

ARTICLES

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Phenomenal and Representational Character of Conscious Experience¹

My aim in this paper is to critically evaluate the debate surrounding the distinction between phenomenal and representational character of conscious experience which is one of the important debates in contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness studies. The main objective of this paper is to seek an answer to the question – whether the content of conscious experience is phenomenal or intentional, or both? In the introduction, I will introduce the phenomenal and representational as two significant properties of consciousness. In the first part, I will articulate the debate regarding the distinction between phenomenal and representational character of consciousness. Here I will argue that the phenomenal and representational properties of experience are not mutually exclusive of each other as many philosophers have taken them to be and one can be understood in relation to the other. In relation to the above distinction, many theories of consciousness have been developed emphasizing on the one or the other property of consciousness. My second objective in this paper is to argue against the strong or reductive representationalism. In relation to this, I will discuss Michael Tye's position as a representative of strong representationalism. In the third part, I will argue against it drawing sources from the works of various non-reductive representationalists particularly from Tim Crane's version of representationalism.² In the final section, I will try to

defend a position which may be called phenomenological representationalism where I will try to reconcile the divide between phenomenology and intentionality. In this context, I will argue, on the one hand, against the Cartesian notion of subjectivity which leads to pure phenomenal consciousness and, on the other hand, against the physical explanation of consciousness which leads to strong representationalism.

INTRODUCTION

Consciousness lies at the heart of the mind-world relationship as the former makes the later intractable. Consciousness is one of the most integral parts of the living organisms and understanding it leads us to understand the latter in a better way. Conscious experience may be regarded as one of the most significant phenomena of human life because it is through conscious experience, our minds engage with, and make sense of, the people and state of affairs in the external world. Conscious experiences contribute to the major part of the human mind and indirectly to human life. It is the most important factor in the life of the mind, and one may say that our minds have their lives due to consciousness. Solving the mystery of life certainly depends on solving the mystery of consciousness.

The subject matter of consciousness in its different shades has been fundamental to many pursuits of knowledge. Various philosophers throughout the ages have tried to understand and explain it in different ways. One of the important debates about consciousness in recent times is the debate centering on the distinction between phenomenal and representational character of the conscious experience. One can say that many philosophical discussions on consciousness, in contemporary philosophy of mind, revolve around this distinction.

In contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophical discussion on 'consciousness' has taken broadly two trajectories. Some philosophers discuss consciousness as consciousness of something or some states-of-affairs. On the contrary, some philosophers take

consciousness as in itself. Since the time of Brentano and Husserl, it is widely held that mental phenomena or consciousness states are always 'consciousness of something, directed towards or about something. Thus, this 'directedness' or 'aboutness' feature of consciousness or mental states is called 'intentionality' and mental states that are said to be directed at or about something is called 'intentional or representational states'.³ The representational nature of consciousness is understood in terms of its directedness or aboutness. Brentano called 'intentionality' as 'the mark of the mental' and hence he used this criterion to distinguish between mental states and physical states. However, it should be noted that Brentano's notion of intentionality is not the criteria to distinguish between representational and phenomenal character of consciousness. In fact, in Brentano and subsequently in phenomenological tradition, these two features of consciousness were discussed in single account. "Intentionality" for Brentano is the criteria by which one can distinguish between physical phenomenal and mental phenomena, and mental phenomena here obviously include our phenomenally conscious states.

There is, however, a different account of 'consciousness', according to which consciousness is not always consciousness of something. It is rather understood as an intrinsic property of experience, a property which is attached to our experience due to the subjective features of our experience as such. On this view, there are some conscious states which cannot be said to be directed at or about something. These conscious states do not represent something outside of consciousness itself. This interpretation of 'consciousness' holds that the phenomenal or the subjective property or the intrinsic quality of a conscious state is the most important or dominating feature of conscious state and a state which has this feature is called a 'phenomenal state'. Mental states, which are phenomenally conscious states are said to be internally conscious states. There is a subjective inner perspective attached with phenomenal consciousness or phenomenal conscious states. In fact, the subjectivity or first-person perspective makes our consciousness states phenomenal. The subjective inner perspective

attached with every phenomenal state is also sometimes called 'qualia'. It can be expressed in everyday language by the phrase 'what it is like states'.⁴ It follows from this phrase that there is something it is like to possess a phenomenal conscious states like, to taste pickle, to smell rose, to feel nervousness etc. What it is like for a subject to have various experiences or to become a subject of various experiences can be referred to as the phenomenal consciousness or phenomenal character of consciousness. The phenomenal character of being an experiencing subject and the phenomenal character of various experiences that she has, are closely related to each other. An experience without being the experience of a particular subject cannot be called phenomenal. It is further said that different kinds of experiences may be phenomenally or subjectively similar. Take the example of colour experience. There are different shades of colour red. What it is like to experience deep red is similar to what it is like to experience light red than experiencing black or green. It is because the phenomenal properties involved in experience of different shades of red are subjectively similar than phenomenal properties involved in the experience of black or green. Philosophers have identified different kinds of phenomenal conscious states or experiences out of which perceptual experiences like seeing green, hearing music, touching ice etc. are significant. The hard problem of consciousness, it can be said, arises due to the irreducibility of phenomenal and subjective properties of consciousness to physical or natural⁵ properties of our experience. The phenomenal consciousness has also been understood in two different but closely related ways by referring to the subjects and their conscious experience. There is something like to be a subject who is having different experiences. There is also something like to have a particular experience with its own phenomenological richness. In spite of the subject or experiencer being the same in various experiences, each experience comes with its own distinctive phenomenological character. Though the phenomenal character of consciousness is not all about the Cartesian notion of subjectivity, nevertheless it, in an important sense, inherits the Cartesian notion

of subjectivity. The phenomenal character of consciousness taken in its extreme form leads to the Cartesian notion of pure subjectivism where consciousness is understood as pure without having any necessary or constitutive relation with external world. On the other hand, the representational character of experience taken in its extreme form leads to pure physicalism or objectivism where there is a constant denial of subjectivity.

ARTICULATING THE DEBATE

From the above discussion one can reach the conclusion that there are primarily two different properties of consciousness i.e. representational and phenomenal. Representational is the property of being directed towards objects and states of affairs—the way conscious perceptual states represent state of affairs, while phenomenal is what it is like to subjectively possess a conscious experience. It is accepted by all philosophers that all our thoughts are intentional as these are about or directed upon objects and state of affairs. There cannot be thoughts without being thoughts about something or some state of affairs. But in the case of other mental phenomena like perception, sensation and mood, there are disagreements among philosophers. Some think that these states do not have intentional or representational properties. Those who give importance to the representational character of consciousness and try to define mental states or conscious states in terms of it and think that intentional or representational nature of mental states or conscious states explains the relationship between mind and world in a better way, are called representationalists or intentionalists. Theories of this kind, following Thomasson, can be called ‘one-level account of consciousness’.⁶ On the other hand, those who give importance to phenomenal property or phenomenal character of consciousness, and try to define conscious mental states by this feature and think that phenomenal consciousness gives a better account of the relationship between mind and world are called anti-representationalists or phenomenists. Theories of this kind have been called ‘higher-

order accounts of consciousness'.⁷ According to representationalism or intentionalism, consciousness is always consciousness of the world; it represents something in the world. On the contrary, higher-level accounts of consciousness or 'phenomenism'⁸ states that, conscious states are not always directed outward or represent something in the world; it rather consists in the awareness of the mental states and its phenomenal character itself. The debate between representationalism and phenomenism has been defined by Ned Block as the 'greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind'. He writes,

"The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind – may be even all of philosophy – divides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of consciousness experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and functional. A convenient terminological handle on the dispute is whether there are "qualia". Those who think that the phenomenal character of conscious experience goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and functional are said to believe in qualitative properties of conscious experience, or qualia for short."⁹

The debate between intentionalism and phenomenism or representationalists and anti-representationalists is not always straight-forward to formulate. It is so because there are different ways of formulating the debate between these two opposing views as there are different versions of representational as well as phenomenal character of consciousness. The main focus of the debate is on whether one of the two properties is exhausted or fully explained by the other one. The representationalists would deal with the above issue by saying that the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by its representational content and thus phenomenal content of conscious states is nothing but identical with or supervene¹⁰ on representational character of experience. They are of the opinion that what we call the phenomenal content of experience is nothing but just the representational content of experience. According to this view, if

representational content of any two possible conscious states differ, then their phenomenal content must also differ and if their representational content remain the same, their phenomenal content would also remain the same.¹¹ Following the above view, one can say that the phenomenal property of consciousness is grounded in the representational content of consciousness. This way of explaining the nature of consciousness becomes more problematic when it is tied up with the physicalism program in consciousness studies. However, it is not necessary that representationalism with regard to consciousness should always lead to physicalism. However, in contemporary philosophical literature on consciousness, there seems to be strong connection present between physicalism and representationalism.

On the other hand, the anti-representationalists or phenomenists would suggest that the phenomenal character of conscious states is not exhausted or fully explained by its representational content. They are of the opinion that, it is rather intentional content of experience which is exhausted by the phenomenal character of experience and to this extent; phenomenal character of experience does not supervene on and is not identical with the representational content. According to them, the phenomenal content of any possible experiences may vary, while their representational content remain constant and their phenomenal content may be held constant while their representational contents differ. This view suggests that the representational property of consciousness is grounded in or explained by the phenomenal character of consciousness experience. The above strategy of explaining consciousness also falls into several problems because of its inheritance of the notion of pure subjectivity of the Cartesian variety severing the tie with the external world. However, those who are insisting upon subjectivity or first person perspective need not necessarily embrace it.

Many philosophers in their attempt to explain the nature of consciousness have followed the above strategy i.e. explaining, rather explaining away one property in terms the other property.

Instead of following this approach, one could have explored the way how these two properties co-exist in most cases of our conscious states. It seems that in many conscious states the phenomenal character of consciousness is not exhausted by the representational character and vice-versa. Rather, each of these properties enriches the other.

It is important to note that, most intentionalists and anti-intentionalists, to some extent, would agree on the point that our conscious states have both phenomenal and representational character. But their disagreement is regarding whether any one of these two properties outruns or dominates the other. The contemporary debate surrounding the distinction between the phenomenal and the intentional centers around the issue whether our perceptual experience like seeing green, smelling rotten egg etc, bodily sensations like feeling hungry, itches, pain, tickle etc., and various moods and emotions are intentional or phenomenal. The issue became more intense by the arguments of some anti-intentionalists that there are some bodily sensations like pain, and some emotions and moods which are purely phenomenal. According to these philosophers, these forms of conscious states are not directed at anything and hence they lack the feature of 'intentionality' altogether. For example, according to Searle, there are forms of nervousness, elation and undirected anxiety that are not intentional. Searle writes,

"Many conscious states are not intentional, e.g., a sudden sense of elation."¹²

Searle is of the opinion that, consciousness and intentionality are not to be taken as the same phenomena because of the fact that there are some conscious states which are not intentional and on the other hand, there are some intentional states which are not conscious states. According to him, though the class of conscious states and the class of intentional states seem to overlap each other, they should not be taken as identical, nor can one be reduced to the other. The 'intentional' property of mental state is not present in every mental state. It is only present in mental states like beliefs, hopes, love, desire etc. whereas mental states like nervousness,

elation and undirected anxiety etc. do not possess the characteristics of intentionality. These mental states do not have the feature of 'aboutness' or 'directedness' which is said to be the necessary feature of our mental states. Someone's nervousness or anxiety is not to be necessarily directed at or about anything in the world. If we ask someone, 'what are you anxious of?' (What are you elated about?), he does not necessarily possess an answer to this question, while in cases like desires, beliefs etc., he has a definite answer to a question of the above kind, (like, 'what is your belief about'). Even if Searle is of the opinion that all states are not intentional states, it would be quite controversial to call him an anti-intentionalists because he has himself developed an important theory of 'intentionality' abandoning some of the traditional and misleading concepts about it. He has, however clearly distinguished between phenomenal states and intentional states. According to him, there are clear cases of phenomenal states which are not intentional and there are clear cases of intentional states which are not phenomenal states. He is not thereby claiming that all mental states are intentional or all mental states entirely phenomenal.

There are many other philosophers who are of the opinion that bodily sensations like pain, emotions and moods do not have any intentional object. For example, Collin McGinn says,

"By sensations, we shall mean bodily feelings... as well as perceptual experiences. These differ in an important respect; will call for a subdivision within the class of what we are calling sensations. Bodily sensations do not have an intentional object in the way that perceptual experiences do ..."¹³

In similar fashion, Ned Block states that:

"Note...that phenomenal content need not be representational all (my favorite example is the phenomenal content of orgasm)."¹⁴

There are different versions of arguments for 'phenomenalism'. Primarily, there could be two versions of phenomenism or 'anti-Intentionalism' which may be called strong phenomenism

and weak phenomenism. The strategy of strong phenomenism is not only to put emphasis on the notion of pure subject or subjectivity, but also to reduce everything into it. This is present in some readings of Descartes and Husserl. On the other side, weak or relaxed phenomenism though puts emphasis on subjectivity, it tries to accommodate the view that our subjectivity itself is constituted by the representations of the world in mind.

There are also many versions of representationalism. For our purpose we will concentrate on two of them. Strong reductive representationalism – strong reductive intentionalism- thesis has been defined by Tye as:

“It is the view that both the representational content with which phenomenal character is identical can be spelled out in physical or functional terms and that the further conditions on that content can be spelled out similarly.”¹⁵

Tye is one of the major proponents of ‘reductive intentionalism’. According to him, the reductive version of intentionalism holds that the condition by which the representational content represents the objects and states of affairs in the world are functional. According to Tye, one well known “reductive representationalist proposal is that the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as its poised abstract nonconceptual intentional (or representational) content or it’s PANIC, for short.”¹⁶ Reductive representationalists identify ‘qualia’ or phenomenal character of experience with the qualities or features of the object which is experienced. They do not identify it with the feature of perceiving states themselves. According to these philosophers, knowing what it is like to see red is just a matter of knowing what visual quality of redness is like. Fred Dretske is another proponent of this kind of view. He states that:

“There is no more to the quality of one’s experiences in experiencing blue than there is to the color blue since the color blue is the color of one’s experiences.”¹⁷

Hence, it follows from this that qualia or phenomenal character of experiencing blue is nothing subjectively qualitative than just the

property of blueness in the world. Phenomenal qualities of experience are just the external qualities of the physical world which are represented in consciousness.

The major proponents of non-reductive intentionalism are Tim Crane, Thomasson, McGinn etc. It is just the opposite of what we have explained about the reductive intentionalism. It has been defined by Tye as “Non-Reductive strong intentionanism (Representationalism) is the view that either aspects of the content itself or aspects of the further conditions on the content are neither physical nor functional. On this view, phenomenal character is identified with representational content, but the content itself or conditions in it, are irreducibly subjective”.¹⁸

The uncompromising distinction between phenomenal and representational character of consciousness leads to two extreme opposing views explaining the nature of consciousness mainly because of two reasons. One is the way in which the notion of subjectivity or first person perspective has been understood leaving aside all the worldly connections it has. The other reason is the way in which the representational nature of consciousness is understood leaving aside the human subject. The strategy of explaining consciousness in terms of making a distinction between two properties of consciousness and explaining one in terms of the other has been a dominating one in contemporary philosophy. But for many reasons this has not been a successful strategy. The representational property of consciousness is not the dominating property of consciousness as representationalists think, neither is the phenomenal property as anti-representationalists take it to be. This way of looking into the nature of consciousness is problematic. In many conscious states, it is not even plausible to make such distinction the way it has been made because these properties of consciousness are intimately linked together. It is not the phenomenal character alone or the representational character alone, which can explain the nature of consciousness. Rather, the impossibility to make the distinction between these two in the case of many conscious states reveals one of the significant aspects of consciousness. The watertight distinction between phenomenal

and intentional content of consciousness is grounded in the opposing views of pure subjectivism and pure objectivism. Some philosophers like Husserl disillusioned by naïve objectivism return to pure subjectivism and some others like Tye and Dretske by being perplexed by the notion of subjectivity embrace pure objectivism.

MICHAEL TYE'S REDUCTIVE REPRESENTATIONALISM

Michael Tye is one of the major proponents of 'representationalism' in contemporary discussions on consciousness. As mentioned earlier, his view of 'representationalism' can be called 'strong and reductive representationalism'. As opposed to the view proposed by anti-representationalists, Tye claims that, any mental state which is phenomenally conscious must have intentional content. Any special threat, whatsoever, for physicalism, would not arise by admitting the phenomenal or subjective qualities of our experience. Once the concept of 'subjective experience' or 'phenomenal character' is properly understood, the physicalists would have nothing to fear from the argument in favour of it. However, the problem remains with Tye's strong representationalism because there are several flaws in his understanding of the phenomenal character of consciousness. According to him, phenomenal character of experience is not only identical with representational content of experience, but also they can be reduced to or explained by physical or functional terms. He suggests that, the phenomenal character of experience itself is the intentional content of experience. Thus, he writes:

"The traditional view that what it is like is a matter of intrinsic, head – bound (or soul bound) qualities has been in peaceful slumber for too long. What follows is an attempt to rouse it and shake it apart. Sleeping dogmas should not be left to lie undisturbed. The thesis that phenomenal character is representational is an idea whose time has come."¹⁹

Tye is of the opinion that, the phenomenal qualities of experience are representational in nature. What it is like to see

red, what it is like to taste mango is not something that is intrinsic to the subject or resides inside head or soul in the sense that it is beyond its representational character. At the outset, it can be pointed out that a particular experience in order to be intrinsic to the subject does not necessarily have to depend solely on residing in head or soul of the subject. I think the notion of 'subject' is much more nuanced than its being a head or a soul. Then of course a question would arise, as Tye thinks, if it can be shown that these characteristics do not exist in the head, where is their place of existence? It seems that there is no clear answer to this question from the philosophers who argue for their existence. Countering the above point, one can say that though 'head' is necessary for having the phenomenal experience, it is not sufficient for explain it. Tye goes on to say that "unfortunately, the different kinds of subjectivity are frequently conflated, even by prominent philosophers. The result is that many people are perplexed, but not all of them are perplexed for the right reasons".²⁰ There is a paradox involved in the heart of the philosophical reflection on phenomenal consciousness. If we are able to properly understand the nature of phenomenal mind, then the paradox involved in it will be solved. So, according to him, the phenomenal mind must be given a physical, functional and representational explanation.

Tye has given various arguments for 'representationalism'. Here, for my purpose, I will focus on his PANIC theory of phenomenal consciousness. He has extensively argued for the representational content of bodily sensations like pain, perceptual experiences like seeing red, touching ice etc and different moods and emotions. According to him, all these experiences have their representational content and can be explained by their representational content. These experiences are not in themselves. They are, on the contrary, object directed or intentional states.

Tye developed a representational explanation of phenomenal character in relation to different kinds of conscious experiences. According to him, phenomenal character of experience is identical with intentional content of experience in the sense that there is nothing like a phenomenal character of experience which goes

beyond the representational content of experience. Phenomenal character of experience is not only explained fully in terms of the intentional content, but also it is exhausted by the intentional content. The differences in the intentional content of experience go hand in hand with the differences in their phenomenal character. To quote Tye,

“Phenomenal character (or what it is like) is one and the same as a certain sort of intentional content. This is the most straightforward explanation of the fact that “what it is like” linguistic context are intensional, of the fact that all experiences and feelings have intentional content, of the pairing of felt differences and intentional differences, and of the phenomenon of transparency.”²¹

Another important point on which Tye emphasizes is that the phenomenal character of experience is not a part of the mental representation itself which occurs within the sensory modules. Phenomenal content which is found in experiences and feelings arises at the level of the output from the sensory modules and inputs to a cognitive system. Phenomenal content is found when the output of the sensory modules like of perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, primary emotions and mood are served as an input to the higher cognitive states like belief, hope etc. The implication of the above point made by Tye is that there is nothing subjective about a particular sensation taken independently of a belief system. There would be nothing like to have an experience if it is not serving as an input to a cognitive system. A bodily sensation is not necessarily some one’s sensation. There is nothing like to be the subject of a bodily sensation. A sensation gets its phenomenal character when it is related to a cognitive system.

I think it is not always necessary for the output of a sensory module to serve as inputs to a cognitive system. Even in those cases, the basic sensations are marked by the subjectivity of the individuals who are having them. For Tye, it lies at the interface of the non-conceptual and conceptual domains of our mental phenomena. The functional role, intentional contents and internal

structure of phenomenally conscious states are different from the functional role, intentional contents and internal structure of belief systems because of the fact that cognitive states like belief, desire cannot have the phenomenal character. Phenomenal content of conscious experience is non-conceptual and concepts are not involved in phenomenally conscious states.

According to Tye, phenomenal content of conscious experience is one and the same as poised abstract non-conceptual intentional content which is known as 'the PANIC theory' of phenomenal character. 'Abstractness', 'Poisedness', 'non-conceptuality' and 'intentionality' are the basic and fundamental defining features of the phenomenal character or content of conscious experience. He suggests that the representations that differ in their PANICS also differ in their phenomenal character, and representations that are alike with respect to their PANICS are also alike in the phenomenal character. There can be no difference in phenomenal character without affecting the PANIC of phenomenal character.

The 'poisedness' feature of phenomenal character is that the contents which are available with the outer representations of the relevant sensory modules must stand ready for the use by belief/desire system and these contents should be situated in a position to make a direct impact on the system in producing beliefs, desires etc. This non-conceptual phenomenal content of experience should be sufficiently available for the higher cognitive system to produce the conceptual beliefs and desires. There is one thing common in the above two features which is that both poisedness and non-conceptual feature of experience can be understood in relation to the belief and desire system. The point, however, in this context can be made is that the content of perceptual experience cannot stand ready for the use by belief/desire system without itself being conceptual. It is interesting to see, in this context, the relationship that exists between poised and non-conceptual content of experience. The non-conceptual content of experience has to be poised enough in order to be available for being used by belief system. The problem here is that

the content of experience cannot be poised enough for being used by a conceptual system without itself being conceptual.

The phenomenal content of experience is abstract in the sense that no particular concrete object is necessary in its content except for the subjects of experiences in some cases. Different concrete objects can phenomenally appear to be alike or same. So, one object can be substituted for the other object without any phenomenological change. According to Tye:

“So the existence of that particular leg is not required for the given phenomenal character. What is crucial to phenomenal character is the representation of general features or properties. Experiences non-conceptually represent that there is a surface or on internal region having so-and-so feature at such-and-such locations, and thereby they acquire their phenomenal character.”²²

The above view proposed by Tye is problematic because it undermines the phenomenological richness of our experience by making the concrete objects irrelevant for the phenomenal character of our experience. In most cases, our experiences of objects have phenomenal richness not because of the abstract properties of the object, but because of the specific properties of the object in each context. It is not clear how we would account for the difference in phenomenological richness among different experiences, if no concrete object is required for making our experience of it phenomenologically rich.

REPRESENTATIONAL CHARACTER OF PAIN

The fundamental thesis proposed by Tye about representational character of consciousness is also applicable in the case of pain and other bodily sensations. He is of the opinion that our bodily sensations like pain have intentional content, it represents something to us. Our experience of pain represents some disturbances to us and it represents some changes in our body. When we experience pain in our finger tip, it represents something in our finger tip.

One of the controversies regarding pain is about whether a person can feel pain in phantom limbs. If the person can feel pain in his phantom leg, then this can be used as a case against representationalism because there is no object of pain as such in this case. Tye suggests that here the context is intentional. Someone can have a pain in her left leg even though he has no left leg. When one has a pain, that pain represents that something in his left leg. In the case of phantom leg, no concrete left leg is required to represent pain in it. It should be, in this context, noted that in the absence of concrete leg or real intentional object, if as Tye thinks that the context is intentional, then it cannot be entirely physical or explained by physical object or properties. Intentional objects in some contexts can be physical, but not the intentional context. Tye thinks that the intentional object of the pain is an abstract left leg and its concrete existence and non-existence does not really matter to the intentional state of pain. Tye writes,

“That there is a hidden intentionality in statements of pain location is confirmed by our tasks of pains in phantom limbs. People are subject to pains in limbs that no longer exist. For example a patient who has had his leg amputated may report feeling pains in the leg in places where he had experienced pain previously. Pains are also sometimes felt in phantoms of other body parts.”²³

Even though some philosophers claim that if someone does not have a left leg, then it is really impossible to have a pain in it, Tye thinks it is not really a threat to his proposal. According to Tye, someone’s pain in the leg represents more than just that something in the leg. If it is so, then what it obviously means is that the representational character of experience cannot be entirely explained in terms of its intentional object alone. When we have a pain, we feel it and while feeling it, we experience it. Tye brings in the phenomena of bodily damage or disorder to explain it. So his proposal is that,

“Pains are sensory representations of bodily damage or disorder. More fully, they are mechanical responses to the relevant bodily changes in the same way that basic visual sensations are mechanical responses to proximate visual stimuli. In the case of pain, the receptors (known as nociceptors) are distributed throughout the body. These receptors function analogously to the receptors on the retina...These representations, to repeat, are sensory. They involve no concepts. One does not need to be able to conceptualize a given bodily disturbance in order to feel pain.”²⁴

Though some kinds of pains bring some bodily changes or disturbances in us, these cannot be just mechanical responses to our bodily changes. Feeling of pain cannot just be a mechanical response. The context in which someone is hurt would also enter into the phenomenal character of having pain. Suppose someone who is physically hurt by a communal violence, his feeling of pain is not just a mechanical response to certain bodily changes. The phenomenal feeling of pain is also due to the kind of person she is. Social and cultural contexts which enter into constituting a subject are also subjectively responsible behind her feeling of pain and other experiences. Of course, if the representation is sensory in nature, one does not have to conceptualize it in order to have it. But that may not be the only way to say that a concept is present in a sensory representation. If concepts in form are not operative in our sensory representation, then it is not even possible to say it is the experience of a particular subject.

REPRESENTATIONAL CHARACTER OF EMOTIONS

According to Tye, there are some emotions and moods which obviously possess intentional character. They represent something in the mind about the objects and states of affairs outside of the mind. For example, feeling elated that finally the movie is out, feeling bored that it is raining yet again. These states are called

compound states consisting of a mood or emotion and the belief about it. The belief about various happening leads to the different moods or emotions.

Traditionally, it is supposed that the beliefs about emotions and moods are certainly intentional. But the feeling or emotion or moods itself are not taken to be intentional at all. According to Tye, moods and emotions are also sensory representations like bodily sensations as these states have intentional character. They also represent some physical changes in the body. For example – someone's feeling of anger leads to some physical changes in his body. His blood pressure will rise, his nostrils will flare, his face will flush, his voice will become louder, and he will clench his teeth and hands and so on. Hence,

“Their physical changes are registered in the sensory receptors distributed throughout your body. In response to the activity in your receptors, you will mechanically build up a complex sensory representation of how your body has changed, of the new body state you are in. In this way, you will feel the physical changes. The feeling you undergo consists in the complex sensory representation of these changes.”²⁵

The above explanation of the sensory representations of pain suitably fits with the intentionalist view about the bodily sensations and other perceptual experiences. Another point is that, if we do not feel any changes in the body, then we cannot form a clear conception of what it is like to be angry. If we take away all the sensations that are produced out of all the bodily changes, then there seems to be nothing left to claim that someone is feeling pain. What it is like to experience a pain is just the bodily, physical changes occurring due to that pain.

Bringing certain insights from the phenomenological tradition in to this context, particularly from Merleau-Ponty, would be a fitting response to the way Tye has thought about the notion of body (or bodily changes) in the above cited paragraph. The notion of lived body is very significant in this context to understand the

phenomenological richness of lived experience particularly bodily sensations. Merleau-Ponty writes:

“The body is to be compared, not to a physical object, but rather to a work of art... A novel, poem, picture, or musical works are individuals that is, being in which the expression is indistinguishable from the expressed, and their meaning, accessible only through direct contact, being radiated with no change of their temporal and spatial situation. It is a nexus of lived meanings, not the law for a certain number of covariant terms.”²⁶

Our body plays more substantial role in our life rather than just being a complex physical entity. Merleau-Ponty has compared our body to a novel because our body has a “nexus of lived meanings,” the grasping of which is not possible if we take it only as a physical object. In a novel what is being expressed cannot be separated from the expression. In the case of body as well, we cannot distinguish it from the meanings, relevancies and richness of our experience and life. Our body is far more than just a physical entity and it refers to a living organism which is richer in meaning, so are our bodily changes. The notion of ‘lived body’ needs to be seriously taken into consideration in order to understand how, in it, the phenomenological and representational character of our experience are indistinguishable from one another and neither of these can be understood in terms of the purely physical explanation of body.

TIM CRANE’S NON-REDUCTIVE REPRESENTATIONALISM

In this part, I am going to highlight the merits of a non-reductive representationalism. A different account of intentionalism proposed by Tim Crane may be called impure or non-reductive form of Intentionalism. ‘Pure Intentionalism’ is the view that the conscious character of a state of mind is determined by its intentional content alone and all intentional content is propositional. Crane rejects both these assumptions of ‘pure

intentionalism'. According to him, the conscious character of a mental state must be determined by its entire intentional nature and intentional nature of a mental state must consists of three factors.²⁷

- Intentional object
- Intentional content
- Intentional mode.

Crane holds that any intentionalist should explain the phenomenal character of experience on the basis of these three factors which constitute the intentional nature of mental states. We can get to know the intentional object of the mental states by asking the question to the person who is the possessor of mental state: 'what is his mental state is about?' An intentional state may be about or of one object or various objects. There is another way of saying that some intentional states have intentional object by suggesting that these states have concern for something. For example, take the mental state of desire. A desire is a desire for something, not a desire about something. Crane is of the opinion that it is the 'concerning feature' of intentionality which should be the focus of the study of intentionality and I think this 'concerning feature' brings out the nuanced aspect of the intentional object. While trying to understand the notion of 'intentionality' we should not be too much attached to the words like 'about' or 'aboutness' for the reason that there are some cases of mental states in which the terms like 'about' or 'aboutness' are not suitably fitted into, though they are intentional mental states.

Further, according to Crane, there are two feature of an intentional object.

- Non-existence.
- Self-transcendence.

The non-existence feature of intentional object is that there may be some intentional objects which do not literally exist. These intentional objects are called 'mere intentional objects'. This feature of intentional object, nevertheless, is not applicable to

all intentional objects. The second feature of intentional object is its 'self-transcendence'. This is the view that if an intentional object exists at all, its existence transcends any intentional state which has it as its object.

The intentional content of a mental state is the way in which the intentional object is represented to the mind. The way an intentional object is represented to mind constitutes the intentional content of a conscious state.

The intentional mode of a mental state, on the other hand, is the relation the subject of a mental state bears to the object of the mental state. The same object can be an object of different mental states. For example, rain. Someone can be bored by the continuous rain; someone can desire for rain, someone can hope for rain, someone can feel cold after rain etc., hence, there is a distinction in intentional mode.

So, these above three features taken together constitute the intentional nature of a mental state and Crane holds that the character of a conscious mental state should be explained by the entire intentional nature of the mental state rather by any one or two feature of intentional nature. I think Crane is right here in saying that in order to understand the representational character of consciousness, we need to take all these features into consideration. Taking these three features together, one can accommodate the phenomenological richness of experience in his account of consciousness. But in his other works, he has maintained that the content of perception is nonconceptual. This will not go well with having these three features in representational character. How could the representational character of conscious experience involve the three above features without our conscious experience being conceptual? Crane's main aim in considering these three features of consciousness is to argue against reductive or physical representationalism. I think his argument will fall short of making the case against physicalism if the intentional mode and intentional content of perception do not involve concepts.

Crane also criticizes the second assumption of 'pure intentionalism' that the content of mental state is always propositional. The

content of all intentional states cannot necessarily be assessable as true or false, and to that extent it is not propositional. He states that there are many intentional states which cannot be described as true or false. So Crane says:

“The thesis that all intentional mental states are propositional attitudes lacks phenomenological plausibility. To take a nice example of Victor Caston’s: when asked to think a number between one and ten, what comes to mind is a number, not a proposition. And it is a familiar fact that certain emotions, notably love and hate, can be directed on objects rather than always on state of affairs. While the notion of a propositional attitude must play an important role in any theory of intentionality, it does not exhaust the application of the concept of intentionality.”²⁸

Crane advocates a weak or liberal version of intentionalism along with David Chalmers, according to which, the phenomenal character of an experience must be determined by its entire intentional nature. According to him, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience must supervene on its intentional nature rather than on intentional content alone. There cannot be two experiences which are identical in their intentional nature but differ in their phenomenal character. I think, in this case also, instead of saying the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on the representational character, it is better to say that the former supplements the latter. Our conscious experiences phenomenologically represent various things. By saying this we are not putting the phenomenological character of experience beyond the reach of its representational character. If these are indistinguishable from one another in our experience, then it is meaningless to say that one supervenes on or identical to the other. Moreover, it would fit well with Crane’s point of concern that phenomenological character of consciousness should be given due importance. He quite justifiably said that while giving an intentional account of mental state, the phenomenological feature of mental state must be given due importance and in his opinion, the task in which we are engaged is a phenomenological one.

Crane has argued for the intentional nature of all mental states including bodily sensations, emotions and moods. There are some non-intentionalist philosophers who have rejected the 'intentionalism thesis' by saying that these states do not have any intentional object and these states represent nothing. These kinds of states do not say anything about the external world other than their having a subjective feel. In case of mental states like visual experiences, we can make distinction between the experience and what it is an experience of, but in case of pain, we cannot distinguish between the experience of pain and what it is an experience of. This echoes Merleau-Ponty's point that 'expression cannot be distinguishable from expressed'.

But Crane, however, denies the above view. According to him, even in the case of mental state like pain, a distinction can be made between pain and feeling of pain. For example, someone being woken up from a dreamless sleep by feeling some pain. In this case we can say that the existence of pain is prior to consciousness of or awareness of pain and this prior existence of pain causes the person to wake up. So a pain can exist without anyone being conscious of it. In this line of thought, we can hold that pain is some kind of entity on which awareness of pain is directed at in our pain state. So feeling of pain can be held to be an intentional state. But, how the person wakes up from sleep if she does not have the awareness or feeling of pain? When the person is in pain, it makes sense to her when she is aware of it. Saying this would not mean that her pain is about anything. In this case also, the pain cannot be distinguishable from feeling of pain. Rather, it is possible to distinguish between feeling of pain and causes of pain.

In order to address the issue regarding the intentional character of pain, Crane made a distinction between two different theories about the representational character of pain. One is called the mental object theory and the other is called perceptual theory of bodily sensation. According to the earlier view, the states of mind like pain are internally directed at the objective properties of the world whereas perceptual theory of bodily sensation says that bodily sensations of pain is like a form of perceptual awareness

of one's body. It is one form of perceptual experience. When we experience pain, we become aware of some part of our body that is in pain. We become perceptually aware of the felt location of pain in our body.

The perceptual theory of bodily sensation, Crane thinks, is stronger than the mental object theory of bodily sensation because of its perceptual identification of 'felt location'. That is why he writes:

"What tells in favor of the perceptual theory is the fact that to concentrate on the ache, I must necessarily concentrate on the part of my body which aches; the mental object theory cannot explain this necessity. Attending to bodily sensations is achieved by attending to a part of the body where these sensations feel to be. This is because bodily sensation is form of awareness, the awareness of things going on in one's body."²⁹

When we feel a particular bodily sensation, we feel it in a particular location or part of the body. Suppose one has a toothache, it is typically felt in the tooth. There may be cases where we can feel pain but are not able to say where the pain is exactly located. However, this does not mean that these kinds of pain or sensations are not felt in the body at all. It must be felt somewhere in the body. We cannot comprehend the fact that we have a bodily sensation but that is residing somewhere away from our body. According to him, the example of phantom limb does not really create any problem at all, precisely because in such a situation the subject feels the body to be extended to the point where it has been before. So in so far as pain has a felt location, it has some form of representational character.

In spite of adhering to the above position concerning pain, Tim Crane criticizes the pure intentionalists' account of pain. As we have discussed before, Tye claims that the representational content of our pain experience is the part of our body which is experienced as damaged, distorted or disordered. According to Crane, though it is true that, in some cases, experience of a pain is

an experience of the damage in the particular part of body, but there is nothing in an experience of pain which connotes damage to the subject. Instead of taking only the intentional content or intentional object as reductive intentionalists have done so, we need to consider intentional object, intentional content and intentional mode in order to show how experience of pain phenomenally represents.

It is these three features taken together which constitute the intentionality of pain. Hence, according to Crane, all bodily sensations can be explained by their intentional nature. In the similar fashion, one can also argue for the intentional nature of emotion and moods. Apparently it seems that feelings and emotions have no intentional object at all, they are not about or of anything. As a response to this Crane says that to possess an intentional state, it is not always necessary for the subject to know the intentional object and intentional content of that intentional state. Subject may sometimes be ignorant of the intentional object and intentional content of his intentional state. The cause of his intentional state might lie in future or in remote past which he could not comprehend at that moment. However, two features of intentionality are always present with every case of bodily sensations, emotions and moods. One is the relational structure of intentionality and the other is the perspectival or fine-grained nature of intentionality. The relational structure of intentionality is the fact that there is a relation between subject and object of the intentional state. Thought is the relation between subject and object. The fine-grained nature of the intentional state is that, the intentional states like bodily sensations, emotions and moods can represent the objects and states-of-affairs in its detail.

Even if we take the felt location as the intentional object of pain, it should not be thought of as the sensory representation of mere physical properties. Representational nature of consciousness can be understood in a better way if do not identify intentional object, intentional content and intentional content with certain physical properties. When we have different emotions, we have the world in

a particular way. Amie. L. Thomasson has put it in the following way.

“When we are in the grip of a given emotion or mood, the world shows up to us in certain characteristic ways: in anger an action shows up as unjust or insulting and deserving of retribution; in elation the world shows up as delightful; in depression, our situation shows up as hopeless and worldly events show up as pointless and not worth bothering about. What it is like to have a mood or emotion is, at least in part, a matter of the world showing up to us in these value charged ways.”³⁰

Following Crane and others we can say that non-reductive intentionalism has the privilege of being phenomenologically superior over the strong and reductive intentionalism. A mental state should be defined by its intentional nature, rather than by its intentional object or intentional content. Only if we explain mental states in terms of its intentional nature, then we can incorporate their phenomenology in our intentional account. The phenomenological domain of a subject’s experience should be given due importance, while we are giving an objective and intentional account of the experience.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL REPRESENTATIONALISM:

RECONCILING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN THE PHENOMENAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL CHARACTER OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The way strong representationalism explains the nature of consciousness cannot be successful because of its phenomenological implausibility. It cannot include the phenomenological features of our experience in their explanation. The way strong reductive representationalism explains the nature of consciousness, it seems that the explanation of consciousness is based on the denial of the existence of consciousness itself. An objective and representational account of mind-world relationship does not have to be necessarily physical or reductionist. The distinction between internal and

external, subjective and objective as two opposing poles gives rise to the rigid distinction between phenomenal and intentional. It is held axiomatic by many philosophers that the subjective excludes the objective, phenomenological excludes the intentional. It is obviously wrong to exclude the subjective from the objective, phenomenal from the intentional as these properties are blended together in our consciousness. In order for the world to have bearings on our thought, our minds must have the feature of intentionality. Conscious states must be necessarily representational, but it should represent the world in such a way that its phenomenology should be taken care of. Conscious states phenomenologically represent worldly content in relation to the subject of these conscious states. Thoughts must have objects because our mental states cannot represent something without being concerned about that thing. If we assume the ontological real distinction between mind and world, then we cannot make sense of intentionality or representational nature of our mental phenomena. It is in the phenomenological experiential domain of our consciousness, the ontological gap between mind and world can be bridged. If, in order to develop a representationalism thesis of consciousness, we work on the ontological distinction between mind and world, then the problem will rise regarding where to situate the intentionality, either on the mind side or on the world side. One can avoid this dichotomy if we take subject neither as a mind nor as a body, but as an embodied subject.

We should be able to give a representational explanation of the mind-world relationship where conscious states are directed towards the objects and states-of-affairs in the world and must include the phenomenological feature of experience. Our explanation of the relation between mind-world should be grounded in a phenomenological domain. All the interactions that take place between subject and object must be under the purview of phenomenological domain. Mental states or intentional states are necessarily a constituting part of the phenomenological domain. The subjective character of our consciousness enters into the constitution of representational nature of our consciousness and

vice-versa. Hence, in the phenomenological domain, one cannot really make a distinction between phenomenal and representational character of experience. It is certainly not right to suggest, on the one hand, that an intentional object cannot be a part of the phenomenological domain and what it is like to experience is not intentional, on the other hand. McDowell rightly says that:

“The most conspicuous phenomenological fact there is... that experience, conceived of from its own point of view, is not blank or blind, but purports to be revelatory of the world we live in.”³¹

The idea of purely qualitative states or epiphenomenalism is highly problematic and obscure and it is the idea which makes the mind-world relationship problematic by attracting the elements of Cartesian dualism. We should emphasize on the idea that the phenomenological domain itself is external, objective, intentional and more importantly situated in the world. The phenomenological domain of our experience is not something isolated from the objective and social world. The task on which we are engaged ourselves here is necessarily phenomenological one. As McDowell has rightly said:

“One of the chief objections to the psychologistic postulation of implicit knowledge stems from a concern that the notion of inner life, the life of mind, not to be made unrecognizable.”³²

We should work on the idea that the life of mind itself is in the phenomenological domain, which is not isolated from the world like the way Descartes understood mind as an inner threat. The life of mind is phenomenologically rich. Physicalists' account of the relation between mind and world is not phenomenologically rich and hence could not explain the essence of the life of mind. Gregory McCulloch in the same vein says that physical or reductive account would not be interpretational and accurate. According to him, a complete phenomenologically adequate account of individual's conscious life must be interpretational.

“Intentional content can figure in the phenomenological domain in a far from trivial way, linked to interpretation, and access to this phenomenology is not given by physicalist accounts, or indeed by any other account which fails to be interpretational.”³³

Hence, both extreme forms of view pertaining to consciousness create the problem for the relationship between mind and world. Both pure phenomenalism and pure subjectivism on the one side and both pure intentionalism and pure objectivism on the other side are new forms of dualism and hence cannot be sustainable. We should acknowledge a phenomenological representationalism account of the relationship between mind and world where all the distinctions would be merged and will constitute a coherent relation. Mental states are object-directed or intentional not in the null environment. When subjective is directed towards the objective world, then both subjective and objective have to be present there. The content of mental state cannot be intentional in the empty environment. To quote McCulloch:

“No account of intentionality or content can do that. There can be no subjectivity when the entire objective is missing. To try to have world directed thinking in the null environment is to fall to the demonic dilemma and hence to lose all brief on what thinking, world directedness is, thereby falling into incoherence.”³⁴

To understand the relationship between mind-world, there is a need to take the idea of subject as an embodied being seriously into consideration. The subjective and the objective which lead to two different and seemingly opposing character of consciousness should fuse into each other instead of excluding each other. Neither subjective nor objective properties of consciousness can be taken in isolation. Hence, we cannot really distinguish between phenomenal and intentional, subjective and objective, internal and external. These distinctions can be made, at the conceptual level, for the sake of having different ways of looking into the mind-world relationships. But in order to get coherent or unified

picture of mind-world relationship we should work on the possibilities where all these distinctions are merged. We cannot really compartmentalize between subjective or phenomenological domain and objective, physical or external domain. Making a watertight distinction between phenomenal and intentional character of consciousness supplemented with pure subjectivity and pure objectivity respectively would fall into sideways-on account of the relationship between mind and world.

First person perspective of the subject is the core of what we call phenomenal consciousness. First person perspective of the subject is not actually detached from the world where the subject is situated. In fact, the way the subject is situated in the world constitutes her first person perspective. In this sense one can say that first person perspective necessarily involves or represents the world in various conscious states. If we take the phenomenological account of the first person perspective into consideration, then one can bridge the explanatory gap between phenomenal and representational character of consciousness. The representational and phenomenal characters of consciousness are built into each other in case of most conscious states. It is better to say that our conscious states phenomenologically represent states of affairs of the world. The reductionist approach regarding consciousness to be successful, one has to reduce not only the experiences but also the subject of experience into physical entities or properties. Without reducing the subject and her subjectivity, one cannot reduce her experiences. And reducing the subject into few physical properties is not possible.

Both reductive and non-reductive representationalism advocated by Tye and Crane respectively put emphasis on the point that the representational content or nature of conscious experience is non-conceptual. This view is specifically problematic because of many reasons. A crucial point made by McDowell is that the content of conscious experience cannot be representational if it is not conceptual. He, I think, rightly said "Representational content cannot be dualistically set over against the conceptual."³⁵ Another point which should be taken into consideration is that

the representational content of consciousness cannot accommodate its phenomenal character if it is not conceptual because with the availability of concepts in our experience the phenomenal character of our subjectivity is being represented by various states of our mind. The content of the world, if it is not conceptual in some form, cannot become the content of our mind and consciousness.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have tried to show that the content of conscious experience is both phenomenal and intentional and in many cases of experience one cannot distinguish between them. The strategy of explaining the nature of consciousness should change in this regard while aiming to give a unified picture of the relationship between mind and world. Our conscious experiences phenomenologically represent the world to our mind as both phenomenal and intentional character of consciousness are built into each other. I have tried to argue against pure phenomenism on the one hand and pure or strong representationalism on the other hand. One cannot completely reduce the subjectivity into the objects or properties of the world and *vice-versa*. Reducing the subject and her consciousness into physical properties would lead to denial of subjectivity, and reducing the world into pure subjectivity would lead to the notion of mind which is devoid of the worldly content.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. I am indebted to my teacher Manidipa Sen with whom I started thinking about various issues in philosophy of mind. I have also been benefited by talking to my graduate students of Philosophy of mind.
2. Tim Crane in his paper "Intentionalism" and other works has defended a non-reductive version of representationalism.
3. I will use the term 'representational' and 'intentional' interchangeably.

4. This phrase was used by Thomas Nagel in his article "What is it like to be a bat?", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 83, No. 4, 1974, pp. 435–450.
5. There is a significant distinction between physicalism and naturalism. See David Chalmers' *The Conscious Mind* and John McDowell's *Mind and World*.
6. Thomasson, "Phenomenal Consciousness and the Phenomenal World" in *Monist* 91, No. 2, 2008, p. 191.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
8. Ned Block calls this kind of view as 'Phenomenism'.
9. Block, "Mental Paint and Mental Latex" in *Philosophical Issues*, Vol. 7, *Perception*, 1996, p. 19.
10. Reductive representationalists would claim that the phenomenal character of consciousness is identical with the representational content whereas non-reductive representationalists would rely on supervenience Thesis.
11. The philosophers who argue for the above view are Michael Tye, Tim Crane, William Lycan, Fred Dretske, Gilbert Harman, Alex Byrne, Amie. L. Thomason, D.M. Armstrong, John McDowell etc. leading to different versions of intentionalism.
12. Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 2.
13. McGinn, *The character of Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 8.
14. Block, "On a Confusion about a function of Consciousness" in *Behavioral and Brain sciences* 18, 1995, pp. 227–287, p. 234. Philosophers who argue for the phenomenal character of experience are Tomas Nagel, Frank Jackson, Christopher Peacocke, Ned Block, David Chalmers etc.
15. Tye, "Representationalist Theories of Consciousness", in *The Oxford handbook of Philosophy of Mind*, Edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann and Sven Walter, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009, p. 257.
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17. Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995, p. 85.

18. Tye, "Representational Theories of Experience", In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*. Edited by B. Mclaughlin and A. Beckermann. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 257.
19. Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of Phenomenal Mind*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: A Bradford Book: The MIT Press, 1995, p. xi.
20. Ibid., p. xiii.
21. Ibid., p. 137.
22. Ibid., pp.138–139.
23. Ibid., p. 112.
24. Ibid., pp. 113–114.
25. Ibid., p. 126.
26. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Translated by Colin Smith. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 150.
27. See Crane, "Intentionalism" in *The oxford handbook of Philosophy of Mind*, Edited By B. Mclaughlin and A. Beckermann. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 474–493.
28. See Crane, "Intentionality as the mark of the mental" in *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*, Edited by Anthony O'Hear, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 229–252.
29. See Ibid., pp. 229–252.
30. See Thomasson, "Phenomenal Consciousness and the Phenomenal World" in *Monist* 91, No. 2, 2008, p. 206.
31. McDowell, "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space", in *Subject, Thought and Context*, Edited by P. Pettit and J. McDowell, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 152.
32. McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 181.
33. McCulloch, *The Life of the Mind: An Essay on Phenomenological Externalism*. London & New York: Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group, 2003, p. 35.
34. Ibid., p. 53.
35. McDowell, *Mind and World*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 3.