7 A Look at French and Phillips' Naïve Realism

Adam Pautz

7.1 Introduction

I favor representationalism about experience. Suppose you see a tomato. On a representational view, for you to have this kind of experience is for you to "experientially represent" (for it to experientially seem to you) that there is a red and round thing before you.

A virtue of representationalism is that it can accommodate "internal dependence": even in normal perception, internal neural processes play a big role in shaping the qualitative character of your experience, over and above selecting what features of the world you perceptually detect. According to internalist forms of representationalism, how you experientially represent the world is often due to our internal processing, rather than to the character of the world itself.

Naïve realism is an important rival view. It comes in different forms. A basic form might hold that, when you see the tomato, the character of your experience is fully grounded in your perceiving some of the actual features of the tomato.

In my book *Perception* (2021), I argued that *basic* forms of naïve realism cannot accommodate internal dependence.[1] However, I conceded that more complex forms of naïve realism can accommodate internal dependence. A very interesting example is Craig French and Ian Phillips' form of naïve realism (2020).[2] Whereas a basic form of naïve realism holds that the character of experience is sometimes fully grounded in what is perceived, French and Phillips' version holds that "the ways" we perceive things in the external world always play an enormous role, where those ways are significantly determined by our *internal* neural responses. While I conceded that this form of naïve realism accommodates internal dependence, I criticized it on other grounds. One of my criticisms was that it is "merely negative" because talk of "ways" of perceiving lacks positive content. In my follow-up paper "Naïve Realism v Representationalism" (2023a,b), I also noted that, occasionally, French and Phillips gesture at a more positive account in terms of *how the world* "*strikes*" *us* in experience. But I pointed out that this resembles a representational account in terms of *how we represent the world* in experience.

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In their "On Pautz's *Perception*" (2023a), and also in their contribution to this volume, French and Phillips have responded to these points. They acknowledge that their view is "negative". They make several helpful clarifications.

Here I will take another look at French and Phillips' view in the light of their responses. I regard their view as an important rival to representationalism, and I am interested in seeing how it might be best developed.

I will begin with an initial sketch of French and Phillips' view (Section 7.2). Then I will consider two arguments for it: their argument concerning illusion (Section 7.3), and an argument based on internal dependence (Section 7.4). Next I will turn to criticism. I will argue that their "quietism" is unmotivated and unappealing (Section 7.5). I will raise three phenomenological problems for the view (Section 7.6). Finally, I will raise a problem about sensible qualities (Section 7.7).

7.2 An Initial Sketch of French and Phillip's Naïve Realism

Let us begin with French and Phillips' account of *non-hallucinatory* experience. Here are some key quotations:

> Naïve realism is the view that the conscious character of experience in genuine cases of perception is constituted, *at least in part*, by perceptual relations between subjects and aspects of the mind-independent world. (2020: 1)

> Elements [of the external world] can be presented, and so shape character, in many different *way*s, due to variation in perspectival factors. (2020: 8)

> For us, ways of perceiving do partly ground the character of experience. But the character of experience is constituted by *what* is presented not just the way it is presented. (2023)

> We deny the claim that the character of experience is exhaustively constituted by its presented elements. This is not because of "a couple of exceptions" … we think [it] is false … whenever we are acquainted with mind-independent objects. (2023: 3)

> Neuro-computational factors may figure amongst the perspectival factors which generate different ways of perceiving. (2020: 17)

> To talk of ways is simply to insist that there is *no function* from presented elements to qualitative characters. (2020: 13)

So French and Phillips have a "two-factor" view. When you view a tomato, the character of your experience is jointly grounded by (i) what features you perceive *and* (ii) the "ways" in which you perceive them. In what follows, I will call (i) *the first factor* and (ii) *the second factor*.

French and Phillips (2023a,b, 2) say that these factors are inseparable:

> Ways [are not] separable and independent character-constituting aspects of experience: for your experience to involve a way in which something is perceived, something must be perceived. Remove the object and no residual "way of perceiving" remains.

To illustrate, consider some examples. First, consider an example of "internal dependence". You and a hypothetical twin view a tomato. Your twin belongs to a different human-like population that evolved differently. As a result, you and your twin undergo different neural patterns in V4, the area of the brain specialized for color processing. These neural patterns occupy different locations in the neural similarity space for color. So while the tomato looks red to you, it looks orange to your twin. On the two-factor view, factor (i) may be the same between you and your twin: what you perceive may be the same. So the difference is down to a difference in factor (ii): the "ways" you perceive the tomato.

Here is another example. Suppose you view an *orange* tomato under normal light, and your hypothetical twin views a *red* tomato under normal light. However, due to innate differences in neural wiring, you undergo exactly the same V4 neural response. So even though the tomatoes are physically different, they appear exactly alike to you and your twin. French and Phillips' might hold that in this case (ii) the "way" you perceive the colors of the tomatoes is the same. But they hold that (i) what you perceive is different. So they take it that their two-factor version of naïve realism implies that you and your twin color experiences of the tomato are, in their words, "*qualitatively distinct* in having their characters partially grounded in orangeness in one case and redness in the other" (French and Phillips 2020: 13; my italics). This is so despite the fact that, if you could consecutively have these experiences, you would say "what they are like is the same".

What about hallucination? For instance, suppose you hallucinate a tomato. The two-factor account does not apply because both factors involve perceiving the world. So, to handle hallucinations, French and Phillips offer a different account. In particular, they accept M. G. F Martin's "negative epistemic" account of hallucination. As Martin (2006: 370) puts it, "there is nothing more to the character of the hallucination than that it can't be told apart through reflection from a veridical perception".

When you perceive a tomato in a normal case, what do French and Phillips mean by saying that you perceive it "in a certain way"? Is this "way" talk supposed to be pretheoretical language that is already part of English,

or is it supposed to be a new technical vocabulary that they are introducing for the first time (a vocabulary we are supposed to get a grip on from their examples)? And, when they say "you can perceive the same external items in different ways", do they simply mean "you can have qualitatively different experiences of the same external items"? In that case, of course, such talk cannot be an informative *explanation* of why you can have qualitatively different experiences of the same external items.

The fact is, French and Phillips themselves say that their talk of "ways" has no positive content. After all, in the final quotation above, they say "to talk of ways is simply to insist that there is *no function* from presented elements to qualitative characters". It is just to reject a basic form of naïve realism on which, at least in some cases, what you perceive *fully* grounds the character of your experience.

So far, then, French and Phillips' view comes to this:

> *French and Phillip's naïve realism*. In non-hallucinatory experience, the character of your experience is *partly* grounded in (i) what is perceived. It is also partly grounded in (ii) *something else*. We can talk of "ways" to describe this "something else". But to talk of "ways" is simply to insist that the character of your experience is not *fully* determined by what is perceived – it's also partly determined by something else.

Do French and Phillips ever give any positive characterization of the "something else" that plays a partial role in grounding the character of your experience in normal cases?

I want to put this question aside for a while. First, in the next couple of sections (Sections 7.3–7.4), I want to take a look at *arguments* for their view. Then (Section 7.5) I will come back to the question of what the "something else" might be. I will argue that their "quietism" here is unmotivated. And then (Sections 7.6–7.7) I will raise additional problems.

7.3 French and Phillips' Argument

French and Phillips' positive claim is that in non-hallucinatory cases the character of your experience is *at least* partly grounded in what you perceive. They equate this with "naïve realism" (2020: 1).

To support naïve realism, they cite C. D. Broad's discussion of the "purely phenomenological point of view" in his "Some Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Perception" (1952). They write:

> Naive realism can be motivated on the grounds that it best captures how perceptual experience seems from a first-person perspective, considering perception from a "purely phenomenological point of view".
>
> (2023b: 364)

Let us grant French and Phillips' positive claim: the character of experience is *at least* partly grounded in what you perceive.

French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism also makes a negative claim: it is *never* the case that the character of experience is *fully* grounded in what is perceived; it is *always* partly grounded in "something else". What is their argument for this?

French and Phillips need an argument for their negative claim, because some naïve realists might deny it. Maybe, in *some* cases, perspective merely selects which features you perceive, and this in turn *fully* grounds the character of your experience. What is French and Phillip's argument for their claim that this never happens?

In "Austerity and Illusion", French and Phillips' use *illusion* to argue for their view. To illustrate, suppose you view a flat, white and round disk that is tilted. Suppose that no depth cues are present, so you cannot even really tell that it is tilted. As a result, it genuinely looks *elliptical* to you.

Some naïve realists might handle this case by saying that the round thing has the "perspectival" property *being elliptical from here,* and the character of your spatial experience is fully grounded in your perceiving this property of the object. This would be a "one-factor" account of the case: what is perceived fully grounds the character of your experience

But French and Phillips say that this one factor account has a "price", namely that "it requires that additional presented elements must be introduced" (2020: 7), in particular, the perspectival property "elliptical-from-here".

So French and Phillips propose an alternative two-factor account. The character of your experience is grounded in (i) your perceiving the roundness of the disk and (ii) your perceiving it in a certain "way". As they see it, the big virtue of their two-factor account is that "there is no need to appeal to perspectival shapes or relational appearances" (2020: 7).

But I think French and Phillips' argument from illusion for their two-factor account faces three problems.

First, French and Phillips do not exactly say *why* there would be a price in accepting a one-factor account on which the character of your experience of the disk is fully grounded in perceiving it as having the property *being elliptical-from-here*. On one interpretation, their objection to such an account is that it goes against "common sense" to suppose that the disk has the property being elliptical-from-here (2020: 3). On another interpretation, their objection is based on Occam's razor: it is complicated to suppose that the disk has the property of being elliptical-from-here in addition to the property of being round.

On either interpretation, French and Phillips' objection fails. We *all* must recognize that the round disk has the property of "being elliptical from here". For we must all agree that it has a certain *visual angle* relative to your vantage point. And, as is well-known, properties like *being elliptical-from-here* can be defined in terms of visual angles. So French and Phillips cannot object to a naïve realist view appealing to such properties that "it requires that

additional elements must be introduced" (2020: 7). They must *themselves* recognize those elements.[3]

Let us set aside this first problem. Let us suppose that French and Phillips are right that we should avoid perceived properties like *being elliptical-from-here*. Their two-factor account is not the only naïve realist account that avoids such "perspectival properties". Another naïve realist account of illusion that avoids such properties is M.G.F Martin's negative epistemic account.

Recall that in *hallucination* cases French and Phillips already accept M.G.F. Martin's negative epistemic account. On this account, in a hallucination case, there is nothing more to the qualitative character of your experience than that it is reflectively indiscriminable from veridically perceiving something. And this is not grounded in any positive condition describable in psychological terms (like experiencing a sense datum); it is grounded in your neural response.

Why not then apply this account to your illusory experience of the round disk as elliptical? On this view, the qualitative character of your experience is simply grounded in the fact that your perception of the round object is reflectively indiscriminable from perceiving an elliptical object. This account does not *require* Phillip and French's two-factor naïve realist account of the case. For, as in the hallucination case, the fact that your perception of the round object is reflectively indiscriminable from perceiving an elliptical object may not be grounded in any positive condition describable in psychological terms. Maybe it is simply grounded in your neural response to the object, which in the circumstances is like your neural response to elliptical objects.[4]

Here is a third and final problem with French and Phillips' argument from illusion for their two-factor naïve realism. Phillips and French assert that, in *every* case, what is perceived does not fully ground qualitative character. Instead, in *every* case, the *way* you perceive the world plays an additional role in grounding qualitative character, over and above what is perceived (see the quotation in Section 7.2). But they have no argument for this very general claim.

For the sake of argument, grant that their two-factor view is right in some cases, such as the round disk that looks elliptical. It does not immediately follow that it applies to all cases. After all, even if in some cases qualitative character is grounded partly in what you perceive and partly in the way in which you perceive it, there may be some *other* cases where qualitative character is fully grounded in what you perceive. For instance, when you see a tomato in perfect conditions, we can distinguish between (i) what you perceive and (ii) the way in which you perceive it. But maybe in this case the way you perceive the tomato (e.g. your point of view) helps select which features of the tomato you perceive and which features are out of view, and then this in turn *fully* grounds the character of experience. Nothing French and Phillips say in "Austerity and Illusion" rules this out.[5]

7.4 An Alternative Argument for French and Phillips' Naïve Realism

I think that there is a stronger argument for French and Phillips' two-favor naïve realism.

In my book *Perception* (2021) and elsewhere (2018), I noted that French and Phillips' two-favor naïve realism accommodates "internal dependence". I think that this is the best argument for their view.

Let me begin by clarifying internal dependence. Even a basic form of naïve realism allows that your nervous system shapes your experience of the world: the external world is rich with properties, and the nervous system determines the character of experience at least to the extent that it selects what objective external properties you causally detect and thereby perceive. For instance, pigeons are sensitive to ultraviolet light. So maybe they experience alien external colors that we cannot imagine.

Internal dependence is the stronger claim that the brain contributes to your experience *over and above* determining what you causally detect and thereby perceive in the external world. We can make this precise in the following way.

First, imagine that you are viewing a tomato. Now imagine a hypothetical counterpart of yourself in a counterfactual situation. Imagine that everything "external" is held fixed. Thus, your counterpart causally detects, in a biologically normal way, exactly the same external chromatic "state" of the tomato: the tomato's having a certain chromatic property. Imagine that the *only* differences are in postreceptoral chromatic processing. You and your twin undergo different neural patterns in V4, occupying different locations in the neural similarity space for color. The differences may result in behavioral differences. We can call this a *coincidental variation case* because there is a perfect coincidence in what is normally causally detected but variation in neural and behavioral responses (see Figure 7.1).

Now *internal dependence* for color experience can be defined as the claim that, in such a coincidental variation case, you and your counterpart would have *different color experiences* of the same tomato, even if you causally detect exactly the same external chromatic state in a biologically normal way.



Figure 7.1 A coincidental variation case

In this sense, there is an "organismic contribution" to the character of color experiences.

Likewise for other experiences: bodily sensations, auditory experiences, olfactory experiences, and so on. Internal dependence on your own experiences of pain, loudness, smell, and color can be equated with the claim that, in the kind of coincidental variation cases illustrated in Figure 7.1, your hypothetical counterpart would have experiences of pain, loudness, smell, and color different from your own.

Internal dependence is not obvious *a priori*. For all we know *a priori*, it may be that in such cases your and your counterpart's experiences would be the *same*, even though they are realized by quite different neural states and result in different behavior. How, then, might internal dependence be supported?

One idea is that there are actual coincidental variation cases. In particular, there are actual cases of "normal variation" in which different individuals have different experiences of the same things in biologically normal conditions. Isn't that enough to establish internal dependence?

The trouble is that such actual cases may not be cases of coincidental variation. For instance, when you and a pigeon normally have different color experiences of the same object, the pigeon's visual system is sensitive to UV light while your visual system is not. Similarly, it may be that, if a color chip looks pure blue to you and green-blue to your friend, the color chip has multiple colors or color-aspects, and you pick up on one and your friend picks up on another. In that case, such cases are not coincidental variation cases because there is not a perfect coincidence in what is normally causally detected. So it may be that the experiential differences are due to differences in what is perceived in the external world, rather than internal neural differences.

Even if there are no actual coincidental variation cases, there may still be internal dependence. Your neural processing may still actually contribute to your experience over and above selecting what external states you perceive. Thus, in *hypothetical* coincidental variation cases, your counterpart would have different experiences.

However, we still face the question of how we might support internal dependence. Elsewhere I have supported internal dependence using psychophysics and neuroscience. For many types of experiences, there is *bad external correlation* and *good internal correlation*. That is, structural relations among experiences (similarity and difference, equal intervals, proportion) are better matched by structural relations among their internal neural correlates than by structural relations among the physical properties that are causally detected (for details see Pautz 2017, 2018, 2021, 2023). This supports the idea that neural processing contributes to your experience over and above selecting what external states you perceive. So, in hypothetical coincidental variation cases, your counterpart would have different experiences due to the differences in neural processing, even if there no difference in what they detect and perceive in the external world.[6]

Now consider the following argument for French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism:

1 Basic naïve realism: the character of your experience of a tomato is *at least* partly grounded in your experiencing the actual features of the tomato.
2 In a coincidental variation case (Figure 7.1), you and your twin perceive the *same* features of the tomato.
3 But you and your twin have qualitatively *different* color experiences of the tomato owing to the internal differences ("internal dependence").
4 Therefore, even if the qualitative character of your experience is *partly* grounded in what you perceive (premise 1), it cannot be *fully* grounded in what you perceive; it also must be partly grounded in something else, which differs between you and your twin owing to the internal neural differences.

Call this the *argument from internal dependence* for French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism. In his essay "Rethinking Naïve Realism" (2019), Ori Beck uses internal dependence to support a somewhat similar form of naïve realism.

As already noted in Section 7.3, French and Phillips support (1) on the basis of "reflection on how perceptual experience seems from a first-person perspective" (2023b: 364). They could support (2) on the grounds that you and your twin's visual systems are both causally detecting the same features of the tomato in biologically normal ways. So it would be implausible to say that one of you perceives those features while the other fails to perceive them (cf. the "simple causal-functionalist account" of perception in Pautz 2023: 390–391). Finally, premise (3) is just internal dependence, which can be supported on empirical grounds.[7]

Now, since I am a representationalist, I think that this argument for two-factor naïve realism fails. I reject the first premise: I do not think we should accept naïve realism based on "reflection on how perceptual experience seems". Still, I think that the argument from internal dependence may be the best argument for French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism. It avoids the three objections I raised in Section 7.3 for their argument based on illusion.

My first objection to their argument from illusion for their two-factor naïve realism was that it depends on the idea that we don't perceive perspectival properties of things like "elliptical from here". I objected that they give no strong argument for this claim. The internal dependence argument requires no such claim, and so avoids this objection.

My second objection to French and Phillips' argument from illusion for their two-factor naïve realism was that they neglect an alternative account of illusion: a Martin-style negative epistemic account. (This alternative account of illusion would also be in line with their claim that we don't perceive

perspectival properties like "elliptical from here".) No such objection carries over to my argument from internal dependence.

My third objection against French and Phillip's argument from illusion was that it does not immediately establish their claim that two-factor naïve realism applies to *all* non-hallucinatory experiences. My internal dependence argument avoids this objection. Internal dependence holds for our perception of all features. Indeed, it even holds for our perception of *spatial* features. You and a hypothetical counterpart in a "coincidental variation case" (Figure 7.1) might normally detect *all* the same objective properties of a tree (including the same objective but "perspectival" angular sizes and the same distances) but *still* have different spatial experiences owing entirely to internal differences in your constancy mechanisms (see Pautz 2011a and especially Masrour 2015, 2017).

Thus, take *any* perceptual experience of some features you have here in the actual world. The argument from internal dependence shows that you have a possible twin who perceives the same features of objects but who has a qualitatively different experience due to internal differences. So, for *any* experience, even if its character is partly grounded in what you perceive, it must also be partly grounded in something else that is related to your neural responses to what you perceive.

I also think that the internal dependence argument for French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism is superior to any argument based on actual "normal variation" cases. For instance, a color chip might look pure blue to you and green-blue to your friend. As already noted, maybe in all actual cases of "normal variation" the relevant perceivers causally detect and thereby perceive *different* external states. Then such cases provide no reason to accept two-factor naïve realism. French and Phillips (this volume) call this response "Different Presented Elements". My argument from internal dependence has the advantage of very definitely ruling out this response. In a coincidental variation case, by stipulation, you and your twin's visual systems causally detect exactly the *same* features of objects. So, in such a case, it would be very hard to see how you might be perceiving *different* features of those objects. In line with premise 2 of the argument, it is reasonable to say that you and your twin are perceiving the same features.

By the way, in "On Pautz's *Perception*", French and Phillips agree that it is a virtue of their two-factor naïve realism (in contrast to a more basic version) that it can accommodate internal dependence. They say "Our ways-based version of naïve realism overcomes the challenge of internal dependence". And then write:

> Owing to differences in postreceptoral wiring, you and your counterpart differ in perspectival factors which include your different V4 representations. Consequently, you and your counterpart see the same stimulus in a different way; you have qualitatively different experiences.

In my view, it is not just a virtue of French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism that it can accommodate internal dependence: it may be the best argument for accepting it.

One final point. French and Phillips say (2020: 10) that *one* difference between their view and a view developed by Ori Beck (2019a,b) is that they accept the "inseparability thesis" while Beck denies it. They assert that "ways are not separable and independent character-constituting aspects of experience – for your experience to involve a way of experiencing, something must be perceived" (2023a, 2). By contrast, Beck (2019a,b) denies the inseparability thesis because he holds that ways of experiencing are also present in hallucination cases where nothing is perceived. (Beck's view significantly differs from French and Phillips' view in other ways.)

But I am unsure *why* French and Phillips accept the inseparability thesis. It does not appear to be a conceptual truth not requiring argument – after all, Beck rejects it. So I am unsure about their rationale for this feature of their view.

7.5 French and Phillips' Quietism Is Unmotivated

In the rest of the essay, I will develop some objections to French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism.

My first objection is this. In their "Pautz on *Perception*" (and in their contribution to this volume), they insist that their view is a "quietist" theory, in a sense I will explain. But, I will argue, their quietism is unmotivated.

In Section 7.2, I noted that French and Phillips' two-favor naïve realism is underspecified. When you view a tomato, the character of your experience is grounded by (i) what you perceive and (ii) "something else". They describe the second factor (ii) in terms of "perceiving the tomato in a particular way", but they acknowledge this lacks positive content.

Can French and Phillips say more about (ii)? There are two related questions here:

1 What *is* the second factor?
2 What is the minimal supervenience-base for the second factor?

I will look at two positive elaborations of French and Phillips' view that address these questions: *the striking version*, which is suggested by some of their own remarks; and *the neurobiological version*, which they do not consider but which fits naturally with internal dependence. Then I will look at their own *quietist version* of their view.

I begin with the "striking" elaboration of the second factor (ii). In "Austerity and Illusion" (2020), French and Phillips say that an external state might "strike" you in various ways – as *orange*, *oval*, and so on.[8] In an earlier essay, Phillips (2016: 375–376) says that *striking* resembles the representationalist's notion of *experiential representation* in at least

one respect: it is an automatic result of sub-personal neural processing. French and Phillips also suggest that "striking" partly grounds qualitative character:

> Why does the way in which the subject perceives the scene affect the qualitative character of their experience as it does? Our answer here will advert to how the various elements of the scene *strike* the subject.
>
> (2020: 13)

Here they seem to be saying that the way in which the subject perceives the scene affects qualitative character, because it affects how elements of the scene strike the subject, which affects qualitative character.

There is further evidence that French and Phillips hold that "striking" partly grounds qualitative character. Consider a case where a round thing looks elliptical to someone. They think that in this case the qualitative character of their experience is (partially) grounded in the fact "that the shape seen strikes them as being more like an oval than any other shape" (personal correspondence, 2020).

This suggests the following elaboration of their two-favor naïve realism:

> *The striking version.* When you view a tomato, the character of your experience is (i) partly grounded in your perceiving the actual features of the tomato and (ii) it is also partly grounded in how those features strike you (red, round, etc.), where internal neural factors often play a role in grounding how they strike you. As for a hallucination, there is nothing more to the character of the hallucination than that it can't be told apart through reflection from a veridical perception.

French and Phillips could understand "striking" as a three-place relation holding between an element of an external world, a perceiving subject, and a perceptible property: *external element e strikes subject S as F.*

In that case, "striking" is analogous to Alston's (1999) notion of "appearing". Alston appeals to the relation *e appears F to S*, a three-place-place relation holding between an object, a perceptible property, and a subject. In non-hallucinatory experience, Alston accepts the "theory of appearing": how external items appear to one in this sense grounds the character of experience. Likewise, on the striking version of French and Phillips' view, how external items strike us is part of the ground of the character of experience.

But, even if "striking" resembles Alston's "appearing", the striking version of French and Phillip's view I have in mind differs from Alston's theory of appearing. French and Phillip defend a two-factor theory of non-hallucinatory experience. Then they accept Martin's "negative" theory of hallucination.

By contrast, Alston (1999) defends a "one-factor" theory of non-hallucinatory experience: qualitative character is *fully* grounded in the ways external items appear to one. And he accepts a "positive" theory of hallucination. In fact, he extends his theory of appearing to hallucination (only here it is "hallucinated images" that appear to one).

To get a feel for this elaboration of French and Phillips' view, let us apply it to some cases. Consider the coincidental variation case discussed in Section 7.4 (Figure 7.1). You and your twin perceive the same chromatic state of the tomato. Factor (i) is the same between you and your twin. French and Phillips say the difference in color experience is due to a difference in factor (ii): you and your twin perceive the tomato in different ways. But they are quiet about what this comes to. Their talk of "striking" suggests a natural elaboration. The tomato strikes you (appears to you) as *red* while it strikes your twin (appears to your twin) as *orange*. These are distinct qualities.[9]

Next, consider the example discussed in Section 7.3 where a tilted round thing appears elliptical to you. On the striking version of French and Phillips view, the qualitative character of your experience is partly grounded in (i) your perceiving the roundness of the disk but it is also partly grounded in (ii) your perceiving it in a certain "way". They are quiet about what this comes to, but the striking elaboration is very natural: it strikes you (appears to you) *as elliptical*. This helps ground the character of your experience.

The striking version of French and Phillips' two-factor view is in line with their "inseparability thesis". If striking can be understood as a three-place relation whose first term is an external item, then it cannot occur in the absence of an external item (just like dancing cannot occur without a dancer).

The striking version also accommodates French and Phillips' "phenomenological motivation" for naïve realism. That is because it remains a form of naïve realism as they understand it. It holds that the character of your experience is partly grounded in what you perceive.

In sum, the striking version of French and Phillip's view would get them everything they want. Indeed, in the quotation above, they assert that how external items strike one helps explain the qualitative character of experience. For these reasons, in my book *Perception* and my follow-up paper "Naïve Realism *v* Representationalism" (2022), I provisionally assumed that they accept it.

But in their "On Pautz's *Perception*" (2023), and also in their contribution to this volume, French and Phillips now reject the striking version of their view. Here is why. I remarked in my earlier discussions that the striking version of French and Phillips' view holds that striking helps to ground qualitative character, so that it has the following consequence:

> "Striking" is not a post-experiential affair; it is an experiential affair.
>
> (Pautz 2023: 396)

French and Phillips (2023a, This volume) pick up on this remark. They now deny that striking is an experiential affair. They insist that it is post-experiential:

> We do not identify ways of perceiving with how presented elements strike subjects… Striking is *post-experiential*: experience presents to one a thing (in a certain way) which then elicits a reaction of being struck by its similarity.
>
> (French and Phillips 2023a: 4)

In their contribution to this volume, they repeat the claim that striking is "post-experiential". So, while the "striking" version of their view as I understood it holds that how things strike us helps ground qualitative character, French and Phillips now hold that it is instead a post-experiential reaction to experience that plays no such role. It is like perceptual judgment in this respect.

However, because the striking version of French and Phillips' view appears to get them everything they want, and because it is suggested by their own remarks, the question arises: *why* do they now reject it?

Here French and Phillips appeal to Gareth Evans' brief discussion of "striking" in *The Varieties of Reference* (1982). They say that Evans suggests that "striking" is post-experiential. And their talk of "striking" comes from Evans.

But Evans does not say that striking is post-experiential. He says (1982: 293) that it is a "reaction to objects", not that it is a reaction to experiences. In any case, his discussion certainly contains no *argument* for thinking that striking is post-experiential.

However, we can sidestep the issue of whether Evans himself uses "striking" to pick out something experiential or post-experiential. For, as I already noted, the kind of elaboration of French and Phillips' view that I have in mind could be directly formulated using Alston's experiential notion of "appearing". On this elaboration, their second factor "perceiving a feature in a particular way" is a matter of "the feature appearing a certain way".

French and Phillips (2020: 10–11) also reject such an elaboration of their view in terms of Alston's notion of "appearing". But the question arises: *why* do they reject it? What is their argument? As I have emphasized, it would get them everything they want.

For the sake of discussion, let us suppose that French and Phillips can construct a convincing argument against elaborations of their view in terms of "striking" and "appearing". And let us turn to another possible elaboration:

> *The neurobiological version*. When you view a tomato, the character of your experience is (i) partly grounded in your perceiving the actual features of the tomato (ii) it is also partly grounded in your *perceiving those features by way of certain neural states*. As for a hallucination,

> there is nothing more to the character of the hallucination than that it can't be told apart through reflection from a veridical perception.

This elaboration of French and Phillip's view differs from one in terms of "striking" or "appearing". It doesn't identify their second factor with how the world strikes or appears to one. Rather, it identifies their second factor with relational states of the form: perceiving so-and-so by way of such-and-such neural states.

This is consistent with French and Phillip's current understanding of "striking" as a post-experiential affair. The idea is that the character of your experience is partly grounded in your neural response to objects. French and Phillips could say that this in turn shapes how objects "strike" you, where this is a *post-experiential* reaction to your experience.

I think that French and Phillips should seriously consider the neurobiological version of their view. After all, presumably, they would accept that, if we hold fixed what you perceive, there is variation in qualitative character just in case there is variation in your neural response to what is perceived. So they might identify their second factor "perceiving things in certain ways" with perceiving things by way of certain neural states.

The neurobiological elaboration of French and Phillips' view also fits with internal dependence – a claim they appear happy to accept (2023a,b). Given internal dependence, neurobiological factors *always* play *some* role in grounding qualitative character.

The neurobiological version is also consistent with French and Phillip's inseparability thesis. It identifies perceiving a thing in a certain way with a *relational* fact: perceiving the thing by way of a certain neurobiological state. So, "remove the object and no residual way of perceiving remains".

True, the neurobiological view implies that a *necessary condition* on perceiving things in a certain way is that you perceive them by way of a certain type of neurobiological state. But this does not entail that undergoing a neurobiological state is *sufficient all by itself* for the existence of a way of perceiving an object.

For example, a neurobiological state can occur in a hallucination case, or in a brain in the void that has always been causally isolated from the external world. But then it does not count as a "way of perceiving", according to the view I have in mind. Again, on the view I have in mind, perceiving a thing in a certain way is world-involving, relational fact. So there exists a way of perceiving only when the neurobiological state has been caused in the right way by a physical object in the external world. (Analogy: a piece of paper is a dollar bill only if it has been produced in the right way by the U. S. Treasury Department.) Beck (2019a,b) accepts something like the neurobiological view but denies inseparability. I am suggesting an alternative neurobiological view that endorses inseparability.

Finally, the neurobiological version remains a form of "naïve realism" because it retains the claim that (i) *what* you perceive plays a role in

grounding qualitative character. So it should be consistent with "reflection on experience".

In sum, the neurobiological elaboration of French and Phillip's two-factor naïve realism would get them everything they want. However, although they do not devote any significant discussion to it, they would reject it, as the following remarks show:

> Neuro-computational factors may figure amongst the perspectival factors which generate different ways of perceiving. But they do not exhaust such factors, nor exhaustively determine such ways.
>
> (2020: 17, footnote.)

> The way of perceiving involved [when you see a car at night] is perceiving *under sodium streetlights*.
>
> (2020: 11)

> [Internal dependence holds] not because internal factors are *constitutive* of colour character but because they help causally explain why you [and your twin] perceive the [tomato] differently.
>
> (2023a: 2).

> We allow only that *sometimes* ways of perceiving causally depend upon internal factors.
>
> (2023a: 3)

Thus, suppose you view a red car under streetlamps, so that it appears orange. On French and Phillips' view, the character of your experience is partly *grounded* in *your perceiving the car under streetlights* (for they say that this is a way of perceiving, and in their 2023 they say that "ways of perceiving partly ground the character of experience"). By contrast, on the neurobiological elaboration of their view, the streetlights (which might be *entirely out of view* as you look down at the car) *merely causally influence* your neural response. And in turn *perceiving the color of the car by way of that neural response* helps to *ground* the character of your experience. So this account of the case differs from French and Phillips' account in holding that the streetlights (which, again, might be entirely out of view) merely play a *causal* role, not a *grounding* role, in shaping the character of your experience.

Here is an argument against French and Phillip's rival view. They say that "only *sometimes* ways of perceiving causally depend upon internal factors". Against this, for *every* experience, we can construct a coincidental variation case (Figure 7.1) in which someone has a different experience due entirely to an internal neural difference. So internal neural factors must *always* play some role in explaining the character of experience. (It is also unclear why they say that they only play a "causal" role, rather than a grounding role.)

In any case, since they reject the neurobiological elaboration of their view, French and Phillips need an argument *against* it. But they supply no such argument. They reject it, but do not explain why.

For the sake of discussion, let us suppose that French and Phillips can construct a convincing argument against an elaboration of their view in terms of neural responses. In that case, we still face the question: what is their elaboration of their view?

The answer is that they do not have one. In "On Pautz's *Perception*", they write "we do not offer a general account of ways of perceiving". In an earlier look at their view, I raised the worry that it is almost "entirely negative" (2023a,b: 396). In their own contribution to this volume, they respond by conceding that their account is indeed "largely negative". They call it "quietist" (Section 5). So they accept:

> *The quietist version*. When you view a tomato in normal conditions, the character of your experience is (i) partly grounded in what you perceive but (ii) it is also partly grounded "something else" (perhaps a different "something" in different cases). We can talk of "ways of perceiving" to describe this "something else", but this is "simply to insist that there is *no function* from presented elements to qualitative characters" (2020, 13). There is no general positive account of ways of perceiving.

I find this quietist view unsatisfying. When they face a case (e.g. a coincidental variation case) that challenges naïve realism because the character of experience cannot be fully explained by what is perceived, French and Phillip invoke their "second factor". But then they give no general account of this second factor. Why not? Do they have an argument that no general account is possible?

Maybe French and Phillips will reply that the quietist form of their two-factor naïve realism may be unsatisfying but there is a strong argument for it: namely, there are strong arguments against all general positive elaborations of their second factor.

But, as we have seen, French and Phillips give no arguments against positive elaborations of their second factor in terms of striking/appearing or in terms of neural responses. And it is hard to see how they might do so, because as I have shown those positive elaborations get them everything they want. So my first objection to French and Phillips' view is that their quietism is unmotivated.

7.6 Three Phenomenological Objections

As noted in Section 7.3, French and Phillips' argument for accepting naïve realism over representationalism in the first place is "that it best captures how perceptual experience seems from a first-person perspective" (2023b: 364).

Here they cite C. D. Broad's classic essay "Some Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Perception" (1952).

But I will now argue that, in some ways, French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism goes *against* "how perceptual experience seems". In particular, I will raise three phenomenological objections. They weaken their phenomenological argument for preferring their view to representationalism.

My *first* phenomenological objection is this. Suppose an ordinary person, Maude, views an *orange* tomato under normal light. Then she views a *red* tomato. However, because (unknown to her) a beam of unusual light is directed upon the tomato's surface, it appears to her the very same shade of orange as the first tomato. She would say she "has the very same experience" of the tomatoes.

Now, on French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism, the qualitative character of a person's experience is grounded in (i) what she perceives and (ii) the way she perceives it. French and Phillips' think that factor (i) differs between Maude's two experiences of the tomatoes. So they hold that those experiences are "*qualitatively distinct* in having their characters partially grounded in orangeness in one case and redness in the other" (French and Phillips 2020: 13; my italics). This is so even if they are reflectively indiscriminable.

As noted, French and Phillips think that their view "best captures how perceptual experience seems". But, in this case, this seems not to be so. After all, Maude has the relevant notion of qualitative sameness. If asked how her experiences seem to her from a first-person perspective, she would say "what it is like to have the experiences is the same". And she would make this judgment even if she knew all the relevant facts (that the tomatoes in fact have different colors and only look the same because of odd lighting).

So we can give the following argument against French and Phillips's account. (i) French and Phillips' claim that Maude's experiences of the two tomatoes are *not* qualitatively the same, but rather qualitatively distinct. (ii) But ordinary people (including Maude herself) disagree with this when they say "what it is like for Maude to experience the two tomatoes is the same". They would not recognize a sense in which "what it is like for Maude to experience the two tomatoes is different". (iii) Therefore, French and Phillips' view implies an *error theory* of the judgments of ordinary people. (iv) But such an error theory is implausible.[10]

In my view, French and Phillips' best response to this argument would be for them to *give up* their two-factor naïve realism. Instead of saying that qualitative character is partly grounded in what is perceived (which they think differs between Maude's experience of the two tomatoes) *and* partly grounded by the way it is perceived, they could say that it is *fully* grounded by the way it is perceived. And they could say that Maude perceives the two tomatoes in exactly the same way (whether or not they do in fact say this). So her experiences are qualitatively the same, not "qualitatively distinct". This would be to give up naïve realism because what is perceived is no longer doing any work.

I do not think French and Phillips would go for this response. I think that they would wish to retain their two-factor naïve realism. In that case, they need an alternative response.

Maybe French and Phillips could just say, contrary to step (iv), that ordinary people *are* in error when they judge that "what is like for Maude to have the experiences is the same", because they do not know the true theory of qualitative character. But such a massive error theory is hard to accept.

French and Phillips might keep their two-factor view but offer a different response that is more charitable to the judgments of ordinary people. They might reject premise (ii) asserting that their view disagrees with those judgments. In particular, they might say that, when ordinary folk judge that those experiences are qualitatively the same ("what it is like to have them is the same"), they have in mind a certain concept of qualitative sameness, qualitative sameness$_1$. They might allow that when the folk make this judgment, their judgment is true. But, French and Phillips might say, when *they* assert that Maude's experiences are *not* qualitatively the same, they have in mind a *different* concept of qualitative sameness, qualitative sameness$_2$, that is tied to what objects are perceived.[11] Maude's experiences might be qualitatively the same$_1$ (the folk notion) and also be qualitatively distinct$_2$ (French and Phillips' notion). So, they are *not* disagreeing with ordinary folk, and their view does *not* imply a massive error theory of the judgments of ordinary folk. Their two-factor naïve realism is a theory of qualitative character$_2$, not qualitative character$_1$.[12]

However, in that case, French and Phillips' claim that Maude's experiences of the two tomatoes are "qualitatively distinct" (that is, qualitatively distinct$_2$) may no longer be very interesting. For how might they introduce the relevant notion of qualitative distinctness$_2$? Suppose that they introduce it by tying it to what is perceived. That is, suppose that, in saying that the two experiences are "qualitatively distinct", they just *mean* that the two experiences involve perceiving objects that *in fact* have different colors. Then it is a trivial claim that everyone can accept. For everyone can accept that the two experiences involve perceiving objects that *in fact* have different colors.[13]

My *second* phenomenological objection to French and Phillip's two-factor view is as follows. Consider again a coincidental variation case (Figure 7.1). You have a normal experience of a red tomato. You have a hypothetical twin who has a very different experience of the same tomato. His experience of the tomato is just like your experience of an *orange* tomato.

What view of this case "best captures how perceptual experience seems from a first-person perspective"? Intuitively, you are acquainted with an actual instance of red. And your twin is acquainted with an actual instance of a different color quality, orange. And that grounds the difference in character. Call this the *simple act-object account* of the difference. I think that it best captures "how perceptual experience seems". (I'm only saying that the simple act-object account is plausible in this case. In cases of covert attention

shifts and vision becoming blurry, it may be less plausible that differences in character are due to differences in what is perceived.)

An example of a simple act object account of the coincidental variation case is the sense datum view of Moore, Russell, and Broad. On this view, you experience a red and round sense datum, while your twin experiences a distinct orange and round sense datum. These sense data are brain-generated. Moore, Russell, and Broad thought that the simple act-object account is supported by reflection on "how experience seems from the first-person perspective".[14]

Another example of an act-object account of this case is Keith Allen's selectionist naïve realism, which differs from French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism. Roughly, Allen's idea (2016: 72) is that the tomato is objectively both *red* and *orange* (it was red and orange even before sentient creatures evolved). Somehow, owing to your neural differences, you are acquainted with its red color, while your counterpart is acquainted with its orange color. This grounds the qualitative difference.

By contrast, French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism violates the simple act-object account of the coincidental variation case, thereby departing from how experience seems. On their view, you and your twin are acquainted with the same chromatic state of the tomato. The difference in qualitative character is grounded in a difference in the "way" in which you and your twin perceive the tomato. As we saw in the previous section, they are "quietists" about what this comes to. But they would certainly deny that it involves your being acquainted with an instance of red, and your twin being acquainted with an instance of orange.

So although in support of their view French and Phillips cite Broad's "Some Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Perception", their view goes *against* the act-object account of the case that Broad himself would have said is supported by reflection on experience.

My own representational account of the coincidental variation case also violates the simple act-object account of the case, but for a slightly different reason. A simple act-object account of the case (such the sense datum account and Allen's account) is an *actualist* account: the character of you and your twin's experiences is grounded in your being acquainted with actual instances of colors. By contrast, my representational account is a non-actualist account. The characters of your and your twin's experiences are grounded in your merely *experientially representing* that there are instances of different colors.

So both French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism and my own representational view depart from the kind of simple act-object account that is supported by reflection on experience. This weakens their case for accepting their two-factor naïve realism over representationalism. It is unclear that their view *better* captures how experience seems.

In response, French and Phillips might concede that they must reject the *simple act-object account* of the coincidental variation case. On their view,

it is not the case that the ground of the difference in the character of your and your twin's color experiences is that you are acquainted with an actual instance of red while your twin is acquainted with an actual instance of a different color quality, orange. But, they might point out, they at least can accept a weaker claim that we might call *object-involvement:* on their view, *the object is part of the ground* of the character of you and your twin's experiences, because the ground is their perceiving *the tomato* in a certain way. Maybe phenomenology supports object-involvement (Alston 1999: 200–201). So if their view accommodates object-involvement while representationalism does not, this may be a phenomenological advantage of their view over representationalism.

But I do not think that we have any reason to accept object-involvement in the coincidental variation once we reject the simple act-object account, because I think our reason to accept object-involvement derives from our reason to accept the act-object account. In any case, representationalists can also accept object-involvement. For they can accept *singular* representationalism (Speaks 2015). They can say that the ground of qualitative character is *perceiving (perceptually representing) specific objects as having certain properties*.

My *third* and last phenomenological objection to French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism is that it does not accommodate a certain intuitive datum.

To illustrate, consider a hypothetical case. Mary sees a white, round sphere as blue and oval entirely owing to aberrant neural activity. In *Perception*, I claimed that the following is supported by reflection on "how experience seems":

> [Property-involvement] *Blue* and *oval* figure in the ground of the character of Mary's experience, even though they are not possessed by the white and round sphere she perceives.
>
> (2020: 228)

Nearly all theories of perception endorse property-involvement. On the sense datum view and Peacocke-style sensationalism, the ground of the character of Mary's experience is her experiencing a *bluish* and *oval* visual field region (Peacocke 2008). On the traditional theory of appearing (Alston 1999), the ground is the physical object appearing blue and oval to her, even though it is neither blue nor oval. And on my own representational view, the ground is Mary experientially representing that the object is *blue* and *oval*, even though it is not.

Does French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism accommodate property-involvement? As discussed in Section 7.5, they are "quietists" about the ground of qualitative character. So it is unclear. Certainly, on some elaborations, it does not accommodate property-involvement. For instance, I noted in *Perception* that a "neurobiological version" of their view does not accommodate property-involvement, because on this version of their view the

ground of Mary's experience is simply her perceiving the round and white object by way of a certain neural state.[15]

In "Pautz on *Perception*", French and Phillips attempt a response. They do not deny property-involvement. In fact, they seem to suggest that their view accommodates it. They write that "given the *way* that Mary perceives the whiteness, it will strike Mary as similar to blueness" and then they say "*That* is how blueness gets into the picture (and similarly for ovalness)". In short, they seem to think that they accommodate property-involvement because they hold:

> [1] The white and round thing "strikes" Mary as blue and oval.

But French and Phillips are making a mistake here. [1] alone is insufficient to entail property-involvement. To accommodate property-involvement, they would need to combine [1] with:

> [2] The fact that the white and round thing strikes Mary as blue and oval *is part of the ground* of the character of her experience.

Here is an analogy. A representationalist view accommodates property-involvement because it holds (i) that Mary experientially represents the object as blue and oval *and* (ii) that this is part of the ground of the character of her experience. Similarly, to accommodate property-involvement, French and Philips need to accept [2] as well as [1].

But, in "Pautz's on *Perception*", French and Phillips *reject* [2], thereby undermining their own attempt to accommodate property-involvement. As we discussed in Section 7.5, they deny that the fact that the white and round thing strikes Mary as blue and oval *is part of the ground* of the character of her experience. Instead, they insist that striking is "post-experiential". Mary has an experience of the object with a certain character. And in turn this results in the object striking Mary as blue and oval.

At this point, French and Phillips might deny property-involvement as I understand it (even if they do not explicitly deny it). That is, they might deny that *blue* and *oval* figure in the *ground* of the character of Mary's experience. Instead, they might say that *blue* and *oval* are only involved in her *post-experiential* response to her experience. So they do not accommodate property-involvement but replace it with something else.

But French and Phillips say that they are motivated by "how perceptual experience seems". And I think that property-involvement as I understand it is supported by how Mary's experience seems to her. The properties *blue* and *oval* figure in the *ground* of the character of Mary's experience, not merely in her post-experiential response to her experience. I am not alone in thinking this. As noted above, nearly all major theories of perception endorse property-involvement so understood. So if French and Phillip's view violates property-involvement, this will weaken their claim that their view fits better than representationalism with "how experience seems".

There is another reason to accept property-involvement besides its phenomenological plausibility. I think that French and Phillips are correct to note that the properties *blue* and *oval* figure in Mary's post-experiential response to her experience. In fact, necessarily, if anyone has the same experience, the perceived object will strike them as blue and oval, and they will be disposed to judge it to be blue and oval. What explains this? The best explanation is that these properties are involved in the ground of the experience itself. Because the experience is constituted by something appearing *blue* and *oval* (in agreement with property-involvement), it is to be expected that it will tend to result in a post-experiential judgment that the object is *blue* and *oval* (Pautz 2010: 288–289; Pautz 2021: 231).

In sum, property-involvement is supported by reflection on experience, as well as explanatory considerations. But what French and Phillips say in "On Pautz's *Perception*" falls short of accommodating it.

7.7 A Problem about Sensible Qualities

My final problem for French and Phillips' naïve realism concerns sensible qualities, such as colors and smells. I will focus on color.

Even though a theory of color is an important part of any theory of perception, French and Phillips do not offer such a theory. Naïve realists like themselves are under pressure to accept a "response-independent" theory of color. After all, they support naïve realism by how things seem (French and Phillips 2023b). And it certainly seems like the redness of a tomato, for instance, is a response-independent quality of the tomato. Furthermore, as Campbell (2020: 408) says, "the colour seems to have a certain unity and simplicity that the physical basis altogether lacks". The quality red seems to be "simple" or "primitive" in the sense that there is no interesting identification of the form "to be pure red is to be …".

So, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that French and Phillips accept such a response-independent theory of color. Even before sentient creatures evolved, things had certain "primitive color qualities". They were linked to the "reflectances" of objects by way of basic "chromatic ground laws" that must be accepted "with natural piety" (Allen 2016: 110).

Now French and Phillips also accept internal dependence (2020: fn. 17; 2023). If French and Phillips were to combine a response-independent theory of color with internal dependence, then they would face an argument:

1 In line with a response-independent theory of color, even before we evolved, there was a "chromatic law" to effect that an object with reflectance *R* has a certain primitive color, *X*. And an object cannot have multiple colors within the same color space: for instance, an object was not both red and green.
2 Given internal dependence, humans might evolve to have (say) "red" experiences of an object with reflectance *R* and primitive color *X*, while another species evolves to have "green" experiences of such an object.

3 Given this, it is very natural to say that you believe the object is *red*, while the other species believes it is *green*.
4 Given a response-independent theory of color-attributions, it follows that your belief and the other species' belief cannot both be right. Either humans or the other species regularly have false color beliefs in normal conditions. So, long-term color error in normal conditions is possible.
5 If it is possible, then we need some explanation of why we and other creatures are not actually subject to long-term color error in normal conditions.
6 Such as explanation cannot be supplied.

I have developed this "missing explanation" argument in greater detail elsewhere (Pautz 2006, 2011b), so here I will be brief. The case for (6) is based on a kind of "independence claim". What neural responses a creature undergoes in response to an object (and hence their color experiences and color beliefs) are determined by (i) mutations in the creature's ancestors and (ii) the selection pressures operating on those ancestors - *their* particular habits, dietary needs, ad predators. And these factors are *independent of* the "chromatic laws" associating particular reflectances with particular primitive colors. Given this "independence claim", there can be no explanation of why we and other creatures should evolve so that our color beliefs are in line with the pre-existing primitive colors of things.[16]

In response to the missing explanation argument, French and Phillips could accept a *response-dependent theory* of color instead of a response-independent one. For example, they could develop their view along the lines of Lewis (1997) and McLaughlin (2003).[17]

Lewis and McLaughlin hold that we evolved to respond to objects by having color experiences with certain non-representational "color qualia". This kind of "subjective response" view of color experience traditionally goes with a response-dependent theory of color. And, in fact, Lewis and McLaughlin accept a response-dependent theory of color. They hold that an object is *red* relative to a population *P* just in case members of *P* normally respond to the object with color experiences with quale *Q* (the quale actually associated with experiences of red things). They regard this biconditional as *a priori*. They think it is like "something is sweet just in case it normally tastes sweet".

In some respects, French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism resembles Lewis and McLaughlin's "subjective response" theory of color experience. French and Phillips say that they believe in "mental paint" in the sense they believe that the items one is aware of do not fully determine phenomenal character (2020: 14–15). Lewis and McLaughlin believe this as well. And somewhat as Lewis and McLaughlin hold that we evolved to respond to objects by having color experiences with various non-representational "color qualia", French and Phillips hold that we evolved to respond to objects by perceiving them in various non-representational "ways". (Of course, they also insist there are differences.) And, like Lewis and McLaughlin, they could naturally combine their view of color experience with a response-dependent

view of color: an object is red relative to a population *P* just in case members of *P* normally respond to the object by perceiving it in way *W* (the way of perceiving actually associated with red things).

If French and Phillips were to accept such a response-dependent theory, they would dodge the above "missing explanation argument". When we judge that an object is red, we are judging that we normally perceive it in a certain non-representational way. If some other population judges that the object is green, they are judging that they normally perceive it in a different, non-representational way. So we are both right. In general, a population's color judgments are virtually guaranteed to be true in normal conditions.

But, while moving to a response-dependent theory of color would solve one problem, it would create another. As I noted at the start of this section, French and Phillips' argument for naïve realism over rival views (such as my own representational view) is based on how things seem. But reflection on how things seem supports a response-independent theory of color over a response-dependent theory. That is why naïve realists typically accept such a theory of color (Allen 2006). Our naïve view is that the colors of things are objective and explanatorily prior to our color experiences of them. So if French and Phillips were to instead accept a response-dependent theory of color in order to answer the missing explanation argument, this would tend to undercut the motivation for their brand of "naïve realism" in the first place.

The lesson here resembles the lesson of my discussion of "phenomenological" problems for French and Phillips' naïve realism (Section 7.6). In general, French and Phillips' brand of naïve realism departs from how things seem at various points. So reflection on how things seem does not strongly support it over rivals such as representationalism.

7.8 Conclusion

French and Phillips have developed an interesting new form of naïve realism (Sections 7.1–7.3). I think its best feature is that accommodates internal dependence (Section 7.4). However, I think it also faces some challenges. Their quietism is unmotivated and unsatisfying (Section 7.5). And, while their view accommodates internal dependence, it significantly departs from our "naïve" view of experience. It violates a few phenomenologically plausible claims about experience (Section 7.6). And it may need to be combined with a response-dependent view of colors, thereby departing from our "naïve" view in another way (Section 7.7). These points tend to undercut their case for accepting their brand of naïve realism over representationalism based on "how things seem".[18]

Notes

1 See also Pautz (2017, 2018, 2023).
2 French and Phillips' (2020) form of naïve realism is in the same general vicinity as Logue (2012) and Beck (2019a). Logue and Beck mention internal dependence as

a motivation for their forms of naïve realism. I plan to discuss their forms of naïve realism in a separate essay.

3 At this point, French and Phillips might change their objection. They might allow that the disk has the property *being-elliptical-from here*. They might object that you cannot *perceive* such properties – such relational properties are not perceivable. But the properties we perceive are many and various; and relational properties are among them (e.g. distance-from-here). So it would be hard to show that we cannot perceive *being elliptical-from-here*.

4 Indeed, Martin himself seems to extend his account of hallucination to illusion: he writes "in cases of illusion and hallucination, one is in a situation which fails to be the way that good cases are, but which purports to be the way that the good case is" (2006: 372). French and Phillips might object that extending Martin's account of hallucination to illusion would miss out on the difference between illusion and hallucination. But this is not so. On this view I have in mind, when you have an illusory experience of the round disk as elliptical, the character of your experience is grounded in your having a *perception of the actual properties of the disk* that is reflectively indiscriminable from perceiving an elliptical object. So an external object is part of the ground of your illusory experience. This is not so in a hallucination case.

5 Maybe French and Phillips would object to this view on the grounds that there are possible cases where someone perceives all and only the same features of the tomato that you perceive when you look at it under normal conditions (no blur, unusual light, etc.), but they fail to have the same experience: for instance, someone who perceives the tomato under strange light. But it is not obvious that such a person does perceive all and only the same features of the tomato as you. For instance, maybe the usual light prevents them from being acquainted with the redness of the tomato – it obscures its actual color. And maybe the unusual light means they perceive a new, temporary "color-look" of the tomato constituted by the actual light it is reflecting – a feature that is no present when you view the tomato in normal light. In any case, my point is that there is a lacuna in their argument: even if their two-factor holds in certain cases (e.g. certain cases of illusion), it may require further argument to show that it holds in all.

6 Epstein (2022: section 4) raises some interesting challenges to my argument for internal dependence based on good internal correlation and bad external correlation. But in Pautz (2023: 386–387) I give uncontroversial examples of good internal correlation and bad external correlation. An especially uncontroversial example is pain intensity (Ibid., 392). And once one accepts internal dependence for pain intensity on empirical grounds, consistency demands accepting it in other cases on the basis of similar evidence. Epstein himself eventually accepts internal dependence.

7 Here I am saying that French and Phillips could use internal dependence to support their two-factor naïve realism. Against this, Epstein (2022: fn. 16) says that naïve realists do not need to accept two-factor naïve realism in order to accommodate internal dependence. He proposes an alternative form of naïve realism that accommodates internal dependence (similar to one I developed and criticized in Pautz 2011b). But, as Epstein notes, his version has a "cost" (2022: 18–19): it has the odd consequence that, if our neural responses to external colors had normally been even a little bit different, we all would have been "color zombies". French and Phillips' two-factor naïve realism has no such consequence. In this respect it is superior to the kind naïve realism proposed by Epstein.

8 Actually, French and Phillips say that the redness of a tomato might strike you as "like" a case of orange or as "like" an oval thing (2020: 12–13). But if an external item can strike you as *being like a case of orange*, presumably an external item can strike you as simply *orange*.

9 Of course, if French and Phillips accepted this Alston-style account of the case, they would need to say what these distinct qualities are. One option is that they are response-dependent properties of a certain kind (Pautz 2017: note 3; 2021: 165).

10 The argument I am making here does not anywhere rely on the principle that "if one cannot introspectively tell that *E1* and *E2* are qualitatively distinct, then they are not qualitatively distinct". This principle is undermined by phenomenal continua (Speaks 2015). Rather, my argument is ordinary folk who grasp the notion of qualitative sameness would judge that Maude's two experiences of the tomatoes are a paradigm case of qualitatively identical experiences, even after they know the relevant facts. Since an error theory of such judgments would be implausible, there is reason to think that they are qualitatively the same.

11 In line with this "two concepts" response, French and Phillips (2021: 14) say that (i) Maude has "the same color experience" of the two tomatoes (so that ordinary folk are right in *one* sense) and yet they also say that (ii) she has "qualitatively distinct" color experiences of the two tomatoes.

12 See Beck (2019b) for the idea that there are "two conceptions of qualitative character".

13 Perhaps when French and Phillips say that the two experience are "qualitatively distinct", they mean something a bit more substantive: that those experiences "fundamentally" involve seeing tomatoes that in fact have different colors, so that they belong to different "fundamental kinds" (2021: 14). But I find this talk of fundamental kinds to be very obscure; also, even if the concept is in good standing, it is not clear why a representationalist like myself would need to reject this kind of claim about fundamental kinds (Pautz 2023: 398–399).

14 Roughly, Moran (2019) and Sethi (2020) accept an act-object theory according to which the "objects" are physical objects in good cases and brain-generated sense data in bad cases. (This is a rough characterization, and there are importance differences between their views.) I am unsure how they would handle my coincidental variation case in which the same objects normally appear to have very different colors to you and your twin. Maybe they would say that one of you is acquainted with the actual colors of physical objects, while the other is doomed to always perceive private, brain-generated sense data that do not correspond to physical objects. We can also imagine coincidental variation cases involving other sensible qualities such as smell; maybe they would handle such cases similarly. This would make their view vulnerable to the my "missing explanation argument" (Pautz 2011b; see also section 7 of this essay).

15 In Pautz (2010: 288–289), I argued that other naïve realist views (in the same ballpark as French and Phillip's view) violate property-involvement.

16 Epstein (2022: section 7) suggests that naïve realists could block the missing explanation argument by rejecting my "independence claim". He claims (2022: 21) that "the probabilities that certain physical events would occur (such as mutations) were not fully fixed by the totality of the antecedent physical facts, but were instead determined by non-physical, high-level properties". So he suggests that what primitive colors were associated with particular reflectances helped to *sway mutation events* in our ancestors in such a way that our ancestors ended up evolving neural states that "align with" those primitive colors, resulting in veridical experiences of them. (He also says if all the physical facts had been the same but reflectances had been associated with different primitive colors, this would have likely resulted in different mutations, resulting in different neural states that would have "aligned with" those different primitive colors.) But mutation events are chance events. There is no evidence that they were somehow swayed by what primitive colors were associated with particular reflectances before we evolved.

17 I think that French and Phillips have another reason, besides the missing explanation argument, to reject a "primitivist" response-independent theory of color and accept a "response-dependent" theory. Given "bad external correlation", the chromatic laws required by such a response-independent theory will be objectionably complex (Pautz 2018; 2021). Cutter (2022: 738–741) also develops this argument. Following Campbell (2020: 411), Epstein (2022: section 8.2) replies that a naïve realist might already accept a general anti-reductive theory of the manifest image. There are irreducible properties (e.g. zoological properties) popping up all over the place, linked to the fundamental physical ground floor by way of complex ground laws. In that case, it is not much of an additional cost to apply the same model to sensible qualities. But even if one accepts this kind of general anti-reductive theory, one should probably accept a single general "principle of plenitude" for irreducible properties. The naïve realist's ground laws for specific types of sensible qualities (linking them to specific physical properties) will not be derivable from such a single general principle. And, given bad external correlation, they will be numerous and unsystematic. So they will be a significant additional cost (see Pautz forthcoming). Epstein (2022: note 58) concedes the point: "for a naïve realist who denies the existence of complex 'inter-level' relations in non-qualitative domains, the empirical finding of bad external correlation, in revealing the need for uniquely unsystematic external laws linking physics to qualitative properties, would impose a more significant theoretical cost [for a response-independent primitivist theory of color]".

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