The Radical Unknowability of Kant's Thing in Itself

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COGITO
Volume III, Number 2
March 1985
pp. 101-116

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IN HOPES OF MAKING UP FOR KANT'S APPARENT NEGLECT OF justifying his Critical philosophy in general, and his assumption of the thing in itself in particular, some recent philosophers have attempted to develop transcendental arguments which can do just that. But their endeavour rests on an assumption which Kant himself firmly denied: i.e. that the thing in itself is in some sense knowable. If the thing in itself is held to be knowable, then the interpreter is freed from the need to justify Kant's task in some other way. For the only conclusive justification would then be to prove the existence of the thing in itself as an item of knowledge. Since the interpreter's answer to this question of the knowability of the thing in itself will determine not only his means of justifying the transcendental "turn," but also, to a large extent, his approach to the rest of Kant's System, it is of central importance to consider the plausibility of an affirmative answer.

Ralph C.S. Walker's recent arguments can serve as a sounding board for our discussion of this issue. In the introduction to *Kant on Pure Reason,* he insists: "even the most dedicated Kantian must admit that . . . there is no reason *in principle* why transcendental arguments should not establish conclusions about how the world must be, and not just the phenomenal world . . . Here Kant was simply mistaken."[1] He frequently alludes to the same position in his book, *Kant;*[2] but his de-

tailed elaboration and defence of just what this view entails occurs in a paper entitled "Synthesis and Transcendental Idealism," in which he maintains that

> Kant never saw . . . that there is no general reason why truths established [by transcendental arguments] should always have to be read into the world: instead they may be conditions which hold independently of us [i.e. must be true of the thing in itself[3]], but without which experience would be impossible for us. [4]

After analysing the implications of Kant's notion of 'synthesis,' he concludes:

> All we can infer is that things in themselves must exist and must (therefore) have properties; and, no doubt, that some of them are subjects of experience. This much knowledge about the noumenal world is indispensable for transcendental idealism, if it is to retain its transcendental character and keep itself distinct from idealism of a more radical, but less satisfactory, kind. [5]

Walker's position is enigmatic, however, inasmuch as it is difficult to understand how anyone can both suggest that the thing in itself is to *any* extent knowable (in the Kantian sense of the word—see section II) and also unequivocally call himself a Kantian. Fortunately, in order to bring to light the discrepancy between these two views, it is necessary neither to presuppose an exhaustive understanding of the intricacies of Kant's doctrine of the thing in itself, nor to determine his own justification for using it the way he does,[6] nor to discuss thoroughly the well-worn issue of the nature and limitations of transcendental arguments. For the inadequacy of the position Walker represents can be established independently of a *detailed* knowledge of Kant's System. Accordingly, I will first examine the validity of the particular claims Walker believes might constitute knowledge of the thing in itself (section II), and I will then attempt to determine why he regards his revisionary interpretation of Kant's doctrine as so *obviously* compatible with the remainder of Kant's philosophy. My goal will be to demonstrate

that one *cannot,* in fact, *both* claim to be a 'dedicated Kantian' *and* maintain that the thing in itself is knowable 'in principle'—if, that is, one wishes to remain self-consistent.

II

The four most eligible candidates for election to the honorable status of 'knowledge of the thing in itself' can be expressed in the following propositions:

(1) The thing in itself exists.
(2) I am a thing (or self) in itself.
(3) The thing in itself has spatio-temporal properties.
(4) The properties of the thing in itself conform to our categories of thought.

All other possible knowledge claims could be derived from one or more of these fundamental assertions. Therefore, it will suffice for the purposes of this paper to examine the merits of each of these four in turn.

Before we can determine whether or not (1) constitutes knowledge of the thing in itself, we must take careful notice of what the word 'knowledge' (*Erkenntnis*) means for Kant. He uses this word in a number of different ways, which need not be discussed here;[7] but he is clearly referring to *empirical* knowledge when he limits knowledge to phenomenal objects. And he repeatedly defines empirical knowledge as consisting of judgments in which 'concepts' and 'intuitions' are synthesized with each other. This is the point being made, for example, when he makes his famous claim that "Thoughts without content [i.e. concepts without intuitions] are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."[8] Kant's various transcendental arguments, however, are intended to yield knowledge of the "synthetic a priori" conditions for the possibility of experience (i.e. of empirical knowledge); and it is apparently this *transcendental* type of knowledge which Walker thinks can in principle be gained in regards to the thing in itself. (For the purposes of this paper, other kinds of transcendental knowledge, such as that supposedly manifested in Euclidean geometry, can be ignored). But like empirical knowledge, transcendental knowledge must also be connected with intuition (otherwise it could not be "synthetic."[9]). A transcendental argument can make this connection, and thus yield knowledge, only if the

concepts with which it deals are "schematized"—i.e. only if they are made to be "homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other with the appearance."[10] Therefore, if such an argument is to provide *knowledge* of the thing in itself, it must synthesize an *intuition* —or at least reveal how an intuition can be synthesized—with the *concept* of the thing in itself.[11]

A transcendental argument for the existence of the thing in itself would maintain that experience is possible only if something real, to which this concept refers, can be said to "exist" (in some loose sense of the word), and that since experience undoubtedly is possible, the thing in itself must exist. That Kant would support some such argument is evident from the fact that what little argument he does give in support of the thing in itself tends to take something like this form, as when he says (defining the major premise) that if experience has bounds—and he has argued that it must—then "that which binds it must lie without it."[12] Any doubt that he argues for the necessity of presupposing the reality of the thing in itself in a way which is at least similar to his usual transcendental form of argumentation is dispelled by Chipman, who gathers together a number of Kant's incomplete arguments and forms them into a single, surprisingly "consistent" (albeit "inconclusive"), transcendental-type argument.[13] We can agree with both Kant and Walker that something along the lines of a transcendental argument can provide a *good reason* for presupposing the reality of the thing in itself. But we cannot agree with Walker when he parts company with Kant by inferring from this that a bit of *knowledge* about the thing in itself can thereby be gained. For, in spite of his use of transcendental-type argumentation on its behalf, Kant does not believe he has (or could) gain any knowledge of the thing in itself. On the contrary, he always stresses that the concept "merely characterizes a something in so far as it should be distinguished from objects of the senses," and of which therefore "we cannot have the least knowledge:" "for us [it] remains entirely unknowable."[14]

But if Kant does not think a transcendental argument (or indeed, anything resembling one) can yield knowledge of the thing in itself, then what is such an argument supposed to prove when applied to this concept? Does it attempt to prove that the thing in itself is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience in the same sense as Kant's three "analogies" (also proved by transcendental arguments) are supposed to be? I think not; for the analogies—and indeed, all Kant's categorical principles—constitute, or define, what experience *is*, whereas the thing in itself has to do with what experience *is not*. Unknowability is an unobvious, yet analytic ingredient in the concept of the thing in itself:[15] to talk about the thing in itself which is knowable is like talking about the "red" which is not a colour. So the most any argument can prove conclusively about the thing in itself is that it is *indirectly* related to the possibility of experience—that is, that the concept of the thing in itself is the necessary starting point which must be presupposed if a transcendental inquiry is to be possible.[16] The difference in arguing about the status of the Principles is that they are related to intuition (via the Schematism of the Categories), whereas the thing in itself by definition cannot be related in any positive sense to intuition (at least of the human type).

Rather than proving the "objective validity" (in either its empirical or its transcendental senses) of the thing in itself, Kant intends his arguments to prove the rational coherence, and thus to secure the "*subjective* validity" of presupposing the "existence" of the thing in itself. He clarifies the difference between these two types of truth by saying that only a judgment which is both objectively and subjectively valid constitutes *knowledge* (*Wissen*), while one which is merely subjectively valid constitutes *belief* (*Glauben*).[17] Such belief, however, is by no means groundless. On the contrary, it means for Kant that "I know with certainty *[ich gewiss weiss]* that no one can have knowledge *[kennen könne]* of any other conditions which lead to the proposed end."[18] This rational faith, which is required for the acceptance of the unknowable thing in itself, is similar to—though not the same as—that required for the acceptance of the ideas of reason, and employed by Kant throughout his practical philosophy. To discuss it at any length at this point would be to digress unnecessarily from our main purpose;[19] but I should at least mention that, although Walker himself gives some attention to the role of belief, he limits his discussion to *empirical* belief—i.e. to beliefs about what we can *experience*.[20] As a result, he inevitably concludes that reference to belief "is not good enough. The argument is not transcendental."[21]

Therefore, although Walker is right when he says Kant thinks "certain conclusions about the independent character of things in themselves can be established by transcendental [-type] arguments,"[22] he

nevertheless is mistaken to think such conclusions can be regarded in any Kantian sense as knowledge. For a transcendental argument would be no more capable of providing knowledge of the thing in itself than an ontological argument could provide knowledge of God:[23] in both cases the most such arguments could accomplish with respect to their unknowable subject-matter would be to encourage rational faith in the reality of something corresponding to the concept, in spite of its lack of intuitive content.

Having now demonstrated the incoherence of the claim that the Kantian must affirm that (1) can in principle constitute knowledge, it hardly seems necessary to apply our findings to the other three propositions; for if I am right in ascribing an analytic status to the proposition,[24] "The thing in itself is unknowable," then *all* propositions claiming to convey knowledge of the thing in itself are *ipso facto* meaningless, if not false. Nevertheless, a brief account of each of these will serve to point up the radically unKantian nature of such claims.

That Walker would insist that something like (2) can in principle constitute knowledge of the thing in itself can be unambiguously inferred from his statements quoted in section I. This contrasts sharply, however, with Kant's repeated warning that "we *know* our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself."[25] (The only apparent exception to this—the self-awareness produced by "the synthetic original unity of apperception"—is said by Kant to be "a *thought*, not an *intuition*," and therefore not to constitute knowledge.[26] This point, which Kant himself emphasizes, seems to be missed by Walker when he states that in this passage "The flood-gates are opened; the principle that I can have no knowledge regarding things in themselves has been breached."[27]) Kant would want to add, of course, that some sort of transcendent self must be postulated in thought in order to help bring "systematic unity" into the structure of one's overall philosophy;[28] but he would not interpret this to mean that such a self is a synthetic a priori condition for the possibility of empirical knowledge (i.e. is transcendentally knowable). The existence of a transcendent self is neither empirically nor transcendentally knowable, because it can never be anything for us but a non-intuitable concept in which we may or may not believe.

That Walker would insist that something like (3) and (4) can constitute knowledge of the thing in itself is implied in his claim, quoted in section I, that "there is no general reason why truths established [by transcendental arguments] should always have to be read into the world. . .:" for he thinks space, time and the categories could, in principle, be proved to be properties inhering in the thing in itself, rather than a priori forms of knowledge inhering in the knowing subject.[29] In both cases Walker is closer to Kant's position than it might seem at this point; yet in both he allows one step further to be taken than Kant would allow.

Concerning (3) Kant admits, as Allison points out, "that space and time have objective as well as subjective grounds, and that their ultimate objective grounds are things in themselves," which, however, "are not themselves in space and time and are therefore unknowable."[30] If space and time are grounded objectively in the thing in itself, then the latter must be conceived of as having something *analogous* to the spatio-temporal properties of phenomenal objects. But to refer to this unknown something with the word "properties," as Walker does (see I), is at best the result of carelessness and at worst a blatant contradiction, since the word "properties" can be meaningful to us only if it refers to the thing in itself.[31] (Walker's contention that "the conception of things in themselves without any properties is simply absurd"[32] seems to result from a misinterpretation of Kant's theory of perception, which we shall discuss in III.) Thus, although Kant would never agree that (3) can constitute knowledge, he might affirm the conceptual consistency and subjective validity of the less presumptuous assertion:

> (3') The thing in itself has something analogous to the spatiotemporal properties of phenomenal objects.

Similarly, with respect to (4), Kant does not deny that we can apply the categories to the thing in itself: what he denies is that such an application can ever produce knowledge. To suppose it could would be to ignore Kant's view that the categories can *only* produce knowledge when used in connection with intuition. Thus, whereas Walker would presumably affirm the possibility of knowing (4) to be true (as long as a sufficiently rigorous transcendental argument were formulated on its behalf), Kant would affirm no more than that

> (4') The concept of the thing in itself can be categorized by the human understanding

(INSERTION:) refers to an object with intuitive content -- which it does not when it

is conceptually consistent, and can be assumed to be subjectively true.

It seems, then, that we can apply Findlay's comment to our situation when he says "in such cases we do not, according to Kant's usage, have knowledge, only a rational presupposition of knowledge. There is no reason to reform Kant's usage, provided we clearly understand it." The quandary which has yet to be resolved is why a 'Kantian' philosopher would insist on the possible legitimacy of such a radical reformation in the use of Kant's terms. Therefore, to this problem we shall now turn.

III

One can regard the claims argued against in II as legitimate only by first committing one or more of three errors. The first is an equivocal use of the word "knowledge;" the second is a misapplication of transcendental arguments; and the third is a (covertly) unKantian rendition of Kant's theory of perception. As we shall see, each of these stems from a failure to distinguish clearly between the transcendental and the empirical perspectives on knowledge. Although we have looked briefly at the first two reasons in II, a closer look at Walker's use of each is in order here, inasmuch as he is by no means alone in his tendencies.

A popular way of defining 'knowledge' is in terms of 'justified true belief.'[34] Helpful though this may be in many contexts, it can be a dangerous stumbling block to a clear understanding of Kant's philosophy. For when Kant denies the knowability of the thing in itself, he does not intend to preclude justified true belief in its reality. On the contrary, he means to affirm that knowledge in this sense—as the subjective conviction that one has sufficient rational reasons for believing certain concepts to express truth about the way things are—is not only possible, but indispensable to the Critical philosopher. When he says he must "deny *knowledge* in order to make room for *faith*,"[35] he means only to acknowledge the necessity of differentiating between what is *known* through the synthesis of intuition and conceptualization and what cannot *possibly* be known (because it cannot be intuited[36]), but nevertheless *can* become an object of justified true belief.

When Walker refers to the "knowledge about the noumenal world (which) is indispensable for transcendental idealism" (see I) he may unintentionally be using "knowledge" in its *popular* sense, in which

case Kant would be largely in agreement with him: (1), (2), (3') and (4') *are* the justified true beliefs which Kant would regard as being indispensable to his transcendental idealism. Only in this sense could Walker be consistent (though not entirely accurate) in saying: "Officially all Kant allows us to *know* about things in themselves is that they are somehow the source of the data we receive in intuition."[37] For if "know" in this context is intended in its strict Kantian sense, then Walker's claim is simply not true: the thing in itself is a matter of rational belief, not knowledge. Indeed, the only actual *knowledge* that Kant would regard as indispensable for transcendental idealism would be the transcendental knowledge of the necessity of the "principles of pure understanding" for empirical knowledge (i.e. of the necessity of synthesizing the pure intuitions of space and time with the categories). So Walker's supposition that he has shown Kant's limitation of knowledge in its *strict* sense to be untenable would in this case simply reveal an equivocation in Walker's use of Kant's terms. This may well be the full explanation of why he makes this supposition;[38] but I suspect it only scratches the surface. For the second of the above-mentioned reasons seems to take us closer to Walker's main intentions.

Anyone who holds a position such as Walker's, yet is not misled by the various meanings of the word "knowledge," must believe that some sort of intuitive data concerning the thing in itself is actually available (perhaps by using transcendental arguments). For only in this case would one's use of the word "knowledge" in the claims we are considering be thoroughly consistent with Kant's usage.[39] But what could it mean for a transcendental argument to connect the concept of the thing in itself with a corresponding intuition? The thing in itself is by definition not intuitable. Or, if it is identified with that which is presented to us in intuition—as some interpreters would suggest—then it would in so doing become an appearance for us. In II I have already questioned the legitimacy of extending the application of transcendental arguments to the thing in itself by pointing out that Kant limited their use to the proof of transcendental (as opposed to transcendent) truths. Transcendental arguments cannot prove anything about "conditions which must hold independently of us" as Walker seems to think they can (see I), because by "independent of us" Kant would mean "independent of our knowledge" and if we suddenly *knew* about such conditions, they would no longer be independent (in Kant's transcendental sense). The only way

one could continue to maintain the legitimacy of such an extension of the scope of transcendental arguments would be by regarding the thing in itself—as well as the process of perception in general—in a radically unKantian manner. This third suggestion takes us, I believe, to the very heart of Walker's divergence from Kant.

Walker reconstructs Kant's theory of perception and of the role of the thing in itself by analysing "the character of the given" in Kant's system. In particular, he investigates "the relationship that may obtain between the properties of things in themselves and the qualities we ascribe to things."[40] But throughout his discussion he treats the thing in itself in much the same way as Kant treats the appearance when viewing it from the empirical perspective. Kant's use of the term "appearance" refers to "the undetermined object of an empirical intuition,"[41] which is "outside us" when regarded from an empirical perspective even though it is "only in us" when regarded from a transcendental perspective,[42] and which is the root cause of our most primitive awareness of the material sources of our empirical knowledge.[43] In one of his clearest explanations of the "given data" with which the transcendental philosopher deals, Kant says:

> Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations. . .[44]

In sharp contrast to this warning, Walker's reconstruction of Kant's theory, as I shall demonstrate, ignores the part played by such appearances and supposes instead that the "given data" with which the transcendental philosopher concerns himself is actually the thing in itself.

Walker points out, quite correctly, that "the data given to us in intuition must possess a character of their own."[45] But he then intimates that this "character of their own," which has a "substantive role to play in determining the character of the (empirical) world of appearances", is derived from "things in themselves," not from appearances.[46] Later he makes the same point rather more explicitly: "given the ways of ordering (or synthesis) that we do use, what the world of

appearances turns out to be like depends on the character of things in themselves."[47] The vital role of appearances *as such* in perception seems to be wholly ignored, to the extent that he considers synthesis—which for Kant always concerns a manifold of intuited appearances—to be concerned directly with the thing in itself. But what he is really doing, I suggest, is redefining the thing in itself so that it takes over the role Kant assigns to the appearance in his theory of perception. This explains why Walker thinks it "is simply absurd" to conceive of "things in themselves without any properties:" for Kant the appearance *does* have properties, and *these* are what we map "into our own quality space" through empirical synthesis.[48] Walker, however, says empirical synthesis is "guided by" the properties of the *thing in itself,* and that it "can be thought as governed by a function which maps the intrinsic properties things have in themselves into our own quality space."[49]

The reason Walker himself gives for putting forward this view is commendable: he urges that unless "some relationship does obtain"—i.e. can be *known* to obtain—between the thing in itself and objects in the phenomenal world, there will be nothing to prevent "the given element" in perception from being "dropped out as otiose," as in "more radical" forms of idealism.[50] What he misunderstands is that this "given element" is for Kant the *appearance:* Kant would agree that some relationship must obtain between *it* and the object as empirically known (the phenomenon); but this frees the thing in itself to fulfill quite a distinct function as the rationally presupposed starting point for the *transcendental* perspective. Thus Kant would agree that we have good reasons to believe, as Walker says, that "what happens in the world of appearance is dictated not by ourselves alone but by the character of the *an sich,*"[51] but that this is true can never be a matter of *knowledge* for us—not even transcendental knowledge. What *could* be a matter of knowledge—and it is this well-known Kantian view which I suspect Walker is actually leaning towards in the above suggestion—is that empirical knowledge must be composed not *only* of the form of experience (i.e. space, time and the Categories), but *also* of its matter (i.e. appearances).

If this criticism of such an interpretation of Kant is accurate, then the latter actually turns out not to extend the scope of transcendental arguments at all: it merely affirms (covertly) that they can be

applied in just the way Kant applies them (viz. as yielding conclusions about appearances). The trouble is that in so doing such an approach inevitably uses Kantian terms in unKantian ways (in particular: "thing in itself" in place of "appearance"). Perhaps in the end this muddled reconstruction of Kant's theory of perception is responsible for Walker's willingness to declare that various (patently unKantian) assertions must be affirmed by "even the most dedicated Kantian."

IV

The foregoing criticism of Walker's interpretation of Kant has had to be rather selective, and hence has not been entirely fair to his general approach. He readily admits, for example, that although the thing in itself should "in principle" be regarded as knowable, he is himself unable to construct a transcendental argument which would demonstrate the validity of such knowledge. Thus, it could even be that when he says "in principle" he means something like "from God's perspective," in which case his position would be (for us men) irrefutable. But it seems unlikely that this would be his intention, since he makes it fairly clear that he simply wants to acknowledge that Strawson and others have come closer than Kant thought possible to establishing the validity of certain claims, and that, however "improbable" it might seem, there is nothing which necessarily prevents some future philosopher or logician from going even further.[52] In any case, the bulk of Walker's interpretation suffers surprisingly little from the anomalous views criticized above; indeed, one reason for concentrating on the latter has been to purge his interpretation of certain key features whose inconsistency renders them unable to fit coherently into his overall picture of Kant's philosophy. My focus on these features, therefore, is ultimately intended to make his interpretation more tenable, rather than to dispense with it completely.

One does not have to be an expert on the formulation and/or criticism of transcendental arguments to see their inapplicability to the thing in itself. For even a partial understanding of their form and the scope of their application is sufficient to reveal that, for an expert transcendental logician to try to extend his proofs to cover that which is transcendent is as thoroughly unKantian as it would be for him to try to *prove* by transcendental arguments that, for example,

$A \neq -A$, or that God exists. As I have tried to demonstrate in this paper, transcendental arguments can be applied properly only to prove that certain principles instantiated in experience are in fact "synthetic a priori conditions for the possibility of experience." So the only way to maintain that such arguments can be extended to cover transcendent reality is to contend that we meet transcendent reality itself *in experience;* yet this entails a denial of the validity of "transcendental idealism," and with it, the label "dedicated Kantian."

The essence of my criticism of any Kantian philosopher who follows such an approach is that it requires the acceptance of two incompatible positions. It tries to allow for some form of direct, rational contact with transcendent reality, and yet to defend transcendental idealism (which itself *is* the view that *nothing* we know empirically is "ultimate" in this transcendental sense). To render these positions compatible would involve at the very least the clarification of those views which lack coherence even if they are not regarded as Kantian: viz. an equivocal use of the word "knowledge," an extension of the limits Kant puts on transcendental arguments, and the association of a theory of perception such as Walker's with the name "transcendental idealism." But even if somehow they were to be made compatible, I cannot see how anyone holding them could legitimately regard himself as a Kantian. For the only Kantian answer to the question "Is the thing in itself knowable?" is that it *must* be *unknowable*; indeed, anyone who wishes to insist otherwise is likely to find a friendlier atmosphere in the rationalist perspective of (for instance) the Leibnizian camp, or in the empiricist perspective of (for instance) the more recent phenomenalist camp, than in the strange land occupied by the transcendental idealist perspective of the Kantian camp.

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NOTES

[1] Ralph C.S. Walker (ed.), *Kant on Pure Reason* (Oxford, 1982), p.3.

[2] Ralph C.S. Walker, *Kant* (London, 1978), pp. 122-3, 126, 134. (Hereafter referred to as *Kant*.)

[3] In order to avoid unnecessary ambiguity, I will use the singular phrase "thing in itself" whenever possible. It should be understood, however, that "thing" in this case is short for something like "the transcendent reality which is independent of me and which

may or may not be composed of 'things'."

[4] Ralph C.S. Walker, "Synthesis and Transcendental Idealism" (unpublished, used by permission of the author), p. 9. (Hereafter referred to as 'STI.')

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[6] I have dealt with these two issues in detail in "Six Perspectives on the Object in Kant's Theory of Knowledge" (*Dialectica*, forthcoming) and "Faith as Kant's Key to the Justification of Transcendental Reflection" (*The Heythrop Journal XXV* (October 1984), pp. 442-55), respectively.

[7] I have attempted in "Knowledge and Experience in Kant's Critical Philosophy" (*Kant-Studien*, forthcoming) to distinguish four distinct "perspectives" on knowledge in Kant's system: the practical, the logical, the transcendental, and the empirical.

[8] *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. N. Kemp Smith (London, 1929), p. B75. (Hereafter referred to as *CPR*.) See also Henry Allison's translation of Kant's *On a Discovery . . .* in *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy* (London, 1973), p. 125. (Hereafter referred to as *Discovery*.)

[9] Kant makes this clear in a letter to Reinhold (12 May 1789), tr. H. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 164; see also p. 171.

[10] *CPR*, p. B177.

[11] Kant stresses the merely conceptual nature of the thing in itself when he says the "Aesthetic" distinguishes "between the *knowledge* of things as appearances and the *conception* of them according to what they are as things in themselves" (*Discovery*, pp. 124-5, emphasis added).

[12] Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, tr. L.W. Beck (New York, 1950), p. 109.

[13] Lauchlan Chipman, "Things in Themselves," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 3 (1973), pp. 489, 491.

[14] *Discovery*, p. 125; cf. *CPR*, pp. B45, B629.

[15] The *unobvious* nature of the analytic connection between unknowability and the thing in itself explains why Kant repeatedly argues for its necessity. And its *analytic* nature explains why he never bothers to support it with a *rigorous* argument: his primary concern is with *synthetic*, not with analytic, judgments. (Cf. Henry Allison, "The Non-Spatiality of Things in Themselves in Kant," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 14 (1976), p. 319-20.

[16] I have called such an argument a "transcendental-*type* argument," rather than simply a "transcendental argument," because the latter deals not with the possibility of a transcendental inquiry, but only with the possibility of empirical knowledge.

[17] *CPR*, p. B850.

[18] *CPR*, p. B852. Kant's technical meaning for objective "knowledge" is *Erkenntnis* (sometimes translated as "cognition"). *Wissen*, by contrast, is a wider, more subjective term, used to refer to cases in which "the holding of a thing to be true *[Fürwahrhalten]* is sufficient [for a given person] both subjectively and objectively" (*Ibid.* p. 850). Kant's use of the verbal forms of both words in the same sentence at this point is therefore a potential source of confusion, especially when the two are indistinguishable in translation. *Wissen* is, as it were, the combination of the two mutually exclusive terms, *Glaube* and *Erkenntnis*.

[19] Moreover, I treat this subject in detail in "Faith as Kant's Key," *op. cit.*

[20] *Kant*, pp. 122-5.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[22] 'STI', p. 10.

[23] Cf. *CPR*, pp. B642-8.

[24] This proposotion is not a "judgment" in Kant's technical sense, for it does not connect an intuition with a concept.

[25] *CPR*, p. B156, emphasis added.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. B157.

[27] *Kant*, p. 134.

[28] *CPR*, p. B596.

[29] *Kant*, p. 130. Although he regards this as a reasonable possibility, Walker himself would not wish to describe the thing in itself as being in space and time (STI, pp. 17-8). He does suggest, however, that Kant's proofs of the objective validity of the Principles might need to be extended to apply to the thing in itself as well as to the world of appearances if they are to succeed (p.18).

[30] Allison, *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy*, *op. cit.*, p. 93; cf. p. 123.

[31] When Kant says, for example, (arguing against Eberhard) that an intuition "does not provide us with *the properties which pertain to it as it is in itself*" (*Discovery*, pp. 125-6, emphasis added), he is not implying that there might be some other way for such properties to be knowable (e.g. by examining the simple constituents of appearances àla Eberhard, or by perfecting a transcendental argument à la Walker); on the contrary, he is implying that the question as to whether or not the thing in itself has "properties" can for us only be a matter for speculation, not knowledge.

Walker comes close to this position when he says "there must be something in the things in themselves which corresponds to redness and is responsible for the similarity of our recurrent sensations of red" (ST, p. 7); but he gives the impression that the "must" means something more for Kant in this context. A quick review of the section on the "postulates" (*CPR*, pp. 265-74) reveals the unKantian character of Walker's claim that "there are also conditions which the noumenal world *must* satisfy if experience is to be possible for us" (STI, p. 7, emphasis added).

[32] STI p. 14.

[33] J.N. Findlay, *Kant and the Transcendental Object* (Oxford, 1981), p. 8.

[34] See e.g. Antony Flew, *God & Philosophy* (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1966), §1.10; and Anthony Kenny, *The God of the Philosophers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 35.

[35] *CPR*, p. B xxx.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. B 265.

[37] STI, p. 6, emphasis added.

[38] If it is, then much of the remainder of this section is superfluous, inasmuch as Kant, Walker and I would agree on everything but how loosely the word "knowledge" should be used in Critical philosophy.

[39] The same could be said for one's use of the word "must" (see n. 31).

[40] STI, pp. 13, 15.

[41] *CPR*, p. B34.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. B59, A373.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. B207.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. A108-9.

[45] STI, p. 6.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 14-5.

[49] Ibid.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] *Kant*, p. 126.