Ethics for drone operators: rules versus virtues

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Abstract

Until recently most militaries tended to see moral issues through the lens of rules and regulations. Today, however, many armed forces consider teaching virtues to be an important complement to imposing rules and codes from above. A closer look reveals that it is mainly established military virtues such as honour, courage and loyalty that dominate both the lists of virtues and values of most militaries and the growing body of literature on military virtues. Although there is evidently still a role for these traditional martial virtues, it is equally evident that they are not particularly relevant to, for instance, military personnel operating drones. This chapter looks into the ethics of unmanned warfare from the perspective of military virtues and military ethics education, and addresses the question of what we need to solve that just-mentioned misalignment: 1) a new set of virtues; 2) a different interpretation of the existing virtues; or 3) a different approach altogether, that is, an alternative to teaching virtues? That we have to think about such questions is at least partly because unmanned systems bring risk asymmetry in war to a new level, making warlike virtues such as physical courage by and large obsolete. The last section of this chapter therefore addresses the question: to what extent does the possibility of riskless warfare makes drone use ‘virtue-less’?

Introduction

Militaries are by tradition rule-guided organizations. And mostly for good reasons: setting rules makes clear to military personnel what they can and cannot do, and provides outsiders to the organization, say the local population in a mission area, with some security regarding the way they are treated. An example is the prohibition of torture, a ban that is to be maintained regardless of how expedient it might be not to do so. Some decisions, and the matter of torture is again a good illustration of that (but so is the use of certain types of weapons, such as chemical and biological weapons, or expanding bullets), we rather do not leave to the discretion of the individual soldier. Rule-based ethics point to the importance of having universal, categorically binding moral norms. On
the other hand, such rule-based approaches have as an important downside that rules lack flexibility, and are often mostly ineffective when there are no witnesses around. Also, rule-following can impede the ability to see the moral aspect of what one is doing, while that ability is evidently essential to morally sound decision-making. Hence that rules should leave soldiers with some leeway in that decision making, if only to keep them from committing so-called ‘crimes of obedience’ (Kelman and Hamilton 1989). It is probably for that reason that one text book on military ethics, meant for educating military personnel, unambiguously states that ‘in any situation where law and ethics set different standards, a member of the military profession will follow the higher standard, inevitably the one required by ethics’ (Coleman 2013, 268).

Making good use of this leeway presupposes a good disposition, though, and it is at least partly for that reason that many militaries see a virtue-based approach to teaching military ethics as an important complement to rules imposed from above in their effort to make their personnel behave ethically. Where rule-based approaches, interpreted narrowly, mainly aim at securing compliance, virtue ethics asks for a lot more, including the kind of supererogatory acts the military depends on. What is more, virtue ethics assumes that character can be developed: virtues are to be understood as dispositions that can be acquired through training and practice. This appeals to many military trainers and educators because such an approach sits rather well with the way most militaries see themselves: as being in the business of character-building. Finally, virtue ethics is in keeping with the tendency of many Western militaries to move away in their ethics education from a largely functional approach towards a more aspirational approach that aims at making soldiers better persons, mainly based on the view that bad persons are not likely to form morally good soldiers – although they could of course still be effective ones (Robinson 2007; Wolfendale 2008, 164).

In theory utilitarianism is a possible third candidate for underpinning the ethics education for military personnel, but in practice it is seen by most as particularly unfit for that purpose, mostly because ‘an outcome-centred approach may lead all too easily to military expedience as the sole guide to actions in war’ (Bonadonna 1994, 18). Utilitarianism not only holds that we should base our judgment of whether an act is morally right or wrong (and hence also whether it should be done or not) upon the foreseen consequences, but also, much more revolutionary, that everyone’s life and happiness should weigh equally. Its critics seem to hold that utilitarianism is not bad per se, but that the utilitarian calculus is likely to be misapplied in a self-serving way. Military ethicist and political philosopher Michael Walzer has pointed out, as have many others, that the valuing of ‘each and every person’ in the same way will not work when ‘solidarity collapses’ (2004, 39). Precisely that is what happens in war, where we cannot but expect to see little willingness to take the consequences to all parties into account equally.
The ethics (and specifically the just war theory) that is to guide politicians and military decision makers during armed conflict consists of a mix of rule-based elements (such as the prohibition of certain weapons, and discrimination between civilians and combatants) and, despite Walzer’s misgivings, more utilitarian ones (proportionality, chance of success). However, as we already noted, most militaries today consider an aspirational virtue ethics approach as the best way to underpin the ethics education of military personnel that are actually carrying out military operations (Robinson 2007). The question is whether this approach is also the best one for the moral education of drone operators, and if it is, what virtues should hold central place in that virtue-based education. The more general, underlying question is whether what counts as a military virtue is place and time dependent; at first sight a convincing argument can be made that this is not the case. Some military virtues are valued in all times and places – mainly because they perform an important function in or for the military. Martial courage is, of course, the obvious example here, being the quintessential military virtue. But if we take a closer look at courage, it also becomes clear that drones bring us to a whole new ball game: its operators do not seem to need physical courage at all. Regarding other important military virtues appearing on military lists (see Robinson 2008), such as loyalty, discipline or obedience, it is at the minimum unclear what beneficial role they could have for operating armed drones.

If we for the moment assume that traditional martial virtues such as physical courage are not the most relevant for drone operators, there are at least three possible answers to the question what we do need. One could argue, of course, 1) that the virtue approach is the right one, but that we need virtues that are better suited for military personnel flying drones than the traditional rather bellicose ones are; or 2) that not only the virtue approach is the right one, but that the traditional virtues by and large suffice – with the caveat that the use of drones does ask for new interpretations of these virtues; or, finally, 3) that virtues are of little help here and that we need something different altogether, presumably rule-based or utilitarian ethics, or a combination of both.

‘New’ virtues for new tasks

If we assume that the existing conceptions of current militaries’ virtues are of little use in regulating the conduct of drone operators, devising a new list of virtues would be a first possible way forward. In this line of thought, drone operators do need virtues, but not necessarily the traditional military ones. The virtues we teach military personnel are to fit their particular job, and the virtues that drone operators need are most likely more about exercising restraint than about demonstrating virtues such as courage, loyalty, and discipline. Such virtues of restraint are less military-specific, and could for instance be found among the more ‘general’ cardinal virtues. Interestingly, of the four cardinal virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance and justice, only courage has hitherto made it to the
traditional lists of military virtues and values, albeit not only in its Aristotelian form of physical
courage on the battlefield, but also as moral courage. Wisdom, temperance and justice have not
made it to most lists of military values, but are today probably as necessary as courage is (see Skerker
et al. 2019). These virtues have a wider scope than the traditional military virtues, and incorporating
them could have the collateral benefit that it would bring those parts of the military that would
subscribe to these cardinal virtues in closer alignment with society at large. Respect, incidentally, is a
virtue that is listed by many militaries, but is evidently also deemed important in larger society.
Opting for a set of virtues that is closer to the four cardinal virtues would also give us a set of virtues
that does justice to the ancient idea that one cannot have one virtue without the others, and that all
the virtues are interrelated. Being just is of little value if one lacks the courage to defend justice, for
instance, while courage is of not much use without practical wisdom to guide it. The haphazard lists
of virtues militaries now subscribe to (see Robinson 2008) miss these interconnections.
Yet one could also argue that devising a new list of virtues from scratch is perhaps a bridge
too far for what is for the most part a relatively traditional organization. That the existing military
virtues are ill-aligned does not necessarily mean we have to opt for different ones. Instead, one could
also identify the weaknesses of the existing virtues and see if the way militaries interpret these
traditional virtues can be improved. Although most militaries today cling to fairly traditional
interpretations of the virtues, other readings are of course possible. The question is then not which
new virtues the military should promote, but in what form the existing ones should best be
understood.

*Interpreting the old virtues in new ways*

So a second way forward would be to interpret the existing virtues somewhat differently, more
precisely: less narrowly, than is commonly the case (see Schulzke 2016, 195-6). The gist of the codes,
oaths, and values (which, even if their actual influence is limited, at the minimum do communicate
what an organization thinks important) as currently formulated in most militaries mainly pay
attention to the organization and colleagues; there is little in them that regulates the behaviour of
soldiers towards civilian populations. The virtue of courage is especially interesting in the context of
unmanned warfare. We already noted above that at present most conceptions of military courage
include moral courage, instead of being limited to more martial (physical) forms of courage. So it
seems that courage means different things in different contexts. Aristotle, for instance, famously
defined courage in his Nicomachean Ethics as the mean between rashness and cowardice, and
thought that this virtue is especially needed in battle – a brave man does not fear a noble death in
war (Aristotle 1962). This conception of courage as a mean fitted the ancient Greek phalanx
formation very well, as both an excess or a deficiency of courage would destroy the organized whole
it was. But this martial notion of courage is clearly worlds apart from what Gandhi envisioned when he pleaded for courageous but nonviolent resistance to British colonial rule – that was about moral courage.

Some years ago, Jesse Kirkpatrick (2015a/b) and Robert Sparrow (2015a) had an interesting although somewhat semantic discussion on the question whether or not drone operators possessed the virtue of courage. If a definite conclusion had to be drawn from that discussion, it would be that these operators do need courage, but more in the form of moral courage than martial courage.

Seeing that drone operators run no significant physical risk (at least not in the current asymmetric conflicts) the term ‘martial courage’ is out of place here. Moral courage is an important subspecies of the virtue of courage as it asks us to uphold our principles even if others disagree, and perhaps hold us in contempt for sticking to them. As Ian Miller defines it, moral courage is ‘the capacity to overcome the fear of shame and humiliation in order to admit one’s mistakes, to confess a wrong, to reject evil conformity, to denounce injustice, and to defy immoral or imprudent orders’ (2000, 254).

It is virtues such as these that have to provide guidance to military personnel in morally ambiguous situations, seeing that providing general rules and guidelines for such complex situations will not work – militaries seem now and then even disinclined to give them (see for instance Whetham 2017). Peter de Lee (2019) gives an excellent example when he describes how an acting sergeant on her first day in a supervisory role overseeing a Reaper team stuck to her judgment, against the opinion of all present, that an alleged parcel placed on the back seat of a motorbike piloted by a Taliban target was in fact a child – which it in the end turned out to be. (She would have been equally courageous, of course, if the supposed parcel turned out to be precisely that – a parcel. But in that case it would perhaps have been more difficult to muster that same amount of moral courage at another time.)

What is interesting here is that physical courage is primarily (though certainly not only) something one’s superiors and colleagues benefit from. Moral courage has a wider reach, and is, in line with the earlier mentioned distinction between an aspirational and a functional approach, more about being a better person than about being an effective soldier (compare Robinson 2007, 22; Robinson 2008, 1). This form of courage is not only important to the military because it needs personnel who dare to blow the whistle if necessary, but also because it benefits from soldiers who dare to correct colleagues when they think they act wrongly, or even report them if necessary. Its beneficiaries, today, are not only military colleagues, as is predominantly the case with physical courage, but, as the example of the acting sergeant clearly shows, also the outsiders (e.g. civilians in the vicinity of a planned drone strike) the military is there to protect. Moral courage can only perform that function if militaries allow room for it, however. The good thing is that militaries today rarely fail to at least pay lip service to moral courage, and they generally claim to deem it a plus to
have among its personnel principled people who dare to blow the whistle if necessary – or to stop a colleague who is about to commit a wrong. But although their definitions of courage include moral courage, in reality military organizations all too often offer a fairly unfriendly environment for acting on moral principles, especially when adherence to these principles appears to conflict with organizational interests or mission success. That drone pilots are probably less subject to the forces of peer pressure and group loyalty than other members of the military could make it easier for them to gather the moral courage that is needed to make right decisions or to display loyalty to principle instead of group loyalty (Lee 2012, 15).

Loyalty is as often mentioned on lists of military virtues as courage is. But that same loyalty that militaries value so much is at the same time a cause of both unethical conduct and attempts to cover that conduct up. To improve matters militaries could interpret loyalty in such a way as that it includes loyalty to a profession or principle, not just loyalty to one’s group and organization, as we now often see (see also Olsthoorn 2011). Loyalty to one’s professional ethic, instead of to one’s organization and colleagues, is nothing more or less than what is commonly understood to be one of the key characteristics of a professional, something military personnel claim to be. Of course, the position of a professional in a civilian occupation is essentially different from military personnel in a conflict zone. That civilian professional can put the interest of his clients above everything else without putting him- or herself in harm’s way, whereas a soldier cannot at all times act in the interest of the local population without incurring more risks to himself. For that reason, especially when we consider the fact that in the eyes of many the predominant task of most military organizations is still the defence of national territory, the emphasis on loyalty to the organization is not that surprising.

The interesting thing here is, of course, that drone operators can take the interests of outsiders into account with no extra risk to themselves, and in that way the fact that the risks for this category of military personnel is effectively nil might open the door to a more professional – in the meaning of impartial – attitude. One could even wonder whether, at a time when many armed forces consider the promotion of universal principles as their main ground for existence, the development of a truer professionalism, with the main focus of loyalty being the soldier’s professional ethic instead of his organization, is still too far-fetched.

Respect, finally, was mentioned previously as a virtue valued by both the military and society at large. A closer look, however, reveals that respect in the military is now and then limited to respect toward colleagues. The US Army describes respect as, among other things, ‘trusting that all people have done their jobs and fulfilled their duty.’ This definition seems to implicitly limit respect to colleagues. Here, too, a less narrow interpretation seems in place.

Rules and utility instead of virtues
A final way ahead would be to reconsider whether virtues in fact form the best underpinning for the ethics education for drone operators in the first place. We saw that the traditional military virtues are of themselves already more inward looking than the cardinal virtues, but also on more a theoretical level virtue ethics is fairly self-regarding: virtue ethics focuses on the agent and his or her character and flourishing, even in situations (and war is probably such a situation) where an outcome-centred approach would seem to be more appropriate. Aristotle’s idea of virtue is on the whole a lot less attentive to the needs of others than is the utilitarian notion of the greatest happiness for the greatest number or the rule-based maxim to treat others same way you want them to treat you.\(^6\) Now, as we have seen, military ethicists often criticize utilitarianism because it would make military expedience outweigh all other concerns (see for instance Snow 2009, 560), but in fact the consequentialist precept that the consequences to all persons should weigh equally could, if taken seriously, lead to a fairer distribution of the right to life. Utilitarianism does not condone the maximizing of our own utility, as some seem to hold, but that of all. This means that soldiers should take as much care, and run as much risk, to avoid casualties among enemy civilians as they would do for their own civilians (Shaw 2015). Although such an impartial view may be expecting too much from regular soldiers in a regular war in defence of one’s own country, in many of today’s operations in which drones are used one probably should be able to do so a bit more easily. Even when enemy forces do little to avoid civilian casualties, or even target them deliberately, utilitarianism is not about fairness, but about minimizing the damage of warfare (Shaw 2015, 139–140).

As to rule-based ethics, in recent years, both Schulzke (2016) and Renic (2018, 194) have argued that more emphasis on rule-based approaches is in place in the case of drone operators – the first-mentioned mainly on the ground that alternative interpretations of the military virtues that would fit drone warfare are so different from the current ones. In defence of the somewhat more rudimentary form of rule-based ethics (rudimentary because it disregards the good intention most forms of rule-based ethics ask for)\(^7\) that we encounter in most militaries, one could argue that pointing out what is permitted and what is not, and what the consequences of transgressing these rules are, should also have a role in the ethics education for military personnel operating drones. Failing to do so can be costly for perpetrator and victim alike – something that can be overlooked in an ethics education that focuses too much on character development. That universal rules lack flexibility is not always a problem; torture, as we already noted, is at present under every circumstance forbidden, and flexibility here could quickly bring us onto a slippery slope. As said in the introduction, we do not leave the decision on these matters to individual soldiers, however virtuous they might be. The just war tradition is primarily founded on an ethic that stresses the importance of such universal, categorically binding moral rules (though, as we noted before, there are unmistakably also some consequentialist elements within the just war tradition). Clear rules have the
additional benefit that they can turn potential moral dilemmas into tests of integrity: it is clear what is the correct way to proceed, yet there is pressure (from peers, or the prospect of furthering one’s own interest) to follow a different course of action (Coleman 2009, 105-6). Research shows that military personnel who lack guidelines to deal with such morally critical situations experience more moral dilemmas, increasing the likelihood of moral injury (Schut 2015). This risk of moral injury is something that drone operators face too. Although in the past some argued that killing might get a bit easier with the increased physical and psychological distance between soldiers and the battlefield (see for instance Olsthoorn 2011, 126), we now know that ‘[p]hysical separation from the combat zone does not […] automatically lead to emotional disconnection. The crew of a Tornado flying at low level above an enemy contact may be more emotionally disengaged than the Reaper crew’ (Lee 2012).

Risk and the military profession

In earlier days, bows, catapults and firearms have been vilified for being the weapon of choice of cowards, yet it seems that armed drones push things even a bit further by doing away with risk altogether – which raises the interesting question to what extent risk is fundamental to the (image of the) military profession, and whether the elimination of risk will change it. Although the use of drones is on first sight not very different (as long as such systems are not fully autonomous that is) from using an aircraft to drop a bomb from a high altitude, their rise makes it possible to engage the enemy from such a safe distance that it reduces the risks for their military operators to about zero. This reduction in risk to personnel could make one wonder whether the military profession becomes a less honourable one as a consequence, as honour often involves acting against one’s own self-interest (including the preserving of life and limb) to further a higher interest. The difference between running a limited risk and running no risks is perhaps not merely gradual: ‘For men to join in battle is generally thought to be honourable, but not if they are so situated as to be able to kill others without exposing themselves to danger whatever’ (Welsh 2008, 4). The Time magazine journalists Ghosh and Thompson observed that people in Waziristan, the region in Pakistan where drones killed many Taliban leaders, see the use of drones as dishonourable and cowardly (2009). And, according to military ethicist George R. Lucas, ‘the removal of any risk of harm to the military (…) seems grotesquely unfair, persecutory, oppressive, abusive, and therefore morally repugnant,’ reminding us ‘of the Death Star from Star Wars’ (2015, 175).

Some militaries are aware of that problem, and attempt to draw the use of armed drones into the realm of honour. In an article in The New York Times (Schmidt 2016) of a few years ago we read, for instance, how
[f]or years, the military’s drone pilots have toiled in obscurity from windowless rooms at bases in suburban America, viewed by some in the armed forces more as video game players than as warriors. But in a reflection of their increasingly important role under President Obama, the drone operators will now be eligible for military honors akin to those given to pilots who flew over the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.

This new award can also be conferred upon US military personnel who launch a cyber-attack, the article continues. Although all of this – honouring the courage of what are sometimes somewhat derogatively called ‘cubicle warriors’ – might sound somewhat odd to many people, it fits well with the rise of ways of war fighting in which soldiers run less risk – in the same article we read that ‘[a]ccording to the Pentagon, the first seven Medal of Honor awards for service in Iraq and Afghanistan were given to those who had died. But since 2010, all 10 people who have received the Medal of Honor have been living at the time it was awarded’ (Schmidt 2016)

Most, however, will still feel that the use of armed drones is difficult to reconcile with what is commonly understood by the term ‘honourable’: incurring risk to oneself seems to be a vital part of it. Fighting one’s adversary from a low flying manned aircraft would indicate an acceptance of risk to oneself, but if that would also increase the risk to the local population one might ask what the point is. Dismissing the use of drones because their use is free of risk for the attacking side and thus dishonourable, might as a result boil down to accepting higher risks to oneself and the local population just to prove your honourableness (see also Strawser 2010). As that would be a distinctively unsatisfying option, we have to ask ourselves whether the language of honour is suited to describe drone warfare to begin with (see also Goldstein 2015, 75). That the drawbacks of military honour are as numerous as the advantages might form another reason to leave honour out of the equation (see also Sparrow 2015b, 390). What defines warriors is not so much their acceptance of risk, but the restraint with which they exercises violence (see also Renic 2018) – which brings us back to our earlier conclusion that for drone operators abiding by the rules is perhaps as important as exercising virtue.¹⁰

Contrasting supposedly risk adverse drone pilots with the assumed death wish of, for instance, a suicide bomber is not going to be particularly helpful, though. The comparison echoes the occidentalist rhetoric of a feminine West that Al Qaida and ISIS are always eager to embrace. Buying into that ‘you love Pepsi, we love death’ rhetoric not only implies that drone operators are not honourable because they do not put their life at risk, but possibly also that we should deem their ‘opposites’ (the death-seeking suicide bombers), honourable – not a conclusion many of us would want to accept. Risk aversion is not bad or dishonourable in itself; it is only a problem insofar as it comes at the cost of increased risk to the outsiders (civilians in foreign territories) the military should
defend if it wants to live up to its professed ambition to be a force for good. Perhaps the real issue deserving of our attention is that we are generally more concerned about casualties among our fellow countrymen and women than among unknown persons in far-away countries – this is perhaps to some extent understandable and natural, but certainly not moral. Or honourable, for that matter.

Conclusion
Apart from some academics who have a clear preference for virtue ethics, rule-based ethics or consequentialist ethics, in real life most people tend to see a role for both virtues and rules, and consider the consequences of an action as well (see also Nagel 1986, 166). They are probably quite right in doing so, and one could even argue that those involved in professional ethics education are more or less duty-bound to take a fairly comprehensive approach towards teaching ethics. That means paying attention to rules, virtues and consequences, but also to situational factors that make unethical conduct more likely to occur. What is clear though, is that some of the traditional martial virtues such as courage and loyalty are in their current interpretations less relevant for today’s drone operators. Especially the obsoleteness of physical courage – the willingness to incur risk to life and limb – in unmanned warfare has led to some not too helpful comments on its honourableness. Nonetheless, we do need to look for alternatives for the traditional military virtues, and in the above a few possible ways ahead have been outlined.


Thompson, Mark and Bobby G. Ghosh. 2009. ‘The CIA’s Silent War in Pakistan.’ *Time*, 1 June.


Virtues are typically described as stable character traits that are worth having, often working as correctives to our self-regarding inclinations (Foot 2002, 8-12). Most virtue ethicists hark back to the time-proven work of Aristotle, who held that we become virtuous by actually performing virtuous acts. Performing courageous deeds grows courage, for instance. It is this Aristotelian view on virtues that underlies most literature on military virtues too. As Robinson has explained, ‘The approach adopted in most armed forces is that of “virtue ethics,” with their philosophical origins found in Aristotle. Essentially, virtue ethics seeks to ensure moral behavior by instilling certain virtues (loyalty, honesty, and courage) to create good character. Consequently, many military academies have adopted an approach based on Aristotelian virtue ethics’ (Robinson 2007, 29).

As one author writes, ‘utilitarianism would lend itself to abuse in precisely those kinds of situations in which ethical safeguards are most needed, and should, for this reason, be stricken from the list of viable alternatives for the military’ (Snow 2009, 560). According to Stephen Deakin ‘the utilitarianism ethic often does not work in a military community. It is not the ethic of a virtuous person desiring to do good in every circumstance (...). Rather, it is the ethic of a highly educated rational calculator who is constantly considering whether an action is harmful to the Army or not, and, inevitably, what he can get away with’ (2008, 24).

Loyalty to the organization is the main aspect of military professionalism that is somewhat at odds with what a ‘regular’ professional ethic entails, and, in the past, some have for that reason maintained that the military profession was ill-suited to develop into a ‘true’ profession (see for instance van Doorn 1975). Armed forces socialize their employees thoroughly into the organization, which contributes to the strong loyalty military personnel feel towards each other and their employer. That military personnel are predominantly trained in house, whereas other professionals (such as doctors) as a rule receive most of their formal professional training before entering their job, makes this socialization into the organization, instead of into a profession, easier. As a consequence, different militaries have different organizational values (often still service specific), but there are as yet no values of ‘the military profession’ as such. By contrast, the values and standards of ‘regular’ professionals stem from universities and professional associations, not from their hospital or law firm (Mintzberg 1983, 192).

The US Army values can be found at https://www.army.mil/values/.

Military ethicist Timothy Challans describes how ‘early drafts of the Army’s 1999 leadership manual included the notion of respect; in fact, the key feature of respect was that of respecting the enemy on the battlefield. That idea did not survive the staffing process, and even a cursory check of the manual today will reveal that only Americans are mentioned as being recipients of this important value of respect’ (2007, 163).

For Aristotle, the good life took precedence over the moral life (Nagel 1986, 195, 197). The virtue of justice is a possible exception; Aristotle deemed it the most complete virtue because the best person (?) is not he ‘who practices virtue toward himself, but who practices it toward others, for that is a hard thing to achieve’ (Nicomachean Ethics 1030a). cite “(Aristotle 1962: p#)” here?

Although not asking anyone to go beyond the call of duty, rule-based ethics, especially as conceived by its main protagonist Immanuel Kant, can demand quite a lot from military men and women. In this understanding, moral duties are to be followed because one accepts them by choice, not because they are imposed from the outside and backed by sanctions (see also Martinelli-Fernandez 2006, 56-7).

Yet, although the distinction between ethical dilemmas and tests of integrity is an important and meaningful one, the situations in which this apparently straightforward distinction is blurred are the most interesting. For instance, it is generally thought that the loyalty one feels towards colleagues is nothing more than a pressure that can create a test of integrity. Loyalty is then viewed as the suspension of independent judgment, or the ‘willingness not to follow good judgment’ (Ewin 1992, 412). But if loyalty amounts to a value, and for most members of the military it does, then there might be a dilemma again (see also Coleman 2009, 112).
Two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Susan Sontag (2001) made a somewhat similar (and much criticised) remark: ‘If the word “cowardly” is to be used, it might be more aptly applied to those who kill from beyond the range of retaliation, high in the sky, than to those willing to die themselves in order to kill others. In the matter of courage (a morally neutral virtue): whatever may be said of the perpetrators of Tuesday’s slaughter, they were not cowards.’

One could argue, in addition, that ‘the value of military effectiveness should be held in higher esteem than that of mere physical risk in battle (...). The ultimate mission of the military should be effective national defense and not heroism for heroism’s sake. Accordingly, the strategically effective logistitian, drone pilot, or informational officer should be held in equal if not higher regard in the military of the twenty-first Century than that of the tactical level infantryman’ (Robillard 2017, 217).

Like other military personnel, UAV operators are subject to situational forces that are much stronger than those most of us will ever encounter. Their ethics education should not only aim at furthering virtues, or respect for rules, but also at giving insight into the factors that make unethical conduct more likely to take place. Factors such as negative peer pressure, dehumanization, stress, sleep deprivation, the national and organizational culture, but also the amount and kind of training and education received, perhaps influence our conduct more than our character does (Doris and Murphy 2007). The social psychologist’s advice to avoid morally challenging situations is clearly not very helpful for UAV operators, but with more knowledge about the influence of these factors, militaries can do more to make the erosion of moral standards less likely to occur. The insights social psychology offers should hence have a prominent place in the moral education of UAV personnel. However, as we noted, some of these factors might have less influence on UAV operators than on regular military personnel.