Book IV Chapter 10 Aristotle says time does not get faster or slower and therefore is NOT "motion" NOR "change" (218b15-20). But Aristotle is unclear in his commitment to a definition of time: "time seems MOST to be motion AND a CeRaiN change" (218b19) (emphasizes mine own): Aristotle claims that "time" is multiple and "everywhere and with all things" (218b14-218b15). Further Aristotle says "motion" and "change" mean the same thing yet are two different words (218b20) ! Book IV Chapter 11 Time is "sensed" by the "soul" by way of the soul "enduring" and so sensing this endurance — a duration (218b31,218b32). Sensations are pieced together to conform to their presentation: Aristotle uses the event of awaking to represent the piecing together of a then to a now — which anachronistically bears resemblance to the way in which current scientists explain the brain's processing of gaps on information (218b24-25). What does "waking among the heroes" mean? I know of one story where a ruler was so distraught after the death of his lover until the ruler was told by a medium/oracle that his deceased lover was among the heroes. Yet, Aristotle here seems to be piecemeal in his writing — the text reads seamed, as if the latter part of the sentence does not match the prior (218b21-218b25). I found one person who writes of another author's commentary which states that the phrase was likened to recovering patients, the healing of the body as a sensed form of change that is made real (pictured below). Never the less, Aristotle here claims that regardless of external perception of time that an internal perception always is perceptible through this or at least some sorts of sensations saw felt by the "soul" — because of Aristotle's conclusion from this above reasoning being "time neither is motion nor is without motion" leads me to believe that Aristotle does not believe internal movement of the soul is a kind of motion proper — Aristotle seems to believe motion is always external, lateral. The conclusion "with motion" seems to be thus a necessary consequence of the "soul" existing in nature, which has moving parts. This alone shows the self-contradiction of Aristotle's mereology of motion. The remainder of Book IV Chapter 11 is a precursor to Augustinian time: Aristotle reckons with time's incongruity as perceived and as felt and settles upon an atomistic conception of the soul in space that somehow also extends beyond its piece to piece together the various nows: this is. I believe, where Augustin had the idea of a soul which extends into a future and a past and brings together the both into a now: the fat man has a belly in the future and an ass in the past. My understanding — outside of Aristotle — is that the consciousness processes the senses as it is wont to do: time is a resolution of the speed of internal motion outward and the speed of external motion laterally — and time is so understood by the body's (or other measuring instrument's) physical processes to synthesize those two perceptions so sensed together into a coalesced coherence — these two speeds are determined by enjoinment boundaries — splinters in time may indeed be ontic.

Book IV Chapter 12, 220b1-13 Aristotle demonstrates difference of unit measure — this provides a kind of argument for multiplicity for kinds at all, and thus for a multiplicity for kinds of motion: For any number is said in different ways, then there need be different ways for all things. This is consistent with my above demonstration of a quadrupartit basis for ontology, and thus for all of nature. "Since, however, what is in time is in as in number, some time may be taken greater than that of every being which is in time" (221a26-9). Thus time is of different kinds. Aristotle finds time to also be the cause of things: I do not wish to quote Aristotle's examples because I believe Aristotle used his examples sardonically, for Aristotle was highlighting the hypocrisy of laypeople reasoning prejudicedly toward agony rather than toward both agony and comfort (221a30-221b5) — For Aristotle gives a preposterous conclusion that only obtains if one were to accept time as the cause of only negative affects, but it would seem that the scholastics gathered not the irony so shown in the preposterousness of the conclusion and took the argument as a literal proof for a "God outside of Time" (221b3-221b7). 221b8-221b23: Aristotle equivocates time and the soul's processing of time. That is all I wish to say for this paragraph. 221b24-222a10: I was correct: Aristotle here explains how his prior argument was ironic by demonstrating the absurdity of a being outside of time: however, because Aristotle uses geometry in abstrac tum as basis, Aristotle seemingly unintentionally bolsters the ironic argument for anyone who took Euclidean geometry to be indeed correctly representative of nature and possibly necessarily so too of some "infinite God"... "a greater time," seems thus for Aristotle only applicable to fictions, since Aristotle calls upon Homer and his "non-beings" — Aristotle's word for fictions, which for Aristotle seems to include Meinongian objects (221b30-32,222a1-10). Aristotle incorrectly extrapolated "displacement" to "all things" upon a "change", and as such Book IV Chapter 13 (222a10.5-222b29/30) is moot. I ask "where is there no soul?"; Do we take Plotinus' "soul" and "all soul"? Or do we take "the possibility of a soul being at some "there"?"? This is where I believe Heidegger took faith in projection of the self as a seeing of the soul in an "over there", beyond the then conventional usage of "der" for "sein" — because what of "Sach"? (223a22-223a23). Aristotle too frequently gives a concept two different names and then attempts to create a new concept from the old through a cleavage made by the other concept so imported by the new double name: X is Y... and Z... but X cannot be both Y and Z and thus must be neither Y or Z but is still X but is now X in this new way of saying X. The above argument is my making fun of Aristotle's ontological methodology.