Unlimited differs from infinite in that the concepts pertain to two different sides/directions: to be unlimited assumes a space outside of the limit in which a limit would exist --- unlimited is from within out; to be infinite assumes a space outside of limit into which a finitude would further --- infinite is from within out. The above two words have structured the milieu of thought. Fortunately, Henri Bergson articulates and reminds us of an orthogonal concept, one orthogonal to both "unlimited" and "infinite" --- and that is "intensity".

The intensity of experience has only measure. Experience always occurs as a measure. The issue, however, is that for "scientists" their 'measure' is but a relay that is gauged either by initial stimuli or by an "objective" observer who is other to the experience (for the observer in antiquity (and still today at times) IS the instrument used to relay some kind of information about an experience to either the person experiencing or to an observer ("That looks fun!")).

And so occurs a phenomenological regression: a turtle - chasing of the physiological the psychical and the phenomenological. I got a tattoo once and somehow projected the pain into the roar of the stylized picture of a tiger on the wall. The question remains: How can any device external to the experience be found satisfactorily near-enough to depicting / representing / recreating / revealing experience - itself or experience - as - experienced so much so that the relay would be indistinguishable from the reality of the experience proper, that is, the intensional measure?

The argument for such anti-Leibnizianism deteriorates into two: either an experience simply IS that of an other or the person experiencing cannot tell --- or articulate --- a difference: A way out of an epistemology / ontology dilemma is through always solving ontology first and then worrying about the epistemic: epistemology can never be solved in itself because without the foundation of Being, there would be no knowing (ha!), and the latter need not be known in order to be (double ha!). That said, the experience of something is more than any sensation (or any small interior time-segment of an experience (be it externally / extensionally or internally / intensionally) relayed / measured) held theoretically "singular" or considered separate from its origins and conclusions: The sensation of the experience of eating an apple could never be reduced to exactly one act or reduced to exactly one phenomenon (an act is different than a phenom; but for every act experienced, there is at least one phenomenon); as such, the concept of a multitude that lies (un-) seemingly 'outside' or 'transcendental' to the immediately tangible needn't be "unlimited" or "infinite". If I have the same amount of 2's as the cardinality of the set of integers, is such a set of 2's a greater intensity than the even distribution of the integers? I would say so, and most practical people would as well. A person can die from drinking more than 2 liters of water in less than an hour but would not die from drinking a sip of water repeatedly for the rest of their lives (lest any of you belabor the analogy). If there are multiple spheres packed in a box, are you seriously going to attempt to convince any rational entity that there is only one "ball" in such a set as "box"?