“Sadness is a Heap of Sand”

Thinking about metaphors

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Abstract

This paper is an attempt to understand metaphors in themselves and in our cognitive economy. Steinhart (2001) characterized metaphors in terms of processes of analogical transference. Metaphors, so considered, appear to respond to a natural tendency of the mind that would be common to both necessary and inductive processes and, apparently, even to insane ones. However, it is important to understand these analogical transference processes as a whole and in their similitudes and differences in the various cases. I first analyze necessary and inductive transference processes and consider different models for their explanation. Then, I focus chiefly on metaphors and their peculiarities. I consider a potential rule-following explanation; I differentiate between the process of creation and of understanding metaphors from the author’s and the reader’s perspectives and how this impinges on our explanatory models. From here, I connect back to the question of analogical transference and reconsider the extent to which it applies to metaphors. Finally, I address a related problem concerning the potential risks that are also tied to our dispositional metaphorical capacities.

Keywords: logic, analogical transference, rule-following, Steinhart, Glucksberg, Black

1. Introduction

Numerous studies of metaphoric language have attempted to reconstruct the logic implicit in these figures of discourse, whose use is not limited to the literary or poetic purposes but abounds in the construction of what are referred to as ‘theoretical metaphors’, used often in scientific explanations. A relevant proposal is the idea that metaphors work by way of an analogical transference from situations where a given subject, event, or property plays ‘the same functional role in the source situation as another does in the
target one’. This view is impressively elaborated by Steinhart (2001), who builds upon proposals made by Thagard (1995), Kittay (1987), and others to defend what he calls a Structural Theory of Metaphors (STM). I use his illustration of the problem as a point of departure. The traced analogy between both source and target, Steinhart goes on, allows for the transference of implications from the source context to the target one, permitting to advance a creative hypothesis. Theoretical metaphors, on which he specifically focuses, such as “the cell is a fabric” or Hobbes’s claim in his Leviathan that “the state is an artificial animal”, would be ‘ampliative’ in this sense.

Such a metaphorical re-description directs research concerning the target by assigning to it the task of interpreting all the metaphorical concepts and propositions in the metaphorical re-description of the target. (Steinhart, 2001, p. 9)

Once the similitude is found, the metaphor promotes a ‘reinterpretation of the target’ according to the new set of associated implications and recalled commonplaces introduced by it. As a fabric, Steinhart argues, the cell, for example, is analysed in terms of the production of goods for the consumption of the organism, its possession of a control centre, the manufacturing process, etc.¹ It is because the analogy is a true one, and there is a functional correspondence between both situations — or one situation is a structural ‘counterpart’ of the other — that, according to Steinhart, it can be effective. He applies the possible worlds strategy to metaphors, so that the analogy between source and target situations is understood as an analogy between worlds, or world parts. Metaphors are

¹ Steinhart (2001, p.6-7) borrows this metaphor from (Swanson, 1960: 26 - 41)
“logical organisms in the ecology of language” (Steinhart, 2001, p. 1.), and his goal is to uncover their logical structure.

However, there remains much confusion in trying to understand these logico-semantic constructs, both in themselves and for the role they play in the human cognitive system. First of all, to what extent can we see metaphors according to this model, and what are the benefits, and maybe the risks, of this tendency of the mind to find such analogies and on their basis make further transference of attributions? Why are there any analogies there to be found, in the first place, and what does it mean that there are? What are the cognitive processes behind these analogical operations? These are some of the questions I am interested in. Steinhart has done a thorough and systematic job in the attempt to reveal a formal structure of metaphors that would make a computational account of them possible. His is an imposing work, and I could not attempt to deal with it the way it deserves. But I refer to his position throughout the paper, since I found some interesting convergences with my own perspective. Mine is fostered, however, through a much less formally elaborated path. My plan is to analyse these questions first in a straightforward way as they appear from my perspective, leaning towards a rule-following approach, and elaborate upon them, afterwards, by appealing to some relevant authors and positions with which I share some common visions.

The route I take has the following directions: 1) I focus on analogical transference processes resulting from different forms of equivalences, where we identify something with something else and, as a result, transfer the properties of the one to the other. 2) In this connection, I compare necessary inferential transferences (and corresponding generalisations) with inductive ones, distinguishing two explanatory proposals to give account of both of them. 3) Proceeding from more easily explainable cases to more complex ones, I include in the equation metaphors and even insane forms of analogy. 4)
Focusing then on metaphors, I try to give an account of them, particularly from the generative perspective. 5) At this point, I go back to the question of the extent and legitimacy of transference procedures in their case and how it compares with the previous examples of necessary and inductive transferences. 6) Finally, I consider the possible dangers likely to arise also from this human tendency to further expand resemblance processes and be ready to transfer additional associations on their basis.

2. Transference

On the face of it, there is something perfectly natural in this practice to expand from something already known to something new which resembles the known in a good many respects. Our linguistic building system and also our whole process of inductive belief formation are examples of this. Attributions of ‘being cold blooded’, ‘having lungs’, being ‘oviparous’, etc. will be quickly transferred from our well-known reptiles, such as iguanas, geckos, and lizards, to the next encountered lizard, on the simple basis of it exhibiting sufficient resemblance to members of the sort. Research on new cases will be guided by such initial similarities with well-known examples. Not unlike Steinhart's reconstruction of the metaphorical case — in fact, its prototype — we will try to prove in the strange new lizard that we just met what we know about the old ones. Through this process, we might come to find out, for example, that some lizards are viviparous. But we were at first instance departing from the assumption that our new specimen would be oviparous too and so orienting our research to check their reproduction system. We expect there to be some uniformities in nature based on extensive experience in the past that has shown there to be such.

Do we have a right to assume some such similarity, to generalise from the old to the new? That is the whole point of Hume’s ‘problem of induction’. Such transference processes
are standard in our epistemic activities. Steinhart also points out the role of induction in metaphoric analogies, as we will later see. But where is the line between common inductive and metaphoric transferences, and between these and insane ones, also known to work through some form of analogical projection? Russell (1946, Chap.12, p.699) famously claimed that if there were no answer to Hume’s scepticism, there would be no difference between sanity and insanity. So, how do these phenomena differ? The similarity between inductive generalisations and the process of expansion (generalisation in a sense too) of linguistic rules has often been pointed out too, especially in Kripke’s discussion of the paradox that is seen to threaten Wittgenstein’s considerations on rule-following. I will touch upon these questions as well.

Next, we consider how diverse processes of ‘inferential transference’ work. We depart from those we are well acquainted with and that are part of our daily life and gradually move to metaphoric ones to prove whether these allow a similar understanding.

2.1. Necessary Inferential Transferences

If we take any geometrical figure, we can make some measurements and come to conclusions regarding the sum of its angles, the number of its vertices, or any such thing. In doing so, we already know that this applies to all other geometric figures like it. We know the conclusion necessarily transfers to all cases. One might wonder how we know that.²

Take a cube, and consider now two possible answers

² Ommitied for reasons of anonymity
a) Because any cube (a, b, c, …n) is equal to this one, and according to Leibniz’s law, \( AxAy((x = y) \rightarrow AF(x) \leftrightarrow F(y)) \), we can infer that they will share the same properties.

Since we take it as an \( a \text{ priori} \) rule that all equal things share the same properties, and all other cubes are identical with this one, we can conclude that their number of vertices will be eight too. In this explanation, it is assumed that an \( a \text{ priori} \) inferential rule about identity (that we, through Leibniz, have managed to identify) delivers the background legitimation for our generalising scheme. Let’s see the second answer:

b) Because the pattern found in this cube has those properties (the sum of its vertices comes down to eight) and this pattern is present in every token, all individual tokens have it too.

Here the reason why the singular tokens of a cube have the property is not secondary to exhibiting an identity relation with the specific token we examined in the case of a). The property is seen to belong to this pattern that we are conceptually registering, so wherever the pattern is present, the figure is ‘a cube’ and the property will be present too. There is no need of any further generalising inference from the one instance to the many. It is plainly clear that whatever applies to the pattern applies to the pattern redundantly, wherever it is. The question before — how do you know that property attributions generalise? — would not pose itself. However, to be able to prove that the property belongs to the pattern with necessity, we require an extra step. It is through a contrafactual exercise of imagination that we can come to prove that were we to change the number of
its vertices, we would not obtain a cube anymore.\(^3\) A necessary inference from the pattern to its having necessarily 8 V takes place in this very moment, not before. To put it more plainly, while through the first step we obtain a statement of how things are, \(\varphi \text{ is } \xi\), it is not until we perform the second step that we count with proper proof of its necessity \(\varphi \rightarrow \xi\).

The geometrical case is exceptional since we have to do with a geometrical pattern that we are conceptually registering. But in what follows, I talk in terms of ‘conceptual patterns’ and ‘individuals’. Therefore, I do not want to commit myself to talk of universals and particulars, or other metaphysical terminology, as it might be tempting to do here, since this can be misleading. I want to trace a parallel with conceptual acquisition in empirical cases, and the more epistemic notion of a conceptual pattern lends itself better to such a purpose. But the question still is how the different models affect our beliefs about how the transference process occurs.

We immediately see a difference between these \textit{a priori} examples and \textit{a posteriori}, empirical ones, such as the induction case and the introduction of empirical concepts presumed by it. Neither conceptual expansion nor inductive generalisations at basis can be said to be necessary. There is no contradiction in experience presenting the black swan that controverts our predictions with unexpected cases. Asking ‘how do you know that it transfers to all?’ appears to be more justified here. But let’s consider things in more detail.

\section*{2.2. Inductive Inferential Transference}

\(^3\) The opposite, of course, does not work. We might have the eight vertices but not have a cube.
How do we proceed in empirical cases? After considering a series of instances of a type $T$, that each and every time come accompanied with some further property, or event, $P$, we feel justified to transfer this association to any new instance of the sort, searching for it, if it should not be apparent from the beginning. We can ask again with Hume: what legitimises us in doing so? Or, maybe, we should question first what it is that we appeal to in coming to such conclusions.

We can try the two models considered above here too. Consider the first:

a)* To the extent that some new instances (e, f, g...n) of ‘men’ are equal (in some relevant respects) to our known cases of such (a, b, c, d) if some further feature $P$ always comes associated with these latter ones, we can presume it will be associated with e, f, g, and n too.

The process of generalisation is seen to operate here once more via the *a priori assumption* that indistinguishable things have the same properties (or produce the same events), Leibniz’s indiscernibility of identicals, but understood in terms of relative identity. Rightly or wrongly, we would use this logical structure to come to our conclusions. It is this form of relative identity that Steinhart too finds underneath metaphorical inferential processes. But I will come to this point later. The model of explanation in a) is more of a *referentialist* sort. The aspects considered are not to be put down to any specific common features. It would rather be understood as an undefined resemblance between extension members. It amounts to saying that because the new instance $t_n$ is ‘equal’ to $(t_1 V t_2 V t_3 ...)$, understood as inclusive disjunctions, and since the

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4 We can make perfect logical sense of two instances being equal (in some relevant respect), and therefore what applies to the one applies to the other.
property $P$ applies to all and any of them falling under the concept, it applies to $t_n$ too. To the extent that this undefined similarity between cases constitutes a form of \textit{sameness} between them, it serves via Leibniz’s law for property transference. Our right to avail ourselves of this structure here, key to the problem, is discussed later. But let’s consider, in parallel to the geometrical case, a second alternative:

b)* It is because the existent instances of ‘men’ share a common \textit{conceptually registered pattern} $\varphi$, with which some further association $\xi$ is made, that we can assume that whenever $\varphi$ is present, the association with $\xi$ will be there too.

The inferential association is not made with any particular instances of the concept but with the conceptually registered pattern itself, which here is stylised to a true communality. There is no need to proceed per ‘identification’ of new instances with pre-existent extension members to be able to generalise and attribute the associated property to the new. There is no appeal to Leibniz’s law serving as an inferential link. As before, since the link is traced with a conceptual pattern, $\varphi \text{ is } \xi$, so, redundantly again, it is traced with the conceptual pattern wherever it shall be. To put it more plainly: the inductive generalisation from this point on is not an inference at all. Neither is there a puzzle concerning what makes the generalisation possible to any new instances or how we came to know it. There might be one regarding whether some new case is an instance of the concept, but not any more about whether, when it is, $\xi$ applies to it too, since we move at a general abstract level from the beginning on. We do exactly as with the cube case. Although here, with those exceptions which we would consider analytic to our departing conceptual understanding, an imaginative counterfactual exercise could scarcely show
that should \( \xi \) not be there, \( \varphi \) would not be what it is any more. Therefore, the second probatory step above would be gratuitous, and we lack a proof of necessity.

While in the geometrical case the pattern is given to us already, through the very first inspected instance of a cube, and the same goes for the association made, here both of these aspects are obtained through an antecedent process. First, given a series of resembling instances \( t_1, t_2, t_3 \ldots t_n \), we stylise a common conceptual pattern,\(^5\) which might be modified with the acquisition of new experiences, with the pattern being permanently reassessed. New members will be added because to some extent they exhibit the same pattern. Second, the procedure is then repeated to obtain the association. All known instances of our pattern \( \varphi \) are observed to be associated (correlated or whatever) with \( \xi \). This will be captured in a new associative pattern, \( \varphi \ is \ \xi \). At this point, we are provided with a parallel to the geometrical case. The pattern now has the same status as the cube; the association made is attached to it with equal generality, and we now assume too all other cases will be so.

It is no question that there is an obvious and huge difference between both cases. Both regarding the stability of the pattern (which is subject to experiential modifications) and that of the association, we are making a huge idealisation that in no way makes the inductive connection true. Obviously, it is possible that we are wrong, of course. We can distinguish two different questions here.

1) What allows us to claim the connection between \( \varphi \ and \ \xi \) to be the stable on the basis of a finite number of instances?

\(^5\)Omitted for reasons of anonymity.
2) What allows us to transfer, once the association is made, to new instances?

Regarding 1), we are making an informed guess on the basis of past experiences. No proof of necessity is available. It is simply a declaration of how things are as far as we know: as far as we know (i) ‘man is vulnerable to COVID-19’. This in no way precludes finding later that just a sub-sort of man is vulnerable to COVID-19 and coming to a sub-pattern association: (ii) genetic sub-type-x of man is vulnerable to COVID-19, adding a possible ceteris paribus clause. But for now, we will assume (i). This is different in the analytic model, where the connection is considered necessary \( \varphi \) is \( \xi \): ‘man is rational’. Here we find the same type of necessity as in the geometrical model because a lack of \( \xi \) by \( \varphi \) would render \( \varphi \) itself impossible.⁶ Still, despite the increased similarity with the geometrical case, the a posteriori character of those ‘necessary cases’ renders them subject to future discoveries and further correction, just as would be the case with Kripke’s category of the ‘a posteriori necessary’. It might not be H₂O but a finer composition not recognisable with today’s analytic means (H₂346O77Π) that is responsible for our ‘water’ samples; or we have to reduce the term due to important and pragmatically relevant discovered dissimilitude between H₂O samples, to H₂O₂5 and not to H₂O₃2, imagine, which now requires a new denomination, or whatever would make sense chemically as an example.

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⁶ The similarity is just an idealisation, since what is packed in our conceptual pattern resulted out of a process of discovery, which later (when included in conceptual content) became redundant as pertaining to it. The purported ‘necessary properties’ (those without which something would cease to be what we understand it to be) of individuals previously sorted up according to some communality can well be discovered later. ‘Water is H₂O’ can become assimilated later into conceptual content and be treated as analytic. This belongs to Quine’s scepticism with the analytic/synthetic distinction, since nothing prevents these postulated ‘certainties’ becoming more specified again in the process of inquiry. But while we hold to such connection as defining our concept, it is the case that were \( \xi \) not the case, \( \varphi \) would not be \( \varphi \).
Regarding 2), assuming the rightness of 1), the further application to new instances is not a new inference but an already accepted fact. No mediating inference through indiscernibility (as in b) above) is required.

In this moment, we said, the parallel with the geometrical case is reached. The dissimilitude between both cases conceals the fact that we are using the same cognitive structure. This is the key aspect here. We have attempted to achieve the same simple generality as in the geometrical case, to obtain the same benefits. Our conceptual work is, as it were, a labour of stabilising the world, an attempt to fix some template of conceptual patterns to which fixed properties and relations can be ascribed in a way akin to a geometrical structure. Since, as soon as we can assume stability, our world seems much more manageable and the unknown, through the known moulds, capturable and predictable. Needless to say, that reality escapes and transgresses continuously this stabilising work of ours, demanding unceasing re-capturing, reassessments, and transformations. This notwithstanding, there is much gain in it, and our aspirations are not thereby made unworthy.

If the individual token of the cube serves our purposes without further research, it is because it is already a representation of the conceptual pattern. It is already a generality present in all cubes. We can have the conceptual pattern of a cube, the capacity to figure out such a spatial arrangement, but specific representations of it are observable patterns themselves. We need not obtain them out of a series, as we already have them.⁷

⁷ This explanation requires further development, but I think something along these lines should serve to give account of it.
One last point before we leave this section. Someone might want to push the thought further, that when we reason to new cases, we do infer from the general statement \( \varphi \) is \( \xi \) to ‘this token is \( \varphi \); therefore, \( \xi \) must be the case (or occur) too’. However, this is not a matter of a new epistemic discovery, but the mere search for an experiential confirmation. From the point of view of knowledge, no new conclusion is inferentially reached; we are ascertaining our associative scheme in the particular instance. There might be further reasons we have gained as to why this way of being and the observed association are linked, but that is another question. However, here is where the schematic ideality of our cognitive structure is put to proof, since we know its impure origin in a finite set of experiential examples and therefore its vulnerability.

The whole point is, surely, not to deny the obvious dissimilitude between both cases but to unravel how our epistemic conceptual structure moulds upon the geometrical one, which delivers the basic structure we try to bring experience to adjust to, with the purpose to control it through easier and more manageable schemes. On the other hand, doing away with the impression of inferential steps in between (as was proposed by models b or b*) allows further simplification of the cognitive procedure. It shows there to be no necessity at stake here except if counterfactually reached, which in the standard inductive case is not even to be had.

2.3. Back to Hume’s problem of induction

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8 Contemporary explanations of dispositions or causality argue that we might be able to explain that it is in the nature of the object that some effects or further conditions might originate. It is not my aim to enter into that controversy. But I am suggesting that it is not with any specificity of the individuals, no matter how many are considered, but with a way of being, a shared pattern, that the association is made. Therefore, it is that way of being that is made responsible (for whatever reason) for the condition or effect that accompanies it. This would, thus, go well with the mentioned approach to that extent.
The concern of Hume’s problem of induction is that our tendency to project from our past experience to new cases through corresponding transferences is not in any way a requirement of reason. We cannot claim to have contributed to solving that problem; we cannot make necessary what is not. We have in fact defended that there is no necessary inference mediating the process, not in the synthetic association between the property and the conceptual pattern, and not in the later attribution of the property to new cases. Hume is right in the sense that there is no necessity to be grasped allowing us to generalise. But we are actually not illegitimately assuming there to be such; we simply stabilise a correlative association among two patterns and, once done, assume it to be correct wherever it shall be. This is a hypothesis about how things are. If we are right, this is so eternally, as it were. We are not inferring anything else. We will, as we said, simply prove over and over empirically whether we are right. However, the very fact that it should be possible at all to obtain both stable conceptual patterns and associative ones, together with the accuracy of our theories and our predictions on this basis, speaks for some stable correlations being there too, and this seems good enough.

To take a stance now, our purpose was to try to understand how the so-called ‘transference of properties from the old to the new’ works in standard cases. We have concluded that this is a matter of associations made between abstract conceptual patterns that, in the inductive case, we try to confirm in experience. With these results in view, we can now try to explore the function of metaphors and then see the similitudes and differences with the cases above.

3. Metaphors
Metaphors, according to Steinhart’s model, would exhibit a similar structure, in the sense that if the concept \( w \) is applied to \( x \), then we are in some way postulating some identity that allows us now to transfer what we associate with \( w \) to \( x \). Accordingly, we shall determine: first, where is the identification supposed to rely upon, and, second, how do we justify that we proceed to further transference of associations? This will require clarifying the differences with the previous inductive cases. But let us look much more thoroughly into the workings of metaphors, how or to what extent the transference model applies to them. As I said, I will first approach this question trying to make sense of metaphoric-conceptual application from a rule-following perspective and see how far I come and how this coheres with other perspectives and understandings. This includes inspecting and comparing with Steinhart's proposal and the transference model.

3.1. The Working of Metaphors

Although not all metaphors work the same way, let’s take, for example, Steinhart’s ‘cell-fabric’ or Hobbes’s metaphor of ‘the State as an artificial animal’. The reason these are metaphors is because we would tend to say that the term ‘animal’ cannot literally, that is, truthfully, be applied to the State, or the term ‘fabric’ to the cell, for instance. Why not? Well, just the same as we would not accept the term ‘elephant’ to be applied to a cloud similarly shaped, or ‘octopus’ to a much too embracing partner. Although we can most obviously see some resemblances between these cases, we cannot, on pain of meaning dissolution, let our common use of words be expanded freely following merely the inextinguishable possibilities humans have of finding resemblances.⁹ This, unlike what a permissive family resemblance account of meaning would seem to suggest, would seriously threaten any shared and truthful linguistic understanding. We do not want any

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⁹ Omitted for reasons of anonymity.
pear-shaped object in the world ending up being a pear and then obtain a collection of
varieties when we ask our creative loved ones to get a kilogram of them. Not to speak of
elephant-like collections of delight. That is why, strictly speaking, we rather say these are
‘pear-shaped’ objects or ‘elephant-like’ ones. Clearly, not anything can be ‘an elephant’
or ‘a pear’. While we do limit conceptual application through shared criteria, even if these
should be evolving ones, our capacity to go on finding similarities clearly transcends
these.\textsuperscript{10} In making use of this capacity, we trespass to the territory of the playful and
artistic, and this is the territory of the metaphoric too.

I do believe that metaphorical language use is mostly about such transgressions and our
confidence that others can follow us that far. However, not every expansion of a concept
beyond shared use is necessarily a metaphor. If a child calls a zebra ‘a cow’ or an orange
‘a ball’, he is not making a metaphor. But the puzzling thing is that we can even use
metaphors that attribute contrary properties to some things, as in Heraclitus’s aphorism
“War is the father of all things”, where clearly ‘war’ amounts to destruction and
‘fatherhood’ to creation. In the same line, unifying opposites, Garcia Lorca writes, “and
love warms itself with snow tears”. This last one is a complex metaphor, since the idea
of love ‘warming itself’ is already a metaphor, and then that this should be through ‘snow
tears’ introduces additional metaphorical charge. But the fact that the whole complex of
feelings at issue should through the coldness (the snow tears) be warming suggests that,
somehow, the experience allows comparison with both. The question is how can some
experience exhibit resemblances with complete opposites, and, furthermore, how can this
be informative and meaningful. We can, in fact, make the most grotesque metaphorical
constructions. We can say “a man is a ballpen”, or “a hand a piece of bread” or “a hand a

\textsuperscript{10} Omitted for reasons of anonymity.
submarine”, “a star a waterfall”, “sadness a heap of sand” — almost anything is possible. So, the question is if resemblance is central to metaphor, how could these apparently opposed and unlike things be found alike in any sense.

The clue, I think, is that we do not limit ourselves to compare some (conceptualised) types of things with each other. We are not referring simply to the target (keeping Steinhart’s useful differentiation between target and source) but often to it through the different contexts, relations, or associated stories we are connecting it with. How could a man be a ballpen? Well, even when this is truly the first occurrence that came to my mind, having considered no similarity before, I could, once suggested, make quick sense of it, appealing to a man’s capacity to slide along the world writing his story, for example. It was not difficult. But give me any other comparison term and I will find a way to trace a resemblance too. Consider: “a hand/a piece of bread”. Well, the piece of dough for which the whole human being is the loaf, soft, tender and white, warm at times, and always helpful for our survival. Now, “a hand/a submarine”. I can turn my eyes to the capacity of the hand to hide under a table and not come to the surface, so that others remain unaware of the secret missions taking place down there. “Star/waterfall”? I just need to consider the sparks of the star, its continuous, never-ending poring of brilliance. “Sadness a heap of sand?” No worries! These are weighty, earthy tears, with a heaviness antithetic to the lightness of happiness, which anticipates our earthy final nature (if we should be allowed, going the creative path). “A tree/a ball”? Hmm, more difficult, but let us try this: a tree is a ball of nature we turn round and round from fruits to seeds to flowers and back again!
Does that mean that anything can be made similar to anything else somehow? I have been made aware that Nelson Goodman seems to have suggested that. 11 Wittgenstein, for his part, argued that a rule can be made to cohere with anything (quote), and this would seem to fit here quite well. If with ‘family resemblance’ we refer to a lax ‘crisscrossing of similarities’ in Wittgenstein’s terms, our examples do cross at some point. If I now add a new member, let’s say my sunglasses are characterised as “submarine” too to the midday light and its UVA rays, keeping my thoughts and plans hidden from the eyes of curious strangers. Am I proposing through my verbal sharing to lay the terms of a new rule? One, perhaps, that focuses more on the abstract aspects of the submarine, its role, its clandestine activities, and the purpose to hide them, while leaving its physical appearance, transport abilities, and aqueous medium aside. Or am I simply expansively applying our old rule to unforeseen members and expecting others to follow, as if our hands and sunglasses were Goodman’s and Kripke’s “grue emeralds” in the ‘submarine’ world? As argued above, we do have criteria to exclude sunglasses and hands from being regarded as true ‘submarines’. Unless the linguistic community agrees to the contrary, this cannot be an acceptable expansion of the rule. The alternative option considered implies reducing my pattern to the mere functional aspects of submarines and from this perspective finding new candidates: political dealings, love affairs, algorithms. In that sense, we would be making a new rule.

This would go along with Glucksberg’s (2001, pp. 38–42) reconstruction of metaphors as attributive categories denoting class inclusion. His proposal is precisely that we would have a dual use of metaphorical terms. On the one hand, a term could denote a series of concrete objects. On the other, it could be used as an abstract category that refers to its

11 Reading Glucksberg (2001), I was made aware that Nelson Goodman (1972) appears to have said that ‘everything in the world is similar to everything else in the world in some sense’, which is also perfectly suitable here.
functional aspect and could as such apply to different objects. So, our ‘submarine’
denotes, in our terms, two different rules: the concrete one that would apply to specimens
of ships with special characteristics, and the abstract one that allows as members hands,
political dealings, love affairs, etc. Glucksberg (2001) offers an interesting explanation
as to why this mechanism is not at all an exception in human linguistic behaviour, but
rather exposes a natural tendency to use prototypes of a class in attributive modus to refer
to all similar objects, as when we use Kleenex to refer to all paper handkerchiefs, or Xerox
to all photocopy machines (p. 40), or, in our case, ‘submarines’ to refer to hidden
activities. In some languages, such as the sign language of the deaf or some primitive
languages, this would even constitute the standard, he argues. Concrete words are used
as abstract class terms.
Glucksberg’s proposal is most clarifying. It can give account of some puzzling aspects of
metaphors, such as what he calls the ‘non-reversibility of metaphors’. I believe he is right
that, for the most part, in using a metaphor we are trying to include a new individual (our
target) in the extension of a concept. Therefore, a hierarchy is introduced that makes a
reversion unsuitable. This insight allows to explain that characteristic wonderfully. It
perfectly coheres too with the rule-following perspective we were considering. As he
says, even when the metaphor appears to be reversible, it does not mean the same in the
one direction as in the other.
However, while in Glucksberg’s account we create a new, previously non-existent
meaning that we will use as the abstract meaning of the term, what in his example
corresponds to being ‘vicious, predatory, aggressive, tenacious’, constituting the new
abstract meaning of the term ‘shark’, these are aspects that belong partially to the meaning
of the term. They leave aside, as he describes it, others such as ‘can swim, has fins, has
sharp teeth, etc.’ (p. 41). An issue that calls for attention here is that seeing this metaphoric
use as a new category, or a new derived rule that allows further members, conflicts somehow with our sense of the uniqueness of metaphors. We, in fact, do not want a new, more restricted term to do the job; we would not go for it if there were one fitting those specific aspects.\textsuperscript{12} We really want to keep the appeal and charm of the resemblance with true members of the original term (in Glucksberg’s example, the shark). It is as if in being attributed to them, it would provide something akin to a caricature of those lawyers or fiscal agents we want to present on those terms. We want in fact the whole imposing bloody picture of the shark with its physical attributes, its cold eyes, its silver gleaming skin, its fin visible from afar, and the over-dimensioned teeth — they all should play their part in the symbiosis that the metaphor allows. Instead of pinning down a new, more restricted abstract category that really applies to both, we want to leave open the whole interplay of resemblances to be found. Of course, in a sense, these latter ones do not apply in truth to our target, while the others, those in the abstract category, do. But we do not just want to be truthful. There are several ways of finding resemblances: the silverly gleaming skin brings a knife to mind, the rapid and barely visible fin approaching, the undercover threat when the teeth are finally visible. Each feature can play its part in further associations we make; each allows further resemblances in a kind of metaphoric reverberance, and the author wants to facilitate this pluri-valence, invite further interconnected stories (higher-order resemblance) that can nourish each other in the interplay with the target. For this reason, I tend to prefer the transgressive expansion of resemblances option, without a defined traced path as a model. However, it must be acknowledged that, when talking in terms of truthfulness, these semantic acts of same-

\textsuperscript{12} In this sense, consider Black’s (1962, pp. 31-34) critique of substitutional views (as if we were to encipher the intended abstract meaning that the metaphor would be expressing through the literal one). The term \textit{catachresis} would refer to the use of metaphors to fill a gap in language, a failing word, whose place is occupied by the metaphor. But, as Black says, when this is the case, the term as a metaphor is deemed to disappear. I do believe that metaphors fill a comprehensive gap (the one expressing the author’s perspective upon the target (the metaphorical pattern), but not one that could be replaced by an abstract category or any new word.
rule transgression (though not literally true) are particularly successful in their own way, because they suitably rely on those more correctly applicable abstract features.

3.2. Metaphors from the Author’s Perspective

Let us pay attention now to the way metaphors are created. The casual examples proposed above were selected by their apparent dissimilitude, their unrelatedness. It was *a posteriori* that I considered a plexus of aspects, complex contexts, related structures, functions, appearances, etc. through which an analogy could be made. But that is not the way metaphors are normally created. My experiment was artificial. It aimed to show the surprising fact that actually we can drive analogies almost as far as we want. In creating metaphors, however, the author experiences and gathers a whole bunch of associations, personal recollections, popular colourings, and historical or cultural interplays with the target that the source, together with the network of cultural (or personal) connections it, again, releases for us and allows to express more accurately. This provokes the selection of a specific source as a metaphor in an often-unconscious way. A perceptual shark might simply surface into the author’s mind or pour out through his pen without warning or workout. The drawn analogy need not concern the source’s conceptual pattern, but either aspects of it, as in Glucksberg's abstract shark, or enhanced associations with it recalled precisely through their resemblances with the author’s personal gathering. This gathering is of itself a pattern, and it is this pattern, *and not the target*, that the source most precisely resembles.

A few aspects to be commented upon here. First, I want to draw special attention to the capacity we exhibit in the metaphoric creation process to gather a series of complex aspects and associations that we then try to couple with some term (the source) that allows sufficient enough matching. The suggestion is that the specific considerations under
which we witness our target build of themselves a higher-order pattern, through a process not so different from the way standard concepts are created. By the constitution of some empirical concept, we fix our attention on the physical characteristics of, for example, a rhinoceros, its size, colour, general appearance, horn, reproduction system, etc. Here, though, we might be paying attention to more sophisticated aspects, which can include cultural codes, just as seeing someone as too old-fashioned, unusual for his generation, big, heavy and scary, and kind of an endangered cultural species. These aspects are gathered too through a cognitive synthesis in the search for a good match, which might find success in calling him ‘an Australopithecus’. What metaphors do is, thus, to create higher-order patterns agglutinating complex features and other connotations, where there are no specific concepts, and borrowing the closest one available to capture most of it. This suggests that the function of art is indeed to create new non-conceptual patterns that allow us to capture specific perspectives regarding reality that go beyond any ready-made conceptual apprehension. Second, even if it constitutes a pattern, the grade of specificity our considerations might achieve counsels against the creation of a specific new concept to register it. This again would speak for the specificity and unity of the artwork. In a sense, it would be a case of catachresis, but in my reconstruction it is not deemed to disappear into an abstract category.

Glucksberg’s suggestion of an abstract category derived from the source term and applicable to the target would cover some other metaphoric cases with difficulty. For example, if I say, “Your eyes are Trafalgar Square on a rainy day”, it is rather forced to say there is an abstract pattern of Trafalgar Square covering both the physical Trafalgar Square and your eyes. Maybe I am recalling you sitting on a bench with a languid distant gaze in Trafalgar Square one rainy evening, with the lights of Trafalgar Square reflected
in your iris. Maybe Trafalgar Square for me is the centre of the world, and I am further implying your eyes are the centre of the world to me. My experience in considering the gaze in your eyes brings a whole mnemonical recollection to mind having that picture of Trafalgar Square as its most prominent match. Or maybe there is no recollection at all, simply a wild association of two pictures of nostalgia, the one expressed by your eyes and the one I have experienced of Trafalgar Square on a rainy day. Or, on the contrary, your expression might resemble that of the triumphant silhouette of Captain Nelson with proud gaze against the rain. A reader requires some imagination to complete the analogy going far beyond a common category. Of course, the problem is how far we can become private in our associative networks and keep sufficient understanding. Such constructions, nevertheless, put forward the difficulty of providing a common description in terms of abstract categories.

At times, our ampliative consideration of the target might in effect deliver a new abstract pattern that matches different candidates, including the source. Imagine in considering silence, I say “silence is empty saddlebags”, thinking of all the tumult of noises and troubles we carry unceasingly with us, bustling minds full of nonstop thinking, worries, relations, or properties requiring care, collection, and recollection, never-ending sound we are saddled with. Those thoughts and feelings we put together often unconsciously bring us per inversion to a negative pattern, and their lacking would amount to silence. This emptiness of something that can be full can be matched by other candidates — empty bottles, empty drawers, etc. — but there are important nuances that the empty saddlebags cover, and the others do not, the effect of being saddled, the idea of carrying it with you through a journey, the heaviness weighing upon you, that the other candidates do not match as well. To what extent can we say that we are dealing with an abstract category that covers all, as in Glucksberg’s model? If we limit it to the basic ‘emptiness of
something that can be full’, we can argue that both silence and the empty saddlebags, as well as all the other candidates, fall under the category; but as was the case with the shark, very explicit and specific aspects of the saddlebags make further contributions to our more extensive pattern.

I have been talking in terms of ‘patterns’ since in the absence of existent linguistic terms, coming to a conceptual category requires the previous non-conceptual synthesis of aspects that we might posteriorly see resembled in several possible source concepts together with their more or less shared connotations. If concepts or categories are intersubjective terms, there is, strictly speaking, no concept yet. That is, from the author's perspective, there would first be this gathering and just later, once a specific source concept is chosen, 'a category' that comes close to expressing it linguistically. For Glucksberg, as we saw, this would be an abstract version of the particular term chosen with its new restricted meaning (the abstract shark) that allows application to the unusual case. But even once a given source term is chosen — “empty saddlebags”, for example — it is in the way it needs to be adapted to cover the anomalous target case that the meaning comes closer to expressing what the author had in mind. The communality, we said, is not with the target but with a way of considering it, and that is what the reader attempts to figure out through the path led by the source concept. To be sure, the two-step explanation we have given can be put down like this: 1) we obtain a pattern that often enables plural resemblances (different possible mappings, if we use Steinhart's terminology), and 2) we come to a concept (or category) once the selection of the most fitting term is made. This allows us to keep talking of matching while explaining Glucksberg’s non-reversibility aspect. To the extent that the match is not between source

13 Omitted for reasons of anonymity.
and target, but between a way of contemplating the second and the first (which allows its linguistic expression), we can say the target itself falls under the source term, since it falls too under a specific way of being considered. The source term irreversibly applies to the target, not the other way around. Glucksberg explicitly questions the matching account of metaphors because he does not make the distinction between the target and the pattern of the target. We do not have a match between ‘silence’ and “empty saddlebags”, but between the author’s personal thoughts and associations with silence (the pattern) and empty saddlebags.

However, it is interesting to consider in this context what Steinhart, following Hall (1989), calls the three phases of metaphorical transference. He distinguishes 1) analogical access, 2) analogical mapping, and 3) transference (inductive transmission of the characteristics of the ones to the others).

Analogue inference finds and uses the shared relational structure of conceptual systems to extend our knowledge. Analogue inference begins with a known system T, searches a knowledge-base (e.g. the Network of conventional knowledge) for a better-known system S sharing relational structure with T, and then exploits the fact that the known structure of T is the same as (or very similar to) that of S in order to infer the existence of additional structure in T that is also the same as (or very similar to) that of S.2 (Steinhart, 2001 p., 84)

In Steinhart’s account, in the access stage, we would try to find ‘a shared relational structure’ between target and possible sources. Steinhart’s explanation of how exactly this takes place in his logical system is quite complex, but the general idea is the following: We would depart from the target situation and try to find relationally
isomorphic source candidates. The mapping process, accordingly, is a matter of showing how the relational structures of both source and target match. For example, in the metaphor ‘Socrates is a midwife’, we would map (i) philosopher/idea/think/express with (ii) mother/baby/conceive/give birth. An alternative source candidate would have been (iii) chef/meal/cook/serve (Steinhart, 2001, p. 88). This fits well with the considered ideas of there being some common pattern, understood in Steinhart's way as a relational structure or common functional role, and it possibly deriving into a category covering other candidates that might have served as well. Steinhart does not talk in these terms, but we could figure out here a category in Glucksberg's terms recording something like (*)'the assistant that helps bring to existence a given product'. Allowing the possibility of plural candidates supports this reconstruction, which, somehow, puts together Glucksberg’s and Steinhart’s suggestions: we could have an abstract category expressing a relational structure that could cover candidates in different contexts, or worlds, as Steinhart puts it. The chosen term 'midwife' in the metaphoric construction Steinhart departs from could be attributed to Glucksberg’s double structure: it expresses the particular concept ‘midwife’, on the one hand, and represents an abstract category too, similar to the one we just proposed. The interesting result is this idea of 'the shared functional role' being a matter of distilling what Glucksberg calls an overarching general category in terms of (*), which admits plural-extension members belonging to different 'worlds', just like 'concealing' covers sunglasses, submarines, or furtive love affairs. As opposed to Glucksberg, Steinhart insists on the matching or mapping, but he is not talking about target and source but about their relational structures or their functional roles. As members of the extension, they would match each other in what the category expresses, but they are irreversibly subsumed under the category. Steinhart is not considering these
questions about categorical application and irreversibility; they actually shine a somewhat
different light on his proposal.

For Steinhart, our goal in this mapping process is to try to understand the target based on
the more accessible knowledge of possible sources. In the cell/fabric case, our familiarity
with the notion of a fabric illuminates our understanding of the cell. This explanation,
however, suits well the theoretical metaphors Steinhart focuses on, such as the
“cell/fabric” or “state/rational animal” cases and, arguably, the “Socrates/midwife” one
too, but less perfectly so other merely literary ones, where it would not be exact, at least
not always, to say that our superior knowledge of the source helps us to understand the
deficiently known target. It is true of them too, as I argued above, that the source allows
us to express better a bunch of aspects gathered regarding the target. However, both the
idea of a common category and Steinhart’s shared relational structure (open also to
various contenders) appear to miss the uniqueness that at least some literary examples
have for us — the very bloody shark with its open teeth and crossed eyes, all those
nuances that make this candidate and not any of the others, the perfect match for our feel.

If we see it from this perspective, the surprising thing is how we manage to express some
things in terms of others so different from them. However, if we think about it, properties
(as is said of universals) are extensively shared by so many things in nature — coolness,
heat, density or lightness, yellowness or brilliance, hardness, softness, roughness,
darkness — all are shared by innumerable things. The same with relations and actions:
producing, inhibiting, fencing, lacking, opening, closing, rotating, hiding. More complex
substances like water, for example, exemplify coldness, liquidity, transparency, density,
softness. Silence and emptiness are both forms of lacking, heaviness a feature of earth
and psychic burdens. The ingredients of the world allow diverse cooking and are found,
as we know, in the most different soups. This permits recognition of sharing similitudes
among incredibly diverse things and the stylisation of any of them to compose abstract
general properties likely to be shared. Shared relational structure in Steinhart’s picture is
made possible through this phenomenon concerning shared actions, shared internal
relations, etc. in disparate fields.

3.3. Metaphors from the Reader’s Perspective

Consider now the perspective of the reader. A reader will find the proposed analogy
brought about by the metaphorical construction between two, in principle dissimilar,
things already done. He, then, proceeds to reconstruct the aspects of the source that could
make sense when applied to the target: according to the transference model, first those
that would grant the analogy and then additional associated features that allow
transference on that basis. The author, Steinhart argues, frequently confronts us directly
with the results of the transference process without making the analogy explicit. We
would not find the cell/fabric analogy directly expressed, but the claim “the cell
manufactures its nutrients”, for instance, or, in his favoured example to illustrate this
point, “my car guzzles gas”. In this last case, the transference of properties from the
animal sphere to the automobile one leaves implicit the basic analogy. But, on other
occasions, such as in “Socrates is a midwife”, there might be no further transferential
elaboration by the author. When there is not, it is the reader who brings forward the
transference process in his understanding of the target when seen from the perspective of
the source, or so Steinhart suggests. The reader might proceed trying to transfer the more
specific characteristics of the source to the target (including the bloodiness, fin, etc. of
the shark), exploiting the unique characteristics of the selected candidate. It might,
therefore, be argued that in Steinhart's model, seen from the perspective of the reader, the
Analogical transference has the form of an inductive argument in which the premises are propositions native to the source and target, and the conclusions are the analogically transferred expressions. (Steinhart, 2001, p. 126)

He bases himself on the proposals of Niiniluoto (1988) and Copi (1982) for inductive arguments by similarity, and he proposes a similar one for analogy (Steinhart, 2001, p. 126).

\[
\begin{align*}
R_1(x), \ldots R_k(x), \ldots R_n(x) \\
R_1(y), \ldots R_k(y), \ldots R_n(y) \\
\hline \\
\alpha(R_k(y)), \ldots \alpha(R_n(y))
\end{align*}
\]

The suggestion is that if there is an analogical isomorphism between two objects \(x\) and \(y\) (belonging to corresponding sets \(S\) and \(T\)), and thereby there is a mapping of properties between \(x\) and \(y\), such that \(R_1(...x..), \ldots R_k(...x..)\) and \(R_1(...y..), \ldots R_k(...y..)\), then if \(x\) has some further properties \(R_k(x)\ldots R_n(x)\), then, per analogy (expressed through the analogy operator \(\alpha\)), \(y\) will have them too, and thus we obtain the conclusion of the argument.

Steinhart here is using the standard inductive model understood according to Leibniz’s law. He also talks of comparing two objects as in our referential model (in a) above). However, our metaphors are mostly not among particulars, but among maybe a particular and a type of thing, like in the shark or the submarine or the midwife. Our understanding of the ‘midwife’ in Steinhart’s example, and he’s capabilities, goes beyond the specimen

uniqueness of this candidate is considered and further elaborated upon. Possibly, although here it is further aspects pertaining to the very idea of the source that are transferred to the target and not others associated with it as in normal inductive cases. Let us concede that the reader proceeds tentatively like this. The question is, then, whether, in the generation process, we can so neatly distinguish between the mapping and the transference stages, whether the author himself proceeds that way. Before I defended that the author bundles together a whole set of associations with the target in the search for the perfect source concept. The answer to the previous question is, thus, to be given with care. This pattern the author gathers, on whose basis the matching with this specific source candidate is done, can already go as far as to include the associated transference properties, or it may even be that it was on their behalf the matching was done. Think of the “sadness is a heap of sand” case or other imaginative ones like “coronavirus and my earrings” (they both stick to our body through their outer spikes). The neat separation between some tokens of a type and further correlated properties that we find in inductive cases is muddled here. The analogy is not between a truthful extension member of the conceptual pattern and is therefore not a truthful case of the type that could justify the transference.

So, how far is this putting into question the transference model in the metaphoric case? Or maybe the transference model works in a somewhat different way here.

4. Transference again

For Steinhart, the transference process would be mediated through a form of inductive inference that he explicitly explains through Leibniz’s indiscernibility of identicals. All three stages of analogical transference would rely on an inductive process so understood.
Analogical transference has the form of an inductive argument in which the premises are propositions native to the source and the target, and the conclusions are the analogically transferred expressions. (Steinhart, 2001, p. 126)

He bases himself on the proposals of Niiniluoto (1988) and Copi (1982) for inductive arguments by similarity, and he proposes a similar one for analogy (Steinhart, 2001, p. 126).

R1(\ldots x\ldots), \ldots Rk-1(\ldots x\ldots), R k(\ldots x\ldots), \ldots Rn(\ldots x\ldots)

R1(\ldots y\ldots), \ldots Rk-1(\ldots y\ldots)

\alpha(Rk(\ldots y\ldots)), \ldots \alpha(Rn(\ldots y\ldots))

The suggestion is that if there is an analogical isomorphism between two objects x and y (belonging to corresponding sets S and T), and thereby there is a mapping of properties between x and y, such that R1(\ldots x\ldots), \ldots Rk-1(\ldots x\ldots) and R1(\ldots y\ldots), \ldots Rk-1(\ldots y\ldots), then if x has some further properties Rk(x)\ldots Rn(x), then, per analogy (expressed through the analogy operator \alpha), y will have them too, and thus we obtain the conclusion of the argument.

Steinhart here is using the standard inductive model understood according to Leibniz’s law. He also talks of comparing two objects as in our referential model (in a) above). However, our metaphors are mostly not among particulars, but among maybe a particular and a type of thing, like in the shark or the submarine or the midwife. Our understanding of the ‘midwife’ in Steinhart’s example, and her capabilities, goes beyond the specimen
we might have before our eyes. This token is like ‘and since that one is a dog, this one will bark too’, so to speak. I do, therefore, think that transference is mostly tied to conceptual identification. But, while in the standard case conceptual identification amounts already to confirming a common core conceptual pattern first and then, on its basis, further characteristics, in the metaphoric case, things are different. In non-metaphoric cases, those further associations are understood as new empirically gained synthetic information about the type registered by our conceptual pattern, which will be transferred to any new token. In the metaphoric cases, there is 1) a mere conceptual identification but no true shared conceptual pattern, since the target would in a literal sense be excluded as a member of the extension of the concept, and 2) the communality found between source and target can already go beyond the conceptual pattern too to include a whole bunch of relational and secondary associations (among which those that might be considered synthetic and ‘inductively gained’ could be included). Resemblance is found to expand as we see fit without the censuring effect of truthful conceptual normativity. In that sense, the separation between those allowing the isomorphism and further ones (seen as inductively transferred in Steinhart’s model) could be less clear-cut here.

Now think of the ‘sadness- heap of sand’ case. It is true that once we have found a set of shared characteristics — heaviness, oppressiveness, burial reminders, for example — these will guide us in the further search for others. If ‘heaviness’ is common to both sadness and a heap of sand, we will think then of immobility, because heaviness can drive or cause immobility; if we consider burial dispositions, we may think of death for similar reasons. Steinhart speaks of the possible existence of a shared determination or causal structure between source and target in the case of metaphors based on the analogical
isomorphism. It need not be, he says, since what is determinant in the source need not be so in the target. This, for similar reasons, goes with what I just argued. But, in a way, each shared property opens a plexus of associations or causal connections that we can try to apply to our target. So, even if the inductive associations that link a conceptual type with further characteristics do not strictly apply to our target, there is an interesting effect here. As I said before, the possibility to find analogies among the most disparate things relies on what we might call 'the ubiquity of properties', the fact that properties are shared among the most widespread variety of existential beings and contexts. Now, those properties on their part are associated among themselves. Heaviness and the difficulty to move go together no matter if we talk of psychic or physical phenomena, and the same with submarine and beyond the surface or any of the others. Properties might also have their own dispositions to cause further effects. So even if our target does not count as a truthful case of the conceptual pattern at stake, with which the inductive association is made, it does make sense to try as we do, because there is truth in the shared properties' associations. This explains further, I believe, the truthfulness of metaphors from which Steinhart wants to speak. Steinhart understands the isomorphism in terms of shared relational structure, or common functional role; however, I think this is ultimately traceable to the fact that common properties and further interactions apply in differing contexts but are the same ones.

As he expressly says, Steinhart considers mainly theoretical metaphors, and he remains cautious as to whether his model applies to literary metaphors as well. My aim is to cover these last ones too, and if we should do so, we might have to expand the idea to convey those cases where the analogy, rather than pre-existent, is created, constructed, imagined by the reader. Take now the Trafalgar Square example. The reader might proceed first, in
the most straightforward way, trying the potential obvious communalities: the eyes of the
addressee play the same functional role in the world of personal relations as Trafalgar
Square on a rainy day does in the city. The proud figure of Nelson defying the rain in the
city will be compared with character traits of the addressee’s eyes in the world of personal
relations, proud against the inconveniences. However, there are many other possible
personal or historical connections that both author and reader could recall. Maybe
fantasies about ways we might figure them up that never were the case. Some experience
the author had on a given day that pins down both photographs superposed, for example,
that of the loved one on a certain bench and Trafalgar Square in pouring rain. Would that
be a relational isomorphism or some other sort of connection? My question is whether
Steinhart's reconstruction in terms of equal functional roles or relational isomorphism
allows us to give account of all sorts of literary metaphors. I think it drives far, aided by
the mentioned universal ubiquity of properties, but it might not be all embracing when it
comes to the possible connections that metaphors allow to trace.

One point needs clarification in this context, and that is how talking about communalities
and the fact that the target is not a truthful case of the conceptual pattern fits with the
defence I made before of it not being a set of abstract characteristics as Glucksberg
proposes, but the whole idea of the source, the whole bloody shark that we want to have
present. I think the clue is that we want to consider the whole because the metaphor can
thrive when looked at from different perspectives. Visual reminders of aggressivity are
more expressive when the teeth and the eyes take part in the picture, and fear is called for
by the fin becoming visible and coming towards one, with bloody legs of the victims
contributing to intensify the scary feelings. That is, visual and experiential, filmic or told
stories, all are playing their part. Any of the characteristics at differing experiential or
associative levels can contribute to the resemblance. And, yes, it is commonality, in this sense, but also staging or a soundtrack, intensification of the experience by associated memories. These last ideas are exploited by those defending the 'framing effect' account, such as Richard Moran and similar proposals. We will explore them below in considering Black's account.

Going back to the point about transference, I have defended the associative model against the one based on Leibniz’s law. I believe the first step of the analogy is not between particular instances but between the gathered pattern of the target and the source concept plus possible further associations. But the reason transference does not work standardly in the case of metaphors is of a different sort that does not depend on the chosen model.

(i) We have a conceptual application of the source concept to the target, but no truthful application of it (we are not identifying, or recognising, the conceptual pattern of the source in the target considered on its own); furthermore, those characteristics issuing the resemblance might include already secondary inductive (or other) associations with it.

(ii) Since it is not the same normatively accepted conceptual pattern \( \varphi \), but rather a transgressive resemblance expansion of it \( \varphi^{\#} \), other causal or dispositional associations \( \xi \) with that first source conceptual pattern \( \varphi \) need not work here. However, (iii) since, as we saw, there is nevertheless a communality of shared properties (heavy, dark, dangerous, etc.) that, on their part, are associated with other dispositions or otherwise tied to them; there are reasons to truthfully go for some transference in that sense. At the level of properties, this could be perfectly well explained through the associative model. Some might still argue that in both the conceptual attribution and the further inductive transference on its basis we would be acting in terms of 'make believe' (Walton 1993).

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14 I do not want to say it is a different rule, but a transgressive expansion of the rule.
We do *as if* the one applies and *as if* the other therefore applies too. But there is something to the truthfulness of metaphors, as Steinhart argues, that I see explainable through the truthfulness of shared properties and their implications.

To make sure, in defending that the conceptual pattern is not truthfully applied and in talking of a "resemblance expansion of it ϕ*", I am defending that there are non-normatively shared transgressions of conceptual rules. These, I have defended, are characteristic of art. An artist on his own can go on expanding the rule for the application of a concept using resemblances at whichever level of abstraction, and, although we cannot pretend this to be accepted as truthful applications, we do have the capacity to follow. I think metaphorical use of words allows explanation in these terms.

5. **Max Black on Metaphors from the Reader’s Perspective**

In his reconstruction of metaphors, Max Black (1962) tends to adopt the perspective of the reader, explaining how metaphors work and are meaningful to the reader. Through the metaphor, he says, the reader will recall characteristic commonplaces about the source and tries to see them then in the target. He will try to view the target from that perspective. The idea is to see the metaphor as a filter which would enable us to focus specifically upon those aspects of the target that allowed viewing it according to the evoked commonplaces associated with the source, leaving others that do not permit comparison in the shadows.

Let us try, for instance, to think of a metaphor as a filter. Consider the statement, "Man is a wolf." Here, we may say, are *two* subjects—the principal subject, Man
(or: men) and the subsidiary subject, Wolf (or: wolves). Now the metaphorical sentence in question will not convey its intended meaning to a reader sufficiently ignorant about wolves. What is needed is not so much that the reader shall know the standard dictionary meaning of "wolf"-or be able to use that word in literal senses—as that he shall know what we will call the *system of associated commonplaces*.

Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in "wolf-language" will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot, will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others—in short, *organizes* our view of man. (Black, 1962, p. 41)

Black's suggestion of metaphors being a filter is wonderfully illuminating. On the one hand, it stresses the idea of metaphors providing a 'given way of considering the target' that coheres with what I said before about the generation of metaphors from the author's perspective. Since it is not the target, but a specific way of considering the target, that is best registered through the source concept together with its associations. This goes along with Black's idea that it is not the whole target but those ways of viewing it that we want to express or illuminate. On the other hand, the appeal to what remains in the shadows deserves attention as well. In fact, it seems to me most profitable to explain other related phenomena to our analogic capacities that we should be considering too.

Even if, as I have argued, the associations we can make with the source go beyond the 'system of associated commonplaces' Black envisages (referring possibly to cultural connotations or more personalised ones), both standard meaning and associated common places are non-renounceable. The reader must have some hold in understanding from which to depart. These need not exclude taking into account also those other aspects that
do not immediately allow application “in man language”, as in the shark example, the teeth or the dark fur of the wolf, the howling and all those intensifying impressions that feed our fear and reach vivid sensations and recollections, fairy tales, stories, etc. In making the metaphor, the author is inviting us to 'consider man from this perspective', and you can then add personalised experiences to the picture.

6. On Light and Shadows

I would like to explore the downside of the metaphor now, the couple pinched together by the illumination and the shadows. With it we shall consider some negative sides of our metaphoric capacities that link them to more tendentious or manipulative practices, such as caricatures, propaganda, and tergiversate 'framing'. To the extent that we can find ways to match the target with the source and, as we saw, this need not be difficult at all, we can easily raise a case for similarity, intensifying in readers or observers (when the metaphor is a visual one, as is often the case in publicity) the sense of true likeness. In tendentious comparisons or caricatures, in politics, for example, it is often enough to find some slight coincident truths on which to build the analogy, even if there should be much that, carefully looked at, speaks against it. Or if an absolutely opposite analogy should be perfectly well applied to the same target: 'men are sheep', for example. You just have to add some intensifiers and the true basis will be enough to do the magic. Even if it has been suggested that the whole of language works in a sense that way (consider heideggerian accounts for example), there is, no doubt, an essential difference regarding both the extent and truthfulness of the match and the extent that contradicts it while remaining in the shadows. We cannot expect that the target meets the source's conceptual pattern truthfully, but we do and should expect it to be so in the normal case.
To finish with, insane forms of analogical reasoning appear to function by expanding the considered transgressive resemblance mechanism to the extreme. In other words, they appear to have lost the capacity to separate normatively guided truthful applications from slight and quick personalised ones, thereby speeding up the process of resemblance-finding without the patience of careful exactitude proof needed for truthful attribution.

The upshot, therefore, should be that while the appeal to sensations, connotations, and emotions can beautify and enlarge our worldview, we should beware that it may also be aimed at shining a deceitful light on it.

7. References


