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Logic and Phenomenology: Wittgenstein/ Ramsey/Schlick in Colour-Exclusion

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6.1 The “Colour-Exclusion Case”

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the matter of colour-exclusion has marked the multiplication of philosophical methodologies. Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* (1922) approaches the matter in terms of propositions like “This *is* of two colours [uniformly and coincidentally]” as exhibiting logical impossibility and as involving contradiction. Under the acknowledged influence of that position, Schlick’s article “Is there a Factual A Priori?” (1930) approaches the matter in terms of propositions like “This *cannot be* of two colours [uniformly and coincidentally]” as exhibiting logical necessity and as amounting to tautologies. An advocate of logical empiricism, Schlick thereby questions the alleged attempt, made in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901, 1913/1921), to employ such propositions as expressions of substantial

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knowledge in order to ground and legitimize a phenomenological philosophy.

The *Tractatus* does not provide Wittgenstein's final word on colour-exclusion. His paper "Some Remarks on Logical Form" (1929) reconsiders his early approach while making room, as maintained herein, for a conception of impossibility without formal contradiction and a conception of necessity without formal tautology.

Furthermore, it has been repeatedly hypothesized that a key to Wittgenstein's puzzling reflections on phenomenology in manuscripts from 1929 and early 1930s may be found in the same paper.¹ The point, advanced in what follows, is that the rationale of those reflections becomes first visible, and more tenable, against the background of the approach to colour-exclusion in "Some Remarks on Logical Form". That paper reconsiders, after Ramsey's influential review of the *Tractatus*, a crucial tenet of early Wittgenstein. It is the tenet that a Tractarian content-neutral account of the syntax of connectives is applicable to any domain of discourse, whose subjects may be as varied as the ones investigated by later Wittgenstein (e.g. colours, time, pain).

In brief: Wittgenstein's reconsideration, after Ramsey's review, of the *Tractatus* provides the rationale for the methodological reflections from the former's manuscripts, which are less sceptical than Schlick's, on the viability of a phenomenological philosophy. Colour-exclusion turns out thereby to be a case, if not factual, at least calling for philosophical judgment.

The text proceeds like this. Section 6.2 exposes a charge against a Tractarian account of logical syntax: for Ramsey, early Wittgenstein holds unjustifiably that any proposition taken to exhibit logical impossibility, like the impossibility of a fleck of two colours, is analysable into formal contradiction. Section 6.3 explores ways in which Ramsey's charge is taken on board by "Some Remarks on Logical Form", while bringing forth the view that propositions like "This is of two colours" cannot be analysed into formal contradiction. Section 6.4 reconstructs a mirror image of early Wittgenstein's approach to colour-exclusion, from Schlick's claim that propositions like "This cannot be of two colours" exhibit logical necessity and amount to formal tautologies. It is by that means that Schlick questions Husserl's alleged conception of

such propositions as expressing substantial knowledge—being factual a priori judgments—and testifying to the viability of a phenomenological philosophy. Section 6.5 isolates two responses to Schlick's approach to colour-exclusion, suggesting that it is not more viable than early Wittgenstein's. The first response is informed by the 1929 paper, the second is Wittgenstein's own. Section 6.6 assesses the rationale of Wittgenstein's reflections on phenomenology as informed by his approaches to colour-exclusion from early onwards.²

6.2 Necessity, Possibility, Impossibility

[T]he only necessity is that of tautology, the only impossibility that of contradiction. There is great difficulty in holding this; for Mr. Wittgenstein admits that a point in the visual field *cannot* be both red and blue; and, indeed, otherwise, since he thinks induction has no logical basis, we should have no reason for thinking that we may not come upon a visual point which is both red and blue. Hence he says that 'This is both red and blue' is a contradiction. This implies that the apparently simple concepts red, blue (supposing us to mean by those words absolutely specific shades) are really complex and formally incompatible. He tries to show how this may be, by analysing them in terms of vibrations. But even supposing that the physicist thus provides an analysis of what we mean by 'red' Mr. Wittgenstein is only reducing the difficulty to that of the *necessary* properties of space, time, and matter, or the ether. He explicitly makes it depend on the *impossibility* of a particle being in two places at the same time. These necessary properties of space and time are hardly capable of a further reduction of this kind.³

6.2.1 A Tractarian Background

The first sentence of Ramsey's charge draws upon two Tractarian remarks. One is: "As there is only a *logical* necessity, so too there is only a *logical* impossibility".⁴ Involved here is uniqueness: the only pertinent necessity, just as the only pertinent impossibility, is logical. The other is: "The truth of tautology is certain, of propositions possible, of contradiction

impossible. (Certain, possible, impossible: here we have an indication of that gradation which we need in the theory of probability.)”⁵ Involved here is an incipient concern with modality: certainty, possibility, impossibility mark gradations of modality; certainty is exhibited by tautology, possibility by propositions, impossibility by contradiction.

On the one hand, tautology and contradiction are characterized in terms of truth. On the other, they are not propositions proper, but limit cases (*Grenzfälle*) of combinations of signs, extreme cases (*extreme Fälle*) of truth-conditions.⁶ Those are the only cases where truth-operations yield respectively truth and falsity throughout.

When combinations of propositions involve tautology or contradiction, that is in virtue of their logical forms, exhibited by truth-operations. What propositions say is not the ultimate focus of analysis. Insofar as it was all-pervasive of content, form would be exhibited, once the analysis gets going, “without troubling ourselves about a sense and a meaning”.⁷ In particular, while the *truth* of tautology is certain and that of contradiction impossible, they say nothing, being *senseless* yet not *nonsensical*. Tautology and contradiction belong to the symbolism of logic like “0” to the symbolism of arithmetic.⁸

It is against this background that Ramsey draws upon the remark involving uniqueness and the one concerning modality, so that the only pertinent necessity would be that of tautology and the only pertinent impossibility, that of contradiction.⁹

6.2.2 Colours and Swans

Ramsey attends to Wittgenstein’s admittance that a fleck cannot be red and blue, and that “cannot” exhibits impossibility in the use at stake. What is really the matter? Not that a fleck *is not* red and blue, or that it *has not been* so. That it *cannot be* so is not established through induction, which, in line with Ramsey’s reminder, does not have a logical basis in the *Tractatus*.¹⁰

What if one still tried to solve the difficulty by appealing to induction, seeking to record constancies or tendencies of pertinent factual cases? One would inadvertently conceive of a fleck being red and blue as

a possibility—logically—no less tenable than a fleck not being so. Just as swans being black is conceivable as a possibility—logically—no less tenable than swans not being so. It would be as if philosophers could forecast one’s witnessing a fleck being red and blue uniformly and coincidentally, just as explorers, contrarily to their forecast though, have in fact witnessed swans being black uniformly, more or less.

The admittance that a fleck red and blue is an impossibility, coupled with the view that the only impossibility is that of contradiction, suggests that “This is red and blue” involves a contradiction. Wittgenstein is straightforward: “The assertion that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time, is a contradiction”.¹¹

That an assertion like “This is red and blue” is a contradiction, is, nonetheless, not obvious. It does not seem to be of the form of $p \ \& \ \text{not-}p$, like “This is red and not red”. And “This is blue” is not mutually substitutable with “This is not red”. For, if the latter was taken to say something substantial, that something is of another colour than red, then it could, unlike the former, account for something being, e.g., green. Or, if “This is not red” was taken to not say anything substantial, then it would still not be mutually substitutable with “This is blue”, which does say that something is blue.

6.2.3 Analysis: Physical Vs. Logical

On the task of actually tracing a contradiction, Ramsey charges Wittgenstein with not going far enough, or being on a wrong track altogether. Instead of carrying out a logical analysis of propositions at issue, the *Tractatus* would analyse colour concepts in terms of vibrations, taking a detour through physics. The difficulty with the impossibility of one fleck of two colours coincidentally, would be made, in Ramsey’s words, to “depend” on the impossibility of one particle in two places at the same time. Reversely, the necessity that one fleck be of no more than one colour at a given time would be “reduced” to necessary properties like those of space and time.

Established thereby would be *physical impossibility and physical necessity*, if anything. In the best scenario, a logical analysis of colour

propositions is carried out via a logical analysis of physical laws. Analysis has to go on, insofar as a proposition saying that one particle is in places P_1 and P_2 at the same time does not seem to be of the form of $p \ \& \ \text{not-} \ p$, like a proposition saying that one particle is in place P_1 and not P_1 . In the worst scenario, the detour through physics leads to a dead-end, especially if Ramsey is right that necessary properties of space and time are not further analysable so as to solve the difficulty.

Either way, there remains the question whether the only *logical impossibility and logical necessity* are those of contradiction and tautology. Or: are the propositions at issue un-analysable into contradiction and tautology, while yet exhibiting logical impossibility and logical necessity? The question remains in two further scenarios. *Contra* Ramsey's charge, one may note that the *Tractatus* does not "reduce" the difficulty to, or make it "depend" on, physics. The remark at issue is rather about "how this contradiction presents itself (*sich... darstellt*) in physics",¹² it can well be an alternative presentation of one and the same difficulty. *Pro* Ramsey's charge, one may note that a manuscript version of the remark reads: "That a particle cannot be at the same time in two places looks already rather like (*sieht schon vielmehr aus wie*) a *logical impossibility*".¹³ But then, a pre-Tractarian surmise (i.e. that one particle in two places boils down to logical impossibility) would simply compete with Ramsey's surmise (i.e. that necessary properties of space and time are not amenable to a logical analysis to do the job).

6.3 Contradiction, Collision, Foreseeability

Given the interactions between Wittgenstein and Ramsey after the publication of the *Tractatus*, and their conversations once the former returned to Cambridge in 1929, it is expectable that Wittgenstein gave some thought to Ramsey's charge exposed above. It is particularly expectable that Wittgenstein attempted to actually carry out a logical analysis of ascriptions of colours.¹⁴

That is what one finds in "Some Remarks on Logical Form". An ascription of colour, say, red at time T in place P can be symbolized as $R P T$. It should be "clear to most of us here, and to all of us in ordinary

life” that the proposition stands in “some sort of contradiction” with B P T , an ascription of another colour, say, blue at the same time T in the same place B . Wittgenstein adds:

Now, if statements of degree were analyzable – as I used to think – we could explain this contradiction by saying that the colour R contains all degrees of R and none of B and that the colour B contains all degrees of B and none of R .¹⁵

6.3.1 Ascriptions of Colour Degrees Are Un-Analysable

The problem is whether that which is recognized in ordinary life as *some sort of contradiction* between coincident ascriptions of colours, really boils down to a *proper contradiction* between ascriptions of colour degrees across a colour spectrum. Saying “This is red” would involve ascribing some colour degree or some interval of colour degrees, while saying “This is blue” would involve ascribing another degree or interval. The task would become to unveil a contradiction when ascribing coincidentally different colour degrees or intervals of colour degree.

That approach, nevertheless, does not lead far enough. For, like coincident ascriptions of colours, coincident ascriptions of colour degrees, are of a different form than p & not- p . “This is of n and $n + 1$ colour degrees” is not of the form of “This is of n colour degrees and not of n colour degrees”. And “This is of $n + 1$ colour degrees” is not mutually substitutable with “This is not of n colour degrees”. If something is of $n + 1$ colour degrees, it may be taken to be of n colour degrees too, but if it is of n colour degrees, it is not of $n + 1$ colour degrees as well.

What if contradiction is unveiled by analysing coincident ascriptions of colours into coincident ascriptions of colour degrees, without ending the analysis? This is what Wittgenstein admits to have thought “not long” before the 1929 paper: ascriptions of degrees of quality, like degrees of colour, can be taken to be analysable into a logical product of single ascriptions of quantity and a completing statement: “As I could describe the contents of my pocket by saying ‘It contains a penny, a shilling, two keys, and nothing else.’”¹⁶

But this first available route leads to a dead-end. A symbol like $E(b)$, for an ascription of a unit of colour brightness b to an entity E , involves that an ascription of a double unit of brightness to the same entity be symbolized as $E(2b)$. Then $E(2b)$ should be analysable into the logical product $E(b) \& E(b)$. Yet, this product yields $E(b)$ instead.

Another route is to distinguish between units of brightness and take $E(2b)$ as the logical product $E(b) \& E(b)$. Yet, this is to symbolize units of brightness as being different in such a way that, when an entity has *some* unit, the question arises: Which of the two units it actually has? The answer, as it were, is lost on the way of analysis.

As these attempts to analyse ascriptions of degrees into a logical product turn out to be unviable, Wittgenstein leaves behind one reference point of the *Tractatus*:

I maintain that the statement which attributes a degree to a quality cannot further be analyzed [...] The mutual exclusion of unanalyzable statements of degree contradicts an opinion which was published by me several years ago and which necessitated that atomic propositions could not exclude one another. I here deliberately say 'exclude' and not 'contradict', for there is a difference between these two notions and atomic propositions, although they cannot contradict, may exclude one another.¹⁷

6.3.2 The Logical Product of Colour Ascriptions Is Logically Un-Foreseeable

That a further analysis of ascriptions of degrees leads to a dead-end, involves that such ascriptions are un-analysable, amounting to atomic propositions. How is an opinion published in the *Tractatus* thereby "contradicted"?

While holding that combinations of propositions that exhibit logical impossibility involve contradiction, early Wittgenstein regarded impossibility as an extreme or limit case of truth-functional combination. The question is whether the *Tractatus* could accommodate some truth-operations with the propositions at issue, be they atomic or not, which are to yield falsity throughout without these operations involving contradiction.

This is the difficulty at issue, approached either from the angle of coincident ascriptions of colours, or from that of coincident ascriptions of colour degrees. On the one hand, that some “collision”, some “mutual exclusion”,¹⁸ is involved between coincident ascriptions of either colours or colour degrees, is quite clear: coincident ascriptions cannot be simultaneously true. On the other hand, coincident ascriptions of neither colours, nor colour degrees, can be analysed into contradiction. Which becomes apparent through a truth-table of the logical product of colour ascriptions.¹⁹ Their logical product would reach a contradiction, if it yielded falsity throughout, in the four possible truth-combinations of two ascriptions: $T \cdot T$, $T \cdot F$, $F \cdot T$, $F \cdot F$. But this logical product yields T , F , F , F instead of F throughout. It is thus required that:

In this case the top line ‘T T T’ must disappear, as it represents an impossible combination. [...] here *is* no logical product of R P T and B P T in the first sense, and herein lies the exclusion as opposed to a contradiction. The contradiction, if it existed, would have to be written [as accommodating $T \cdot T = F$] but this is nonsense, as the top line, ‘T T F’, gives the proposition a greater logical multiplicity than that of the actual possibilities.²⁰

There is no logical product of coincident colour ascriptions in the first sense, to yield truth, given the very impossibility of building a true proposition by ascribing different colours or colour degrees to the same fleck. Maybe stipulating that $T \cdot T$ yields F in coincident colour ascriptions forges their truth-table into one of contradiction. But the cost would be one’s ending up with a nonsensical notation. Plus: an amendment that sometimes $T \cdot T$ yields F “gives the proposition a greater logical multiplicity than that of the actual possibilities”, making room for logical product to handle truth-values in ways that mismatch the ones foreseeable through Tractarian truth-tables.²¹

In a 1929 manuscript entry, Wittgenstein wonders whether the logical product of coincident colour ascriptions may not account for a different meaning of “and”. Since therein not all their truth-possibilities fall away (*wegfallen*), although the product is to turn down (*abgewiesen*)

all of them, yielding falsity throughout.²² But even if “and” had a different meaning in coincident colour ascriptions, its different meaning would still be highlighted by a difference between the foreseen way in which logical product handles truth-values ($T \cdot T = T$, $T \cdot F = F$, $F \cdot T = F$, $F \cdot F = F$) and the hitherto unforeseen way ($T \cdot F = F$, $F \cdot T = F$, $F \cdot F = F$).²³

6.3.3 Substitutability Does not Back up Foreseeability

Nor does inclusive disjunction handle truth-values of coincident colour ascriptions as foreseeable through Tractarian truth-tables. Whereas inclusive disjunction, more generally, $T \vee T$, $T \vee F$, $F \vee T$, $F \vee F$ yields T , T , T , F , the inclusive disjunction of coincident colour ascriptions is to yield F , T , T , F . Then $T \vee T = T$, the first line of the truth-table, should disappear, or be substituted by $T \vee T = F$, considering that there is no Tractarian inclusive disjunction of coincident colour ascriptions in the first sense, when both ascriptions are true. It cannot be true, not in a bivalent logic, that a fleck is red *or*, in an inclusive sense, blue. Just as it cannot be true, without further ado, that it is of n colour degrees *or*, in an inclusive sense, of $n + 1$ colour degrees.

Central to the *Tractatus* is that the ways in which truth-operations handle truth-values are foreseeable, that once an operation is introduced, its handling of truth-values in any case is thereby introduced. Reversely, one was not supposed to come across something like colour-exclusion, where an operation handles truth-values in ways unforeseen through truth-tables. Wittgenstein entertained this view already in his earliest philosophical text, the 1913 “Notes on Logic”.²⁴ No less central to the *Tractatus* is the substitutability of any truth-operation by certain others, like negation together with inclusive disjunction, or together with logical product.²⁵

On this basis, it may be expected that, since both inclusive disjunction and logical product turn out to handle truth-values of coincident colour ascriptions in unforeseen ways, each and every other operation—in virtue of its substitutability—will do the same. But that expectation would not be satisfied, e.g. in exclusive disjunction, which turns out to handle

truth-values exactly as foreseen through *Tractarian* truth-tables. In coincident colour ascriptions, $T \vee T$, $T \vee F$, $F \vee T$, $F \vee F$ yields F , T , T , F , just as it does more generally.

6.4 Syntheticity, Aprioricity, and Their Quarrel

Coming to consider that colour-exclusion, not a matter of physical impossibility, is neither one of logical impossibility exhibited by contradiction, Wittgenstein remains unsatisfied, already in “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, with his approach to the matter. To elucidate it further, the paper calls for a “logical investigation of the phenomena themselves”, an “ultimate analysis of the phenomena in question”,²⁶ an approach to lay down a syntax and establish in which cases certain combinations of T’s and F’s must be left out from truth-tables. Ramsey’s review of the *Tractatus* was a guide of Wittgenstein thus far.

Schlick, another influential reader of Wittgenstein, finds in the latter’s endeavours up to the 1929 paper “the correct solution” to colour-exclusion. The solution would have a broader methodological significance, providing resources to assess the viability of competing philosophical approaches.

6.4.1 Philosophy and Its Future

The end of Schlick’s 1930 paper “Is there a Factual A Priori?” mentions the source of his approach to coincident colour ascriptions:

The first who, to my knowledge, has given the correct solution of the difficulty is Ludwig Wittgenstein (see his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and a paper in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*).²⁷

Schlick’s acknowledgment of Wittgenstein as having altogether solved the difficulty with colours by 1929 is striking, if only because the paper has an open end, it merely proposes a way toward a solution, and its very point is that a solution was not provided by the *Tractatus*.²⁸ Schlick, however, finds in these texts “fundamental logical clarifications,

simply decisive for all future philosophy”. He opposes them to alleged novel truths, whose tenability would co-depend with the viability of the approach that provided them: phenomenology. The viability that Schlick directly questions is not that of the approach, but that of the knowledge it claims to establish:

Which, then, are the propositions that the phenomenologist brings forward as proof of his view, and which he believes, as Husserl expressed himself, to ground a science (*eine Wissenschaft begründen*) that ‘gains an abundance of knowledge most rigorous and decisive for all philosophy to come’? It is famously judgments as these, that every tone has one intensity and one pitch, that one and the same surface could not be simultaneously green and red [...].²⁹

Such knowledge would consist in Husserl’s factual a priori judgments, a sort of synthetic a priori judgments. Schlick’s strategy is to dismiss the very possibility of the synthetic a priori and, alongside, that of the factual a priori, which would constitute groundworks of phenomenological science.

In another 1930 paper, “The Future of Philosophy”, Schlick opposes again aspirations to turn philosophy into science as “a theory, i.e. a set or system of true propositions”. He sees that as a hopeless desideratum, and rather regards philosophy as an ongoing activity of clarification. The extended, 1932 version of the paper insists that “Science should be defined as the ‘pursuit of truth’ and Philosophy as the ‘pursuit of meaning’”, while “[t]here can be no science of meaning, because there cannot be any set of true propositions about meaning”.³⁰ At the end of the day, the future of philosophy would not belong to phenomenological science, but rather to a descendant of Wittgenstein’s philosophical logic: logical empiricism. “Is there a Factual a Priori?” reads further:

The empiricism which I represent believes itself to be clear on that, all assertions, principally speaking, are either synthetic a posteriori or tautological; synthetic propositions a priori seem to it to be a logical impossibility. Must it give up this standpoint, which it has been able to defend with ease against Kantian philosophy, in face of the propositions which Husserl and his school have apparently made the groundworks of a new

philosophy? Is it some synthetic assertion a priori that every tone has a determinate pitch, that a green spot is not also simultaneously red?³¹

6.4.2 A Dismissal of Would-be Scientific Phenomenology

The core of Schlick's attempt to undermine phenomenology is his questioning *whether* there could be propositions both synthetic and a priori, and *why* some such purported propositions came to be counted as factual. The interrogation yet begins, according to the logical-empiricist programme, by asking *how*

such propositions are factually used, in what circumstances they occur in general. Here we establish in a remarkable way that neither in science nor in life are they utilized, if we overlook a purely rhetorical use (an orator might perhaps exclaim: 'What is black, is however not white!'); only in the phenomenological philosophy do they play a role. This must already make us suspicious.³²

The suspicion is whether such propositions, in lack of an established use, either scientific or common, are actually sensical. Their claimed use as groundworks of phenomenology would be insufficient to establishing that they have sense, or to providing them with one.

Schlick takes two examples, whose gist is the following. If someone said that a lady wore a green dress, it would be odd to ask: Can I take it the dress was not red? The interlocutor may insist: I have already told you it was green. By the same token, if an explorer perorated about encountering lions entirely yellow and at the same time blue from tip to toe, one could reply straightaway that such a thing is impossible. The explorer may well insist that such is the disbelief of someone who has not yet seen something both entirely yellow and entirely blue. There would be nothing to concede.

While it is by experience that someone comes to know that some dress is wholly green, or that lions are of some yellow, once one knows that, there is no need for further experience in order to know that the dress is not uniformly red, that lions are not generally blue. Schlick is firm thereof:

We must admit that an unbridgeable difference, of principle, subsists: it lies simply in that we only a posteriori know what clothes this or that person wears, or how people in general dress up; that we however *a priori* know that a green dress is not a red dress, and a yellow skin, not a blue one.³³

Insofar as phenomenologists contended that propositions like “A dress green all over is not red all over” or “A skin entirely yellow is not entirely blue” are not common judgments of experience, Schlick would agree with them. They would diverge, however, at the point where phenomenologists insisted further that “these propositions really conveyed a knowledge, that they were contentful (*sachhaltig*), that they had a material (*material*), not merely formal, character”.³⁴

What speaks for that contention? That the propositions at issue “appear to be factually (*tatsächlich*) about colours, about sounds, so about the content, the material of sensations”. What speaks against? The very “triviality of the propositions in question, which we find elsewhere only in tautological, nothing-saying propositions, that alone in virtue of their form are true and convey nothing upon reality”.³⁵

Schlick invokes the triviality and tautological character of those propositions as given evidence, by contrast to an appearance of their conveying knowledge about a content or material of sensations of colour or sound. His preliminary verdict is:

Our ‘factual’ a priori propositions are in truth of purely conceptual nature, their validity is a logical one, they have tautological, formal character.³⁶

In the end, propositions taken to be factual a priori and groundworks of phenomenology would not convey substantial knowledge (*Erkenntnis*), but be tantamount to tautological knowing (*Wissen*). They would exhibit not factual or material necessity, but conceptual or logical necessity, and indicate “only the content of our concepts, i.e. the way we utilize our words”.³⁷ Schlick’s final verdict is:

As nothing-saying formulae, they contain no knowledge and cannot serve as the groundworks of a special science. Such a science as the phenomenologists have promised us does not even exist in fact.³⁸

After noting Wittgenstein as the acknowledged influence of the above inquiry, its allusive source can also be noted: *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as a Science*. Schlick mentions in passing only their author: Kant.³⁹

In the final analysis, Schlick insinuates that phenomenologists are metaphysicians in disguise, claiming a reality for a science allegedly grounded on factual a priori propositions. By insisting that propositions like “A surface cannot be red and green [uniformly and coincidentally]” are a priori yet analytic, instead of a priori and synthetic, he suggests that groundings of phenomenology are either vacuous of sense (if recognized as tautologies) or logically impossible (if regarded as factual a priori). Phenomenologists would be left with two, not very congenial, options. They would have to admit that their endeavours are either grounded on a void, or not grounded at all. Either way, phenomenology would be far from becoming a future science, and even from being a science in fact. Such a thing would be neither real, nor possible.

6.5 Trivialities, Tautologies, Phenomenologies

Now, one may ask if Schlick’s flattening reference to the *Tractatus*, as on the same plane with “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, does not expose him to the very difficulty that Wittgenstein posed for his earlier self. It is also noteworthy that, while sharing in conversation with Schlick doubts upon Husserl’s synthetic a priori, Wittgenstein does not show any signs of concern about the viability of a phenomenological philosophy.

6.5.1 A Mid-Wittgensteinian Response

If Schlick’s approach to colour-exclusion is a mirror image of early Wittgenstein’s, that should be enough to make us, to use Schlick’s word, suspicious.

What Schlick presents as the strength of his position, is in fact its weakness: the mutual substitutability, assumed by him, between the notion of linguistic triviality and that of formal tautology. Again, Schlick appeals to

the triviality of the propositions in question [...], which we however regard merely as tautological, nothing-saying, which are *true only in virtue of their form*.⁴⁰

Establishing to what extent propositions like “A surface cannot be green and red” express trivialities requires far more nuances than the ones available so far.⁴¹ Yet, granting that such a proposition does express a triviality, the task remains to establish whether it involves a tautology as well. Schlick insists:

An analytic proposition [...], or – as we more clearly say – a tautology, [...] presents only *a purely formal transformation* of equivalent expressions and serves therefore only as *a technical means within a proof, a deduction, a calculus*.⁴²

While this may fit the conception of tautology and analyticity in the *Tractatus*, it is not clear how it could accommodate the propositions at issue. For, just as a proposition like “This is red and blue” (early Wittgenstein’s) is un-analysable into *p and not-p*, a proposition like “This cannot be green and red” (Schlick’s) is un-analysable into *p and p*. “This is green” and “This is red” are not equivalent any more than “This is red” and “This is blue” are contradictory.

Either Schlick’s propositions are denials of early Wittgenstein’s, and then the negation of *T, F, F, F*, yields *F, T, T, T*, instead of truth throughout, characteristic of tautology. *Or* Schlick’s propositions are not denials of early Wittgenstein’s, and then it remains unclear how they can be analysed in terms of any other Tractarian truth-operation so as to reach tautology. The difficulty is that “cannot”, when exhibiting logical impossibility, is not equivalent to “not”; if that was so, logical impossibility may well collapse into physical impossibility.⁴³

Untouched, there remains an outlook: colour-exclusion is, depending on the angle of approach, a matter of logical impossibility (after early Wittgenstein, despite Ramsey’s sensing some hesitation thereof), or a matter of logical necessity (after Schlick: “the necessity of the validity of those truths would be [...] a purely logical one”).⁴⁴ There also remains the difficulty to establish in what sense these modalities are

purely logical, now, that colour-exclusion brought forth an instance of impossibility without *formal contradiction*, and one of necessity without *formal tautology*.

The two faces of the difficulty are alluded to in Wittgenstein's paper, where propositions like "One colour cannot have two degrees of brightness" are qualified—not as tautologies—but "in some sense tautologies", while coincident colour ascriptions are taken to involve—not a contradiction—but "some sort of contradiction".⁴⁵

6.5.2 Mid-Wittgenstein's Own Response

The above is what Wittgenstein could have responded to Schlick, but not what he did respond, at least on one occasion. In a late 1929 conversation, recorded by Waismann and entitled "Anti-Husserl", Schlick asks Wittgenstein:

What can one reply to a philosopher who means that the assertions of phenomenology are synthetic judgments *a priori*?⁴⁶

Wittgenstein responds in two steps. To a proposition like "I have no stomach ache" or "I have no money" there corresponds a denial like "I have stomach ache" or "I have money". The affirmation and the denial presuppose one another, they are both sensical propositions. Now, by a proposition like "An object is not red and green" does one want to say that one has not seen such an object so far? No. (Nor that such a thing is unlikely to be seen, which would be to lapse in a forecast from induction). One rather wants to say "I *cannot* see such an object", that "Red and green *cannot* be in the same place". And what does the word "can" mean here? It is "obviously a grammatical (logical) concept, not a factual [sachlicher] one".⁴⁷ By opposition to the former propositions about pain and money, the latter proposition is not sensical, lacking a denial so that they would presuppose one another.

Wittgenstein then resorts to a *reductio ad absurdum*. Suppose that the propositions at issue were synthetic, while the word "cannot" means logical impossibility. Since a proposition is the negation of its negation,

there should be also propositions like “An object can be red and green”, synthetic in their turn. As synthetic propositions, they would be sensical, the situation they presented would be possible. But as “cannot” means logical impossibility, one would have to conclude that the impossible is possible. Insofar as this is absurd, propositions like “An object cannot be red and green” cannot be both synthetic (to exhibit possibility) and a priori (to exhibit impossibility). Wittgenstein adds:

Here there remained for Husserl only the way out to clarify there is yet a third possibility. Thereto I would reply: one can find words; but I can think of nothing beneath.⁴⁸

At this stage, Wittgenstein would perhaps go as far as agreeing with Schlick that there is an “unbridgeable difference, of principle”, between sensical propositions exhibiting possibility, and some propositions lacking sense exhibiting logical impossibility. Some differences are yet notable.

Firstly, Wittgenstein does not say with Schlick that propositions like “An object cannot be red and green” are trivial, and tautologous, and analytic, and a priori. If something positive transpired from this silence, it may be a suggestion that Schlick’s equating the notion of necessity not only with those of triviality and tautology, but further with those of analyticity and aprioricity, needs further scrutiny. But Wittgenstein gets involved in conversation mostly negatively, saying that he cannot associate a thought with Husserl’s concatenation of the words “synthetic” and “a priori”.

Secondly, Wittgenstein does not thereby admit some unfamiliarity with relevant literature, or an intellectual limitation of his. His point is that the notion of synthetic a priori is unintelligible. And that is a technical diagnosis, not an accusation of “obscurantism”, like the one brought by Schlick to Husserl.⁴⁹

Thirdly, Wittgenstein makes room for a distinction in status between propositions employing “cannot” and those employing “not”. This is the very distinction that weakens Schlick’s strategy to undermine phenomenology, by presenting its assumed groundworks as constituted by tautologies vacuous of sense.

Lastly, while Schlick is adamant about throwing away phenomenology altogether, as an unreal and impossible enterprise, someone else close to Wittgenstein, Drury, recollects:

Professor Schlick from Vienna was due to read a paper to the Moral Science Club entitled 'Phenomenology'.

Wittgenstein: You ought to make a point of going to hear this paper, but I shan't be there. You could say of my work that it is 'phenomenology'.⁵⁰

Wittgenstein's responses for Schlick, in conversation and via Drury, leave open the eventuality of some variety of phenomenology not being or even needing to be grounded on either the synthetic or the factual a priori. Then some phenomenologies would be possible after all, without their being metaphysics in disguise. Wittgenstein's solitary remarks in manuscripts from the same period even consider such a phenomenology to be real, at least real enough to be given a chance.⁵¹

6.6 Logical Uniformity and Phenomenological Multicolourity

The issue of coincident colour ascriptions triggered the reconsideration of a Tractarian account of logical syntax. Such an account was charged by Ramsey's review with an exclusivist construal of impossibility as involving formal contradiction, and revisited by Wittgenstein's 1929 paper with an interest in the reliability of logical foreseeability.

In this case, one can yet appeal to something: early Wittgenstein's distinction between logic and its application. Wittgenstein himself, however, will come to consider motives why a syntax pertaining to matters like colour-exclusion is to be surveyed, in the end, not by a Tractarian logic of form, but by a logic of content, which he qualifies in manuscript as phenomenology.

6.6.1 A Tractarian Appeal

Not only must a proposition of logic be capable of being refuted by no possible experience, but it must also not be capable of being confirmed by any such.⁵²

For early Wittgenstein, given that a truth-table was a proposition of logic and part of an adequate notation, it would be neither confirmable nor refutable by any possible experience. A Tractarian truth-table exhibiting the syntax of logical product would be immune in the colour-exclusion case, whether the latter is approached as involving an experience, phenomena, or talk thereof—be they actual or possible. Moreover:

The *application* of logic decides what elementary propositions there are.

What lies in the application logic cannot foresee.⁵³

Insofar as a logical investigation or ultimate analysis of phenomena or of talk thereof was already employed in “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, while introducing ascriptions of degree as atomic or elementary propositions, that approach would amount, from a Tractarian vantage point, not to logic but to its application. Early Wittgenstein’s logic may not foresee—as the paper suggests—that among elementary propositions there are ascriptions of degree, yet again, that seems to have fallen precisely outside his scope. In this sense, the *Tractatus* has been charged, again and again, for not doing something that it was anyway not meant to do. The remark yet goes on:

This is clear: logic may not collide [kollidieren] with its application.

But logic must have contact [sich berühren] with its application.

Therefore logic and its application may not infringe [übergreifen] one another.⁵⁴

Now, this brings the *Tractatus* back in question, insofar as what the 1929 paper points out is that Tractarian logic does collide with, that

it does infringe upon, its attempted application. Wittgenstein's admittance, that a content-neutral account of logical syntax does not hold for colour-exclusion without amendments, implies that his early logic of form, a *uniform logic*, lacks the *smooth application* expected from it.

What Wittgenstein's paper really questions is whether or to what extent one can rely on logical foreseeability, while introducing a notation before or without carrying out its application, while still betting on an insurmountable contact between the two. Indeed, after the *Tractatus* equated logical foreseeability with that "there can *never* be surprises in logic", the 1929 paper considers that "it would be surprising if the actual phenomena had nothing more to teach us about their structure".⁵⁵

Now, it is as though the 1929 approach involves one's somehow milking a syntax of colour ascriptions out of colour phenomena, thus rendering their exclusion as having a somewhat empirical basis.⁵⁶ True, Wittgenstein characterizes "the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves" as "in a certain sense a posteriori". But it is unlikely, to say the least, given early Wittgenstein's and Ramsey's circumspection, that the sense at stake be one in which logical investigation lapsed into physical analysis. And the paper also reads: "If the proposition contains the form of an entity which it is about, then it is possible that two propositions should *collide in this very form*".⁵⁷

Like Tractarian contradiction, exclusion remains a matter of logical form. Wittgenstein, however, will not retain the Tractarian view that logical form is comprehensively exhibited by formal logic.⁵⁸

6.6.2 A More Comprehensive Syntax

A middle Wittgenstein of early 1929 maintains his trust in a Tractarian account of logical syntax, to be amended here and there, while mending the issue of an eventual nonsensical notation. In this episode, a logical investigation or ultimate analysis of phenomena and talk thereof would amount to an application—if not as smooth as expected—of Tractarian logic. Yet, matters like colour-exclusion present not only logically surprising ways in which operations handle truth-values, but also further and interconnected matters, with inference and negation.

A middle Wittgenstein of late 1929 and beginning of 1930s, encountering such proliferating matters, reconsiders the relation between Tractarian logic and a logical investigation of phenomena. Even while skipping episodes of this history, several landmarks are noticeable. In another conversation with Schlick, recorded by Waismann in 1930, Wittgenstein remarks:

As a summary one can say: the coupling of propositions of a truth-function forms only one part of a syntax. The rules I laid down at that time [of the *Tractatus*] are now constrained by the rules that stem from the inner syntax of propositions and which prohibit that two propositions ascribe to reality different co-ordinates. All truth-functions are allowed that are not prohibited by these rules.⁵⁹

“Rules” of coupling of propositions turn out, as Wittgenstein puts it on the same occasion, to “forms only a part of a more comprehensive syntax [bilden vielmehr nur einen Teil einer umfassenden Syntax]”.⁶⁰ Then a fleck of two colours could be counted as a logical impossibility without coincident colour ascriptions having to be analysable into contradiction. That is, insofar as the logical impossibility at stake was due to “rules that stem from the inner syntax of propositions”, and which passed unnoticed while one surveyed modalities of coupling of propositions.

The former “rules” would constrain [eingeengen] those of truth-functional coupling, which sheds light on the puzzle why certain lines are to disappear from certain truth-tables when analysing coincident colour ascriptions. “Rules” stemming from the inner syntax of propositions would also prohibit [verbieten] that two propositions (e.g. coincident colour ascriptions) ascribe to reality (e.g. a fleck) different coordinates (e.g. “red” and “blue”) and allow [erlauben] only certain truth-functions in certain cases.

All in all, whereas for the *Tractatus* the only impossibility was that of contradiction, Wittgenstein’s approaches to colour-exclusion, at least those up to around 1930, bring forward a conception of logical syntax accompanied by a notion of *impossibility as syntactic prohibition without formal contradiction*, and one of *necessity as syntactic guideline without formal tautology*.⁶¹

6.6.3 Outwith Fundamentality and Regionality

A logical investigation or ultimate analysis of experience, phenomena, or talk thereof envisaged by “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, insofar as it was an application of logic, would remain ancillary to the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein, nonetheless, wonders in manuscript whether the investigation or analysis of matters like colour-exclusion does not involve a logic in its own right, along with the logic of form, by then seemingly faint:

The distinction between the logic of content [Logik des Inhalts] and the logic of propositional form [Logik der Satzform] in general. The former seems, as it were, multicoloured, the other faint; one seems to handle that which the picture presents, the other is like the frame of the picture, a characteristic of the pictorial form.⁶²

Tractarian logic of propositional form provides a content-neutral account of logical syntax. It surveys modalities of coupling of propositions “without troubling ourselves with a sense and a meaning”,⁶³ once the logical apparatus has kicked off. In instances like colour-exclusion, however, Wittgenstein came to consider that “rules” exhibited thereby are constrained by others, stemming from the inner syntax of propositions and which, while being non-truth-functional, are sensitive to what the picture presents, to propositional content.

The job, then, to provide a survey of the syntax of colour ascriptions pertains neither to a logic of form (as it seems it never did), nor to an application of logic (as the 1929 paper suggests it to be), but to a multicoloured—that is, heterogeneous—logic, which Wittgenstein will qualify as phenomenology. At the same time, he diagnoses a feeling that, even if a multicoloured phenomenology was not the *ancilla* of a uniform logic, there would yet have to be some distinction of status between the two:

And how does that which we feel express itself, namely that the truth-functions are more fundamental than the phenomenological? For, I believe, only in grammar must that express itself as well.

[...] Grammar, if it lied before us in the form of a book, would not consist in a series of chapters merely ordered side-by-side, but would exhibit another structure.

And in this must one – if I am right – see also the distinction between the phenomenological and the non-phenomenological. There would be a chapter on colours where the use of colour words was regulated; but that would not be comparable to what was said in grammar on the words not, or, etc. (the ‘logical constants’).⁶⁴

One may feel that truth-functions are more fundamental than the phenomenological, if their ways to exhibit logical syntax was taken to be immune to any possible experience, phenomena, or talk thereof. The feeling may be reinforced by a view that a truth-functional account of syntax of words for logical constants is applicable to any proposition, while a syntax of colour words is not. It would be as though Tractarian logic of form was a fundamental logic, at least more fundamental than phenomenology as logic of content, apparently a regional logic, say, for a domain of colours, their words, and the latter’s concatenations. The manuscript yet questions this appearance:

But it is strange that *in grammar* there must be given an essential and an inessential generality.

A logical and a phenomenological one. But wherein they differentiate themselves from one another?

[...] That twofold kind of generality would be so odd as if of two rules of a game both holding equally invariably, one was talked about as being the more fundamental.

As one could thus decide if the king or the chessboard was essential to the game. Which of the two was more essential, which more accidental.⁶⁵

If it is strange or odd that there be a twofold kind of generality, it is not because what was established was one—essential, fundamental, truth-functional—generality, and what remained to be established was another—inessential, regional, phenomenological—generality. It is the very status of truth-functional generality that has been brought in

question, since a Tractarian account of logical syntax was charged by Ramsey for its construal of impossibility as inescapably involving formal contradiction, and by Wittgenstein himself for its reliance to too great an extent on logical foreseeability. Logical generality was solicited by a Tractarian account of logical syntax, insofar as truth-functional analysis was taken to exhibit syntax for, and be smoothly applicable to, any propositional combination. Yet, as analysis decomposes compound or complex propositions, and not atomic or elementary ones, it has a blind-spot: non-truth-functional “rules that stem from the inner syntax of propositions”.⁶⁶ The latter turned out to constrain truth-functional ones, whose logical generality had been taken to be intimately related to a general form of the proposition.⁶⁷

In this light, a perhaps hyperbolic claim, that “Wittgenstein’s first philosophy collapsed over its inability to solve one problem—color exclusion”,⁶⁸ may have its use, if one considered that the general form of the proposition got quaked around the same time, and that echoing thereby were less austere notions of impossibility and necessity.

A further exploration of the intricacies of Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenology would lead far astray now. Here, let it just be noted that he did not only qualify the approach as a logic of content, but in other remarks, also posed it alongside physics, and alongside psychology too, and even as a pure psychology, before it was somewhat equated—which is not to say substituted—with the approach called “grammar” in the *Big Typescript*.

Insofar as phenomenology was a logic of content, it would involve a point of departure from particular propositions, heading towards a point of exhibiting a syntax of their use. Phenomenological investigation or analysis would be carried out around such and such a spectrum of intelligibility, like colour-space (*Farbenraum*) or tone-space (*Tonraum*), namely, logical spectra of domains of discourse about colours or tones. Phenomenology would span such spectra, without its investigations or analyses involving an all-pervasive space of intelligibility. Such a space, a Tractarian logical space, would become questionable.

It is not by coincidence that, immediately after considering the way in which logical product handles truth-values of coincident colour ascriptions, and an eventual alternative meaning of “and”, Wittgenstein wonders in manuscript:

Is there given for all propositions which I can connect logically one *space* in which they ‘go together, or not’? If I e.g. say, I see red and hear a sound, these go both in *time* with one another. They order themselves in time, I mean, they lie themselves in time one next to the other. I.e. they lie both in time and do not disturb one another.

It is then as though the sense of more propositions lied spread in logical space insofar as they could not disturb one another, while others may raise a claim for the same place.⁶⁹

But coincident colour ascriptions do disturb one another, and raise a claim for the same place, insofar as they collide in logical form and aim at ascribing, to one and the same reality, different colour coordinates. To that extent, their sense cannot lie spread in logical space. In fact, their mutual disturbance may overthrow the very notion of such a space. And then, if there was no fundamental logical space, neither would colour-space or tone-space be merely regional spectra of investigation, nor would phenomenology be merely a regional investigation. For, “regional” as opposed to what?⁷⁰

Notes

1. In the 1960s, Spiegelberg felt that the paper contains “some very telling anticipations” of Wittgenstein’s development, and asked: “What else is missing here but the actual name ‘phenomenology?’” (1968/1981, pp. 207, 208); in the 1970s, Rhees conjectured: “Some remarks about ‘phenomenological language’ may refer to the earlier view in that paper.” (1975, p. 349); in the 1980s, Gier saw the paper as the place where Wittgenstein “indirectly introduces the phenomenological programme of his middle period.” (1981, p. 106) (Spiegelberg 1981; Rhees 1975; Wittgenstein 1975; Gier 1981).
2. While Wittgenstein’s concern with phenomenology is addressed here in what its rise is concerned, it will remain a further task to explore the zigzags of that project.
3. Ramsey (1923, p. 473).
4. TLP, 6.375 my tr. That the clause “Wie es nur eine *logische* Notwendigkeit gibt” does not condition the clause “so gibt es auch nur

eine logische Unmöglichkeit” is clearer in the translation of Pears & McGuinness than in Ogden’s. Henceforth, unless otherwise stated, the followed translation is that of Ogden, collated with his correspondence with the author of the *Tractatus* (Wittgenstein 1973).

5. TLP, 4.464.
6. Cf. TLP, 4.446d, 4.46a.
7. Cf. TLP, 6.126b, 3.33.
8. Cf. TLP, 4.461, 4.4611.
9. Note that, while Wittgenstein deals with what is necessary (*notwendig*), he characterizes the truth of tautology as certain (*gewiss*). Ramsey’s charge targets the Tractarian conception of one variety of necessity (i.e. certainty, exhibited by some propositional combinations and involving tautology), while being aware that it does not exhaust early Wittgenstein’s dealings with necessity: “But not all apparently necessary truths can be supposed, or are by Mr. Wittgenstein supposed, to be tautologies. There are also the internal properties of which it is unthinkable that their objects do not possess them.” (Ramsey 1923, 473–474).
10. Cf. TLP, 6.31, 6.3631.
11. TLP, 6.3751c.
12. TLP, 6.3751b.
13. Wittgenstein (2000, Ms 103, pp. 46r-47r [16.8.1916]/1961, p. 81 tr. mod.). Wittgenstein’s manuscript entries undated in the original are dated according to Pichler (1994).
14. And this *search for expected* contradictions may have triggered his later remarks on *coming across unexpected* contradictions (cf. Waismann, 1967/1979, pp. 120, 127, 174, 208).
15. SRLF, p. 33.
16. SRLF, p. 32.
17. SRLF, p. 33.
18. SRLF, p. 34.
19. Henceforth, “colour ascriptions” stands for ascriptions of both colours and colour degrees.
20. SRLF, pp. 34–35.
21. The difficulty persists when analysing simultaneous ascriptions of colour degrees, and even in Von Wright’s “logico-philosophical fantasy”—an alternative colour system of an imagined tribe—as he himself admits (Von Wright 1996, p. 14).
22. Cf. Wittgenstein (2000, Ms 106, pp. 89–91 [≈ 3.4.1929]/1975, § 79).

23. One can further differentiate between a connective “and” vs. an additive “and” (Austin 1980/2000, p. 208). And such different meanings can be taken to be indicative of a heterovocality of logical constants (McManus 2009, pp. 310–313), as opposed to their univocality at work in the *Tractatus*. And then such logical constants would turn out to be, as it were, inconstant.
24. Cf. TLP, 5.451; p. 105 of the raw version of “Notes on Logic” from the 2nd edition of *Notebooks 1914-1916* (Wittgenstein 1979); p. 242 of the restructured version, presumably by Russell, from *The Journal of Philosophy* of 1957 (the version published in the 1st edition of the *Notebooks*) (Wittgenstein 1957).
25. The *Tractatus* mentions only substitutability by negation together with inclusive disjunction, but leaves room (note the phrase “e.g.” (*z.B.*) in TLP, 3.3441a) for other instances of what was latter called a functionally complete set: negation together with logical product; NAND (a.k.a. Sheffer stroke); NOR (a.k.a. Pierce arrow, or Quine dagger).
26. SRLF, pp. 30, 35.
27. Schlick (1969a, pp. 29–30/1979a, p. 169 tr. mod.). Actually, Schlick’s original title is “Gibt es ein materiales Apriori?”
28. For Wittgenstein’s dissatisfaction with the approach in the paper, see also his letter to Russell from July 1929 (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 99), and the critical notes to reprints of the paper in Copy & Beard (1966) and Wittgenstein (1993).
29. Schlick (1969a, p. 24/1979a, p. 165 tr. mod.).
30. Schlick (1969b, p. 173; 1979b, pp. 126, 128).
31. Schlick (1969a, p. 25/1979a, p. 166 tr. mod.).
32. *Ibid.*, tr. mod.
33. *Ibid.*: p. 27/p. 167 tr. mod.
34. *Ibid.*, tr. mod.
35. *Ibid.*, tr. mod.
36. *Ibid.*: p. 28/p. 168 tr. mod.
37. *Ibid.* p. 30/p. 170 tr. mod.
38. *Ibid.*, tr. mod.
39. The main transcendental questions in Kant’s *Prolegomena* were: (1) How is pure mathematics possible? (2) How is pure natural science possible? (3) How is metaphysics possible in general? Cf. Kant (2004).
40. Schlick (1969a, p. 23/1979a, p. 164 my italics, tr. mod.).
41. That will be Wittgenstein’s later difficulty with “greenish-red” in *Remarks on Colour*. Cf. Wittgenstein (1977).

42. Schlick (1969a, p. 23/1979a, p. 164 my italics, tr. mod.).
43. Thus the suggestion that, for a proposition A like “This is red and green”, $not-A$ is meaningful and true (cf. Allaire 1959, p. 204), would be untenable if $not-A$ was taken to stand for “This *cannot* be red and green”. Maybe $not-A$ could be taken to be meaningful and true if it stood for “This is *not* red and green”, while the latter was meant to account for, say, a blue fleck; but that would not have much to do with coincident colour ascriptions anymore.
44. Schlick (1969a, p. 27/1979a, p. 167 tr. mod.).
45. SRLF, pp. 32, 33.
46. Waismann (1967/1979, p. 67 tr. mod.).
47. Ibid., tr. mod.
48. Waismann (1967/1979, p. 68 tr. mod.).
49. Schlick (1969a, p. 23/1979a, pp. 163–164).
50. Drury (1984, p. 116).
51. So the claim that Wittgenstein embraced the synthetic or the factual a priori makes not stronger (as assumed e.g. by Gier 1981, pp. 155–183) but weaker the claim that Wittgenstein embraced a phenomenological philosophy (as seen e.g. in a reply to Gier by Monk 2014).
52. TLP, 6.1222 tr. mod.
53. TLP, 5.557a-b tr. mod.
54. TLP, 5.557c-e tr. mod.
55. TLP, 6.1251; SRLF, p. 30.
56. According to an earlier reading, Wittgenstein’s paper provides the solution that “particular place-times ‘only have room’ for one colour” (Sievert 1989, 293). According to a recent reading, the solution involves an account of exclusion which “would not be formal, if we think of formality collapsing with truth-functionality”, while “logic in this period begins to depend on a great number of non-logical facts” (Silva 2012, 54, 13).
57. SRLF, pp. 30, 34 my italics.
58. Cf. “It is Wittgenstein’s [early] distinction between the completion of the task of logic and the later appropriation of the form of experience [...] that needs to be reassessed.” (Friedlander 2001, p. 216).
59. Waismann (1967/1979, p. 80 tr. mod.); cf. Wittgenstein (2000, Ms 108, p. 52 [1.1.1930]/1975, § 83).
60. Waismann (1967/1979, p. 74 tr. mod.). It was said that “the rules for the connectives given in the *Tractatus* were incomplete” (Hacker 1972, p. 110), and that “Wittgenstein had already given up or was about to

give up one of the central claims of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, that of the completeness of its truth-functional logic, which is expressed in proposition 6” (Marion 1998, p. 110). Yet again, if a Tractarian account of logical syntax was incomplete, its incompleteness would be—not one of early Wittgenstein’s logic for its own sake—but one of its resources to be applied as smoothly as expected.

61. Wittgenstein will then reconsider the status of rules and also the arbitrariness of grammar.
62. Wittgenstein (2000, Ms 109, p. 130 [12.9.1930]).
63. TLP, 6.126b.
64. Wittgenstein (2000, Ms 109, p. 120 [9.9.1930]).
65. Wittgenstein (2000, Ms 109, p. 121 [9.9.1930]; pp. 129–130 [12.9.1930]).
66. Cf. “[Early] Wittgenstein was able to get his truth-functional apparatus going, without having to know in advance whether elementary propositions consist of dyadic or 27-termed relations!” (Marion 1998, p. 115).
67. In 1929 Wittgenstein makes it explicit: “The general form of the proposition can be nothing else than the general form of truth-functions.” (Wittgenstein 2000, Ms 106, p. 59 [≈ 3–4.1929]).
68. Hacker (1972, 86).
69. Wittgenstein (2000, Ms 106, p. 93 [≈ 3–4.1929]).
70. I would like to thank Juliet Floyd, Tom Greaves, Babrak Ibrahimy, Quentin Kammer, Oskari Kuusela, Denis McManus, Jean-Philippe Narboux, Rupert Read, Sidra Shahid, Marcos Silva, Christian Skirke, Timur Uçan, and Henri Wagner (for comments on drafts of this text), to further contributors to events at the Universities of Bordeaux, Ceará, and Liège (for discussions on related papers presented there), and to Alice Christophe (for having inspired some thoughts on exhibition in logic).

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