Rabbinic text process theology

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Preface

If it adopted the a priori principles of A.N. Whitehead and of Christian process theology, a Jewish process theology would be a Jewish variety of natural theology. Mordecai Kaplan's reconstructionism came close to this. It might even be termed a Jewish natural process theology, with a strong sense of the natural role of tradition and, thus, in this case, an openness to the cultural milieu of rabbinic tradition, as well as a commitment to the pragmatisms of William James and John Dewey. Kaplan cited Whitehead favorably; his reconstructionism is at the very least compatible with process theology and thus illustrates one version of what a Jewish process theology would look like in practice.

What would a Jewish process theology look like, however, if it also adopted, rather than borrowed selectively from, the a priori principles of rabbinic Judaism – among them, the authority of Torah given on Sinai, an historically particular revelation of divine instruction for a particular people, and the authority of the Oral Torah, an historically evolving hermeneutic, according to which that revelation becomes normative practice for communities of observant Jews? I trust this would not be a naturalism, since it would be a theology that found its grammar or regulative logic in a textual hermeneutic rather than in an account of the orders of perception and imagination. It would not, for the same token, be an anti-naturalism, but rather a theology for which the distinction between natural and super- or non-natural was not definitional.

For such a theology, for example, the world out there would belong to the order of creation (maaseh bereshit), rather than to "nature." This would mean that, since God creates through words,
language (at least some sort of language) and world would be intimately connected rather than extrinsic phenomena. It would mean, furthermore, that for language to “know” the world would not be surprising and that something like a form of realism would not be out of the question. While it would presuppose the authority of divine speech and even of some human interpretations of it, this other-than natural theology would not, as naturalists might suppose, present a heteronomous conception of divine law. If the distinction nature/not nature would not be definitive for this theology, neither would those of autonomy/heteronomy, body/spirit, this world/other world. This theology would present its own variety of neutral monism; in this case, however, the undifferentiated plenum would be termed a plenum of undifferentiated signification (or pure semiosis), of which undifferentiated feeling (or pure experience) was an instance; “prehension” would be another term for interpretation.

Max Kadushin was the first and, as far as I know, the only Jewish thinker to articulate a process theology in the service of what he considered the behavioral or halakhic authority of classical rabbinic literature. In this paper, I examine Kadushin’s work as the foundation of a rabbinic text process theology. I assume, from the outset, that such a theology may complement a Jewish natural process theology and that a Jewish process theology, in general, would appear as a process of dialogue between textual- and natural-process theologies.

Max Kadushin’s organismic study of rabbinic Judaism

From the time of his doctoral studies at The Jewish Theological Seminary of America (New York) in the 1930s, Kadushin sought to identify the rationality of classical rabbinic discourse, or of what he later called “the rabbinic mind.”¹ Typical of the class of post- or

“aftermodern” Jewish thinkers that includes Martin Buber, he was educated in the traditions of both rabbinic Judaism and the western University and emerged from the latter dissatisfied with traditional Judaism’s contemporary self-understanding. Searching within modern social science and philosophy for the intellectual tools which would enable him to identify Jewish norms for life in the modern world, he allied himself with Mordecai Kaplan and was one of the early exponents of Kaplan’s Reconstructionism. With Kaplan, he was attentive to the powers of change and process within rabbinic Judaism and argued for radical reformation within the context of the Conservative variety of observant Judaism.

Like other aftermodern thinkers, however, Kadushin was also suspicious of essentialist or apriorist tendencies in modern social science and philosophy, which tendencies he considered symptoms of the dogmatism and individualism he rejected in any system of thought and practice. From the start, he believed that rabbinic Judaism was in its indigenous patterns anti-dogmatic, social and particularly attentive to the integration of ethics into the details of everyday life and experience. Kadushin was thus attracted to some of his contemporaries’ pragmatic and organicist criticisms of the dogmatism and individualism that accompanied what many now call “modernist thinking.” At the same time, he observed that pragmatists and organicists also displayed these modernist tendencies, at times presenting their alternatives to modernity in dogmatic and individualistic ways. He judged that, at a certain point, Kaplan went this way, betraying his organicist commitments in favor of a dogmatic and idiosyncratic philosophy of organism. Eventually, Kadushin parted company with Kaplan’s Reconstructionist movement and sought to construct a place for himself within Conservative Judaism, with its dual allegiances to

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2 See P. Ochs, “Max Kadushin as Rabbinic Pragmatist,” in URM, pp. 165–196. I argue there that Kadushin is most appropriately classified among the group of “aftermoderns,” including Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Hermann Cohen, Emil Fackenheim, and so on. I note that this group displays a characteristic pattern of inquiry, among the major stages of which are: (a) university training (from which they emerge as critics of traditional forms of Jewish self-understanding, turning to modern philosophy as a tool for improving this self-understanding); (b) subsequent disillusionment with the modernist thinking they acquired in the university (which breeds an attempt to locate indigenous forms of self-understanding within traditional Jewish practices and literatures); (c) an attempt to nurture reformational communities of Jewish inquirers, informed by both traditional Jewish norms of practice and western-academic norms of inquiry.

3 See glossary.
rabbinic Judaism and to modern, but non-modernist modes of reform.  

Kadushin’s scholarly project was to identify the rationality in rabbinic discourse. In part, his project was an index of his reformatory critique of traditionalist tendencies in observant Judaism: in this respect, “rationality” signified reasoned grounds for responsible change. In part, his project was an index of his apologetic defense of Jewish religiosity in the face of what he took to be western philosophy’s slanderous criticisms of rabbinic Judaism’s “irrationality.” Kadushin believed that the dogmatism and individualism he rejected in modern thinking accompanied the university’s promoting both sides of a modernist antimony: between reductive, scientistic rationality on the one hand and reductive, emotivist irrationality on the other. He believed that criticisms of rabbinic Judaism came from thinkers burdened by either side of this antimony: rationalists criticized rabbinic literature for its irrationality and emotivists criticized it for its heteronomy. Kadushin grew critical of reconstructionism when he began to see in its claims symptoms of the modernist antimony. He was unprepared to part company with Kaplan, however, until he was convinced that he could find a clear alternative to modernism – a non-reductive reasonableness – within rabbinic Judaism.

For his doctoral thesis, Kadushin sought to identify the rationality that was displayed, indigenously, within one literary document of rabbinic Judaism, the homiletic, or midrashic text Seder
Eliahu. His method was to reduce the text to its rhetorically fundamental units of meaning and then to attempt to identify the rational principle on the basis of which the units were organized into a coherent whole. He described his discovering such a principle as a eureka experience, culminating months of detailed textual work. He discovered that, in his estimation, previous scholars had misunderstood the way in which rabbinic midrash displays its principles of rationality. Expecting individual statements of midrash (the text's fundamental units of meaning) to display these principles, they judged the literature "non-rational" when they found that individual statements, even those attributed to the same author, are often contradictory. The problem was that they were looking, apparently, for an organizational principle which would systematize the many and varied rabbinic statements, and they soon found that these statements would not fit into any logical scheme.

Kadushin’s method was, instead, to go "behind the statements to the concepts which the statement embodied" and which belonged to a coherent or rational system of values. What became his life’s work was to examine the inner logic, or grammar, of this system, including its actualizations in this and, as he would claim, in all documents and practices of rabbinic Judaism.

Kadushin labeled the rationality of the rabbinic system of concepts “organic,” later reporting that he described it this way before a friend, Horace Kallen, introduced him to what would become his storehouse of literature on the principle of organism or organismism. In the storehouse were works by Whitehead, Dorothy Emmet (on Whitehead), Henri Bergson, John Dewey, Raymond

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9 Concerning Kadushin’s use of the terms “organic” and “organismic,” Steinberg writes that “both words have the same connotation in Kadushin’s writings. ‘Organic’ is the term he used in his earlier writings. He changed to ‘organismic’ . . . [when] he noted that ‘organic’ is commonly used in fascist philosophies to glamorize pseudo-science and racial prejudice” (“Max Kadushin: An Intellectual Biography,” in URM, p. 4, n.8.) See Max Kadushin, Organic Thinking: A Study in Rabbinic Thought (New York: Bloch Publishing, 1938), p. 252.
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Wheeler and, perhaps most influential, William Ritter and R. Bailey. Kadushin claimed it was not first this organismic theory, but his empirical studies of the actual character of rabbinic thinking that convinced him precisely what was missing in modernist models of rationality and in modern as well as classical philosophic characterizations of rabbinic thought. Whatever impressed him first, Kadushin delivered his mature description of what he called "organic thinking" and "the rabbinic mind" by integrating organismic theory with literary data and with his own responsiveness to contemporary theological needs. In the historical-critical mode of his peers, Kadushin claimed to offer his theological constructions as reconstructions of what was really going on in the literary documents he examined. As recent critics have noted, he tended, in fact, to generalize beyond and at times independently of these documents. If this means that Kadushin's work displayed more of the imaginative than he would have liked, it also means that this work may be more pertinent to the constructive work of process theology than he would have thought. The following section offers a summary of the process theology Kadushin developed throughout his career.

Kadushin's process theology of rabbinic Judaism

Kadushin's process theology was what he considered a descriptive study of the form of organismic or process thinking that was displayed in the scriptural hermeneutics of rabbinic Judaism. The fundamental elements in this theology were organic concepts, or, more specifically what he later called value concepts; their modes of interrelation in an organic complex, illustrated in the case of what he


later called the rabbinic mind; and their modes of actualization in fundamental units of literature (which units he called individual, statements) or of religious behavior (acts or worship, charity and so on).

He offered this general definition of organic concepts:

Organic concepts are concepts in a whole complex of concepts none of which can be inferred from the others but all of which are so mutually interrelated that every individual concept, though possessing its own distinctive features, nevertheless depends for its character on the character of the complex as a whole which, in turn, depends on the character of the individual concepts. Each organic concept, therefore, implicates the whole complex without being completely descriptive of the complex, retaining, at the same time, its own distinctive features.  

The organic concepts of particular interest to Kadushin were the value concepts of rabbinic Judaism, as displayed or actualized in the literature and conduct of rabbinic Jews. The following are among the most prominent features Kadushin attributed to these rabbinic value concepts.  

The concepts are all named by value terms displayed in the indigenous language of rabbinic literature. While the grammatical roots of these terms may all be found in the Hebrew Bible, many of the terms acquire levels of meaning which do not appear in the Bible. They are therefore biblically inspired, but not biblical. For example, “in rabbinic usage, the term tsedakah almost always connotes ‘charity’ or ‘love’, while in biblical usage it connotes ‘righteousness.’”  

Others examples of rabbinic value terms are torah, Israel, humanity (adam), loving-kindness (gemilut hasadim), God’s mercy (middat ha-rahamim), God’s justice (middat ha-din).  

The value concepts are actualized or concretized in interpretive events whose records are individual literary statements or individual acts of observable conduct. Kadushin believed that the rabbis displayed their religious values most clearly in their collections of scriptural homilies, or midrash aggadah. He claimed that, in the absence of an independent practice of philosophic reflection, the rabbis adopted

12 Kadushin, Organic Thinking, p. 184. He cites with favor Ritter and Bailey’s definition of the “organismic conception” as “the conclusion that... wholes are so related to their parts that not only does the existence of the whole depend on the orderly cooperation and interdependence of its parts, but the whole exercises a measure of determinative control over its parts” (from The Organismic Conception, cited in Organic Thinking, p. 185).

13 This list, which paraphrases Kadushin’s claims, is suggested by Simon Greenberg’s summary of these features in Greenberg, “Coherence and Change,” pp. 19-44.

homiletic reflection as their means of conceptualizing these values.\textsuperscript{15} Within this literature, he identified individual "haggadic statements" as authoritative records of the value concepts' actualizations. For example, in the midrashic collection on Genesis, \textit{Genesis Rabbah}, we find this interpretation of the scriptural passage, "And God saw everything that [God] had made: and behold, it was very good" (Gen. 1:31).\textsuperscript{16}

(a) In the copy of R. [Rabbi] Meir's Torah [Pentateuch] was found written: "And behold, it was very [\textit{me'od}] good": and behold, death [\textit{maweth}] was good . . .

(c) R. Johanan said: "Why was death decreed against the wicked? Because as long as the wicked live they anger the Lord, as it is written, 'Ye have wearied the Lord with your words' [Mal. 2:17]; but when they die they cease to anger Him as it is written, 'There the wicked cease from raging' [Job 3:17], which means, there the wicked cease from enraging the Holy One, blessed be he . . . ."

According to Kadushin, these are two \textit{haggadic statements}, each of which actualizes different elements of the rabbinic value concept on the occasion of its interpreting the text of Genesis. Examining the first text philologically, the text's modern editor observes, "This may mean either that Rabbi Meir's manuscript read maweth ("death") instead of me'od ("very") or that this was inserted as a marginal comment."\textsuperscript{17} Kadushin might have said that, in either case, Rabbi Meir interpreted a textual idiosyncrasy in a way that poses the question, "How can death be good?" As suggested by the second statement, his rabbinic readers inferred the answer, "Death is a potent force for repentance."\textsuperscript{18} In other words, Rabbi Meir's observing a textual idiosyncrasy became an occasion for the rabbis' actualizing such value concepts as Repentance (the wicked repent through their death), The Wicked' Creation (God's creation includes death), God's Justice (the wicked are punished through death), and God's Mercy (that punishment removes God's wrath).

\textit{Value concepts have both cognitive and valuational components.} They refer to objects in the world as occasions for displaying rabbinic values. In the haggadic statements from \textit{Genesis Rabbah}, for example, reference to death occasions interpretations about repentance, mercy, and so on. In Kadushin's terms, value concepts

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\textsuperscript{15} From P. Ochs, "Max Kadushin as Rabbinic Pragmatist," in \textit{URM}, p. 179.


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., I, pp. 66-67.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
"express approval or disapproval of a phenomenon [or mode of behavior] and thus endow it with whatever significance it has for us. And they imply the reason for the judgment they express." ¹⁹

The value concepts are to be distinguished from "cognitive concepts," which "describe whatever we perceive through the senses . . . such as table, chair, tall, round;²⁰ and from poetic or "connotative concepts," which "are not tied to any particular manifestation."²¹

While connotative, value terms also refer to identifiable, though not definable, notions. These notions, such as "loving-kindness" and "God's mercy," are defined only in situ, which means that every definition is an actualization, or concretization of the value concept, of which there are innumerable such actualizations. The value concepts display a drive toward concretization: put differently, they are performative or pragmatic concepts and cannot therefore be reduced to any particular set of semantic definitions. "A value concept is not an idea which is inferred and can never be the result of speculation or observation."²² Hence, value concepts are not deducible one from the other and cannot be arranged in a hierarchical order.²³

"Since value concepts are 'defined' by the situations that concretize them, the value concepts of a society are embedded in the pattern of life of that society and are included in its vernacular. Since the valuational concepts of a group and their embodiment in its pattern of life distinguish it from all other historic groups, the maintenance of the special character of the group is thus to a large extent a matter of the transmission of the valuation terms."²⁴

The value concepts therefore participate in a complex of value concepts with respect to which they display their meanings. Within this complex, each value concept "interweaves" with every other, which means that it may be actualized in relation to any other value concept. The

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 50–51. This and the following definitions are drawn from P. Ochs. "Max Kadushin as Rabbinic Pragmatist," in URM, p. 182.
²¹ Kadushin apparently drew a distinction between reference, or the way a concept referred to objects in the world, and sense, or the way it was associated with certain meanings. It appears that "cognitive" and "connotative" concepts refer to ideal types: the one tending to have reference without sense, the other sense without reference.
²² Kadushin, The Rabbinic Mind, p. 22.
individual concept is itself a complex of sub-concepts, each of which, while an aspect of the more general concept, also preserves its own individuality. For example, the concept torah includes the sub-concepts of the study of torah, the efficacy of torah, commandments, and so on. "The more concepts [that are] concretized in any given situation, the more meaningful . . . [the] situation will be." In fact, the concepts "possess the characteristic of potential simultaneity," which "means that the whole complex is brought into play upon every situation;" the potential is limited only by circumstances and mood.

The potential simultaneity of concepts introduces an element of paradox. Since concepts with apparently contrary connotations may be actualized in a single situation, the meaning of the situation may appear paradoxical. "The rabbis studied the Torah with both love and fear or awe in their hearts, emotions having conceptual parallels, respectively, in God's love and in God's justice; and these contradictory feelings are perfectly natural." The value complex is therefore fluid as well. A given situation may be interpreted by different concepts, and interpretive tendencies may vary over time, or evolve.

Kadushin as both disciple and critic of Whitehead

Evaluating Whitehead's Science and the Modern World, Process and Reality, and Religion in the Making, Kadushin noted that the following "metaphysical concepts can be taken as generalizations of the characteristics of rabbinic theology:"

In his notion of "prehension" we see the generalization of the potential simultaneity of concepts; in his idea of "appetition" [the urge to actualization] that of the concretization of concepts; in his idea of "a cosmic epoch" that of organic levels; in his idea of a "society" that of the relation between the organic complex and the individual configurations of it; in his idea of "rhythms" [the idea that every great rhythm contains lesser rhythms without which it could not be] that of the relation of the concept to its sub-concepts.

26 Ibid., pp. 194-5.
27 Ibid., p. 196.
28 Ibid., pp. 247-8.
He noted other parallels as well, but these are the most conspicuous. Kadushin’s comment suggests that, in Whiteheadian terms, he conceived of rabbinic Judaism as a conceptual organism, or society of interpretive events, which collectively prehends an antecedent organism, Biblical Judaism, at the same time that its members prehend other members.

Kadushin’s empirical evidence for this conception was that no other model provided a better explanation of the indigenous organization of rabbinic literature. He considered each document of rabbinic homiletics, or midrash, a document of rabbinic theology and conceived of it as a society of individual midrashic statements, which he identified, in turn, with theological judgments or prehensions. For example, the second haggadic statement cited earlier from Genesis Rabbah – “why was death decreed against the wicked?” – prehended the statement from Genesis, “and God saw everything . . . .” Each such prehension entails a synthesis of what Kadushin first called “organismic concepts” and later called “value concepts,” such as Repentance, Creation, and so on. These correspond in Kadushin’s system to Whitehead’s “eternal objects.”

Kadushin noted that the value concepts had both a cognitive component and an affective one, the concepts’ “warmth,” as he called it. Like Whitehead, he associated the affective with the valutational, thus providing a psychodynamic place for value judgments:

every rabbinic value-concept had a drive toward actualization or concretization; and many of them, such as charity, . . . repentance, the study of Torah, and numerous others, directly impelled the individual to appropriate overt actions. But impulse alone would have made such drives only sporadic at best; it could hardly have ensured steady concretization. Being mental factors, however, the concepts were subject to conscious direction. They could not only be embodied in Haggadah but also in Halakah, in commonly observed laws or rules for concretization. These laws, fashioned by the rabbis, . . . ensured steady concretization. The concretization of the concept of charity, to give several examples, was made certain by the various agricultural regulations, included the tithes for the poor, pe’ah ([leaving un gleaned the] “corner of the field”) . . . , and by the institutions of tannach (community plate) . . . .

These and all the other concretizations of the value-concepts in law . . . are not “legalism.” They did not crowd out the possibilities for spontaneous concretizations; for proof, we need only point to such a rabbinic concept as deeds of loving-kindness which has reference also to deeds of love done beyond what is required by law. Moreover, Halakah is itself a product of the value-concepts’ drive towards concretization, and

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29 To be sure, Kadushin says explicitly that “‘eternal objects’ are not value concepts” (ibid., p. 248), but the two notions function comparably in the two thinkers’ systems. In the following paragraphs, I discuss similarities and differences between the two notions.
without doubt the most important product. Lacking Halakah, the value-concepts, with
their need for steady concretization in actual life, might not have functioned at all.30

Kadushin considered the individual midrashic statement a product (for Whitehead, a concrescence) of the value concepts' drive to actualization: an individual event of interpretation (prehension) guided by some limited configuration, or set of relations, among value concepts. Each such statement is authored by some individual person, such as Rabbi Meir: for the integrative process of the rabbinic value system as a whole is inseparable from the integrative processes of the individual persons who constitute rabbinic society. "The maintenance of the special character of the group is... to an extent, a matter of the transmission of the valutational terms,"31 but the valutational terms are [themselves] only symbols of the concepts, which "are, in fact, often drives to action" within a society of individual persons. Each such person, finally, "is less an entity than a continuous process making for an entity. Every individual is a more or less successful integrative process in constant function. In this process of integration, the value concepts seem to play an enormous, perhaps a decisive role."32

To be guided by these value concepts is to live a life of holiness, in imitatio dei. A process theologian might want to spell out the theological implication that these concepts would, in their simultaneity, constitute what Whitehead called the Primordial Nature of God.33 Their valutational character would represent the "appetitive" aspect of the Primordial Nature, and God's Consequent Nature would be known by the fruits of this appetition: what the rabbis call halakhic practice as imitatio dei. In these terms, we might expect Kadushin to have conceived of the homiletic midrash aggadah

30 The Rabbinic Mind, pp. 79-80. Kadushin read with favor Emmet's study of Whitehead. She wrote, "Whitehead defines [the 'eternal objects'] broadly as 'forms of definiteness,' or 'pure potentials for the specific determination of matters of fact.' The metaphysical status of an eternal object is, therefore, to be a possibility for actualisation" (Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, p. 113). Of possible interpretations of the status of eternal objects, she favored this one: that Whitehead "might define universals as recurrent types of uniformity exhibited in the process, but without any status outside it" (p. 107). God and world are thus interdependent, as are concept and concrescence, the Primordial and the Consequent: or, for Kadushin, the value concept and the halakhah.

31 Ibid., p. 81.
32 See glossary for definitions of technical terms to follow.
as a literary concrescence of God's Primordial Nature within the context of rabbinic practice, the legal midrash halakhah as a literary concrescence of God's Consequent Nature within this context and his analysis of the value concepts, abstracted from their literary context, as the rabbinic equivalent of Whitehead's philosophical theology.

However, respecting a strong tendency in rabbinic thought, Kadushin was reluctant to refer to God other than through God's actions, and he was strongly critical of metaphysical speculation, including that of the medieval Jewish philosophers, such as Saadya, Maimonides, and so on. His reluctance appears to have reflected his sense of the redundancy of attempts to conceptualize God's immanence: God, he might have said, is already present as partner in all rabbinic discourse and as communicant in all words used about this world; actions taken on behalf of the rabbinic system of halakhah are actions in which God's presence is concretely, or even tactiley embodied. Rabbinic discourse is profoundly anthropomorphic, but it does not make anthropomorphism itself a conceptual issue. Kadushin argued that the aggadah's anthropomorphisms as well as its references to God's otherness were expressions of the rabbis' varying experiences of God as near and as distant and that neither experience should be foreclosed by philosophic argument. He believed that the rabbis were wary of essentialism because the construction of verbal forms of essence might have distanced them from the One with whom they were already in such intimate relationship, reducing a subtly detailed process of relationship to the less subtle terms of conceptual definition.

For such reasons, Kadushin found aspects of Whitehead's system both inapplicable to the rabbinic model and out of keeping with an organicist program. He wrote that Whitehead's

35 As illustrated, in extremis, in the teaching that, when one reaches into his or her pocket for charity-money, the hand that reaches is literally God's hand (from the Tanya of Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi).
objects" must, in some sense, be fixed, and are, to that extent, independent of the process.

Exactly the same inconsistency is to be found in Whitehead's view of religion. Whitehead declares that "the topic of religion is individuality in community" and that the "individual is formative of the society, the society is formative of the individual." These and similar statements depict religion as organismic ... [Yet, Whitehead also says that] "theoretically, rational religion could have arisen in complete independence of the antecedent social religions of ritual and mythical belief," adding that, of course, this was not the case historically. The organismic Process which means that "the topic of religion is individuality in community" is, then, according to Whitehead, theoretically superfluous since rational ideas, those which are eternal, whether rising from religious or other fields can, theoretically, be arrived at by the individual sans community ... "institutions ... bibles ... codes of behaviour," he remarks, "are the trappings of religion, its passing forms." If religion consists primarily of eternal ideas, this is correct; but if religion is an organismic Process, its materials, its social institutions, cannot be separated from the Process itself.37

Kadushin argued, in sum, that Whitehead's "description of religion as an organismic process must necessarily conflict with his description of it as a rational system of metaphysical concepts."38 He objected to the formality of these concepts: their specificity, definiteness and eternality, and the process through which he believed philosophic theologians would abstract them from particular organic systems and then over-generalize their domain of reference to all possible systems. He argued that since, for Whitehead, "eternal objects' are envisioned in 'the primordial mind of God,'” they could therefore not be described definitively by human interpreters. This was not to say that they could not be described at all, only that the descriptions would be vaguer than Whitehead allowed. In other words, Kadushin’s alternative to metaphysics was neither a strictly negative theology nor the sort of agnosticism process theologians might identify with a relativistic postmodernism. It was, instead, a text, as opposed to a natural process theology.

We have come to the turning point in our discussion. Kadushin was both disciple and critic of Whitehead, because Whitehead provided him a vocabulary to fill only half of his needs: a process vocabulary, but not a text process one. Kadushin concluded that he had to complete the job himself, inventing his ingenious but also idiosyncratic and imprecise theory of value concepts. His conclusion was an unfortunate one, because it kept him from making

38 Ibid., p. 251.
more complete and critical use of the logic that I suspect already influenced his theory: the logic of symbols, or semiotics, of the American philosopher Charles Peirce (d.1914). We have evidence that Kadushin studied Peirce’s work, and I have found that Kadushin’s theory of value concepts resembles Peirce’s logic of symbols more closely than it does the theory of “eternal objects” and “prehensions” after which Kadushin claimed to base his presentation. On the following pages, I will therefore describe Kadushin’s differences with Whitehead from the perspective of Peirce’s semiotics.

If the value concepts of Kadushin’s text process theology function in many ways like the eternal objects of Whitehead’s natural process thought, they differ, specifically, in both their logical modality and their etiology. Modally, the value concepts represent what Charles Peirce called would-be’s, or real possibilities. Like the eternal objects, they are non-individual, but their generality is of the sort Peirce labeled indefiniteness or vagueness: the generality of an indefinite description of some existent thing, as opposed to the generality of an indeterminacy, or abstract possibility, definitely described. To distinguish the two, Peirce suggested that the principle of contradiction did not apply to what was vague, while the law of excluded middle did not apply to what was general. He drew another distinction which readers may find more helpful:

39 According to the biblical scholar and philosopher, Yohanan Muffs, Kadushin rarely referred to Peirce in writing, but “I think you might like to know that Kadushin was a careful reader of Peirce’s writings and talked of them at great length. We used to walk down Riverside Drive together [in the 1960s], coming home from the [Jewish Theological] Seminary. One of us would hold a volume of Peirce’s Collected Papers, and we would discuss his philosophy in detail” (from a conversation I had with Muffs in 1988).

40 Or in the way they contribute to the modalities (necessity, possibility, impossibility, etc.) of the propositions in which they appear.

41 Or in that from which they are derived.

42 With regard to the general, he added, “Thus, although it is true that ‘Any proposition you please, once you have determined its identity, is either true or false’; yet so long as it remains indeterminate and so without identity, it need neither be true that any proposition you please is true, nor that any proposition you please is false.” With regard to the vague, he added, “So likewise, while it is false that ‘A proposition whose identity I have determined [a vague reference] is both true and false,’ yet until it is determinate, it may be true that a proposition is true and that a proposition is false” [Charles Peirce, Collected Papers vols. 1-6, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1931, 1935), vol. 5, par. 448. Future references to this volumes will be to volume and paragraph number: e.g. 5.448].
A sign . . . is objectively general in so far as it extends to the interpreter the privilege of carrying its determination further. Example: "Human beings are mortal." To the question, Which human beings? the reply is that the proposition explicitly leaves it to you to apply its assertion to what human beings you will . . . A sign . . . is objectively vague in so far as it reserves further determination to be made in some other conceivable sign, or at least does not appoint the interpreter as its deputy in this office. Example: "A man I could mention seems to be a little conceited." The suggestion here is that the man in view is the person addressed; but the utterer does not authorize such an interpretation or any other application of what she says. She can still say, if she likes, that she does not mean the person addressed. Every utterance naturally leaves the right of further exposition in the utterer.44

In addition to their vagueness, value concepts are also to be distinguished by their performative character. Their meaning is made fully definite, within context-specific occasions of action or judgment, to those engaged in the actions or judgments entailed in their meaning.45 In these terms, the rabbinic value concepts function as divine utterances to members of the rabbinic society, guiding those members of rabbinic society who receive them to act or judge in certain ways on certain occasions. Each value concept displays a range of context-dependent definitions which, if viewed simultaneously, may appear contradictory and which admit of no summary, context-independent definition. Yet, the organic system coheres as a whole.

According to Kadushin, the text process theologian lacks discrete and definite concepts which would iconize that coherence: there is no knowledge of God’s mind to tum simul. In place of such a totalizing knowledge, the theologian possesses what we might call a symbolizing knowledge of God. Classifying the ways in which signs may refer to their objects, Peirce distinguished among three different kinds of signs. He said an icon (such as a sculpture depicting some person) refers to its object by virtue of characters of its own and does so whether or not the object actually exists; an

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43 I have rendered Peirce's example gender neutral.

44 Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.447.

45 The rabbis' value conceptual language is thus performative. Adopting the terminology of J.L. Austin [How To Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1978)], Edith Wyschogrod has recently described "classical Judaism" as "a perlocutionary language" ("Works that 'Faith': The Grammar of Ethics in Judaism," Cross Currents: Religion and Intellectual Life 40.2 (Summer, 1990), 176-193, 178). This means that the use of the value concepts in rabbinic writing or speech is intended to have consequences. In Austin's terms, perlocutionary speech acts are those in which "saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, or of the speaker or of other persons" (p. 99; cited in Wyschogrod).
index (such as a weather vane pointing to the wind’s direction) refers to its object by virtue of being actually affected by the object and thus by virtue of qualities which it shares with the object; a symbol (such as a word) refers to its object by virtue of a law which causes the symbol to be interpreted as referring to the object. In these terms, we may say that the value concept terms are icons of the theologian’s knowledge of God. The indices of that knowledge are the peaceful heart (lev shalem) of faith and of relational knowing (yedid’ah). The complete symbols of that knowledge are the interpretive activities by way of which societies of individual persons live in God’s image (b’tselem elohim). Kadushin claimed that, by way of contrast, the metaphysician’s concepts—such as Whitehead’s “eternal objects”—display the generality of abstract possibility and are, therefore, non-organismic. Such concepts come to us fully defined but indifferent to context. We are each, consequently, free to apply them as we see fit, but we remain, for the same reason, powerless to influence their essential definition.

The etiological differences between value concepts and eternal objects are equally significant. For Kadushin, the value concepts receive their characterizations from indigenous practitioners of the organic system of rabbinic Judaism, rather than from scholarly or cross-cultural analyses of them. As Peirce said of the word “God,” value concepts belong to the vernacular and thus to a societal organism whose individuality and conceptual integrity is the starting point of organicist studies. The concepts are to be characterized intrasystematically or, in the language of another recent hermeneutic, intratextually. Kadushin argued, on the other hand, that Whitehead’s eternal objects did not belong to any organic systems of lived practice and were, therefore, only “analytic tools.” He applied to them the same disclaimers he applied to his own analytic vocabulary about value concepts:

We have seen . . . that generalizations epitomizing aspects of the organismic process in general are only analytic tools, not organismic concepts. In other words, the logical

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47 In Austin’s terms, they are merely “constative,” or representational, but non-performative.
48 In the language of ethnosience, the characterizations are “emic,” rather than “etic,” though the ethnoscientist—here, Kadushin—does sort them out and refine them for scholarly inspection.
method here remains the same as in all other types of scientific research. It must, of course, remain the same if it is to be valid. The organismic approach differs from other types of scientific study only in its hypothesis: We are utilizing the organismic approach when we attempt to prove by logical means that the subject under analysis is organismic.  

Kadushin did not object to Whitehead’s – or his own – engagement in scientific analysis. He objected only to Whitehead’s mistaking the categories of scientific analysis for concepts of religion. It would be consistent with Kadushin’s argument to say both that analytic, including metaphysical, concepts belonged to vocabularies independent of organic systems and that they reified characters selectively abstracted from such systems. From this perspective, Kadushin believed that, in finding his analytic concepts religiously interesting, Whitehead committed what he himself termed the fallacy of misplaced concreteness: in this case treating as organic, and thus concrete, concepts that were abstractly general.

Kadushin argued, further, that organicist thinkers tended to underdevelop as well as misplace their analyses.

The basic fallacy of many philosophies of organism consists in the failure to take account of the fact that each organismic form has its own individuality, the organismic character of which must be demonstrated with respect to the consistuents peculiar to itself. Generalizations or concepts epitomizing aspects of the organismic process in general are only descriptive or analytic, not organic concepts . . .

Social philosophies of organism are especially apt to suffer from what we have termed “the basic fallacy.” The organismic approach in the social sciences demands, first of all, minute and painstaking analysis in order to discover the particular organismic forms, each with its own individual characteristics, in which social life abounds. Until these organismic social forms are identified in detail, all generalizations, even if couched in terms of the organismic approach, are bound to prove sterile.

To respect the individuality of organic systems, Kadushin sought to keep his organicist theology within the limits of an empirical study of rabbinic Judaism in its literary self-expression. Recent scholarly criticisms of Kadushin’s inadequate empiricism have reinforced his principle, if not his practice. Jacob Neusner writes, for example, that Kadushin addressed the issue of a descriptive theology of the Dual Torah that seems to me urgent . . . I believe Kadushin was the only scholar before this writer who took seriously the documentary boundaries of texts . . . [But] his error lay in interpreting too soon, describing too little, analyzing altogether too much out of context. He missed the specificities,
Neusner's words suggest that, beyond modal and etiological differences between value concepts and eternal objects, and beyond differences between the organismic studies of texts and of perceptual experience, text and natural process theologies may differ in their relative tolerances for generalization. The text process theologian may be more willing to sacrifice generality for the sake of attentiveness to concrete detail.

Text and natural process theologies: summing up the differences

Partly supportive, partly critical of Whitehead, Kadushin's rabbinic theology is best described as a process theology unlike other process theologies: a text process theology in dialogue with, but not identical to, Whitehead's natural process theology. Reinforcing Whitehead's nonrelativistic postmodernism, Kadushin criticized modernist notions of rationality without abandoning the reasoned study of religious knowledge. He offered a non-sensationalist, non-mechanistic epistemology which allowed for the direct perception of values and, by way of those values, the direct experience of God's presence. He portrayed knowable, individual entities (such as judgments, homilies, texts, persons, or communities) as both societies of member entities and as members of societies of comparable entities. He portrayed each such entity, furthermore, as a concretizing interpretation, or prehension, of other entities. The interpretation is guided by eternal objects, here labeled value concepts. These value concepts manifest God's creativity, but they are not God's alone, since human interpreters contribute to the process through which the value concepts emerge as earthly guides. Kadushin's rabbinic theology thus supported a personalist

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52 "Foreword," to URM, pp. xi, xii, xiv. Richard Sarason adds, "It is ironic . . . that despite his vigorous objections to the model of systematic philosophical theology and his insistence on the experiential character and origin of the rabbinic value concepts, [Kadushin's] own analysis owed more to philosophy than to history . . ." ("Kadushin's Study of Midrash," URM, p. 51.)
conception of creativity and was compatible with an anthropomorphic conception of divinity. It recommended forms of inquiry which integrate realms of theory and practice.

Kadushin denied the indeterminate generality and definiteness that Whitehead attributed to eternal objects, describing them instead as irretrievably vague and, thus, subject to development or redefinition (even if this development belongs to a different temporal order than that of the development of individual entities). He denied philosophers a privileged role in the process of concretizing eternal objects: the value concepts display their meaning within the lived practice of the community of religious practitioners. Denying his own inquiry a privileged – or even normalized – place within that community, Kadushin therefore denied a special place to "ontology" as a privileged science managed by a privileged class of thinkers. His theology thus represented a variety of what Peirce called critical common-sensism,\textsuperscript{53} characterized by a common-sense realism.

As a common-sense realist, Kadushin argued that activities of linguistic description are themselves realia: what, in a Peircean mode, we might label pragnata ("deeds"), or event-activities in which value concepts are concretized in context-specific actions. These pragmata may interpret (prehend) other event-activities, linguistic or extra-linguistic. From this perspective, neither linguistic nor extra-linguistic realia are reduced to the other, since both represent modes of prehension. Natural process theologians object to distinctions between "supernatural" and "natural." Kadushin judged arguments for or against such distinctions to be expressions of the reductive preoccupations of modernity. For him, references to "nature" are references to "the order of creation" (maaseh bereishit): since all such references are interpretive acts, guided by the value concepts, distinctions between "nature" and "non-nature" are simply indices of ways in which the value-concepts interrelate in certain contexts of interpretation. Linguistic and non-linguistic events are both realia, each interpretive of the other. Rabbinic Jews, for example, may respond to reading rabbinic midrash as they would respond to observing everyday social events of normative

significance. This is a sign of what Kadushin would call the integration of critical thinking and everyday moral practice in rabbinic Judaism. He considered the value concepts' acquiring linguistic labels in the midrash to be a sign of the rabbis' critical thinking.

Kadushin did not fully explicate his theory of critical thinking, but I would imagine it went somewhat as follows. Biblical religion represented one organic level of Judaism (in Whitehead's terms, one "cosmic epoch"); rabbinic Judaism represented another level. Biblical religion actualized a complex of value concepts which are actualized, in new ways, in rabbinic Judaism: as an individual value complex (organism), the one religion interpreted the other. The literary products of rabbinic Judaism—Mishnah, the Talmuds, the collections of midrash—represent stages in the later religion's process of development. Not only individual religions, but also their value concepts as well represent societies of their individual actualizations. The development from biblical to rabbinic Judaism was marked by gradual modifications in the societies of entities which characterized each of the value concepts and the value complex as a whole. The midrashic literature is an index of the rabbis' having made these modifications a subject of explicit inquiry. Puzzled—at once troubled and excited—by what appeared to be differences between the Bible's and their own value concepts, they sought both to demonstrate their fidelity to the explicit biblical text and at the same time to perfect methods of creatively transforming the values implicit in it. Kadushin believed that the rabbis' definitive move was to invent noun-forms to label these values. This invention marked the emergence of an explicit, rabbinic science of normative change. Having iconized or diagrammed the value concepts, the rabbis gained the power not only to teach rabbinic, as opposed to biblical, values explicitly, but also—and more modestly—to manipulate or experimentally modify the values. Since the values represented societies of actualizations, the rabbis could not alter them by definition, that is, in strictly a priori fashion. Instead, they altered them by adding significant quantities

54 “The Bible and rabbinic theology are, then, successive organic levels, with the second emerging from the first . . . . Because the rabbinic complex has a wider range of concretization and hence enriches with significance a wider sphere of situations, it is . . . richer than the biblical” (Kadushin, *Organic Thinking*, p. 227); cf. *Organic Thinking*, 219ff. also *The Rabbinic Mind*, p. 273ff; 303ff.

55 See Kadushin, *The Rabbinic Mind*, pp. 35ff.
of new actualizations, each one a *midrash*, or literary concretization of the value concept in its altered state. For the philosophic, or *a priori* thinker, rabbinic literature appears hampered by self-contradiction. For Kadushin, these apparent contradictions display only the ironic character of a process of conservatory reform or stability-in-change, in which the value concepts were transformed from the ground up and the old forms were displayed alongside the new. Since the rabbis' presented their *midrashim* within the idiom of everyday communal discourse, there was, ideally, no separation between the literary expression of the rabbis' critical thinking and popular practice.\(^\text{56}\) As teachers, the rabbis' burden was no longer to translate or apply their reforms to everyday reality, but only to multiply instances, providing their constituencies more opportunities for observing the value concepts at work and, thus, for acquiring reformed habits of practice and belief. Kadushin shared with Whitehead, as well as with Peirce, Aristotle and Maimonides, a habit-theory of moral law or virtue.\(^\text{57}\)

What, then, guided the rabbis' reforms? Here we see Kadushin's differences with Whitehead displayed in their divergent theories of moral change. Whitehead's notion of the definiteness of the eternal objects corresponds to the concern of contemporary process theologians to define the principles of responsible moral change. Kadushin believed that a value concept may be defined only vaguely, through a series of interpretive narratives, or *midrashim*, each of which represents an event-activity guided by the value concept in association with some configuration of other value concepts. To attempt to define the value concept more discretely would be to abstract, hypostatize and over-generalize selective features of such event-activities: and, thus, to commit what Whitehead called the error of misplaced concreteness. Kadushin argued that, without explicit principles, the rabbis were guided in

\(^{56}\) Kadushin idealized the degree to which "there [was] no gap between the authors or teachers and the folk" (*The Rabbinic Mind*, p. 85).

\(^{57}\) I am identifying Whitehead's general theory of concretion and of individual entities with a habit-theory of conduct. See his *Religion in the Making*, ch. 1 and passim. For a general discussion of recent applications of Aristotle's theory, see Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue, A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 181ff. For Maimonides, see, for example, his *Guide of the Perplexed*, I.34.III.53 and, in general, his *Eight Chapters*. For Peirce, see, for example, his 1903 comments on "Ideals of Conduct," in *Collected Papers*, 1.591ff.
their reforms by the evolving value complex itself. They made judgments, a posteriori, about concrete cases, with sensitivities heightened by emergent tendencies of thought which they need not have hypostatized. Not above offering some provisional hypostases of his own, Kadushin called these tendencies emphatic trends, noting that, without crystallizing into value concepts, they influenced how the value concepts developed from out of the biblical complex. Among the emphatic trends, Kadushin identified what he called the rabbis' concerns for universalism and for personal individuality. Beyond that, Kadushin had no more general, normative claim to make. His ethics was an empirical account of how the value concepts displayed themselves in classical rabbinic Judaism. As for contemporary ethics, Kadushin offered observations only about his own community of Conservative Judaism. He was a reformist within that community, but refused to adopt any general principle of ethics as a principle of reform. He assumed, instead, that reformists would offer their judgments ad hoc, guided by their sense of how the complex of value concepts as a whole had evolved in response to changing conditions of judgment.

In sum, Kadushin believed that ethical language was meaningful only intrasystematically, and he suspected ethical universalists of what we might call ethical imperialism. With Peirce, he believed that ethics, along with religion, belonged to the vernacular. At the same time, again along with Peirce, Kadushin offer a universalizable, meta-ethical theory of how value complexes may behave in general. Philosophic and social scientific accounts of organism contributed to this theory, but by contributing to an explanatory model which he believed would adequately account for the facts of human value conceptual life. He was therefore searching for an empirical model with the broadest possible domain of reference, but not for an a priori model. In this search, he found that Whitehead and other organicists offered him the most viable analytic paradigms, while the rabbis offered him a prototypical case of organismic or value conceptual thought-and-practice.

Within Kadushin's writings, the difference between what I have labeled natural and text process theologies appears starkly as the difference between an ontologizing and a non-ontologizing form of theological inquiry. The differences may not foreclose dialogue, however, since each form of inquiry may expose weaknesses in the
Natural process theologies appear weakest in their limited attention to the linguistic and semiotic presuppositions of ontology and to the vagueness inherent in performatives – including all metaphysical concepts with performative or normative significance. Kadushin’s text process theology appears weakest in its rigid dichotomization of the theoretical and practical dimensions of inquiry. I will conclude this section with comments about the latter.

As noted earlier, Kadushin argued that “generalizations epitomizing aspects of the organismic process in general are only analytic tools, not organismic concepts.” He criticized Whitehead for overlooking this distinction and treating his metaphysical generalizations as pregnant with religious and thus organismic meaning. We might reply, on the other hand, that Kadushin’s dichotomy may reflect a romanticized distinction of “unsullied” folk practice and “objectivistic” science. Does critical thinking introduce an unwanted discontinuity into the organic process of vernacular discourse? If so, how does Kadushin distinguish the rabbis’ critical thinking about their value concepts from his own? Perhaps he might have argued more strongly that analytic languages are languages of cultural borrowers, who translate the discourse of one organism into the terminology of another. If he replied that this other is simply “science,” we might answer, again, that various postmodern epistemologists, from Peirce to Ludwig Wittgenstein to the more radical Paul Feyerabend, have urged us to consider the organismic contexts of scientific inquiry itself. Kadushin’s language of analysis may represent the terms one community of inquiry employs to inspect the way another community conducts its inquiry. Kadushin’s final reply might be moreanguished: “you don’t seem to realize that I belong to two different and unmediated communities: a community of science and a community of religious practice. Respecting the integrity of each, I apply the analytic language of one to the practical language of the other.” I am not convinced that Kadushin identified his two communities carefully. He tended to assimilate his actual religious community to the community of practice he attributed to the

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36 Organic Thinking, p. 251.
authors of the rabbinic literature. As a result, he tended, on the one hand, to misrepresent his own analysis as an activity of "science in general," rather than as one of the normative activities of his distinctly contemporary rabbinic community. On the other hand, he tended to misrepresent his description of rabbinic values as a reconstruction of extra-scientific traditional claims, rather than as part of a contemporary practice of rabbinic interpretation, informed by the sciences of interest to contemporary practitioners. In the process, he attempted to isolate rabbinic values from the critical intelligence that informed his own analytic work and that would inform the practice of those values in his contemporary rabbinic community.

Responding to these objections, I conclude this paper by presenting an emended version of Kadushin's text process theology. This is an abstract of a "Rabbinic Process Textualism," prepared for the sake of introducing Kadushin's theology into a transforming dialogue with naturalistic process theologies, Jewish and Christian and other.

**Conclusion: a rabbinic process textualism**

A text process theology which adopts rabbinic modes of scriptural interpretation as normative cannot also adopt a process ontology as normative, because it cannot assign general or universal validity to any single ontology. If we define ontology as a description of the most general characters of an entity, specifically, of an entity of very expansive domain, then a rabbinic theology is meta-ontological, since it refers to God's creativity as that with respect to which any entity – including any organismic system of law – may become other than it is. For rabbinic theology, all actual entities – organisms or finite systems of being – are creatures of God. This means that they cannot be described adequately if God's creativity is excluded from their description. That creativity contributes a surd element to all such descriptions, which must then be probabilistic, since no set of characters will exhaustively describe any class of two or more such entities. We may therefore construct ontologies with as much certainly as is permitted in any probabilistic science, but the ontologies are necessarily descriptive and specific
to the domain of description. This does not preclude a transcendental ontology 59 – which remains a sophisticated way of inspecting innate ideas – but it does mean that any such inspection describes the characters of a thinking-entity in its particular domain of activity. This thinking-entity may have a very expansive domain, indeed, but any such expanse remains finite, or not simply general. Thus, to any ontology, no matter how expansive, another may be added, and we must speak of ontologies, rather than ontology.

In this approach, ontology is defined as an empirical or descriptive science, whose practitioners identify the most general features of a given entity, usually of the most expansive entity with which they are acquainted.60 The language of ontology is necessarily iconic or image-making. This means that the ontologist’s reader or listener is supposed to receive the ontologist’s descriptions as predicates of a process of thinking which would correspond, in the reader’s imagination, to the entity’s process of being what it is. If the ontology is a good one, this correspondence should enable the reader to make accurate predictions about what may be observed of the entity on a given occasion. Expansive ontologies describe entities in which ontologist and reader are participants. In this case, a good ontology would enable ontologist and reader to make accurate predictions about their own behavior, which means that the ontology would have normative value. Because every entity contains a surd element and could thus be other than it is, ontologies are necessarily selective: iconic representations are representations with respect to a particular, interpreting entity – what the semiotician would call the ontologist’s interpretant (or interpreting prehension). “The ontologist’s reader or listener” represents such an interpretant. This is not to suggest that the ontologist’s interpretant need be so narrowly conceived: no matter how expansive it is, it must simply remain finite. Ontological descriptions are therefore not nominal, but they are partial; the relation of entity (as what

59 That is, an ontology constructed by identifying the conditions according to which existence as we know it is (appears) possible. I am claiming that such an ontology – Kantian, Husserlian, or other – must be presented, in non-dogmatic fashion, as a fallibilistic, or probabilistic, science.

60 The idea is to replace dogmatic claims about “universality” with far-reaching yet fallibilistic claims about “expansiveness.”
the semiotician calls object) to interpreting entity (interpretant) is a real, but finite relation.

A rabbinic text process theology is meta-ontological, because it refers to God's creativity, which is that with respect to which ontologies display their finitude. With respect to particular ontologies, such references appear as limitations or as sources of learned ignorance, and rabbinic theology appears as negative theology. There are no iconic representations of God's creativity and, thus, we have no intuitive knowledge of revelation. Nevertheless, there are non-iconic forms of representation, and we may have non-intuitive knowledge of revelation. Rabbinic text process theology understands the revelation of Torah on Mount Sinai to mean that we have knowledge of the meta-ontological: we can say something about how entities display their finitude and become other than they are. This means there are rules to God's creativity, even if the rules are themselves probabilistic ones, or incompletely determined.

For rabbinic text process theology, revelation signifies an interruption in a finite entity's processual life as well as in any ontology which serves it. The interruption is manifested with respect to a particular moment in such a life, and the intuitive or iconizing knowledge we have of the revelatory moment is of that life, rather than of the interruption per se. To study the revelation itself, however, is to study verbal, and usually textual, testimony about the life of that entity before and after or in response to revelation, which is the life of that entity as it has become other than it is (was). The mark of revelation is our interpretive judgment about how life has changed or become other that it was in response to revelation. This mark is both an indexical and a symbolizing sign (two different forms of prehension). In Peirce's semiotic, an index marks the thatness of an interruptive event; it points without describing. Radical difference in the life of an entity points to the revelatory event, without describing it. For the semiotician, a symbol refers to its event-object by leading its interpreter to re-enact, in its relation to the symbol, the symbol's own relation to the event-object. The re-enactment is a form of imitation, marked by its own uniqueness, which will have symbolic significance to yet another interpreter, and so on. Revelation thus displays its meaning to a potentially indefinite series of symbolizing interpretants: in rabbinic theology, these constitute the revelation's text process.
In a recent study, Steven Fraade examines this text process as displayed in the 3rd century rabbinic commentary on Deuteronomy, the *Sifre Deuteronomy*, or *Sifre*. He writes that “rabbinic literature is a medium dedicated both to transmission and transformation: its texts not only transmit received traditions from an earlier time, but simultaneously and often subtly transform – for purposes of their own place and program in time – what they seek to transmit.”

To illustrate the point, he examines a well-known passage from “Chapters of the Fathers”.

> Moses received [gibbel] Torah from Sinai and transmitted [masar] it to Joshua, and Joshua to the elders, and the elders to the prophets, and the prophets transmitted it to the men of the Great Assembly. They said three things: Be thorough in judgment, raise up many disciples, and make a fence around the Torah. Simon the Just [ca. 200 b.c.e.] was among the last of the Great Assembly. He used to say: ... Antigonus of Soko received [Torah] from Simeon the Just. He used to say: ...” (mishnah *Avot* 1:1-3).

Fraade explains:

This “chain of tradition” continues with five pairs of teachers, each of whom adds one or more teachings to what he has received before transmitting the newly transformed Torah to the next link in the chain. The last pair is that of Hillel and Shammai [ca. 30 b.c.e. – 10 c.e.], who in turn [despite some kinks in the chain] transmit what they have received and taught to Rabban Jochanan ben Zakkai [2:8], who together with his five students establishes, at the time of the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 c.e., the first specifically rabbinic center for learning at Yavneh (Jammia).

In this genealogical chain each “link” [explicitly beginning with the men of the Great Assembly, but implicitly for their predecessors] transforms as it transmits Torah. That which is added at each successive link in the chain is no less Torah than that which precedes it as it takes its place within the cumulative tradition, which is said to originate in the divine revelation at Sinai.

As an example of the way the chain works, Fraade examines *Sifre*’s reinterpretation of Deut. 32:7, from Moses’ parting song to Israel: “Remember the days of old, consider the years of each and every generation: ask your father, and he will inform you, your elders, and they will tell you.” *Sifre* interprets,

> [A] “Ask your father [about this] and he will inform you”: These are the prophets as it says, “When Elisha beheld it he cried out [to Elijah], ‘Father, father’” (2 Kings 2:12).
> [B] “Your elders and they will tell you.: These are the elders, as it is said, “Gather for Me seventy men of the elders of Israel” (Num. 11:16).

Another interpretation: ...

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61 From an earlier draft of “The Early Rabbinic Sage in the Text of the *Sifre,*** to appear in revised form as ch. 3 of *From Tradition to Commentary* (Albany: SUNY, 1990).

62 Ibid., pp. 2-4.
Fraade explains:

Note how the terms “father” and “elders,” appearing in parallel construction in the biblical text, are transformed. These terms no longer signify one’s own biological father and the elderly of one’s family or community as sources of wisdom: Rather in the first set of interpretations ([A] and [B]) they are viewed as leadership classes of the past, but with implications for the present... The “fathers” are the biblical prophets, represented in the present by their writings, while the elders are the seventy elders of Moses’ time, represented in the present, we may infer, by the collectivity of the sages and their teaching... 

... The second set of interpretations ([A'] and [B']) shifts our attention from past and present to future, messianic times. The “father”... is now interpreted to refer to God, who in the messianic future will be the teacher of all of Israel, obviating the need for mediating prophets.

Thus, all of the exegetical significations have changed between the two sets of interpretations from biblical past... to messianic future... except for the elders, who remain the one constant... What, then, connects the exegetically unattended to present with the biblical past on the one hand and with the messianic future on the other? Precisely that constant, the elders, who in the present are the present generation of elders, or rabbinic sages, in their very activity of Torah study and explication.63

A text process theologian might interpret Fraade’s illustration in the following way. For the community that receives the Torah as revelatory, “Honor your father and mother” (Exod. 20) are words that interrupt its customary ways of understanding “honor, “father” and “mother.” A member of the community might think “this is what ‘father’ means,” or “this is who he is.” But, as a consequence of receiving those words as revelatory, this person might be led to think somewhat differently: “yet, if honored, ‘father’ would mean more this, and this person must then be that...” The scriptural word “father” would therefore no longer refer to this entity of which the person had a particular image, but would, instead, come to refer to a way of transforming his or her understanding of this entity and, then, of any entity called “father.” The word – to use Austin’s terminology 64 – might have any number of constative meanings, or images of “father,” but its ultimate meaning would be a perlocutionary one: this “way of

64 See n. 41 above.
transforming understanding.” From this perspective, the goals of
Sifre were both to declare that Scripture displayed its meanings in
this performative fashion and to identify the performative meaning
of certain words within the rabbinic community. Who is “father?”
Sifre did not claim that what was once called biological father
actually referred to prophets or to God, or that it changed its
meaning from father to prophet: the scriptural term remains
“father,” not “prophet” or “God.” It claimed, rather, that “father”
in Deut. 32 is a symbol which refers not to being – which must
appear as some particular being, such as “biological father” – but to
the potential interruption of being, which appears, then, for that
community, as “biological father who now acquires the role of
witness to Moses’ words,” and now, for this community, as “pro-
phet,” and then for the community to come, as “God.” Each
interruption introduces a new performative command: “no longer
understand your father to be mere father; he is now witness to
Torah,” then “no longer as mere witness, now prophet,” and so
on. From this perspective, Sifre is not re-assigning Scripture’s
ontological meaning, but revealing Scripture’s meta-ontological
depth. The text interpretation is, therefore, non-iconic. “Father” is
not an icon of “biological father” or of “prophet.” It remains a
symbol of the process through which each potential icon is made to
refer beyond itself: the passage from father(f) to prophet(p) to
God(*) refers to some processual symbol (fp . . . n*). For any given
interpreter, the ultimate meaning, or interpretant, of this symbol is
the transformed habit of understanding and action which will
enable the interpreter, at a given time, to assign a given value (n) to
“father” or some other value to “elder.” Fraade notes that, for the
rabbinic authors of Sifre, “fathers” are prophets and “elders” are
the rabbis themselves, who interpret these words and their perfor-
mative meanings. We have yet to hear how these values might be
transformed as Fraade receives Sifre’s words into his own commu-
nity of practice.

For the text process theologian, in sum, to know a revelation is not
to depict it, but to walk in its way: to participate in an interpretive process
which displays, in the habit-changes which accompany interpretation, the
meaning of God’s creativity. The developmental aspect of the rabbinic
text process is thus halakhah (from the root halakh, “to walk”): the
rabbinic “way,” or law, in which the meaning of revelation is
displayed in behavioral guidelines particular to each generation in
its time and place. This law is a mediating symbol of revelation, whose ultimate interpretant is habit-change. The habit-change, rather than the law itself, is the mark of revelation, imitatio dei, and must itself, therefore, manifest divine creativity.65

For rabbinic text process theology, habit-change is the ultimate subject matter of ethics as a non-ontological science. From this perspective, there are three forms of ethical inquiry. The only strictly ontological ethics is the empirical study of the most general, normative features of the societal entities — including the most expansive ones — in which the inquirer is a participant or participant-observer. Here, "normative" features are those which could influence participants' decisions about how to act. From this perspective, ontological ethics would tend to be a form of ethnography, call it ethno-ethics. What is usually called "rabbinic ethics" would refer to a species of meta-ontological ethics, which may be identified in the biblical traditions with theological ethics. This is the descriptive — and, in that sense, empirical — study of the most general, normative features of a revelation's text process, in which process the inquirer is a participant or participant-observer. In his study of rabbinic ethics, for example, Kadushin labeled the normative features of rabbinic Judaism "value concepts." The value concepts behave in some ways like the normative features of an ontological ethics, since they are general and may guide conduct. The difference is that the conduct represents a revelatory way, or halakhah, and therefore has habit-change, rather than the continuation of some way of being, as its ultimate interpretant. This means that "loving-kindness" (gemilut ḥasadim) and "God's attribute of

Thus, a moment of God's creativity can be interpreted only by another moment of God's creativity. This claim corresponds to traditional Jewish and Christian claims that scriptural interpretations can be authentic or non-authentic, and that the authentic ones are informed by God's spirit (however named). Such claims may be evaluated quantitatively as well as qualitatively: God's spirit may be listened to more or less attentively and, thus, interpretations may be more or less reflective of God's creativity. To discuss who is to judge this would be to replay, from a text-process perspective, familiar arguments about the relative authority of communal and specialized decision-making procedures. Rabbinic theology regards the Torah as authentic testimony about a revelation of God's creativity and the rabbinic tradition of scriptural interpretation as an authentic process of interpreting the meaning of that revelation. The tradition displays, intrasystematically, criteria for evaluating the authority of supportive testimony about God's creativity and of the interpretations which serve such testimony. As an evolving process of interpretation, the tradition constitutes an individual entity — as long as it is not identified with any single, context specific description of it. In its finitude, this tradition cannot include all possible testimonies about God's creativity, nor all text-processes which may possibly interpret the Sinaitic testimony. In its finitude, furthermore, the tradition presupposes
mercy" (middat ha-raḥamim) are attributes of not-being, and in that sense of becoming, rather than of being. These are attributes of the ways in which entities become other than they are in relation to other entities: not just any way other, but other in the particular ways displayed in this particular revelatory text process. One feature of the rabbinic text process as a whole is the eschatological hope that these attributes of non-being may become as if attributes of being. The "as if" is a reminder, however, that, in this world, or this mode of temporality, being and not-being are not identical. Interpreting Sifre, for example, we cannot assign any final value to "father." Technically, this means that we cannot represent the value concepts iconically or eidetically, but only indexically and symbolically through narratives and exempla, rather than through definitions.

Rabbinic ethics, and theological ethics in general, are context specific, but in a less limiting way than are ontological ethics. In a particular revelatory text process, God's creativity is displayed as the occasion of habit-change in a particular societal entity: gemilut ḥasidim, for example, is a value concept for rabbinic Jews of the Talmudic period. Since it refers to a form of change, however, rather than to any particular form of being, the value concept refers to a form of relation that will characterize at least two classes of entity (a Jewish habit changed and not-yet changed) and may conceivably characterize an indefinite number of societal entities, rabbinic and other. Within a particular theological ethics, there is, however, only one linguistic category for referring to a value concept in its maximal generality. This is the category of names for God: the one whose creativity is otherwise displayed only in the particular way particular habits are changed. Even then, such names tend to appear as value concepts, stark indices of the one, but informative icons only of its appearances among the many.66 The rabbinic ethicist supposes that gemilut ḥasidim, for example, displays the divine concern that will also appear within some other revelatory traditions, but not necessarily in the same way it

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appears in the rabbinic one.\textsuperscript{67} Within the domain of ethics itself, the only medium that links the one and the many is relationship, which is itself the one in its concrete and context-specific manifestation. Otherwise put, two systems of ethics are linked only through conversations and other forms of interaction between them, rather than through any form of inquiry undertaken by members of either system independently of such interaction.

The sort of analysis I have offered in the preceding two paragraphs illustrates the third form of ethical inquiry, meta-ethics. It is the only form of ethics which supplies a vocabulary for making generalizations about two or more systems of ontology or two or more text processes. In exchange for this privilege, meta-ethics is deprived of the kind of ontological meaning and ethical force that are associated with the first two forms of ethics. As meta-ethicist, Kadushin coined such terms as "value concept" and "organic thinking" and analyzed rabbinic ethics in terms meaningful to academics interested in ethical phenomena in general. By insisting that these terms referred, themselves, to "analytic," rather than "organic" concepts, he sought to protect the integrity of ethical systems from the intrusions of science. He feared the misplaced concretenesses of scientists who mistake the categories of analysis for those of the analysand. As I suggested earlier, however, Kadushin may have been overly protective. Separating analytic and organic concepts too sharply, he failed to identify the particular entity with respect to which scientific inquiry – including his inquiry – has its own variety of meta-ontological meaning.

Meta-ethics has its place in western academia,\textsuperscript{68} understood as a hybrid and highly contested collection of text processes, interpreting testimonies of both biblical and non-biblical revelations of divine creativity (so-named and not so-named!). What are called "analytic" or "scientific" vocabularies function within academia the way "value conceptual" or "organic" vocabularies function within particular revelatory text processes. That is to say, scientific vocabularies are not particular to this or that vernacular (in our

\textsuperscript{67} The way a value concept appears within a tradition may be judged by the set of concretizations that illustrate it. Two value concepts would appear similar if their respective sets of concretizations appeared to be isomorphic.

\textsuperscript{68} Using "western" as a term of origination and not of exclusion. The following analysis draws on research that was made possible by a grant from the Spencer Foundation.
terms, they are not ontological), but they are particular to some text process, for which they name rules of habit-change and thus have ethical force (that is, they are meta-ontological). They are different from revelatory text processes in the specific virtues they inculcate and in their claim to general rather than indefinite indeterminacy: that is, in their presumption of context-independence. The organi-
cist science that attracted Kadushin belonged to one of a set of academia's contested text processes. Its proponents promoted it as the correct member of this set, arguing on behalf of its usefulness not only as a means of describing phenomena particular to any of the ontologies of interest to academics, but also as a norm for evaluating the various systems of ontological ethics and for encouraging certain kinds of habit-change within them. When he objected to certain aspects of Bergson's or Whitehead's thinking, Kadushin was objecting to what he considered the limits not only of their explanatory schemes, but also of their meta-ontological ethics. He argued, on philosophic grounds, that Bergson and Whitehead were incompletely loyal to their organicist principles, since they treated some of the analytic concepts of their science as if they were the value concepts of some system of ethics.69 He might have sought, instead, to identify the academic text process to which those "analytic" concepts belonged and on behalf of which Bergson and Whitehead promoted value concepts of which at least one appears to have been incompatible with those of his rabbinic ethics. This is the concept of God as being.

From a text process perspective, the error of attempting to describe the presence of God as being is the error of attempting to iconize God's creativity. As we have seen, the alternative is to describe the presence of God in its non-being and to symbolize God's creativity in an indefinite process of transformatory interpretations. Kadushin argued that such a process is an organism whose individuality and context-specificity Whitehead failed to appreciate. Does this mean that text process theology is simply incompatible with a natural process theology? To introduce the answer I hope we might be able to find on another occasion, I close

69 If Kadushin differed so sharply on certain points from Whitehead, it may be because Kadushin tended to assimilate his philosophic to his vernacular activity, while Whitehead may have tended to assimilate his vernacular to his philosophic activity. A process naturalist may or may not object to the latter form of assimilation; a non-relativistic process textualist must object to either form.
with an illustrative scenario of how apparent differences between
the two forms of process theology might be resolved.

In this scenario, what natural process theologians call ontological
claims would be simply relabeled and divided (in text process
terms) into a set of meta-ontological and a set of meta-ethical
claims. Each set of claims would be attached to a different level of
ethical inquiry within academe, undertaken by potentially differ-
ent communities of inquirers. On the level of meta-ontological
inquiry, text process and natural meta-ontologies would represent
mutually-irreducible but complementary forms of inquiry. These
forms would be undertaken by several different sub-groups of
inquirers, such as rabbirnic text process, Jewish natural-process,
Christian natural-process theologians, and so on. Text- and
natural-process theologies would employ contrasting vocabularies
(referring, for example, to nature vs. creation, supernatural vs.
textual, or being vs. non-being) to communicate to their different
sub-groups of inquirers ways of promoting the virtues of habit-
change in different societal entities. On the level of meta-ethical
inquiry, a single community of process meta-ethicists would de-
velop a single vocabulary for describing the different forms of
process meta-ontology. This community would share the virtues
which promote the forms of habit-change that are appropriate to
this level of academic inquiry. According to this scenario, one
person might function both as rabbirnic meta-ontologist and pro-
cess meta-ethicist, and another both as natural process meta-
ontologist and process meta-ethicist. Their differences would be
constructive and instructive.

Glossary

Here is a glossary of technical terms used in this essay. The
ultimate sources of the terms are indicated as follows: K, Kadushin;
W, Whitehead; P, Peirce. If I have varied an author’s term to suit

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70 In a letter to me, Norbert Samuelson notes that such a text process theology
“sounds like Hermann Cohen’s particular brand of idealism, and Kadushin’s rabbirnic
Judaism sounds like Cohen’s Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism.” He adds that
“the concept of God, functioning as a value term which stands outside of any perceived
reality is most compatible with Cohen’s Kantian notion of a world that ‘ought to be’
standing outside of the world that ‘is’.”

71 I am indebted to Sandra Lubarsky and to David Griffin for stimulating this essay,
and to Norbert Samuelson for offering extensive suggestions for its revision.
my purposes, I add a +. [For Whiteheadian definitions, I have consulted Kadushin's favorite interpreter of Whitehead: Dorothy Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism (London: MacMillan and Co., 1932).]

Appetition: an urge to realize some relevant possibility, combined with a valuation in support of that urge (W). In Kadushin's terminology, this corresponds to a value's "drive for concretization" (K).

Concrescence: the process by which the elements (e.g., prehensions) of an actual entity grow together into a unity. The entity is this concrescence (W).

Consequent Nature of God: God's everlasting prehension of the actual occasions in the temporal world. This is the source of all objectification (W).

Eternal object: a "pure potential for the specific determination of matters of fact," that is, a real possibility to be actualized; or a form of definiteness in the process of becoming (W).

Events: the ultimate facts of nature, which include every conceivable occurrence; an event is a nexus of inter-related occasions. Actual occasions or entities are good old things in the world, understood as processes of concrescence. Thus, events interconnect things (W).

Interpretation: the activity in the context of which a sign or symbol refers to its meaning or object (P).

Interpretive events: occurrences of interpretation (K+).

Modernist thinking: the "Cartesian" or Cartesian-like tendency to generalize doubts about aspects of a tradition of thought-and-practice into doubts about inherited knowledge as such, and the "Cartesian" attempt to substitute the authority of certain individual perceptions and judgments for the authority of inherited traditions of knowledge (P+).

Organism: nexus, or the fact of togetherness among actual entities; every entity is also a nexus of its prehensions of other entities (W). Thus, conceptual organism refers to a nexus of concepts (W+, K).

Prehension: a "grasping," the way one actual entity appropriates aspects of other actual entities in its own development. The actual entity is thus composed of its prehensions of other entities (W). I identify both feelings and interpretations as prehensions.
Primordial Nature of God: God's eternal ordering of the universe of all possibilities; or God's conception of the order of all eternal objects. This is the primordial source of both novelty and limitation in the universe (W).