

Honor and the Military

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ABSTRACT: This article deals with the notion of honor and its role in today's military as an incentive in combat, but also as a check on the behavior on both the battlefield and in modern "operations other than war." First, an outline will be given of what honor is and how it relates to traditional views on military courage. After that, the Roman honor-ethic, stating that honor is a necessary incentive for courageous behavior and that it is something worth dying for, is contrasted with today's prevailing view which sees honor as something obsolete and archaic and not as a legitimate motive. The article then addresses the way honor continues to have a role in today's military, despite its diminishing role in society at large. Subsequently, the drawbacks of the military's use of the honor ethic are addressed, focusing also on the current operation in Iraq. The final section tries to find a solution to these problems.

INTRODUCTION: HONOR IN THE MILITARY

Parallel to the renewed interest over the past two decades for virtues in ethics literature, in military ethics military virtues such as courage are now more in the spotlight than they used to be.¹ In this context, often references are made to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, where courage is defined as the middle position between rashness and cowardice, springing from the right attitude concerning feelings of confidence and fear in the pursuance of a morally just cause. This virtue is, Aristotle thought, especially needed in battle, and a brave man is someone who does not fear a noble death in war.² This Aristotelian view lies at the heart of the idea of the citizen soldier, and is pivotal in many texts on military ethics. It has two elements: first, courage is, as the other virtues are, the mean between excess and deficiency. Second, courage should serve a noble end.³ This latter element has two problems.

To begin with, this ideal of making sacrifices for morally worthy goals, for instance freedom and democracy, might prove too steep. The decision to join the military is, according to some, to a considerable extent motivated by post-traditional reasons such as salary and the wish for adventure.⁴ More importantly,

some authors point out that, although the traditional military ethic underlines the importance of courage, the sense of community has dwindled and that the willingness to make sacrifices seems to be rather low.⁵ Similarly, in actual combat, patriotism and abstract ideals do not seem to be the motivating factor.⁶ A recent study into the combat motivation of U.S. soldiers during the first weeks of Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrates this: the researchers found that most soldiers in Iraq had enlisted for reasons belonging to the economic realm. During the period of the actual fighting soldiers fought for each other, not for abstract notions, including patriotism.⁷ It is probably a bit too optimistic then, to think that the global village will be the kind of community soldiers are willing to make sacrifices for.

The second problem is that military men and women actually have little to say about the causes they are fighting for. Even though Aristotle maintained, and most contemporary ethicists maintain, that courage should serve a morally just cause to deserve that predicate,⁸ in general, soldiers are instruments of politics, and do not necessarily subscribe to the causes they are fighting for. In fact, they do not have a say in what these causes are, nor do they want to have a say in such matters.⁹ In theory, it is and should be irrelevant to the professional soldier whether he fights to spread freedom and democracy, or for more base reasons such as oil or electoral success.¹⁰ The war in Iraq is a perfect example of why this is the case.

The invasion of Iraq by coalition troops has been legitimized in different ways (links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime, weapons of mass destructions in Iraq, ending gross human rights violations, and bringing freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people), and has since become increasingly controversial. If soldiers were to be motivated by abstract causes, in this case this would mean that their motivation would depend on their opinion about the justness of this war and the feasibility of bringing democracy to a country without a democratic tradition, their belief in the reasons rendered subsequently, and their sensitivity to the critiques of George W. Bush's policies. It would also mean that their motivation would decrease or disappear if some of the reasons rendered would prove to be false, as seems to be the case in Iraq.¹¹

Clearly, there is a discrepancy here; what military men ought to do according to their Aristotelian role, making sacrifices for morally just causes, is not always the same as what makes them tick, nor is it what should concern them according to what is considered to be normal civil-military relations, nowadays. In practice, armies have found a way to close this gap between theory and practice. Soldiers are induced to make sacrifices for the greater good, but for a motive that is not completely altruistic: an appeal is made to their sense of *honor*.

This somewhat archaic sounding notion of honor is best understood by contrasting it with the more modern notion of conscience. Especially in its modern understanding as an "inner voice," conscience is more demanding than honor, presupposing moral autonomy (it might prompt someone to go against social norms); yet it lacks an external component. Honor, on the contrary, has an important external component as it concerns both the value that someone allocates to himself *and* the value others place on him.¹² The "inauthentic" side of honor also

shows from the fact that honor often functions as a reward for making the right choice between higher interests and self-interest. In its ultimate form it might mean the choice between life and death.¹³

This view that courage, especially in the military, needs honor as a reward goes back to, at least, the Romans. Where the Greeks pondered on the ideal depth of the phalanx, the Romans addressed the question of what makes men fight.¹⁴ And although the more demanding notion of conscience clearly is on a par with the way most people see themselves, even today the older notion of honor is more useful for understanding today's military because it is *less* demanding.

OLD AND NEW VIEWS ON HONOR-ETHICS

No one, the Romans thought, will risk his life for the greater good, unless there is honor to be earned. Marcus Tullius Cicero for instance, the best-known and most subtle representative of the Roman honor ethic, disagreed with both the Epicureans and the Stoics who tried to convince their fellow citizens that honor was not something worthwhile pursuing. According to the Epicureans peace, and peace of mind, were the two things to be valued in life. The competition for honor and glory was seen as endangering those very things. In Cicero's view, however, Epicurean philosophy was mistaken in presenting men as essentially self-seeking.¹⁵ The Stoics were equally hostile to the notion of honor. Partly because of reasons put forward by the Epicureans, and partly because, in their eyes, any virtuous conduct that is undertaken in exchange for a reward, for instance honor or fame, is not virtuous at all. This was, in Cicero's view, an impossible and even dangerously strict definition of virtue.¹⁶ It takes away the incentive for trying to be virtuous from those who may not be without faults, but mean well. Where Epicurean philosophy asks too little, Stoic philosophy asks too much.

Cicero thought that honor might provide a middle ground between Epicurean hedonism and Stoic strictness. In his view, soldiers, although far from selfish, cannot be expected to perform their duties from a sense of duty alone.¹⁷ Only the perfectly wise act virtuously for virtue's sake. However, those perfectly wise are rare—Cicero himself claimed that he had never met such a person.¹⁸ For the not so wise a little help from the outside, consisting of the judgments of peers and the concern for reputation, can be of help. No one is insensible enough to put up with the blame of others.

During the tumultuous era that followed the end of the Roman republic, Epicurean and Stoic views, promoting peace of mind as the highest good, would gain in popularity. This was not the end of the honor ethic, however; the notion of honor still played an important role in the code of chivalry in the Middle Ages, and in the Renaissance the rediscovery of classical thought gave honor another impulse.¹⁹ Nonetheless, the ethics of honor was about to become obsolete in Western thought to be replaced by two strands of thought stressing respectively utility and autonomy, somewhat resembling Epicureanism and Stoicism. Although in some aspects antithetical, both shared, like Epicureanism and Stoicism, an animosity towards the ideal of honor.

Halfway the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes's "rival theory about the universality of self-interest" undermined the ethic of honor.²⁰ This view proved so successful that two centuries later Alexis de Tocqueville noticed that people in his day and age saw only self-interested motives at work in their own behavior, even when it was clear that, according to de Tocqueville, more altruistic motives were at play. As far as honor still has a role in modern times it is the quiet virtues that are held in honor, at the expense of the "turbulent" ones that bring glory but also trouble to a society. Especially "martial valor is little esteemed."²¹

Our present-day understanding of ourselves is partly colored by this economic view, but for another part it follows the Stoic view. With the Stoics, we tend to think that people are to be virtuous from a love for virtue, not from a fear of losing face. Instead, we have put our faith in conscience: the dominant view is that we, contrary to our predecessors, live in a guilt culture, not a shame culture. Moral autonomy is the highest good and everything that falls short of this ideal is simply not good enough; the shift from a shame culture to a guilt culture is therefore generally seen as a moral improvement.

Similarly, "honor and chivalry seem to play only a small part in contemporary combat," supposedly because "popular passion overcame aristocratic honor."²² Should honor be mentioned, for instance in the well-known West Point credo "Duty, honor, country," something else is meant: honor at West Point is synonymous with integrity. The cadet adheres to the West Point Honor code (a cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do) because he accepts it, not because he is concerned about what others might think of him when he breaches it. The West Point conception of honor is more demanding than the notion of honor as outlined above, more or less on the same plane as conscience, and presupposes moral autonomy. It sees honor as an internally felt duty, not as something with an important external component.²³ A closer look, however, learns that the military might be one of honor's strongholds in modernity.

HONOR IN THE MILITARY

It was the economic view which in many countries led to the All Volunteer Force that presumably did away with the citizen soldier; the type of soldier that came closest to true courage in Aristotle's view. The adoption of an AVF meant that "the military was to be treated as any other occupation, competing with the civilian sector to attract adequate manpower and quality."²⁴ Being a soldier became an occupation instead of a calling, and self-interest became more important than identification with a higher good.²⁵ Most authors, however, are "in agreement that utilitarian ethics don't work well in the military setting."²⁶ Professional soldiers fight well against weaker opponents, but are the first to fly when the danger becomes too great, Aristotle already stated.²⁷ Contrary to the citizen soldier, who prefers death to disgrace, the professional soldier attaches more value to his own safety than to his good name, he maintained.²⁸ In reality, professional armies do not run away because, evidently, the professional soldier is not motivated by self-regarding motives alone.²⁹ Treating soldiers and officers as if they are essentially

self-seeking can, however, seriously hamper their effectiveness, as the U.S. Army experienced during the Vietnam War.³⁰

The ideology of moral autonomy, on the other hand, asks too much of military personnel. Lawrence Kohlberg's influential model of moral development is paradigmatic for this way of thinking, and widely used by military ethicists. According to this three level (and six stage) model, people are egoistic and calculating at the preconventional level, the one thing keeping them from misbehaving being their fear of punishment. Once at the conventional level, they are also sensitive to peer pressure (at the first stage of this level) and the norms of society (at the second stage), and concerned about their reputation. Adherence to universal ethics is deemed the highest, postconventional or "principled" level.³¹ The rare person that reaches this level seems to resemble the perfectly wise person Cicero claimed he never met—Kohlberg mentions Gandhi and Martin Luther King as examples. One recent military ethicist, echoing Cicero's criticism of the Stoic philosophy, described Kohlberg's model, with its emphasis on the morally autonomous individual, as "troublesome" in the military context.³² Inside the military, as is the case elsewhere, most individuals are stuck at the second, conventional level—but most soldiers probably function at the first stage of this level, and are most likely more inclined to conform to the norms of their peers than to the norms of society.³³

Already in 1724 Bernard Mandeville wrote in his *Fable of the Bees* that the strongest motive for courageous behavior is the wish to avoid being considered a coward by fellow soldiers. If one might be tempted to flee if no witnesses are present, the presence of others makes flight virtually impossible.³⁴ One makes a soldier courageous by inspiring him "with as much horror against shame, as nature has given him against death."³⁵ In *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War* from 1732, Mandeville stressed that the Christian ethics of his day, in his view comparable with the Stoic ethics of former times,³⁶ was useless in war because it was incapable of motivating soldiers. In practice, every commander will take recourse to the opposite honor-ethic.³⁷ The honor-ethic expects us to put high value on ourselves, while the Christian ethic demands humility. For most of us, the former comes easier than the latter. For that reason, pride has nowhere been more encouraged than in the army and "never anything had been invented before, that was half so effective to create artificial courage among military men."³⁸

In Mandeville's opinion, honor was something artificial which made soldiers forget their "real" interests,³⁹ a chimera with some instrumental value at best.⁴⁰ His texts are essential, because they combine the modern view of man as self-seeking and the classical preoccupation with honor, and his insight that honor can be used in an instrumental way received extensive empirical validation in the twentieth century. After World War II, a number of groundbreaking studies appeared, stating that abstract principles, such as freedom or democracy, do not play much of a role in motivating soldiers,⁴¹ and that talking about them is almost a taboo under those circumstances. Only 5 percent of the enlisted U.S. men in World War II named idealistic reasons (including patriotism) as incentives.⁴² If abstract notions do not do much to motivate, what does?

According to a famous study from this period, soldiers “do not aspire to a hero’s role, but they are equally unwilling that they should be considered the least worthy among those present . . . personal honor is the one thing valued more than life itself by the majority of men.”⁴³ The soldiers described here were clearly at the conventional level: the attitude of troops caught and corrected on flight is “not unlike that of a small boy caught in the act of playing hooky.”⁴⁴ When peer pressure crumbled because some fled, others were likely to follow.⁴⁵ Research into the motivation of the *Wehrmacht* in World War II reached similar conclusions.⁴⁶ A more recent study by the Israeli Defense Force showed that letting dependents, comrades, or the unit down was considered “the most frightening aspect of battle” by well over 40 percent of soldiers and officers.⁴⁷

These seminal studies stressing the importance of cohesion are rather old, and their methodology and conclusions are increasingly debated.⁴⁸ However, a new study by the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, based on forty interviews, corroborated most of the findings of the earlier studies. Although after the outcome of the war ideological notions were mentioned more often as motivating, suggesting that soldiers were on one of the higher Kohlberg stages, soldiers clearly stated that during the days of combat they fought for each other, indicating that unit cohesion appeared to have been the primary source of combat motivation.⁴⁹

DRAWBACKS OF CONVENTIONAL ETHICS

The studies into combat motivation in World War II have been very influential in the military, and are still taught at military academies around the world. Armed forces have adapted their internal organizations to profit from the findings that surfaced in this research,⁵⁰ but have paid less attention to the drawbacks of the honor-ethic. Given their preoccupation with honor, shared by both the protagonists and antagonists of the honor-ethic, it is no small wonder that Roman philosophers did address most of these downsides.

One objection is that a courageous act undertaken for a reward hardly deserves to be called moral, and that the term sacrifice seems somewhat out of place in such a case.⁵¹ This is a point the Stoics put forward, which in turn was considered a bit too strict by Cicero. The Stoics also pointed to another drawback: what if there is no relation at all between honor and virtue? Most modern authors seem to share this concern that virtue and honor do not go hand in hand and hold that the distribution of honor, status, respect, and reputation is unfair, and that these good things are bestowed upon the wrong people.⁵² What was a concern for Cicero and an insight for Machiavelli, namely that reputation not always follows virtue, and that people can gain glory without deserving it, has today become a truism. A somewhat similar drawback is that honor can be reduced to a matter of “not being caught.” In that case, when no one is around, everything is permitted.⁵³

Another possible objection concerns the morality of using a reward to induce people to put both their own existence, and that of others, at risk.⁵⁴ Mandeville already pointed out that honor can be used in a manipulative way, putting pressure on soldiers to do something definitely not in their own interest. A commander motivated by a desire for fame might endanger both his men and his mission.⁵⁵ On

an international level, Thucydides held that honor was one of the main reasons that made states go to war. Although here also the term itself has become slightly out-of-date, honor and reputation probably still play a role in today's international relations.⁵⁶ President Bush, for instance, "clearly linked honor and the need to redeem it through revenge" in his statements after the September 11 attacks.⁵⁷

However, the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq excluded, for most of the militaries in the Western world peacekeeping and humanitarian missions are becoming their core business. In these new operations we sometimes see that the group cohesion this peer pressure depends on, can lead to the kind of in-group favoritism that is dangerous to the people the military are supposed to protect. Special Forces, with stronger cohesion than regular units, are especially prone to this bias. Belgian paratroopers and Canadian airborne troopers seriously mistreated members of the local population when on a humanitarian mission in Somalia. One Belgian paratrooper urinated on the face of a dead Somali civilian, and two of his colleagues held a Somali civilian over an open fire. Both incidents took place in 1993. In that same year, Canadian airbornes from 2 Commando, known for its strong in-group loyalty, tortured and murdered a Somali teenager that had tried to access the Canadian camp—and kept silent about it. Canada disbanded its elite airborne regiment because of this incident.⁵⁸

Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that troops in Iraq who are trained for combat, experience difficulties in adjusting to less aggressive ways of working needed to win "the hearts and minds" of local populations after major combat is over.⁵⁹ It is likely that what was a factor contributing to the success of the troops during the initial phase, might hamper them now in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. Force protection seems to take precedent over the safety of the Iraqi population, and this might well be an unavoidable consequence of stressing unit cohesion, setting a premium on bonding over bridging. Changes in the U.S. army unit manning system that momentarily are being implemented under the name of Force Stabilization aim at further increasing group cohesion.⁶⁰ This is in line with the old studies into combat motivation, and makes sense from a war winning perspective, but might be detrimental for the prospect of peace-building.

The incidents that have been reported by the media and organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are possibly not the consequence of a breakdown of discipline and cohesion, as has been suggested, but might well be a consequence of cohesion. The statement of a Navy corpsman, interviewed about his knowledge of Iraqi prisoners being mistreated by Marines, that "there was a lot of peer pressure to keep one's mouth shut," points in that direction.⁶¹ This would mean that those incidents are not the result of the military structure not working as it should, but, disturbingly, something built into the military apparatus when it works as it is supposed to work.

Ironically, the military's dependence on honor has its downside in the lack of respect for the Iraqis' sense of honor.⁶² In dealing with the local population, offensive behavior to the Iraqis' dignity might sometimes be a result of ignorance of local sensitivities; in interrogating prisoners it is a deliberate tactic, based on the handbook assumption that Arab culture is a shame culture, and making use of supposed taboos on dogs, nudity and homosexuality. These injuries to the Iraqis'

personal and social honor are, evidently, humiliating to them, and it is likely that this strengthens both the insurgency and the terrorist groups the coalition troops are trying to fight.⁶³

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THESE DRAWBACKS

As the older studies, the recent study into combat motivation in Iraq by the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute has been criticized for its poor methodology and statistics, but the main point of critique has been that this study ignores that, according to most research, social cohesion has no clear correlation with group performance. That soldiers in Iraq state that they fight for each other, is because that is what they heard during training. Task cohesion (group members share the same goal), however, does seem to correlate with group performance.⁶⁴ If true, this would mean the military could do with less social cohesion, putting an end to some of the grimmer consequences of stressing this particular type of cohesion. This way out, however, in its turn overlooks that task cohesion can be of no more than limited use to the military because soldiers cannot be relied on to be driven by the ideals that inspired their political leaders. So, also in Iraq, honor, in its modern guise of social cohesion, had to do what task cohesion could not accomplish: motivating soldiers to deliver combat, even if the higher cause is unclear or disputed. Despite its evident drawbacks honor is something the military will not do without when fighting its wars.

However, the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have moved to a phase in which stabilizing the country is more important than delivering combat. Under those circumstances maintaining group cohesion is important, but the harder question is how to address the drawbacks of the honor-ethic mentioned above. Some pragmatic solutions are at hand. First of all, Special Forces should be used for what they do best: special operations. Peace keeping and humanitarian operations should be left to other units. Second, military education should not only be aimed at group cohesion, but also at being able to develop relations with people outside their own group.⁶⁵ Research into the behavior of U.S. military personnel in Somalia, suggested that non-homogeneous units, e.g., including women and ethnically diverse individuals, often do a better job in this than homogeneous groups do.⁶⁶ Although troops in Iraq might have benefited from this insight, the need for cohesion has in fact been used over the last decades as an argument for closing the military to, respectively, ethnic minorities, women, and homosexuals.

On a more fundamental plane, most philosophers of old deemed it necessary that honor was internalized: the actual presence of others is no longer needed, and the gaze of imaginary others suffices for honor to function. In addition, they distinguished between “true” and “false” honor. Cicero, for instance, held that “true” honor should serve the public cause, not some personal end. Today’s use of honor as a substitute for having to subscribe to the cause one is fighting for, as is the case in Iraq, makes it—from Cicero’s point of view—a form of “false” honor. Although this idea of “internalized” honor, serving a greater good, tackles most of the drawbacks of the honor ethic, it brings it also closer to Aristotle’s account of courage and even to the Stoics. It resembles the solution of the ethicist stating

that the moral education in the armed forces should aim at reaching a higher “Kohlbergian stage.”⁶⁷

One might wonder how realistic this is. On the other hand, even in the paradigmatic shame cultures like the heroic society as depicted by Homer, shame was to a certain degree internalized, and, writes Bernard Williams in his *On Shame and Necessity*, it is a silly mistake “to suppose that the reactions of shame depend simply on being found out.”⁶⁸ Without shame being internalized the idea of a shame culture would make no sense,⁶⁹ and although the internalized other is abstracted and generalized, “he is potentially somebody rather than nobody, and somebody other than me.”⁷⁰ This somebody is not necessarily the one in closest geographical proximity, i.e., it is not the opinions of one’s neighbor that matter most.⁷¹ In the case of the military, the “significant other” should not only be the team member.

Michael Ignatieff, for instance, describes how the regimental honor of the Canadian armed forces was badly damaged for quite a while after the incidents in Somalia described above.⁷² This is not group cohesion in the small unit consisting of members who know each other well, but *esprit de corps*: the shared identity of those belonging to a larger unit consisting of people who do not interact with each other on a daily basis. *Esprit de corps* is used by the armed forces to counter the more inwardly directed group cohesion, and a code of conduct can be part of it, making the honor ethic less particularistic. Clearly, it is not only the honor in the small group that can work as a check, but also the honor of a regiment or of the armed forces as a whole.

The honor ethic itself might thus be part of the solution. Although it is “a slender hope”⁷³ that what is an incentive in combat can function as a check in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, it might be, by lack of more altruistic motives, our best bet. It only works, however, if the honor ethic consists of more than how the behavior will look in the eyes of the group members, and also has some substance in the form of a code, with do’s and don’ts. Although such a code makes the honor ethic more demanding, it is still much less demanding than an ethic based on abstract notions such as human rights and freedom and dignity.⁷⁴

CONCLUSION

The Stoics didn’t think much of honor, holding that people potentially love virtue, and should be able to act accordingly. Virtue should be its own reward, and honor is nothing but vanity and a source of turmoil and envy. This view of honor can be found in our ideals of autonomy and authenticity, and in the writings of some military ethicists. Others, some military policymakers among them, have a more economic view (slightly resembling Cicero’s account of Epicureanism) that is just as hostile to the notion of honor, and see man as essentially self-seeking. Those who, on the other hand, hold that honor has an important function reject this economic view, also do not believe that man has a natural tendency to act virtuously. Virtue is within reach of most people, but needs a reward. Although all three positions have been maintained at different times by different authors, the first two positions have gained ground.

The military traditionally depends on the willingness of some to make sacrifices for the security of others, but neither the ideology of moral autonomy nor the economic view of man is likely to install this willingness. Both give center stage to the individual. The military, however, is more collectivist,⁷⁵ and somewhat at odds with the ethics of Western society at large in using honor as an incentive to create this willingness.⁷⁶ Despite the military ethicist's misgivings, both the training and organization are aimed at this goal. To understand the military it is therefore necessary to also take notions such as honor and shame into account.⁷⁷ Not doing so also means not seeing the serious downsides that come with this conventional ethic that guides most of the military men and women, and that are especially troublesome in today's missions that hardly resemble the wars of the past. The solution to these shortcomings lies not in abandoning the honor ethic, but has to be found within its framework.

Endnotes

1. See for instance James H. Toner, *Morals Under the Gun. The Cardinal Virtues, Military Ethics, and American Society* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000); Reed R. Bonadonna, "Above and Beyond: Marines and Virtue Ethics," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 1994, nr. 1; P. B. Debb, "The Anatomy of Courage," *Army Quarterly and Defense Journal*, nr 127, 403–6.
2. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1107b, 1115a, 1115b.
3. "The soldier will have to develop . . . some sort of humanitarian cosmopolitanism that exists besides feelings of patriotism." Gerhard Kümmel, "A Soldier is a Soldier Is a Soldier Is a Soldier," in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2003), 432.
4. See for instance Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960) and Giuseppe Cafario, "Military Officer Education," in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, 266.
5. See for instance Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (London: Duckworth, 1985), 254.
6. See for instance Samuel Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier* vol. II. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949). This is something apparently overlooked by William Patterson in his interesting contribution on military desertion, published in this journal. "To Fight or Not to Fight? The Ethics of Military Desertion," *International Journal of Applied Philosophy* 19:1, 2005, 11–25.
7. Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen, and Terrence M. Potter, *Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), 9.
8. See for instance Toner, *Morals Under the Gun*, 111–4.
9. "In their day-to-day activities they live according to the self-conception that they are public servants, and according to their own formulation of civil-military relations, namely, that there is no question about who is in control." Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 368.
10. On the other hand, "[n]o political leader can send soldiers into battle, asking them to risk their lives and to kill other people, without assuring that their cause is just—and that of their enemies unjust." Modern princes "work hard to satisfy their subjects of the justice of their wars; they 'render reasons,' though not always honest ones." Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), xi–xii and 39.

11. See also James P. Sterba, "Why the U.S. Must Immediately Withdraw from Iraq," *International Journal of Applied Philosophy* 19:1, 2005.

12. See for instance Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order. Revised Edition.* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), 238; Julian Pitt-Rivers "Honour and Social Status," in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, ed. J. G. Peristiany, (Chicago: Midway Reprint, 1974), 21.

13. As Leo Braudy put it recently in his *From Chivalry to Terrorism*: "Historically, it is the concept of honor that mediates between individual character and outside forces, as well as the body that wants to survive and the mind that seeks other goals, including a glorious death." *From Chivalry to Terrorism: War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 49.

14. Ardant Du Pick, *Battle Studies* (Harrisburg: The Military Publishing Company, 1947), 50–5.

15. Cicero's account of Epicureanism was more polemic than truthful, as he himself undoubtedly knew.

16. *De Finibus* IV.21, 55, 63–8, 75–7; *Pro Murena* 61–65. On other points, however, Cicero adheres to the Stoic position. See for instance *De Re Publica* I.27, *De Officiis* III. 33, 36 and 38, and *Tusculan Disputations* II. 5253.

17. *Tusculan Disputations* I.32, II.58. The Roman historian Sallust wrote that the greatness of Rome was a result of the competition for glory by those young men, who, destined to lead by birth and education, entered the battlefield with a burning desire to beat their peers by being the first to slay an opponent (*Catilinae Coniuratio*, 1–2, 7). This is rather the opposite of the current state of affairs, according to Charles Moskos, "Reviving the Citizen-Soldier," *Public Interest*, Spring 2002, 76–85.

18. *Tusculan Disputations* II.51. Aristotle, on the other hand, held that a mature person never goes astray. Therefore "a good man" does not need the sense of shame to keep him on the path of virtue—reason keeps him on track. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1095b and 1128b. See for an author following Aristotle on this point: Reed R. Bonadonna, "Above and Beyond: Marines and Virtue Ethics," *Marine Corps Gazette* 78:1, 1994, 19.

19. Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 100.

20. *Ibid.*, 101.

21. Alexis Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 620–2. According to Fukuyama, the "struggle for recognition has shifted from the military to the economic realm, where it has the socially beneficial effect of creating rather than destroying wealth." Francis Fukuyama, *Trust* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 7.

22. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 35

23. The same holds true for Richard A. Gabriel's definition of honor as "the ability to recognize moral dilemma's and to have the integrity and strength of character to act upon one's perception." *To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 157, and Ted Westhusing's definition of honor as a "constancy, harmony, and refinement of the natural virtues of greatness of mind and extended benevolence." Westhusing is negative on the idea of regimental honor because it "tends to pervert and transfigure both greatness of mind and extended benevolence, but especially extended benevolence." "A Beguiling Military Virtue: Honor," *Journal of Military Ethics*, 2: 3, 2003, 195–212.

24. Gabriel, *To Serve with Honor*, 5–6.

25. Charles C. Moskos, "Institutional/occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update," *Armed Forces & Society*, 12: 3, 1986, 378–9.

26. Bonadonna, "Above and Beyond," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 18.
27. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1116b.
28. *Ibid.*
29. See also Patricia M. Shields, "A New Paradigm for Military Policy: Socioeconomics," *Armed Forces & Society*, 19: 4, 1993, 514, 515, 519, 525.
30. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 18–9.
31. Lawrence Kohlberg *Essays on Moral Development* vol. I: *The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981).
32. Toner, *Morals Under the Gun*, 56–7.
33. Interestingly, the U.S. Army adopted Maslow's theory of a hierarchy needs, but the 1983 leadership manual did not address Maslow's fourth need: that for esteem and recognition. W. Brinsfield, "Reality Check: The Human and Spiritual Needs of Soldiers and How to Prepare Them for Combat," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 403.
34. "One man in an army is a check upon another, and a hundred of them that single and without witness would be all cowards, are for fear of incurring one another's contempt made valiant by being together." *Fable of the Bees* vol. I 233.
35. *Ibid.*, 231. If in that manner the fundament is laid for artificial courage, than the thing to do is to flatter and praise the bold, to reward the wounded and to honor the dead. High-sounding words about the justness of the cause, despising death and the bed of honor, together with uniforms and decorations, provide against little cost the courage money cannot buy.
36. Elsewhere, Mandeville claimed that he knew the Stoic teachings as well as Seneca did, but disagreed with them for the same reasons as Cicero did. *Ibid.*, 161, 163, 179.
37. "The men are prais'd and bouy'd up in the high value they have for themselves: their officers call them gentlemen and fellow-soldiers; generals pull off their hats to them; and no artifice is neglected that can flatter their pride, or inspire them with the love of glory." *Enquiry* 161.
38. *Ibid.*, 60
39. *Fable of the Bees* vol. I, 246.
40. Mandeville cynically rhymed: "The Soldiers that were forc'd to fight, If they surviv'd, got Honour by't." *Ibid.*, 6.
41. "Lofty ideas and ideals we must have, if only to assure that man will go forward. But it is unworthy of the profession of arms to base any policy upon exaggerated notions of man's capacity to endure and to sacrifice on behalf of ideals alone." S. L. A. Marshall, *Men against Fire* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1947), 153.
42. Stouffer, *The American Soldier*, 108, 150.
43. Marshall, *Men against Fire*, 149.
44. *Ibid.*, 150.
45. That the soldiers know each other is crucial, because when "a soldier is unknown to the men who are around him he has relatively little reason to fear losing the one thing he is likely to value more highly than life—his reputation as a man among other men." *Ibid.*
46. Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, summer 1948, 280–315.
47. Ben Shalit, *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 10–3. A study by Charles Moskos into combat motivation in Vietnam underlined that lofty ideals

don't do much to motivate, but also showed that latent ideology does play a role. According to this study, soldiers are also not very willing to make sacrifices for the benefit of the group either. They develop primary group relations mainly because their chances of survival are best served that way. A soldier needs the support from his fellow soldiers, and the only way to get that is to provide such support himself. So, Moskos states, the Hobbesian picture of man is essentially correct. "Why Men Fight," *Trans-Action*, November 1969. Joseph Blake and Suellen Butler, however, suggest that in Vietnam enlisted men sometimes did make sacrifices for their comrades in a way that didn't serve their own survival. "The Medal of Honor, Combat Orientations and Latent Role Structure in the United States Military," *The Sociological Quarterly*, autumn 1976

48. Marshall for instance, supposedly drew his conclusions beforehand, and later fabricated the evidence to support them. Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), 302 n98. Shills and Janowitz's study was criticized for its naiveté, interviewing German prisoners of war and taking their word for it when they stated that they were not motivated by the Nazi-ideology. David R. Segal and Meyer Kestnbaum, "Professional Closure in the Military Labor Market," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 445–6.

49. Wong, et al., *Why They Fight*, 9–14, 19.

50. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (London: Pimlico, 1993), 53 and 72–3.

51. In this view, the thinkers of Greek and Roman antiquity, were "indeed children, and young children, in a Piagetian tale of moral development." Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 77.

52. See for instance Michael Walzer *Spheres of Justice: a Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 257 and MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 196.

53. This has been a recurring theme from Plato's tale of Gyges' ring to H. G. Wells's *The Invisible Man* (1897), the basis for Paul Verhoeven's movie *Hollow Man* (2000).

54. Honor caused more deaths than the plague, as J. G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers state in a foreword to their *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

55. Cicero warned that, especially when we are doing well, we should not listen to flatterers suggesting that we are entitled to praise when we actually are not—a frame of mind leading to the worst kind of blunders. *De Officiis* I.xxvii.

56. Barry O'Neill, *Honor Symbolism and War* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999). See also Kaplan, *Warrior Politics*, 131–2.

57. Akbar S. Ahmed, *Islam under Siege: Living Dangerously in a Post-Honor World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 60. See also Bertram Wyatt-Brown, "The Ethic of Honor in National Crises: The Civil War, Vietnam, Iraq, and the Southern Factor," *The Journal of The Historical Society*, 5: 4, 2005, 445–9.

58. For the role of group bonding in this incident, see: Donna Winslow, "Rites of Passage and Group Bonding in the Canadian Airborne," *Armed Forces & Society*, 25: 3, 1999.

59. See for instance Norimitsu Onishi, "Allies: Dutch Soldiers Find Smiles Are a More Effective Protection," *The New York Times*, October 24, 2004.

60. Group cohesion is difficult to accomplish in the mixed units that are often used in the expeditionary era. Officer rotation policies, aiming at providing as many officers as possible with necessary experience, can also have a negative impact on group cohesion and on the morale of NCO's and enlisted. Gabriel and Savage, *Crisis in Command*, 13; Jeffrey L. Thomas and Carl Andrew Castro, "Organizational Behavior and the U.S. Peacekeeper," in *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper*, ed. Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 140.

61. <http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/navy3545.pdf>. Viewed on Feb. 22, 2006.
62. See also Wyatt-Brown, "The Ethic of Honor," 449–50.
63. Jessica Stern, "Terrorism's new Mecca," reprinted from *The Globe and Mail*, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/stern_mecca_gm_112803.htm. Viewed on Sept. 28, 2005.
64. Robert J. MacCoun, Elizabeth Kier, and Aaron Belkin, "Does Social Cohesion Determine Motivation in Combat? An Old Question with an Old Answer," *Armed Forces & Society*, 32: 1, 2005.
65. Joseph L. Soeters, "Bonding, Bridging and other Contrary Demands. Why Today's Military Needs to be Ambidextrous," working paper.
66. Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, "Humanitarians or Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope," *Armed Forces & Society*, Summer 1995, 634.
67. Toner, *Morals under the Gun*, 165.
68. Williams *Shame and Necessity*, 81–2.
69. *Ibid.*
70. *Ibid.*, 84
71. *Ibid.*, 83.
72. Michael Ignatieff, "Handcuffing the Military," in *Military Ethics for the Expeditionary Era*, ed. Patrick Mileham and Lee Willett (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 28–9.
73. *Ibid.*, 157. Military ethicist Shannon E. French states that "[w]hen there is no battlefield, and warriors fight murderers, they may be tempted to become the mirror image of the evil they hoped to destroy. Their only protection is their code of honor." *The Code of the Warrior* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 241. According to military historian John Keegan, "[t]here is no substitute for honor as a medium of enforcing decency on the battlefield, never has been and never will be." Cited in Michael Ignatieff, *The Warriors Honor* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), 118.
74. *Ibid.*, 6.
75. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 64.
76. *Ibid.* and Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 248.
77. See also Robert. D. Kaplan, *Warrior Politics. Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos* (New York, Random House, 2002), 108–9 and Bradley C. S. Watson, "The Western Ethical Tradition and the Morality of the Warrior," *Armed Forces & Society*, 26:1, 1999, 55–72.