

Moral Subjectivism vs. Moral Objectivism

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Abstract

Moral subjectivism is not self-defeating, contrary to what moral objectivists claim. Ockham's Razor favors moral subjectivism over moral objectivism. It is circular for moral objectivists to say that since we construct sound and cogent arguments out of moral statements, moral statements are true. Moral subjectivism acknowledges the role that arguments play in our moral lives, contrary to what moral objectivists contend. The way in which moral objectivists attempt to establish moral objectivism ironically supports moral subjectivism.

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