

**Error, Truth, and Anxiety against Death: Reading Georges Canguilhem's 'On Science and Counter-Science'.**

**Christopher O'Neill**

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**ABSTRACT:**

Here I consider Georges Canguilhem's remarkable essay 'On Science and Counter-Science' (1971) as a reflection on both the life and the philosophy of his departed friend Jean Hyppolite. I begin by suggesting that Canguilhem's essay takes up and critiques Hyppolite's critique of empirical reason in *Logic and Existence* (1953). Drawing upon materials from the Canguilhem archives, I then demonstrate that Canguilhem composed the 1971 essay by returning to and drawing from a seminar he gave in 1955–56 on 'Science and Error'. I consider the significance of this 'return' as a kind of memento mori. In 'On Science and Counter-Science' Canguilhem pursues a vivid account of the significance of error within (scientific) reason, as caught between the twin poles of Cartesian correction and Nietzschean affirmation. In his refusal to choose between these poles, Canguilhem affirms the restless vital quality of the trace of the concept, which destabilises the perfection of death and the absolute.

Keywords: error, death, Canguilhem, Hyppolite, Nietzsche, Descartes

George Canguilhem's contribution to the *Hommage à Jean Hyppolite* (1971), 'De la Science et de la Contre-Science' ('On Science and Counter-Science'), is a tour de force.<sup>1</sup> Short but dense, the essay draws from Canguilhem's remarkable seminar on *Science and Error*, delivered in 1955-56, during his first year as Chair of History and Philosophy of Science at the Sorbonne.<sup>2</sup> While 'Science and Counter-Science' is not generally considered to be actually 'about' Hyppolite's life or his work, here I argue that we should consider it a commentary on both. I

suggest firstly that Canguilhem's essay takes up and critiques Hyppolite's critique of empirical reason in *Logic and Existence*.<sup>3</sup> Secondly, I consider the significance of Canguilhem's 'return' to his 1955-56 seminar as a kind of *memento mori*. Canguilhem pursues a vivid account of the significance of Error within (scientific) Reason, caught between the twin poles of Cartesian correction and Nietzschean affirmation. In his refusal to choose between these poles, Canguilhem affirms the restless vital quality of the trace of the concept which destabilises the perfection of death and the absolute.

Canguilhem and Hyppolite were close contemporaries.<sup>4</sup> They met in 1925, during Hyppolite's first and Canguilhem's second year at Paris's elite *École Normale Supérieure*.<sup>5</sup> Many years later Canguilhem would recall portraying his classmate as 'the Questioner' during one of the *École's* end of year *revues*, satirising him as someone who 'inexhaustibly questioned others and himself'.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, Hyppolite's 'powers of interrogation' were, per Canguilhem, striking even among a generation of Normaliens including Canguilhem, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Simone Weil, and Raymond Aron.<sup>7</sup> Canguilhem and Hyppolite had little contact after graduation until the end of the second world war, when the two became colleagues at the University of Strasbourg. But they were close thereafter, and would both eventually make their way back to faculty positions at the Sorbonne and the *École Normale*. Together they would wield immense philosophical and institutional influence upon the formation of the post-war generation of structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers including Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Louis Althusser, and many, many others.

In Canguilhem's 1948 essay 'Hegel in France',<sup>8</sup> he notes his admiration for Hyppolite's 1939 and 1941 translations of Hegel's *Phenomenology*,<sup>9</sup> as well as his 1946 *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*.<sup>10</sup> He credits Hyppolite with helping to deliver the French from their long ignorance of Hegel. Canguilhem identifies the longstanding French dismissal of Hegel as the product of French imperial 'decadence',<sup>11</sup> a sense of living outside the passage of history during the imperial heights of the second empire and the *belle époque*. This feeling would only be interrupted after the violent irruption of the first world war, and especially the cataclysm of the Bolshevik revolution, which 'made clear, even to the least clairvoyant, its essentially historic character, that is to say, its generation of a history to come'.<sup>12</sup>

Michel Foucault famously described the challenge of his own intellectual generation as the imperative to 'flee Hegel', and he understood his debt to Hyppolite precisely as a lesson in

what was at stake in making this escape.<sup>13</sup> Analogously, perhaps the challenge of Hyppolite and Canguilhem's generation was to find a way out of the Neo-Kantian hegemony of their own formation under philosophers like Léon Brunschvicg and especially the mononymous Alain (aka Émile Chartier). Alain's philosophy of pacificism was passionately supported by the Normaliens he taught in the interbellum years of the Third Republic. But it failed perhaps to furnish its adherents with the necessary means to think and respond to the calamity of the rise of Fascism — a calamity which in France surely made imperative the need rethink the question of the philosophy of history and of action.

Of course, fleeing a Kantian pacificism is not the same as fleeing Kant *tout court*, and Canguilhem's philosophical path did not encourage him towards Hyppolite's passion for Hegel's dialectic. While the Canguilhem of 1948 was fascinated by the interwar and postwar Hegelian turn, his interest was couched in a language of characteristic probity. He notes that in postwar France 'nothing is now more outdated than Critique, [for which] we have substituted polemical propaganda, an intellectual form which prepares the ground for war'.<sup>14</sup> He worries that the new attention to Hegel portends a dogmatic and regressive philosophical turn, by which 'in the name of *dépassement* [the French translation for the Hegelian *Aufhebung*] we risk arriving at a perilous regression, a mental barbarism skilfully dissimulated beneath a purely scholastic technique and vocabulary'.<sup>15</sup> In this context he cautiously praises Hyppolite's *Genesis and Structure* for its 'academic prudence', for his ambition to 'present' Hegel to a curious but essentially ignorant reading public as much as to 'interpret' him.<sup>16</sup> And it was this prudence which Canguilhem would continue to profess admiration for after Hyppolite's death—in one of several obituaries he noted that he was influenced as much by Hyppolite's 'style as a worker' as by his work per se.<sup>17</sup>

How then are we to understand Canguilhem's contribution to the *Hommage* he helped to organise in dedication to his departed friend? 'On Science and Counter-Science' takes up the significance of Error within the place of scientific reason and epistemology. Canguilhem frames his analysis through the consideration of a phrase from La Fontaine's fable 'An Animal on the Moon' (1678). La Fontaine invokes the rift produced in perception when we spy a stick poking out of a river, whose appearance appears bent to us through the refractions of the water. Are we to agree with La Fontaine, Canguilhem asks, that when I perceive that 'the water crooks a stick/My reason straightens it as quick'?<sup>18</sup>

[Or] should we say that my reason is right to confirm the broken stick in its brokenness? When the reality of the stick viewed as broken has been replaced by the reviewed reality of stick as refracted, on the one hand we continue to perceive broken a stick that we know is straight, without thereby succeeding in substituting the knowledge of it for the perception of it as simply one observation for another; on the other hand, the admission of the necessity of the illusion forces us to cease identifying being with appearance. An opposition breaks the unity of the affirmation. Although appearing broken, the stick is no longer broken – rather it is judgment itself which is broken.<sup>19</sup>

The question posed by La Fontaine turns on the place of error within appearance and the consequence of this ‘break’ in judgement for the status of (scientific) truth. This is a familiar problematic for Canguilhem, and in fact his essay returns to and in part directly quotes from his 1955-56 seminar *Science and Error*. ‘Science and Error’ is unpublished and will likely remain so. But it is available for consultation at the Canguilhem archives at the École Normale Supérieure’s Centre d’Archives en Philosophie, Histoire et Édition des Sciences (CAPHÉS),<sup>20</sup> and has already attracted secondary literature from scholars including Samuel Talcott and Michele Cammelli.<sup>21</sup> As in the *Science and Error* course, in ‘On Science and Counter-Science’ Canguilhem approaches the problematic of the place of error within the affirmation of scientific truth by confronting the perspectives of Descartes, as representative of scientific logic, and Nietzsche, as portending what he describes as a ‘counter-science’ which would redeem or expand the place of error within a more ‘courageous’ scientific method.

Canguilhem cites Descartes’ famous assertion in his reply to Gassendi’s objection to the fifth meditation—that:

Even though we do not always experience our senses deceiving us, the fact that we sometimes do is sufficient reason for doubting them. The point about error is that we are not always aware of it as such... We have [then] to be very careful not to admit anything as true that we cannot prove.<sup>22</sup>

In Canguilhem’s reading, the capacity for error to dissimulate itself does not mean that for Descartes there is an ‘inconsistency’ to error in itself. To the contrary Canguilhem writes, ‘there

is a consistency to error – [but] it is the composition without discernment of two references of judgement by which reality is identified and distinguished’ – that is, it collapses or ‘composes’ the appearance of the stick with its truth.<sup>23</sup>

Error here then marks however only a negative experience of the true. As Descartes writes in his reply to Gassendi, ‘our being subject to error is not a positive imperfection... but the negation of a higher degree of perfection’ and as such ‘the false is never a moment of the true’.<sup>24</sup> Here then the recognition of the stick as broken negates any potential value of its appearance as such, except in the moment of negation itself. For Canguilhem, though, this conception of scientific truth is inadequate to a properly philosophical understanding of the history of science—it implies a notion of the history of scientific discovery as the uncovering of various truths hidden like ‘fossils’ waiting to be dug up, while forfeiting any capacity to give a positive value to the way that different modes of error may condition practices of scientific judgement, or may possess a ‘power of alteration’.<sup>25</sup>

In this critique of the notion of error in empirical science, Canguilhem is remarkably close in form and substance to Hyppolite’s critique of empirical subjectivity in chapter 2 of his 1953 work *Logic and Existence*, especially the section ‘Empirical Reflection and the Dogmatism of Being’.<sup>26</sup> In this passage Hyppolite uses the same figure of the broken stick to critique the formalist account of contradiction in empirical subjectivity. ‘Natural knowledge perceives or observes what is’, Hyppolite begins the chapter; ‘Observation overcomes the perception in which it collects the sensible and seeks its permanent determinations. But it would never reflect upon itself, if it did not encounter the scandal of illusion or of error’.<sup>27</sup> Error can become the motor of this self-reflection. Thus Hyppolite describes how the empirical subject is able to assimilate the contradiction in the appearance of the stick and its reality without a recognition of being’s own internal difference: ‘The stick cannot be simultaneously crooked and straight; it is crooked for me and straight in itself. The error arises from my viewpoint, from my particular situation, which is attached to my particular engagement in the world...’.<sup>28</sup>

Empirical subjectivity, however, immediately contradicts this contradiction through the formalist sovereignty of the law of non-contradiction, which would erase the contradictory as simply equivalent to the false, and so elide the question of consciousness’s own contradiction. What is necessary for Hyppolite is that ‘speculative reflection [which would] see in this

contradiction a contradiction belonging to the object as well as the subject, a dialectic which is the very dialectic of being'.<sup>29</sup>

This is not the path of thought which Canguilhem takes. For Hyppolite, error constitutes that 'scandal' which would propel thought to a higher degree of speculative reflection. For Canguilhem, error is not 'overcome'—it is a destabilising and irresolvable problem which accordingly demands a courageous and *creative* response. Opposing Descartes, Canguilhem turns to Nietzsche, who in his words, 'provides a theory of axiological commitment as truth, a rehabilitation of what ontological logic, and of what an essentialist or scientist rationalism names as "error"'.<sup>30</sup> Along similar lines, in the 1955-56 seminar notes, Canguilhem writes that 'before Bergson, Nietzsche affirms that being, substance, the absolute, identity, the thing, that is to say all logical-ontological categories, all the conditions of possibility for the exercise of theoretical thought, are false'.<sup>31</sup> But as Canguilhem also notes, Nietzsche's critique of the place of error within rationalist logic is obviously not itself conducted within the field of logic—instead, for Nietzsche, it is 'logic-itself which is error' insofar as it works against the significance of error as a vital necessity.<sup>32</sup> For Nietzsche 'life is the condition of knowledge. [And] Error is the condition of life', since 'all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspectives and [indeed] error'. As such, we should

'love and cultivate error as it is the womb of our knowing'. If it is not possible for the living organism to perceive the stick except as broken, then to deny this error is to deny something fundamental to life itself – it is to affirm knowledge as life-denying, or as stemming from a fear of life and its incessant play of 'struggle, invention, risk, and suffering'.<sup>33</sup>

While the recuperation of error as an authentic element of lived experience is deeply attractive to Canguilhem, he nonetheless reproaches Nietzsche for his suspicion or dismissal of modern scientific method. If, Canguilhem writes,

life were only life, force, will to power, its fall in tension would be unintelligible. If life contains its own limitation, why should a science which provides a theory of these limitations, in taking life as its object, be only an 'error' of life? Why couldn't science,

born out of the fear of life, be, as a determination of the limits of life, accepted by life and used courageously through life?<sup>34</sup>

Canguilhem seems to suggest that to deny the utility of logic, even as the error of the living, would itself express a kind of *ressentiment*. If Canguilhem appreciates Nietzsche's rehabilitation of the value of error, then he hopes to extend this rehabilitation to the error of logic itself, to somehow expand or confront the Cartesian frame rather than to simply dismiss or explode it. Canguilhem then develops a tense, perhaps aporetic dialectic between these two poles. 'If Descartes could not produce a theory of creation', he concludes, 'then Nietzsche was not able to produce a theory of science, which would also be a theory of appearance'.<sup>35</sup>

Although 'Science and Counter-Science' is usually considered to be only tangentially related to Hyppolite's life and work, Canguilhem's critique does seem to be in dialogue with Hyppolite's own reflections, and its 'first draft' (in 1955/56) was written in the immediate wake of the publication of *Logic and Existence* (in 1953). Nevertheless, Canguilhem does not follow Hyppolite towards a critique of empiricism's experience of contradiction as opening a path towards thinking the Absolute. Rather, Canguilhem's approach is characterised by what Derrida described as his tendency towards the 'hesitation waltz'.<sup>36</sup> Nietzsche's example portends the possibility of a productive counter to the reductive rationalism of Cartesian scientism, a suggestive if frustratingly ambiguous thesis.

But let us extend the stakes of this aporia, and restate the question: why is it that Canguilhem returns to *Science and Error* in order to pay tribute to his departed friend? At the level we have just outlined, this return can be read as the recognition of an unmarked debt to Hyppolite in the course's original conception—a more or less respectful engagement with and marking of distance regarding the question of 'error' (and indeed, of 'science') within their respective philosophies. But it is possible to displace this first answer; there is perhaps more 'at stake' in *Science and Error* and 'On Science and Counter-Science' than a furtive engagement with Hyppolite's critique of empirical reason.

A crucial, if somewhat obscure structure of *Science and Error* is the significance of death itself as an interpretative frame. When the intrepid archival researcher opens the folder containing Canguilhem's *Science and Error* seminar notes, they are confronted with a slightly disconcerting postcard depicting *Vanitas and Trompe l'Œil* by the French artist Jean-François de

le Motte (c. 1635-1685).<sup>37</sup> A canvas, partly affixed to a wooden frame resting upon a table, depicts a skull surrounded by other classical symbols of decay and the vanity of man's endeavours: an empty bottle, a dead stalk of wheat, an extinguished candle, and so forth. The skull rests upon a letter addressed *À Tous...*, and at the top of the canvas lies the warning '*COGITO MORI*' (REMEMBER DEATH). Beyond the frame of the painting we can see the tools of the working artist—his palette, preparatory sketches, and an abandoned maulstick (which the absent painter would have used to rest his hand upon). Canguilhem scholar Samuel Talcott reproduces an image of the postcard on the front cover of his monograph *Georges Canguilhem and the Problem of Error*. In his ekphrasis, he notes that,

A vanitas suggests that all human effort is hollow and worthless, but this painting emphasizes the long and patient work required to create such a message... The vanitas commands us to recognize that biological desire is empty and void because we all die in the end. But in treating this command as a message portrayed by a technically and laboriously produced image, the painting undoes that imperative. It does not tell us the ultimate status of desire and life, offering instead a portrait, not of the artist's person, but of his workplace, tools, and the disorder and decay within which he pursued his work.<sup>38</sup>

As Talcott points out, the painting's warning in fact only reads *COGITO MO-*. The canvas within the trompe l'œil has, in the artist's absence, already partly escaped its frame and curled back to obscure its own message, the inscription partly effaced by the entropy it affirms.

When Canguilhem 'returns' to *Science and Error* in 'On Science and Counter-Science', he is not only returning 'thematically', but seems to be literally reading over these papers and drawing particular passages from the lecture into his tribute. Discussing Nietzsche's confounding affirmation of vital error, for example, Canguilhem writes, 'Truth is a kind of error, in the sense of a vital illusion, without which a certain kind of living creature, man, would not be able to live' (*La vérité est une espèce d'erreur, au sens d'illusion vitale, sans laquelle une certaine espèce de vivants, l'homme, ne pourrait vivre*).<sup>39</sup> Compare this with a passage from page 115 of the *Science and Error* lecture notes: 'Truth (in the logical sense) is a kind of error (in the vital sense, that it to say existential, for Nietzsche), without which a certain kind of living creature, man, would not be able to live' (*La vérité (au sens logique) est une espèce d'erreur (au sens vital, c à d [c'est à*

*dire] existentiel, pour Nietzsche) sans laquelle une certaine sorte de vivants (l'homme) ne pourrait pas vivre).*<sup>40</sup>

The part of the quote in parentheses is written in green ink, and is neatly distinguished from the remainder of the phrase, which in the margins of the page Canguilhem notes glosses §308 of Genevieve Bianquis' 1937 translation of *La Volonté de Puissance*; 'Truth is a sort of error, lacking which a certain kind of living creature could not live' (*la vérité est une sorte d'erreur, faute de laquelle une certaine espèce d'êtres vivants ne pourraient vivre*).<sup>41</sup> We can see how the Canguilhem of 1971 has returned to the Canguilhem of 1956—he synthesises Nietzsche/Bianquis' original phrase with his own commentary to produce the later paraphrase. Further down the page he notes several further aphorisms in which Nietzsche tarries with the confounding nature of truth and its relation to death. Below Nietzsche's aphorism 'What is truth? Inertia',<sup>42</sup> he comments 'The postulate of knowledge – identity – this is the negation of the postulate of creation – alterity. Being would be death' (*L'être ce serait la mort*).<sup>43</sup> With the same green pen, Canguilhem adds a small circle, and the note 'cf. Tarde'. On a small scrap of loose paper (again marked with the same *rayon vert*), he adds a passage from Gabriel Tarde's *Universal Opposition*: "What is called perfect? A being to which nothing is lacking," says Bossuet. One cannot imagine a better definition of a corpse than this definition of God. Death surrenders us to the full totality of our pre-vital nature, to eternal Being'.<sup>44</sup>

Both *Science and Error* and 'On Science and Counter-Science' end with the same aporia, more baldly put by Canguilhem in *Science and Error* than in the *Hommage*: 'Descartes does not produce a theory of creation. Nietzsche does not ultimately grant a positive status to science. The question, therefore, remains unresolved'.<sup>45</sup> But in *Science and Error* death as the frame of the problematic is made explicit—not as contradiction to be elided or overcome, but an anxiety to be affirmed as itself vital. This frame is 'doubled' in the *Hommage*, which is, after all, not a *Festschrift*, but a *Gedenkschrift*—a writing whose impossible recipient is precisely the absent friend himself. The *Gedenkschrift* confronts the limits of life, if differently to the scientific reason that Canguilhem reproaches Nietzsche for eliding. Canguilhem's tribute marks his distance from Hyppolite's Hegelianism. It does not collapse this difference into a Cartesianism which would absorb or synthesise the 'scandal of error', but instead into a Cartesianism stained and productively destabilised by Nietzsche's vital affirmationism.

Canguilhem helped to assemble the *Hommage à Hyppolite*, and although his own contribution to the collection seems to hold Hyppolite at a respectful distance, we can see how the piece confronts the same strange contradictions in the relation between error and Being, or error and the living, that Hyppolite had approached in his own work. Canguilhem's Cartesio-Nietzschean response both displaces and pays tribute to his deceased friend—a 'courageous' writing against the silence and finality of death which would affirm the endless and endlessly productive anxiety of the philosopher's questioning. In this it is a fitting tribute indeed.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Georges Canguilhem, 'De la Science et de la Contre-Science', in Suzanne Bachelard (ed.), *Hommage à Jean Hyppolite* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), 173-180. Quoted passages from Canguilhem are my own translation unless otherwise noted.

<sup>2</sup> Michele Cammelli draws attention to and brilliantly analyses the relation between these two texts and Canguilhem's thinking of the Nietzsche-Descartes relation in his *Canguilhem Philosophe: Le Sujet et l'Erreur* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2022) (though he does not consider the essay or the seminar in relation to Hyppolite). See especially 139-88.

<sup>3</sup> Jean Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*, trans. Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).

<sup>4</sup> Without question the best overview in English of their biographical and intellectual relationship is Stuart Elden's article 'Canguilhem, Dumézil, Hyppolite: Georges Canguilhem and his Contemporaries', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 307.1 (2024), 27-48.

<sup>5</sup> See Georges Canguilhem, 'Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968)', in Camille Limoges (ed.), *Georges Canguilhem: Histoires des Sciences, Épistémologie, Commémorations, 1966-1995, Œuvres Complètes Tome V* (Paris: Vrin, 2018), 347. Although this piece was originally published in 1969, Canguilhem notes that he is writing only 'a few weeks' after Hyppolite's death in October 1968, and specifies that he had met Hyppolite '43 years ago', hence a meeting date of 1925.

<sup>6</sup> Canguilhem, 'Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968)', 347.

<sup>7</sup> Canguilhem, 'Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968)', 347.

<sup>8</sup> Georges Canguilhem, 'Hegel en France', in Camille Limoges (ed.), *Georges Canguilhem: Résistance, Philosophie Biologique et Histoire des Sciences, 1940-1965, Œuvres Complètes Tome IV* (Paris: Vrin, 2015), 321-41.

<sup>9</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, trans. Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Aubier, vol. 1 1939, vol. II 1941).

<sup>10</sup> Jean Hyppolite, *Genèse et Structure de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit de Hegel* (Paris: Aubier, 1946); in English translation Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Samuel Cherniak (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).

<sup>11</sup> Canguilhem, 'Hegel en France', 338.

<sup>12</sup> Canguilhem, 'Hegel en France', 338.

<sup>13</sup> Michel Foucault, 'Discourse on Language', in Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. A.M Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 235.

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- <sup>14</sup> Canguilhem, 'Hegel en France, 339.
- <sup>15</sup> Canguilhem, 'Hegel en France, 341.
- <sup>16</sup> Canguilhem, 'Hegel en France, 329.
- <sup>17</sup> Canguilhem, 'Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968)', 349.
- <sup>18</sup> Jean de la Fontaine, *Fables of La Fontaine* (4<sup>th</sup> ed.), trans. Elizur Wright Jnr (Boston: Sanborn, Carter & Bazin, 1856), 45.
- <sup>19</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 173.
- <sup>20</sup> Fonds Georges Canguilhem, Centre des Archives en Philosophie, d'Histoire, et d'Éditions de Science. GC 13.1.1 *La Science et L'Erreur*.
- <sup>21</sup> Michele Cammelli, *Canguilhem Philosophe*; Samuel Talcott *Georges Canguilhem and the Problem of Error* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
- <sup>22</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 174.
- <sup>23</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 174.
- <sup>24</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 174.
- <sup>25</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 175.
- <sup>26</sup> Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*, 76-80.
- <sup>27</sup> Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*, 76-77.
- <sup>28</sup> Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*, 77.
- <sup>29</sup> Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*, 84.
- <sup>30</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 177.
- <sup>31</sup> Canguilhem, *La Science et l'Erreur*, Lecture XXII, L'Erreur selon Nietzsche, 112.
- <sup>32</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 178.
- <sup>33</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 178.
- <sup>34</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 180.
- <sup>35</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 180.
- <sup>36</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Life Death*, ed. Pascale-Anne Brault and Peggy Kamuf, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020), 72.
- <sup>37</sup> Jean-François de Le Motte, *Vanité et Trompe l'Oeil*, n.d., ca. 1650–1700, 118.7 × 90.8 cm, Le Musée des Beaux-Arts de Dijon.
- <sup>38</sup> Talcott, *Canguilhem and the Problem of Error*, 271.
- <sup>39</sup> Canguilhem, 'De la Science, 178.
- <sup>40</sup> Canguilhem, *La Science et l'Erreur*, 115.
- <sup>41</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche *La Volonté de Puissance*, trad. G Bianquis (Paris: Vol II., 1937). § 308.
- <sup>42</sup> Canguilhem, *La Science et l'Erreur*, 115.
- <sup>43</sup> Canguilhem, *La Science et l'Erreur*, 115.
- <sup>44</sup> Canguilhem, *La Science et l'Erreur*, 113. Canguilhem gives page 144 of *L'Opposition Universelle* as the citation, thought at least in the 1897 edition the truncated passage can be found on page 146.
- <sup>45</sup> Canguilhem, *La Science et l'Erreur*, 116.