Platonic Dualism Reconsidered

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1 Introduction

The soul occupies and takes up space: it has both location and extension. Not only that, but it can move through space. It is capable of causally interacting with the body by making contact with it. And such contact can cause body to adhere to the soul, so that the soul becomes visible and heavy. Plato, I shall argue, commits himself to exactly these claims in his treatment of the soul in the *Phaedo*. To those of us schooled in post-Cartesian philosophy, this can come as something of a shock: isn’t body defined, at least in part, via extension? If so, how can Plato, as a dualist, maintain both that the soul is incorporeal and that it is extended in space? Considerations such as these have led numerous interpreters to dismiss passages in the *Phaedo* that appear to commit Plato to the above-mentioned claims as overblown metaphor. Bostock (1986, 28), for example, writes, ‘...obviously this interpretation of the *Phaedo* is absurd. It treats the soul as if it were made of some quasi-material stuff....It is not what Plato means to suggest at all, and when he spoke of the soul being “interspersed with a corporeal element” he obviously meant to be understood as speaking figuratively’. Gallop (1975, 143) observes, ‘Unpurified souls....are described in terms that could not literally apply to the soul in its essential, incorporeal nature. How could an incorporeal thing be “interspersed with a corporeal element” (c4–5), be “weighed down” (c10), or
“fall back into another body and grow in it” (83d10–e1)? Such language, taken literally, describes interaction between one material substance and another’. Dorter (1982, 80) concurs: ‘the references to the “gluing”, “imprisoning”, “binding”, and “nailing” of the soul to the body, as well as its “unweaving” of itself, are clearly metaphorical. Coming in the midst of these metaphors, the reference to the soul’s being made to have corporeal form....may readily be construed as metaphorical also’. And Hackforth (1955, 52 n. 3), commenting on Plato’s depiction of the philosopher’s soul as constricting away from the body at 67c, writes, ‘This is perhaps the most materialistic language used by Socrates about the soul in the whole dialogue. Taken literally, it would imply the spatial diffusion of a sort of vital fluid throughout the body; but of course it must not be taken literally, but rather as a vivid metaphor....’ The few interpreters who do not dismiss these claims, for the most part either do not discuss them at length, or treat them as localized, pertaining only to select passages in the dialogue, rather than reflecting a consistent philosophical viewpoint.2

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1 See also Palmer 2021, 28 and Jones and Marechal 2018, 95-6.

2 Thus, e.g., Robinson (1995, 30–1) and Woolf (2004, 116–18) each treats these claims as applying solely to Socrates’ defense and the affinity argument, and as conflicting with other philosophical claims that Plato advances in the rest of the dialogue. Ebrey is sympathetic to the claim that the soul changes spatial location between lives (2023, 169), but does not engage extensively with the question of whether it possesses spatial attributes. In her detailed discussion of Orphic influences on the Phaedo, Nightingale engages seriously with aspects of the dialogue that imply that the soul possesses spatial attributes, but does not address the topic directly (2021, ch. 3). Broadie 2001 offers an influential argument that Platonic dualism should not be
My aim in this paper is to reverse this trend, to offer a careful analysis of what I shall call Plato’s theory of the spatial soul in the *Phaedo*. I argue that passages suggesting that he views the soul as located and extended in space, and as capable of locomotion and of contact with body should not be dismissed as mere metaphor and that, collectively, these claims are both compatible assimilated to Cartesian dualism; she does not, however, approach this in terms of the role of spatiality. Two notable exceptions are Thein 2018 and Johansen 2017. Thein grants that the soul possesses at last some spatial attributes in the *Phaedo*, but differs from me in connecting this to the claim that Plato is noncommittal concerning the incorporeality of the soul. Johansen, in arguing that Plato espouses weak substance dualism in the *Phaedo*, maintains that the soul is capable of assimilating to the bodily attributes of visibility and heaviness; this, in turn, implies that it possesses spatial features (28). I am in broad agreement with Johansen’s arguments, though I do not follow him in holding that the soul is capable of becoming visible and heavy; see n. 9, below.

Given that Plato is an author known for speaking in metaphor, it is in place for me to indicate what principles I am using to determine when Plato is speaking figuratively, when literally. I believe that, as interpreters, we must exercise the utmost caution in claiming that interpretive charity demands that we take a claim non-literally. Plato wrote in a very different time and place than ourselves and had quite different intuitions than many of us; we cannot baldly assume that views that we consider philosophically implausible are ones that he could not have intended literally. There are certainly passages where Plato clearly signals to the reader that he is speaking figuratively. For example, at *Phaedrus* (*Phdr.*) 246a6–7, he suggests that we should liken (*ἴοικέτω*) the soul to a winged team and charioteer. But in other cases, we need to be more
with Plato’s commitment to substance dualism and offer him significant explanatory advantages. In the first part of the paper, I argue that what has driven interpreters such as Bostock, Dorter, Gallop and Hackforth to dismiss passages that appear to advance the theory of the spatial soul is a fundamental misunderstanding of how Plato conceptualizes body. They assume that as an incorporeal substance, the soul cannot be spatially located or extended, since they take these to be exclusively corporeal attributes. But I shall argue that a close examination of how Plato conceives of body and of how he develops the soul/body opposition reveals that he is not committed to the view that only body is capable of spatial location, extension, locomotion and contact.\textsuperscript{4} Such interpreters also assume that the spatial soul theory, taken at face value, is absurd, and that interpretive charity demands that we not attribute it to Plato. I argue that, whether or not we find the theory absurd, it is clear that Plato did not, since he advances a theory along exactly these lines circumspect. Where we lack explicit indicators that Plato is speaking metaphorically, we can appeal to two considerations. First, does what Plato says, interpreted literally, conflict with other claims that he is committed to at the time of writing, in a manner that would be apparent to him? Second, is the claim, taken literally, philosophically unattractive in a way that Plato would have recognized and wished to avoid? As I shall demonstrate, neither of these considerations demands that we treat passages in the \textit{Phaedo} where Plato assigns spatial attributes to the soul as merely figurative.

\textsuperscript{4} Cf. Pasnau (2011) who offers a fascinating discussion of related issues as they arise in the late middle ages through the early modern period; Pasnau suggests that the contemporary philosophical assumption that immaterial entities lack location stems from a failure to recognize the wide range of ways in which one might distinguish the immaterial from the material (332–3).
in the *Timaeus*. In the second part of the paper, I sketch out some of the explanatory advantages and deficits of the spatial soul theory. On the one hand, it offers Plato an elegant account of the unity of body and soul and of their causal interaction, and it undergirds his eschatology. At the same time, it leaves certain questions under-explained, such as the mechanism by which two such different substances causally interact. I conclude by turning to some of the ethical ramifications of the spatial soul theory: it supports an ascetic reading of the *Phaedo*, since it implies that any interaction between soul and body is to be avoided.

2 **The Spatial Soul in the *Phaedo***

Before I turn to these arguments, we should first take a closer look at the theory itself. What is the textual evidence suggesting that Plato subscribes to the theory of the spatial soul in the *Phaedo*? And what are its fundamental commitments? I will begin by listing some of the claims that Plato makes in the *Phaedo*, which suggest that he subscribes to the spatial soul theory.

First, Plato defines death as the separation of the soul from the body. Thus, at 64c4–5, he asks, ‘Is [death] anything other than the separation of the soul from the body’, and at 67d4–5, he writes, ‘therefore, this is called death, the freedom and separation of the soul from the body’.

Now, it needn’t follow from the definition of death as the separation of the soul and the body that the soul changes spatial location upon death and hence that the soul is spatially located; we can speak of two things becoming separated when, say, one of them ceases to characterize the other or when the two cease to be related to one another. But such an interpretation is ruled out by the fact that Plato repeatedly characterizes the separation of the soul from the body in language that implies that their separation consists in a change in spatial location. For example, in the cyclical argument,

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5 Translations throughout are my own, based on the Burnet OCT’s.
he observes that ‘if this is so, that the living come to be again from the dead, then surely our souls would exist there’, in Hades (70c8–d1). Whether or not Plato subscribes to traditional mythology regarding Hades, it seems clear that he takes the soul to change spatial location when it comes to occupy and animate a body. Similarly, in the recollection argument, he claims that recollection ‘would be impossible if our soul didn’t exist somewhere (που) before being born in this human form’ (73a1–2), and in the affinity argument, he describes the soul after death as ‘departing to another place (τόπον) of the same kind, noble and pure and invisible’ (80d5–6). In the final argument, Plato proposes that it is the soul’s entering a body that makes it alive: he writes that ‘soul, whatever it occupies, always comes to that thing bringing life’ (105d3–4).6 Conversely,

6 Not all uses of expressions such as ‘being in’, ‘approaching’, ‘departing’ etc. in the final argument can be given an unqualified spatial/locomotive reading. For example, at 104b10, Plato describes an opposite form as approaching (ἐπιούσης) some quality in an object; given that Plato treats the forms as unchanging (78d1–9), it seems unlikely that he means that the form literally moves through space when it approaches an object. However, it is also noteworthy that the sorts of examples Plato discusses in the final argument are not all on a par: the way in which the soul brings life to an organism seems to bear more resemblance to the way in which fire brings heat and snow brings cold than to the way in which, say, twoness brings evenness, and the cases of snow and fire seem to admit of a straightforwardly spatial/locomotive reading. Again, it is striking that in the case of the soul, Plato does not only specify that it departs when death approaches (as is demanded by the fact that it is indestructible), but he also states where it goes—to Hades. In the myth of the afterlife, even those souls that are sufficiently purified by philosophy as to achieve disembodiment are described as arriving at indescribably beautiful
‘when death comes to the man....the immortal part departs, going away safe and undestroyed, making way for death’ (106e5–7); on this basis he concludes that ‘the soul....is most certainly deathless and indestructible and our souls will really exist in Hades’ (106e9–7a1; cf. 81a4–5, 107d3). Again, whatever we take Plato’s views to be on Hades, the terms of the final argument seem to require that the soul continue to exist somewhere after it departs from the body. Collectively, these claims imply that the soul has a spatial location, that it is capable of changing its spatial location, and that its capacity to animate a body is due to its being located inside the body.

Second, in describing the relation of soul to body, Plato repeatedly uses language indicating that the soul can become attached to the body. Thus, he laments that the soul cannot achieve truth so long as it is ‘kneaded together with’ the body (συμπεφυρμένη, 66b5), and advises the philosopher to purify his soul by avoiding ‘communion and contact’ (κοινωνοῦσα....ἀπτομένη, 65c8–9) with the body and ‘accustoming the soul to gather itself together and collect itself by itself (συναγείρεσθαί τε και ἁθροίζεσθαι) from all sides away from the body’ (67c7–8; see also 80e3–5). The souls of those who are overly attached to the corporeal, who devote themselves to the pleasures of the flesh, are alternately described as tied (διαδεδεμένη, 82e2), bound (καταδεῖται, 83d1), glued (προσκεκολλημένη, 82e2) and nailed (προσηλοῖ, 83d4) to their bodies and as filled or infected (ἀναπιμπλώμεθα, 67a5) with its nature. Collectively, these passages imply that the soul is capable of contact with the body and of becoming attached to the body; the images of the dwelling-places (114c2–6); this mythological language implies that even when disembodied, the soul occupies some spatial region.
non-philosophic soul being kneaded together with the body and of the philosopher’s soul contracting away from the body indicate that the soul is extended throughout the body.

Finally, in Socrates’ defense, as well as in the affinity argument, Plato suggests that excessive contact with the body causes a corporeal element to become attached to the soul, causing the soul to be reincarnated. Such a soul is ‘interspersed with the corporeal, with which it has grown together due to the soul’s communion and intercourse with the body, through always being with it and through much practice’ (81c4–6). This corporeal element is ‘....weighty and heavy and earthy and visible. Having this, such a soul is weighed down and dragged once again to the visible realm’ (81c8–9). This soul is ‘such as to never arrive at Hades in a pure condition’; it always exits ‘full of body, so that it falls quickly into another body and grows in it as if it were sown there’ (83d9–e1). In these passages, Plato maintains that when the soul interacts with the body, it makes contact with it; this contact can lead to the soul becoming attached to the body and this corporeal accretion then causes the soul to re-enter another body after death. Thus, the way in which Plato conceives of the risk of a life devoted to bodily pleasure seems to demand that the soul be capable of contact with and attachment to the body.

In sum, the core commitments of the spatial soul theory are the following:

i) The soul has location in space.

7 In fact, this corporeal accretion plays a dual role in Plato’s eschatology. On the one hand, it causes impure souls to linger on Earth as ghosts (81c8–d4). On the other hand, it also explains why, after these impure souls are dragged to Hades, they are quick to reenter a body (83d9–e1); conversely, souls that are purified of the body at death are able to achieve a condition of permanent disembodiment (114c2–5).
ii) The soul has extension.

iii) The soul is capable of locomotion.

iv) The soul’s interaction with the body involves contact between soul and body.

v) This contact can cause a corporeal element to become attached to the soul.

vi) The soul animates a body in virtue of its occupying the body and it ceases to animate a body as a result of its exiting the body.

3 Body in Plato

What, then, has caused my opponents to reject the theory of the spatial soul, to treat these passages as mere metaphor? What motivate them are certain assumptions about the nature of body. My opponents assume—correctly, I maintain—that Plato is a substance dualist, that he takes soul and body to be distinct substances. Their error, I shall argue, is that they incorrectly assume that this entails that the soul, as incorporeal, is incapable of spatial location, extension and locomotion, and of contact with matter. Thus Bostock, for example, writes that Plato cannot really mean that the soul is extended throughout the body, since that would imply that it is made up of some ‘quasi-material stuff’ (1986, 28). He adds that we ought not to take Platonic soul to be made up of stuff since ‘the notion of an immaterial stuff does not seem to make much sense’ (ibid., 36). Thus, Bostock appears to assume that whatever is extended is made up of stuff, and that whatever is made up of stuff is made up of material stuff and hence is a body. Gallop worries that an incorporeal thing cannot be interspersed with and spatially diffused through a corporeal body since ‘such language, taken literally, describes interaction between one material substance and another’ (1975, 143). Gallop appears to assume that whatever is spatially diffused throughout a material substance must itself be a material substance. Finally, Hackforth objects that to treat the soul as spatially diffused in the body is to treat it as material; he adds that discarnate souls cannot have
dwelling-places since ‘an immaterial being cannot occupy space’ (1955, 186). Like Gallop, Hackforth appears to assume that whatever is spatially diffused throughout the body must be corporeal; he makes the additional assumption that whatever occupies space must be corporeal. In sum, my opponents assume that body is defined as whatever is extended in and occupies space and as whatever is made up of some stuff; since Plato treats soul and body as distinct substances, passages where Plato appears to treat soul as possessing these properties must be merely figurative.

In response, the first thing to note is that it is not, in fact, clear how sharp Plato takes the distinction to be between soul and body in the Phaedo. On the side of the body, though this is a topic of interpretive controversy, several passages seem to suggest that Plato treats the body as a subject of appetites and even beliefs, which we would ordinarily consider to be purely psychological states. On the side of the soul, things are equally ambiguous. In the affinity argument, Plato divides being into two kinds and aligns the body with the class of the visible, changeable and divisible, the soul with their opposite. But in the very same argument, he depicts souls that devote themselves to bodily perceptions and pleasures as becoming changeable (79c2–

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8 65b9–11, 66c2–7, 83d4–7 and 94b7–d6. I am inclined to follow, e.g., Bostock (1986, 26–7), Ebrey (2023, 181), Rowe (1993, 142) and Woolf (2004, 107–8) in taking Plato’s intended meaning in these passages to be that the body is responsible for causing the soul to undergo sensory experiences which result in the soul’s forming erroneous and misguided beliefs and desires. For the contrary viewpoint, that takes Plato to hold that the body is, itself, the subject of mental states, see, e.g., Carone (2005, 229 n. 9) and Lorenz (2011, 250–1).
visible (81d4), heavy (81c8–9) and even corporeal (83d5). Thus, in the very argument where
Plato develops his general opposition between body and soul, he also suggests that this opposition

9 In what sense does Plato mean that these souls become visible, heavy and corporeal? There are
two alternatives for how we might understand him. On the one hand, we might take Plato to
mean that the soul itself adopts all of these characteristics (see Johansen 2017, as well as Woolf
2004, 117 ns. 34, 35 and 36). The soul could still remain distinct from the body since it only
takes on these corporeal attributes accidentally. However, two considerations weigh against this
interpretation. First, I believe it minimizes the distinction Plato wishes to draw between body
and soul. Second, it makes the corporeal accretion redundant. If the soul itself can become
heavy, then there is no need for a corporeal element to become entwined with the soul, dragging
it back into embodiment. Thus, I believe it is preferable to take Plato to claim that the soul
becomes visible, heavy and corporeal in virtue of its becoming fused with a bodily accretion that
possesses all of these traits (see Rowe 1993, 193). Note that at 81d9-e2, Plato refers to a
corporeal element that follows (συνεπακολουθοῦντος) the soul; at 83d9-10, he depicts the
impure soul as falling back into embodiment because it departs full of (ἀναπλέα) body; and at
81c9-11, he describes it as weighed down because it possesses (ἔχουσα) something bodily.
Whereas the soul, on its own, remains imperceptible and incorporeal, it counts as perceptible and
corporeal in virtue of its becoming grown together with (σύμφυτον, 81c6) a bodily element.
Thus, when Plato claims at 81d4 that the soul partakes (μετέχοισαι) in the visible and is seen, we
can understand him to mean that the soul is seen because it has a share of something visible,
namely the corporeal accretion that has become entwined with it; should the soul purify itself of
may not be entirely straightforward. While Plato distinguishes soul from body in terms of its being invisible, imperceptible and changeless, these do not appear to be properties that the soul unqualifiedly possesses, so much as attributes that it must strive to fully realize by purifying itself of the body. Thus, part of what distinguishes the soul appears to be a kind of indeterminacy; it is, as Plotinus puts it, amphibious, capable of transforming itself when it assimilates to the intelligible or the sensible realms (Enneads 4.8.4.33–4).¹⁰

This might seem to suggest that the best response to my opponents is simply to deny that Plato is a substance dualist. However, such a maneuver would risk misrepresenting Plato’s position; Plato is unquestionably a substance dualist, albeit not of a Cartesian stripe. Granted, Plato does not operate with the proto-Aristotelian conception of substance that underlies most post-Cartesian discussions of dualism.¹¹ Furthermore, to the extent that Plato does possess a conception of substance—note that the Greek expression, ousia (pl. ousiai), that has come to be translated as substance, literally means being—it is at once broader and more restrictive than the one advanced

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¹⁰ See also Enneads 4.4.3.11–12 as well as, e.g., Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus ii, 137; iii, 254.

¹¹ See, e.g., Descartes AT 7 161 and, more recently, Hart 1988, 2–4, Kim 2011, 33, and Lowe 2009, 66–7. In their discussions of substance dualism, these authors all allude to the conception of substance as a subject of predication that Aristotle advances in Categories V. This is, of course, distinct from the conception of substance as form that Aristotle appeals to in De Anima II i, when he defines the soul as substance as form of the organism.
by Aristotle in *Categories* V.\textsuperscript{12} Broader because anything that exists counts as an ousia, and this is not restricted to ‘things’, as opposed to properties;\textsuperscript{13} more restrictive because, in the strictest sense, only forms possess full being\textsuperscript{14} and hence count as ousiae. However, as Crane (2003) has trenchantly argued, the concept of substance, in fact, does little work in contemporary debates over substance dualism. Rather, the crux of the controversy is whether the soul possesses a distinct nature from the body and whether it is capable of existing separately from the body. And it is clear that Plato emphatically endorses both of these claims in the *Phaedo*. Early in the dialogue, for example, he declares, ‘one part of us is body, one part soul’ (79b1–2), and at the conclusion of the affinity argument, he affirms that both the body and the soul are capable of existing apart from one another (80c2–1a10).\textsuperscript{15} Even if in the strictest sense, only forms qualify as substances for Plato,

\textsuperscript{12} A further complication: in the *Timaeus*, Plato distinguishes three ontological kinds—forms, sense-particulars, and the receptacle (48e2–9a6)—and is thus better described as a trialist than as a dualist. It is unclear where the soul fits in this ontological schema; Fronterotta argues that it is an additional kind (2007, 234), whereas Betegh maintains that, due to its amphibious nature, the soul fails to fully belong to any discrete ontological kind (2018, 126).

\textsuperscript{13} E.g., in the *Sophist*, the Stranger argues against the Giants that the class of beings (*onta*) is not restricted to bodies by encouraging them to recognize that certain incorporeal entities also qualify as beings. He does so by arguing that the soul and justice are incorporeal and are beings, specifying that justice is something that is possessed by the soul (246a4–7e7). Thus, the soul and the property, justice, that inheres in it, are both treated as candidate beings.

\textsuperscript{14} See, e.g., *Republic* (*Rep.*) 475e9–80a13 and *Timaeus* (*Tim.*) 27d5–8a4.

\textsuperscript{15} See also, e.g., *First Alcibiades* 129c2–30c6, *Gorgias* 524b2–4 and *Laws* (*Lg.*) 959a5–b5.
there is a looser sense in which the soul counts as a substance, and a distinct substance from the body.

Thus, I am inclined to agree with my opponents that we should view it as a condition of adequacy for any interpretation of Plato’s psychology that it preserve some sense in which soul and body are distinct substances. But this does not imply that the soul does not possess spatial attributes. When we examine how Plato characterizes the soul/body opposition in the *Phaedo*, it emerges that at no point does he develop this opposition in terms of body’s being located and extended in space and made of stuff. Instead, their opposition centers on body’s being perceptible, earthy, heavy and subject to change. In the affinity argument, Plato distinguishes two classes of beings: on the one hand, the forms are forever the same and incapable of change; on the other hand, particulars are never in any way the same (78c10–e4). He then observes that particulars can be touched, seen and grasped with the other senses, whereas forms cannot be perceived, but only grasped by the intellect. On this basis, he proposes that we distinguish ‘two classes of beings, the visible and the invisible’ (79a6–7). He then introduces a second distinction: ‘One part of us is body, the other soul’ (79b1–2), and proposes that whereas the body is more akin to the class of the visible, the soul is more akin to the class of the invisible (79b16–17); later, he refers to the body as the visible part of us, the soul as the invisible (80c2–3, d5). Plato concludes the affinity argument with the assertion that the soul is most like the ‘divine, immortal, intelligible, one in form, indissoluble and always the same in relation to itself, whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble and never the same as itself’ (80b1–
Thus, in the central passage in which Plato develops an opposition between body and soul, he does so in terms of body being perceptible, changeable and soluble, but not in terms of its possessing spatial attributes.

What about how Plato characterizes the corporeal, more generally? Could Plato’s more general treatment of the corporeal in the *Phaedo* imply that whatever is spatially located and extended must be corporeal? Plato makes nine uses of the term * sómatoeides*, corporeal, in his

16 The fact that Plato phrases this in comparative and superlative (*more like, ὁμοιότερον, most like, ὁμοιότατον*), not absolute terms might be taken to indicate that the difference between body and soul is not absolute but rather comparative: the soul has a greater tendency than the body to be invisible, the body to be visible. To this, one might add the observation that Cebes, at least, hesitates to claim that the soul is unqualifiedly unseen, asserting, instead, that it is not visible to *humans* (*79b7-8*). Against this line of interpretation, Plato nowhere countenances the possibility of bodies becoming invisible; the fact that the body is more akin to the class of the visible than the soul does not seem to preclude its being unqualifiedly visible. Furthermore, in the case of the soul, Plato uses its being unseen as evidence that it is more akin to the class of the unseen: as Ebrey rightly emphasizes, the class of the unseen is not solely defined in terms of invisibility, but also in terms of its members being unchanging and unqualifiedly what they are (*2023, ch. 6*). Thus, when Plato claims that the soul is *more akin* to the invisible, this indicates that it resembles, but is not a full member, of the class of invisible objects whose primary members are forms; it resembles this class in virtue of its being invisible.
At 81b5–6, he refers to the sōmatoeides as what one can touch, see, drink, eat and use for sexual pleasure; at 81c8–9, he writes that the sōmatoeides is weighty and heavy and earthy and visible; and at 86a1–3, Simmias calls the lyre and its strings sōmatoeidiē, composite and earthy. Thus far, we have no evidence whatsoever that Plato exclusively associates the body with what is extended in and occupies space. Instead, all of our evidence indicates that in the *Phaedo*, Plato associates the body with what is visible, perceptible, earthy and changeable.

Perhaps to be maximally charitable to my opponents, we should open our discussion to Plato’s entire corpus. If Plato defines body in other dialogues as what is extended in and occupies space, then perhaps they can be justified in applying that definition to the *Phaedo* and concluding that passages that appear to support the spatial soul theory must be dismissed as purely metaphorical. Before we proceed, it is worth making the following clarification. My opponents tend to use the terms body and matter interchangeably, and to express their concern in terms of the soul’s being treated as if it were material. But in fact, matter, hulē, and body, sōma, are distinct concepts for the Greeks: the Stoics, for example, hold that matter is but one kind of body.¹⁸

¹⁷ The occurrences within the *Phaedo* are at 81b5, 81c4, 81e1, 83d5 and 86a2. The occurrences outside the *Phaedo* are at Rep. 532c7, *Sophist (Soph.*) 273b4, *Tim.* 31b4 and *Tim.* 36d9, and are consistent with my analysis. Rep. 532c7–8 describes the upper realm that the prisoner reaches upon exiting the cave as a ‘corporeal and visible place’, and *Tim.* 31b4 claims that what is generated is ‘corporeal, visible and tangible’; thus, the corporeal is linked to what is perceptible.

¹⁸ The other kind is god/logos; see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 7.134 (LS 44b); Aristocles ap. Eusebius, *Praeperatio Evangelica* 15.4.1 (LS 45G).
Furthermore, though this claim is perhaps controversial, the concept of matter, *hulē*, appears to be an Aristotelian innovation. Plato uses the term, *hulē*, only once to refer to matter generically, at *Philebus 54c2*; it therefore seems likely that matter was not a significant part of his conceptual apparatus.¹⁹ Thus, for Plato, the relevant contrast is not between soul and matter, but between soul and body. The concept of body, *sōma*, in turn, is a messy one, since in Greek, as in English, it is used both to refer to the bodies of humans and other organisms, and to refer, more broadly, to corporeal substances. Plato’s use of the term, *sōma*, has received little scholarly discussion,²⁰ though this is clearly significant for understanding his psychology and natural philosophy. Plato uses *sōma* and its inflections roughly 859 times in his corpus.²¹ The vast majority of these occurrences refer to the bodies of living organisms. However, he also uses *sōma* to refer to inanimate bodies such as metals (*Soph. 265c2–3*), stone (*Tim. 60b7*), products of weaving and of

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¹⁹ Note that it is controversial whether the receptacle of the *Timaeus* should be understood as matter, insofar as it appears to do the conceptual work of both space and matter. In any event, even if the receptacle should be understood as matter, it is not identical to body. And whereas Plato is highly interested in the opposition between soul and body, he says nothing about the relation of soul to the receptacle.

²⁰ But see Frede’s examination of Plato’s expansion of the senses of the terms *sōma* and *asōmaton* as it relates to Stoic metaphysics (2021, 243-6), as well as Betegh’s excellent discussion (unpublished), in which he argues that the metaphysical concept of body, referring to material objects in general, is a Platonic innovation.

²¹ The precise number depends on which works one excludes as inauthentic; a maximally conservative count would be 815, a maximally permissive one, 925.
carpentry (Soph. 227a3–5, Statesman 258e2), glass, incense and wax (Tim. 61b6–c2), poison (Lg. 933a), sweat and tears (Tim. 83e1), raw materials such as gold, silver and lumber (Statesman 288d2) etc., as well as the bodies of the sun, moon and stars (e.g. Rep. 530b3). At Phaedrus 245e4–5 as well as Sophist 226e8–7a3, Plato uses sōma to refer to both inanimate and animate bodies, when he distinguishes sōma apsuchon, soulless body, from sōma empsuchon, ensouled body. And in the Timaeus, Plato uses sōma to refer to both animate and inanimate bodies, generally, when he refers to the receptacle as what receives all bodies (50b6); he repeatedly refers to earth, air, fire and water as sōmata (e.g. 56a4) and even calls them prōta sōmata, first bodies (57c7). Thus, when Plato contrasts soul and body, it is indeterminate whether he wishes to contrast soul to the human body or to the broader class of corporeal substance.

How, then, does Plato characterize sōma—construed either specifically, as the body of a living organism, or generically, as corporeal substance? In the Philebus, Plato appears to hold that whatever is made up of earth, air, fire and water is a body, since he argues that the universe must be a body based on the fact that it is composed of these; in this context, he writes, ‘Do we call the combination of all the things we spoke of just now [earth, air, fire and water], body?’ (29d7–8). In the Sophist, Plato develops a contrast between certain materialists, whom he refers to as the giants, and the friends of forms. The giants are presented as insisting that ‘only what affords some contact and touching exists, since they define body the same as being’ (246a10–b1); in challenging the materialists, he implies that sōma is what is visible and tangible (247b1–6). In the Statesman, Plato writes that body does not belong to the class of things that are unchanging; since the universe has a share of body, it is necessarily subject to change (269d5–e2). The implication is that changeability is a necessary attribute of body. In the Laws, Plato presents an extended argument against certain atheists; in this context, he claims that the root of their error is assuming that earth,
air, fire and water are the first of all beings, and that soul is derived from these (891c1–9). The way in which Plato frames his discussion is significant: he argues that soul is one of the first creations, coming before all bodies, sōmata, thereby equating earth, air, fire and water with bodies (892a2–5). He goes on to argue that what is akin to soul is older than what pertains to body, and lists belief, care, intellect, craft and law as things pertaining to soul, hardness, softness, heaviness and lightness as things pertaining to body. The upshot is that soul appears to be characterized as the source of psychological states, the body as what has texture and weight. In a later passage, Plato amplifies this opposition in a manner that might appear to offer support to my opponents. He lists ‘habits, customs, willings, calculations, true beliefs, cares and memories’ as things pertaining to soul, ‘length, breadth, depth and strength of bodies’ as things pertaining to body (896c9–d2). This might appear to entail that spatial extension is an attribute distinctive of body. However, it is noteworthy that he refers to these as length, breadth and depth of bodies, thus allowing conceptual room for incorporeal forms of spatial extension. As I shall discuss in the next section of this paper, this possibility is one that Plato exploits in the Timaeus, when he presents world soul as extended throughout the body of the universe.

It is in the Timaeus that Plato offers his most sustained discussion of body, in the course of developing his natural philosophy. At 28b7–c2, he writes that the universe is generated, since ‘it is both visible and tangible and it has a body, and all such things are perceptible. And as we saw, what is perceptible is grasped by opinion with perception, and such things have come to be and are begotten’. Though this passage falls short of offering a rigorous definition of body, it suggests an association between being corporeal and being visible and generated. We see a similar

22 See also Lg. 896e9–7b1.
association at 31b4–5, when Plato claims that whatever comes to be must be ‘corporeal and visible and tangible’. He continues that nothing could become ‘visible apart from fire, nor tangible without something solid, nor solid without earth’, and concludes that it is for this reason that the demiurge made the universe out of fire and earth (31b5–8). This passage is problematic, as it conflicts with his treatment of the soul as generated but not composed of fire and earth. Nonetheless, like the passage at 28b7–c2, it supports the conclusion that being visible, tangible and solid, and hence composed of earth and fire, are necessary conditions for being a body. At 46d6–7, Plato explicitly contrasts body and soul: whereas earth, air, fire and water are visible bodies, soul is invisible (see also 36e6). Finally, at 53c4–8, Plato writes: ‘...it is clear to everyone that fire, earth, water and air are bodies. And the entire class of body has depth (βάθος). And it is completely necessary that depth be enclosed by surface, and every rectilinear surface is composed of triangles’. This passage, once again, treats earth, air, fire and water as paradigmatic bodies. It

23 Cornford (1957, 43, n. 2) notes that if τὸ γενόμενον (the generated) at 31b4 referred specifically to the generated universe, rather than to generated things in general, we would expect Plato to use the imperfect, ἐδεῖ (it was necessary), rather than the present, δεῖ (it is necessary).

24 Notwithstanding the tense of δεῖ (see n. 23), the best solution to this difficulty is to follow Proclus (Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus ii, 4) in taking Plato’s claim in this passage to be restricted to body; it occurs in a context where Plato is seeking to determine the necessary conditions for the demiurge to construct the body of the universe. See also Broadie (2012, 90 n. 19) and Ostenfeld (1982, 123 n. 87). An alternative which Cornford suggests in passing is to replace τέ δεῖ (and it is necessary) with τ᾽ ἐδεῖ (and it was necessary).
also offers an additional condition for being a body: whatever is a body possesses depth and is composed of elemental triangles.

Before we conclude our examination of Plato’s conception of σῶμα, it is important to consider a difficult question that arises from our discussion of the Timaeus. On the one hand, as I shall go on to discuss, the Timaeus strongly implies, not only that the soul has spatial location, but, further, that it has extension: Plato describes the soul of the universe as stretched through and interwoven with the body of the universe in every direction and as entirely enclosing it (36d8–e3). At the same time, as we have seen, his discussion of body appears to connect body with depth. Thus, in the final passage we examined, at 53c5–6, he claims that all body has depth, and concludes on this basis that all body must be composed of elemental triangles, and at 31b4–6, as we have seen, he claims that nothing is solid without earth.25 Are these claims in tension? Do they imply, either that the soul cannot be extended, or that it must be corporeal? I think it is clear that they do not, and for two reasons. First, at most these passages imply that whatever has three-dimensional

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25 Cornford (1957, 44, n. 1), following Proclus (Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus ii, 12), takes στερεόν (solid) in this passage to mean resistant to touch, rather than three-dimensional. The former sense is supported by the connection that Plato develops between being tangible and being solid (31b5-6); furthermore, this reading would alleviate the difficulty I examine in what follows, namely that the soul is three-dimensional but not composed of earth. However, the fact that at 32a7-b2, Plato appears to resume his earlier claim that the body of the universe is solid, and here, he does so in terms of a contrast between its being ἐπίπεδον (plane) and its being στερεοειδές (solid), suggests that the primary sense of solidity Plato is concerned with here is three-dimensional solidity.
extension is a body. But as Johansen has argued, though Plato’s treatment of the soul in the *Timaeus* implies that it has spatial extension, this is consistent with its being extended in two, but not three dimensions (2004, 140–1). Second, 53c5–6 only claims that depth is a necessary condition for being a body, and thus allows for the possibility that the soul can be incorporeal while also occupying three dimensions.\(^{26}\) Indeed, at 53c7–8,\(^{27}\) Plato narrows his focus from surfaces to rectilinear surfaces, allowing conceptual space for souls to possess depth that is bounded by non-rectilinear, curved surfaces.\(^{28}\)

\(^{26}\) One might argue against me by observing that Plato was writing in a context in which a standard mathematical definition of body was as what has three-dimensional extension (see Euclid, *Elements* 11, def. 1, as well as Aristotle, *Topics* 142b24–5 and *Physics* 204b20). However, there is decisive evidence that Plato would reject the assumption that whatever possesses three-dimensional extension is a body. In his discussion of geometrical solids in Republic VII, he specifies that true astronomy is the study of the motions of ideal solids, not those solids which are seen and possess bodies (σόμα τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὀρόμενα, 530a3–b4).

\(^{27}\) For further discussion of this difficult passage, see Brisson (1974, 360–1). The passage at 31b4–6 is, on the face of it, more problematic, since it suggests that there is a necessary connection between possessing depth and being composed of earth. But it also clearly cannot be taken at face value, since it would then also imply that none of the other elemental bodies possesses depth. See Betegh 2018, 132 as well as n. 24 above.

\(^{28}\) Indeed, Plato’s description of world-soul as enclosing the spherical body of the universe all around from the outside (34b3–4), and of mortal rational soul as housed in a round skull in order
What emerges from our examination of Plato’s treatment of σώμα is that he analyzes it along the following lines:

i. σώμα is perceptible.

ii. It is either composed of or identical to earth, air, fire and water.

iii. It is necessarily subject to change.

iv. It has depth, construed as being made of elements composed of rectilinear planes.

Conversely, when we turn to Plato’s treatment of soul, we do not see him claim that it is to be distinguished from body by its lacking location, extension, motion etc. Quite to the contrary, the final argument of the Phaedo defines the soul as a principle of life, implying that its role is, in part, to initiate motion in body; this conception of the soul as a source of motion is made explicit in the Phaedrus (245e2–6a1) and Laws (896a5–b1) when Plato defines the soul in terms of its capacity for self-initiated motion.

4 The Spatial Soul in the Timaeus

Nonetheless, my opponents might counter that, even if Plato does not distinguish body from soul in terms of its being located and extended in space, capable of motion etc., to attribute such properties to soul is absurd. Interpretive charity therefore demands that we not take Plato seriously when he appears to make exactly these claims in the Phaedo. But here we should be careful in how we deploy the principle of interpretive charity. It is not enough that we should find the theory of the spatial soul absurd, though I shall argue that this theory is, in some regards, philosophically attractive. To be justified in dismissing the textual evidence suggesting that Plato subscribes to

to conform with its circular motions (44d3–6) suggest that if soul possesses three-dimensional extension, it must be spherical or ovoid.
this theory, we would need to demonstrate that he would find the theory absurd. But in fact, we have decisive evidence to the contrary, that he would not find the theory absurd, since he develops a theory along exactly these lines in his later dialogue, the *Timaeus*.29

In the *Timaeus*, Plato proposes that, just as the body is made up of some stuff—earth, air, fire and water, so rational soul is made up of some stuff—portions of being, sameness and difference (35a1–6). Recall that one of Bostock’s grounds for rejecting the spatial soul theory was that ‘the notion of an immaterial stuff does not seem to make much sense’ (1986, 36); so much for that objection. In the case of the soul of the universe, this stuff is clearly located and extended in space:30 Plato writes that the demiurge ‘set a soul in the center of [the universe] and stretched it

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29 See also Johansen 2017, 18 and 28. My opponents might, perhaps, argue that the *Timaeus* cannot be used to defend a non-metaphorical reading of the spatialist language of the *Phaedo*, since Plato states that his account in the *Timaeus* is a myth (*muthos*, 29d2). However, as Robinson observes, Plato refers to the account in the *Timaeus* more than twelve times as a *logos* (argument), as a *muthos* only four times; since his account concerns perceptible reality, it enjoys the status of a likely account, but not of infallible knowledge (1995, xvii; see also Brisson 2017, 70). Thus, to call it a *muthos* is not to imply that the account is a metaphor waiting to be unpacked but, rather, to draw attention to the epistemic limitations of the subject-matter; though it is a likely account, it is also the best account we are capable of. See also Vlastos 1995, 248–50, who argues that Plato signals repeatedly that the *Timaeus* is intended as a scientific treatise, as well as, more recently, Johansen 2004, ch. 3.

30 If soul is located in space, then this raises the question of why Plato does not discuss the relation of soul to the receptacle. One possible reason is that soul does not relate to the
throughout the whole and, further, covered the body [of the universe] with it all around on the
outside’ (34b3–4; cf. 36d8–e3). Further, as numerous interpreters have emphasized, the soul of
the universe engages in thought through its rotational motion; thus the soul of the universe clearly
engages in locomotion. In fact, we see a similar position advanced in the Laws, when Plato
argues that the motion of nous, intellect, is rotational, (897d3–8b3), and in the Phaedrus, when
Plato mythically represents contemplation of forms as the rotational movement of the soul around
the periphery of the universe.

To turn to Plato’s treatment of human soul in the Timaeus, our souls are divided into three
parts, corresponding to the tripartite division of the Republic. Plato lays great emphasis on their
specific corporeal locations: the rational part is located in the skull, since its ball-like shape
conforms best with reason’s rotational motion (44d3–6). Spirit is separated off from reason by the
neck, which functions as an isthmus or boundary to ensure that spirit stains reason as little as
possible; spirit is placed between reason and appetite so that it can act as reason’s auxiliary in
controlling appetite. Furthermore, it is placed near the heart so that it can make use of the blood
vessels to communicate with the entire body (69d6–70c1). Finally, appetite is placed below the
diaphragm so as to provide it with yet another barrier, separating it from reason; it is placed near

receptacle in the same manner as corporeal particulars: though it is located in space, it is not
located in space in the way of being a temporary reflection of the forms in some region of space.

31 See, e.g., Brisson (1974, 333–6), Broadie (2012, 179 n. 18), Burnyeat (2000, 57–9), Corcilius
of the soul’s motions in the Timaeus and Laws, see Lee 1976.
the liver so that reason can communicate with it by creating images on the surface of the liver (70d7–1d4). In all of this, it is striking just how specific Plato is in assigning bodily locations to the parts of the soul, and how these locations are justified in terms of their either enabling or preventing the soul-parts from making contact with one another and with the bodily organs. All of this implies a model by which the parts of the soul interact with one another and with the body through contact. This contact model is operative in Plato’s account of perception as well, which he analyzes in terms of the motions of external objects being conveyed through the body to the soul (64b3–6).32 Thus, at 43c1–7, for example, Plato describes sensations as disturbances that occur when the body strikes against (προσκρούσειε) external earth, air, fire and water; ‘the motions caused by all of these are borne through the body to the soul and strike against (προσπίπτοιεν) [it]’.33 At points, Plato’s discussion is strikingly mechanistic: for example, mental illness arises

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32 Cf. *Philebus* 33d2–4a7, where Plato claims that perception occurs when affections pass through the body to the soul and provoke a sort of shaking, as well as *Theaetetus* 186b11–c2 and *Rep.* 584c4–5. For further discussion of Plato’s theory of sense-perception in the *Timaeus* see, e.g., Brisson 1997, Lautner 2005 and Miller 1997.

33 I follow Cornford (1957, 148) and Zeyl (1997, 1246) in treating the soul as the implied object of προσπίπτοιεν at 43c5. Corcilius notes that Plato does not supply an object for προσπίπτοιεν and, on that basis, objects to claiming that Plato envisions bodily motions as making contact with the soul (2018, 89–90). However, as Betegh observes, Plato uses the exact same verb at 43b7 (προσπιπττόντων) to describe the way in which external objects affect the human body (2018, 130–1). Thus, it seems that Plato wishes to suggest that the way in which external objects
when the vapors produced by a man’s acidic and briny phlegms become pent up in his body and mix with the motions of his soul (86e5–7a7), and the reason our heads have less flesh than our hips is that cranial flab would reduce our rational soul’s perceptual sensitivity (74e1–5c7). Plato provides us with a similarly mechanistic account of the unity of soul and body: he writes that the soul is anchored to bone marrow by minute rivets; when the organism ages, digestive friction eventually wears down the elemental triangles that enclose the marrow, and ‘the interlocking bonds of the triangles around the marrow no longer endure, and coming apart due to stress, they let loose the bonds of the soul’, causing death (81d5–7).

There are, of course, deep and significant differences between the *Timaeus* and the *Phaedo*: soul in the *Timaeus* is partite and partly mortal, claims that Plato would presumably reject in the *Phaedo*. But my point is not to suggest that we can import the psychology of the *Timaeus* causally affect the body, through contact, impact and transmission of motion, is exactly parallel to the way in which the body subsequently affects the soul.

34 See further Gill 2000 and Lautner 2011.

35 Though full consideration of the relation between these two dialogues would fall beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth briefly noting the way in which the *Timaeus* appears to move away from the extreme asceticism of the *Phaedo*. Though both dialogues share numerous assumptions about the nature of the soul and its relation to the body, they put them to significantly different use. To wit: both dialogues present reason as in some sense between the visible and intelligible realms. But though the *Phaedo* depicts the soul as capable of assimilating to either the unchanging, invisible realm or the changeful, visible realm, it is only akin to the former (79c2-d7). By contrast, the *Timaeus* builds the soul’s intermediacy into its very nature:
wholesale into the *Phaedo*, but, rather, to argue that since Plato clearly assumes the spatial soul theory in the later dialogue, we ought not to dismiss passages in the earlier dialogue that suggest that he subscribes to it there as well. Sedley (1989) has argued that the *Timaeus* develops more fully the teleological cosmology that Plato hints at in the final myth of the *Phaedo*; by the same token, I take the *Timaeus* to develop certain ideas concerning the nature of the soul and its relation to the body that we see introduced in the *Phaedo*. Crucially, in both dialogues, Plato assumes that the soul has location and extension, that it is capable of locomotion, that it is forms a unity with the body through being located inside the body, that it is joined to the body by some sort of tethering or interweaving, and that it interacts with the body by contact. As a final note, I might add, in confirmation of my interpretation, that it sits well with Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s psychology in *De Anima* 1.3. Here, Aristotle criticizes Plato for claiming that the soul is a

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our souls are composed of the same ingredients as divine soul, namely divisible and indivisible being, sameness and difference; the latter is said to “come to be in relation to bodies” (35a2-3). Again, in both dialogues, embodiment is a source of difficulty for rational soul. But whereas in the *Phaedo*, caring for the body is presented in an entirely negative light, as a distraction from contemplation (66b7-c1), in the *Timaeus*, we are enjoined to care for both body and soul in order to produce a well-balanced and hence beautiful human being (87c1-8e7); indeed, the *Timaeus* warns against cultivating the soul at the expense of the body (87e6-8a7), a sentiment the *Phaedo* would strongly eschew. Though for mortal creatures, embodiment interferes with the rational soul’s cognitive functioning (43a4-4b1), embodiment per se is not bad—the world soul, though embodied, is not hindered in any way by its body from its perfect rational functioning.
magnitude\(^{36}\) and that it engages in locomotion (406b26–7b26); I have argued that Plato makes precisely these claims in the Phaedo, and that he develops them further in the Timaeus.

5  **Explanatory Strengths of the Spatial Soul Theory**

My opponents, of course, wish to dismiss the passages that support the spatial soul theory because they take the theory to be absurd. Ultimately, the reason I believe that we should resist this move is that the theory, while it may be odd, is not absurd; on the contrary, it offers Plato significant explanatory advantages. In the first place, the theory provides Plato with a neat explanation of the unity of body and soul. Though Plato seems to hold that one is ultimately his soul and that the body is merely a temporary accretion of mortality, while one is embodied, there is a sense in which one’s soul and one’s body constitute one thing. Thus in the Phaedrus, Plato writes that when a soul settles into an earthy body, ‘the whole, the soul fastened to a body, is called a living being’ (246c5). But this raises the question of what makes a given soul and body constitute a unity or a whole. One’s soul is uniquely tied to one’s body; it cannot cause other bodies to move and it is not directly affected by what happens to them. But in virtue of what does one’s soul belong to one’s body and no other? On the spatial soul theory, we have a ready answer: one’s soul belongs to one’s body because it is located inside it.\(^{37}\) This is tied to the theory of animation and death that

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\(^{36}\) I follow Shields (2016, 127) in understanding Aristotle’s complaint that Plato treats the soul as a magniude as an allusion to the claim in the Timaeus that it is a circle or sphere.

\(^{37}\) Supposing that the soul is located inside the body, does it occupy the same space as the body or is it juxtaposed with it? The majority of interpreters who broach the issue treat the two as colocating (e.g., Betegh 2016, 415, 420; Corcilius 2018, 84 n. 67; Ostenfeld 1982, 250; and Robinson 1995, 106–7). They typically cite, in support, Tim. 34b3–4, where Plato claims that the
Plato advances throughout the *Phaedo*: the body becomes animated when the soul enters it and dies when the soul exits it. This explanation, of course, demands that the soul be located in space and capable of locomotion. The soul animates the body by causing the movements and changes constitutive of life for the organism; the reason why it must enter the body to do so, I propose, is that the soul causally interacts with the body through contact and contact requires spatial

demiurge stretched the soul of the universe throughout its whole body (διὰ παντός), and 36d8-e4, where he describes the demiurge as fitting the soul of the universe with its body, center to center (μέσον μέσῃ), and interweaving it throughout. Granting that this provides significant support for the colocation view, two things should give us pause. First, in many other passages in both the *Phaedo* and the *Timaeus*, Plato characterizes the way in which the soul is bound to the body in terms which suggest juxtaposition, not colocation. Thus, in the *Phaedo*, Plato describes the soul as bound or tied (67d1, 81e2, 82e2, 82e6 etc.), glued (82e2), nailed (83d4) and pinned (83d5) to the body. In a similar vein, in the *Timaeus*, he depicts world-soul as fitted (36e1) and interwoven with (36e2) its body, and human soul as bound to or tied to the body (43a5, 44d5, 69e4, 70e3, 73d6, 81d7). To depict two things as bound, nailed, pinned or glued together suggests that they occupy distinct, albeit contiguous regions of space. Second, the account Plato gives in the *Timaeus* of soul-body interaction suggests that soul and body interact via contact, resistance and transmission of motion (see n. 47 below). But if the soul’s interaction with the body relies on their resisting and making impact with one another, then the soul cannot occupy the same space as the body. Thus, though Plato does not paint a consistent picture, the evidence suggests that the soul is juxtaposed with the body. However, not much hinges on this in terms of defending the more general thesis that the soul possesses spatial attributes.
proximity. This brings us to the second advantage of the spatial soul theory: it offers Plato an explanation of soul-body interaction. Soul and body interact by making contact with one another. Though Plato does not fully spell out the details of how such contact occurs, it is at least less problematic that an immaterial soul should causally interact with a material body if we take the soul to be located in space, extended, capable of locomotion etc.\(^\text{38}\)

Before continuing, it is worth pausing to note how these explanatory advantages are lost if we reject the spatial soul theory. In the first place, if we refuse to grant that the soul is spatially located and capable of locomotion, then what explanation can we offer of the unity of body and soul? If we take the soul to simply be some center of consciousness or willing without spatial location, then we are left with the question of what makes that center of consciousness belong to a given body. The only option is to declare that a soul and a body are a unity in virtue of their causal connectedness. But this is to treat as a brute fact precisely what we are seeking to explain, why a particular soul is causally connected to a particular body and no other.\(^\text{39}\) Alternatively, perhaps, following a suggestion by Broadie (2001, 304–5), one might try to maintain that a given


\(^{39}\) See Kim (2005, 70–92) for a presentation of his classic pairing problem. Kim argues that the dualist cannot make sense of soul-body causal connectedness and hence of soul-body unity because the ‘immaterial minds of the serious dualist’ are ‘wholly immaterial and entirely outside physical space’ (73); if the soul is outside of space, then there is no framework with which to explain its pairing relation to the body. This assumption, that the serious dualist cannot treat the soul as being located in space, is, of course, one that I dispute in this paper.
soul and body constitute a unity in virtue of the soul’s affective attitudes towards that body: the soul belongs to the body in virtue of its desire for and sense of identification with that body. Now, for Plato, it is certainly an important fact that most people tend to identify as embodied creatures and not as souls with a contingent, fleshy encrustation. But this identification cannot be the source of soul-body unity, and for two reasons. First, the philosopher would not need to long for death, as Plato maintains in the *Phaedo*, to be rid of his body; he would simply need to cease identifying with it. Second, according to Plato, most non-philosophers remain deeply attached to their bodies after death, yet cease to be unified with them. Plato’s repeated claims that the soul enters the body prior to birth and exits it upon death are difficult to dismiss; perhaps, then, my opponents might grant that the soul is unified with the body by being located inside it. This would require them to concede that the soul is spatially located and capable of locomotion. But perhaps they might try to hold their ground by denying that the soul is extended and capable of contact with the corporeal. But this inevitably leads to the following question: why, exactly, should Plato require that the soul be located inside the body in order to animate it if he does not hold that it causally interacts with the body through contact? If the soul could cause the body to move simply by willing it to, then there would be no reason why the soul must be located inside the body in order to animate it.

I have argued that for Plato, soul and body constitute a unity in virtue of the soul’s inhabiting the body. In fact, Plato also holds that souls and bodies can be unified to varying degrees.\(^{40}\) This brings us to a final advantage of the theory of the spatial soul: it undergirds Plato’s

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\(^{40}\) Thus, there are two distinct ways in which Plato speaks of the unity of body and soul. On the one hand, all animate organisms are a union of body and soul. However, granting that all living organisms are unions of body and soul, these can be more or less unified. Thus, in the *Phaedo*,
eschatology in the *Phaedo* and thereby plays a key role in his defense of the philosophical life. While even the philosopher’s soul, which withdraws from the body to the degree possible, is unified with his body while he is alive, the souls of non-philosophers can become considerably more entwined with their bodies. Through repeated and extensive causal interaction, their souls eventually become enmeshed with their bodies. Plato reflects this when he refers to their souls as nailed, glued and grown together with their bodies. As a result of this intertwining of soul and body during life, upon death, non-philosophers’ souls depart with a corporeal accretion. Plato writes that such a soul will depart ‘interspersed with the corporeal, with which it has grown together due to the soul’s communion and intercourse with the body, through always being with it

Plato claims, on the one hand, that the soul will only truly be pure and hence capable of knowledge when it is separated from the body at death (66d7–7a2), while, on the other hand, enjoining the philosopher to separate his soul from his body to the extent possible while still alive (67a2–b2). In virtue of what does a soul, while still alive, count as more or less unified with its body? In the *Phaedo*, Plato urges the philosopher to approximate a condition of being dead (64b7–9) and to purify his soul by turning away from bodily pleasures to the extent possible (64d2–5a7). Given that death is when the soul is fully separated from the body, and that the philosopher approximates being dead by minimizing his pursuit of bodily pleasures, it follows that the philosopher’s soul separates from the body in virtue of minimizing its causal interaction with the body. This involves his soul’s contracting away from the body (67c7–8, 80e3–5) and as we shall see, results in its not becoming entwined with a corporeal accretion.
and through much practice’ (81c4–6). Here, Plato posits a clear causal sequence: the soul cares for and has intercourse with the body; as a result, it becomes grown together with it; this causes it to depart interspersed with the corporeal. This corporeal accretion, in turn, causes the soul to reenter another body. By contrast, the soul of the philosopher, which has minimized its contact

41 Plato’s use of the term, sōmatoeides (corporeal) at 81c4 and 81e1 raises an ambiguity regarding what the corporeal accretion consists in. A few lines earlier, Plato describes the sōmatoeides as what can be ‘touched, seen, drunk, eaten or used for sexual pleasure’ (81b5–6). However, it seems unlikely that the accretion is some food or drink; after all, the soul is not presented as making direct contact with food and drink etc., but rather as being affected by the body when the body ingests these. More plausibly, Plato is claiming that what adheres to the soul is some small residue of the body. This is confirmed by the fact that the accretion is said to become ingrown with the soul as a result of the soul’s communing with the body (81c5–6), and by the further fact that in other passages where Plato refers to the accretion, he describes the soul as exiting full of the body (80e3, 81b1, 83d10).

42 Plato does not clarify how, exactly, the corporeal accretion causes re-embodiment. 81d9–e2 suggests that re-embodiment is caused by the soul’s desire for the corporeal accretion. (Though the genitive sōmatoeidous at 81e1 can also be grammatically construed as the subject, rather than the object of the desire, it is implausible to treat the corporeal accretion as the subject of mental states; see n. 8 above). 67a6–b2, 80d5–1a10, 82b10–c1, by contrast, all appeal to a likeness principle to explain why philosophical souls, purified of the body, are able to grasp the incorporeal forms, reach Hades, and spend their time with the gods. These passages suggest that the corporeal accretion leads to re-embodiment due to an attraction of like to like; 83d9–e1
with the body during life, is able to depart without a corporeal accretion and hence to avoid reincarnation; in this pure state, it is able to fully grasp the forms. Plato writes that the philosopher’s soul ‘departs pure, dragging nothing of the body with it, because it was not willing to consort with it during life, but it fled from it and gathered itself together towards itself, because it always cultivated this, which is nothing other than philosophizing correctly’ (80e2–6). Part of the value of philosophy is that it enables the soul to depart pure; Plato cashes out the purity of the soul in terms of its lacking a corporeal accretion. But for the soul to be capable of possessing or lacking a corporeal accretion, of becoming enmeshed with or withdrawing from the body, it must be extended in space and capable of making contact with the body.43

My opponents are forced to maintain that this talk of a corporeal adhesion is merely a colorful way of representing the soul’s persisting desire for or identification with the body. But should we interpret Plato that way, his argument begins to fall apart. Consider, for example, the passage at 67a2–b2. Plato writes:

\[\text{implies an almost automatic connection between the soul’s exiting full of body and its re-entering another body. Note that the question of what particular form one’s next life will take is distinct from the question of what causes one to reenter embodied existence at all; on the former issue, see Kamtekar’s (2016) excellent defense of the natural consequence interpretation.}\]

43 Though the Phaedo contains Plato’s most sustained discussion of the possibility of a soul’s possessing a corporeal accretion, he also alludes to it at Rep. 519a8–b5, Rep. 611e5–2a3 and Tim. 42c4–d2; the Timaeus passage draws a connection between some mass of earth, air, fire and water becoming grown onto (προσφύντα) the soul and its being subject to continued reincarnation.
While we live, we will come closest to knowing in this way, if, as much as possible, we do not consort or have communion with the body, insofar as it is not completely necessary, and do not infect ourselves with its nature, but purify ourselves from it, until the god himself releases us. And being pure, by being freed of the folly of the body, it is likely that we shall be with like company, and shall know through ourselves all that is pure—and this is presumably the truth. For it is not permitted that impure should grasp pure.

καὶ ἐν ὃ ἄν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ως ἐσικεῖν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ ειδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιπλώμεθα τῆς τοῦτον φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἔως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκός μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι’ ἢμὼν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινὲς, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἵσσως τὸ ἄληθὲς· μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμίτου ἦ.

Here, Plato appeals to a like-knows-like principle to explain why devotion to the corporeal should render us incapable of grasping forms: devotion to the corporeal causes a corporeal accretion that makes the soul unlike, and hence incapable of knowing, the incorporeal forms. But what explanation is left if we abandon the spatial soul theory? What does the philosophic soul’s purity consist in, such that it resembles and hence is able to know the forms? It will not do to equate the purity of the philosopher’s soul with his devaluing or failing to identify with his body. Plato’s argument demands that the soul’s purity resemble that of the forms, and it would be utterly absurd to propose that the forms devalue or fail to identify with their bodies. Furthermore, this debunking interpretation makes Plato come across as willfully misleading. Throughout the Phaedo, Plato
speaks as though the problem with excessive attachment to the body is that it causes the soul to become contaminated with a corporeal accretion; if the corporeal accretion were just a vivid metaphor for the soul’s attachment to the body, then he would be claiming, vacuously, that the problem with an excessive attachment to the body is that it causes an excessive attachment to the body. In sum, on the spatial soul theory, we see Plato develop a strikingly consistent account of the nature and causes of soul-body unity and interaction. A soul and a body are unified when the soul is located inside the body; they interact via contact. Excessive contact can result in the soul’s developing a corporeal accretion that renders it incapable of knowing forms and causes it to reenter a body upon death.

6 Explanatory Weaknesses of the Spatial Soul Theory

Despite its explanatory power, the theory of the spatial soul is not without difficulties; I will focus my attention on two problems arising from Plato’s view that the soul interacts with the body via contact. My first concern is as follows. It seems clear that Plato takes the soul to be imperceptible and hence intangible. This is central to how he distinguishes the soul from the body. But if the soul is intangible, then in what sense can it make contact with the body? We see this difficulty arise in the Timaeus as follows. On the one hand, Plato explicitly distinguishes body and soul in terms of perceptibility and imperceptibility (36e5–6). On the other hand, he claims that nothing is ‘tangible (hapton) without something solid, nor solid without earth’ (31b6). Since the soul is not composed of earth, this seems to imply that it must be intangible. But Plato goes on to speak of perception in terms of the soul’s touching, ephaptesthai, its objects (e.g. 37a6); significantly, the
Greek words for touching or making contact, *haptesthai*, and for being tangible, *hapton*, are
cogitate expressions. How can something intangible touch anything?\(^{44}\)

To the extent that Plato has a solution to this difficulty, I would suggest that it might be
along the following lines. In the *Physics*, Aristotle refers to what appears to be a standard
mathematical definition of contact: ‘Things are said to be in contact (*haptesthai*) when their
extremities are together’ (226b23).\(^{45}\) In *On Generation and Corruption*, Aristotle provides an
extended treatment of contact and of how it enables things to affect one another. He writes,
‘Nevertheless contact in the proper sense applies only to things which have position. And position
belongs only to those things which also have a place; for in so far as we attribute contact to the
mathematical things, we must also attribute place to them, whether they exist in separation or in
some other fashion’ (322b3–3a3). Aristotle goes on to provide a discussion of contact which
applies primarily to physical magnitudes, but for our purposes, the significant point is that there is
a sense of contact which can apply to geometrical objects, objects that are, presumably, intangible

\(^{44}\) A parallel difficulty arises concerning the *Sophist*. As we have seen, the materialists identify
body with what offers contact and touch (246a10–b1), and the Stranger builds on this in arguing
that incorporeal entities, that are invisible and intangible—his examples include soul—exist
(247b1–6). Unless Plato is contradicting the analysis of perception as involving contact between
the soul and the body that he advances in the *Timaeus*, the soul had better be capable of contact
in some sense. Perhaps, though, Plato does not, himself, endorse the claim that the soul is
intangible; the Stranger may only be advancing this claim dialectically, to argue against the
Giants, based on their own assumptions.

\(^{45}\) See also Mugler 1958, 80–3. Translations of Aristotle are from Barnes 1984.
and imperceptible. Perhaps, then, the solution to Plato’s difficulty is to draw a distinction between two senses of contact, *hapsis*. On the one hand, the soul is capable of touching or making contact with the body in the mathematical sense that Aristotle alludes to, which involves spatial contiguity. On the other hand, it might be intangible in the sense that it does not give rise to tactile sensations. In the *Timaeus*, Plato in fact provides a fairly narrow analysis of touch: he breaks it into perceptions of hot and cold, hard and soft, heavy and light, smooth and rough and pleasant and painful, and analyzes these sensations in terms of the effects of the four elements upon the human body (61d5–5b3). To the extent that the soul is not composed of earth, air, fire and water, it does not cause tactile sensations; in this sense, it is intangible. However, this does not prevent it from making contact with body and hence receiving and imparting motions.

However, the very terms in which we have, perhaps, resolved this first difficulty seem to give rise to an even more pressing one. If the soul is indeed incorporeal, then what is the

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46 Cf. *Generation and Corruption* 329b17–20, where Aristotle lists, as tangible qualities, hot-cold, dry-moist, heavy-light, hard-soft, viscous-brittle, rough-smooth and coarse-fine. Presumably when Aristotle earlier speaks of mathematical objects as making contact with one another, he does not mean to apply these qualities to them.

47 Betegh has argued persuasively that in the *Timaeus*, soul-body interaction involves not just contact, but also resistance (2018, 130–3). Betegh draws attention to Plato’s use of -πίπτειν (to fall) compounds to characterize both the impact of external bodies upon the periphery of the human body and the impact of the body’s motions upon the soul; given that bodies resist one another when they make impact, we have reason to suppose that soul-body interaction also involves resistance.
mechanism by which it makes contact with the corporeal? Even if we grant that the soul has location and extension and is capable of locomotion, it still seems to be a very different sort of thing than the body; how, then, does it causally interact with the body? Furthermore, supposing that it is made of some incorporeal stuff—in the *Timaeus*, Plato specifies that rational soul is made up of being, sameness and difference—what does it even mean for some portion of these to move through space or to make contact with the body? Plato simply does not provide answers to these questions. The reason for this, I believe, is that they failed to puzzle him. Thus, in the *Laws*, while discussing how the soul of the sun causes it to move, Plato considers three possible explanations: first, ‘...the soul, being inside this body that appears round, carries it, just as our soul carries us around everywhere’; second, ‘being furnished from somewhere outside with a body of fire or some air, as some people say, it pushes a body by force with a body’; and third, ‘barren of body, but having some other exceedingly wondrous powers, it guides [the sun]’ (898e8–9a4). Two things are noteworthy here. First, Plato identifies the first option with how our souls move our bodies—our souls carry us around in virtue of being inside our bodies. Second, he views this as utterly unproblematic. It is only the third option, on which the soul guides the body without being located inside it or making contact with it through a corporeal intermediary, that he finds mysterious; it would require some ‘exceedingly wondrous powers’. Interestingly, Plato has the conceptual space to find it problematic how two different ontological kinds should interact: famously, he struggles to explain how forms causally interact with sense-particulars, and in the *Parmenides*, he raises a related difficulty for how the forms could be subjects of human knowledge, given the ontological chasm separating them from mortal souls (133b4–4e8). Perhaps part of the reason he is not puzzled by the interaction between the soul and the body is that, even if they are different
substances, the gap between them is not so great: they are both located in space and time, capable of change etc.

More generally, for Plato, the puzzling question is not how soul and body should causally interact, but how motion should ever arise in matter. He sees soul as necessary in order to explain how motion could be initiated. Thus, in the *Laws* he asks what would happen if the universe were to come to a standstill (895a6–b1). The first thing that would be required to reinitiate motion would be self-generated motion. But should we ever see self-generated motion arise in some body, we would posit that it is alive, in other words, that there is a soul in it; in this context, he defines soul as motion capable of moving itself (896a1–2). Given that the conceptual role of soul for Plato is, in part, to initiate motion in body, he views its capacity to do so as not requiring further explanation. Interestingly, to the extent that worries about soul-body causation are worries about how two different kinds of substance can causally interact, this problem appears not to have arisen in Classical antiquity. Granted, Plato’s successors, the Epicureans and Stoics, argue against him that, as a source of motion, the soul must be corporeal. Thus, Epicurus writes that if the soul were incorporeal, ‘it would be unable to act or be acted on in any way’ (*Letter to Herodotus* 67, LS 14A), and Cicero writes that ‘Zeno also differed from [the Platonists and Peripatetics] in thinking that it was totally impossible that something incorporeal....should be the agent of anything, and that only a body was capable of acting or of being acted upon’ (*Academica* 1.39, LS 45A). But

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48 One might speculate, however, that such a concern is at the root of Aristotle’s introduction of *pneuma* (breath) as the causal intermediary between soul and body at *De Motu* 10. See Dillon 2009, 354.

49 Translations from Long and Sedley 1987.
their difficulty is not how an incorporeal soul should initiate motion in a corporeal body but, rather, how an incorporeal soul should do anything.50

7 Ethical Implications of the Spatial Soul Theory

To conclude this paper, I will briefly consider the implications of the theory of the spatial soul for the ethics of the Phaedo. Recently, there has been a controversy concerning how to interpret the asceticism of the Phaedo. What attitude does Plato recommend towards the body? And to what degree are we to avoid pleasures of the flesh or, for that matter, perceptual experience? Proponents of the evaluative interpretation, such as Woolf (2004) and Russell (2005), maintain that Plato does not require that we abstain from bodily pleasures; it is sufficient that we should disvalue them. By contrast, those who advance the ascetic interpretation, such as Butler (2012) and, more recently, Ebrey (2017), argue that Plato requires us to avoid bodily pleasures to the degree possible, since they necessarily distort our judgments, causing us to believe that the sensible world is both real

50 My discussion clearly does not exhaust the difficulties with Plato’s theory. He leaves many questions unanswered: for example, does soul have a specific size, shape or weight? This might be suggested by his occasional references to the soul, or parts of the soul, as larger or smaller (e.g. Rep. 442a5–6, 442c5; Tim. 88a7–8), as well as by his depictions of the disembodied soul as having an inclination to move upwards (e.g. Tim. 42b3–4, 90a2–b1; Phdr. 246d6–8c8). Such a view, if indeed Plato would subscribe to it, cannot help but strike us as odd, but it is difficult to determine whether this is because the view is inherently philosophically implausible, or because our philosophical imaginations are, perhaps unbeknownst to us, cramped by Cartesian and/or Christian assumptions.
and valuable. On either interpretation, however, questions remain. Why, on the ascetic interpretation, should engagement with the body necessarily distort our judgments; why, for example, should experiencing corporeal pleasure necessarily cause even the carefully-trained philosopher to over-estimate the reality or value of its sources? And, on either interpretation, how does the possession of incorrect evaluative and/or ontological beliefs render the philosopher’s soul impure? On the theory of the spatial soul, we have a ready answer to these questions: the

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51 Given the constraints of space, it is not possible fully to do justice to the complexity of these authors’ arguments. However, it is worth noting that Woolf’s position, in particular, is nuanced; though he favors the evaluative interpretation overall (2004, 98), he also maintains that the ascetic interpretation makes better sense of the affinity argument.

52 Russell offers the following explanation of why the experience of intense pleasure should corrupt our judgments of value: pleasure is, itself, a way of registering value (2005, 89). However, this explanation appears to be in tension with Russell’s opposition to the ascetic interpretation. If a judgment of value is embedded in the very experience of pleasure, then it is not clear how the philosopher could experience intense bodily pleasure without forming an incorrect judgment of value.

53 Ebrey takes the philosopher’s soul to be pure insofar as it does not contain bodily desires (2017, 13); in a similar vein, in his defense of the evaluative interpretation, Woolf suggests that psychic impurity may be a matter of the soul’s believing that only the bodily is real (2004, 103). But as we have seen, such an interpretation will not do, both because the soul’s impurity is supposed to result from its attitude towards the body, and because the soul’s purity is supposed to resemble that of the forms. Like myself, in his discussion of the affinity argument, which he
problem with the life of bodily pleasure is that sustained causal interaction with the body causes
the soul to become entwined with the body, making it impure and hence incapable of knowledge.
This gives rise to a vicious cycle: a soul that is incapable of knowledge will be unable to recognize
the false foundations of its way of life, and will continue to devote itself to bodily pleasure until,
at death, it departs with a corporeal accretion and is condemned to re-embodiment. Thus, the
theory of the spatial soul supports a strongly ascetic reading of the Phaedo: even if it were possible
for the philosopher to enjoy pleasures of the flesh while remaining aloof from them, the damage

takes to reflect an ascetic strand in the dialogue, Woolf takes psychic impurity to be a direct
result of the soul’s interaction with the body (2004, 120).

But isn’t the philosopher’s soul enmeshed with his body insofar as it directs the various activities
that comprise his embodied life? In response, it is worth noting that, while Plato presents the soul
as the cause of life for the organism, he nowhere depicts it as responsible for organic functioning.
Of course, this does not address the range of conscious activities that the philosopher does engage
in—even the philosopher must walk, eat, drink and so forth, activities which require the soul to
engage with the body. But the reason Plato depicts the philosopher as approximating being dead
(64b7–9) is that, to the extent possible, the philosopher turns away from bodily activities and
pursues an activity, philosophy, that does not involve the body at all. Though his soul has not yet
lost its causal power over his body—he is not yet dead—in reducing causal engagement with the
body, it approximates the state when it will be entirely dissociated from the body (see Pakaluk
2003, 102–7). The evaluative interpretation is certainly correct, though, to emphasize that when
the philosopher does engage in bodily activities, he does so with reservation—even though his
soul is temporarily embodied, he does not view embodiment as essential to who he is.
would be done and his soul would be corrupted, by the mere fact of his engagement with the body. That is not to say that the philosopher can withdraw from his body wholesale: indeed, his soul must interact with his body, both in order to sustain life and in order to subdue his body and prevent it from interfering with his philosophic activity. Tellingly, even in contemplation, the philosopher cannot escape the contamination of corporeal experience; in order to recollect the forms, the philosopher must begin with perception. Thus, even as the philosopher cannot help but engage with the body, he is left in the position of hoping that this engagement will not contaminate his soul; his corporeal existence is a cause for disquiet, rather than something to be welcomed.

Perhaps the most persuasive argument for the evaluative interpretation is the fact that Plato represents Socrates as engaged with this world (see Russell 2005, 85–7 and Woolf 2004, 104–6). Against this, Butler argues that Plato presents Socrates as living an ascetic life to the extent possible, given the demands of embodied existence and his moral obligations to others (2012, 104, 113–16).

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