One Act of Mind: A Comment on Sebastian Rödl’s *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity*[[1]](#endnote-1)

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**1. Judging that things are so, and thinking oneself to judge**

I am delighted to comment on Sebastian Rödl’s fearless and hypnotic book. It is not an easy work, and certainly not an easy one to take on in the guise of critic. How could it be, given what Rödl describes as its “curious character”? He says that “it propounds no theses, advances no hypotheses, does not recommend a view or position; it does not give arguments that are to support a view, it does not defend a position against competing ones, it does nothing to rule out contrary theses” (p. 13).

That may be so – but there are sentences asserted, often with emphasis and conviction. Perhaps some are true, and the best – if they are true, and if he is right – are true without contrary and discoverable to all. We are presented with a framework for thought. We are presented with claims about how fundamental concepts – concepts without which we cannot even begin to do philosophy – relate to each other.

In this response it may seem that I am propounding theses and offering arguments. I have more of a taste than Rödl does for organizing sentences into paragraphs, numbering them and calling the paragraph an “argument”. But I am not really arguing for anything. Rather, I am seeking to fiddle around with, to poke, and to try to seek clarity in relation to the framework Rödl has offered us.

My contribution will be to report, first, that, when I read and seem to accept what Rödl says thinking is, I find myself suspecting that what at one moment seems to be a thought, is actually no thought at all. Maybe such unstable thinkings are not illusions, and I really do have a clear thought after all. It will also be to report, second, that I seem to have ways of thinking which I cannot find mirrored in the ways of thinking described by Rödl. Maybe such seeming thoughts are illusions, and I do not really think in those ways. I am open to being convinced of both possibilities.

My central worry will be that *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity* is insufficiently sensitive to the first-person perspective and its importance – indeed, that his view amounts to skepticism of there being any such a thing.[[2]](#endnote-2) It may, at first, seem mischievous to suggest this – after all, the book makes self-consciousness the foundation of all. It is science; it is philosophy. I will suggest, however, that if it is those things, then it is not also properly understood as self-consciousness. I suppose that any story according to which objectivity and self-consciousness are *one* will meet the twin anxieties, that we lose self-consciousness or we lose objectivity. But to clarify, my anxiety is not that we lose self-consciousness and are left only with objectivity. My anxiety is that, in the end, we lose both.

The expression of this anxiety, in this piece, will come from focusing on a view of judgment conveyed by what is perhaps the central claim of the book: the claim that judgment is self-conscious, where that means that judging that things are so, and thinking oneself to judge that, are one act of mind.[[3]](#endnote-3)

Few philosophers who have worked on self-consciousness and self-knowledge have not crept up to, and tried to evoke, something like this thought. See, for an exemplar, Matthew Boyle’s claim that in the basic case, one’s belief that P, and one’s knowledge that one believes that P, are “not two cognitive states [but] are two aspects of *one* cognitive state” (2011, p. 228).

The thought is also not unlike, although it is to be distinguished from, the claims made by Shoemaker, in his commitment to the self-intimation thesis. It is also similar to, though distinct from, certain kinds of constitutivist theses on which the judgment that P always, or necessarily normally, thereby commits the thinker to the thought that I judge that P. The thought also recalls, but is to be distinguished from, the claim in the other direction that any thought that I judge that P will also involve a judgment that P – perhaps because judging that I judge that P thereby commits me also to the judgment that P.

So, how are we to understand the thought that judging, and thinking one so to judge, are “one act of mind”? Well, we can rule out any suggestion that Rödl is committed only to one-way *conditional* claims, that is, to either:

1. All judgings that P are also thinkings that I judge that P
(Judging P  Thinking I judge that P)

or

1. All thinkings that I judge that P are also judgings that P
(Thinking I judge that P  Judging P)

(A) leaves it open whether all thinkings that one judges that P are also judgings that P, and (B) leaves it open whether all judgings that P are also thinkings that one judges that P. Rödl allows for neither possibility. However, nor is the claim simply the biconditional one that:

(C) All judgings that P are also thinkings that I judge that P, and all thinkings that I judge that P are also judgings that P. (Judging P  Thinking I judge that P)

For Rödl, any judging P *is also, and thereby,* a thinking I judge that P, and *vice versa*. For Rödl, the nature of judgment is such that to judge P is, in the same act of mind, to think that I judge P. We are told that to judge P and to think I judge that P *are to do the very same thing.*  We can – adopting Lucy Campbell’s very helpful label here – call Rödl’s claim a *two-in-one* claim (Campbell 2018). It stands in contrast to what we might call *two-together* claims.[[4]](#endnote-4)

Now it is worth noting straightway, as Campbell does, that *two-in-one* claims require a degree of explanation beyond *two-together* claims. Two-together claims need to produce some causal, constitutive, or other dependence claim that makes it plausible that, if one has a judgment that P, then one has a thought I judge that P, or *vice versa*, or both. *Two-in-one* claims have to explain what could be meant by saying judging that things are so, and thinking oneself to judge that, are “one act of mind”, and to do that will be to give some idea of what *a judging* is, and what *a thinking one is judging* is, and some idea of when they are the same thing, and how to count them. In short, we have to do some metaphysics of mind.

Moreover, the claim Rödl offers purports to be *philosophically illuminating*. We are not invited simply to think that “to judge that things are so is to judge that things are so”, or indeed to think that “to think that I judge that P is to think that I judge that P”. It is a *two*-in-one claim, and there needs to be an explanation that makes sense of the *duality* in the commitment to *unity,* and one that can do philosophical work.

The duality alongside the commitment to unity is captured by Rödl in a number of metaphors. He talks of “containment”, “inclusion”, “suffusion”, “having as a background”, “permeation”. They are, he insists, more or less useless or “inept” ways of talking. They are forms of thought that are suited to relate distinct particulars, and given that his point is that we do not have two things here – thinking and what is thought – the metaphors are bound to mislead. They are metaphors suited to relate particular things, and the thought that self-consciousness and what is thought are not two things, but one, is the topic of the book – well, maybe, but they are nevertheless being *used* in fact for some purpose, and seem to be necessary forms of expression in the context. Inadequate though they may be, there is no saying what the topic of the book is without them. And note that there is one thing the metaphors – however unhelpful they may be – have in common: they stand for *asymmetric* relations that explain how two things, events, or substances, can come to be unified into the boundaries of just one.

Sometimes Rödl seems to hold a simple identity claim:

(D) All judgings that P *are identical* with all thinkings that I judge that P.

However, identity claims are reflexive and, given that the metaphors he reaches for are all irreflexive relations, we should perhaps wonder whether he can allow himself something of the following *form*:

(E) All judgings that P *C\** thinkings that I judge that P

where *C\** is whatever the “making one out of two” irreflexive relation is. *C\** may be “contain”, “are suffused by”, “are included in”, “have as a background”, “are permeated by” or something else.

So, a simple first question might be: Does Rödl, in fact, mean to convince us of a straightforward identity claim here, or not? Are all judgings that P, thinkings that I judge that P, perhaps in the same way that all discrete masses of water are masses of H2O, or that all utterances are linguistic acts? Or does he have a more complex relation in mind?

I think we can see the contrasting explanatory demands facing Rödl more clearly if we put together four claims he makes right at the beginning of the book, and look at what follows from them. The first is the claim we have already highlighted.

1. *The “Judgment is self-conscious”* claim: all judgings that P *C\** thinkings that I judge that P, and this is true irrespective of what P is. (Where *C\** is the asymmetric “two-in-one” relation.)

However, we can also find three further claims:

1. *The “thinking is judging”* claim: all thinkings that P are judgings that P. (“I use ‘judgment’ and ‘thought’ interchangeably”, p. 4)
2. *The “not two things thought” claim*:judgings that P are not at the same time, and “alongside” judgings that *I judge that P*. (“[T]here is no meaning in saying that, in an act of thinking two things are thought, *p* and *I think p*”, p. 6). “As judgment is self-conscious, there are not two things judged: *p* and *I judge p*. The *I judge* is inside what is judged insofar as it is something judged” (p. 13).
3. *The “not two thinkings” claim:* judgings that P are the same acts of mind as thinkings that I judge that P. (“judging that things are so and thinking oneself to judge that *are one act of mind*” (2017, p. 217 )

These four claims together lead me to ask for two requests for clarification.

*First request for clarification: Russian Dolls*

1. All judgings that P *C\** a thinking that I judge P. (Assumption I)

2. All thinkings that P are judgings that P. (Assumption II)

3. All judgings that P *C\** judgings that I judge P. (From 1 and 2)

4. My judgment that P *C\*s* a judgment that I judge that P. (From 3)

5. My judgment that I judge that P *C\*s* a judgment that I judge that I judge that P.

7. My judgment that I judge that I judge that P *C\*s* a judgment that I judge that I judge that I judge that p.

8. And so on….

9. Therefore, my judgment P *C\*s* an infinite number of judgments.

Now it may be that Rödl is happy with the idea that, whatever exactly we mean by C\*, a judgment C\*s an infinite set of judgments which we may specify in terms of an infinite number of iterations of “I judge” conjoined to “P”.

Or, he may insist that, if there are not *two things* judged when I judge P, and I judge that I judge P, and there are not two judgings when I judge P and I judge that I judge P (as follows from III, and IV combined with II), then there are not in fact an infinite number of things judged when I judge P, and judge that I judge P, and judge that I judge that I judge that P, and so on; there is not an infinite number of judgings. Just as well. However, while this may help in diminishing the threat of infinity, it does not help us in understanding the sense in which we have *two*, or *many* here and the sense in which we have *one*. Perhaps P, I judge that P, I judge that I judge that P etc. are all – as he at one point suggests – simply *orthographically* distinct ways of writing P.[[5]](#endnote-5) But I do not understand that. There is no logic on which the semantic, and rational properties of these sentences can be entirely coincident.

So, if Rödl is not happy with the idea that there are an infinite set of judgments being involved whenever we judge, then he either needs:

a) a way of blocking the move from *thinkings, comprehendings, understandings* that I judge that P, to *judgings* that I judge that P, and to insist that the *C\** relation applies only to judgings, not to thinkings;

or b) to deny that one can coherently judge that I judge that I judge P, or that I judge that I judge that I judge that P.

How to do b)? Well, if, as Rödl says, there is *no meaning* in saying that, in an act of thinking, two things are thought – P, and I judge that P – then, perhaps, there is no meaning in claiming any difference between “P” and “I judge that P”. If that is the case, then there also will be no difference between I judge that I judge that I judge P, or that I judge that I judge that I judge that P. But, again, I do not understand that. And, again, there is no logic on which the semantic, and rational properties of these sentences, are entirely coincident. Moreover, there is then no meaning in the central claim that “judging that things are so, and thinking oneself to judge that, are one act of mind”.

The difficulty, it seems to me, is retaining a sense for the *two-in-one thought* while denying a sense to the *three-in-one*, *four-in-one*, and so on.

How to do a)? I think there is some mileage in the strategy suggested by a) which I will come back to at the end. However, Rödl *himself* does not offer much in the way of material that would enable us to pursue the option, and a strict reading of his intentions suggests that he would eschew – perhaps even deplore – the attempt. Nevertheless, it *is* telling that Rödl tends to avoid the locution “judging that I judge that P” despite the letter of his account making it no less problematic than the forms of locution he does use. He talks always of our judging that P, to also contain (*C\**) our “thinking”, or our “comprehending”, or our “understanding” that P. But, officially, he himself cannot think that there is anything important in this. After all, he is committed to II. So, thinkings, comprehendings, and understandings, are just judgings for him. If, however, we were to abandon II, and were to offer an account of thinkings, comprehendings and understandings, as distinct from judgings, then we would have a way of blocking the Russian Dolls regress.

*Second request for clarification: The “Two or One?” argument*

1. All judgments that P*C\** thinkings that I judge P.

2. All thinkings P are judgings P.

3. The relation of *C\**, whatever it is, is a non-reflexive relation.

4. My judging that P and my judging that I judge P are one act of mind: my judging P *is identical with* my judging that I judge that P.

5. My judging that P *C\**s my judging that I judge that P.

6. So, my judging that P and my judging that P are not the same thing (From 3 and 5)

7. So, my judging that P and my judging that P are both the same thing and not the same thing.

Whatever relation holds between the judgings captured by *C\**, we need to know whether we have plural or singular judgings. If the answer is *both*, then we need to know in what way we have plural judgings, and in what way we have singular ones. Otherwise, we face a simple contradiction. We need, in short, to be given an account of these. To repeat, we need some idea of what *a judging* is, and what *a thinking one is judging* is, and some idea of when we have two and when we have one; we have to do some metaphysics of mind.

**2. Costs of “full collapse”?**

As I suggested before, there is a way of reading *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity* that makes these requests for clarification – “Russian Dolls” and “Two or One?” – just go away. If we press the thought that any hint of plurality is utterly surface, if we insist that there is no distinction in what we mean when we think, say or write P, and when we think, say or write I judge P – these are merely orthographically and superficially distinct – then these problems do not arise. We might press Rödl to say which meaning remains: “P”, or “I judge P”. He will resist answering the question, I imagine. They mean the same. My worry, however, is that this move leaves him unable to make sense of the first-person perspective. Let me try to say both why I think this and why it is a problem.

The first naïve thought is that whatever we say about the relationship between self-consciousness and judging P, we *can* judge “I judge that P” where what I am doing is judging “alongside”, or “together” with my judgment that P – and that such judgments are important. The truth of a “two-in-one” view does not immediately rule out the impossibility of there being cases of “two-together” judgments of the kind at issue. I can judge P and judge that I judge that P – that is what makes it possible for me to judge that P and I judge that P.

We can recognize this possibility even if we deny that, in the normal case, judging that P and thinking that I judge that P involves two judgments. The question “how should we think about the *not normal* case?” is still permissible. Can we not have two judgments like this together even so? They may not be *foundational*, in the way that my judgment that I am judging P, in judging P is purported to be, but if they are *possible* then we need to understand them. And if P, and I judge that P, are identical in meaning, they are not possible.

A second, more substantial worry is that we may not understand the nature of the first-person perspective operative *at a moment of judging* unless we understand how it relates to the perspective operative when I look forward, or back, or counterfactually at that moment. And that fact gives my judgment that I am judging that P, when I judge that P, a job to do that is distinct from simply judging P. And if my judging that I judge that P has a job to do distinct from my judging P, then my judging that I judge that P must be able to have distinct meanings.

What job might such a judgment have to do? Here are some self-ascriptive judgments:

I judged yesterday that I would get my comment article on Rödl’s *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity* finished by yesterday. I judged wrongly yesterday.

I judge that what my sister judges is beneficial for my mother is probably more reliable than what I judge is beneficial for my mother.

I judge today that tomorrow I will judge truly that I am sending off my comment article on Rödl’s *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity*. I will also judge that I judge that I am sending off my comment article on Rödl’s *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity*.

I would now judge that the horse Tiger Roll would not win a second Grand National, had he not won the 2019 Grand National yesterday.

I would have judged that I would get my comment article on Rödl’s *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity* finished yesterday if I had not been so distracted. If I had not been so distracted, I would have judged truly yesterday in judging that I would get my comment article on Rödl’s *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity* finished by yesterday.

These sorts of judgments are not a direct problem for Rödl’s deflation. After all, they do not have the present-tense indicative form I judge that P, or P. However, there do seem to be important truth-value links between these kinds of self-ascriptions and the present-tense one, which does have the form “I judge that P”.

I judged wrongly when I judged yesterday: I did not get the comment finished. Yesterday I judged P, and I judged that I judged that P. My judging that I judged that P yesterday was true – I did judge, yesterday, that I would get my comment article on Rödl’s *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity* finished by yesterday. But I was wrong – my judging that P turned out to be a false judging. *Both these are needed:* both the recognition now that I judged falsely when I judged P, and that I judged truly that I judged that I judged P. Both are needed for me to characterize and acknowledge my fallibility and proneness to error, my perspective yesterday in contrast to today. Moreover, arguably, both are needed for me to understand what a judgment is: to judge P is to stake a claim about how things are, or were, or will be – and to do that is to make room for the idea that I could fail, that I could get things wrong. What enables me to understand that I got it wrong yesterday, and that I would have been able to appreciate yesterday the possibility that I may have got it wrong, is that I judged *truly* that I judged that P, but unfortunately it turned out that not-P. To make this claim means I need to be able to distinguish my judgment that I judged P from my judgment that P.

But need I make these claims? Perhaps a subject without the capacity to look forward or back, to reflect on lessons learned and lost, could take things to be true without the capacity to link their earlier false judgment with their corrected one. However, such a subject would have no insight into their rational capacities, and concomitantly, no insight into their perspective on the facts. Indeed, it is hard to see how we could even credit such a subject with the capacity to think “I judge that P” given their inability to at the same time comprehend that their judgment could depart from the facts. Rationality, and the power to judge, on this view, requires not just a coordination by a subject with the *world*, but a coordination by a subject with themselves over time: with *their past and future efforts of coordination with how things are*. Rationality and revision require an appreciation of my first-personal judgmental perspective, over time and in terms of possibility, not just that I judge truly on matters independent of my judgments about my judgments. I need to keep track of the patterns of my judgments, as well as the facts independent of those judgments that I judge of. If one held that one could not be rational, and could not make sense of one’s rational nature, unless one could both track these judgments at a time and over time, and from person to person, then Rödl’s claim that in judging we also appreciate the validity and rationality of our judgment would require him also to separate one’s judging from one’s judging of what one judged.[[6]](#endnote-6)

On this view, there is an illusion of room, or need, for the present-tense *collapse* only if we keep out of mind the cross-temporal, cross-modal and cross-personal cases. And once they come back into mind we will have no stable notion of the power of judgment unless we block the radical deflation in the present-tense case. To embrace the *collapse* is to be unable to articulate our first-person perspective, and to be unable to articulate our first-person perspective is to be unable to articulate the power of judgment to know.[[7]](#endnote-7)

These considerations take us back to the job of finding the duality, in the unity, of the present perspective: the judgment that P and the thought I judge P that we get in the present. I have said that any “two-in-one” claim needs a story – an account of how two can be one.

We start with the very general thought of the non-identity of *two* particulars. (Distinct **a** and **b** cannot be one particular **a** (or **b**)). To deny that is to settle with contradiction. We need some guidance, therefore, on how we should individuate the relevant acts of mind that are our topic: the judgment P, the thought that I judge that P, so that we can have two in one.

We know already that we cannot, according to Rödl, individuate them only by content, or by content plus force. So, then, how do we? Rödl does not obviously give us an account of the nature of judgment that would enable us to answer our “how do we get two in one?” question. We are asked to accept the two-in-one thought long before we get any hint of a discussion of the metaphysics that might be involved in judgment.

However, we are introduced, towards the end of *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity*, to the idea that judgment is the exercise of a power to know, or actually the exercise of some (second) power which is a power to know the thing judged. But let us set aside that Aristotelian wrinkle.

One way to approach this is to ask what a power to know must be if my judgments – my judgment that P, and my thinking that I judge that P – which are exercises of that power, are the *same* in the present tense case. For what X is there in the case of the power to X *no difference* in the present tense between judging P and thinking that I judge that P? One suggestion might be that X, for Rödl, is the power to reason from facts, to think soundly – we see this reflected in his denial of the force-content distinction and also, in fact, in Frege’s own insistence that the judgment stroke cannot be construed as part of the *content* of what is judged, but is a “fundamental” force.

Suppose a judgment is an exercise of the power to know. Suppose the power to know is a power to *use* facts in reasoning. Then to judge P is to gain the power to use the fact P judged in reasoning – practical or theoretical. On these suppositions, exercises of my power to know P in judging are acquisitions of the power to use P in reasoning: to come to know P is to gain the power of reasoning with P. Thus, the exercise of a power to know – in the judging of P – *is* the power to reason with P. (John Hyman may think this. See Campbell 2018 for the thought that this may help with “two-in-one” claims.)

Now, I have the power to reason with P to the same extent, and in the same way, that I have the power to *use my judgment that P* in reasoning. The exercises of my power to know in judging P, and in concluding that Q, say, on the basis that I judge that P, are plausibly seen to be coincident powers. In virtue of what, then, do I gain the power to use the truth, P, in reasoning? I gain that power in judging that P, and in using the fact that I judge P as my grounds in reasoning. Thinking, comprehending, understanding etc. that I judge that P does not increase, nor diminish, my power to use P in reasoning – it is the same thing. This is why the “I judge that P” is contained in my judgment P: in the present-tense case, my act of judging P, and thinking I judge that P, in order to conclude Q, say, give me *coincident grounds* in my reasoning.

If the power of self-consciousness is the *power to use myself* – my acts, my states of mind, my judgments – in deliberation and reasoning, then the power to know is the power of self-consciousness. However, we have got here by asking about the metaphysical nature of judgment. And we have answered our question by appeal to rational agency, in particular by appeal to the idea that a subject knowingly uses their judgments in reasoning.

How might this allow us to avoid our explanatory puzzles? Why are there no Russian dolls? There are no Russian dolls because to *judge* that I judge P and *to think* that I judge that P can be taken to be different things on this story. To think that I judge that P, or, as it might be more perspicuously put, to think with recognition of my judging that P, is no more than to *use* my judgment that P in my reasoning. It is to understand myself as judging that P, in using P in my grounds for Q, say. There is, here, just one judgment: the judgment that P. There is, however, the coincident power to judge P, and to use that judgment P – and, so, to use P – in my reasoning.

And the “two-in-one” problem? There are two powers coincident in any act of judgment when my judgment is a successful exercise of my power to know: the power to reason with P, and the power to reason from my judgments. When “P” is false, I exercise only my power to reason from my judgments, not from P, but when P is true or known – that is when my judgment is an exercise of knowledge – my reasoning from my judgments *is* my power to reason from P. So, for any fact P, my judgings that things are so, and my thinkings that I judge that things are so – viz. my use of my judgings in my reasoning – are the exercise of the power to reason from P, and as such, are one act of mind.

Some account along these lines might allow us to make sense of the pivotal claim that judging that things are so, and thinking oneself to judge that, are one act of mind, and in a way that does not lead to paradox, regress, or collapse. However, Rödl himself will not, I think, accept a resolution of this form. The route suggested cuts against his avowed claims in three ways.

First, on the suggested resolution we make a distinction between kinds of thinking: the thinking involved in judging, and the thinking involved in *using* that judgment in reason. While we can agree that judgings are thinkings so to judge, we need to be skeptical of the claim that we can “use ‘judgment’ and ‘thought’ interchangeably” in our philosophical explanations (p. 4).

Second, taking this route demands that we tell a story about what the agent is doing when they judge. Do they simply judge P, or do they further judge Q, say, in the light of judging P? What is it for them to judge P, and how does it relate to them using their judgment in reason? Answering these questions takes us into the “literature of epistemic agency, believing as an activity and so on”, which Rödl says “smothers the question how the objectivity of thought relates to self-consciousness” (p. 35). He adds that “the self-consciousness of thought is not in view in the infatuation with agency” (p. 36). Infatuations always carry risks, but if what I have said points towards the beginning of a resolution to a genuine puzzle, then a flirtation, at the very least, seems to be recommended. It may even be a flirtation he has in fact indulged in, in the claim that judgment is a power to know.

Third, on my way of proceeding, we started to sketch a metaphysics of mind in order to try to make sense of the connection between self-consciousness and judgment. However, on the explicit project of his book, this would mark a failure to understand that connection: that project does not allow that connection to be explained by anything – it is the *explanans*. But then I am left with the feeling that my understanding of what it is for judging that things are so, and thinking oneself to judge that, be one act of mind, is illusory.

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1. Thanks to Lucy Campbell, Adrian Haddock, Anil Gomes, Adrian Moore, Sebastian Rödl, David Zapero for reading this and offering either comments or reassurance, or both. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Rödl, in personal correspondence, confirmed this skepticism, writing “I do not think there is such a thing as a first-person perspective”. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. This succinct formulation of the self-consciousness claim is taken from Rödl (2017, p. 217). In *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity,* we have “her judgment and her thought of it as valid are but one act of mind” (p. 4); “the *I think* is contained in what is thought” (p. 7); “in judging what I do, I think myself judging it. The *I judge* is inside what I judge” (p. 38); “judging that things are so is understanding oneself so to judge” (p. 39); “If judgment is self-conscious, then the first and fundamental apprehension of an act as a judgment *is* the act so apprehended” (p. 40), and many more. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. “[A] person’s *belief that p* and her *knowledge that she believes that p* are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of a single cognitive state, so that one’s *being in* some belief-state is already tacitly knowing oneself to be in it. I will call this the ‘two-in-one’ claim. If the two-in-one claim is true, then it needs explaining, since not all conditions of a person are such that being in them brings with it tacit knowledge that one is in them” (Campbell 2018, pp. 333-334). Note that Rödl is concerned not with belief, but with judgment, and he does not make the point in terms of tacit knowledge. I nevertheless think Campbell’s topic is ours, and the way of putting things very helpful. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Rödl writes: “we may form the letter *p* by writing, in the shape of a *p*, the words *I think*” (p. 6). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. I am not claiming originality in making points of this kind. They echo in various ways, for example, those made in Williams (1985, pp. 66–69), and in Burge (2000). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. As stated in footnote 2, Rödl seems to accept the former. He would, therefore, need to resist the suggestion that the former is required for the latter. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)