

The Notion of Truth in Natural and Formal Languages

The purpose of this paper is to complete the RHS of Tarski's famous formula: $\forall x \text{ True}(x) \leftrightarrow \varphi(x)$

For any natural (human) or formal (mathematical) language L we know that an expression X of language L is true if and only if there are expressions Γ of language L that connect X to known facts.

By extending the notion of a Well Formed Formula to include syntactically formalized rules for rejecting semantically incorrect expressions we recognize and reject expressions that evaluate to neither True nor False.

An axiom is a proposition regarded as self-evidently true without proof. Axioms are really nothing more than a set of expressions of language that have been assigned the semantic property of True. Axioms form the ultimate foundation of Truth-conditional semantics.

The natural language equivalent to an axiom in formal language is a {known fact}. Some expressions of natural language are simply defined to be True.

Example: "a cat is an animal".

Formalized as: $(\text{cat} \in \text{animals})$ or $(\text{cat} \triangleleft \text{animal})$

where \triangleleft is the [is_a_type_of] operator adapted from UML Inheritance relation.

The only reason that we know that "a cat is an animal" is that it is defined to be True.

Meaning Postulates (1952) by Rudolf Carnap formalized natural language semantics:

(x) $\text{Bachelor}(x) \rightarrow \sim \text{Married}(x)$

Let 'W' be a primitive predicate designating the relation Warmer. Then 'W' is transitive, irreflexive, and hence asymmetric in virtue of its meaning:

(a) $(x)(y)(z) W(x,y) \wedge W(y,z) \rightarrow W(x,z)$

(b) $(x) \sim W(x,x)$

(c) $(x)(y) W(x,y) \rightarrow \sim W(y,x)$

Generalizing the notion of a (known fact) to formal language we define an axiom as any expression of (formal or natural) language that has been assigned the semantic property of True. This concept of an axiom provides the ultimate foundational basis of conceptual Truth.

Validity and Soundness <https://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/>

A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be invalid.

A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is both valid, and all of its premises are actually true. Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound.

If we define a symbolic logic predicate to formalize the distinction between a valid deductive argument and a sound deductive argument where Γ represents the premises and C stands for the conclusion then:

$\text{Provable}(\Gamma, C)$ is simply a valid deductive argument where the premises Γ may or may not be true. $\text{True}(\Gamma, C)$ is simply a deductive argument known to be sound because its premises Γ are axioms. $\text{Provable}(\Gamma, C)$ is more fully elaborated by Mendelson's reference to $\Gamma \vdash C$.

Introduction to Mathematical logic Sixth edition Elliott Mendelson **1.4 An Axiom System for the Propositional Calculus**

A wf C is said to be a consequence in S of a set Γ of wfs if and only if there is a sequence B_1, \dots, B_k of wfs such that C is B_k and, for each i , either B_i is an axiom or B_i is in Γ , or B_i is a direct consequence by some rule of inference of some of the preceding wfs in the sequence. Such a sequence is called a proof (or deduction) of C from Γ . The members of Γ are called the hypotheses or premisses of the proof. We use $\Gamma \vdash C$ as an abbreviation for "C is a consequence of Γ ".

$\Gamma \vdash C$ is merely infix notation for this predicate $\text{Provable}(\Gamma, C)$. My Truth predicate can be defined as $\text{True}(\Gamma, C)$ by simply requiring that the Mendelson premises be axioms. By doing this the Valid deductive argument specified by a formal proof becomes a Sound deductive argument, thus the conclusion is necessarily True. Because $\text{Axioms} \subseteq \text{WFF}$ therefore $\text{True}(\Gamma, C) \subseteq \text{Provable}(\Gamma, C)$.

We generalize the Mendelson provability predicate: $\Gamma \vdash C$ by applying it to every formal system $\forall L \in \text{Formal_Systems}$. $\exists \Gamma \subseteq \text{WFF}(L)$ formalizes "set Γ of wfs" and binds Γ to the existential quantifier. $\forall L \in \text{Formal_Systems} \text{Provable}(L, C) \leftrightarrow \exists \Gamma \subseteq \text{WFF}(L) (\Gamma \vdash C)$

Transforming the above generic Provability predicate into a generic Truth predicate:
 $\forall L \in \text{Formal_Systems} \text{Provable}(L, C) \leftrightarrow \exists \Gamma \subseteq \text{Axioms}(L) (\Gamma \vdash C)$

To verify that an expression X of language L is True or False only requires a syntactic logical consequence inference chain (formal proof) from a sequence of Axioms followed by a sequence of WFF to the consequent of X or $\sim X$. (Backward chaining reverses this order).

The key understanding that the above analysis provides:

- (1) Axioms are the ultimate foundational basis of conceptual Truth.
- (2) $\text{True}(L, X) \subseteq \text{Provable}(L, X)$

When $\text{True}(L, X) \subseteq \text{Provable}(L, X)$ we can see that it is impossible for any expression of language X to be True in L and not Provable in L .

Sentence (mathematical logic) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_\(mathematical_logic\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic))

In mathematical logic, a sentence of a predicate logic is a Boolean-valued well-formed formula with no free variables. A sentence can be viewed as expressing a proposition, something that must be true or false. The restriction of having no free variables is needed to make sure that sentences can have concrete, fixed truth values: As the free variables of a (general) formula can range over several values, the truth value of such a formula may vary.

Predicate logic is augmented with an <assign alias name> operator.

LHS is assigned as an alias name for the RHS

$LHS \equiv RHS$

The LHS is logically equivalent to the RHS *only because*

the LHS is merely an alias name (place-holder) for the RHS

The <assign alias name> operator allows an expression to refer directly to itself.

When we formalize expressions of language such as the Liar Paradox using the above universal truth predicate, we can finally understand its semantic error.

"This sentence is not True."

$LP \equiv \forall L \in \text{Formal_Systems} \sim \text{True}(L, LP)$

Expanded definition of above:

$LP \equiv \forall L \in \text{Formal_Systems} \sim \exists \Gamma \subseteq \text{Axioms}(L) (\Gamma \vdash LP)$

[LP] makes the assertion that there is no sequence of WFF that proves [LP].

Is this assertion True or False?

If there was a sequence of WFF that proves [LP] it would be self-contradictory because it proved that its own proof must fail therefore making its proof succeed. [LP] is not satisfied thus not true.

If there is a not sequence of WFF that proves [LP] its assertion would be true but in order for a WFF to evaluate to true it must be satisfied. [LP] also cannot be false, because its assertion is True.

So we have the paradoxical case where the assertion of a proposition is True, yet this does not make the proposition itself True. Since [LP] cannot possibly be either True or False it is therefore semantically incorrect.

ON FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS
OF PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA AND RELATED SYSTEMS I
by Kurt Gödel Vienna

The analogy between this result and Richard's antinomy leaps to the eye; there is also a close relationship with the "liar" antinomy,¹⁴

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof.

Since Kurt Gödel said that the Liar Paradox "can ... be used for a similar undecidability proof." The semantic error of the Liar Paradox equally applies to the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem.

A formula precisely analogous to the Liar Paradox specifying Provability instead of Truth

$G \equiv \forall L \in \text{Formal_Systems} \sim \exists \Gamma \subseteq \text{WFF}(L) (\Gamma \vdash G)$

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