6 Pain and Space

The Middle Wittgenstein, the Early Merleau-Ponty

Mihai Ometiță

At one point in Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy*, his mind-body dualism is confronted with the common case of one's localizing the pains one feels. The confrontation is troublesome insofar as pain would pertain to mental awareness, while localization to bodily extension. To localize pain thus seems to be an attempt to bridge an unbridgeable gap, and ultimately end up with a fiction like a "square circle". Descartes' attempt at a solution involves his admitting that perception can be clear (*clara*) without being distinct (*distincta*): it can be "present and manifest to an attentive mind", without being "so separated and delineated from all others that it contains absolutely nothing except what is clear" (Descartes 1982, Part I §45; cf. §46). On this account, if one's boxing fellow constantly punched one's torso, or an acupuncture needle repeatedly pierced one's finger, one would vividly perceive pains without sharply distinguishing each pain perception from another. Yet, Descartes still finds troublesome the question that now seems to be unanswerable: Where exactly does each pain begin and end? This question would pose a threat to the certainty of knowledge. And this threat would be a further reason to deny that pain is—as it were, philosophically or rigorously speaking—in the finger, the torso, or indeed the body; that pain is elsewhere than "in the mind". In the end, for the Cartesian dualist, localizations of pain authored by common subjects remain unintelligible ascriptions.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the so-called middle Wittgenstein addresses in his turn the issue of pain localization. This time, the issue poses difficulties for an account of the intelligibility of language rather than for one of the certainty of knowledge. Instead of being concerned with the delimitation of pain as such, Wittgenstein's remarks are guided by the question: How is such and such a pain commonly located after all? In effect, he scrutinizes the very assumptions and expectations of a Cartesian conception of pain localization. In this respect, his approach and Merleau-Ponty's anti-Cartesian account of corporeality in *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945) illuminate one another. The task remains to show how Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty aim at doing justice to

common localizations of pain throughout the body, localizations whose intelligibility is denied by Cartesian dualism.

As a first step in addressing this task, two complementary diagnoses of the Cartesian approach to the body will be provided. What is questionable in dualism is its objectification of the body according to Wittgenstein, and its deappropriation of the body according to Merleau-Ponty (*section 1*). The middle Wittgenstein's account of self-ascriptions of pain will then be introduced. Against that background, ascriptions like "I have a pain in my finger" appear, contra Cartesian dualism, as commonly intelligible and philosophically in order. At the same time, the workings of such ascriptions pose a problem for a Tractarian account of common language (*section 2*). Thus, the middle Wittgenstein's abandonment of the Tractarian conception of a uniform logical space will go hand in hand with his acknowledging a heterogeneous multiplicity of sensorial spaces (e.g. visual-space, tactile-space, feeling-space). He thereby comes to share with Merleau-Ponty the anti-Cartesian view that corporeal pain is intimately related to corporeal localization, while corporeal space is not a continuation of the physical space of things (*section 3*).

1. One's Stance on One's Body

1.1 Objectifying One's Body

> Does my body have pains?—One would like to say: "How can the body have pains? The body is, after all, in itself something dead; a body knows, after all, nothing of itself!" And here it is again as though we saw in the essence of pains and *recognized* as a fact of their nature that the body could not have them and it is as though we recognized that, that which they have, must be an essence of a different kind, namely, a mental kind.
>
> (MS 157a, 7r-v [1934])[1]

Wittgenstein unveils here a propensity which paves the way for Cartesian dualism. It is the propensity to conceive of one's body as a material object.[2] What is really at issue? It is not that to assimilate one's body to a material object would be tantamount to reifying it. For, bodies are neither abstract objects (as one may say numbers are), nor abstractions (as ideas of corporeality may be taken to be). It is the very concreteness of one's body that inspires its assimilation to a material object. It is its exposure to perception; not only to visual or tactile modalities, but even to aural, oral, and olfactory ones: a body can be seen or touched, it can be heard falling like a skeleton in a biology lab, tasted like a block of salt, or smelled like a handkerchief. The latter may not be all that Wittgenstein's interlocutor would like to say.

As a veritable Cartesian, the interlocutor would rather assimilate one's body to a material object in virtue of their both purportedly lacking

self-knowledge or self-consciousness.[3] Neither one's body nor a material object could have pains insofar as both were essentially dead. But the characterization of a material object as something dead is already susceptible of nonsensicality. For, pending qualifications that would make intelligible what is for a material object to be alive, its characterization as dead remains an unfortunate string of signs. And if this string was akin to the reply that the body is "in itself something dead", the latter too, in virtue of the affinity, may be suspected of nonsensicality. After all, how is a notion of one's body that could not be alive—and is yet dead—to be understood?

Wittgenstein, nonetheless, does not straightaway regard the interlocutor's reply as nonsensical. He rather suggests that taking one's body as a dead object involves taking for granted a lot more. The condition "it is as though" indicates that what is at issue, what makes the characterization inappropriate, calls for further scrutiny. The scrutiny will benefit from some insights of Merleau-Ponty.

1.2 Deappropriating One's Body

> We are habituated through the Cartesian tradition to deappropriate [*déprendre*] the object: the reflective attitude purifies simultaneously the common notion of body and that of soul by defining the body as a sum of parts without interior and the soul as a being totally present to itself without distance.
>
> (PP, 230)

This passage from Merleau-Ponty and the previous one from Wittgenstein shed light on one another, in their conversation with Cartesian dualism. Wittgenstein asked: Does *my body* have pains? He asked something not about his body alone, but something about one's *own* body. His interlocutor replied: How can *the body* have pains? Wittgenstein and his interlocutor seem to not be addressing the same matter, or at least not in the same manner. What is the difference and its significance really?

As Merleau-Ponty warns, we have become accustomed through the Cartesian tradition to "deappropriate the object", namely, the matter of investigation, irrespective of what or who that is. In this sense, one instance of deappropriation is Wittgenstein's interlocutor replying to the question, whose subject-matter was *one's own body*, by way of another question, whose subject-matter was *the body*. The matter of investigation as posed by Wittgenstein is thus immediately disowned by the dualist interlocutor. The investigation undergoes a shift, from a voice in the first-person singular to an impersonal voice in the third-person. To a voice coming, as it were, from nowhere, insofar as the interlocutor immediately takes distance from the matter of investigation, as if that was a celestial body, some relation to which to be first established by contemplation.

Another instance of deappropriation is the Cartesian interlocutor's adopting a voice in the first-person plural, no less impersonal and coming, as it were, from everywhere. Indeed, Wittgenstein took the interlocutor's reply as making it seem "as though we" did such and such. The reply assumed that we "see" into the essence of pains, that we "recognize" as a fact of their nature how their essence "must be". And that what we see and recognize is a commonplace. In this instance, one deappropriates the matter of investigation in the manner in which one relegates the responsibility for one's discourse to anyone who may be concerned by it.

But Cartesianism does not in fact draw upon a commonplace. As Merleau-Ponty points out, the philosophical approach specific to it is the reflective attitude, which "purifies" and "defines" the matter of investigation, and that is precisely what it does to the common notions of body and soul. The reflective attitude purifies and defines these notions as a sum of parts without interior (i.e. as *res extensa*, like any material object), and respectively as a being totally present to itself without distance (i.e. as *res cogitans*, like any mental state). The Cartesian dualist seems to say "This is how *one conceives of the body*", as if talking in no one's name; or "This is how *we conceive of our body*", as if talking in everyone's name. But what the Cartesian dualist simply says is "This is how *the body should be conceived of*".

These two instances of deappropriating one's body are motivated by one and the same attempt to divorce common notions from their common uses, while imposing restrictive meanings onto those notions. Such an attempt may not seem by itself problematic, as long as it managed to show that and how the amended notions still make sense. Does the Cartesian conception of the body manage that?

1.3 Dissolution of Objectification and of Deappropriation

The objectification and the deappropriation of one's body are two sides of the same coin. To assimilate one's body, say, to the chair one sits on, taken to be neither self-conscious nor self-knowledgeable, is to assume that one's consciousness and one's knowledge could be ascribed to nobody or to everybody. Conversely, to adopt a voice as if it was coming from nowhere or from everywhere, is to regard the fact that it actually comes from a body as irrelevant as the chair one happens to sit on when uttering something.[4] The common root of these assumptions is an inadequate conception of presence:

> In particular, the object is not an object unless it can be moved away and thus ultimately disappear from my visual field. Its presence is of such a kind that it does not hold without a possible absence. [. . .] When I say that my body is always perceived by me, these words are not to be taken in a simply statistical sense and there must be, in the

> presentation of the body proper, something which renders absence or even variation inconceivable.
>
> (PP, 103–5)

The objectification and the deappropriation of one's body involve what Merleau-Ponty takes to be a conflation of the senses in which one's body and an object are present to oneself. The presence of an object is a presence of something which could have been absent. It is a presence of something which admits of it being moved closer, as well as being moved away, from me. Or it admits of my moving nearer to or farer from it. It may be that I am in the proximity of an object without my being able to move it significantly or at all (e.g. my noticing a huge rock next to me). Or without myself being able to move significantly or at all (e.g. my noticing a tower in front of my window while being imprisoned or immobilized). But in these situations the difficulty or even the impossibility at stake is physical or *de facto* (cf. PP, 104). Such a difficulty or impossibility may be encountered or not, while the presence and absence of the object around me remain equally conceivable.

By contrast, that my body is always present for me is not a statistical claim. Indeed, it is neither a claim based on past situations and factual observations, nor a claim that could be refuted by future such situations or observations. The absence or variation of my body are rather inconceivable in that I could not perceive something in the way I do if my body disappeared, or if it was someone else's body. What characterizes one's own body, according to Merleau-Ponty, is an "absolute permanence" or "primordial presence", which is the very background of the relative presence and absence of objects around oneself (cf. PP, 105–6).[5] It is against the background of the permanence or presence of my body that objects can appear and disappear around me in the first place.

Once these two modes of presence are distinguished, the assimilation of one's body to a material object appears more clearly as unviable. And so does the approach to one's body in the manner in which one approaches an object, namely, in the third-person:

> If I attempt to think of [the body] as a cluster of processes in the third-person—"vision", "motricity", "sexuality"—I observe that these "functions" cannot be bound among themselves and to external world by relations of causality, they are all confusedly reclaimed and implicated in a unique drama. The body is not, then, an object. [. . .] Whether it is about the body of the other or about my proper body, I do not have any other means to know the human body than by living it, that is to say by reappropriating [*reprendre*] on my own account the drama which traverses it and by confounding myself with it.
>
> (PP, 230–1)

Through the reflective attitude, one claims to recognize within corporeality various qualities or properties in the manner in which one recognizes them in the reality of things. One conceives of one's body as a cluster of processes. What this conception overlooks, according to Merleau-Ponty, is that the alleged distinct processes are "implicated in a unique drama", which is to be taken on one's own account if they are to be understood in the first place. That is not to regard one's being embodied as dramatic, let alone to dramatize about it. At issue there is rather an analogy, one that has a methodological rationale. The point is to substitute the reflective attitude with an approach to one's situation in the world as if that was a theatrical situation. The methodological switch enables one to consider that processes like vision, motricity, or sexuality are neither discrete acts of the body, nor discrete acts of consciousness on the part of a contemplative spectator. If they appeared to be discrete, it is because the reflective attitude already segmented them, for the sake of reflection, from one's concrete acting in the world.

In the case of the drama, although one can well isolate theatrical acts from a theatrical scene, the effectiveness of each act is not due to it alone, but to its being interlaced, together with other acts, into the whole of the theatrical play. If one distinguishes between vision, motricity, sexuality, etc., in the third-person, one presents their effectiveness as that of different horses pulling different carts. Their effectiveness, however, involves their informing each other, their enveloping one another.[6] This mutual envelopment remains opaque to the approach in the third-person. Merleau-Ponty is, as seen, quite resolute in this respect: "I do not have any other means to know the human body than by living it", namely, by confounding myself with it. Which is not meant as a remedy for someone whose body could have been truly dead at any point, or who could have truly distanced oneself from one's body. It is the reflective attitude that makes it seem—inadvertently—that those had been conceivable possibilities. So Merleau-Ponty's statement works as a reminder that corporeality is a reality not of distant celestial bodies, and not only of disparate bodies of other persons, but the intimate and ineluctable reality in which one finds oneself in the first place. The Cartesian dualist only passes this reality into silence, while adopting a voice as if it came from *no body* (i.e. nowhere), or from *every body* (i.e. everywhere).

Merleau-Ponty's call for the reappropriation of the drama which traverses the human body has a specific addressee, who was also Wittgenstein's interlocutor in his preceding remark. It is a plea to the Cartesian dualist to reconsider one's bodily situation, since the attempt to deappropriate one's body poses the threat that one estranges oneself from intelligibility altogether. This plea will be backed up by Wittgenstein's account of self-ascriptions of pain as being, *contra* Cartesian dualism, well intelligible and philosophically in order.

2. Pain Ascriptions and Logical Space

2.1 Affirmative and Negative Ascriptions

> If I say "I have now no pains", then I obviously describe thereby my present state. And thus "no-pains" signifies (*bezeichnet*) this state, whereas "pains" another state and the formal relation of both expressions indicates a formal relation of states.
>
> (MS 107, 203 [1929])

Wittgenstein considers here that the signifying relation of the expression "I have pains" to a state of painfulness somehow parallels the signifying relation of the expression "I have no pains" to a state of painlessness. Further, a formal relation between expressions indicates a formal relation between states. What sort of relations are at issue more exactly?

According to the *Tractatus*, a proposition determines one place in logical space (TLP 3.4), while the whole logical space is already given by a proposition. It is by way of the logical scaffolding round a proposition that the latter reaches through the whole: namely, by way of the logical coordinates that connect each proposition with other propositions (TLP 3.42). For instance, through the operator of negation (*Verneinung*), while the negating (*verneinend*) and the negated (*verneint*) propositions determine different logical places: that of the negating proposition lies outside that of the negated proposition (TLP 4.0641). Wittgenstein now seems to apply this general account of discursive intelligibility to pain expressions:

> "I have no pains" means: If I compare the proposition "I have pains" with reality, it turns out that it is false.—So I must be able to compare it with what is actually the case. And this possibility of comparison—even if it does not yield truth—is what we mean with the expression that what is the case must play itself out in the same space as what is denied (*das verneinte*); it must be *only otherwise*.
>
> (MS 107, 203–4 [1929]/PR §62)

After the *Tractatus* thematized logical space as an all-pervading spectrum of intelligibility, regarding propositions in general, Wittgenstein now notes that what is the case (i.e. actual pain) "must" play itself out in the same space as that which is not the case (i.e. possible pain). This necessity of the state of painfulness lying in the same space as the state of painlessness is, however, not a *metaphysical* "must", concerning how things should stand with the essence of pains. It is a *logical* "must", pertaining to the very intelligibility of pain expressions. For, if the states of painfulness and of painlessness, as well as pain expressions, did not all belong to one and the same space of intelligibility, one would not be able to meaningfully compare affirmative and negative expressions with one

another and with pertinent realities. And yet, the space in question is not Tractarian logical space:

> I compare this state [of painlessness] with another [i.e. a state of painfulness], thus it must be comparable with it. It too must lie in pain-space (*Schmerzraum*) although in another place.
>
> (MS 108, 37 [1929]/PR §82/BT, 102)

The negative proposition "I have no pains" and the affirmative proposition "I have pains" would be regarded, along the lines of the *Tractatus*, as determining different places in an all-pervading logical space of intelligibility. However, note for now that the state of painlessness and the state of painfulness are now said to lie in different places of pain-space, a spectrum of intelligibility of pain-related matters.

The comparability of the affirmation "I have pains" with reality exhibits an internal relation not only between this expression and its negation "I have no pains", but also between the state of painfulness and the one of painlessness. Further, that the affirmative proposition "I have pains" and the negative proposition "I have no pains" signify a state of painfulness and one of painlessness respectively, exhibits an internal relation between these expressions and these states. By now, this account of the intelligibility of self-ascriptions of pain seems to be not much more than an application of the Tractarian account of discursive intelligibility in general. Yet, a focus on the matter of negation is in order.

2.2 A Family of Negations

The itinerary thus far enables a closer comparison between the accounts of negation provided by the early and the middle Wittgenstein. As noted, according to the *Tractatus*, the logical place of the negative proposition lies outside (*liegt ausserhalb*) the logical place of the affirmative proposition. "Outside" is, however, not a genuine localization here. It rather means: somewhere in logical space, just not in the logical place of the affirmative proposition. But how may this account for the fact that the negation of "I have pains" is, after all, "I have no pains" and not, say, "I have no money"?[7] The early Wittgenstein's answer could be that the relation of a proposition, to the proposition that *pertinently* negates it, is marked not merely by the occurrence of the operation of negation in a proposition whatsoever; otherwise, "I have no money" could have well been taken to negate "I have pains". The pertinent negative proposition is rather further considered to correspond to the same reality that the negated proposition corresponds to. After all, a major tenet of the *Tractatus* is not simply that the sign of negation corresponds to nothing in reality (TLP 4.0621a) but, further, that to the affirmative and the negative propositions corresponds one and the same reality (TLP 4.0621c).

Now, one novelty in Wittgenstein's middle period is that negation—like other operations—turns out to be not univocal, but rather operate with truth-values of varied propositions in varied ways. One issue that contributed to the advancement of this view is that of coincident colour ascriptions like "This is red and blue simultaneously all over". In that respect, Wittgenstein admitted that conjunction is non-univocal, in that it cannot operate with truth-values in a standard Tractarian way. Indeed, the combination of "This is red" and "This is blue", when ascribed to one and the same fleck, cannot yield a true proposition, as their Tractarian conjunction would allow them. In virtue of the substitutability—underlined by the *Tractatus*—of certain operators with certain others, further operators, in particular cases, turn out to not operate with truth-values in standard Tractarian ways.[8] Concerning negation, Wittgenstein comes to admit that, instead of a univocal operator, there is rather a "family of negations". Namely, that "'negation' has different uses" and thus one "will constantly be asking whether 'not' has different meanings" (AWL, 101).[9]

This novelty imposes a new look at the relation between affirmative and negative propositions in particular cases. The middle Wittgenstein insists that, lest the two propositions and their correspondent situations determine different places of one and the same space,

> my proposition ["I have no pains"] would somehow mean that my present state [of painlessness] has *nothing to do* with one of painfulness; for example, as if I said that the colour of this rose has nothing to do with the conquest of Gaul through Caesar. I.e. there is no connection (*kein Zusammenhang vorhanden*). But I mean precisely that between my present state and one of painfulness there subsists (*besteht*) a connection.
>
> (MS 108, 37 [1929]/PR §82/BT, 102)

In the end, the relation between an affirmation and its pertinent negation cannot be marked by an operation taken to be univocal throughout discourse. Wittgenstein's treatment of coincident colour ascriptions called for a reconsideration of logical operators, focused on the domain of discourse about colours. That involved a survey of colour-space, a spectrum of intelligibility of colour-related matters. By the same token, his treatment of self-ascriptions of pain now calls for a further reconsideration of logical operators, focused on the domain of discourse about pain. This will involve a survey of pain-space, a spectrum of intelligibility of pain-related matters.

We saw the middle Wittgenstein remarking that the relation between the affirmative expression of pain and the pertinent negative expression, as well as their comparability with pertinent realities, involves that these expressions and their correspondent states lie in the same space

of intelligibility. The remark is now to be read as involving their lying not merely in one and the same space—say, logical space—but in a specific space, namely, in pain-space. Further, we saw the early Wittgenstein remarking that the logical place of the negating proposition is outside the logical place of the negated proposition. Now the remark is to be revised as involving not merely that the former logical place is outside the latter, but that it is within the range of pain-space, and not in another spectrum of intelligibility, say, colour-space.

These two revisions impose a third one, concerning the connection of a proposition with others. Again, according to the *Tractatus*, each proposition reaches through the whole logical space by way of the logical scaffolding round the proposition, namely, its logical connections to other propositions (TLP 3.42). Wittgenstein's clarification for Ogden's translation of the *Tractatus* reads:

> [T]he scaffolding is as big as the logical space. You could imagine a house with such a big scaffolding round it that by its length, breadth and width it filled the whole space.
>
> (LO, 25)

For the middle Wittgenstein, a proposition cannot be taken anymore to reach through the whole of an all-pervading logical space, but through such and such a spectrum of intelligibility, like pain-space or colour-space. The all-pervading spectrum of intelligibility which was once taken to be filled by the scaffolding of one single house will break down into "islands of sense",[10] each of them accommodating a different kind of scaffolding of a different kind of house.

2.3 Imploding Logical Space

Wittgenstein's concern with spectra of intelligibility pertaining to specific domains of discourse, the concern which culminates with the implosion of logical space in his middle period, dates back to the Tractarian project. Without thematizing them, the *Tractatus* leaves room for notions like colour-space and pain-space, considering that any phenomenon, insofar as it admits certain characteristics and not others, lies in the spectrum of its own possibilities:

> A speck in visual field need not be red, but it must have a colour; it has, so to speak, a colour-space round it (*um sich*). A tone must have *a* pitch, the object of the sense of touch *a* hardness, etc.
>
> (TLP 2.0131)

Neither of these spectra of intelligibility, which Wittgenstein later explores at length, would include another. For, one cannot ascribe to phenomena

as different as colours and pains one and the same quality (e.g. intensity) in one and the same sense. Still, according to the *Tractatus*, spectra of intelligibility like colour-space and pain-space would be pervaded by logical space. This spectrum of all spectra would be *complete*, in that it was drawn by a limit, whose attempted trespass paid the cost of an estrangement from intelligibility: "what lies on the other side of the limit (*Grenze*) will be simply nonsense" (TLP i).[11]

By contrast, colour-space and pain-space would be drawn by limitations, which may be trespassed, while a proposition need not cease to have a sense altogether, as its sense may simply modify, as in ascribing intensity across the domains of discourse about colours and pain.

At the same time, the Tractarian spectrum of all spectra would be *uniform*, insofar as allegedly univocal logical operators (like negation) would operate with truth-values in the same ways throughout discourse.

In 1929 Wittgenstein began to reconsider the idea of the completeness and the uniformity of logical space.[12] He initially had to admit that bits of the Tractarian logical apparatus (like conjunction) cannot be applied smoothly, that is, without amendments, to coincident colour ascriptions. Similarly, attempted applications of inclusive disjunction or negation encountered proliferating difficulties. Wittgenstein initially tried out various ways to mend the *Tractatus*, but then had to admit that what his early logic exhibits "forms only a part of a more comprehensive syntax" (WVC, 74). These reconsiderations shatter the Tractarian conception of logical space: a spectrum of all spectra of intelligibility cannot be maintained anymore as being complete and uniform. Logical space implodes into heterogeneous spectra of intelligibility, each of whose syntax cannot straightaway be taken to hold across them. What remains after the implosion of logical space in Wittgenstein's middle period is a multiplicity of notions of spatiality.[13]

The immediate upshot of the middle Wittgenstein's approach to self-ascriptions of pain was the re-consideration of a Tractarian, uniform account of discursive intelligibility in terms of logical space. Yet the impact of the approach is not confined to the development of his philosophy, affecting as well a Cartesian, uniform conception of perceptual extension in terms of physical space.

3. Pain Localizations and Sensorial Spaces

3.1 Physical Space and Visual-Space

> [Sensations] are however not usually regarded as being solely in our mind or perception, but as being in our hand, or our foot, or some other part of our body. And it is definitely as uncertain that a pain which we feel as if in the foot, say, is something existing outside our mind, in the foot; as

> that the light which we see as if in the sun exists outside us, in the sun; but both these prejudices belong to our childhood.
>
> (Descartes 1982, Part I §67)

Descartes begins here by describing how one commonly ascribes sensations such as pleasure and pain, not to mind, but to regions of the body. Yet, the reflective attitude immediately disrupts the descriptive approach and imposes a line of reasoning: given the mind-body dualism, such ascriptions could not be but uncertain. Uncertainty, however, may be hard to put up with while reflecting on sound subjects. So relegating it to infantile individuals may seem to be an option. In yet another step, childhood is brought worryingly close to insanity by Descartes' adding that "when someone says that he sees colour in some body, or feels pain in some limb, it is exactly as if he were to say that he sees or feels there something of whose nature he is completely ignorant, that is, that he does not know what he is seeing or feeling" (Descartes 1982, Part I §67). Indeed, within the constraints of dualism, someone who was certain of something outside of one's mind could not be but out of one's mind.

One is, however, not constrained to endorse the constrains of dualism. If one does not give in the temptation of the either/or approach, the premise of the uncertainty of pain being "outside of mind" need not be taken to imply that pain is certainly "inside of mind", just as the latter phrase need not be taken to have an exclusive meaning. As Wittgenstein points out:

> The phrase that "something happens in our mind" should, I believe, indicate that it is not localizable in physical space (*physikalischen Raum*). Of stomach aches one does not say that they happen in the mind although the physical stomach is indeed not the immediate place (*unmittelbare Ort*) of pains.
>
> (MS 110, 39 [1931]/BT, 221r)

Wittgenstein would agree with Descartes that pains are not localizable in a physical region of one's body, that is, not localizable in physical space. But that need not mean that they happen in the mind. The question of the immediate place of pains—and thus of their immediate space—is the question whether corporeal pains are not rather *located* by way of a perceptual modality specific to them. That is, before or without their being *allocated* to a bodily region, by way of a perceptual modality like vision:

> Toothaches do have a place in a space, insofar as one e.g. can say they wander between, or are at, two places simultaneously, etc.: but their space is not the visual or the physical.
>
> (MS 114, 26v [1932]/BT, 514)

In the previous section, we saw Wittgenstein regarding the state of pain as lying in pain-space. That was not yet an indication of the immediate space of pains. Pain-space is a spectrum of intelligibility pertaining to the discourse about pain. It is not a sensory field, and its places are not genuine localizations. The state of painlessness lying in another place of pain-space than the state of painfulness is only a requirement of the states being intelligibly comparable with one another. Just as the logical place of the negating proposition lying outside of the logical place of the negated proposition was only a Tractarian requirement of the two propositions being logically connected to one another. Now, unlike pain-space, visual-space is an oriented sensory field:

> One can also say that visual-space is an oriented space, a space in which there are an above and under and a right and left. And *these* above and under, and right and left have nothing to do with gravity or the right and left hand.
>
> (MS 105, 31 [1929]/PR §206/BT, 456–7)

The places of visual-space, unlike those of pain-space, are genuine localizations. In visual-space, however, coordinates such as "above", "under", "right", or "left" have a different meaning than in physical space. In the latter case, their meaning may be clarified by resorting to physical explanations like the law of gravity, or by common explanations like the distinction between the physical limbs of one's body. In visual-space, nonetheless, places are ascribed by determining the relative position of entities to one another: e.g. "I see the red fleck above the blue one". And still, visual-space is not the immediate space of pains. After all, one does not need to see one's stomach in order to have a stomach ache. And one does not have a toothache only insofar as one sees the tooth in a mirror.

Dualism provides two mutually exclusive options. *Either* pains were psychic impressions, which would illuminate our awareness of them, while beclouding our localizing them. *Or*, pains were physiological stimulations, which would illuminate our localizing them, while beclouding our awareness of them. Descartes finds himself pressed to choose the first option. But Wittgenstein unveils a third option:

> [I]n the sense in which one calls pains a mental state, [o]ne wants with the word "mental process" to distinguish "lived experience" from "physical process" (*"Erlebnis" vom "physikalischen Vorgang" unterscheiden*).
>
> (MS 114, 189 [1933])

The notion of lived experience opens the way for a conception of pains as not straightaway reducible either to a purely mental act or to a purely physiological event. The notion accommodates both the awareness of the

intensity of pains and the localization of pains. Now, if pains do have an immediate place, which is neither physical nor visual, the question remains as to which space that place belongs to.

3.2 Tactile-Space and Feeling-Space

Another candidate for the status of the immediate space of pains is a sensorial space which pertains to the surface of one's body:

> Suppose I touch with my hand for a painful place, I search in tactile-space (*Tastraum*) but not in pain-space. I.e. what I eventually find is properly a place and not the pain.
>
> (MS 108, 142 [1930]/PG, 393/BT, 658)

To search in pain-space is not something one can do. Such an attempt would not even make sense, insofar as pain-space is, again, not an oriented sensorial space, but a spectrum of intelligibility. As such, it is *determined by logical coordinates* (e.g. negation), yet not *oriented by spatial coordinates* (e.g. "above").

Rather touching with one's hand for a painful place turns out to involve searching in tactile-space. Tactile-space is an oriented sensorial space, in which one can meaningfully refer to an "above" and an "under". Wittgenstein yet emphasizes that searching in tactile-space ends up with finding not the pain but a place. What does that mean? Insofar as one already has pains, one does not need to search for them; one does not have to look for what one already has. And insofar as one palpates one's body in order to identify a bodily region that may hurt, one can find a painful place, but never simply pain.

The underlying point is that there is no such thing as corporeal pain that is not corporeally localized or localizable. While Cartesian dualism renders the localization of pain as a fiction akin to a square circle, Wittgenstein considers that such a fiction is rather the Cartesian conception of pain as lacking localization. Instead of *conceiving* of pain and localization as irreconcilable, he rather *observes* that they are inseparable: "In pains I distinguish an intensity, a place etc." (MS 107, 286 [1930]/BT, 506). And further, that these characteristics are precisely the criteria for distinguishing pains: "How can then different pains distinguish themselves from one another? Through intensity, through the character of pain (sharp, piercing etc.) and through the localization in the body" (MS 211, 755 [1931]/BT, 510). Merleau-Ponty makes a similar observation more explicitly against Cartesian dualism:

> For if I say that my foot hurts, I do not want to say simply that it is a cause of pain in the same way as the nail which is cutting into it, and only nearer; I do not want to say that it is the last object of the

> external world, after which there commences a pain of an intimate sense, a consciousness of pain by itself without place, which relates to the foot only through a causal determination and within the system of experience. *I mean that pain indicates its place (indique son lieu), that it is constitutive of a "painful space" ("espace douloureux").*
>
> (PP, 107, italics added)

It is the inseparability of corporeal pain and corporeal localization that will lead Wittgenstein to distinguish between the place of pains commonly ascribed to a bodily region (e.g. a finger) and the immediate place of pains in what he calls feeling-space (*Gefühlsraum*), the sensorial space pertaining to the perceptual modality he calls sensibility (*Empfindlichkeit*).

Like visual-space and tactile-space, feeling-space is oriented. But one and the same coordinate does not have one and the same meaning across these spaces: "The words 'above', 'below', 'right', 'left' have another meaning in visual-space, another in feeling-space" (MS 112, 123r [1931]/ BT, 458). For, criteria of localization are not the same in visual-space and feeling-space: one *sees* a red fleck "above" a blue one, one *feels* a sharp pain "above" a dull one.

Wittgenstein's account of pain as having an immediate place in a feeling-space, and Merleau-Ponty's account of pain as indicating a place in a painful space, converge in their impact upon dualism. Both accounts are motivated by the attempt at doing justice to manners of localizing and describing pain, manners which, after all, are as common among adults as among children. Cartesianism does acknowledge that up to a point, but under the pressure of dualism, dismisses the children's manners as infantile toddles, and the adults' manners as fringing on insanity. Such manners are not, however, mere divagations from some rigorous way to entertain self-ascriptions of pain, but rather part and parcel of common life. And even of a less common condition, which attracts the attention of both Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty.

3.3 Phantom Pain and Corporeal Localization

Cartesian dualism falls short from doing justice not only to the common case of one's localizing pains across one's body, but also to the less common case of one's localizing pains in a region of one's body that has been severed. The latter case, of so-called phantom pain, was not foreign to Descartes himself:

> When the eyes of a certain girl whose hand was infected by a serious disease were blindfolded whenever the surgeon approached (lest she might be disturbed by the apparatus of treatment); and when, after some days, her arm had been amputated up to the elbow, on account of the gangrene spreading through it; and when cloths had

> been substituted for the amputated part, in order that she might be completely ignorant of having been deprived of it: she would sometimes complain that she felt various pains in the hand which had been removed, now in one finger, now in another. *This clearly could not happen for any reason other than that* the nerves which previously descended from the brain to the hand, and were then terminated in the arm next to the elbow, were moved there in the same way as they must previously have been in the hand when the feeling of this or that painful finger was imprinted upon the soul residing in the brain.
>
> (Descartes 1982, Part IV §196, italics added)

This physiological account of phantom pain appears to Descartes as the only possible one since he already approaches pain through the lens of the mind-body dualism. Again dualism forces one to choose between two options. *Either* the immediate place of pain is "in the physical body", a claim questioned already by Descartes, as inconsistent with his conception of one's body as an object. *Or* the immediate place of pain is "in the mind", a claim which may appeal to the Cartesian ascription of a common nature to mind and pain, an ascription which is yet questioned by both Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, the case of phantom pain in the following remark:

> The experience of toothaches can be thought in totally other surroundings than those we are used to. (Let us only think that one can factually have pains in the hand although in a physical sense that does not exist anymore, because it has been amputated.) In this sense, one could have tooth-aches without the tooth, head-aches without the head. We make here simply a distinction like the one between visual-space and physical space [. . .].
>
> (MS 114, 25r [1932]/BT, 768)

This allusive distinction, along the lines of the one between physical space and visual-space, is a distinction between the localization of pains in a region of the body and the immediate place of pains in feeling-space. Feeling-space is coextensive with the reach of the perceptual modality which Wittgenstein calls sensibility. It is yet not coextensive with one's body in the physical sense, whose stature and dimensions can be determined by measurement. On the one hand, the reach of sensibility is commonly narrower than the physical extension of the body, insofar as one cannot conceive of feeling pain in the hair or in the tip of one's nails (cf. MS 107, 271 [1930]; MS 115, 116 [1933–1934]). On the other hand, sensibility does not normally reach out beyond the physical extension of the body, except for the very cases like phantom pain:

> That my sensibility does not reach out beyond this body (except in cases where one has had a limb, e.g. an arm, amputated and yet he feels pains in the fingers). These are strange and interesting facts.
>
> (MS 108, 4 [1930]/PR §55)

In his turn, Merleau-Ponty provides an extensive account of phantom pain, whose discussion at length falls outside the present scope. What is noteworthy, however, is its point of convergence with Wittgenstein's. They both hold, against Cartesian dualism, that corporeal pain is inseparable from corporeal localization even in the limit case of pain ascribed to a region of the body which has been amputated. They both consider that the corporeal localization of phantom pain is not what Cartesianism takes it to be: a fiction of the mind sustained by physiological wiring, differing only in sophistication from the purported fiction of common localizations of pain.

Wittgenstein emphasizes that phantom pain is—no less than common pain—a matter of *feeling* in the first place. Thus phantom pain still has a place in feeling-space, that is, within the reach of sensibility, even if the bodily region to which it is ascribed does not exist in the physical sense. In the same vein, Merleau-Ponty elucidates the sense in which pain persists in the phantom limb as an *affective* presence:

> If, however, patients experience the space of their arm as alien, if in general I can feel the space of my body as enormous or minute, despite the testimony of my senses, it is because there is an affective presence and extension for which objective spatiality [. . .] is not even a necessary condition, as the phantom arm shows.
>
> (PP, 172)

In the final analysis, both Wittgenstein's and Merleau-Ponty's accounts of phantom pain show that the difficulty of Cartesian dualism to accommodate this case is tied to the Cartesian reduction of corporeality to that which is extended in physical space. On the one hand, Cartesianism conflates the senses of space pertaining to different perceptual modalities (i.e. vision, touch, feeling), and regards bodily spatiality as univocal. On the other hand, it conflates bodily spatiality and objective spatiality, and regards the body as an object. These two conflations are the sides of the same coin: a uniform conception of perceptual extension in terms of physical space.

The lived experience of one's body, however, reveals a multiplicity of senses of extension. On the one hand, the notion of bodily spatiality turns out to be non-univocal, insofar as coordinates have different meanings in visual-space, tactile-space, and feeling-space. On the other hand, the notion of bodily spatiality turns out to be irreducible to that of physical

extension, insofar as sensibility does not commonly reach some extremities of the physical extension of the body (e.g. the hair, the nails), although in less common cases, it can reach beyond it (e.g. in phantom pain). Physical extension, namely, the objective spatiality of things in the world, is neither a sufficient, nor a necessary, condition of bodily spatiality.

Conclusion

For Cartesian dualism, common localizations of pain throughout the body are ultimately unintelligible ascriptions. Relegating pain to mental awareness and location to bodily extension, Descartes suggests that only an infantile or insane individual should say something as purportedly unintelligible as "I have a pain in my finger". However, this attempted revision of common discourse about pain turns out to be, in light of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, itself estranged from intelligibility. Cartesian dualism involves, on the one hand, an assimilation of one's body to a material object, which involves in its turn a conflation of the modes of presence of bodies and objects. On the other hand, it involves a deappropriation of one's body and the adoption of a discourse belonging, as it were, to *no body* or to *every body*. This pretence to talk about the body impartially or in everyone's name in fact covers up the questionable propensity to purify and define common notions of mind and body.

While dismissing the methodological pretension that common life is answerable to a philosophical doctrine, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty account for pain localization in a manner which seeks to rehabilitate the common discourse about pain. This leads the middle Wittgenstein to reconsider his early approach to discursive intelligibility in terms of a uniform and all-pervading logical space. He comes to abandon that approach for the sake of one which reflects the actual workings of ascriptions (e.g. of colour or of pain) pertaining to specific perceptual modalities. He thereby comes to acknowledge a heterogeneous multiplicity of sensorial spaces (e.g. visual-space, tactile-space, feeling-space). This multiplicity is occulted by the Cartesian conception of perceptual extension in terms of a uniform physical space.

In effect, the middle Wittgenstein and the early Merleau-Ponty simply reinforce the view, against Cartesian dualism, that corporeal pain is corporeally located, although corporeal space is not a continuation of the physical space of things.[14]

Notes

1. Translations of Wittgenstein's manuscript remarks are mine, and most translations of passages from Merleau-Ponty are modified.
2. The *Blue Book* version of the remark indeed substitutes the last two occurrences of "body" with "material object" (BB, 73).

3. Again, the *Blue Book* version of the remark substitutes "knows nothing of itself" with "isn't conscious" (BB, 73).
4. The idea of a *voice* belonging to *nobody* or to *everybody* goes hand in hand with the idea of a *sight* of something from *nowhere* or from *everywhere*. Merleau-Ponty finds in Leibniz the questionable assumption of "the house seen from nowhere" (PP, 77) and, more widespread, throughout so-called objective thought, the no less questionable counterpart: the assumption of "the house seen from everywhere" (PP, 79).
5. In a similar vein, Wittgenstein regards the lack of limit of the visual field as inconceivable without the vagueness towards the margins. That vagueness is absolute, irreducible to the relative vagueness of drawings, which can be, be seen, or be conceived as vague or not (cf. subsection "Vague, Unclear, Imprecise" from the *Big Typescript*/MS 213, 465–8 [1932–33].)
6. Cf. "If I am sitting at my table and I want to reach the telephone, the movement of my hand towards it, the straightening of the upper part of the body, the tautening of the leg muscles are enveloped in each other (*s'enveloppent l'un l'autre*)" (PP, 172).
7. Cf. "'I have no stomach ache' is comparable with the proposition 'These apples cost *nothing*'. They cost namely no *money*, but not no snow or no trouble" (MS 108, 36 [1929]/PR §82).
8. Cf. Ometiță (2017, section 6.3).
9. For more on Wittgenstein's reconsideration of negation, and its impact on central Tractarian tenets, see McManus (2009).
10. The phrase is borrowed from McManus (2009, 309–10).
11. Kant's distinction between trespassable limitations (*Schränken*) and inescapable limits (*Grenzen*) in *Prolegomena* (cf. Kant 2004, §§57, 59) may have inspired the *Tractatus*, which discusses (in 6.3611) the conception of the visual incongruity of the hands from the *Prolegomena*.
12. For his disillusionment with the "logical uniformity" of the *Tractatus*, and his contrasting it in the middle period with "phenomenological multicolourity", see Ometiță (2017, section 6.6).
13. Marrou's paper on middle Wittgenstein reaches a similar conclusion: "The new idea here is that of a system of relations that pluralize tractarian logical space in several spaces" (Marrou 2008, 7).
14. For comments on various drafts of this chapter, I am grateful to Babrak Ibrahimy, Oskari Kuusela, Marco Nuzzaco, Rupert Read, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Sidra Shahid, Timur Uçan, and other members of audiences at the UEA Philosophy PGR Seminars (University of East Anglia, UK), The 5th Symposium of the Nordic Wittgenstein Society: Wittgenstein and Phenomenology (University of Stavanger, Norway), and *Über den Schmerz—Philosophische und medizingeschichtliche Auseinandersetzungen* (University of Tübingen, Germany).

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