See also Beeckman, Isaac; Force and Determination; Hydrostatics; Law of Nature; Mechanics; Mydorge, Claude; Optics; Physico-Mathematics; Physics; Rainbow; Vortex

FOR FURTHER READING

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Secondary Sources


JOHN A. SCHUSTER

LOCKE, JOHN (1632–1704)

Locke was born in 1632 in Somerset, England, to a Protestant landowner. At the age of fifteen, he enrolled in the Westminster School before going on to Christ Church, Oxford. In 1666 he met Anthony Ashley Cooper (the future Earl of Shaftesbury), who was to become his patron and whom Locke was to serve as secretary for much of his life. Locke shared the political vicissitudes of Shaftesbury’s career and fled to the Netherlands in 1683, fearful of being charged with treason. After the Glorious Revolution, Locke returned to England; from 1692 until his death, he resided with Sir Francis and Lady Masham, the daughter of Ralph Cudworth.

Locke’s main metaphysical and epistemological work is the mammoth An Essay concerning Human Understanding, which he published in 1689 and revised five
times before his death. Although Locke rarely mentions Descartes by name in the *Essay*, much of that work can profitably be read as a running battle with him. Many of Descartes’ key positions – on innate ideas, the essence and immateriality of the soul, the nature of body as extension – come under attack.

Locke rejects Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas. If the doctrine means that we have ideas before we are aware of them, it is self-contradictory, for no idea can be in the mind without our being aware of it. If, as Descartes sometimes suggests, it means only that we have a capacity or disposition to form certain ideas, then it is trivially true of all ideas (I.ii.5). Nor does Locke have any use for the Cartesian intellect. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes uses the example of a chiliagon to show that we have a capacity for forming ideas that outstrips our ability to generate images. The idea of the chiliagon must then come from the intellect. Against this, Locke argues that, while we have no idea of the figure of the chiliagon, we can reason about its properties by attending to the idea of the number of its sides (II.xxix.13).

Although Locke endorses Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum* (II.i.10), he denies that we can know the nature of the thinking substance. Descartes’ claim that thought is the essence of the mind entails that the mind always thinks, even though it is of course not always aware of having done so. Locke finds this simply implausible; only philosophers “in love with their opinions” (II.i.10) could hold such a view. Moreover, if Descartes were right, there would in fact be two “persons” in each of us. If a person while asleep has a series of thoughts that can never be brought to consciousness by the waking self, then, according to Locke, the waking and sleeping persons are two, and not one.

For Locke, then, what makes identity of a person over time is continuity of consciousness, not sameness of substance (II.xxvii.23). This is just as well, since we can never be sure whether our consciousness resides in a single substance that persists through time; still less can we know whether that substance is material or not (IV.iii.6). “All the great ends of morality and religion” can be secured, Locke thinks, without a proof of the soul’s immateriality.

In the *Principles* (AT VIIIA 30–31, CSM I 215), Descartes identifies a substance with its essence or nature. Just as the mind is thought, so body is extension. Locke argues that “body” and “extension” signify distinct ideas (III.x.6), for body includes the notion of solidity, which mere extension does not. Descartes might agree and require us to revise our idea of body. To this, Locke responds that whichever idea of body corresponds to the world is “left to our senses to discover to us as far as they can” (IV.vii.12–15), implying that the picture of body as more than mere space is justified by experience.

Locke defends a view of substance as an unknown something that supports the qualities we observe. By contrast, Descartes’ identification of a substance with its nature obviates the need to postulate a substratum or underlying something in which the property of extension (or thought) inheres. In an intriguing letter, Locke
claims that he does “not at all understand the Cartesians’ way of talking.” “I can by no means persuade myself,” Locke writes, “that thought exists of itself, but only that a thinking thing or substance does so” (Letter 2498 in Locke 2002, 270).

See also Attribute, Body, Essence, Extension, Idea, Intellect, Mind, Substance, Thought

FOR FURTHER READING

Primary Sources


Secondary Sources


WALTER OTT

LUYNES, DUC DE (LOUIS-CHARLES D’ALBERT) (1620–1690)

Luynes was born the son of Charles d’Albert (1578–1621), first duc de Luynes and chief favorite of Louis XIII. Still an infant, Louis-Charles became second duc de Luynes. In 1639 he obtained the title of pair (Peer of the Realm) and in 1643 was given the title of grand fauconnier (Great Falconer). As an officer he distinguished himself during the Flanders campaign (1640). He died in Paris, October 10, 1690. To exercise his style on a great subject (Baillet 1691, 2:171), Luynes translated Descartes’ Meditations into French. The result was given to Descartes (probably by Picot) during his visit to Brittany in the summer of 1644 (Baillet 1691, 2:219). After his return to Paris in October, Descartes visited the duc to thank him for the honor (Baillet 1691, 2:243). Meanwhile Clerselier, who as yet did not know Descartes directly, translated not only the Meditations but also the Objections and Replies. Although both versions were found to be “excellent,” Descartes preferred Luynes’ for the publication, because that would give “high profile” (Baillet 1691, 2:171) to his work.