Writing while Reading : Part 2

luxurientes 35m

Autrecourt's first argument relies on assessing negative propositions being inherently futile , but because that is tautological , autrecourt fails to assert a claim at all , for autrecourt demands a conclusion by some argument , which is a demand that requests a syllogicstic intermediary — what autrecourt could have possibly asserted was the contraposition , which is not tautological , for the global negation for the globally negative is a local positivity that when coupled with an inversion ...

luxurientes now

an inversion to the global negations negated into local positivity (position) , one arrives at a non generic claim : that some fact , wenn allein mit anderen Facten ist (was meistens oder immer ist) bei dem Fall , dagegeben alles dinges Eingenständigkeit haben oder sind , beide , Wahl , finden Sie naklar , weil , wovon einer mit manchen Sachen ist, der Zusammenhang zwischen Fact und Fall und Sach is available : i know that something lacks an accidental property by knowing what is there .

by
Jacob Roman Parr

luxurientes 35m

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
Autrecourt triple modal 1/5

Modal Planes Are "Cartesian" Planes , also is
Sometimes Always Sometimes Never

Autrecourt triple modal 2/5

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$$f_b(\ ) = f_g \circ f_o$$

$$= f_o \circ f_g$$

Autrecourt triple modal 3/5

Modal Planes Are "Cartesian" Planes . also is
Sometimes Always Sometimes Never

$$N \curlyeqprec N$$

$$f_b(\ ) = f_g \circ f_o$$

$$f_b(\ ) = f_o \circ f_s$$

$$f_1, f : R^1 \Rightarrow R^2$$

$$N \gtrless N \quad N \subseteq [A \; F]$$

$$f_1() = f_1 \circ f_0 \qquad f_. = \begin{bmatrix} e & \emptyset \\ \emptyset & \sim \end{bmatrix}$$

$$f_5() = f_0 \circ f_5$$

$$f_. = \begin{bmatrix} \sim & \emptyset \\ \emptyset & e \end{bmatrix}$$

$$N \; f \; f \; \equiv \; \equiv$$
$$N \; f. \; f. \; \equiv \; \equiv$$

Autrecourt triple modal 5/5

$$f, f : R^1 \Rightarrow R^2$$

$$N \ni N \qquad N \ni [A \ F]$$

$$f() = f_o f_i \quad f : = \begin{bmatrix} e & \emptyset \\ \emptyset & \sim \end{bmatrix}$$
$$f\{ \} = f_o \cdot f_i$$

$$f : = \begin{bmatrix} \sim & \emptyset \\ \emptyset & e \end{bmatrix}$$

$$N f f : = E$$
$$N f : = E$$

We can define Fgreen , Forange as containing functors with • being unary operation as described by the arbitrarily RH matrix multiplication , as shown

Let e represent be the conventional unary identity function

Let ø represent the unary null-function , which maps objects to null

Let ~ represent classical unary (or " dumb " or " simple ") negation

Thus we see that " global " negation is demonstrated above by the blue functor " f_blue " , which is defined (or structured) by two distinct (or different) local negation functors (functions) for each aspect to the truth-value assignment mapping for the antecedent and the consequent respectively respectively

So , the global contrapositive for a
N -> N == AF -> AF
Is a ST -> ST , for the specific instatiations for the claim , by their trivially (or definitionally-given) being at least sometimes-true , we can arbitrarily name existent literal E and simply consider the situation at some time where the literal is actual , which for this Autrecourt's first argument is always , since Facts are always a populated category in the world .

luxurientes 26m

Autrecourt's Nicholas says that some thing is known either from a direct sensory confirmation or from a cessation to a direct sensory confirmation , but Nicholas fails to properly state his own claim in the way that I generously did for him , for Nicholas is talking about some negative thing , something not (some accident or some property) . I will now give Nicholas an argument for how this could be possible to defend by directly defending it in a different way .

♡   ◯ 5   ⟲   ◁

luxurientes 22m

Suppose Nicholas wants to confirm via private knowledge that there is a cessation , then Nicholas would be glad to find the proof for such in Ontics and Idäontics (Parr 2023) or Kinds and Degrees (Parr 2023) .

Suppose Nicholas wants to positively claim that celestial objects exist in a continuous way despite our human senses each confirming to ourselves that we see some thing where the objects are expected to be , for suppose the time is daylight . I intimated the first argument just now ...

luxurientes 16m

That continuous paths or courses or routes or cycles or whichever-word confirmed by prediction concomitantly by sensation at a coincide , which here would probably happen with you outside or near a window , directly confirm human ability to have continuous phenomenological experience spans via retained experience data with recall with an ability to anticipate via calculation from said experiential data as given to the body via some sensation or sense-moment via phenoms (see Kinds and Degrees)...

♡   ◯ 1   ⟳   ▽

luxurientes 10m

Some reader might not find that satisfactory , as they might not have acquired or received such ability , perhaps by being blind or ignorant to specific path-lines , but in such a case would be privy to cyclical occurrences by having slept and awoken multiple times and experiencing multiple consistencies , most obviously the change in temperature vascillating at a consistently consistent yet boundedly variating time across multiple awakenings , as one can tally-remember sleeping-then-awaking . ...

luxurientes 5m   ...

But that might not be convincing for someone demanding permanence to object-cause existence to confirm something being that which you could confirm at all , for if something is actually " different " from being at some time nonexistent then now existent one could doubt that the confirmation would be accurate to the object at that time since that would be a first-experience , to which I reply that that is moot because you'd have enough experiential data available for your recall to confirm sense.

♡   ♡ 1   ⟳   ▽

Replies

luxurientes now   ...
This is not a pessemistic argument but rather one that enjoys human finitude being able to build upon its itself during its own duration — continuity is at least seated within the self for complex onjects which allows for greater possibility in actual continuities to any actual discrete durations in existence across some continuous time — objects with sufficient complexity can retain in multiple ways that might lose some confirmability to its existence but without loss to its ability to exist .

luxurientes 6m

Autrecourt provides or humors the notion that local-destructability if its specific locality is defined , begrenzt , by certain motion (or activity , in a broader sense to motion) ceases :: I have proffered a similar view regarding extreme liminal conditions making a locality exotic-physically : that because objects exist as stable systems on terraced scalar coherence-bands , that upon an alteration at some " prior " grundscale , a different physics would result within a shared universe :: ...

♡ ◯ 1 ♺ ◁

luxurientes now

... is possible without destroying a universe , or a whole system .

♡ ◯ ♺ ◁

luxurientes 20m

I'm not putting this in the book because I decided to just write while reading for the first chapter , but in chapter 2 in the on celestials book, averroes writes something I've considered , which is also something I haven't heard anyone else say exactly or in direct regards to astronomical objects : the sun might be a pseudodysonsphere that has a very convincing cloaking shield that appears as if it's a continuous sunstarrthing

luxurientes 5m

Autrecourt's Nicholas's locality-destruction therefore world-ending " as far as that locality is concerned " is fairly directly an eschatological thought — it is a way to some reckoning to occur fully sufficiently through a locality — the following is not what Nicholas writes : if a locality or some compact proper subset to a world or structured set retains a or some homomorphic structure to the entire set then a destruction could be applied to the locality in part as if the world .

♡   ◯ 2   ⟳   ▽

luxurientes 3m

Obviously I do not know why one would need to mix set with subset nor more importantly to need to destroy some world or even how mixing those terms would be ever needed , but I could think about the reverse income tax experiment held in a New England state in the mid 1900s here in America : ...

♡   ◯ 1   ⟳   ▽

Replies

luxurientes now

For certain literal localities can find themselves being fairly representative to larger collectives to which they are already part-to , and actions on or in a or some localities in representative similarity might impart likewise change on the whole — trends in a layered zeitgeist .

luxurientes 10m

Nicholas de Autrecourt describes accidentals as existing as actions — that the experience we have when receive sense data from reality is in some sense made from an activity occurring in reality that produces such data , or phenoms , receivable to us to create a sensory moment - but there is still a gap the exactness to the phenoms each is not always readily assessed or accessed in the experience : the eggshells have variations yet are similarly white but snail blood is purple .

♡   ◯ 2   ⟳   ▽

luxurientes 4m

The answer it seems lies in the equilibriæ among our different capacities to receive information from reality , on one end , with our capacities to make specific that information to ourselves in recollective ways : the exact smell is remembered so vividly that the entire molecular recipe can be gleaned as if a light shone through a prism , yet the temperature to the day yesterday feels almost as unremarkable as it did the day before .

luxurientes now

But here we must take notice what we can do , and that is to say that what is before me is never the exact thing that was before me before , but that that exactness even if applied to its accidents bears not a change to its being it for internal change is not always a change that alters the thing being that thing before me , even across time — that the ship does at some point change in reality from itself , though , despite my memory , or despite my memory attempting to trick itself gradually .

luxurientes now ···

The answer is that properties are actual when actual , which is always an actuality among things in extensio , that form always has a specific extensitivity to its actual instance that interacts not solely with once-over fixed-space but also with activity about it : the airplane's wing's shape provides a specific activity from its form separate its material , to a degree but to an enough degree to be distinct or conceptually orthogonal in such a way that corresponds correctly to it actually .

luxurientes 5m

So when we speak about ships remaining their identity as specific ship being similar to some person we do not have adequate count toward complexity between the two objects : a ship's identity is not structured in a similar-enough way to a human's identity for a generalized understanding for each's identity to be made , as each are their own dynamic systems and not purely abstract objects that can be reduced to their mere existence in abstractum .

♡   ⊙1   ⟳   ⊽

Replies

luxurientes now   •••

That is to say that we do know difference but in a positive way from there being enough complexity to things , but that this complexity is available from a shared fixed variegated space through which various motions interact in consistent yet contained ways such that we have ourselves able to be able to recognize finitude to things as the intersection where motion meets structure .

luxurientes now   •••

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♡   ⊙1   ⟳   ⊽

luxurientes now   •••

See Kinds and Degrees (Parr 2023) .

luxurientes now   •••

A note on the margin art : the art has all been thus far olives with goat cheese or crèmefraische mixed with a blueberry jam .

luxurientes now ···

What an interesting paragraph that [201] is ! Different kinds of activity defined : atoms assembling up , atoms interacting in some way not assembling or disassembling , objects functioning in a way specific to each own , and dissassembly . What an array . We can easily see here how magnetism is caused by something related but distinct from atomic bonds : that the d orbitals for at least iron has specific open pathways for electrons to flow in neat paths along the repeated element .

luxurientes now · · ·

Autrecourt's Nicholas gives a dicey appeal to perfection but doesn't seem to first retain his own affinity to local movements being local , such that Nicholas falls to his own endowment being not the same endowment as some possibly-enough-seeming permenant object : that if you accept the speculative thesis that Averroes took up for Averroes's argument earlier discussed that there would then not necessarily be a similar enough "perfect" among objects differentiated by at least their temporality .

luxurientes 5m ···

Nicholas de Autrecourt shows that he thinks perfection is an infinite thing made from discrete parts , yet his argument that a lesser perfection (as Averroes said early) " tends " toward perfection — tends discretely in possibly multiple »orthogonal« senses (for things seem to decay in more than one way) , but assumes that there would be no limit , yet the Averroes text , but also the iamblichi text I referenced earlier , provide a gradussium : somewhat perfect objects .

luxurientes now ···

A lovely consideration of a specie being the set with one member or a specie possibly being an actual thing necessarily shared . It would seem somewhat perfect objects are the latter but could be the former but also could be both but as a specie in two different ways toward different perfect grades .

luxurientes 1m

The paradoxicality conjured by Nicholas in the paraphrasing before [203] is a result from sameness being used in two different ways but at the same time in contemplating the sameness across repetitions within a whole along its parts which bear both difference in at least location but sameness in at least some quality , for the bullwhip exhibits repetition to its shape from a varied motion : the u-turn at the arm within the arm but not to the arm wholly to cause motion to be utilized distinct .

♡   ♡ 1   ⟲   ▽

Replies

luxurientes now   • • •

For proclus has written that changes in directions must happen at some linear standstill necessary then proceed in a moving exactly backwards , like a conga line deciding to , rather than simply make a u-turn , dance backwards to the punch bowl .

luxurientes 1m

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♡ ♡1 ♺ ▽

Replies

luxurientes now   • • •

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luxurientes now   • • •

But u-turns are possible because there are sufficiently many in what minims there are to extension , making also too variety in location because there are as well different motions that move such discrete parts to reality that can construct instances without rupturing the whole : that vaccuums are not empty , but rather still .

luxurientes now   ...

I am not convinced that living on a dead end
street's culdesac is more perfect than living
along a road or roads with multiple options for
an exit : Nicholas suggests that an effect with
exactly one cause is more perfect than if there
were possibly multiple different causes or
causal paths to a same effect : such over
reduction insults the fact that there is a
difference to things at all .

luxurientes 2m

Nicholas is on to something when he says that there seems to be something already that is when atomic parts recede or accrue in their fashion to make or unmake , that atomic movement is in a sense ' about ' a thing : this is in accord with what I have said in at least the Solution to the Hard Problem of Conciousness (Parr 2023) but also intimated here in Writing while Reading : Part 2[...] : once-over fixed space pre-provides basic features that impart or unlock said feature on some other scale.

♡   🗨 1   ⟳   ◁

Replies

luxurientes now   ● ● ●

I am not in exact agreement with Anaxagoras ; I do not think that all things are exactly present in all other things nor do I think that all things are exactly fractal or fractally repeated even in some eventually . I think that at least that things can be constructed because the most basic parts are combinable , are compatible in ways to structure together .

luxurientes now · · ·

The highlight term in [205] is Nicholas saying
" flux " to describe atomic material activity
that is not the kind found in celestial bodies :
what could be drawn is that the formal
perfection — celestial bodies being spherical
perpetually — is resultant from their material
at least at their literal extrisic boundary is
conditioned by its own parts to its own stable
system , or ontic , that remains stable through
its activity or activity systems , or pragontic(s)
, all while not fluctuated exo .

luxurientes now ···

Multiple ontics being possible does not immediately entail there being infinite possible ontics : Nicholas does not adhere to Nicholas's atomism being discrete , for each atom would need to have its own finitude in some way in order to be discrete in part to be part while suture to a continuity : that there must be a plurality to atomic parts to have a plurality to gradients that are parts to multiple wholes while distinct enough from their simplicity to self-ground difference(s) .

luxurientes now   •••

When Nicholas says " to which these lower bodies accommodate themselves " , Nicholas is referencing the effects observed , similar to those that Priscian recorded to have been observed , caused by the celetial objects' motions or positions at certain times in cyclical fashion , like tides to the oceans , but also the ebbing to certain rivers , which for some would say is the same cause for human activity being effected at certain times , which some term its study " astrology " .

luxurientes 2m ···

I will say that I did mean some would say " effected " because some would ascribe determinate cause to celestial activity when logicizing why humans act in various ways , which I hold different to being affected , for it seems compatible with at least in-context Nicholas's Catholicism to say that the full-moon affected one's passions or emotions which resulted in some action , but with Catholicism incompatible to say effected , which some astrologers might [have said or held to be true] .

luxurientes 49m

Back to the soul , so Nicholas intimates that the soul is a somewhat perfect object because it's what would seem to be materially homogeneous , that the soul is its own atomic , or most-basic structure , whole but whether also the soul is able to be combined with some other soul or if the soul is never not tethered to some soul-mega-set , what Plotinus called "All-Soul" , is left unaddressed by Nicholas at this paragraph .

♡ ♡1 ↻ ▽

luxurientes 43m

But here we see that Nicholas seats human agency within the capabilities for the human soul , alongside which do we also see an assertion that souls are in some ways well-suited or not well-suited , either , to the physical aspects to whichever body the soul is " grouped " with , for I do not sense that Nicholas is suggesting that souls are grouped across multiple people or comprised by multiple people at once insofar as some one soul would be responsible for ratiocination...

luxurientes 36m

ratiocination , the specie-making capability for Nicholas's " intelligibles " (the term being a plural group name because the specie is acting-as-genera but is not membered with heterogeneous elements , specifically because souls are each materially homogenous trivially from being each most-basic or " atomic ") , for multiple people at the same time , which seems unlikely , so one could say that intelligibles would be thoughts-themselves as specie-acting-as-genera where thoughts have content...

♡ ♡1 ↻ ▽

luxurientes 26m

and are each essentially-interiorized with thought-spaces , which can contain objects that are available to at least ratiocination (the actions that compromise that ability having all , each (possibly in some part-way(s)) , access to the whichever objects within whichever thought within the mind within or part-to the body for whichever person . This seems to be more in-line with Berkeley later in time as well as with Nicholas's volitions listed as capabilities for ostensibly souls uniquely. ...

luxurientes 19m

These two properties to souls gives observational credence to the claim that souls are not formally perfect , for a specific human body might not perfectly match the personality for the soul paired or " grouped " with atomic beings , which I take Nicholas to be using to make two concurrent claims that (i) thoughts are similar to souls in so far as souls seem to be able to 'take-up' various different objects to variegate their interiority without replacing their materiality and (ii) that souls...

♡ ♡1 ↻ ▽

luxurientes 8m

that souls are groupable-things with to group a soul with a body meaning that the soul can "connect"-with in a function-productive way a human body that does not require the human body be essential to the soul's materiality nor to the soul's formality (formality as is structurally provisioned by soul's materiality's actual physical properties*[*this definition here is from my argument provided earlier and not from Nicholas de Autrecourt nor from Averroes] such that various forms are possible) ...

luxurientes 2m

, as it seems that souls are formally-conditioned by the physical human body with which a soul as here is in-question is non-essentially "grouped" -with (or -to) , yet since souls have necessarily '" perfect "' materiality , souls' forms must not be perfect in not both the ways that some thing's form is in actuality (the shape in-actuality or the set containing all potential shapes as is provided by the material and by the material's specific structured-instantiation , both each imparting) .

Footnote :
To not be perfect in not both ways means " must be or is perfect in exactly one way but not in both ways [to satisfy some condition [as considered or as is actually] "

luxurientes now

Bergson actually under-defines image .

···

Capitulating the first treatise in the Universal Treatise (the " first treatise " also being the first treatise in the Universal Treatise that I have read thus far ever despite the Universal Treatise beginning with its second treatise literally , but I decided to read in stated-order) : Nicholas fails to give an adequate argument by asserting a claim that is not made true via a basic material condition because Nicholas provides a temporally-modal conditional claiming a if never , then never ,

♡   💬 2   ↻   ▽

which does not yield a functional truth assignment any in any actual application and is only valid , for even assuming a soundness certifies such a claim to not exist in any way other than as a fiction or meonton or idea or idaontical object etc etc but not in a way that directly corresponds to any fact or facts — because Nicholas provides an inadequate argument , Nicholas fails to be able to say anything about any thing being actually eternal ; I repeat , the best Nicholas could surmise is ...

is or would be a claim about some virtualized yet virtualized-inexact-to-actuality situation where something that never occurs is accessible —- I provided above how Nicholas could have used the contrapositional claim to the temporal never , never : the contrapositive to the never , never conditional is found to be valid , and necesssrily sound . I expect that someone here might suggest that a well-enough defined never-claim is sufficiently selective to some actuality , but it wasn't .

♡   💬 1   ↻   ▽

Replies

Since Nicholas immediately fails his onset goal for his question - answer - argument - investigation that topics Nicholas's first treatise , Nicholas's subsequent discussions are , as I have done , to be considered at best flush to their own independent argument scopes yet with no technical entailment power toward the overall question set forth as in-consideration , which here specifically was stated vaguely by Nicholas as about things and eternity .

luxurientes 3m

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Nicholas's second treatise is not about celestial objects in any way other than Nicholas being worried he might be found eternally incorrect in an imperfect way , but such is not exactly relevant , so I'm skipping it .

note : I meant earlier that I was not going to include where I discuss chapter 2 to Averroes's celestials text retroactively by editing Writing while Reading Part 1. Obviously it is left included here in this Writing while Reading .