September 3, 2013

Frege's Aesthetics in "The Thought"

Frege, in searching for a definition of truth, first presents art works as teleological objects whose goal is truth. However, he notes that this perspective of the truth—a correlation between a representation and some other object—does not coincide with his own. "'True'," he writes, "is not a relation-word and contains no reference to anything else to with something must correspond" (291). If one cannot apply truth to art, then what are Frege's actual opinions on aesthetic works?

Historically, we may point to Plato's Republic as the source for the representational view of art referred to by Frege. From his proposition of the forms as rational, immaterial objects, Plato asserts that physical objects are a first-order representation of these forms and that the contents of art act as second-order representations: representations of the representation[1]. More generally, at most points in Western culture between Plato and Frege, art was teleological, usually serving religious, propagandist, or informational means. It was not until around 200 years before Frege's "The Thought" that we find artists creating art-for-the-sake-of-art. Even still, many works are obviously representational.

Whether aesthetic works are representational or not is not an issue for Frege. He is, instead, more concerned with what these works represent, their content. Noted above, the correspondence theory of art cannot hold given Frege's ontology of thoughts and ideas. All thoughts hereon for Frege are assertions, i.e. propositions, that when saturated by a subject and a predicate, refer to a truth value either True or False, which respectively are themselves structured entities. The subject expresses a specific sense which in turn determines a specific referent whose properties are objective. Similarly, the predicate determines a sense, which is a function that with the subject's sense completes the saturated thought; this saturation determines the reference of the predicate which saturates with the referent of the subject into a truth value.

Considering this framework, when one takes art qua representation as a correspondence between the contents depicted in the work to some object in the world, the contents strive to correspond with the referent it represents but can never without becoming said referent. Yet since the idea conjured by the work is of a different ontological status than the object being depicted, we are not able to bridge the mind-body/real-ideal gap. Additionally he writes: "if the first did correspond with the second, they too would coincide" (291). The content of a work would be the object it depicts. Frege then discusses a correspondence theory with respect to some shared part. He finds that upon locating whatever common property shared between the representation, the fact[2] it supposedly asserts, and the referent

it depicts, one would also need to find a shared part of those parts ad infinitum. Infinite regressions cannot suffice as an account for truth-functioning representation.

Further, Frege explains that the truth ascribed to some work is but an assertion of the form "My idea corresponds to X" where X is the represented object (291). Originally used to support his argument against the correspondence view, Frege implicitly points toward his views on art and our experience of it: art exists not as a thought, but an idea, which is something unique to the bearer and cannot be shared. Ultimately, this solves the problem by constructing the connection between two ideas, one of the art and one of the object, rather than between an artistic proposition and some objective truth outside of the aesthetic realm. This removes the issue of truth from art: For if my idea is not an objective assertion, then it cannot be part of a saturated sentence referring to the True. Moreover, "a thought," Frege reluctantly defines, "[is] something for which the question of truth arises" (292). And since thoughts are not ideas[3], then ideas do not assert truth value.

We additionally come to these conclusions on art through a realization of what is lost between an indicative sentence and its assertion. For this discussion, Frege uses examples of stage thunder and poetry. For stage thunder, we have an intended representation of thunder, which he claims is an "apparent" assertion: it appears to make a claim that the sound you hear is thunder. However, the context in which the listener experiences the sound indicates that an actual assertion does not exist—we all know that the sound really is

not thunder through an implicit acknowledgment made upon entering into the fictional world of the theatrical performance. As for poetry, Frege claims that poetry has thoughts being expressed without "actually being put forward as true" (294). Still, too, an indicative sentence may express both a denoted assertion and implied connotation, but in such a case the realm of connotation falls under the psychological, sense-perception category of idea rather than the truth-oriented area of propositions. Put succinctly: "what is called mood, fragrance, illumination in a poem, what is portrayed by cadence and rhythm, does not belong to the thought" (295). With this demarcation of art and thought, we are now able to understand Frege's phenomenological stance toward art.

Removing art from the realm of truth-based assertions and placing it into that of subjective ideas holds fairly profound consequences. At such a moment, the art critic then loses her ability to assign any objective value to art. Doing so, she asserts that the work has an objective quality about it, but such cannot be the case if the work's contents are solely experienced as ideas. Surprisingly, given the representational attitude expressed toward aesthetic works, Frege's phenomenological account allows non-representational art to have merit in relation to itself and other works of art qua art.

An objection may be raised, however, to Frege regarding an absence of objective truth. If we are to assume Pierce's tripartite semiotic system of Firstness (pre-reflexive experience), Secondness (reflective 'discreteness' in one's consciousness), and Thirdness (law, rule,

pattern, theory), then we see Frege's system account for only Firstness and Secondness, for the initial experience and reflection upon the ideas sensed, but not for any theoretical framework portrayed through a work or series of works. It is in the Thirdness that we locate an opportunity for a possible assertion in a work. If a work's intended theoretical properties accurately coincide with a certain group of other works, we can then compare pieces within such groups, i.e. genres. This keeps the assertion to the realm of ideas and how they are experienced for the individual, so the prior problem of correspondence does not apply. For example, we can have a musical work X whose large-scale form conforms to a Schenkerian *Ursatz* then we may compare the ideas, experiences associated with other works of the large-scale form and evaluate their differences with respect to the persons experiencing and their individual reactions between X and works of that genre[4].

1. Because of this chain of representation connects back to the realm of forms, Plato concludes in Book X that second-order representations are the furthest representations from the ultimate form of the Good. Thus, art qua representation is a type of lying, which he finds to be immoral. He does not consider, for good reason, higher order representations similar to the Droste effect, in which he would find himself with a problem of infinite regression.
2. Frege defines a fact to be "a thought that is true" and promotes the existence of facts in the world based upon our ability to have and perform science (307).
3. If thoughts were ideas then "truth would be restricted to the content of my consciousness," but it is not as witnessed by science and math (301).
4. This problem differs from the one stemming from objectivity via modes of representation in that we are here only discussing ideas and what it means to be an idea. One could apply the "modes" problem to the theoretical framework of subjective correspondences, noticing that an assertion is still being made. However, the above

paragraph does not promote assertions between two bearers, but rather individual frameworks and evaluations that are similar insofar as we share similar mental faculties.

To whom it may concern,

I was recently advised by Graham Schuster, a graduate assistant of the UGA Philosophy Department, to submit a paper in response to the fifth annual Philosophy Student Conference. Because of this, I wrote the following paper specifically for the event. The subject I address is of the philosophical definition of a musical work. I begin with a focused rejection of contextualist views; then I proceed with a revision of the contextualist and sonicist definitions through the lens of Roman Ingarden.

Currently, I am a third year Philosophy student at the University of Georgia with an acute interest in the philosophy of music. I have an extended background in classical music performance and bring this history to light through philosophy.

Presenting my paper at the conference would be such an honor—it would be an immensely educational, special experience. By participating I would be living the life I dream of living. My passion is music philosophy, and I hope to one day study and write on the philosophy of music professional. This conference would be a huge step toward my life-long goal.

With humility,

The Musical Work as Sound and Experience

During a performance by the local symphony of Beethoven's Violin Concerto in D major, Op. 61, what exactly is any given audience member actually hearing? A pleasant conglomeration of sounds? A musical work? Or possibly something else? Intuitively one would say that they are indeed listening to Beethoven’s Violin Concerto. But how would it be possible to experience the concerto the way Beethoven intended it? What if the concertmaster of the local symphony decided to perform the work on an electric violin?

Would it then be impossible to appreciate the performance as the Beethoven's Violin Concerto? This all still assumes that no wrong notes are performed at all.

In his article "What a Musical Work Is" (1980), Jerrold Levinson proposes a three-pronged solution to the problem of the identity of the musical work. These three qualifications are as follows:

> 1.) Musical works must be such that they do not exist prior to the composer's compositional activity, but are brought into existence by that activity.
>
> 2.) Musical works must be such that composers composing in different musico-historical contexts[1] who determine identical sound structures invariably compose distinct musical works.
>
> 3.) Musical works must be such that specific means of performance or sound production are integral to them.

In the following paper, I will dissect Levinson's arguments for each proposition and give reasoned accounts as to why none of his propositions are sufficient. I will then propose a modified definition based on the philosophies of Ingarden, Dodd, and Levinson. In conclusion I will show that my modified proposal resolves the problem of a work being both repeatable and extra-musical.

1.) *Musical works must be such that they do not exist prior to the composer's compositional activity, but are brought into existence by that activity.*

Immediately Levinson rejects the assertion that a musical work is only that of sound structures. Were this the case, Levinson argues, a composer could never create a work at all, for every sound structure would pre-exist every composer as mathematical objects: "sequences of sets of sonic elements[2]" (Levinson, 7). However, the proposed qualification does not disallow the existence of sound structures in a work. Rather, it necessitates that a composer actively creates but never discovers nor assembles.

Levinson's support for this claim, though, is an argumentum ad antiquitatem. He writes: "The whole tradition of art assumes art is creative in the strict sense, ... is a god-like activity" (Levinson, 8). Yet, the necessity for a composer to create has no basis whatsoever in the reception of the work. For example, a listener of the Beethoven Violin Concerto does not need to believe that a composer actively created something new to appreciate the experience. Even so, as a discoverer a composer still ought to receive praise—for she does not happen upon a work, but carefully constructs it through systems of theory.

Expanding upon the above, Levinson states that a work created by a composer has more worth than one discovered by virtue of its newness: "We marvel at a great piece of

music in part because... had its composer not engaged in a certain activity, the piece would (almost surely) not now exist; but it does exist, and we are grateful to the composer for precisely that" (Levinson, 9). Here there is an underlying assumption that a thing may be new only if it is created, but such is false.

It is impossible to have differing concepts of newness in experience. Since the listener comes to know a work through experience alone, created and discovered works would be indistinguishable *qua* experiences. An individual appreciating a work through score-study, however, would still marvel not in its newness, but rather in the experience of its coming to light. Additionally, the discovery of a musical work does not in any way make it less real. Considering the argument for the pre-existence of a musical work as mathematical structures, if a work is discovered instead of created, the work exists all the same. Levinson neglects to realize this. Nonetheless, He argues in terms of worth and not in terms of necessary existence, further discrediting his assertion as one pertaining to ontological status.

The proposed qualification may still be revised. If we concede that a composer does indeed discover a musical work from infinite possible sound structures, then we may regard similar musical works as unique identities by locating the uniqueness not in the sound structures, but in the object of aesthetic experience.

2.) *Musical works must be such that composers composing in different musico-historical contexts who determine identical sound structures invariably compose distinct musical works.*

Progressing his rejection of sound structures as the only component of a musical work, Levinson introduces the problem of extra-musical properties, specifically musico-historical contexts. This is a fair consideration to raise, but addressing the need for an individuation of two works with identical sound structures does not solve the problem of wherein this individuation would lie.

Levinson asserts that the musical work itself must contain this data, which encompasses the specific, extra-musical circumstances under which the work was composed (Levinson, 10). However, his proposal rejects the possibility for the musico-historical contexts to be located within the sound structures. He explicitly defines a musical work as an "S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t^3" (Levinson, 20). Through this definition Levinson inadvertently takes focus away from the perception of music and places it on the production of music. The intent is to ensure that the score of the work holds this specific information, but in two identical scores of some musical-work(s) the only differentiation comes through the manner in which one actualizes the score. Unfortunately, this leads to problems when one considers the ignorant listener.

Assume a music student manages to compose exactly, note-for-note, term-for-term a replica of the Beethoven Violin Concerto without ever having heard, known, or experienced the original in any way. As a consequence of his definition, Levinson ensures that when this student attends the local symphony concert and neglects to read her program, she ought to somehow know through the S/PM structure alone that what she hears is indeed different than her recent composition. But she would not. The student's experience of the performance, although uninformed, is not of Beethoven's composition, but of her own. Placing the musico-historical contexts of a work in the specific sounds empirically thus yields two contradictory experiences.

Through the musical work alone we come to the same conclusion as section 1. The existences of differing perceptions of a given performance must be taken into account.

3.) *Musical works must be such that specific means of performance or sound production are integral to them.*

Levinson argues that the only way a performance ought to be instantiated is through an authentic account of the score, which is the container of the work's individual musico-historical properties. The possibility for a truly authentic performance is thus absent-mindedly ruled out. Purporting this need for authenticity, Levinson writes: "When

Beethoven writes a middle C for the oboe, he has done more than require an oboe-like sound at a certain pitch—he has called for such a sound as emanating from that quaint reed we call an 'oboe'" (Levinson, 15). If we are to take this statement to its logical conclusion, then we must call into question the exact sound Beethoven had in mind when he composed the middle C. Our concept of how the middle C sounds on an oboe may differ wildly than that of Beethoven's, and due to the lack of recording technology in Beethoven's time, no one of the present day may know with certainty how an oboe sounded to him.

Another valid objection, posited by Julian Dodd in his book *Works of Music* (2007), is the hypothetical existence of a Perfect Timbral Synthesizer (PTS). Suppose that in the local symphony's performance, the concertmaster wheels out a never-before-seen contraption, the PTS, and begins the concert. Somehow, every sound produced is completely identical sonically to a performance of the concerto on her violin. Levinson would reject this means of performance by virtue of it not being a violin. If we assume that in an instant everyone in the audience is blinded before the performance of the concerto, they would never be able to distinguish a difference in the performance by a PTS and by its sonic doppelganger. Because of one's possible inability to differentiate two different performances of a work, Levinson's need for a specific manner of performance becomes a superficial wish.

There still remains the unresolved problem as to how one ought to differentiate between two obviously different means of performance while disregarding their sonic similarities. Dodd proposes that there is nothing other than the sounds themselves (Dodd, 268). However, when considering a difference in experience between a performance of by a PTS and its sonic twin, he glosses over an astute detail: "... an audience member's failure to hear the passage as expressive of abandonment is caused by a failure of imagination on their part..." (Dodd, 231-232).

Even though the sonic element is unscathed, he recognizes that there may be still an inconsistency in experience between listeners. Because a physical experience is the only way to come to know a musical work as it was intended by the composer[4], a difference in experience has a significant effect upon the properties of the said musical work. For instance, if we imagine that all information about a piece is lost, then the original intention of the composer is undoubtedly lost and also is the ability for one to experience it in any authentic way. In such a situation, with the loss of all possible authenticity, the work becomes nothing more than a meaningless progression of sounds with no context for it whatsoever. The identity of the work regresses back into the mathematical hypothetical and loses in part the ability for one to attempt to experience the originally intended work. Yet this could not be the case, for a work still exists in part as a hypothetical sound structure.

4.) *A New Definition*

We have seen in the previous sections that dilemmas arise when accepting either contextualist (Levinson) or sonicist (Dodd) definitions of a musical work. Although each possesses fine points as to what a musical work should be, neither, as cohesive systems, adequately solve all ontological problems presented. Based upon the work of Roman Ingarden, the following proposed definition takes into both views presented and adapts them to coincide with the unavoidable, individual aesthetic experience, thus allowing a musical work both the flexibility demanded by musico-historical contexts and the rigidity of the specific sound structure.

To put it concisely, a musical work exists:

a.) physically in its performances

b.) metaphysically as

i.) a type that is perceived as an empirical perfection of the work

ii.) an aesthetic object that one experiences through one's knowledge of the work's properties musical and extra-musical

a.) *Physically in its performances*

This view is taken directly from the sonicist. Through this position we are permitted to accept a work as an abstract object that can have various instances, or tokens. Simply, a performance of a work W is a token of W, W*, if and only if W* is within the "sphere of irrelevance[5]" of W. Otherwise, it may be said that the work of music exists only in the moment of its production and ceases to be once the final note is performed. However this would be in direct violation of Leibniz's law. If a singular performance is recorded and is within the "sphere of irrelevance", then its replaying would also lie within the sphere. Thus, if R* and R**, two different replays as tokens, share every property sonically necessary for their performances to be considered an instance empirically, then R* ≠ R** which cannot be the case.[6]

A purely sonicist-based approach, however, espouses an interesting consequence: if a performance of a work contains a product that lies outside the "sphere of irrelevance", then the performance is no longer a token of the intended work: with one wrong note, W* stops being W* and a token of W.

b.) i.) *Metaphysically as a type that is perceived as an empirical perfection of a work*

When listening to the performance of Beethoven's Violin Concerto, we are somehow able to enjoy the experience even though the concertmaster might have played a few wrong notes. As mentioned above, any performance that contains a part outside of the "sphere of irrelevance" is no longer a proper token. However, the listener's ability to distinguish between the errors of a given performance of the work and the work intended allows her to look past the flaws aesthetically and tune into what the performer meant to play. If what is proposed were false, then at the instance of any wrong note a listener would immediately not be able to appreciate the work performed, but this is absurd.

The musical work here exists not only through its sonic elements but also as a metaphysical object, which one may come to know through repeated listenings or score study. Possessing knowledge of the determinate aspects of a work is crucial to experiencing the work as an object through a particular performance. For example, if an ignorant listener hears the Beethoven Violin Concerto performed an octave lower, he would be none-the-wiser and would not be able to experience the work as intended by the composer. Yet the performance would have all of the original work's gestalt properties. This being so, the performance would still present the informed listener with the opportunity to perceive these gestalt properties and experience the aesthetic object that contains the empirical perfection while the performance might not. We may say then: if V* is a token that shares

every gestalt property with W*, V* is an adequate token for the aesthetic object of W. Thus, the type W has one, definitive sound structure token W*, but may have an infinite array of tokens that signal its aesthetic object through an aesthetic experience by way of its gestalt properties.

Additionally, if the above proposition were incorrect, then the only way for it to exist would be through its score and performance. But this is patently false, as Mozart famously transcribed Gregorio Allegri's "Miserere" from memory alone after only one listening.

b.) ii.) *Metaphysically as an aesthetic object that one experiences through the knowledge of the work's properties both musical and extra-musical.*

A work's existence is fundamentally dependent upon the existence of an experience. When audience members hear a given work, they are either experiencing the work non-aesthetically, aesthetically, or both. By non-aesthetically I mean in such a way that one only reflects upon the empirical sense data being received, and by aesthetically I mean in such a way that one becomes at once physically and intellectually stimulated, encompassing irrational reactions and knowledge of all extra-musical properties.

If this were incorrect, then there would be no way to explain the relevance of extra-musical properties. Dodd insists that two performances of Schoenberg's Pierrot Lunaire and a hypothetical composition by Richard Strauss sonically identical to Pierrot Lunaire are "equally upsetting, anguished, and eerie" (Dodd, 269). His position derives from the assumption that emotional qualities are located directly within the empirical sound structures alone, but this could not be the case. The application of any emotion that is not unique to the sound structure could never be expressed precisely by it. We must come to know extra-musically how to interpret the sound structures into their appropriate emotions. So, if P^*_1 and P^*_2 are tokens of Strauss's and Schoenberg's Pierrot Lunaire respectively, then they would both signal type P empirically while signaling the objects P_1 and P_2 aesthetically. The existence of P_1 and P_2 could not possibly negate the existence of P as a mathematical possibility; so there is no problem.

Even while disagreeing that emotions are extra-musical, one must concede that musico-historical context is definitively extra-musical and likewise integral to an adequate aesthetic experience of a work. If we consider Shostakovich's Fifth Symphony without knowing the history surrounding the piece, the concept of irony would be lost while attempting to experience the aesthetic object. It must then be that the aesthetic object of

the symphony contains the knowledge of the Soviet regime's oppression in order to completely know what the musical work is.

Although Levinson and Dodd have great intentions, their proposed definitions of a musical work have fallen short of a comprehensive idea of what a musical work is. Taking all of section 4 into consideration, a musical work has been shown to be a type with specific, empirical sound data and to contain a multiplicity of aesthetic objects. Through this new distinction, we are now able to comfortably associate a musical work as a discovery that is both universal and particular, and that may be experienced in a myriad of ways. Now we may begin to look into the wide array of questions borne out of prior faults in definition.

1. Musico-historical contexts are any time-sensitive and extra-musical influences that a composer experiences when composing a specific work: musical influence, political climate, personal philosophies, etc.
2. Sonic elements are "pitches, timbres, durations, etc." (Levinson, 7).
3. S/PM is an abbreviation for the conflation of the sound structure and performance-means structure which is specific to the work; X is the composer; and t is the time of composition.
4. This is permitting that there are no musical works intended to never be heard.

5. A concept presented by Ingarden in *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity* p. 23, where each work has parameters for its indeterminate factors (e.g. tempo, exact tone, phrasing, breaths taken, etc.) that a performance may lie within.
6. More on this can be found in chapters 1-5 of Dodd's *Works of Music* (2007).

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September 17, 2014

Argument Critique: Aristotle on Parmenides

In chapter 8 of book I in Aristotle's *Physics*, he expounds an account of "being" that he attributes to "early thinkers," but we may safely attribute it to Parmenides[1]. The argument is presented by Aristotle as follows:

(1) Things exist
(2) Things come to be and pass out of existence

(3) If 2, then it must have come from something or nothing.
  (3.1) If it comes from nothing, then something came from nothing, which is absurd.
  (3.2) If it comes from something, then that something (into which the thing comes) already exists, which is absurd.
(4) Either case of 3 results in a logical absurdity, so by reductio, 2 must be false: Things cannot come to be or pass out of existence.

This argument is unsatisfactory for Aristotle. He, instead, proposes that the dichotomy from (3) is interchangeable with "what is not or what is does something or has something done to it or becomes some particular thing." The difference is that he interprets the thing that comes to be or passes from existence as either something that is or is not previously. This is integral, in that the original argument assumes the subject exists unequivocally; by allowing the subject to be "what is not," Aristotle establishes the void into which things that exist change.

Through an example of a doctor building a house not *qua* doctor but *qua* house-builder, Aristotle demonstrates his theory of qualified being: Things that come to be do so in a manner that carries over the same qualities. As in the doctor who builds a house, in order to be able to become the house-builder he has to have within him as a human the prior ability to be a house-builder and then act with such ability. This, at least superficially, is agreeable within one human, but Aristotle also provides an example of generation.

For a certain kind of animal to come into being, it must possess qualities of its parents. In the hypothetical example of a dog coming from a horse, Aristotle submits that the two animals share at least the property of "animal."

These examples still do not properly address the problem of not-being. For Parmenides, the essence of not-being precludes it from being in any qualified way. Not-being is a self-contradicting idea, and as such can never exist. The inclusion of "what is not" as a thing that changes insofar as the "what is" acts *qua* not-being remains in violation of the essence of not-being. The situation would seem that for not-being to have a quality for a thing to act *qua* not-being, it would presuppose not-being has some existence to draw from, but this directly contradicts not-being itself.

We do find another solution, however, in potentiality and actuality.

1. Zeno can also be considered here as a fellow early thinker, but his arguments are supplemental to Parmenides in this regard.

September 21, 2014

Wollheim, Intent, and Correct Perception

In *Seeing-as, seeing-in, and pictorial representation* Richard Wollheim posits a uniqueness

to appropriately seeing representations, writing that "a standard of correctness applies to [representation] and this standard derives from the intention of the maker of the representation" (205). By using intention as the standard for correctness in representation, Wollheim intends to limit the scope of representations to those paintings that are intended to represent--if there is no intent, then there is no correct way of qualifying an experience as appropriate, as the painting is not within the scope of representational paintings. Thus, a correct experience would be when a viewer, either competent or incompetent, looks at a painting and sees a representation intended to be seen as such. To be explicit, (1) a representational painting must be painted with intent of representing something, and (2) a competent viewer must disentangle the painting and link the representation to its intended object (206).

Although Wollheim uses intention to categorize the types of representational perceptions into sets, the cardinality of the set of all possible intentions is uncountable. This infinitely broad range allows for artistic situations where one may actively explore the limitlessness. Upon exploration, the standard for correctness no longer yields a definite experience. This is not to say that is impossible to have an intention for exactly one representation--many pieces of art exist with such intent. Additionally, the intention is used as a signal for the link between object and representation, which is not so objective either.

The relationship between the object and its representation must first be detailed before continuing. For Wollheim, an object acts as a type and the representation, a token (74-84). As there can be many different representations of one object, one must account for the repeatability and variance between representations, and Wollheim does so by wielding the type-token relationship.

With the type-token relation in mind, a representation, then, is something that has some set of qualities that a viewer may index and use to move from the token to the type. Hence, when a painter intends X to represent Y, she assembles some properties of Y such that X shares the same properties. In order for X to be a representational token of Y, however, the set of properties shared between X and Y must at least include those pertaining to a resemblance of Y (17-18). Reseblance, like the scope of representational intention, is quite broad. As resemblance is but an association rather than an objective connection, the set of resembling properties are limited only by what is conceivable.

Thus, the process is as follows: the painter must take some object Y, gather at least some resemblance properties and attribute them to a representation X intentionally; wherefrom a viewer will see X and unravel the properties and correspond. Let us focus now on the attribution and unraveling as processes moving between a type and token.

Under (1) of Wollheim's criteria, we have the process of attribution. Here the artist instantiates a token with an intent to signal the type for a competent viewer. As explained

previously, Wollheim would expect that such a relationship would only allow for objective situations, but instead it allows for much more. The intention acts as a mental trigger to illicit a representational perception in the viewer, and is thus, a mental entity: The viewer, once cognizant of an intent, knows how to perceive the representation. An artist, then, may create attribute a vague resemblance between token X and type Y, but establish a strong mental connection between the two.

These are the set of possible configurations between types and tokens an artist may intend: (a) one type per token (b) two or more types per token (c) all types per token (d) no types per token.

Wollheim speaks of (a) exclusively, but does not address (b) or (c). On the other hand, (d) would be that piece of art that lies outside of the representational species considered.

The most interesting of these would be (c). If a representation were to signal everything, then any experience would be correct, which Wollheim claims to have no correct representation. However, there lies a great distinction between everything and nothing--a topic too grand to address here--such that if one were to accept the distinction, a concession must be made. Thereby, we have a situation in which Wollheim's model is neither meaningful nor useful: As it would seem to be impossible to perceive all things at once, the model would need to allow for partial correctness. Partial correctness would then need to be

explained as either a measure of types-perceived or attributes-perceived, but this is to be determined.

Similarly to the relationship between type and token, the artist may intend that (e) the representation may signal any number of types. This is different than the prior situations. In those above, the viewer was required to perceive multiple objects simultaneously, whereas now the viewer may perceive any type of their choosing. Thus, we have an example concerning (2) of the framework. As a competent viewer approaches such a representation, they would then begin to unravel the token by signaling within themselves some type(s) of their choosing.

Additionally, an artist may begin to combine the species of representative and non-representative paintings. There are two possibilities: (f) the representation signals an object and does not signal an object; and (g) the representation either signals a object or does not but not both. (f) is an impossible situation in reality, as being signaling an object contradicts not signaling and *vice versa*. On the other hand, (g) is quite possible. (g) is merely an extension of (e); so, a competent viewer may perceive a piece as non-representative and still be correct in their assessment. Unfortunately, this is in opposition to considering a piece exclusively representational or not. Yet clearly, an artist may intend her work to be within a union of some subset containing both non-representative and representative paintings such that what is displayed on the canvas has both properties of representation

and non-representational things. The criteria still stands in that for such a work as (g), one may apply the standard of correctness to it, but only if one wishes.

An elegant solution to all of these problems would be to simply restrict the intention-based framework to only (a), but that leaves (b,c,e,g) orphaned. As they participate in the realm of intentional representation, one would need to reconcile their involvement in having appropriate experiences of themselves. To preclude any artist intent, however, is to devalue intent as a standard marking correctness. Perhaps, each situation falls within its own standard, where Wollheim's addresses only (a)-paintings. This, too, requires more attention than can be given presently.

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When is a Painting a Painting?

When defining art, philosophers typically attempt to resolve the problem, "*What* is art?" However for Nelson Goodman, art is defined through its symbolic functions: "*When* is art?" Goodman presents such functions as "five symptoms of the aesthetic:" (1) syntactic

density, (2) semantic density, (3) relative repleteness, (4) exemplification, and (5) multiple and complex reference (Goodman, 1978, 67-68). These five symptoms, though, do not define art completely, as different kinds of art may not share the same symptoms nor participate in all five (Goodman, 1976, 254; 1978, 68).

Paintings, specifically, need only exhibit symptoms (1) through (4) (1978, 68). In this paper, I will explicate symptoms (1) through (4) and connect them to painting. After this, I will introduce the symptomatic preclusion of notation in painting and then present a counterexample of a notated painting.

The Symptoms:

(1) Syntactic density is the requirement that for any set of characters, the difference between characters or marks constitutes a difference between symbols (1978, 67-68). Further, if given a set of distinct things and if one could order them such that no gap is included in the arrangement, then the set is dense throughout (1976, 136). This thoroughness is the density symptomatic in art.

For paintings, this means that within a certain set of pictorial representations, the physical marks on the painting's surface refer to distinct referents. The example Goodman

gives is that of three men represented with different heights via different mark lengths: the shorter man is drawn smaller and thus with different syntactic marks (1976, 226).

(2) Goodman defines semantic denseness as case such that for any set of referents and symbols, there is no referent that cannot be symbolized uniquely (1976, 152). Similar to syntactic density, there is no gap semantically: every referent has a unique symbolization. For example, the Latin alphabet is semantically dense insofar as there is a unique phonetic sound associated with each "name" of the letters. If there were a sound that named a letter for which we had no symbol, then the current alphabet would not be dense.

A painting is semantically dense in that each symbol on the surface has a definitive referent. If I were to paint a man taller than all the men provided in Goodman's example, then there would necessarily exist some symbolization that represented a man taller than all the others.

(3) What separates a painting from a diagram is a painting's relative repleteness. Pictures and diagrams, for Goodman, are both syntactically and semantically dense pictorial objects. However, the syntactic differences of a diagram that are irrelevant to unpacking its symbols (e.g. "thickness of the line, its color and intensity, the absolute size of the diagram, etc.") are wholly relevant to a painting (1976, 229-230). Any difference in the way the painting exists physically is significant, and thus paintings are relatively replete.

For example, when comparing a musical score to a painting, the size of the clef is an irrelevant feature in understanding the notational system. Yet, if we were to paint the same musical notation, the size of the clef becomes immediately relevant and significant to understanding the painting as art.

(4) Goodman succinctly defines exemplification in *Ways and Worldmaking*: "exemplification, where a symbol whether or not it denotes, symbolizes by serving as a sample of properties it literally or metaphorically possesses" (68). The key difference between only denoting/referring and exemplifying is the symbol's possession of some or all of its referent's properties: "Exemplification is possession plus reference" (1976, 53). The example Goodman provides is one of a tailor and her swatches of fabric. The swatch exemplifies the material, color, texture, etc. of the whole fabric (ibid.). Not all of the fabric is exemplified, however, but that is not a necessity in order to exemplify at all.

Paintings must exemplify if only because they do not denote. A painting of a black square does not denote a certain magnitude of blackness or squareness, but rather exists as an example of what a black square is. In Goodman's view: "Pictorial exemplification is... an inverted system of gauging or measuring" (1976, 236). Instead of beginning with a denoted measurement and then coming to find some referential experience, we are presented with a sample experience in the painting, which we then try to denote with language or empirical

measurements. Exemplification is immediate (1976, 253).

Notating Paintings:

Unlike allographic, or repetitious, arts, painting is autographic: "[A] work is autographic… if and only if even the most exact duplication of it… does not count as genuine" (1976, 113). In other words, if one were to recreate some other painting, then at no time would the new painting be considered the same painting or an instance of the same painting. This is much different from music, where a composer provides a score to a musician that details what an accurate performance would be. However, if all arts exist with some or all of the same symptoms, why are paintings autographic? The answer lies within the question Goodman rejects: "*What* is a painting?"

The symptoms, as described above, explain how paintings exist in the world and the relationships they have with us, themselves, and their symbols. It would seem that an art may only exhibit a symptom if there is something about the art that arises the function—one only shows medical symptoms if there is an underlying disease. So, too, are the arts: There must be an underlying property to a painting that allows the painting to exhibit (1) through (4).

Music, unlike painting, shows no sign of (3) relative repleteness; although, we may find the other symptoms shared between the two arts. A piece of music is (1) syntactically dense in that each sound difference or notational difference results in a different sound heard, (2) semantically dense in that for each sound there is a note symbolizing it and for each sound there is a different property expressed, (4) exemplary in that each performance is a sample of the art and that each sound is a sample of a sound made by that instrument. It would seem then that the border between allographic and autographic arts is within symptom (3). Let us explore this.

Goodman writes that paintings can never acquire a notational system. The problem, as he sees it, is the inability to free a painting "of dependence upon a particular author or upon a place or date or means of production" (1976, 195). Any system devised would be necessarily retroactive in its means that would be only nominal and not "depend upon history of production" (1976, 198). He argues this point by relying on the repleteness of art: (a) If there is a system, it will be nominal; (b) if the system is nominal, it cannot account for every possible property of a painting as they are replete, and therefore have an uncountable number of properties (1976, 196-198).

This argument is only satisfactory when concerning paintings that have already been made. Historically, paintings have been relatively replete, thus disqualifying them from

notation. This does not preclude, however, the possibility of an allographic painting—the prime example is a paint-by-number paintings.

A paint-by-number painting is a painting devoid of the paint. It provides an outline of the color spaces and directions for the painter to choose the appropriate color. Thus, the relationship between paintings of these sort change from two distinct paintings to a relationship between two performances of the same score. Here we have a notational system that gives syntactically and semantically dense symbols and exemplifies the shapes of the color spaces to be filled. Thus, each instance of a painting painted from the same paint-by-number notation would be within the same class of paintings which have been notated.

One could argue against this type of system by pointing to the paintings themselves: Although the paintings share a similar directional origin, they exist as separate, unique objects—they are not allographic amongst themselves. Yet, the same argument could be said of music. Two performances of the same score will never be exactly the same and are thus autographic amongst themselves. But we do not consider them to be different pieces of music entirely.

If we were to change the history of music performance to that of a free-form performance that does not confine itself to any system of organized sound, then surely there would be no way to project a notational system onto it as Goodman argues there can be none for paintings. Yet, if one were to paint in a regimented, constructional, and repetitious manner, then it is wholly possible to devise a notational system that accounts for every property. We must, unfortunately, forgo intended relative repleteness in order to gain repeatable artworks.

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Beautiful Things: On Kantian Judgment and its Objects

Beauty is a paradox: That which is beautiful must at once be aesthetic, rational, and neither of the two. Yet for Kant, this seeming incongruence provides the essence of that

which is beautiful. In his *Critique of Judgment* Kant explicates aesthetic judgment to unravel the method by which we may discover an object's beauty and, thus, beauty itself. This explication, however, does not come without prompting additional unanswered questions which require further explanation.

In this paper: I will give an account of subject-object relationships, the four criteria of a judgment of beauty, and the ensuing deduction. Further, I will attempt a sample aesthetic judgment and in doing so uncover how objects are beautiful. Finally, I will defend that beauty is a response triggered by objects rather than a property of them.

Take for example a palace, like the one Kant conjures in §2. Before being in the actual presence of the palace, one may only envision it from descriptions or from inferring what it could look like from past experiences with palaces. This relationship between the Subject and Object, for Kant, is a representation constructed of only concepts. Upon witnessing the palace personally, the Subject then has an immediate sensual experience with the Object visually: The palace now resides as its own idea in the Subject's mind, and she no longer must rely on concepts alone to think of this specific palace. Of these two types of experiences, only the latter suffices as an appropriate starting point of aesthetic judgment.

Now that the Subject has encountered the palace, she has a bijective relationship with the object—the experience is at once imaginative and reasonable (§1). The visual representation of the palace exists as an image in her mind without necessarily

understanding what she has seen—she may see the shapes, colors, textures, size all relative to one another and not cognize the palace-ness of the palace. This is evidently the case as shown when one encounters new things: One recognizes accidental properties exempt of a required knowledge of what the new thing is essentially.

The Subject may find the palace delightful. It may have a pretty coat of paint or expensive inlays of marble. Kant refers to such delight as agreeable interest (§2). Upon further reflection, the Subject realizes that it would be in her logically best interest to purchase the palace and move in immediately. This type of delight is of the good, esteemed, or approved (§5). These two delights are aroused by feelings of desire, sensual and logical, respectively, which stimulate functions of the imagination and the understanding: The sensual pleasures evoke imaginative conceptions, whereas the logical derivations prompt a desire from understanding.

So much for Subject-Object interaction. Let us move on to the four criteria for aesthetic judgment.

Kant parses and analyzes Beauty by closely examining four of its properties: (1) Beauty is a disinterested pleasure; (2) Beauty is universally valid and without concept; (3) Beauty is final with no end; (4) Beauty is necessarily beautiful.

(1) Judgments of Beauty, like all other experiences, are sensational. As the Subject comes in contact with an Object, the Subject receives sense data and processes the moment

cognitively. However, unlike the previous delights, the agreeable and the good, Beauty is judged *sans* interest.

The mental stimulation from a beautiful object neither is caused by nor causes desire. The feeling that stirs is removed from "objective sensation," and is non-perceptual to the Object: e.g. the green color of a meadow is an objective sensation (§3). The feeling that stirs is also removed from interest. Hence an object cannot be considered beautiful simply because one would find in it agreeable pleasure, as in the sweet smell of a perfume, or esteemed pleasure, as in the moral fortitude of an action.

(2) Being universally valid, judgments of beauty ought to be consistent regardless of who is making them. Thus, anyone who perceives an object and judges its beauty, will necessarily come to the same conclusion. This judgment differs widely from those of pleasure. Pleasure, as Kant argues, is a private sensation that cannot be shared. Since one could never expect another to share the same pleasures from an Object, judgments of beauty arise solely from shared, natural inclinations that are innate to humans as rational animals (§5).

Beauty is also without a concept: There is no dependence upon any accidental or essential features. If there were, then there would be a judgment of interest, with is contradictory. Lacking a common concept of reference between individuals, the universal validity of beauty becomes unprovable in that there is no concept with which one could

prove an object's beauty. Nevertheless, from the shared mental faculties and the free interplay of beauty between imagination and understanding, there is a universally shared harmonious relationship in each human (§9).

(3) Beauty serves no purpose. A thing has purpose when there is some *telos* for which it exists or for which it has been designed (§10). A thing of beauty, however, is then final with no end: as it exists, it continues to exist as itself, with no end other than to be beautiful. If there were an end to Beauty, then there would exist something other than beauty from which one could understand or experience Beauty. But this would require beauty to have a concept, and is thus contradictory. Hence, Beauty retains only the form of an end (§15).

Additionally within the third movement, Kant begins to distinguish different purities of the beautiful. Pure beauty is without *charm* or *emotion* (§13). That is there is no ancillary gratification or pain appurtenant to Beauty. If there were, then there would be some interest involved. Analogously, Objects of Beauty must be pure themselves: Pureness is attuned to the form of the object, and such is of a uniform nature. A "composite" may neither be pure or impure as there is no standard upon which one could measure (§14).

(4) A judgment of beauty is a necessary conclusion—one ought to agree with a true judgment. This is not, however, to say that everyone who attempts to judge an Object will find it beautiful, but that if the Object were truly beautiful, then they should agree (§18). Since a judgment is unprovable, we must appeal to an inclination that is common amongst

all humans (§20). Regardless, this *common sense* is but an ideal that cannot be definitively achieved (§22).

Following these four moments, Kant provides a deduction of the judgment of taste (§§31-39). In this section he details several concerns regarding the subjective and rational natures of the judgment. Although, the significant thesis that defines the act of judgment has been provided in §9 and §22: The experience is of the free movement between imagination and understanding. The methodology Kant uses seeks to prove universality and necessity. With these two accounted for, the activity of judging becomes standardized, and thus, of discussion.

Kant appeals to an acquired taste toward the pleasure associated with beautiful objects that each person has in virtue of them being persons. We know that Beauty is not objective since it has no concepts and is not a matter of cognition (§34). Yet, we also know that Beauty is not necessarily a thing of pleasure as one must be indifferent. Beauty, then, is judged by a predilection for those things beautiful. The example Kant gives is one of a convinced poet who changes his judgment of his poem only after years of experience in honing his tastes (§32). From this, we see that in objects that span over longer frames of time lend themselves to increasingly accurate judgments: The ancient Greeks, for example, are heralded as masters of beauty both in classics in math as their works have persevered the tests of time (ibid). Thus, we see from objects in consensus that there is a commonality, a

universality to judgment that responds from an acquired taste toward the beautiful, and such consensus is normative insofar as it is a conclusion every human may come to.

The activity is as follows: A Subject encounters some Object. At this point, the interaction enters through the senses into the mind as sense data and is reconstructed in the imagination as the Object. Concurrently, the sense data elicits various feelings of pleasure (or displeasure), desire, charm, emotion, etc. If the Subject wishes to engage in the Object in an aesthetically judgmental way, then she will allow the ideas presented in the imagination to freely be considered under the faculty of understanding. Yet, this consideration is not in any way confined to either faculty, imagination or understanding, and is not in any way contaminated with the impurities of various appurtenants of the mind. It is this freedom of movement that excites the judgment of beauty. Upon reaching such harmony of the faculties, Beauty is considered reached and the Object is of those things which are Beautiful.

There seems to be an issue, however. If judgment is to be made of an object without concept, then there is no differentiation between two objects in Beauty. Before pressing further, there needs to be a clarification on Kant's behalf of what it means for an object to be beautiful. Several times, Kant concludes that beauty is not that which can be predicated on to an object—there is no function B(x) that assigns x beauty. A beautiful object is judged to be so if it elicits the interplay of the faculties.

Recalling the example of the poet who rescinds his judgment of his poem, we must uncover what it means for something to be not beautiful. If the above is true, then an object is not beautiful if there is no harmonious interplay between the faculties of imagination and understanding. But seeing as how such faculties can undergo the process of judgment and exist in a state of beauty, what about the object prevents the harmonious relation? For when an object does create the harmony, the beauty is found not in any concept related to the object, but rather in the sensation of the harmony. Thus, we cannot accept any part, accidental or essential, of an object to be of any help or hindrance to the judging itself: The act is *a priori* and as such a Subject may enter into it at any time. Moreover, Kant addresses various mental objects that may elicit a free movement (death, envy, vices, etc.) (§49). This is telling in that judgment is an activity undergone internally: The sensation of experiencing Beauty is from within the process of judging rather than from any physical object. Coupled with the absence of any concept and a purposiveness without purpose, Beauty becomes a thing unto itself which is the act of judging beauty: Beauty is judgment. Hence, the judgment of beauty is not an assignment of value onto an object but a mental state of being.

Such a reading does not directly refute Kant, but rather extends Kantian aesthetics into a realm of phenomenological attitudes toward Objects. Judgment is a mental state one may enter into freely that is akin to the disinterested contemplation that "strengthens and reproduces itself" (§12). A Subject with much experience in engaging the free interplay may

freely and disinterestedly enter into the mental state of aesthetic judgment and then apply concepts and opinions onto some object. This is an intermediary provision between the state of pure Beauty (the free activity itself) and cognizing the concepts under imagination or understanding exclusively, which Kant addresses as adherent beauty (§13, §16). In marrying the two processes one can discuss art *qua* aesthetic objects as opposed to *qua* empirical or subject entities: "Upon interacting with *y* aesthetically, I was enraptured with a, b, c responses..."

Thereby, various Subjects may now bridge the gap of sorts between discussing the beautiful and discussing things. Under different interpretations, the beauty of objects have been nonnegotiable and unprovable: their assertions were mystical and private, paradoxical and innate. But this confusion was a product of misaligning Beauty with an object rather than with the particular state in which someone may conceive of an object. The so-called beauty of an object is therefore the pleasure of the reactions evoked by experiencing an object, mental or physical, under the intentional mental state of aesthetic judgment.

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