Philosophers in the Public Square

A Religious Resolution of Kant’s Conflict

Stephen R. Palmquist

with an appendix coauthored by
Richard W. Mapplebeckpalmer

On Retreat with Kant:
Concord and Conflict in Philosophical Practice

In opposition to the common belief that philosophy is a discipline belonging solely in the university, where it can be safely insulated from influencing or being influenced by the way ordinary people live their lives, a movement has arisen over the past decade or so, commonly known as “Philosophical Practice.” Some trace its early organization back to 1992, when several French philosophers and friends casually met one Sunday morning in a Paris café to discuss an issue of mutual concern. A journalist, overhearing them planning a follow-up meeting and mistakenly thinking it would be open to the general public, announced it in the local press, and the first “Café Philo” was born. Soon the popularity of the weekly gatherings that began cropping up in cafés all over Paris and throughout France came to the attention of philosophers elsewhere, who had already been interested in practical ways of luring philosophy out of the Academy and back into the public square (where it began, in pre-Platonic Athens). Contacts were made between counselors who were already using philosophical ideas and methods to assist clients in overcoming personal problems, consultants who had already been hired by big businesses to assist them in thinking philosophically about various corporate problems, and teachers who were already interested in minimizing current social problems by introducing “philosophy for children” into primary and secondary school curricula. Starting in 1995, annual conferences began to be held, where philosophers engaged in these and other nonacademic activities could share their ideas and encourage others to regard philosophy as more than just an academic discipline.

Soon after attending the Third International Conference on Philosophical Practice, in July 1997, I began exploring various ways of involving myself in philosophical activities outside the university. At that conference I read a paper pointing out that the psychologist Carl Jung was strongly influenced by Kant and arguing that certain Kantian ideas also could serve as useful counseling tools. In addition to experimenting with this possibility in some volunteer counseling I did over the next few years, I started the Hong Kong Philosophy Café in 1999—an organization that has now grown to six semi-independent branches with a mailing list of over four hundred interested participants. Meanwhile, in 1998 I had acquired a ten-acre parcel of forest nestled in the backwoods of Mendocino County, about 150 miles north of San Francisco, with the idea of setting up a philosophical retreat center—an idea that developed out of discussions I had with various participants attending the 1997 conference. In January 2001 the first CIPHER retreat took place in a newly completed house that had been built on the property.

For a Kant scholar accustomed to working in a university setting, these new exploits have been both exciting and challenging. They have forced me to think deeply about whether (and if so, how) Kant’s ideas can be useful to ordinary laypersons. As a result, I have come to a new understanding of the false limitations philosophers put upon themselves when they buy into the assumption that philosophy should be tucked safely away in the inner recesses of the Academy. With the idea of testing the applicability and interest Kant’s ideas might have to the general public, I facilitated a one-day retreat in December 2001, intended as a way of coming to terms with the September 11th tragedy and the resulting war in Afghanistan that was then unfolding. Four local residents, all ordinary working people, none of whom had previous exposure to Kant, met with me for four intense, two-hour sessions of reading and discussion based on Kant’s essay Perpetual Peace. The success of the event was evident not only from the numerous insights that arose during our discussions, but also from the concord we five experienced, and came to hope for the world at large, as a result of considering Kant’s explanation of why war happens and his vision of the way political relations could some day do without it.

The success of that event (and other retreats) motivated me to plan a second retreat on Kant, this time offering scholars an opportunity to reflect in a nonacademic setting on a text where Kant appears to be less optimistic about the possibility (or even the desirability) of concord: The Conflict of the Faculties. Since the focus of my recent research on Kant had been in the area of the religious and theological implications of his philosophy, and since I was...
already involved in the project of coediting the present collection of essays, a retreat discussing how Kant's Conflict offers important guidelines for interpreting his philosophy of religion seemed like a good idea. Four of the five participants in the retreat, held in mid-July 2002, subsequently submitted essays for this volume. As it turned out, however, our discussions focused as much on Kant's conception of what a philosopher should be, and on how the philosophy faculty of a university should relate to the rest of the university and (especially) to the general public, as on the specific details of Kant's philosophy of religion—if not more so.

In the second section of this essay, I provide a report on the discussions held at the July 2002 CIPHER retreat, entitled "Rethinking Kant's Philosophy of Religion." This report does not identify the participants who expressed specific ideas, for in most cases the insights were mutual, arising spontaneously as a result of the concord that developed between us through the protracted attention we were able to give, as a small group of new friends philosophizing together in a relaxed and noncombative setting, to Kant's text. In the third section I then take a step back from the focus on Kant as a topic discussed at philosophical retreats and summarize my overall strategy for interpreting Kant, explaining how and why it provides a strong basis for interpreting his philosophy of religion in an affirmative way. In the last section I argue that one of the best nonacademic professions for a Kantian philosopher to enter would be that of a pastor. The essay then concludes with an Appendix, coauthored by a pastor-philosopher who actually implements many of the ideas presented here.

Kant on the Philosopher's Responsibility to the General Public

In his last published work on religion, Part I of The Conflict of the Faculties (1798), Kant provides numerous helpful clarifications of his previously published views on religion. He bases many of his arguments on a theory of the fundamental difference between the responsibilities philosophers and theologians have in their respective relationships to the government on one hand and to the general public on the other. In this respect, the main difference between philosophers and theologians, he argues, is that the latter are charged with the task of training one of the three "businessmen of the faculties" (i.e., pastors), whereas philosophers have no such responsibility to train public servants. 4

Kant's theory of the difference between philosophers and theologians raises two fundamental questions for anyone interested in promoting a harmonious relationship between the disciplines of theology (and/or religion) and philosophy: (1) Do philosophers have any proper role as public servants, or are they necessarily confined to the university, where they serve merely as critics of the other three faculties? and (2) Would it be possible and/or desirable for a pastor, who presumably must don the cloak of the theology faculty, also to be a practicing philosopher in Kant's sense (i.e., one whose allegiance is to "bare reason")? Exploring how Kant answers the first question in Conflict will be the purpose of this section. After the third section outlines Kant's general understanding of the relationship philosophy has to the higher faculty of theology and to the public practice of religion, we will be prepared to answer the second question in the final section.

Before looking at Kant's views on the philosopher's responsibility to the public, we must address the issue Kant raises in the Preface of Conflict, regarding his own readiness to comply with the deceased king's demand that he remain silent on matters relating to religion. As is well known, the censor for the highly conservative king objected to the theology in Kant's 1793 book, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, and ordered Kant to stop writing on religious matters. In his response Kant did not accept the charges; rather, he claimed his approach was designed to defend and promote the Christian religion. Nevertheless, he agreed not only to stop writing on religion, but even to stop speaking in public on any religious matter as long as he remained the king's servant. Fortunately the king died before Kant did, and Kant argued that this freed him from his promise to remain silent. Kant was therefore able in good conscience to publish this important last work, containing his most mature reflections on religion and theology. 5 Was Kant justified (when judged by the principles of his own philosophy) in taking this "easy way out" in his conflict with the government? Kant's theory of the distinctive role of philosophers seems partially designed to exonerate him from any charge of cowardice: he was merely following his duty as the king's loyal servant. However, as we shall see, this strategy does not succeed, when properly understood.

At the retreat we discerned four distinctive tiers or levels in Kant's account of the philosopher's role. The first and most general level is that occupied by the general public. By "public" Kant means anything outside both the university and the government that is potentially a concern for everyone—that is, anything that is open for discussion by all. Indeed, Kant's term, öffentlich ("public"), has "open" (öffentlich) as its root meaning. University professors and students, like government officials, function as members of the public when they go about their daily lives. But when they carry out their official duties within the Academy, members of the higher faculties function as trainers of "public servants" and are therefore answerable to the government.

The second level is occupied by these public servants themselves—in Kant's scheme the three types of "businessmen of the faculties" (pastors, lawyers, and doctors)—or, for that matter, by any professional whose area of expertise places him or her in a direct relationship with members of the general public. Since the role of good government is to care for the general well-being of the people, Kant argues that the government has a proper duty to exercise a certain degree of control over these professionals. Laws and guidelines are quite rightly instituted for the protection of the public against charlatans or incompetent practitioners. Kant states at one point that, in general, "people want to be led, that is ... they want to be duped" (CF 31). Since most people...
are susceptible to being deceived, the government's job should be to protect the general public as much as possible from being harmed. The more philosophically enlightened the general public becomes, the less strict these government controls will need to be.

In *Conflict* Kant connects the three higher faculties to the three principal desires of ordinary people: "being happy after death, having their possessions guaranteed by public laws... and finally... looking forward to... health and a long life." The philosopher's message to the people ought to be that, in order for these wishes to be fulfilled, one should "live righteously, commit no injustice, and, by being moderate in his pleasures and patient in his illnesses, rely primarily on the self-help of nature." Unwilling to accept such strict demands, unenlightened people look to clergy, lawyers, and physicians for miraculous help, forgetting they have "been a scoundrel all [their] life... broken the law... and abused [their] physical powers" (CP 30). Since these motives are hardly ideal, they need to be regulated by any government that has the people's best interests in mind. Giving the philosophy faculty freedom to criticize everything proposed by these educators of the professions is the best means of "governing" or "patrolling" (controllieren) the higher faculties (28).

The third level is made up of what Kant called the "higher faculties" (theology, law, and medicine)—or what we today would simply call "the academic community," excluding the philosophy faculty (and its intellectual offspring that form departments of their own nowadays). These faculties are distinct because they train the professionals who then go out and "lead" the members of the public who, for one reason or another, do not wish (or are not able) to think for themselves on matters of faith, justice, and health. Kant argues, famously (or infamously), that the government has both a right and a responsibility to keep a watchful eye on any academics whose main function is to train public servants. For if these academics are out of line, they may lead the professionals astray, and this, in turn, could have a directly detrimental effect on the general public.

The philosophy faculty, by contrast, occupies its own distinct, fourth level precisely because it does not train any professionals who relate directly to the public. Instead, the academic philosopher's main task is to engage in *creative conflict* with members of the higher faculties. As such, Kant claimed the writings and speech of philosophers ought not to be of any concern to the government. (This means the censorship he had reluctantly cooperated with for the past four years had been inappropriate. Kant had willingly obeyed an unjust law.) During our discussion of these ideas at the retreat, I suddenly realized that Kant's four-tier theory includes one feature that is often overlooked, mainly because Kant himself does not emphasize it—though he does hint at it. That feature is that these tiers can be arranged either in a straight line, like levels or stories of a building, or in a circle. If Kant had in mind the latter arrangement, then, contrary to first impressions, the philosophy faculty has both the right and the responsibility to engage in direct, uninhibited contact with the general public. What gives philosophers this right is that, in their engagement with the public, philosophers do not claim some special, "higher" knowledge; rather, they appeal to one and the same faculty, "publicly" using the same "cold reason" (*kalt Urteil öffentlich*) that all human beings use when thinking (CP 33).

This can be confirmed by proposing an alternative way of picturing the relationships between the various "tiers" mentioned above, suggested by Kant's practice of referring to philosophy as the "lower" faculty in relation to the "higher" faculties that train professionals. The "heightness" of theology, law, and medicine connotes a royal calling, a direct link to the "high officials" of government. The "lowness" of philosophy, by contrast, connotes a direct link with the general public. There are no professional philosophers. Rather, the philosopher's job is to convey to the general public the views being promoted by the higher faculties (as sanctioned by whatever is "politically correct" at the time) in a way that will enable those who are willing to think for themselves to make up their minds in an informed yet impartial manner. That is, the academic philosopher is (or should be) like the general public's spy, strategically positioned at the heart of the university in order to collect information and serve as the public's most reliable informant.

The problem is that academic philosophers nowadays do tend to regard themselves as forming a distinct profession (aside from being professional teachers). As a result, they often pay allegiance to university administrators in a manner not unlike the way Kant thought the members of the higher faculties ought properly to pay allegiance to the government, at least in their public pronouncements. (Kant thought all academics, whether in the higher or lower faculties, should be free to say whatever they wish, as long as they are speaking only to each other, not to the general public.) The very component of the university that ought to be its independent voice of conscience is all too often just a safe haven for half-witted thinkers to make a comfortable living. If philosophy teachers view themselves as public servants employed by the government to produce other professionals like themselves, then they are actually seeing themselves as members of what Kant called the "higher faculties" and would thereby be subject to government control in Kant's scheme.

Kant's argument boils down to this: in those cases where a government employs philosophers, as when they teach in a publicly funded university, they are serving a function not unlike the "loyal opposition" in a constitutional monarchy such as England. Good government depends on the presence of an opposing voice that is given total freedom to say what it deems best for each situation; and the same is true for professional education. The philosopher, in Kant's scheme, is the proper person to serve this role, because philosophers answer only to the voice of reason. Academic philosophers who work in state-sponsored or private institutions are indirectly performing public service through the influence their research and teaching have on members of the higher faculties; nevertheless, they are not bound by the same restrictions as
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those who perform direct public service, because of the special position they occupy as the "lower faculty." This applies as much to philosophers who work within the confines of a university as it does to those who step outside the university and attempt to reason in a "free and open" manner, unencumbered by the fetters of grades and other limitations of the university context. Philosophical practitioners must be careful not to place themselves in "high places," where their appeal to reason could be compromised by official (e.g., governmental or organizational) intervention.

In light of this interpretation of Kant's position, Kant's personal choice to abide by the will of the censor purely does not merit moral condemnation. That is, he was not doing anything that contradicted his own teachings on moral goodness. However, his decision is also not worthy of praise. For it lacked the very courage that Kant himself thought should be the hallmark of the true philosopher, the courage to stand up to officials (whether they be government or university based) and openly challenge rulings that are in error. Apparently he thought that in his case such a struggle would not be worth the effort. Perhaps he excused himself on the grounds of old age, reasoning that he could simply write what he wished to write on the topic and arrange to have it published posthuminously, if he were to die before the king. Kant's compliance, therefore, is nothing to be overly concerned about; but it is definitely nothing to hold up as an example for others to follow, especially since it fails to implement his own ideals regarding the philosopher's responsibilities to the general public. Although Kant in his old age failed to exhibit the moral courage of Socrates, he cannot be accused of going to the opposite extreme and selling his soul to the devil in the manner of Faust.

The Perspectival Interpretation as a Basis for Interpreting Kant's Conflict

In addition to discussing Kant's views on the relationship between philosophers and the general public, participants at the July 2002 CIPHER retreat addressed a variety of more specific issues regarding the proper interpretation of Kant's philosophy of religion, in light of the interpretive guidelines provided in Conflict. Rather than reporting on those details here, however, I shall now take a step back and look at the overall structure of Kant's philosophical System in hopes of revealing its suitability to serve as a foundation for an affirmative approach to theology and religion.

The organization of Conflict, like that of most books Kant wrote after 1780, is determined by Kant's deep belief that philosophy is at its best when it follows an "architectonic" approach.12 By this he meant philosophers should seek to construct their arguments in an orderly way determined by reason itself, rather than following the merely random approach of collecting information from the "aggregate" we find in experience. Kant's interpreters, especially those who adopt the traditional interpretation, have almost universally rejected this "art of constructing systems" as ludicrous, to the extent that any portion of Kant's System that an interpretor fails to understand tends to be cast aside on the grounds that it was supposedly "only necessary because of the artificial requirements of Kant's architectonic."

The first and foremost aim of my work on Kant has been to demonstrate how mistaken this a priori rejection of architectonic reasoning is—at least, for any interpretor whose first aim is to understand Kant on his own terms. Without adopting the writer's assumptions, an interpretor cannot hope to understand what the writer meant to convey, especially with a thinker as deep and complex as Kant. In this section I shall summarize how this trend can be countered by adopting precisely the opposite assumption regarding the relationship between Kant's architectonic and the various conundrums in his main philosophical writings: where apparent contradictions or incoherencies arise, I attempt to discern how a clearer articulation of the architectonic can resolve the problem. This method enables us to see concord in the otherwise apparently confusing labyrinth of Kant's System, and so also, as we shall see at the end of this section, in the disparate loose ends of the Conflict text.

Most interpretors would agree that the most fundamental presupposition of Kant's entire philosophical System is the "Copernican" hypothesis: the claim that "we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them" (CP, Bxvii). Yet very few are aware that this hypothesis is part and parcel in Kant's mind of the assumption that philosophy must be architectonic. If philosophers must view objects of knowledge as conforming to the forms of thought imposed on objects by the knowing subject, and if these thought forms are by nature logical, then the resulting philosophical knowledge will obviously be expressed according to logically ordered patterns, artistically arranged around an idea of the whole—that is, they will display what Kant calls "architectonic unity." This establishes what I call the overarching "Copernican Perspective" in Kant's System, a Perspective that informs each Critique at the deepest level.14 Interpreters who fail to recognize that Kant presents this hypothesis not as "the final solution," but as a perspective that can be extraordinarily useful for philosophers to adopt, invariably neglect the important fact that Kant does not regard it as exclusive; in particular, Kant expects nonphilosophical (e.g., scientific) knowledge to involve adopting the opposite Perspective, where the aggregate is given a position of priority instead. This perspectival openness should be kept in mind when we consider in the final section how Kantian philosophers can enter a profession usually reserved for theologically trained professionals.

Kant's self-chosen name for his System was "Transcendental Philosophy,"15 so the Copernican (genuinely philosophical) Perspective is also called the "Transcendental Perspective."16 But this "idea of the whole,"17 otherwise known as reason's attempt to discern its own nature and limits, manifests itself in three distinct subject areas or 'standpoints': when we apply our minds to search for the ultimate limits of empirical (e.g., scientific) knowledge, we are
adopting the "theoretical standpoint," where space, time, and the twelve categories define the limit of what we can know. Beyond this limit, the human mind naturally produces certain ideas—the three archetypal examples being God, freedom, and immortality—that must by their very nature remain unknowable. Despite being unknowable, Kant insists there are good, "heuristic" (or hypothetical) reasons for treating them (even in our theoretical reasoning) as if they relate to something real.

Kant's reputation as a philosopher whose primary impetus in theology is negative comes mainly from his utter rejection of the traditional arguments for God's existence in the *Critique of Pure Reason*—viewed by many interpreters as the proper starting point of Kant's philosophy of religion. Yet Kant's own understanding was that to make such arguments the starting point of theology is to adopt a sophisticated approach that could never provide the proper foundations for a living religious faith. By proving the impossibility of all possible forms of theological argument, he believed he was guaranteeing, once and for all, that the atheist's position can never be proved as theoretically valid. For Kant, the negations of the theoretical standpoint on their own provide no foundation whatsoever for theology or religion, but only *prepare the ground* for constructing a genuinely affirmative foundation: no atheist can ever claim a religious person is being irrational by believing in God, since the question of God's existence cannot be settled from this standpoint.

Although Kant criticizes "practical reason" after having criticized theoretical reason, he regards this new standpoint, based as it is on freedom as the "one fact" of reason, as having primacy over the theoretical. In the second *Critique*, Kant's first purpose is to establish what makes an act morally good. This cannot, he argues, be determined by anything external to a human person, including the outcome of the action. Rather, it must be determined by the conformity of the person's freely chosen motivating maxim(s) to the "moral law" that lies in the heart of every human person. Having explained how morality works, however, he goes on to consider why we should be moral, even though acting morally in this imperfect world does not always produce the happiness we think it should. Here Kant offers the first clear and explicit theological affirmation in what I regard as his "theocentric" philosophy: anyone who believes trying to be morally good is a rational approach to life is, by that very fact, acting as if God exists. In order for their beliefs to be consistent with their actions, such persons ought therefore to believe in God.

Kant's third standpoint is often regarded as an afterthought by interpreters, yet Kant himself portrays it as constituting the crowning phase of his entire System: in the *Critique of Judgment* Kant argues that the opposite standpoints of nature (our causally determined, theoretical knowledge) and freedom (our self-determined, practical action) are *synthesized* by various forms of existential judgment. Most of his attention is given to examining how our judgments of beauty, sublimity, and natural purposiveness succeed in combining elements of both the theoretical and the practical standpoints, thereby demonstrating that nature and freedom are, in fact, united in a greater whole in the context of real human experiences. In a lengthy Appendix, Kant explains in considerable detail how this provides the foundation for a "moral theology," whereby God can be viewed not just as a deistic watchmaker, but as a *living God*, who can be encountered—albeit, symbolically—in just such forms of human experience as are examined earlier in the book.23

That the affirmative aspects of Kant's theology do not end here can be unambiguously discerned by any open-minded reader of two of Kant's later works, *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* and *Opus Postumum*. The former is adequately discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 above, and in thoroughgoing detail throughout *Kant's Critical Religion* (KCR), so I shall not venture to give an account of the details here. The one point I shall make is that *Religion* is the book that best exemplifies Kant's application of his twelve-fold architectonic (as determined by the table of categories in the first *Critique*) to the detailed organization of a whole book's arguments. In particular, the four main "perspectives" governing the argument-flow within each *Critique* (i.e., the transcendental, logical, empirical, and hypothetical) are clearly implied by the very titles of the four books of *Religion*: radical evil establishes the transcendental conditions for religion; personal redemption adds the logical means of countering those limits to create meaning; social redemption through church structures gives religion real empirical power to combat evil; and correctly distinguishing between true and false ways of serving God puts believers in the proper hypothetical frame of mind for being good.

In the process of working out this philosophical defense of the rational conditions for the possibility of religion, Kant develops and applies a new and profoundly reforming theological hermeneutic, whereby all doctrines and rituals must be interpreted as moral symbols, either directly or indirectly, in order to be meaningful. When the richness of Kant's accomplishment is fully recognized in this way, the claim of traditional interpreters, that he was actually attempting to do away with religion by reducing it to nothing but morality, becomes almost unbelievably ludicrous. Instead, we see Kant as insisting morality must be *raised* to the level of religion in order to become a feasible human endeavor at all. That is, without embracing religion at whatever level we find ourselves in our moral development, the gargantuan task of obeying the moral law would have to be given up as a lost cause.

Probably the most frequent criticism of Kant's philosophy of religion—and this applies not only to the adherents of the traditional interpretation, but even to many who properly recognize the religious and theological affirmations Kant defended throughout his writings—is that his philosophy leaves no room whatsoever for religious experience. Firestone's reference to my method of interpretation as the "religious" approach is apt, inasmuch as I deny this almost universally accepted claim. In Chapter II of KCR, I argue that Swedenborg's writings served as the most profound catalyst for Kant's development of the all-important Copernican perspective, as well as for quite a few of the
revolutionary theories present in the first Critique yet mysteriously absent in Kant's writings prior to 1764. I demonstrate that Kant's way of dealing with Swedenborg followed the Critical approach that had been his natural way of philosophizing from the beginning rather than rejecting Swedenborg's mystical claims outright. Kant argues that something real and even significant may have been happening to Swedenborg, but that his attempt to draw knowledge from those experiences was illegitimate. On this basis, I claim the entire Critical System was Kant's attempt to work out the details of this "Critical" (theoretically limited, yet open to practical significance) view of what mystical experience entails.

Part Four of KCR develops and defends this claim in three ways. First, I demonstrate by collecting passages from throughout Kant's works not only that he himself had experiences that could properly be called "mystical," but that he gave public witness to them in his writings. Second, I argue that Kant's Opus Postumum was meant to fill a "gap" in the architectonic of his System by accomplishing a double synthesis: on the one hand, to unite the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (the third book developing Kant's theoretical standpoint) with the opposing work, Metaphysics of Morals (the third book developing Kant's practical standpoint), and on the other, to unite the two opposing books in Kant's "judicial" standpoint (namely, Critique of Judgment and Religion) by giving them both a metaphysical expression. This "universal metaphysics" therefore had to deal with a wide spectrum of subjects; but I have demonstrated that Kant's approach, whether he is dealing with the mysterious ether that the science of his day believed underlies all natural phenomena or with the categorical imperative that our morality imposes on us, was existential. That is, his primary attention was on our immediate experience, and how that gives rise, at a secondary level, to all the machinations of Critical philosophy. This, and not some wild theory that Kant was a "mystic" in any traditional or fanatical sense of the word, is all I mean by claiming that Kant's entire philosophical System leads to an existential heart that can best be called a "Critical mysticism."

Keeping in mind this perspectival interpretation of Kant's philosophy and its affirmative religious and theological implications, let us now return to the Conflict text to see what new light can be shed on Kant's intentions therein. First and most obviously, we now can see the overall, threefold division of the book as a direct reflection of Kant's architectonic distinction between the three main standpoints of philosophy: theologians tend to overstep the boundaries of the theoretical standpoint in order to establish knowledge of God; lawyers tend to overstep the boundaries of the practical standpoint in order to determine what is legally right; and doctors tend to overstep the boundaries of the judicial standpoint in order to judge the cause of diseases and the best path back to health. That is, the three "higher faculties" of the university are a direct reflection of the three rational standpoints philosophers must critique when they adopt the Copernican/Transcendental Perspective. The latter, therefore, corre-

sponds directly to the lower faculty of the university. Its job in Kant's System is to "govern" (controlliren) the standpoints in exactly the same manner that the philosopher's job in the university is to govern the pronouncements of those working in and for the other faculties. This lower faculty ought (and need) not be put under any governmental controls, because the government should be concerned only with those who adopt the Perspective of the general public—what I call the Empirical Perspective, making use of reason without first having subjected it to Critique. The higher faculties can be restricted by government regulations because they all adopt this fundamentally nonphilosophical Perspective. They must adopt this Perspective if they are to train the professionals who will be directly leading the general public.

This brings us back to the question whether the philosopher has any legitimate reason to come into direct contact with the general public in Kant's scheme. The diagrams shown here each relate Kant's Perspective-plus-three-standpoints System to the higher-lower faculties distinction in Conflict, but in two radically different ways. Figure 12.1 could be called "the philosopher's academic role in an unenlightened society"; for in any context where the general (nonacademic) public really does simply want to be duped, the philosopher's only hope is to begin by trying to influence the "dopers" themselves, so they will minimize the irrational elements in their teachings and leadings. Figure 12.2, by contrast, could be called "the philosopher's public role in an enlightened society," for in any context where a significant portion of the public has become sufficiently self-examining (i.e., Critical) to be able to adopt the Copernican Perspective on their own, the philosopher has not only a right but a duty to step out into the public square and encourage them to do so. This, as I see it, is what has been happening for the past decade in the Philosophical Practice movement mentioned in the first section.
Finally, we can now see the precise way this overview of Kant’s System assists us in interpreting the diverse views on theology and religion portrayed in *Conflict*. Kant’s understanding of the necessary conflict between philosophy and theology relates primarily (if not exclusively) to *academic* theology, viewed as a training ground for pastors, because of its demoralizing tendency to cater to the inclinations of the unenlightened public. Kant sees no necessary conflict, but rather a great deal of potential *concord*, between philosophy and *religion*, provided the latter is conceived in a properly enlightened manner. Indeed, Kant’s willingness to affirm both theology and religion is in exact proportion to the extent of enlightenment that can be expected from the general public: he remains sharply critical of any theology and religious practice that caters to those who (whether consciously or unconsciously) still want to be “doped”; yet he becomes not only affirmative but filled with a profound hope in a future universal concord when referring to any theology and religion that caters to enlightened members of the general public. A philosopher boldly taking an active role in the realm of public religion could therefore make a significant impact. In the next section I shall explore the potential for practicing philosophy in a concord-orientated manner in a religious context.

The Kantian Pastor: Two Models for Philosophical Practice in Religion

Given the fact that theologians and philosophers often share a wide range of common intellectual interests, I am amazed that nobody (to my knowledge) in the Philosophical Practice movement has given attention to the possibility of practicing philosophy in a specifically religious context. As I argued in the first section, philosophy itself, not only by its nature but also by its appeal to a faculty (power) of the mind that is common to all human persons, cannot be a “profession” in its own right. The more philosophers around the world come to recognize that teaching is not the only profession philosophers can have without giving up their status as philosophers, the more enlightened the general public will become. If religion is indeed the central focus of Kant’s entire philosophical System (see note 21), an obvious alternative profession for Kantians would be the pastoral ministry. With this possibility in mind, our final question is: How, if at all, is it possible for Kantian philosophers to become pastors?

Before offering some suggestions as to how best to answer this question, I shall introduce one further distinction, operating in *Religion* as well as in *Conflict*, between what we can call “ideal” religion and “real” religion. The former would consist of a group of people that fulfills all the requirements of Kant’s “pure moral faith” by meeting together under a simple common belief in a mysterious divine assistance, dispensing with all the historical trappings involved in defending specific religious dogmas and/or requiring members to participate in certain religious rituals in order to become well-pleasing to God. This is the form of religion Kant devotes most attention to describing, yet he readily admits that it is, at this stage of human development, little more than a hope we can hold and attempt to approach in our own imperfect ways. Real human beings, as he repeatedly states, remain creatures of sensibility, influenced by our inclinations; as long as this is true, most people will settle for something less than ideal religion. One of the drawbacks of the traditional interpretation is that it fails to acknowledge the realistic, pragmatic strain in Kant’s writing on religion, where he allows for many forms of belief and practice that fall short of the ideal, provided they prompt people to move in the right direction.

With this distinction in mind, we can distinguish likewise between two ways a philosopher can play an active, positive role in a religious community. The first is to join and support a religious group that conforms as closely as possible to Kant’s *ideal*. Kant recognized that such examples can exist, for he includes an extended reference to one such group as an Appendix to *Conflict*—not insignificantly for my interpretation, a group that was known by the name “mystics.” One of the best examples of such a religious organization nowadays is The Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). Their guiding princi-
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...pleases are surprisingly close to Kant's ideal. No belief is required in any historical or doctrinal claims that would then be regarded as necessary for salvation; all officially sanctioned beliefs focus on enhancing the moral life of the members; in the place of the rituals many religious believers regard as sanctioned by and therefore pleasing to God in and of themselves, Quakers merely sit in silent worship, allowing the spiritual influence of their corporate gathering to empower them to live better (and usually this means more self-examined) lives. The tradition is so close to Kant's ideal (see, e.g., Kant's definition of "religion illusion" in R 170) that, somewhat ironically, there is no special role left for the philosopher to perform. The philosopher who attends can encourage the group to follow a more rational, enlightened course in any corporate actions that are taken, but he or she can have no "professional position" in the group, because such positions simply do not exist. For this tradition strictly interprets Jesus' admonition that the leaders in his Kingdom of ideal religion must not "lord it over" each other to mean no professional leadership (no paid pastor) should be employed.

The second option for a Kantian who wishes to make a difference in the religious world by bringing philosophy into the public square does involve the potential for taking up a professional role: one who feels called to exercise a positive, enlightening influence on ordinary churchgoers (most of whom will, as Kant observed, "want to be led") could become a pastor or priest. Preferably the Kantian philosopher-pastor should be free of any and all restraints imposed by hierarchically organized denominations. The most suitable church will therefore be independent, otherwise the freedom necessary to appeal first and foremost to the common reason of those who attend could be compromised by the need to obey the official statutes established by the denomination's theologians. Nevertheless, this is not the only possibility. Philosophical practitioners could become, for example, Catholic priests or Baptist ministers, provided they are willing to live with the conflict (inner and outer) that is likely to result from adopting the standpoints of both the philosophical (Kantian) theologian and the biblical (denominational) theologian. That is, the conflict between philosophy and theology experienced in the Academy (see the second section) is likely to be mirrored in the Kantian pastor's own mind and/or in his or her relationship with the church hierarchy. Since Kant believed such conflict is healthy, it should not prevent a Kantian from being a good pastor.

Kant provides numerous guidelines for how such a pastor can live and work in a church without inadvertently frustrating the philosophical goal of bringing enlightenment to the general public. Below I outline four basic guidelines for Kantian philosopher-pastors, based on a correlation between the topics of the four stages in Kant's system of rational religion and the four "principles of the invisible church" specified in Book III. That is, these guidelines are likely to place the philosopher-pastor in a position of conflict with certain types of theologians will be evident to anyone familiar with the range of Christian theologies in circulation today. Yet in my experience they are largely consistent with the doubts many thinking laypersons express about the very theologies their denomination tells them they are supposed to accept.

1. Avoid any interpretation of a doctrine or a ritual that would tend to lead people to believe they are not responsible for their own moral evil. As a corollary, discourage people's tendency to project their own evil onto others, especially the members of other religious traditions, for in doing so they contradict the first principle of the true church, universalism.

2. Encourage a basic trust in divine assistance, but not in such a way that the participant is led to believe that God has done or will do everything, without any active participation on the part of the people. Although the latter interpretation of grace may be more attractive, it contradicts the second principle of the true church, public breath of the constitution.

3. Emphasize the supreme importance of love, both toward other members of your own church, in order to establish a healthy moral community, and toward members of other traditions or no religious tradition at all, in order to maintain good relations with the wider community. No other religious law can surpass this one, not even a belief in the supreme importance of one's own scripture or tradition, for this would contradict the third principle of the true church, freedom of relation.

4. Use the beliefs and rituals in your tradition only as tools for promoting the goals stated in (3), never allowing them to be treated as ends in themselves. For to do the latter would be to base the community's religious life on statutes and habits that are by their very nature changeable, and this would contradict the fourth principle of the true church, the unchangeableness of the constitution.

If a philosopher-pastor employed in a hierarchical church is ever asked by church officials (or the denomination's theologians) to subordinate any of the above principles to a prudent maxim that has been handed down by tradition, be or she will be faced with an inner conflict. The pastor as philosopher should boldly stand up to the "higher" authority and defend the principle, but as theologian, should simply obey. While the Kantian could remain silent at this point (R 185-190), he or she must not pretend to believe anything that positively contradicts these basic rational principles. For to acquiesce in this way is to give up all the benefits that may arise out of a creative conflict with theology. The likelihood of and even the need for such a conflict is unlikely ever to pass away as long as the philosopher's Transcendental Perspective and the theologian's Empirical Perspective are seen as anything but complementary and mutually supporting opposites. The fact that an authoritative theologian or church official may not see the conflict in such a positive light should not prevent the philosopher from speaking out in the name of freedom, risking excommunication if necessary in order to "speak the truth in love."
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believe we are living in an “enlightened” age, we are only (at best) a little further along than was the Europe of Kant’s day. Political events since September 11, 2001, show how far we still have to go before Kant’s vision of a “kingdom of ends” (his rational, moral interpretation of Jesus “kingdom of heaven”) becomes a widely accepted reality. Until such a time as philosophers are willing to take a more active role in public discourse, and above all in the nurturing of people’s religious dispositions through direct participation in church leadership, on both professional and nonprofessional levels, those religious leaders who have no philosophical training are likely to attract the largest crowds—and to resist philosophy’s creative influence on religion.

Appendix: A Pastor’s Reflections on Kantian Principles for Church Government

Kant described religious service as the celebration and nurture of a universal and ethical commonwealth under the guidance of God. In R 131–132 he states:

[If] the seed of the true religious faith, as it is now being publicly sown in Christendom, though only by a few, is allowed more and more to grow unhindered, we may look for a continuous approximation to that church, eternally uniting all men, which constitutes the visible representation of an invisible kingdom of God on earth. For Reason has freed itself, in matters which by their nature ought to be moral and soul-improving, from the weight of a faith forever dependent upon the arbitrary will of the expositors, and has among true reverers of religion... universally laid down the following principles.

Here, as throughout Religion, Kant treats his vision as a realistic plan, applicable to real church congregations. In this Appendix a philosophically minded pastor of a traditional congregation—Grace North Church, in Berkeley, California—reflects on how Kant’s principles for true religion actually work in one particular community of faith.48

According to Kant, freedom lies at the foundation of human morality. Yet we each compromise our freedom by allowing our choices to be governed by “weighty” inclinations instead of by the lightness of the moral law.49 As a result, we lose our balance and fall into the depths of sin, or what Kant called “radical evil.” The Bible uses metaphors such as slavery to describe the heavy burden we experience as a result. True religion, as a walk in the lightness of being, restores our freedom. Unlike a slave community, a true Church, in Kant’s view, comprises members who are free to choose the maxims that govern their own decisions (e.g., R 179).

Just as our present path (what we ought to be doing) always lies midway between the horizons of our past (what is, or has been) and future (what we hope will be), so also Kant saw morality’s immediate vertical intersection of our path as being what either balances us or throws us askew. When applying Kant’s insights to our own congregations and religious practice, we should remember that Kant’s vision of people living in a free moral community requires us to shun away centuries of distortion that have obscured the purity of Jesus’ vision of the Kingdom of Heaven. All too much of the Gospel tradition’s long history is the tale of how congregations have been seduced by empires and other power structures to become the very thing Jesus came to free us from.42 Like all true Protestants, Kant was primarily a Critical Catholic.43 He protested against all that would make the catholic (“universal”) community less than catholic. The prophetically Protestant contention is that local religious communities, together with their clergy, have been hijacked: hierarchical governments have monopolized the councils of the people that properly belong to each local neighborhood. They have made themselves deaf to the protests of those they have hijacked.

In the midst of these conflicting voices, Kant quietly tells us how free our life in the Spirit could really be. True religion, unlike sects, does not disconnect us from our fellow humans: religio “reconnects” souls to one another, kata holou, “according to the whole.” In Religion Kant tells the perennial fourfold story of the soul’s encounter with the one who, guiding his path, overcomes the impassable mountains by the lightness of being. While we are still mired in the dark heaviness of evil, we discover to our amazement the archetype in our soul of a new and better order for human living. It resides already in our heart like a seed waiting for spring. As this inner power and focus for our will comes alive in our soul, we find ourselves turning toward it for enlightenment; it motivates us to live freely with others in “an association of human beings merely under the laws of virtue” (R 95).

National and denominational laws are necessarily coercive. But the community we seek can only be established without coercion. It is what Kant called, in contrast to all other societies, “an ethical commonwealth.” “Woe,” he wrote, “to the legislator who wishes to establish through force a polity directed to ethical ends!” Only in a community of souls freely dedicated to the freedom and welfare of all their neighbors can an effective religious standpoint be established, let alone begin to operate. Once we come together in such a noncoercive yet ethical fellowship, the end of this sequence of experience, according to Kant, is the harvest of a free, joyous, and outgoing service to the world by every member of this truly free congregation.

As we have learned to rejoice in the light that shines in the darkness of our own soul, so we now, in friendship with a community of free souls, go forth to shine in the darkness of the world. Building such a network of congregations is a universal duty (R 89), “a duty which is sui generis, not of men toward men, but of the human race toward itself.” As a prophetic minister of universal religion, preparing our various denominational traditions to undergo a com-
complete baptism, Kant has led us “bare” (bloßem) to the font of grace. Within the catholic boundaries of bare reason, we may refresh our will to build a commonwealth that runs counter to the oppressions of society.

To convey Kant's principles of church government to those who attend Grace North Church, I use virginity as a metaphor for spiritual integrity (or oneness). It denotes the soul and those communities of souls who have learned to resist the weight of evil and submit to what sets them free. Chastity is then understood as the political virtue of guarding the freedom and oneness of a virgin community through an emphasis on the purity of each person's responsibility and moral agency. The biblical prophets used these metaphors to inspire a self-enslaved people to work for liberty in a context where the upper classes of the body politic had silenced the critical voices of the lower classes. Likewise, the preachers in the ecclesiastical establishment of Kant's day were hardly listening to and nurturing the voices of a free people; perhaps this is why he argued for the necessity of a true church, yet chose not to attend a "visible church" himself.

In Religion, Kant allowed no substitute for the uncoerced coming together of morally motivated souls in a freely covenanted commitment to work together for the Kingdom of Heaven: "A Church . . . as the union of many, requires a public covenant." In the Congregational tradition of Grace North Church the obligation that ties us together is not Creedal, but Covenantal. In order to be unchangeable, its free agreement must be grounded not in theological belief but in an act of commitment. The stories of Israel and Jesus show what is proper to a covenant undertaken freely, without submission to an ideology. Unlike most Christian traditions that are based on the global ideology of a theological creed, the Congregational tradition of ecclesiastical polity has a philosophical (practically rational) grounding in local obligation. In both Jesus and Kant we find this same emphasis on agreement as acting together for a purpose: to prepare for the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven.

A religious covenant is an act of will whereby the covenanted parties agree to submit their will to the will of God. Such covenants lay no ideology upon the local community. They simply bind us to start together from where we find ourselves in our local situation. Cults cast an illusion of global salvation that tends to devalue the local. They globalize by de-localizing. They offer "knowledge" in a way that excludes the life-giving unknown. Covenants, however, localize without needing to de-localize. They recognize that the hard labor of building an ethical commonwealth cannot but involve a quest for justice, and justice requires honoring the global (the universal and unchangeable aspects of the Gospel) as well as the local (the purity and freedom of the congregation).

The Kingdom of Heaven cannot be achieved by violence or coercion. The way to it can only be governed peaceably. The nature of both the way and the end is therefore to gather friends. If a congregation be not governed by a spirit of friendship, it cannot be religious. A local community of grace is a gathering of friends united by their mutual commitment to God. Although covenants are not creeds, they radiate faith and rich sets of beliefs that can be shared by all rational people. As local, they can be entered into by folk of any theological disposition. By refusing to submit to external coercion and choosing to fulfill our obligations as if they were divine commands, we enter a moral order of friendship where the free bond of love between the covenanted parties becomes the model for all human cooperation.

In contrast to the coercive ways of human monarchies, the "royal priesthood" of a pure community professes only to submit to the king who is crucified. For his Spirit speaks to us not of monopoly and tyranny, but of friendship and creativity. There is no coercion among friends. Like a true monarch, the pastor therefore represents the royal priesthood of every soul. Celibacy is the political virtue that governs the attitude of those entrusted with presiding over the people as they make their decisions. In a free and moral community, every voice must be cherished and heard. But whoever heads the community must refrain from making decisions. He or she must be politically celibate. Without political celibacy, genuine priesthood is compromised and collapses into a monopoly. The whole community is both sovereign and priestly. The only valid governing role for the pastor is to enhance the priesthood and sovereignty of each soul, both within their community and beyond. Therefore the bylaws of CNC make clear that although every parishioner has a vote in the Quarterly Parish Meeting, those in the roles of the Lay Moderator or the clergy may not vote. They are required to be celibate—a total reframing of the Catholic practice of celibacy.

All communities are at risk of being hijacked by those who want to monopolize power. But "this all-surpassing power is from God and not from us." If we are serious about paving the way to implement a transformation of religion according to Kant's vision, then political celibacy (of the lay head of the congregation and the clergy) is the only way to preserve the freedom needed for every voice to be heard. Kant saw how the coercive ecclesiastical and monarchic governments of his day oppressed the lightness of being inherent in a natural, rational, and universal religion. If the purity of the congregation (its virginity) is respected by the listening and learning of a celibate clergy that guarantees that every voice is given due hearing and consideration—then a Copernican Revolution will take place in the local practice of church government. The clergy will revolve around the laity, not vice versa. Such a transformation of the ecclesiastical scene, with power rising from the local level and radiating abroad in a noncoercive way, is in strict accordance with Kant's vision. It quietly floods the top-down structures that dominate us, submerging them in the rising tide of a global ethical commonwealth. We, in our Kantian congregation in Berkeley, all refugees from hierarchical denominations, can testify that this polity not only works but generates a most extraordinary experience of that lightness of being that religious people call grace.
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NOTES
1. The paper "Perspectives in Counseling: Kantian Categories and Jungian Types as Models for Psychopathological Insight" can be accessed from the "articles" page of my web site at www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/srp/pubs.html.
2. Information on the Hong Kong Philosophy Café, including summaries of many past meetings, is available on my web site at www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/HKPC.
3. "CIPHER" stands for "Center for Insight into Philosophical Health, Education, and Renewal." For further information on the meaning of this term as it applies to the retreat center, see the relevant pages on my web site at www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/CIPHER.
4. I take "public servant" to refer to any professional employed and/or regulated by the government in a role intended to be beneficial to the general public. The other two standard faculties in the universities of Kant's day were those of law and medicine, whose task involved the training of lawyers and doctors, respectively. These other two areas, discussed in Parts II-III of Conflict, were not considered in any depth at the retreat, nor will they be in this essay.
5. See CF 10n. For a detailed defense and elaboration of Kant's claim, see Chapter VIII of my book Kant's Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant's System of Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); herafter KCR.
6. Green's essay in this volume alludes to the fact that Kant has often been criticized for apparently breaking his 1794 promise to the king, never again to publish or speak on matters of religion or theology. The supposition is that Kant was thereby breaking his own moral principle, the categorical imperative. However, I see no reason to doubt Kant's own straightforward explanation of the situation in CF 10n. (For a more detailed description of the censorship issue, and a response to the gross misrepresentations of Kant that have been perpetrated in this regard, see KCR 13n, 192–193n.) The claim I make below is not that Kant contradicted his own principles by publishing again on these topics, but that he shirked a fundamental responsibility of the philosopher by agreeing so readily to obey the edict in the first place.
7. See also CF 35 and various examples throughout the book. Whereas Kant encourages philosophers to have the courage to act in public (see e.g., 28–29), members of the higher faculties can act only "officially"—that is, on the public.
8. Unfortunately, Gregor translates this key word simply as "control." But the point is not that philosophers tell members of the other faculties what to do; rather it is that we observe their reasoning, very much in the way the border patrol checks passports before letting a foreigner into the country.
9. Today's universities have many more faculties and departments, most concerned with training particular types of professionals. Most of what we call the Arts and Humanities would have come under the Philosophy Faculty in Kant's day, as would any academic pursuit that was not intended to lead directly to a profession other than university teaching.
10. When relating Kant's theory to the present day, we must keep in mind that Kant wrote Conflict at a time when Prussia was a monarchy. In modern democratic societies a privately funded university can be regarded as having virtually the same relationship to government as a publicly funded institution, because in a democracy

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"the people" (including, of course, those supporting the private institution) technically are the government.

11. For a detailed discussion of the meaning of "architectonic," see KCR, Appendix III--3. I attempt to lay bare the precise form taken by Kant's architectonic as he applies it to his own philosophical System in §§III--4 of Kant's System of Perspectives: An Architectonic Interpretation of Kant's Critical Philosophy (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1993); herafter KSP.
12. As defined in the first section of the Introduction to this volume.
14. For a more detailed account of what I call "the principle of perspective" and the details of how it operates in Kant's System, including a table showing over five hundred places in the first Critique where Kant uses terms that can be taken as equivalent to "perspective," see KSP, chap. II. Chapter III then explains how this relates to Kant's Copernican hypothesis and how Kant's favorite architectonic patterns develop directly out of this assumption.
15. See, e.g., FFM 279. Later, in a footnote to the same work, Kant explains the meaning of "transcendental" in a way that confirms its existential (or "mystical," in a new and specifically Critical sense) rooting in the "fertile bathos of experience" (374).
16. In KSP and KCR, I adopt the convention of capitalizing any word that refers to Kant's entire philosophical System (e.g., to all three Critiques taken together) or to the Perspective that governs it, while leaving the same term uncapsulated when it refers to a specific part (or perspective) within this whole (e.g., to the three standpoints that each govern one of the Critiques, or to the four perspectives that operate within each Critique). For a detailed summary of these different levels of perspectives and a fuller explanation of why the overarching level is capitalized, see KSP, III.4.
17. CPR B46v.
18. For a detailed summary and analysis of the systematic argument Kant constructs in his application of the theoretical standpoint, see KSP, chap. VII.
19. In Kant's Rational Theology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), for example, Allen Wood reveals that even at this early stage in his career he was tending in an anti-Kantian direction. For he evaluates the importance of the three standard types of theoretical argument in exactly the opposite order of Kant's own preferences. For a thoroughgoing discussion of an affirmative alternative to this approach, see KCR, chap. IV. Specific responses to Wood and other philosophers who reject Kant's assumptions about the proper role of theoretical arguments are given in KCR, Appendix IV, "How to Be a Theist without Proving That God Exists."
20. See John Hare's essay in this volume for an excellent argument confirming the problematic nature of atheism from a Kantian perspective.
21. The precise meaning of this term is explained in KCR, §1.3. In short, it does not mean that Kant's main concern was explicitly theological (e.g., establishing certain knowledge of God)—for in this sense his philosophy is undoubtedly anthropocentric—but that a deep sense of God's presence (first as an idea, then as a postulate, then as an existential judgment, and finally as a symbolically experienced reality) serves as the calm center of the "storm" that constitutes the Critical philosophy's several revolutions.
22. This interpretation of Kant's practical argument for belief in God was first expressed in such an illuminating manner by Allen Wood, who refers to it as a "reductio
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ad absurdum practicum" (Kant's Moral Religion [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970], 25–34). Unfortunately, in his later work Wood has gradually become more reluctant to see any significant religious or theological affinements in Kant. Nowadays he tends to adopt the traditional interpretation, with its assumption that Kant is a deist with a reductionistic view of religion, almost as if there were no alternatives. See, e.g., Wood's article "Kant's Deism," in Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, ed. Philip J. Rossi and Michael J. Wreen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 1–21. For an exhaustive refutation of the deistic/reductionistic interpretation, see Part Two of KCR; see also Christopher McMammon's arguments against this interpretation in his essay in this volume. For a detailed account of the architectonic structure of Kant's argument in the second Critique, see KSP, chap. VIII.

23. See KSP, chap. IX, for a detailed summary of Kant's Critique of Judgment and its relation to his architectonic. I further examine the focus Kant's affirmative theology places on symbolism in KCR, chap. V.

24. By "open-minded reader" I mean, in particular, any reader who is willing to put aside all the trappings of the traditional interpretation and consider the possibility that Kant was not out to destroy all religion and theology, but might rather have been attempting a radical philosophical reformation in these areas. When interpreters stop reading negative innuendoes between the lines of Kant's text and see him instead as developing an integrated network of perspectival arguments, theological and religious affinements pop up on virtually every page of Religion.

25. KCR's Appendix IX.2 summarizes the content of Religion in the form of "95 Theses"; most of these are surprisingly consistent with what many forward-thinking Christians actually believe nowadays.

26. See KCR, chap. VIII, for a lengthy account of how these same four "stages" in Kant's argument correspond directly to the main emphases in Christianity: the Old Testament's account of the problem of sin; the Gospels' account of grace as the solution; the early church's attempts to work out the social implications of grace, especially in the writings of Paul; and the Reformation's protest against many (but for Kant, not enough!) of the false means of pleasing God that had developed in Christian tradition. Contrary to the unguarded claim made in Firestone's essay in this volume, Kant's elaboration of these correspondences (i.e., the discussions of his "second experiment") is spread throughout the four Books of Religion, not limited to Book Four. For an introductory-level summary of my argument in KCR, see The Tree of Philosophy, 4th ed. (Hong Kong: Philospych Press, 2000), Lectures 32–33.

27. For an extended example, examining how Kant applies this principle to prayer, see KCR, Appendix VIII. Proponents of the traditional interpretation of Kant's philosophy of religion invariably ignore the "indirect" side of this distinction. Yet this is a crucial component of Kant's affirmation of real, living religions: he finds any religious belief or ritual to be rationally unacceptable, even if it has no direct or literal moral meaning, provided it has the effect of encouraging or enlivening a person's underlying moral disposition. Thus, verbal prayer is acceptable as long as it "fan[s] into flames the cinders of morality in the inner recesses of our hearts" (Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield [London: Methuen, 1930], 99 [English pagination]).

28. If the reductivist interpretation is so ludicrous, how did it become so popular? As Firestone argues in the first section of the Introduction to this volume, the fact that T. H. Greene's Introduction to the translation of Religion presented the reductionist interpretation as the only option is probably the main explanation for its widespread accep-
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"second-level analytic relation." For an explanation of the latter, see The Tree of Philosophy, Lecture 13, and KSF, chap. 3, §11.

38. In KCR, §§IX.2–3, I propose a full-fledged biblical theology focused on love. Such a biblical theology, I believe, would minimize the negative effects of any remaining differences between Kantian philosopher-pastors and biblical theologians, paving the way for a concord that preserves all the creative benefits of both perspectives.

39. Eph 4:15. To remain quiet in the face of a potential conflict, as Kant did throughout the mid-1790s, ironically makes the philosopher virtually indistinguishable from the compliant theologian.

40. This section is adapted from a much longer essay written by the Rev. Richard Mapplebeck-palmer. The full text in its original form, entitled "The Copernican Revolution in Religion: A Testimony on Kantian Church Government," can be found at http://www.hkus.edu.hk/~ppx/texts/KantianTestimony.htm.

41. Thus Jesus said (Mt 11:30). "For my yoke is easy and my burden is light.

42. For a detailed interpretation of biblical references to such political/power issues, see Palmquist's Biblical Theocracy: A Vision of the Biblical Foundations for a Christian Political Philosophy (Hong Kong: Philosphy Press, 1993).

43. See KCR, 239–242. Kant was at the same time a "liberalizing conservative" and a "conserving liberal."

44. Or "prototype" (see Jacobs's essay in this volume).

45. R.96 [87]; cf. Mt 23.

46. Universality (or "oneness"), purity, freedom, and unchangeability (R.101–102 [93]).

47. R.105 [96]. Although the translators give the word covenant, Kant's term, Verpflichtung, more literally means obligation. Kant does not use the German word for covenant, Übereinkommen; but undertaking a public obligation is usually scaled in some sort of covenant. English and German use the same word, Testament, to clarify that the stories of Israel and Jesus are alike stories about fidelity to a covenant.

48. "The wish of all well-disposed people is, therefore, that the kingdom of God come, that His will be done on earth" (R.101 [92]). See Palmquist's "The Kingdom of God Is at Hand!" (Did Kant Really Say That?), History of Philosophy Quarterly 11, no. 4 (October 1994): 421–437.

49. Thus Jesus prayed (Mt 6:10). "Your kingdom come, your will be done on earth as it is in heaven."

50. Cor 4:7.

CONTRIBUTORS

MICHEL DESPLAND is Professor of Religion at Concordia University and a Member of the Royal Society of Canada. His publications include Kant on History and Religion and Reading an Erased Code.

GENE FENDT is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska, Kearney. His publications include For What May I Hope?

CHRIS L. FIRESTONE is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Trinity International University. His publications include "Kant and Religion: Conflict or Compromise?" and "Kant's Two Perspectives on the Theological Task."

ELIZABETH C. GALBRATH is the Joseph E. McCabe Associate Professor of Religion at Coe College. Her publications include Kant and Theology: Was Kant a Closet Theologian?

RONALD M. GREEN is the Eunice and Julian Cohen Professor for the Study of Ethics and Human Values in the Department of Religion and Director of the Ethics Institute at Dartmouth College. His publications include Religious Reason, Religion and Moral Reason; and Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt.

JOHN E. HARE is the Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale Divinity School. His publications include The Moral Gap and God's Call.

NATHAN JACOBS is a Ph.D. student in Systematic Theology at Calvin Theological Seminary.

GREGORY R. JOHNSON is Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Swedenborgian Studies at the Pacific School of Religion. He is editor and translator of Kant's Dreams of a Spirit-Seer and Other Writings on Swedenborg.

CHARLES F. KIELKOPF is Professor of Philosophy at Ohio State University. His publications include A Declaration of Dependence: A Kantian Condemnation of Atheistic Despair.
To our parents,

Harold and Roberta, Richard and Dolores,

for giving us living examples

of how to respond constructively

to the conflicts that inevitably arise

as human beings together seek

to realize a common vision.