

Philosophy in the Turk Lands

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Almost all institutions talk about 'vision.' All proudly display a sentence or two about this 'vision' on their premises. In the lobby of a swimming pool construction company it is possible to discover the statement: "Our philosophy is to have children splash happily in each one of our pools." One wonders if the swimming pool company intends to supply the children, too. Similarly, one can find a dentist who wrote a vision which he intends his future patients to read. Large multinationals reduce their vision to less than five words and let the whole world know.

Some academics talk and write seriously about 'theory.' If one is not aware of the meaning loaded in that word in that context, one is inclined to ask 'theory of what?' When one realizes the word 'philosophy' is thus replaced, one may wish to refrain from making further comments. But is any of the foregoing a true definition of 'proper' philosophy?

First, there was philosophy. Then, disciplines began forming and proceeded to leave the bosom of their mother. Despite (or because of) that origin, the highest degree of university learning is termed Doctor of Philosophy, practically in any subject. As the off-spring disciplines kept taking the field away from philosophy, individual members of populations kept asserting the guiding lights of their lives in proverbs, didactic stories, manuals of statecraft, jokes and other literature and the arts. Therefore, it is possible to derive a whole of the philosophy of a polity from such a widely dispersed record. Can this mean, bringing knowledge back together, instead of examining it in piecemeal?

Accordingly, not all culture may be found in museums, concert halls or restaurants. There are repositories of "mind contents" such as within manuscripts or books which are cared for by libraries. This act of saving past experiences for the benefit of the future is a fact of life. Even fishermen and hunters make notes of their most productive areas. In a similar manner, politicians are fond of visiting the regions that elected them.

Sakla samani, gelir zamani (save the stalks; you will need them)

There are commonalities among people who live in diverse geographical and cultural zones. Food, shelter, clothing are needs of all individuals regardless of where they live. Depending on geographic conditions, in meeting necessities, the means as well as the results will vary. Whether a polity eats beans, cows or crocodiles, all members have to satisfy the requirements of protein intake. That eventually makes a difference in the health of the society. And those differences are reflected in the respective philosophies of polities.

Another factor is, how many hours a person must work a day to procure daily food. Interestingly enough, that factor deeply influences the overall philosophy. Having surplus food was used in defense of keeping slaves; having surplus food was credited in the forma-

tion of philosophical inquiries. Thereby, keeping slaves or peasants in villages became *de rigueur* philosophy in Europe.

Understanding a polity's philosophy helps an observer better understand the nature of that society. That understanding may even help us correctly predict the future behavior of that polity. Psychiatrists and psychologists have been working, since Second World War, to develop formulas for the purpose of predicting the future behavior of societies. The entire practice started with a 'profile' of Adolph Hitler, which effort was declared to be successful. In the case of the emergence of Adolph Hitler, what was the state of German philosophy? That question is interesting to answer, since there were wide-scale philosophical contacts among Scotland, Germany, France and England.

We must also not forget the place of mythical characters and events in the formation of philosophy in various nations. *Gotterdammerung*, set to music by Wagner, said to have been influential in the formation of modern German mind, contains personae and events of the mythical type. The *Alpamysh* epic in Central Asia¹, originally contained no mythical elements. It was composed and set to music as straight history, celebrating the defeat of an enemy who dared to invade the composer's homeland. Since there are dozens of versions of *Alpamysh*, effort was expended to determine the original elements. And by timeline record, the *Alpamysh* epic became the carrier of other ideas and myths, heaped on such a successful transmitter down the line.

At this point, we might touch upon the matter of direction. When philosophers begin constructing their ideology or their own version of truth, they often have a direction; they know which shore they wish to reach and drop anchor. For example, Thomas Hobbes had no qualms about his direction.² Therein hides a second, equally more important problem: how will the future generations make use of a given philosophy? Will they use the precepts contained for a freer society, or just the opposite? Will the society progress or regress, just because a small group of individuals interpreted a philosophical concept according to the exigencies of the moment or their own taste? Naturally, if the members of a polity are well educated and possess knowledge of the origins of the said philosophy, they can challenge and win over narrower points of view.

There was a historical period when the governed masses yearned for a philosopher king. By experience, the masses knew that the philosopher aspect of a king would soften the harshness of the straight king. That specific combination even led some sages of the time to comment that religion was nothing more than a watered-down version of philosophy for the uneducated masses.³ Accordingly, for some polities, it is religion, the belief system, that makes life worth living. The 'attractiveness' of life after death is a powerful incentive. For others, the desire to own the world and spend it to their liking, is the preference. If the

1 Hasan Bülent Paksoy, *Alpamysh: Central Asian Identity under Russian Rule* (Hartford: AACAR, 1989) <http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/paksoy/>

2 Hasan B. Paksoy, *Lectures on Central Asia* (Malaga: Entelequia, 2005) <http://www.eumed.net/entelequia/pdf/b014.pdf>

3 Hasan B. Paksoy, "Alın Yazısı mı, Kişi seçimi mi? İnançlar ve Düşünce Özgürlüğü," *Düşüncelerin Kökenleri* (Florence: Carrie/European University Institute, 2006) http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-10/paksoy_dusuncelerin-kokenleri.pdf

control of the all-available wealth is the governing philosophy, other cover philosophies may be put into play so as to conceal the ultimate goal. Religion is one unfailing path used to reach that goal.

Since the time of organized religions coming into age, with their users' manuals, there has been a tension between belief systems and secularism, however they are manifest. That tension is very much in evidence today; not only within a single country, but also between intercontinental religions. And that tension may even be taken to other celestial bodies with the traveling humans, that is, if measures are not taken to prevent strife.⁴

At times, the philosophy of a polity may be covered over with the philosophy of another polity. This happens with military occupation, and cultural resilience. There are many examples of a victorious army eventually losing superiority, because the people they conquered won over the conquering army with the strength of their cultural values. However, at other times, there may be a *mélange* of philosophies as a result. Some Central Asian states are now living in the throes of triple or quadruple philosophical *mélanges*.

Speculative Masonry⁵ contains the philosophy of self-improvement. Attracted by that premise, newly inducted members have fallen into the euphoric state of applying that idea more broadly in their homelands. The end result was and still is broadly discernible. Revolutions of various types were staged, governance models traded and changed. Then the question arises, whether it was Masonry staging those *coup-de-États*, or the newly inducted members misunderstanding the premise of Masonry? Furthermore, were those who were newly inducted hoodwinked by other members who stood to gain by a change of government?⁶

Traditions are meant to keep a polity on a true and tried method, to allow them a living space, based on the experiences of the old. Traditions are coined by a polity, and accepted by their governance strata, for the health and happiness of all belonging. Without followers or subjects, there is no use being a governor. A method of taking away the wealth of a polity is turning traditions into superstitions. If, for example, making springtime kites from locally available fibers was a tradition (a favorite activity in the Springtime), beginning a rumor that kites made in a foreign country where ancestors used to live are more auspicious, may just start such a superstition. In the end, kite-making from local fibers dies and monetary expenditures transfers the wealth of the polity to another country. What was intended as a happy occasion is thus transformed into a benefit of a foreign power.

The traditional belief system in the Central Asian *bozkir*⁷ was *Tengri*.⁸ Then itinerant mendicant dervishes appeared in the *bozkir* to convert the *Tengri* believers to Islam. This

4 Hasan B. Paksoy, *Humans on Mars and Beyond* (Charleston: Create Space, 2012)
http://www.academia.edu/1464674/Humans_on_Mars_and_Beyond_2012

5 Masonic Lodges of today view the stone masons of yesteryear as the precursors of their fraternal order.

6 Hasan B. Paksoy, "Evrin Dusuncesinin Devrimi" and "Dunya Degistiren mi, Deger Yargisinda Bulunan mi?" *Uzaysal Yonetim Beklerken* (Florence: Carrie/European University Institute)
http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy12/UZAYSAL%20YONETIM%20BEKLERKEN_Paksoy.pdf

7 Hasan B. Paksoy, "Identity Markers: Uran, Tamga, Dastan", *Transoxiana* 8 - Junio 2004
http://www.transoxiana.org/0108/paksoy-identity_markers.html

was perhaps the sixth set of proselytizers, seeking to convert the *Tengri* believers to different religions. In the *bozkir*, both water and food are scarce. Thus, the Islamic mendicant dervishes were completely dependent on their hosts for their own sustenance; because in the *bozkir*, ‘guests’ are looked after politely. After a short time, the mendicant dervishes found themselves injecting *Tengri* precepts into their Islamic messages. Accordingly, the Islamic Allah became *Tengri*; the prophet became *yalavaç* (he who beseeches God); praying was *yakaris* (overtone of complaining). In every case, the *Tengri* version was rather different than the Islamic variety of the *Tengri* terms. Later on, the Islamic *kadi* (religious) courts had to deal with all types of local traditions of *Tengri*, and the *kadi*-judges had to write them down in the famed *kadi* registers. Hence, the practice of Islam became highly localized. One may guess the temper tantrum of the North African traveler, Ibn Battuta, who was always horrified by the variety in Islam. Ibn Battuta insisted that he knew the truth.

Islam gained some foothold in cities, nevertheless. In fact, oases also became a home to the Islamic *madrasah* schools which were swiftly politicized. This not only resulted in the training of some famous scholars, but also produced equally famous religious fanatics who would not shy away from killing rulers when they felt betrayed. Another outcome was that some city-dwelling rulers had their guests assassinated in their sleep, which was done so that the beloved guest would immediately journey to heaven, without delay. All this may have altered the global political and historical landscape in ways that will not be possible to know at present.

One of the advantages of the *Tengri* belief system is that this religion does not have a “users’ manual.” Thus opponents of *Tengri* philosophy cannot study such a manual and look for openings in which to inject their counter positions in order to recruit *Tengri* believers into their peculiar-flavored religion. On the other hand, since there is no hard and fast users’ manual, some enterprising individuals ‘invented’ additional precepts based on the observed characteristics of the *Tengri* believers. There are two prominent attempts, Pan-Turanism and ‘*Kizil Elma*’ (Golden Apple).

‘*Kizil Elma*’ (Golden Apple) was never described, nor did it become the subject of any treatise. The term itself was usually employed with alacrity as in, “Let us go to the Golden Apple.” Except nobody knew where or what that Golden Apple was. Perhaps it was created much like the Pan-Turanism⁹ variety, for the sole benefit of outsiders. Hence, efforts to insert the idea of a Golden Apple into *Tengri*, and even Islam, failed.

It is difficult to adequately proselytize a people and promote a belief system without symbols, music, food and a user’s manual. In the case of *Tengri*, all exist except for the user’s manual. However, filigree symbols, music and food, do not have labels signifying them as companions of *Tengri*. What further compounds the difficulty in identification is that Shamanism and *Tengri* have not been viewed independently. Specifically, elements of

8 Paksoy, *Humans on Mars and Beyond*.

9 Hasan B. Paksoy, “Basmachi: Turkistan National Liberation Movement 1916–1930s,” in *Modern Encyclo-pedia of Religions in Russia and the Soviet Union*, Vol. 4, (FL: Academic International Press, 1991), 5–20.

http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-6/cae12.html

Shamanism, such as the Shaman's drum, is a good symbol for Shamanism, but is not involved in *Tengrism*. *Tengri* is the earliest form of monotheism, whereas the Shamans converse with below-ground gods or spirits. As such, Shamans are the messengers. *Tengri* does not need an intermediary between himself and the population, and is accessible directly by all adherents be they a single person or an entire polity.

Both *Tengri* and Shamanism have poetry set to music. In the case of *Tengri*, the singing is generally accompanied by *kumiss*¹⁰ drinking. *Tengri* is the reason humans exist and he is the protector of all life. When the Central Asians practiced for war, they would go on an extensive hunting expedition covering a vast territory. The objective was to flush-out all venatio and drive them into an enormous circle around which all available troops, mounted on horseback, would stand shoulder-to-shoulder. Just before the killing started, the scholars in the court, on foot, would intercede directly to the ruler on behalf of the animals. The scholars would ask the ruler to save the healthiest and biggest animals from all species so they could live and multiply in order that future generations of humans would also have a chance to exercise hunting.

In Central Asia, the consequence for polluting water was immediate death for any human offender. In an environment where water is precious and scarce, this penalty need not be a cause for amazement. All contemporary attention regarding resources remaining renewable and living 'green' points one to observe that *Tengri* is the original environmentalist belief system. In fact, even after the adherents of *Tengri* came into contact with proselytizers from other religions, some of the 'green' *Tengri* concepts were incorporated into the newcomer religion. Some of the 'sins' found in neighboring religions attest to that. In due course, some of those proselytizers forgot about the religion they were attempting to spread and became adherents of *Tengri*.

A philosophy emerges from the life-time of the given polity that adheres to it. The process is interactive. If the basic philosophy is outright expansionism, as in imperialism, as opposed to moving due to physical pressure from the neighbors, then the written, painted and musical characteristics of that expansionism will be on exhibit. That exhibition will in return fuel more expansionism. Life in Central Asia, and consequently philosophy emanating from this area, are geared toward survival. If the polity cannot survive as a unity, then the philosophy has failed. The central Asian approach to ensuring the success of the survival philosophy and life in general may be described thus:

uruk > *oymak* > *aris* > *soy* > *tire* > *ara*

Reading the formula from right to left indicates expanding levels of a family. Thus, we observe that a pyramidal structure constitutes the bases of the broad community in Central Asia. It has a defined set of steps. An *uruk* is comprised of *oymak*, which are made up of *aris*, a composition of *soy*, itself a subdivided into *tire*, constituted by *ara*. In times of political strain, when war clouds are visible, various *uruk* form coalitions and establish the

10 Hasan B. Paksoy, "The Traditional Oglak Tartis Among the Kirgiz of the Pamirs," *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (1985).

http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-6/cae10.html

ultimate political and economic union, the confederation. The Central Asians termed this process “*tug baglamak*.”

Tug is the horse-tail standard. The leader of a polity or unit had the traditional right to tie a *tug* to his lance. As the *tug* would be more visible than a naked lance, this *tug* was used to identify the polity and, when needed, to signal the cavalry, to order various attacking, flanking, retreat and regrouping signals.

When the leader in question attracted more of his kinsmen to his standard, he would be in a position to add additional *tug* to his own lance. This was necessary because he now had more divisions to command, each with a designated lieutenant, called *tugbay*. For example, in the very late 15th and very early 16th centuries, the Ozbeks and the Kazaks formed their confederations in this time-honored fashion. In the 14th century, Timur was another example. Their population comprised primarily of *urug*, *oymak*, *aris* and so on, that arrived from the Nogay confederation that was dissolving. Via these mechanics Central Asians established their polities, which we might now call states, complete with their geographic domains and governance structures.

The appellation of the confederation was chosen carefully, because it determined the character of the polity. For example, Ozbeks named themselves after Uzbek Han. This took place after an earlier confederation was dissolved, and the components of that earlier confederation chose to join others to form a brand-new confederation.¹¹ Z. V. Togan, in his “Origins of the Ozbeks and the Kazaks” summarizes the process involved.¹²

The foregoing has portrayed *Tengri* as a religion of exclusively the masculine gender. Those who wanted to see *Tengri* as belonging only to men may have received their inspiration from another belief system. However, *Tengri* is celebrated not only coeducationally, but by entire families and kinship structures. As the *dastan Dede Korkut* asserts, competition between men and women, in archery, horse-back riding and single combat wrestling was still conducted every year in the high pastures in Central Asia.

It often seems that the English, French and Germans tend to copy each other, and compete energetically. As soon as one of those nations ‘invents’ an idea, the other two will ‘create’ the same or similar idea under its own national designation. The real reason for that behavior is, to have a philosophical position for their masses, to prevent the ‘foreign’ influences in the form of philosophy invading their territory. For example, Germany has the Nibelungen and the Ring Cycle. Britain has the Lord of the Rings. The French possess their own versions influenced by Wagner or in response to him; two examples are by Gabriel Fauré and André Messager. Given that ‘high culture’ often stimulates and dictates thought patterns in the minds of the governance strata members, and sometimes keeps alive ‘chips on shoulders,’ one must not make the mistake of disregarding this category in the decision-making process. Some old wounds are very difficult to heal, and said wounds may flare at

11 <http://www.spongobongo.com/zy9949.htm>

12 cf. Hasan B. Paksoy, *Lectures on Central Asia* (Malaga: Entelequia, 2005)

<http://www.eumed.net/entelequia/pdf/b014.pdf>

and “Z. V. Togan: On the Origins of the Kazaks and the Ozbeks,” *Central Asia Reader*, Hasan B. Paksoy (ed.), (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-5/

any moment. Even the 20th century is full of examples.¹³ Other examples include garden architecture, building decorations, poetry, music, dance et al.

However, it is much more difficult to emulate others, for ideas must offer at least a tinge of something new, useful and that will encourage the progress of other thought processes. For example, a comparison between *Kutadgu Bilig*¹⁴ published in 1069–1070 A.D. and Prince¹⁵ c. 1515 A.D. may be instructive. The first one is for the people, advising the ruler to look after his subjects for his own happiness, which is in opposition to the latter. This difference in approaching the problem of governance poses a problem. Are the differences due to immediate local conditions? Or are there differences because the Turks had a longer accumulated pool of experiences than the Italians? Better yet, can the differences be explained by a basic philosophical school?

insan inciye denizden çıkarmadıkça, o ister inci olsun -- ister çakıtaşı, farketmez (pearl, if not brought to the sea-surface, may as well remain a pebble on the sea-floor)

Humor may be the easiest medium through which to discover the philosophy of its creators. As in most other carriers of philosophy, humor comes in varieties. Depending on the creating culture, a particular branch may be a more lively source than another. One must keep two factors in mind when dealing with philosophy in humor: first, humor is the highest level of language competence; second, unless one understands the culture and its historical references, the contents may not make sense at all.¹⁶ The recording of humor and the philosophy it contains is not generally a systematic endeavor. For the most part, it is created on the spot and only a very small percentage is eventually recorded. Nightly drinking tables became famous for philosophical humor. However, understanding the published stories requires a thorough knowledge of the circumstances and the language references of the time, including wordplays.¹⁷ The stories of *Molla Nasreddin*, and *Keloglan* contain more serious philosophical humor, even when they are funny.¹⁸

Poetry as well is definitely a carrier of philosophy, though it may be much more difficult to get at the underlying philosophy it contains. This is especially true for the Central

13 Introduction, *Humans on Mars...*

14 Yusuf Has Hajib, *Wisdom of Royal Glory*, translated by Robert Dankoff (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

15 Nicolo Macchiavelli, *The Prince* has many translations and printings.

16 Hasan Bulent Paksoy, "Elements of Humor in Central Asia: The Example of Journal Molla Nasreddin," *Essays on Central Asia* (Lawrence: Carrie, 1999)

http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-6/cae19.html

17 *50 Yilin Turk Mizah ve Karikaturu*, Derleyenler: Semih Balcıoğlu–Ferit Öngören (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları No. 125, 1973). cf Hasan Bulent Paksoy, "Türk Ordusunda Mizah," *Türk Tarihi Toplumların Mayası, Uygarlık* (İzmir: Mazhar Zorlu, 1997)

http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-3/index.html

18 Hasan Bulent Paksoy, *The Bald Boy Keloglan and the Most Beautiful Girl in the World* (Lubbock: ATON, 2004)

http://aton.ttu.edu/pdf/The_Bald_Boy_Keloglan_and_the_Most_Beautiful_Girl_in_the_World.pdf

Asian poetry written by the Classical Chaghatay era poets such as Huseyin Baykara,¹⁹ Ali Shir Navai²⁰ and Babur.²¹ Due to their milieu, those poets expressed their philosophies in a rather coded manner, which I call indexing. A given word in a couplet or quatrain may be central to the understanding of that couplet or quatrain. And that particular word may have more than one meaning, especially with regard to the poet's understanding of the world. During World War I, and even a bit earlier, the objective of the Golden Apple philosophy was advocated in rhyme by Ziya Gokalp. Except, as indicated earlier, the parameters of the Golden Apple were completely unknown and remain a fiction to this day.

In the future, the thought processes described above, will not change, except that computers will be more intimately involved. This will have both benefits and drawbacks. While the words of a proverb or story may be perpetuated without loss, the intentional meanings between the lines may well be. And, usually, those unspoken but roundabout referenced meanings are the real message. For example "beauty is in the eyes of the beholder" has a double meaning. The first is a multi-cultural one, and has the flavor of permissiveness. The second meaning is a rather sharp rebuke, completely dismissing the first party's statement. This loss may be to the pure benefit of the governance strata, aided by the designer community.²² In that fashion, positions contra to the platform of the governance strata can be discredited, made inoperable or killed.

In future philosophy, computers will be taking on more anthropomorphic characteristics, to the extent of becoming pseudo-humans. As such, the computer pseudo-humans will be in a rather advantageous position since their requirements will be more easily met than those for men in their environment. What will make a difference is the skills of the design community. If the designers are able to endow their creations with the human quality known as 'instinct', that may also be a triumph of quantum physics. At that point, humans may have given up ultimate command of all action to the computer-based constructs. Then, does philosophy provide any meaning left for humans or does philosophy then exist only to accomplish the requirements of the computers? This may require a human pledge not to rebel against computer-based creations under a philosophical cloak and include the acceptance by humans of the superiority of the smart 'machines.' That acceptance may be justified by the extant human philosophical conception of 'law of the jungle.' Then the computerized human beings will have the necessary physical and intellectual power to overcome all opposition.

ne ekersen, onu biçersin (you will harvest what you sow)

Every major war in Central Asian history has been celebrated with an epic, called a *dastan*. Major events call for brand new *dastans*. Others can create variants of old *dastans*. The

19 *Risale-i Huseyin Baykara*, http://aton.ttu.edu/risale-i_sultan_huseyin_baykara.asp

20 Robert Devereux (tr.), *Judgment of Two Languages; Muhakamat Al-Lughatain By Mir 'Ali Shir Nawāi; Introduction, Translation and Notes* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966).

21 *The Bābur-Nāma in English (Memoirs of Babur)*, trans. Anette S. Beveridge (London: Luzac & Co., 1922, Reprint 1969).

22 Hasan Bulent Paksoy, *Identities: How Governed, Who Pays?* (Malaga: Entelequia, 2006), 2nd ed. <http://www.eumed.net/entelequia/pdf/b002.pdf>

objective is not only to celebrate the victory, and the event itself, but also to pass on lessons learned to future generations. Thus the offspring benefit because the forefathers ensure their success as a polity.²³ During the second half of the 20th century, the myth of ‘world peace’ captivated some of the populations. That belief hides the fact that competition among polities never cease. In addition, the basic concepts of thought process can be subverted by parties who are interested in the obverse of what is a description of the true conditions on the ground.²⁴

Each polity possesses an objective, whether it is written or only repeated orally, be it based on reality or myth. What is important is that the said objective is in line with the realities of the polity voicing it.²⁵ The ‘Golden Apple’ myth is just that, neither realistic, nor beneficial. It is an amorphous construct, and contains no logical train of thought. The case of pan-Turanism, however, was not a construct of the Turks. “Pan-Turanianism” or “Pan-Turkism,” was formulated and initiated in Europe, not in Central Asia, about the time of the Russian occupation of Tashkent in 1865. This formulation was the brainchild of the Hungarian Orientalist and traveler Arminius Vámbéry, Professor of Oriental languages. It was built on the premise that since the overwhelming majority of Central Asians spoke (and still speak) dialects of Turkish, and share the same historical origins and history, “they could form a political entity stretching from the Altai Mountains in Eastern Asia to the Bosphorus,” where the capital of the Ottoman Empire was located. This pseudo-doctrine was then attributed to the Turks themselves, and the Russians and Europeans claimed it was a revival of Chinghiz Khan’s conquests, a threat not only to Russia, but to the whole of Western civilization. It seemed to justify any action against Central Asia, such as a new “crusade” in the name of self-defense.

In fact, the doctrine was not embraced in Central Asia. As is now known, Vámbéry was in the service of the British government at a time when Britain was embroiled in the Great Game. The fear of a resurgent Central Asia was echoed in Leon Cahun’s history of the Turks and Mongols the year of the Franco-Russian treaty of 1894, and repeated by the Russians in popular and scholarly publications. It was not until the first decade of the 20th century that the notion was received as a “solution” by small groups of émigrés from Central Asia, living in European capitals, who were working to stifle Russian colonialism. Nonetheless, it was a successful public relations ploy for its originators in their dealings with the Western public, and accusations of “Pan-Turkism” can still be heard. It should not be confused with Turks’ national consciousness, their desire for cultural revival and political independence based on historical precedent. The latter, “Turkism,” is a benign designation, not any different than English, Irish or French varieties; or types expressed by other nationalities of the Ottoman Empire.

23 Hasan Bulent Paksoy, *Alpamysh: Central Asian Identity under Russian Rule*.

24 Hasan Bulent Paksoy, "Kutluk Veren Bilgi ve 26 Agustos'a Giden Yol," *Düşüncelerin Kökenleri* (Florence: Carrie/European University Institute, 2006).
http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-10/paksoy_dusuncelerin-kokenleri.pdf

25 Hasan Bulent Paksoy, "Toplum Olarak Varılmak İstenen Sonuç Nedir?," *Düşüncelerin Kökenleri* (Florence: Carrie/European University Institute, 2006).
http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-10/paksoy_dusuncelerin-kokenleri.pdf

Thus the Germans' attempt to persuade the Ottoman leadership to embrace this policy before and during World War I reflects Germany's desire to make political use of such a weapon against its enemies, the Russians, by appealing to their Turkish populations. To undermine British control in Central Asia, another doctrine was revived: Pan-Islam. The Pan-Islamic Movement was an anti-colonial political movement of the late 19th century, and must be distinguished from the "orthodox" Islamic unity of all believers, the *umma*. Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) established the movement in its political form, striving to achieve the political unity of Muslims to fight against colonialism and the colonial powers. It was popular among Indian and north-African Muslims. However, the movement also served the colonial powers well. Painted as a reverse-Crusade, without necessarily using the terminology, but through graphic allusions, the Colonial powers could mobilize both Western public opinion and secret international alliances to fight the "emerging threat." The Germans, after the death of al-Afghani, sought to make that threat as real as possible for the British in India.²⁶

The Turkistan National liberation War is just that, not an initiative to establish a large empire, but for Turks to free themselves from the lordship of the Russian Empire. The details of that National Liberation war is available from the pen of one of the major participants and leaders, Z. V. Togan.²⁷

Kutadgu Bilig, as it also stands today, lays out the formula which is perhaps most suitable for the organization of a republic; at least in terms the Turks will make use of it. Additionally, *Kutadgu Bilig* sets out the principles, leaving sufficient room for the executive branch to make his choices. The *kenges* tradition of electing leaders was kept, even perhaps influenced the Soviet period elections in the Soviet Union (except the Soviet restrictions of candidates).²⁸

One can suggest that philosophy can be experimental as well as humorous in the hands of talented teachers. On a celebrated occasion, which took place over some eight centuries ago, Nasreddin again demonstrates the necessity of experimental science and reasoning: One day Nasreddin brings home three pounds of meat, expecting his wife to cook it for dinner. At dinnertime, finding no meat on the table, Nasreddin asks his wife, "What happened to the meat?" His wife replies, "The cat ate it." Nasreddin breezes into the kitchen, puts the cat on the scales, and discovers that the cat weighs three pounds. Nasreddin quizzically questions the result. "If the meat I brought home weighed three pounds, then, where is the cat? And, if this happens to be the cat, then what happened to the meat?"²⁹

26 Hasan Bulent Paksoy, "Basmachi: Turkistan National Liberation Movement 1916–1930s," 5–20.
http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-6/cae12.html

27 Prof. Zeki Velidi Togan, *National Existence and Cultural Struggles of Turkistan and Other Muslim Eastern Turks* (S. Charleston: Create Space, 2011).
http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-14/Paksoy%20translation%20of%20Togan%20Memoirs.pdf

28 Hasan Bulent Paksoy, "Republic," *Presented to the MIM, ATAA, TDAF, et al. on the 90th Anniversary Celebration of the Turkish Republic*, New York City, October 2013.

29 Hasan Bulent Paksoy, "Introduction," *The Bald Boy Keloglan and the Most Beautiful Girl in the World*.