanding God, his attributes, and his actions, which follow from the necessity of his nature. So the ultimate end of the man who is led by reason, i.e., his highest Desire, by which he strives to moderate all the others, is that by which he is led to conceive adequately both himself and all things that can fall under his understanding.¹⁵

From this passage it is clear, that Spinoza considers reason to be a desire. Reason is nothing other the most active striving to preserve one's being. Further, reason is the Intellect itself, and therefore the win itself;

12. Spinoza, E3Pref, 491.

13. *Ibid.*, E4Pref, 543.

14. *Ibid.*, E4App, 588.

15. *Ibid.*

for reason is the desire by which we strive to adequately understand necessity, and as the following passage suggests, that by which we strive to affirm and identify with necessity.

For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing except what is necessary, nor absolutely be satisfied with anything except what is true. Hence, insofar as we understand these things rightly, the striving of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature.¹⁶

In the final stage of human freedom, one both understands and wills the necessity of the universe because one realizes that our own existence is tied up in it. In doing so, one unites to Nature in that one unites to Nature's essence, or conatus, and wills its preservation. This unification with Nature is what Spinoza means by intellectual love of God. It is the highest blessedness that a human can attain and the only way a human can hope for eternity. Spinoza rejects any idea of an afterlife. The mind dies when the body dies. However, by understanding and willing necessity, humans can grasp eternity during their life. Spinoza offers an immanent philosophy. Eternity is here and now and the best we can do is to understand and affirm that.

Nietzsche also considers the understanding of our psychological drives as a means to achieving power. In this way, Nietzsche's account of psychology is very similar to Spinoza's. However, Nietzsche characterizes his psychological account in terms of the will. Nietzsche's discussion of master and slave moralities serves much the same purpose as Spinoza's discussion of active and passive ideas. Slave morality is when one's beliefs and desires are caused by something other than the self. In fact, it is when, the self is defined in terms of the other. Master morality is when one is self-defined, when one's desires stem from an active will to power, rather than being a reaction to others. Like Spinoza, Nietzsche advocates a move from reactivity to activity. However, for him the move is not one of thought or reason, but one of a will that creates and affirms oneself and one's world. One should move from the state in which one reactively accepts the creations of others (society, religion,

16. E4App, 594.

etc.) to a state where one actively creates one's own world view. The final stage in human freedom is complete affirmation of the necessity of one's being and world. Nietzsche calls this state love of fate. Such affirmation includes the understanding of necessity for what it is: a necessary interconnection of ideas that represent the world view that we created.

The fact that Spinoza and Nietzsche characterize their psychologies in terms of the intellect and the will, respectively, accounts for some major differences between their philosophies. For example, Spinoza and Nietzsche take radically different approaches towards the emotions. Spinoza advocated a moderation of the passions. He saw the affects of hatred, envy, etc., as limitations of one's activity. Therefore, Spinoza advocated that we destroy such affects through rationally understanding their cause. Nietzsche, on the other hand, saw affects as a necessary condition of life.¹⁷ In fact, he specifically criticized Spinoza for "laughing-no-more and weeping-no-more" in his attempt to destroy the affects through analysis and vivisection.¹⁸ Another difference in their approaches to psychology is the status they give to conscious thought. Nietzsche believes that the decisive value of an action is what is unintentional about that action. In other words, there are unconscious motivations and desires and they are more informative about an action than the conscious ones.¹⁹ Further, Nietzsche understands consciousness as a trait in humans that has recently evolved and is therefore "the most unfinished and unstrong."²⁰ He therefore sees consciousness as the least vigorous type of thinking.²¹ In contrast, Spinoza understands consciousness as the most vigorous type of thought. By being conscious of the true origins of the affects, we are no longer passively acted on by unknown causes, but increase our power by acting out of the necessity of our own nature.

Both of these differences in Spinoza's and Nietzsche's psychologies are due to their difference in choosing the intellect or will as the basis of

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, #198, 109.

19. *Ibid.*, #32, 43.

20. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #11, 84.

21. *Ibid.*, #333, 261.

their psychology. Because Spinoza understands the primary drive to power in terms of the intellect, he conceives of the soul as nothing more than ideas about the body.²² In contrast, Nietzsche characterizes the primary drive to power in terms of will, and so he conceives the soul as nothing more than a social structure of drives and affects.²³ In this light, it only makes sense that Spinoza considers conscious thought, or active ideas, to be the most powerful state, while Nietzsche considers the unconscious desires, or active affirmations, to be the most powerful state. This view explains why Nietzsche considers the affects necessary for life. After all, each living thing is nothing more than affects. At the same time, Spinoza views the affects as limitations to life because they make the intellect passive rather than active.

However, we are still left with the question: if will and intellect are the same thing, why are Nietzsche's and Spinoza's characterizations of psychology in terms of the will and intellect so different. The answer is to be found in the process of becoming active itself. Notice that both Spinoza's and Nietzsche's accounts end with the realization that will and intellect are one. For Spinoza, once one fully understands that her preservation is tied up in the necessity of Nature, she automatically wills that necessity. For Nietzsche, once one completely wills the necessity of the world that she created she also affirms the fact that she is the creator. In other words, she now understands that the nature of the universe is chaos and her role in that universe is as a creator of an ordered world. In conclusion, the very achievement of intellectual love of God and love of fate occurs at the moment that one realizes that will and intellect are one. Here we find our answer.

The road to activity starts in passivity or reactivity, a state in which one misunderstands the true nature of things; a state in which, for example, one might think themselves to have free will, to belong to a world designed by a benevolent creator, etc. In other words, one begins the road to activity from a point in which she distinguishes between the will and the intellect. Therefore, new travelers to the destination of activity choose a road, will or intellect, not realizing that they are actually the same. Spinoza and Nietzsche were no different in their journeys.

22. E2P13, 457.

23. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #12, 20-21.

They had to begin somewhere. Spinoza chose the intellect, the road that looked most fruitful in his time. Nietzsche chose the will, more than likely as a reaction to what he perceived as the modern period's failure to navigate the road of reason. Therefore, many apparent differences surface. However, if we look back at those differences, with the realization that will and intellect are the same, we will see that the differences are not so deep after all.

First, let us consider Spinoza's and Nietzsche's different approaches to consciousness. We must remember that when Spinoza advocates active ideas, or what we earlier called consciousness of the causes of one's ideas, he is advocating having active drives and affects. For that is what ideas are. Active ideas are drives for power that are self defined. Passive ideas, in contrast, are affects in which one is confused about their true origin. For example, one may believe that something is good because it agrees with an objective moral code rather than understanding the event's goodness to be completely defined in terms of one's relation to it. Active ideas are necessitated by our nature which is will in so far as it is a striving or desire to increase power. In this way, Spinoza's view really is not as different from Nietzsche's as it appears.

Secondly, Spinoza's and Nietzsche's treatment of the affects does not differ as much as it first appears. Spinoza is not interested in destroying all of the affects, only the passive ones. In other words, he only wants overcome what he calls the passions because they are not caused through our nature alone. For example, the affects of pity, humility, and shame are confused ideas that are caused not by our nature, but unconscious desires for external things, such as others having a good opinion of us. It is these types of affects that Spinoza wants to get rid of. Such affects limit one's power of activity. However, Spinoza praises the virtues of other affects such as joy. Therefore, when Spinoza advocates replacing inadequate ideas with adequate ones, he is advocating that we make the transformation from a passive intellect to an active intellect, and therefore, to an active will. Nietzsche also makes this connection. He defines consciousness as "a certain behavior of the instincts toward one another."²⁴ In other words, thoughts are nothing more than mere shadows of our feelings, only they are darker, emptier, and simpler.²⁵

24. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #333, 261.

25. *Ibid.*, #179, 203.

Nietzsche may praise affects in general, but he certainly does not praise the types of affects that Spinoza is trying to destroy. Nietzsche also sees passions such as pity, humility, and shame as limitations to our power.

In conclusion, a very useful approach to the Spinoza-Nietzsche paradox is a study of the role of the will and intellect within their philosophies. This approach successfully points out some of their fundamental agreements while explaining some of the divergences in their thought. Further, such an approach provides a helpful framework for understanding how these two lonely thinkers fit into the modern picture. We can now understand the seventeenth century indictment of Spinoza's materialism and the nineteenth century controversy of Nietzsche's announcement of the death of God as the modern reaction to the unification of the will and intellect, an ideal for which both Spinoza and Nietzsche strove.

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