

In the 6th century Paul the Persian used his own pen to write a summary of Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias* in the Persian language. Severus Sebokht translated it into Syriac. This book is a transcription and translation of the Syriac manuscript of Paul the Persian's *Peri Hermeneias* and a comparison of it with Aristotle's original Greek text.



Institute for Humanities & Cultural Studies



# **Peri Hermeneias**

**By**  
**Paul the Persian**

**Translated by**  
**Said Hayati**

**with**  
**Paul S. Stevenson**



Institute for Humanities & Cultural Studies

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



## گرامی‌داشت پنجاهمین سالگرد تأسیس پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی

سال ۱۳۹۴ پنجاهمین سال تأسیس پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، بزرگ‌ترین نهاد پژوهشی کشور در حوزه علوم انسانی، است. نخستین واحد تشکیل‌دهنده آن، بنیاد فرهنگ ایران، با هدف «خدمت به فرهنگ و سعی در حفظ و ترویج میراث معنوی ایران و کوشش در راه تهذیب و تکمیل و ترویج زبان فارسی و شناساندن فرهنگ ایران به ملت‌های دیگر»، در سال ۱۳۴۴ آغاز به کار کرد و پس از پیروزی انقلاب شکوهمند اسلامی با پیوستن نهادهای پژوهشی دیگر مانند انجمن حکمت و فلسفه ایران، بنیاد شاهنامه فردوسی، بنیاد فرهنگ و هنر ایران، پژوهشکده علوم ارتباطی و توسعه ایران، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی، فرهنگستان ادب و هنر ایران، فرهنگستان زبان ایران، فرهنگستان علوم ایران، مرکز اسناد فرهنگی آسیا، مرکز ایرانی تحقیقات تاریخی، و مرکز ایرانی مطالعه فرهنگ‌ها در قالب یک پژوهشگاه جامع به‌فعالیت‌های خود ادامه داد که خدمات علمی و پژوهشی آن در حوزه‌های گوناگون علوم انسانی در نزد اهالی علم و دانشگاهیان شناخته شده است.

ثمرات نیم‌قرن بالندگی این درخت تنومند، که با همت برجسته‌ترین استادان علوم انسانی کشور به بار نشسته است، صدها طرح پژوهشی اثرگذار و ده‌ها کتاب و صدها دانش‌آموخته فرهیخته است. این دستاوردها فخری است برای نهاد دانش در سرزمینی که همواره در تاریخ به فرهنگ و شکوفایی تمدنی شهره است.



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Institute for Humanities  
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Cultural Studies  
Tehran, 2016



## پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی

تهران، صندوق پستی ۶۴۱۹-۱۴۱۵۵، تلفن: ۳-۸۱۰۴۶۸۹۱، فکس: ۸۸۰۳۶۳۱۷

### پری هرمنیاس

مؤلف: پولس پارسی

مترجمان به زبان انگلیسی: سعید حیاتی، پل اس. استیونسن

مدیر انتشارات: ناصر زعفرانچی

صفحه آرای و جلد: فرزانه صادقیان

مسئول فنی: عرفان بهاردوست

ناظر چاپ: مجید اسماعیلی زارع

چاپ اول: ۱۳۹۴

شمارگان: ۵۰۰ نسخه

چاپ و صحافی: تفرید

حق چاپ برای پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی محفوظ است.

سرشناسه: پولس پارسی، -۱۳۷۱م.

عنوان و نام پدیدآور: Peri Hermeneias/ Paul the Persian; translated to English  
by Said Hayati, Paul S. Stevenson

مشخصات نشر: تهران: پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، ۱۳۹۴.

مشخصات ظاهری: ۱۳۰ ص.

شابک: 978-964-426-858-8

وضعیت فهرست‌نویسی: فیبا

یادداشت: انگلیسی.

یادداشت: متن حاضر ترجمه رساله پری هرمنیاس از زبان سریانی به زبان انگلیسی و خلاصه‌ای از متن اصلی پری هرمنیاس ارسطو است.

آوانویسی عنوان: پری هرمنیاس.

موضوع: پولس پارسی، -۱۳۷۱م.

موضوع: منطق -- متون قدیمی تا ۱۸۰۰م.

موضوع: فلسفه ایرانی -- متون قدیمی تا قرن ۱۴

شناسه افزوده: حیاتی، سعید، ۱۳۵۴ - مترجم

شناسه افزوده: Hayati, Said

شناسه افزوده: استیونسن، پل، ۱۹۶۱ - م، مترجم

شناسه افزوده: Stevenson, Paul (Paul S.)

شناسه افزوده: پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی

رده بندی کنگره: ۱۳۹۴ پ۹۴/پ۱۵۳ B

رده بندی دیویی: ۱۸۹/۴

شماره کتابشناسی، ملو: ۴۰۴۴۳۲۷

**To Nebonid F. Namroud**  
**And**  
**His Colleagues in the Assyrian Society in**  
**Tehran for Their Attention and Support**





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# Introduction

## Paul the Persian

There is much discussion about the identity of Paul the Persian. Arthur Vööbus hints at the significance of this problem when he writes “the identity of this Paulos involves some complications.”<sup>1</sup> In the view of Junillus Africanus he was associated with the Christian school of Nisibis.<sup>2</sup> Giovanni Mercati,<sup>3</sup> Anton Baumstark,<sup>4</sup> Jarry,<sup>5</sup> A. D. Lee<sup>6</sup> and Peter Bruns<sup>7</sup> offer different points of view

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1. Arthur Vööbus, *History of the School of Nisibis* (Louvain:Peeters, 1965), 170; see the full discussion 170–172.
  2. See Michael Maas, *Exegesis and Empire in the Early Byzantine Mediterranean* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 8.
  3. Giovanni Mercati, *Note di letteratura biblica e cristiana antica* (Roma: Tipografia Vaticana, 1901).
  4. Anton Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur* (Bonn: A. Marcus und E. Webers Verlag, 1922), 120–21.
  5. Jacques Jarry, “Les hérésies dualistes dans l’empire byzantin du Ve au VIIe siècle,” *Bulletin de L’Institut Français D’Archéologie Orientale* 63 (1965): 105.
  6. A. D. Lee, “Evagrius, Paul of Nisibis and the problem of loyalties in the mid-sixth century,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 44.4 (1993): 569–585.
  7. Peter Bruns, “Wer war Paul der Perser?” in *Studia Patristica*, Vol. XLV, ed. J. Baun et al. (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), 263–68.

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## 2 *Peri Hermeneias*

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on this matter.<sup>1</sup> Lee and Baumstark discuss him under the name of “Paul of Nisibis.” Mercati names him “Paul the Persian” (Paolo il Persiano).<sup>2</sup> Bruns describes him as an Anti-manichaean from Nisibis and a philosopher from Rew-Ardashir.<sup>3</sup> Clearly, the information about his life is very scanty.<sup>4</sup>

### Who was he?

There is a pressing question to which I should give an appropriate answer: “Who was Paul the Persian?” This is a fundamental question that extends itself into a series of related questions, which express uncertainty about his very name. Was he the man who had a debate with a Manichaean in Constantinople in 527AD, which is preserved in Greek?<sup>5</sup> Or was he Pawlos of Nisibis, because he was educated at the Syrian school in the city of Nisibis?<sup>6</sup> Or perhaps she was Pawlos the Philosopher.<sup>1</sup>

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1. In his discussion of this issue Bienert includes the names of H. Kikn, G. Mercati and I. Forscher. See Wolfgang A. Bienert, “Die Instituta regularia‘ des Junilius (Junillus) Africanus: Ein nestorianisches Kompendium der Bibelwissenschaft im Abendland,” in *Syrisches Christentum Weltweit: Studien zur syrischen Kirchengeschichte: Festschrift Prof. Hage*, ed. Martin Tamcke et al. (Münster: LIT, 1995), 317.
  2. *Note di letteratura*, 180.
  3. Bruns, “Wer war Paul der Perser?”, 263.
  4. Goulet, Richard, ed., *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* (Paris: CNRS, 2012), 185.
  5. See the three articles by Lucas Van Rompay, titled “Pawlos of Nisibis,” “Pawlos the Persian” and “Pawlos the Philosopher,” in *Gorgias Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Syriac Heritage*, (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2011), 324–325.
  6. Teixidor is dubious about whether he studied in Nisibis. See Javier Teixidor, *Aristote en syriaque: Paul le Perse, logicien du VIe siècle* (Paris: CNRS, 2003), 27.

Was he a Persian teacher from the school of Nisibis, who was teaching in the Nestorian School in Nisibis?<sup>2</sup> Peter Bruns tried to clarify and identify the truth about this person or these persons,<sup>3</sup> although he did not give a suitable answer to this question. Javier Teixidor, however, was successful in his efforts, because he has been able to determine that this was the Paul who had anti-Manichaean debates and who was a disciple of Mar Aba.<sup>4</sup>

In spite of all the difficulties in determining Paul's identity, however, by using a contextual approach while reading the Syriac version of Paul's letter to the Sasanian king Khusrau I,<sup>5</sup> and also the first and last paragraphs of his *Peri Hermeneias*, it becomes clear that his name was Paul the Persian, not Pawlos of Nisibis or Pawlos the Philosopher. He was a Nestorian theologian<sup>6</sup> and philosopher who is said to have worked at the court of Khusrau I.<sup>7</sup> He lived from 531–578/9 AD.<sup>8</sup> Syriac scholars

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1. Van Rompay, "Pawlos the Philosopher," 324–325.
  2. Bienert, "Die Instituta regularia," 308, 316.
  3. Bruns, "Wer war Paul der Perser?," 263.
  4. See Javier Teixidor, "L'introduction au *De interpretatione* chez Proba et Paul le Perse," in *Symposium Syriacum VII* (Rome: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 1998), 293–294.
  5. J. P. N. Land, *Otia Syriaca* (Leiden: Brill, 1875), 1–32 (Syriac section).
  6. Jarry, "Les hérésies dualistes dans l'empire byzantin," 105.
  7. See Dimitri Gutas, "Paul the Persian on the classification of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy: a milestone between Alexandria and Baḡdād," *Der Islam* 60.2 (August 2009), 238.
  8. Henri Hugonnard-Roche, "Du commentaire à la reconstruction: Paul le Perse interprète d'Aristote (sur une lecture du *Peri Hermeneias*, à propos des modes et des adverbes selon Paul, Ammonius et Boèce)," in *Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity: The Alexandrian Commentary Tradition between Rome and Baghdad* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2011), p. 207.

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#### 4 *Peri Hermeneias*

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usually present him as the writer of an introduction to Aristotle's logic addressed to Khusrau Anoshirwan, because of Land's Latin translation of this text.<sup>1</sup> He is also presented as a convert to Zoroastrianism on the basis of a hint by Bar Hebraeus' his chronicle.<sup>2</sup> Some believe he was instructed in Nisibis and wrote his works in Persian or Middle Persian,<sup>3</sup> but Hugonnard-Roche has serious doubts about these matters.<sup>4</sup>

#### **The context**

It is necessary to acquire a comprehensive grasp of Paul the Persian's writings, and of *Peri Hermeneias* as part of these, based on an understanding of Syriac scholars' commentaries on Greek philosophy in Late Antiquity. So let me first give some definitions of Late Antiquity and an explanation of the significance of the position of this text among Late Antique texts. This will be helpful for providing us with an appropriate point of view on the *Peri Hermeneias* of Paul the Persian in Late Antiquity.

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1. J. P. N. Land, *Otia Syriaca* (Leiden: Brill, 1875), 1–30 (Latin section).
  2. See, for instance, Rubens Duval, *La littérature syriaque* (Paris: Librairie Victor Le Coffre, 1907), 250.
  3. Arthur Vööbus, *History of the School of Nisibis* (Louvain: Peeters, 1965), 171.
  4. See Henri Hugonnard-Roche, "Sur la lecture tardo-antique du *Peri Hermeneias* d'Aristote: Paul le Perse et la tradition d'Ammonius," *Studia graeco-arabica* 3 (2013): 38.

**Late Antiquity**

There are different definitions of Late Antiquity. Some define it by setting dates, while others refer to its characteristics. For instance, the Oxford Centre for Late Antiquity delineates its dates approximately and says that it was between 250 and 750 CE;<sup>1</sup> it also adds that there were massive cultural and political changes during this period. Philip Wood maintains that is a period of time in which the inheritance of the Greco-Roman past was reconfigured in a series of new forms.<sup>2</sup> David Hernández calls this period a first Renaissance of the Classical world which, in that cultural tradition, recreated and reaffirmed what is recognized as the most prestigious sources of our civilization. He considers its fundamental contribution to be that of transmitting the Classical legacy.<sup>3</sup> Peter Brown speaks about it under the title of “The Age of Ambition.”<sup>4</sup>

Finding answers for some preeminent questions may help us to develop a precise point of view about the role of Syriac scholars in Late Antiquity. What is the pivotal point for the definition of Syriac scholars in Late Antiquity? Is it right to choose the Greco-Roman world as a starting point? Syriac scholars transferred the knowledge of this area to the world with translations and commentaries in what Daniel King characterizes as three groups. The first is the “translation of Aristotelian texts,” the second,

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1. See the Centre’s website at <http://www.ocla.ox.ac.uk/> (accessed on 4 March 2014).
  2. Philip Wood, introduction to *History and Identity in the Late Antique Near East* (Oxford: University Press, 2013), xi.
  3. David Hernández de la Fuente, *New Perspectives on Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 1.
  4. Peter Brown, *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), 27–53.



“definitions literature,” and third, “introduction.”<sup>1</sup> Or should our perspective perhaps be based on the treatises produced by Syriac scholars in their efforts to transmit Greco-Roman knowledge? If we took Greco-Roman tradition as a starting point, we would agree with the idea of Peter Brown, who describes this period as one in which they reused older pieces in a new mosaic.<sup>2</sup> It is not, however, acceptable<sup>3</sup> when he describes the rise of Late Antique civilization as being due to the drifting of so many alien thistle seeds into the tidy garden of classical Greco-Roman culture.<sup>4</sup> In my opinion, looking through the remaining texts in search of Syriac scholars can be a better route for understanding their endeavors in transmitting Greco-Roman knowledge to Western Asia. In this way some statements open a path to reach the goal.

One reason for Assyrian theologians and bishops to pay attention to Aristotle’s logic is rooted in the theological controversies of the early centuries of Christianity.<sup>5</sup> They intentionally chose Aristotle’s logic for its utility in the debates on the single or dual nature of Christ.<sup>6</sup> Although these statements are reasonable for the central role of Greek logic in theology and polemics<sup>7</sup> in Late Antiquity, a contextual approach to the writings of Paul the Persian makes it clear that he sees logic as a part

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1. See Daniel King, “Why were the Syrians interested in Greek Philosophy?” in *History and Identity in the Late Antique Near East*, (Oxford: University Press, 2013), 64.
  2. Wood, introduction to *History and Identity in the Late Antique Near East*, xi.
  3. Especially the first part.
  4. Brown, *The Making of Late Antiquity*, 7.
  5. Teixidor, *Aristote en syriaque*, 19.
  6. King, “Why were the Syrians interested in Greek Philosophy?” 61.
  7. *Ibid.*, 70.

of philosophy<sup>1</sup> or a tool used by philosophy with some functions in decision-making about general meaning, as well as its functions in ethics, linguistics, theology and also logic itself. This is understandable when we read his letter to Khusrau,<sup>2</sup> since when he starts his letter he outlines his views on linguistics and theology, and also describes three figures of syllogisms for the king of the Sassanids.<sup>3</sup> He illustrated contradictions in his *Peri Hermeneias* without any allusions to Christians debates on some religious matters.

### About the text

Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias*, which means literally 'On Interpretation,'<sup>4</sup> is one of the six parts brought together in the *Organon*,<sup>5</sup> which includes: Κατηγορίαι,<sup>6</sup> Περὶ ἑρμηνείας,<sup>7</sup> Ἀναλυτικὰ πρότερα,<sup>8</sup> Ἀναλυτικὰ ὕστερα,<sup>9</sup> Τοπικά<sup>10</sup> and Περὶ σοφιστικῶν.<sup>11,12</sup> *Peri*

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1. Maintained by Stoics. See Robin Smith, "Aristotle's Logic," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta (forthcoming URL= <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/aristotle-logic/>>. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/>, accessed on 4 March 2014).
  2. Paul the Persian, *Letter to Khusrau I*, 1.
  3. *Ibid.*, 17–28.
  4. William and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 24.
  5. Or "instrument of science"; see *ibid.*, 23.
  6. "Categories."
  7. "On Interpretation."
  8. "Prior Analytics."
  9. "Posterior Analytics."
  10. "Topics."
  11. "On Sophistical Refutations."
  12. These works are listed in C. J. De Vogel, ed., *Greek Philosophy*, Vol. II (Leiden: Brill, 1953), 8.

*Hermeneias* does not deal only with phrase- or sentence-level utterances; it also deals with expressions which consist of words with separate meanings.<sup>1</sup> The main purpose of Aristotle in writing it was determining what pairs of statements are opposed and in what ways.<sup>2</sup>

Aristotle's works on logic in general comprise the earliest formal studies of logic.<sup>3</sup> They systematically divided up all human thought and served as a propaedeutic guide to all science<sup>4</sup> known to Syriac scholars. One of the first treatises on the logic of Aristotle in Syriac was Proba's commentary on interpretation.<sup>5</sup> Syriac scholars studied Aristotle's writings. For instance, Aristotle's *Categories* was standard reading for Antiochians.<sup>6</sup>

Although *Peri Hermeneias* is an important part of Aristotle's *Organon*, which Syriac scholars focused on in Late Antiquity, there is no mention of it in Brock's article.<sup>7</sup> However, we can relegate this text to the earliest translations of Aristotle's works in Late Antiquity.<sup>8</sup> Paul the Persian, with his writings on syllogisms and *Peri Hermeneias*, has sometimes been called a witness to the influence of the *Organon* on Eastern theology.<sup>9</sup> It seems Paul the Persian knew the importance of the position of

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1. Ibid., 43.

2. Kneale and Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 24.

3. Smith, "Aristotle's Logic."

4. Kneale and Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 37–38.

5. Teixidor, *Aristote en syriaque*, 22.

6. Maas, *Exegesis and Empire*, 25.

7. Sebastian Brock, "The Syriac Commentary Tradition," in *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: the Syriac, Arabic and medieval Latin traditions*, ed. Charles Burnett (London: Warburg Institute, University of London, 1993), 3–18.

8. For the characteristics of the earliest translations see *ibid.*, 3, 5.

9. King, "Why were the Syrians interested in Greek Philosophy?" 67.

sylogisms at the heart of Aristotle's logic, and perhaps he, like Kant, was aware that Aristotle discovered everything about logic.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, he wrote a summary of it for the Sassanid king.<sup>2</sup> The writings of Paul the Persian had a definite influence on Islamic philosophical writers of the ninth to eleventh centuries.<sup>3</sup> His influence had to do mainly with the classification and division of philosophy.<sup>4</sup> Concerning the importance of this text I must also mention that this treatise, with its subtitle of "demonstration," played a preeminent role in Miskawayh's *Tartīb al-sa'adāt* in the Islamic period.<sup>5</sup>

It is true that Paul the Persian's *Peri Hermeneias* is very terse and that it does not embrace all of Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias*.<sup>6</sup> Unlike Paul's letter to Khusrau, this treatise is only Paul's abridgment of *Peri Hermeneias*. It is clear that his abridgment did not take a Neo-Platonic approach.<sup>7</sup> Although it seems different from the writings of other Syriac scholars, this was one of the important routes he used to provide access to Aristotle's logical writings. He showed in his writings that he bypassed the Neo-Platonic point of view.

Before giving details about the manuscript of Paul the Persian's *Peri Hermeneias*, I should mention that,

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1. Smith, "Aristotle's Logic."
  2. On the position of the syllogism in the logic of Aristotle, see De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*, 39.
  3. Byard Bennett, "Paul the Persian," in *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, online edition, 2003, available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/paul-the-persian> (accessed on 4 March 2014).
  4. Gutas, "Paul the Persian on the classification of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy," 260–267.
  5. *Ibid.*, 265.
  6. Teixidor, "L'introduction au *De interpretatione*," 294.
  7. Teixidor, *Aristote en syriaque*, 28.

unfortunately, the Syriac text here is incomplete. Still, we can understand that Paul follows the Aristotelian text: he mentions the oppositions built with universal propositions, singular and indefinite.<sup>1</sup>

### **The Manuscript**

The manuscript of Paul the Persian's *Peri Hermeneias* that is recorded in Voste's catalogue<sup>2</sup> is now preserved in the monastery of Notre Dame des Semences in Alqosh, Iraq. This manuscript is the Syriac translation of Paul's writing by Severus Sebokht, who lived from the last quarter of the sixth century to about 631 C.E.<sup>3</sup> The manuscript used as the basis for this translation was copied in the early nineteenth century.<sup>4</sup>

The language of the manuscript is Syriac. It is transcribed on paper in East Syriac (*Maḡn<sup>2</sup>ḥāyā*) letters in three hundred ninety-six lines. It has four and a half lines of prologue and two lines of colophon. It is written in two colours, black and red. The first word is written in black but the rest of prologue is in red. Some of the punctuation marks are in both black and red. Red punctuation marks and words are found on a total of five out of the sixteen pages. The size of the folios is 32×22 cm. The manuscript is written on ordinary paper. There is a colophon that states that this manuscript was transcribed at the

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1. Ibid., 119.

2. Jacques Vosté, *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque Syro-Chaldéenne du Couvent de Notre-Dame des Semences près d'Alqoš Iraq* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste P. Geuthner, 1929), 23.

3. Robert Hoyland, "Jacob and Early Islamic Edessa," in *Jacob of Edessa and the Syriac Culture of His Day*, ed. Bas ter Haar Romeny (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 13.

4. Brock, email message to author, December 20, 2013.

monastery of Rabban Hormizd in 1840, but there is no indication of the name of the scribe.

### **The subject matter**

Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias* argues that a single assertion must always either affirm or deny a single predicate of a single subject.<sup>1</sup> It is like other parts of the *Categories*, which have preliminary studies of the sentence and the proposition.<sup>2</sup>

Some may believe that I should outline diachronic developments in the commentaries and translations of *Peri Hermeneias*, explaining the translations of *Peri Hermeneias* by Boethius, Apuleius,<sup>3</sup> Ammonius, Stephanus and Proba, as well as Severus Sebokht's letter to Ionan.<sup>4</sup> While this approach has merit, another approach is possible. I, like Teixidor, believe that Paul's *Peri Hermeneias* is not a complete translation of Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias*, and that part of it represents original thought on the part of Paul. The similarities and differences between Aristotle's and Paul's writings should be illustrated in a separate section. So the present book is more than just a translation of Paul's *Peri Hermeneias*. It is an opportunity for comparing Paul's and Aristotle's editions of *Peri Hermeneias*.

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1. Smith, "Aristotle's Logic."

2. Teixidor, *Aristote en syriaque*, 21.

3. Richard Sorabji, ed. *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 19.

4. Henri Hugonnard-Roche, "Le commentaire syriaque de Probus sur l'Isagoge de Porphyre. Une étude préliminaire," *Studia graeco-arabica* 2 (2012): 227–243.

### A Comparative Study of *Peri Hermeneias*

The following paragraphs illustrate some of the differences between Paul the Persian's and Aristotle's versions of *Peri Hermeneias*.

Aristotle begins his treatise with a short outline<sup>1</sup> of what he wants to do by defining noun and verb, and then explaining what is meant by denial, affirmation, proposition and sentence.<sup>2</sup>

Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι τί ὄνομα καὶ τί ῥῆμα,  
ἔπειτα τί ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις καὶ  
ἀπόφανσις καὶ λόγος.

First we must establish what a name is and what a verb is; then what negation is and affirmation, and the enunciation and speech.<sup>3</sup>

Rather than giving a general perspective on his aim in writing about *Peri Hermeneias*, Paul emphasizes speech and highlights the position of reason in knowing and the role of reason as the first step in knowing.

تدبرنا من ههنا دگر چکن: تمکبکم ای مهاد.  
هچکمه دگر دجک هکمه دتدبذک. ههنا دتدجک:  
تدب مکبکم ای دجک که. مهاد دتدبذک، دجکمه

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1. My view is a little different than that of the Kneales. The Kneales seem to have taken a macro point of view on the beginning of Aristotle's writing. I, though, focused more on the first sentence. See Kneale and Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 45.  
2. See Aristotle, *The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics*, ed. and trans. by Harold P. Cook and Hugh Tredennick (London: William Heinemann, 1938, reprinted 1962), 115.  
3. Greek text and English translation cited from Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Peryermeneias / Aristotle On Interpretation*, Commentary by Thomas Aquinas, finished by Cardinal Cajetan; trans. Jean T. Oesterle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962; published online at <http://dhspriority.org/thomas/PeriHermeneias.htm>, accessed on 4 March 2014).





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## 14 *Peri Hermeneias*

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the soul,<sup>1</sup> while Paul very quickly divides language into six parts of speech: **ܣܡܐ** (*s<sup>2</sup>mâ*),<sup>2</sup> **ܡܠܠܐ** (*mell<sup>2</sup>tâ*),<sup>3</sup> **ܣܘܒܪܐ** (*h<sup>2</sup>lāps<sup>2</sup>mâ*),<sup>4</sup> **ܥܠ ܡܠܠܐ** (*'al mell<sup>2</sup>tâ*),<sup>5</sup> **ܥܠ ܣܝܡܐ** (*'al s<sup>2</sup>yāmâ*)<sup>6</sup> and **ܘܚܕܐ** (*'essārâ*).<sup>7</sup> He then defines each term and gives examples of it.

If Aristotle can be described as impatient in the way he moves quickly through his discussion of contradictory pairs and the formal classification to which it leads,<sup>8</sup> Paul is even more impatient in that, without illustrating the relative positions of sentences in logic, he outlines his ideas on the details of parts of speech. He focuses on two main parts of speech, the noun and the verb, without elucidating the reasons why he chose these as the most important parts of speech.<sup>9</sup> He explains five kinds of nouns with examples that are not the same as those in Aristotle. Perhaps they are later acquisitions. Aristotle, for his part, states that the noun and the verb are the elements that function within the proposition.<sup>10</sup> In a final point of comparison, some discussion of truth and falsehood is found at the beginning of Aristotle's treatise, where he shows some similarity with Plato's dialogue "Sophist."<sup>11</sup> Though these particular similarities are absent in the writings of Paul and Proba, discussions of truth and falsehood begin sooner in Proba than Paul.

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1. Aristotle, *The Categories, On Interpretation*, 115. Semences

2. Noun.

3. Verb.

4. Pronoun.

5. Adverb.

6. Adsentential adverbial.

7. Conjunction.

8. Kneale and Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 46.

9. Teixidor, *Aristote en syriaque*, 99.

10. *Ibid.*, 112.

11. Plato *Sophist*, trans. Benjamin Jowett ([http:// classics. mit.edu/Plato/sophist.html](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/sophist.html), accessed on 4 March 2014).

Paul first explains five kinds of nouns and gives examples of each kind. He then goes on to present a four-tiered model of language: letters, spoken sounds, thoughts, things thought about. The three highest levels of this model bear a remarkable resemblance to modern triadic models of semiotics, with the following correspondences:

Paul's term	Semiotic term
things thought about	referent
Thoughts	signified
spoken sounds	signifier

Paul explains in more detail what he means by saying that while there are thoughts and things thought about that correspond to everything that exists, there are not letters and sounds that correspond to all things, since the former two items exist naturally, while the latter two must be produced in the form of statements. Paul is clearly aware of the artificial nature of language, whether written or spoken.

Paul's discussion of truth and falsehood initially shows some affinity with the approaches found in Aristotle<sup>1</sup> and in Plato's dialogue *Sophist*. However, their function in Paul's and Proba's versions of *Peri Hermeneiasis* differ. For Aristotle and Plato, truth and falsehood are only criteria, but in the writings of Paul and Proba they are the result of judgment.

For Aristotle, a noun or a verb by itself very much resembles a concept or thought which is neither combined nor divided:

τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ἔοικε τῷ  
ἄνευ συνθέσεως καὶ διαίρεσεως νοήματι,...

The nouns themselves and the verbs are like  
thought without combination and division,...

For Paul, though, this significant matter is only an example for his explanation of the relationship between sound

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1. Aristotle, *The Categories, On Interpretation*, 115.

and thought. As was mentioned above, Aristotle starts to define the noun<sup>1</sup> only after some introductory observations, while Paul quickly moves into the definition.

Paul and Aristotle have a similar approach, though they differ a little on the concept of judgment that is neither positive nor negative.<sup>2</sup> However, Paul adds “sometimes,”<sup>3</sup> which seems closer to the truth. Here are some examples of the similarities and differences between Paul and Aristotle. First, both of them use personal names such as “Socrates” and nouns such as “man,” but in different sentences. Aristotle has interrogative sentences like, “Is Socrates wise?”, while Paul writes, “Socrates is a man” or “Socrates is not a man.” Also Aristotle says, “Man is not white,” but Paul writes “Man is spirit” or “Man walks.”

Aristotle, in another part of his treatise, counts five contradictory pairs.<sup>4</sup> Paul, though, changed it to four pairs<sup>5</sup> of proposed oppositions.<sup>6</sup> Hugonnard-Roche says Paul approaches the analysis of this part<sup>7</sup> by interpreting the propositions in terms of their material subject.<sup>8</sup> Therefore there are some allusions to ἀδύνατον,<sup>9</sup> οὐκ ἀδύνατον<sup>10</sup> and δυνατόν<sup>11</sup> in Paul’s text. Paul the Persian discusses “necessary” (أَلْشَّيْءُ *ālšāyīâ*), “possible” (مَتَمَاشْيَانِيَّةٌ *metmašyānīâtâ*) and “impossible” (لَا مَتَمَاشْيَانِيَّةٌ *lâ mešk<sup>h</sup>hānīâtâ*) together. Aristotle, though, makes

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1. Ibid., 117.

2. For Aristotle see *ibid.*, 121.

3. أَيْ *emā(y)*.

4. Aristotle, *The Categories, On Interpretation*, 160–163.

5. Square logic.

6. Hugonnard-Roche, “Sur la lecture tardo-antique du *Peri Hermeneias* d’Aristote,” 91.

7. Contradiction.

8. Hugonnard-Roche, “Sur la lecture tardo-antique du *Peri Hermeneias* d’Aristote,” 37.

9. Impossible.

10. Not impossible.

11. Possible.

mention of “necessary” in the early part of his writing and waits until later in his discussion to mention “impossible” and “not impossible.” He adds “possible” after these.

Paul’s treatment of oppositions is a rather confusing summary,<sup>1</sup> while Aristotle’s discussion is wider and clearer than that of Paul. At the end of his treatise Paul also gives some statistics about oppositions. He explains some details of simple and compound sentences of three different kinds, and comes up with a total of 1,512. It seems this statistic is a logical extrapolation from Aristotle carried out by Paul the Persian.

The treatise by Aristotle provides an occasion for Paul to write on some important matters of logic. This idea is clearer in his letter to Khusrau I, in which Paul sends philosophy as a gift to the king. Philosophy is clarified through language, and it is emphasized that philosophy is better than all other gifts.<sup>2</sup>

### **Punctuation**

Since the explanation of punctuation marks is not a priority for translators of Syriac manuscripts, there is not enough information about them. It is important to carry out an in-depth study of the punctuation marks in this text. A cursory glance at the punctuation marks reveals seven kinds of marks, most of which are similar to the ones used in Paul’s letter to Khusrau I. These seven punctuation marks are:

•     :     ;     ”     :     |     ❖

There are similarities and differences in the punctuation marks used in this text and in Paul’s letter to Khusrau I. I will illustrate these after offering some notes on the punctuation marks in *Peri Hermeneias*.

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1. Teixidor, *Aristote en syriaque*, 119.

2. J. P. N. Land, 1.

• This is called *pāsôqâ* (breaking-off).<sup>1</sup> It marks a division or separation in recitation. It is also found at the end of a verse or minor clauses which are fairly long or syntactically self-contained. In tone it is probably level or neutral.<sup>2</sup> Here it plays roles such as those of the comma and the period (full stop).

∴ This sign, called *'elaya* (upper),<sup>3</sup> indicates a question or an exclamation. This is the combination of *'esyânâ* (resisting, compelling: ∴) with *pāsôqâ*. It has a rising tone.<sup>4</sup> It seems that its function in this text is closest to that of an exclamation point.

∴ This sign is called *tahtâyâ* (lower).<sup>5</sup> And this is a combination of *sâmkâ* (support:∴) and *pāsôqâ*. It is sometimes at the end of a clause other than the final clause of the verse and particularly when the following words contain an antithesis to what has gone before. It probably has a tonal value.<sup>6</sup> It seems to function like a semicolon.

∴ In East Syriac this is called *zaugâ* (pair) and in West Syriac it is called *š<sup>2</sup>wayyâ* (level). This accent is probably a reduplication of *pāsôqâ*. It occurs less frequently in the older manuscripts than *'elaya* or *tahtâyâ*. Later usage shows that *š<sup>2</sup>wayyâ*, like *pāsôqâ* had level tone.<sup>7</sup> Sebastian Brock believes

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1. J.B. Segal, *The Diacritical Point and the Accents in Syriac* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 64.

2. Ibid., 73.

3. Ibid., 64.

4. Ibid., 74.

5. Ibid., 64.

6. Ibid., 74.

7. Ibid., 64, 75.

that this and the sign consisting of three vertical dots ( ∴ ) usually correspond to a semicolon or sometimes just a comma.<sup>1</sup>

∴ This sign is called *râhtâ* (running) and it is probably an extension of *'eşyânâ*.<sup>2</sup> It is used where two words are closely associated in a context to which a rising tone is appropriate, such as exclamatory clauses. Elias of Tîrhan maintains that *râhtâ* is the only accent that does not delay the recitation.<sup>3</sup> This sign combined with *pâsôqâ*, making a subsidiary pause, is called *râhtâd-pâsêq*. It associates the word over which it is written with the preceding word.<sup>4</sup> It is a more major break, and corresponds to an English period (full stop).<sup>5</sup>

∴ On this mark see the discussion of ∴ (*zauğâ / ş'wayyâ*) above.

❖ This sign indicates the end of a paragraph.

### **Acknowledgments**

My deepest expression of gratitude goes to Adam Becker, who accepted me as a visiting scholar and helped me a lot with acquiring Paul the Persian references.

I owe most respectful thanks to AIIRs for their grant to do research in the United States in the summer of 2012. I am also most grateful for their recommendation to the Kurdistan Regional Government to facilitate my continued research on Paul the Persian in the Kurdistan.

It is a special honor to work with Dr. Azad Ahmed Saadon, president of Nawroz University in Duhok, Kurdistan Region, Iraq. Without his moral and financial support I would

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1. Brock, email message to author, February 4, 2014.

2. Segal, *The Diacritical Point and the Accents in Syriac*, 64, 70.

3. *Ibid.*, 71.

4. *Ibid.*, 128.

5. Brock, email message to author, February 4, 2014.

not have been able to begin this project. I am eternally grateful for his kindness.

I feel blessed and fortunate to have had the chance to meet Benjamin Haddad, who helped me a lot in learning more Syriac and in translating this text. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Rev. Shlemun Isho Khoshaba and his colleagues in Dar Al-Mashreq for answering my questions and providing reference works. I must also express my thanks to Hidemi Takahashi and Samer Yohanna, who helped me gain access to a copy of this manuscript. I also feel profound gratitude for this opportunity to Dr. Mohammad Seddiq, who promptly answered my request about research on Paul the Persian in the area of the Kurdistan Regional Government. I am proud to have had the ongoing guidance of Dr. Mostafa Younesie, whom I cannot thank enough for his help over the last eight years.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my collaborator, Dr. Paul S. Stevenson, whose contacts with the Kurdistan Regional Government and with Dr. Azad Ahmed Saadoon, president of Nawroz University, made it possible for this research to be completed. He also produced the final translation and transliteration of the Syriac text, and for this reason he appears as my co-author on this work.

It should be also noted that some notifications of Dr. Asadollah Fallahi were helpful and my best thanks are to Mr. Zafaranchi and his collaborators in Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies for publishing this book. Moreover, the support of Nebonid F. Namroud and our friends in the Assyrian Society of Tehran is unforgettable. I am grateful to all of them.

## English Translation

“Another commentary on the same book,<sup>1</sup> *Peri Hermeneias*, composed in a concise form by Paul the Persian and translated from the Persian language into the Syriac language by Sebokht,<sup>2</sup> a man who is called Severus,<sup>3</sup> bishop of Qenneshre.<sup>4</sup> Lord help me, amen.<sup>5,6</sup> amen.<sup>5,6</sup>”

¶1<sup>7</sup> [2:5] Man, because of logos, is more excellent than those creatures without speech.<sup>1</sup> Whoever wants to

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1. “The same” refers to the fact that the previous work in the same codex is also a commentary on *Peri Hermeneias*.
  2. Syriac *Sābbukt*.
  3. Syriac *Sēwarē*.
  4. Syriac *Qennešrin*.
  5. “Lord help me, amen.” This is clearly a brief prayer by the scribe as he begins to copy this new section of the codex.
  6. With the exception of the first word, this whole introductory paragraph is in red ink in the codex.
  7. The paragraph numbers (marked with ¶) coincide Hugonnard-Roche in order to facilitate comparison of the two translations.



know something, that can be known, and he wants to know it, he learns<sup>2</sup> it by means of logic for the tool<sup>3</sup> to know everything is Logic, and therefore it is right first to know logos.

¶2 The parts of speech<sup>4</sup> are six: <P-1>noun, [2:10] <P-2>verb, <P-3>pronoun, <P-4>adverb, <P-5>adstantial adverbial,<sup>5</sup> <P-6>conjunction.

<P-1>The noun is an expression<sup>6</sup> that indicates something without time in a statement. If it is divided it means nothing. For example, “man, horse, pearl.” Because if *margānitâ* (pearl) is divided into *mar-gā-nitâ*, then it indicates nothing. Therefore, even if that *mar*, when [2:15] it is said separately, may be an indication of something, when it is found in *margānitâ* it is not an indication of that thing.<sup>7</sup>

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1. The Syriac terms translated “logic” (*m̄lilutâ*) and “speech” (*mellatâ*) in this sentence are derived from the same root, *mll*. Each word can be translated in other ways, depending on context. The translations used here are those most suitable to this context.
  2. The root *yd'* is used for all the verbs translated “know” or “learn” in this sentence. In the fourth and final case it is translated “learn” because it clearly has an inceptive sense here, and this is correctly conveyed in English by the dynamic verb “learn” rather than by the stative verb “know.”
  3. Greek loanword *organon*.
  4. Syriac *m̄nāwātâ d-m̄mrâ*. The word *m̄mrâ* can be variously translated “proposition,” “sentence” or “discourse.” In the present phrase “speech” is part of the fixed English phrase “parts of speech.” When *m̄mrâ* occurs separately in this treatise, we have opted for the generic translation “utterance,” which fits most of the contexts well.
  5. See the discussion of the reason for this label in the paragraph below that gives examples of these elements.
  6. Syriac *qālâ*, and so in the discussion of the remaining five parts of speech.
  7. I.e., of the pearl.

<P-2>The verb is an expression that is in a statement that indicates some active or passive action, along with time. For example, “I cut down”; passive: “I am cut down.”

Nouns and verbs are of two kinds. [2:20] one is determined, for example, “a man,” “he cuts down.” And one is not determined, for example, “no man,” “he does not cut down.”

<P-3>The pronoun is an expression that is said instead of a noun, for example, “I, you,<sup>1</sup> he, we, you,<sup>2</sup> they, this, that.”

<P-4>The adverb is an expression that is applied to a verb, for example, “lovingly, humbly, freely.”

[2:25]<P-5>The adverbial<sup>3</sup> is an expression that is placed in an utterance,<sup>4</sup> as for example *afterwards, at first, outside, inside, no, yes* are placed.

<P-6>The conjunction is an expression that joins an utterance to an utterance, for example “because, on that account, if, on the one hand,”<sup>5</sup> particle.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Masculine singular.

2. Masculine plural.

3. The Syriac expression is *ʿal sʿyāmā*, which can be literally translated “on the statement.” From the examples given it is clear that the author is thinking of sentence-level (*afterwards, at first, no, yes*) and clause-level (*outside, inside*) adverbial expressions.

4. Syriac *mēmra*.

5. “On the one hand” translates Syriac *man* which is the borrowed from of Greek μέν. The matched particles *man...dên* in Syriac are used in a manner similar to the Greek pair μέν...δέ.

6. This last item in the list is incongruous, in that while the previous items are examples of conjunctions, the word here translated “particle,” *ʿātutâ*, refers to a group of copulative particles (see Sokoloff, *A Syriac Lexicon*, 109b sub ܐܘܬܘܬܐ 2b).

Of all the parts [3:1] of speech, the noun and the verb are the most prominent. And of these two, the noun is the most notable. On that account intelligent people sometimes call all parts of speech nouns.<sup>1</sup>

3Five are the kinds of nouns that are said about anything: <N-1>polysemous, [3:5] <N-2>identical, <N-3>polyonymous, <N-4>different, <N-5>paronymous.<sup>2</sup>

<N-1>Polysemous nouns are two or many things which, while they have the same name, are different in the nature that is in that name. For example, “sharpness/rapidity”<sup>3</sup> said about a mind, a sword, a color and steps.

<N-2>Identical nouns are two or many things which, while [3:10] they have the same name, are also the same in

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1. The Syriac term translated “nouns” is *šamāhē*, the primary translation of which is “names.” This rather generic meaning is probably the reason why the author says it is sometimes used as a general label for all parts of speech.
  2. Based on the definitions given by the author, a table can be devised to illustrate the features considered. The terms are kept in the order in which the author lists them.

Syriac	English	One name?	One nature?
<i>šawyuṭ šamâ</i>	Polysemous	Y	N
<i>ʿam šamâ</i>	Identical	Y	Y
<i>saggi ʿuṭ šamāhē</i>	polyonymous	N	Y
<i>(ʿ)hārēnāyuṭ šamâ</i>	Different	N	N
<i>men šamâ</i>	Paronymous	N/A; strictly an etymological relationship	

3. Syriac *harripuṭâ*, which can mean “sharpness” or “rapidity.” Thus it can be applied to a wide range of things, concrete and abstract.

the nature that is in that name. For example, “man” [applied] to me and to you and to the rest of men.

<N-3>Polyonymous nouns are one thing which does not have a single name. For example, *saypâ* (sword), *sapsērâ* (sword), *ḥarbâ* (sword).

<N-4>Different nouns are many different things that also have different names. [3:15] For example, “earth,” “water,” “sun.”

<N-5>Paronymous nouns are nouns that are derived from another noun. For example, from *naggāruṭâ* (carpentry), *naggārâ* (carpenter), and from *qaynāyutâ* (metalworking), *qaynāyâ* (smith).

¶4 There are four things: letters, spoken sounds, thoughts, things that are thought about.<sup>1</sup> Letters are indicators of what is in spoken sounds. Spoken sounds are indicators [3:20] of thoughts that are in the soul.<sup>2</sup> Every thought is from something and about something. There are not letters and spoken sounds that correspond to everything, but there are thoughts and things thought

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1. Here the author gives us a four-tiered model of language. In tabular form, with the most concrete level at the bottom and the most abstract level at the top, this model can be represented in this way:

Syriac	English
<i>meddem da-<sup>o</sup>law hāwê ḥušābâ</i>	things that are thought about
<i>ḥušābê</i>	Thoughts
<i>qālê</i>	spoken sounds
<i>kātibātâ</i>	Letters

As was mentioned in the introduction to this book, the top three levels are remarkably similar to modern triadic models of semiotics.

2. Syriac *napšâ*, which can also be translated “soul.” It is tempting to use the translation “mind,” but this would perhaps be unfaithful to the author’s intent.

about that do correspond to everything. This is the reason: Thoughts and what is thought about exist naturally, but spoken sounds and writing exist in statements.

¶5 [3:25] Sometimes there is a thought in the soul and it is not true and it is not false, for example, if someone thinks simply “horse”; and sometimes it is true or false, for example, if someone thinks, “A horse is four-legged” or “A horse is not four-[4:1]legged.” For when he thinks of or says one part of speech separately, it is neither truth nor falsehood. However, when both are within<sup>1</sup> [a proposition], sometimes they are with one another and sometimes they are divided from one another. Thus is the thought that is in the soul, [4:5] which is perceived separately by means of spoken sound, for example, a noun or a verb that is said separately by means of spoken sound. A separate thought is not an utterance,<sup>2</sup> but only a thought. Nor is a noun or a verb that is spoken in isolation an utterance; they are just a noun and a verb.

¶6 An utterance exists in two ways. One [4:10] is in the thought and is mental,<sup>3</sup> and one is in speech and is perceptible to the senses. When a thought that is in the soul is joined to another thought, then at that time it becomes a mental utterance. Sometimes it is true or false, and sometimes it is not true and not false. For not every utterance is true or false, as we say afterwards. When by means of spoken sound the noun and the verb are said

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1. Here we follow Hugonnard-Roche’s emendation of **ܟܝܘܕ** to **ܟܝܘܕܐ**.
  2. Here we emend **ܡܝܛܐܡܪܐ** (*met(‘)amrâ*) to **ܡܝܛܡܪܐ** (*mêmrâ*), unlike Hugonnard-Roche, who simply omits it. Our emendation is consistent with the structure of the following sentence.
  3. Syriac *metyaddê ānâ*, from the root *yd* “know.” Cf. *napšâ* above.

together, then at that time it becomes an utterance perceptible to the senses, and it is true or false, and it is sometimes not true and not false, as it is also in thought.

¶7 An utterance is a spoken sound that indicates something in a statement. If it is divided, then [4:20] even its parts indicate something, for example, “Man is endowed with a soul”; that is, its nature is one that indicates. If it is divided, then each of its parts indicates something, for example, the noun and the verb.

¶7a [4:23] Ten are the types of sentences: <S-1> vocative,<sup>1</sup> <S-2> interrogative,<sup>2</sup> <S-3> imperative,<sup>3</sup> <S-4> persuasive,<sup>4</sup> <S-5> declarative,<sup>5</sup> <S-6> exclamatory,<sup>6</sup> <S-7> adjuratory,<sup>7</sup> [4:25] <S-8> optative,<sup>8</sup> <S-9> affirmative,<sup>9</sup> <S-10> equivocal.<sup>10</sup> <S-1> Vocative, for example, “Come here!” <S-2> Interrogative, for example, “Where are you coming from?” <S-3> Imperative, for example, “Go away from here!” <S-4> Persuasive, for example, “Give me this thing!” <S-5> Declarative, for example, “The sun is bright.” <S-6> Exclamatory, [5:1] for example, “How bright the sun is!” <S-7> Adjuratory, for example, “God knows it is bright.” <S-8> Optative, for example, “May that place become a hundred, amen.”<sup>11</sup> <S-

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1. Syriac *qāroyā*.

2. Syriac *m<sup>3</sup>ša(°)lānā*.

3. Syriac *pāqodā*.

4. Syriac *māpisānā*.

5. Syriac *pāsoqā*.

6. Syriac *metdammārānā*.

7. I.e., having the form of an oath. Syriac *yammāyā*.

8. Syriac *mettāsimānā*.

9. Syriac *sāyomā*.

10. Syriac *metpaššəkānā*.

11. The sense of this example is not entirely clear. Hugonnard-Roche translates it “soit ce lieu la patrie, amen.” The translation of *mā(°)* as “patrie” (“homeland”) is based on a variant of *mātā* given in

9> Affirmative, for example, “Truly the sun is bright.” <S-10> Equivocal, for example, “When this thing might happen.”

¶8 And it is also possible [5:5] for them to be divided into five [types]:<S-1> vocative, <S-2> interrogative, <S-3> imperative, <S-4> persuasive and <S-5> declarative. For <S-10> equivocal is <S-2> interrogative, since it questions it. <S-6> Exclamatory is greater than <S-5> declarative only by “How!”,<sup>1</sup> but it is declarative. <S-7> Adjuratory is greater than <S-5> declarative by the testimony of God, but it is also declarative. It is obvious that <S-8> optative is declarative, [5:10] in that it is just stronger than the declarative, but it is declarative. And it is clear that if equivocal is interrogative, and exclamatory, adjuratory, optative and affirmative are within declarative, in this way, even as it was said, there are five types of sentences.<sup>2</sup>

¶9 Truth and falsehood exist only in the declarative, [5:15] because the one who says, “The sun is bright” tells the truth in a declarative utterance, and the one who says, “The sun is not bright” tells a lie in a declarative utterance.

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*Thesaurus Syriacus* by Robert Payne Smith, which is also found in Audo.

1. Syriac *mâ*.
2. This classification can be summarized in the following table:

Main category	Subsidiary categories
<S-1> Vocative	—
<S-2> Interrogative	<S-10> Equivocal
<S-3> Imperative	—
<S-4> Persuasive	—
<S-5> Declarative	<S-6> Exclamatory, <S-7> Adjuratory, <S-8> Optative, <S-9> Affirmative

But whoever calls<sup>1</sup> or questions a person or commands or persuades by means of that which he calls or asks or commands or persuades, he does not speak truth or falsehood. Philosophers only care about the declarative [5:20] sentence, on account of the fact that they want to know about everything that is truth and falsehood, so that they can hold onto the truth and leave falsehood behind. Because those other four [types of] sentences are necessary for something else, but the declarative sentence is only for a declaration of knowledge.

¶10 A declaration is what says of a part [5:25] without black, “It is not black.”<sup>2</sup> They both tell the truth and there is no contradiction<sup>3</sup> because of the difference of the parts.<sup>4</sup> And even if one [part] says there are four oppositions<sup>5</sup> and another says there are not four [6:1] oppositions, and the one that says there are four oppositions is saying [this] according to eight, and the one that says there are no oppositions is saying [this] according to two, both tell the truth, and there is no contradiction, because of the difference [in the basis] of comparison.

And even if one says, “The boy [6:5] is a grammarian” and another says, “The boy is not a grammarian,” the one who says that he is a grammarian

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1. This verb, *qārê*, is formed from the same root, *qr*, as the term translated “vocative”: *qāroyâ*.
  2. As Hugonnard-Roche points out, the positive counterpart of this negative statement is clearly lacking in the manuscript. The following sentence assumes that both the positive and the negative statements precede it.
  3. The Greek loanword *antipasis* is used.
  4. Syriac *mānāṭā*. This is grammatically singular but a plural is required for the English in this context.
  5. Syriac *pelgê*.



speaks in terms of potential,<sup>1</sup> and the one who says that he is not a grammarian speaks in terms of actuality.<sup>2</sup> Both speak the truth and there is no contradiction because of the difference of the thing.

¶11 It [6:10] is clear, then, that a contradiction is formed when what I state and what I affirm is the same in affirmation and in negation, but not in polysemy or identity, nor in any other time, nor in any other part, nor any other [6:15] comparable thing; and what is said is not anything different, whether it is said specifically, for example “Socrates,” or generically and not specifically, that is, either undetermined<sup>3</sup> (i.e., without a determinative expression<sup>4</sup>), e.g., “man,” or determined<sup>5</sup> (i.e., with a determinative expression<sup>6</sup>), [6:20] e.g., “every man.”

¶12 There are four determinative expressions: “all, one, not one, not all.” Of these, two are affirmative and two negative. E.g., “Every man is a grammarian,” “One man is a grammarian,” “Not one man is a grammarian,” and “Not every man is a grammarian.”

¶13 [6:25] Natural materials,<sup>7</sup> about which utterances are said, are three: necessary, possible, impossible. “Necessary” is that which, when it exists,

1. “In terms of potential” is *bə-ḥaylā* in Syriac. This interpretation of the phrase, especially in conjunction with *bə-ma bəṛānuṭā*, which follows, becomes clear from the examples given in Sokoloff 447b *sub* ܚܝܠܐ (*ḥaylā*), sense c(2). The translation of *ḥaylā* as “potential” is suggested by Payne Smith 140b, *sub* ܚܝܠܐ, ܚܝܠܐ (*ḥil, ḥaylā*), sense *e*, which best fits the present context.

2. Syriac *bə-ma bəṛānuṭā*. See previous note.

3. Syriac *lā mətahham*.

4. The Greek loanword *pərosdiorismos*.

5. Syriac *mətahham*.

6. Greek *pərosdiorismos*.

7. For “materials” the Syriac uses the Greek loanword *hula(ʿ)s*. In this paragraph the author makes it clear that he is referring to modalities of truth value. He uses the term the same way in paragraph 29. In paragraph 28, however, he uses *hula(ʿ)s* in the sense of the core constituents of a clause, i.e., the verb and its arguments.

cannot be otherwise, for example, “good,” “evil,” “two and two are four.” [7:1] “Possible” is that which is but can be otherwise, for example, “He who walks will sit”; or that which is not but can be so, for example, “He who is not a grammarian but who can become one.” “Impossible” is said of that which [7:5] is not, nor is it possible for it to be: “The lion is a pig,” or “A person who by nature is four-legged,” or “Two and two are ten.”

¶14 Opposition<sup>1</sup> with respect to something individual always forms a contradiction with each one of the natural materials, because in the case of<sup>2</sup> what is necessary, the affirmation is always true, e.g., [7:10] “Socrates is a man,” and the negation is always false, e.g., “Socrates is not a man.” And in the case of what is impossible, the affirmation is always false, e.g., “Socrates is a pig,” and the negation is always true, e.g., “Socrates is not [7:15] a pig.” And also in the case of what is possible, one is true and one is false, e.g., “Socrates is divine” and “Socrates is not divine.”

¶15 Opposition with respect to something universal that has no determinative expression, forms a contradiction in the case of what is necessary, and [7:20] the affirmation is always true, for example, “Man is endowed with a soul,” and the negation is always false, for example, “Man is not endowed with a soul.” Also, in the

1. Syriac *l̥aql̥bl̥āyut̥ s̥ayāmā*.

2. The Syriac phrase translated “in the case of” is *ʿal k̥ayānā ḡ-*. Hugonnard-Roche translates this phrase “selon la nature du.” After considering rather literal English translations (“by the nature of,” “concerning the nature of,” “according to the nature of”), we realized that none of these conveyed what is clearly the sense intended by the author. What he means can be paraphrased as “when modality X is applied.” A concise way to express this in English is “in the case of.” The phrase has been translated this way throughout the treatise.

case of what is impossible, it always forms a contradiction and the affirmation is always false, for example, “Man is a donkey,” and the negation is always [7:25] true, for example, “Man is not a donkey.” And in the case of what is possible, both can be true, for example “Man walks,” “Man does not walk.” But this is only stated in an oppositional manner, and there is no contradiction.

¶[16 [8:1]However, with respect to anything universal and not unique that has a determinative expression, it happens that there are oppositions of six kinds, which I will now state. <O-1> One is “Every man exists. Not one man exists.” <O-2> One is “Every man exists. One man exists.” <O-3>One is [8:5] “Not one man exists. No man exists.” <O-4> One is “One man exists. No man exists.” <O-5> One is “Every man exists. No man exists.” <O-6>And one is “One man exists. Not one man exists.”

¶[17 The opposition that exists in <O-1> “every and not one” is named [8:10] “major opposites.” The one that exists in <O-2> “every and one” is called “subalternate affirmation.” The one that exists in <O-3> “not one and no” is named “subalternate negation.” The one that exists in <O-4> “one and no” is called “minor opposites.” The one that exists in <O-5> “every and no” and also the one that exists in <O-6> “one and not one” [8:15]: both are based on the angles<sup>1</sup> and are named contradictions.<sup>2</sup>

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1. “Based on the angles” (Syriac *men gonāwātā*) implicitly refers to the diagram that follows in the manuscript.
  2. The six kinds of oppositions, with their Syriac terms, are summarized in the following table:

¶18 The one that is <O-1> major opposites, in the case of what is necessary and also in the case of what is impossible, distinguishes<sup>1</sup> truth and falsehood. In the case of what is possible it does not distinguish, because it is possible that the affirmation and the negation may be equally false, e.g., “Every man is healthy” [8:20] and “Not one man is healthy.” The one that is <O-4> minor opposites, in the case of what is necessary and the case of what is impossible, is true and false. In the case of what is possible it does not distinguish, because it is possible for both to be true, e.g., “One man is healthy.” “No man is healthy.” The one that is <O-2> subalternate [8:25] affirmation, in the case of what is necessary, [both parts] together always speak the truth. In the case of what is impossible, [both parts] together always speak falsehood. In the case of what is possible, one [part] [9:1] speaks the truth and one [part] speaks falsehood. E.g., “Every man is a grammarian.” “One man is a grammarian.” The one that

Number	Pair of determinative expressions		Type of opposition	
	Syriac	Translation	Syriac	Translation
O-1	<i>kol- lâ ḥad</i>	all- not one	<i>saqqublāyê rawrbê</i>	major opposites
O-2	<i>kol - ḥad</i>	all - one	<i>qatapasis da-təḥêt ḥadādâ</i>	subalternate affirmation
O-3	<i>lâ ḥad - lâ kol</i>	not one - not all	<i>apopasis da-təḥêt ḥadādâ</i>	subalternate negation
O-4	<i>ḥad- lâ kol</i>	one- not all	<i>saqqublāyê zə'orê</i>	minor opposites
O-5	<i>kol - lâ kol</i>	all - not all	<i>'antipasis</i>	contradiction
O-6	<i>ḥad-lâ ḥad</i>	one-not one		

1. Syriac *məpalləgâ*, which can also be translated “divides” or “separates.”

is <O-3> subalternate negation, in the case of what is necessary, [both parts] together always speak falsehood. In the case of what is impossible it always speaks the truth. In the case of what is [9:5] possible, it always distinguishes truth and falsehood, e.g., “Not one man is a grammarian”; “No man is a grammarian.”

¶19 Both kinds of contradictions <O-5,6> always distinguish truth and falsehood about every natural material; one transmits truth and the other falsehood. On the one hand, <O-1> major opposites are never true [9:10] at the same time, but sometimes they are false at the same time. <O-4> Minor opposites, though, are never false at the same time, but sometimes they are true at the same time. <O-2> Subalternate affirmations and negations are sometimes true and the same time and they are sometimes false at the same time; and sometimes they distinguish truth [9:15] and falsehood at the same time.

¶20 However, only those that are based on the angles form contradictions, because they always distinguish truth and falsehood. The reason is this: The <O-1> major opposites are only opposite in quality, in that one is an affirmation and one a negation. In quantity, though, they are not opposite, because of the two of them, one asserts<sup>1</sup> the whole [9:20] thing and the other denies<sup>2</sup> it. <O-4> Minor opposites also are the same way. One part asserts a thing and the other part denies it. Both of <O-2,3> the subalternates are not, on the one hand, opposite in quality, because both parts are either affirmations or negations. They are, rather, only opposites in quantity, [9:25] because one always asserts or denies everything and one [always asserts or denies] not everything. However,

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1. Syriac verb *swm*, Pe‘al stem.

2. Syriac verb *rwm*, Aph‘el stem.

both of those based on the angles are opposites in quality and at the same time in quantity, because one is always an affirmation and the other a negation; and one is [10:1] universal and the other is not universal.

¶21 This is a diagram of them:

<i>In the case of the three [natural materials]</i>	Major opposites: In the case of of what is necessary and what is impossible they distinguish truth and falsehood, and in the case of what is possible both are false.	<i>in a contradictory manner.</i>						
Subalternate negation: In the case of what is necessary they are both false, and in the case of what is impossible they are both true, and in the case of what is possible they distinguish truth and falsehood.	<table style="margin: auto; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;"><b>not one</b></td> <td style="padding: 2px;"><b>all</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;"><i>they always distinguish truth and falsehood</i></td> <td style="padding: 2px;"><i>they always distinguish truth and falsehood</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;"><b>not all</b></td> <td style="padding: 2px;"><b>one</b></td> </tr> </table>	<b>not one</b>	<b>all</b>	<i>they always distinguish truth and falsehood</i>	<i>they always distinguish truth and falsehood</i>	<b>not all</b>	<b>one</b>	Subalternate affirmation: In the case of what is necessary they are both true, and in the case of what is impossible they are both false, and in the case of what is possible they distinguish truth and falsehood.
<b>not one</b>	<b>all</b>							
<i>they always distinguish truth and falsehood</i>	<i>they always distinguish truth and falsehood</i>							
<b>not all</b>	<b>one</b>							
<i>In the case of the three [natural materials]</i>	Minor opposites: In the case of what is necessary and also what is impossible they distinguish truth and falsehood, and in the case of what is possible both are true.	<i>in a contradictory manner.</i>						

¶22 [10:20] Sometimes in affirmation and negation there is one noun and one verb, and sometimes in both

[kinds of utterances] there are two nouns. If, on the one hand, it is the case that there is one noun, it is a simple proposition;<sup>1</sup> this, then, is a simple utterance. If, on the other hand, there are two nouns, it is a compound proposition; this, then, is a compound utterance. [10:25] Without a verb it forms neither an affirmation nor a negation. Each affirmation is the opposite of one negation, and each negation of one affirmation.

¶23 In a declarative [11:1] utterance always, when “not” is said with a noun, an affirmation is formed. And when it is said with a verb, a negation is formed. Because for the utterance that says, “Socrates is a man,” its negation is this: “Socrates [11:5] is not a man.” And the utterance that says, “Socrates is a non-man,” is an affirmation, and its negation is “Socrates is not<sup>2</sup> a non-man.” Every affirmation in which “not” is, shows that it is a negation, unless it does not say “not”<sup>3</sup> with a verb; and every negation in which there are two “nots”<sup>4</sup> [11:10] shows that it is an affirmation, and likewise it says “not” with the verb. In negations that have a determinative expression, we always say a “not” with the quantifier expression, for example, “not all” and “not one.” When in a declaration there are two nouns, we never use a determinative expression with [11:15] the noun that is the predicate, but we always use it with the noun that is the

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1. Greek loanword *pəroʒasis*.

2. We agree with the clearly necessary inclusion of an additional *lâ* “not” here, proposed by Hugonnard-Roche.

3. Again, we agree with Hugonnard-Roche that it is necessary to insert an additional *lâ* in order for this statement to make sense.

4. At this point the present manuscript inserts “Socrates,” which makes no sense in context and is omitted from consideration in the translation. Hugonnard-Roche’s transcription does not have “Socrates” here and he has no comment about omitting it.

subject. For it is not the case that in the same way that it is possible for us to say, “Every man is an animal,” we can also likewise truly say, “Man is every animal,” inasmuch as this is false.

¶24 Just as three are the parts of time, [11:20] so also is the utterance. Therefore every utterance is formed in three times, for example, “Socrates is. Socrates was. Socrates will be.”

¶25 Every contradiction always distinguishes truth and falsehood, as was said, but not always in the same way. [11:25] For in the case of something that is, and something that cannot be, in the same way it also distinguishes how we know what is true and what is false. But in the case of what is possible, and the case of something that is going to be, it does not always come about in the same way. [12:1] It distinguishes in such a way that we do not know whether the affirmation or the negation is true until it comes about. For example, one says, “Tomorrow rain or a battle will happen,” and another says, “Tomorrow[does not] rain or a battle will not happen.”

¶26 Three are [12:5] the parts of the nature of what is possible. One is that which is like what comes about in most cases, and nature is prior to<sup>1</sup> it. One is that which comes about rarely and at long intervals, and accident is prior to it. And one is that which comes about occasionally, sometimes this way and sometimes that, and our will is prior to it. Men only ask [12:10] one another about this part, and they deliberate and consider. There are

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1. “Prior to” is the translation of Syriac *qədim*. The sense almost causal. It could be translated “responsible for,” “at the root of” or even “logically antecedent to.”



some who say about something that it necessarily<sup>1</sup> was and is, because of necessity,<sup>2</sup> it has in its nature the nature of what is possible. For it will be or it will not be, because it is necessary tomorrow that there will be rain or there will not be; or that I go to India or that I not go. But until it happens, we [12:15] do not know. We observe everything as it is in its essence, and not as we know it. But if everything necessarily was and is, and nothing happens by accident or by will, [then] advice and questions for one another, and work and service, and the virtue and the vice of men, and the punishment and the [12:20] rewards of bowing down and royal dignity are superfluous. It is understood among those who are worthy that such [a view] is foolish.<sup>3</sup> Rather, it is not the case that everything necessarily was or is, but indeed, it also happens by accident or by will.

¶27 When one noun and one<sup>4</sup> verb are spoken together, four are the oppositions. One concerns a thing that is individual. [12:25] One concerns a thing that is universal that does not have a determinative expression. Two concern things that are universal that have determinative expressions. These four, times the three natural materials, come to twelve. And these twelve, times these three times,<sup>5</sup> come to thirty-[13:1] six. And again,

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1. Here the Greek loanword *'ananqê* (in the Syriac adverbial form *'ananqâ 'it*) is used, rather than the Syriac *'ālšāyâ*, which is used earlier in this treatise.
  2. Greek *'ananqê*.
  3. Our interpretation of the Syriac text is very different from that of Hugonnard-Roche, who translates this sentence “et cela pour n’importe quelles choses qu’il convienne de considérer, ce qui est absurde.”
  4. We agree with Hugonnard-Roche in emending **ܠܚܫܒܐ** to **ܠܫܒܐ**.
  5. I.e., past, present, future.

when [there is] one noun and one verb, but the noun is not determined, there are another thirty-six oppositions according to the same calculation.<sup>1</sup> It is obvious that all the oppositions of the simple propositions are seventy-[13:5]two. In the compound proposition, in those that have two nouns in them, there are another one hundred forty-four oppositions, because of the same calculation stated above, when the noun that is the subject and the one that is the predicate are both used in a determined form. For example, “Socrates [13:10] is endowed with a soul,”<sup>2</sup> “Man is endowed with a soul,” “Every man is endowed with a soul,” “One man is endowed with a soul”: there are thirty-six. And again, when the noun that is the subject is determined and the one that is the predicate is not determined, there are another thirty-six. And again, when the one that is the subject is not determined and [13:15] the one that is the predicate is determined, there are another thirty-six. And again, when both of them are not determined, there are another thirty-six. And four times thirty-six is one hundred forty-four. With the simple and the compound together, there are two hundred sixteen oppositions.

¶28 [13:20] What was called an adverb above, for example, “lovingly, humbly,” is a modifier<sup>3</sup> of an utterance, because when I hear that an utterance is said “lovingly” or “humbly”, I know with what [kind of]

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1. Syriac *qānonā*.

2. The English phrase “endowed with a soul” translates the single Syriac word *napšānā*.

3. Syriac *zānā*, used above to mean “kind” or “type,” but used in a different sense here.

modification it is said. The modifier is the quality of what<sup>1</sup> is said about the subject, because the one who says, “That [13:25] man speaks lovingly,” is indicating this: that that utterance is how that man speaks. There are many modifiers like these and we [can] not exhaust them. But those that are especially needed<sup>2</sup> are three: necessary,<sup>3</sup> possible,<sup>4</sup> impossible.<sup>5</sup> The modifiers [14:1] of utterances are different from natural materials<sup>6</sup> about which propositions are said, in that natural materials are in the essence of something, because everything that is said about anything else either is always with it and is necessary; [14:5] or it is never with it and is impossible; or it is sometimes with it and sometimes not with it, but it is possible. Therefore, [the materials] are called natural, because they are in something. However, only in the speaking of an utterance are the modifiers added from the outside to the noun and the verb. [14:10] Sometimes the natural material of the utterance is true, but because of the modifier it is not properly formed,<sup>7</sup> as for example when it

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1. We omit a second, superfluous repetition of *də-haw* (“of what”) found in the manuscript.
  2. Syriac *meṭbāʿên*.
  3. Here the Greek *ʿananqê* is used.
  4. Syriac *meṭmaṣyānâ*, as above.
  5. Syriac *lâ meškəḥānâ*, as above.
  6. For “materials” the Syriac uses the Greek loanword *hula(ʿ)s*. In this paragraph the author uses the word in the sense of the core constituents of a clause, i.e., the verb and its arguments. In paragraph 13 above, however, he makes it clear that he is referring to modalities of truth value. He has just used *zənâ* for the latter purpose.
  7. “It is not properly formed” translates the seemingly simple Syriac phrase *lâ hawyâ*. *Hawyâ* is often translated “it is formed,” but in this context it is clear that semantically proper or accurate formation is what is in view.

it is said that “Socrates speaks humbly,” because if he speaks, and he speaks in a domineering manner, then the [statement] that he speaks is true, but the part about humbly is false. In the negation of a modifier, “not” is always used with the modifier, [14:15] because if it is used with the noun or the verb, it will form an affirmation and not a negation.

¶29 The opposition with a modifier is formed in this way: the modifier is either said in the proposition [composed] of one noun and one verb, or in the [proposition composed] of two nouns and one verb. A noun is either determined or [14:20] undetermined, as stated above. If [it is composed] of one noun and one verb, there are four oppositions, thus: “It is possible that Socrates is walking,” “It is not possible that Socrates is walking,” “It is possible that not-Socrates is walking,” “It is not possible that not-Socrates is walking,” [14:25] “It is not possible that Socrates is not walking,”<sup>1</sup> “It is not possible that not-Socrates is not walking.”<sup>2</sup>

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1. This last statement is added by Hugonnard-Roche to complete the logical sequence. This is the logical place for it, since the oppositions alternate beginning with “It is possible” and “It is not possible.”
  2. The relationships among these eight propositions can be most easily seen in tabular form:

#	Modal	Subject	Predicate	Proposition
1	+	+	+	It is possible that Socrates is walking.
2	–	+	+	It is not possible that Socrates is walking.

Or if, on the other hand, [there are] two nouns and one verb, eight oppositions are formed, thus: “It is possible that Socrates the philosopher is walking,” “It is not possible [15:1] that Socrates the philosopher is walking,” “It is possible that not-Socrates the philosopher is walking,” “It is not possible that not-Socrates the philosopher is walking,” “It is possible that Socrates the not-philosopher is walking,” “It is not possible that Socrates the not-philosopher is walking,” “It is possible that not-[15:5]Socrates the not-philosopher is walking,” “It is not possible that not-Socrates the not-philosopher is walking,” “It is possible that Socrates the philosopher is not walking,” “It is not possible that Socrates the philosopher is not walking,” “It is possible that not-Socrates the philosopher is not walking,” “It is not possible that not-Socrates the philosopher is not walking,” “It is possible that Socrates [15:10] the not-philosopher is not walking,” “It is not possible that Socrates the not-philosopher is not walking,” “It is possible that not-Socrates the not-philosopher is not walking,” “It is not

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3	+	–	+	It is possible that not-Socrates is walking.
4	–	–	+	It is not possible that not-Socrates is walking.
5	+	+	–	It is possible that Socrates is not walking.
6	–	+	–	It is not possible that Socrates is not walking.
7	+	–	–	It is possible that not-Socrates is not walking.
8	–	–	–	It is not possible that not-Socrates is not walking.

possible that not-Socrates the not-philosopher is not walking.”<sup>1</sup>

1. The relationships among these sixteen propositions can also be most easily seen in tabular form. (The same column labels are used as in the previous table, with one addition: Appos[itive].)

#	Mod	Subj	Appos	Pred	Proposition
1	+	+	+	+	It is possible that Socrates the philosopher is walking,
2	-	+	+	+	It is not possible that Socrates the philosopher is walking,
3	+	-	+	+	It is possible that not-Socrates the philosopher is walking,
4	-	-	+	+	It is not possible that not-Socrates the philosopher is walking,
5	+	+	-	+	It is possible that Socrates the not-philosopher is walking,
6	-	+	-	+	It is not possible that Socrates the not-philosopher is walking,
7	+	-	-	+	It is possible that not-Socrates the not-philosopher is walking,
8	-	-	-	+	It is not possible that not-Socrates the not-philosopher is walking,
9	+	+	+	-	It is possible that Socrates the philosopher is not walking,
10	-	+	+	-	It is not possible that Socrates the philosopher is not walking,
11	+	-	+	-	It is possible that not-Socrates the philosopher is not walking,
12	-	-	+	-	It is not possible that not-Socrates the philosopher is not walking,
13	+	+	-	-	It is possible that Socrates the not-philosopher is not walking,
14	-	+	-	-	It is not possible that Socrates the not-philosopher is not walking,
15	+	-	-	-	It is possible that not-Socrates the not-philosopher is not walking,
16	-	-	-	-	It is not possible that not-Socrates the not-philosopher is not walking.

Thus, concerning something individual, there are twelve oppositions; and concerning something universal that does not have [15:15] a determinative expression, another twelve; and concerning something universal that has a determinative expression—“all” or “no” is said with it—another twelve; and concerning the one with which “one” or “not one” is said, another twelve; which together form forty-eight; and these in the three [15:20] times, come to one hundred forty-four; and these with the three natural materials,<sup>1</sup> four hundred thirty-two; and the modifiers of utterances,<sup>2</sup> as was said, come to three, and together with these the three times, come to one thousand two hundred ninety-six oppositions, which are without modifiers.<sup>3</sup> [15:25]The simple [oppositions] are seventy-two, and the compound ones one hundred forty-four; together they are two hundred sixteen. So all the oppositions, including the two hundred sixteen, are one thousand five hundred twelve. And [adding together] the affirmative [16:1] propositions with the negative ones forms three thousand twenty-four, because all the oppositions are [considered] together.

¶29a There is no other calculation of the utterances in which truth and falsehood occur. Every utterance of truth that is stated in a declaration is suitably ascertained by this rule.

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1. Greek loanword *hula*(<sup>1</sup>)s, here used in the sense of modalities of truth value, as in paragraph 13, rather than as in paragraph 28.
  2. Syriac *zənaḡyâ dā-mêmrê*.
  3. Syriac *zənâ*, here apparently used in the sense of “adverbs.”

End of the commentary on the book *Peri Hermeneias*, composed by Paul the Persian and translated by Severus Sabokht.<sup>1</sup>

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1. This colophon is in red ink in the manuscript.





# Syriac Text

## ܩܪܝܬܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ

ܘܥܝܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ  
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1

ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ  
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ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ

2

ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ  
ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ  
ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ  
ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ  
ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܢܐ





5

לִּבְּךָ וְלַחֲמוֹסֶיךָ דְּלִבְּךָ סֵמֶיךָ תַּחֲתֵיךָ הֵן אֲחֻזָּה הֵן  
דֵּיךָ. וְלִבְּךָ דִּין וְ לֵב אֲסִיבָהּ הִמְחֵל אֵין אֲסִיבָהּ.  
וְלִבְּךָ אֲסִיבָהּ דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ הֵן דְּלִבְּךָ דִּין וְ לֵב אֲסִיבָהּ  
דִּמְחֵל דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ דִּין וְ לֵב אֲסִיבָהּ: וְלֵב אֲסִיבָהּ לֵב אֲסִיבָהּ  
דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ דִּין. מְכִיךָ דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ מִחֵל דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ חָדַד  
כְּסֵפְךָ אֲסִיבָהּ דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ הֵן אֲחֻזָּה הֵן דְּלִבְּךָ דִּין  
וְ לֵב אֲסִיבָהּ דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ דְּלִבְּךָ דִּין וְ לֵב אֲסִיבָהּ:  
חָדַד דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ מְכִיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ. אֲחֻזָּה הֵן אֲסִיבָהּ דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ  
דְּכֵסֶפְךָ אֲסִיבָהּ אֲחֻזָּה הֵן אֲסִיבָהּ: וְלֵב אֲסִיבָהּ דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ  
דְּכֵסֶפְךָ אֲסִיבָהּ אֲחֻזָּה הֵן אֲסִיבָהּ: חָדַד דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ  
מְכִיךָ דְּכֵסֶפְךָ אֲסִיבָהּ מְכִיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ.  
חָדַד דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ חָדַד.

6

מַלְמַלְתֵּי אֲסִיבָהּ וְתַחֲתֵיךָ. סָדַד דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ  
מְכִיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ: סָדַד דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ מְכִיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ. וְ  
חָדַד דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ אֲחֻזָּה הֵן אֲסִיבָהּ:  
אֲסִיבָהּ אֲסִיבָהּ וְתַחֲתֵיךָ מְכִיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ. וְלֵב אֲסִיבָהּ  
דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ הֵן דְּלִבְּךָ דִּין וְ לֵב אֲסִיבָהּ: מְכִיךָ  
דְּלִבְּךָ חָדַד מְכִיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ הֵן דְּלִבְּךָ דִּין. וְתַחֲתֵיךָ  
אֲסִיבָהּ אֲסִיבָהּ חָדַד אֲסִיבָהּ חָדַד דְּתַחֲתֵיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ  
מְכִיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ: אֲסִיבָהּ אֲסִיבָהּ וְתַחֲתֵיךָ אֲסִיבָהּ.













למשל. מס. בך כדלע למשל. כל סך כדלע  
למשל.

17


ותו דקמבכמ הנמל: דלבי תו חכ כל סך.  
דמסעבכל דהדבב מחמל. ותו דלבי תו חכ מסך.  
לך קמבבי דאסב סבב מלכדל. ותו דלבי תו חכ  
סך לך חכ למקלמבי דאסב סבב מחמל. ותו  
דלבי תו. סך כל חכ. דמסעבכל, וכדו מלכדל.  
ותו דלבי תו חכ כל חכ: ותו דלבי תו סך כל  
סך למשל דבב קמבב: ולמקלמבי מלכדל.

18

ותו דמסעבכל דהדבב חכ חמל דלכילי ותו  
חכ ותו דל מחמל: כדלע מדלמב מלכדל. חכ  
חמל דמלמלבי ל מלכדל חכ דמלכדל  
דמלמלמבי ולמקלמבי חמלבי חמלבי דלכילי.  
לח: חכ כדלע סלכ. כל סך כדלע סלכ. ותו  
דמסעבכל, וכדו חכ חמל דלכילי חמל דלכילי  
מחמלבי: כדלע מדלמב. חכ חמל דמלמלבי ל  
מלכדל. חכ דמלכדל דלמלמל חמלבי דלכילי  
לח. סך כדלע סלכ. לך חכ כדלע סלכ. ותו  
דמלמלמבי דאסב סבב חכ חמל דלכילי  
למלכדל דלכילי מחמל. חכ חמל דלכילי:  
למלכדל דלכילי מחמל. חכ חמל דמלמלמבי  
למלכדל סך מלכדל מסך מלכדל. דלכילי חכ



מדבר הנהל: סגל מעל מדבר מדמה. השתב דגסג  
 סגל: אדאסוה תגסגה חל ל דלסמ תלב: מכל  
 דאדאסוה הל קהמה זל לקהלהמה. לל תלסג  
 תגסגה דלסמ תלב. מכל דלמעלה סגל חל  
 מדבר. סגל ל חל מדבר הנהל זל מדמה. השתב דג  
 דכל קמהה אדאסוה: סגלסגה לגסג  
 סגלסגה. דלסמ תלב יתב. מכל דלמעלה סגל  
 הל קהלהמה. סגל לקהלהמה סגל חלסג. סגל ל  
 חלסג. 21 סגלסגוה לגהמה השתב.

<p>תגלסגה חלסגה חל</p>	<p>הש דלסמ תלב דלסגל. חל          חלסג דלסגה. הש דלסג          סגלסגה חלסגה חלסגה          חלסג. חלסג חלסג          דלסמ תלב חלסגה חלסגה</p>	<p>חל חלסגה חלסגה</p>
<p>הש דלסגה חלסגה חלסגה סגל          חל חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה          חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה          חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה          חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה</p>	<p>חל חלסג  </p>	<p>חל חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה          חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה          חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה          חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה</p>
<p>חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה</p>	<p>הש דלסמ תלב חלסגה חלסגה          חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה          חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה          חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה</p>	<p>חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה חלסגה</p>



אזהוהדיבדבשהמשה: אך מה שיש לי ענין דמגשגשג. כל  
למעלה אך מה שיש לי ענין דמגשג. למעלה. מהך דק  
לגורן דמחשגן חב למעלה. דגך תצטן סמג  
לגמג. אגמג 20 חב למעלה: דבצטן חכ סמג  
לגמג מעלה. אגמג דגך דגמג אג.

24

לחב דגמג לגמג מעלה ש דגמג: אגמג 20  
מלמעלה. אגמג דגך מלמעלה: אגמג ומגמג 20. לגמג  
דמגמגמג לגמג. מגמגמגמג לגמגמג 20.  
מגמגמגמג 20 לגמגמגמג.

25

חכ לגמגמגמג: למעלה תצטן 20 דגמג  
מגמגמג לחב דגמגמג. יגמג כה למעלה אג  
גמגמג. מהך דגמגמגמג: מגמגמגמגמג  
דגמגמג: אגמגמגמג לחב דגמגמגמג. 20  
גמגמגמג 20 דגמגמג. כל חב דמגמגמגמג  
מגמגמגמג דגמגמג 20. מה למעלה אג  
אגמגמגמג. לחב דגמגמגמג: דגמגמג  
מגמגמגמג גמגמגמג 20 אגמגמגמג. גמגמג  
דגמגמגמג 20: דגמגמגמג 20 מגמגמגמג.  
20 אגמגמגמג 20 דגמגמגמג 20 מגמגמגמג..

26

אגמגמגמגמג לחב דגמגמגמגמג. גמגמג  
דגמגמגמגמג 20: מגמגמגמגמג: מגמגמגמג













עֵינֵי הַמֶּלֶךְ בְּיָמָיו בְּשֵׁשׁ עָשָׂר יָמִים בְּכֶל יוֹם  
לְמַעַן יִשְׁמַע הַמֶּלֶךְ וְיִשְׁמַע הַמֶּלֶךְ..

# Transliteration of the Syriac Text

## Transliteration Conventions

The following table shows the basic transliterations of all of the consonants of the Syriac alphabet.

Syriac	Transliteration
܀	'
܂	b
܄	g
܆	d
܈	h
܊	w
܌	z
܎	ḥ
ܐ	ṭ
ܑ	y
ܒ	k

Syriac	Transliteration
܋	l
܍	m
܏	n
ܑ	s
ܓ	'
ܕ	p
ܕ	š
ܕ	q
ܕ	r
ܕ	š
ܕ	T

In addition to the phonemic distinctions represented by the preceding transliterations, a number of non-phonemic features are represented in the following transliteration. The representation of such non-phonemic distinctions is found in varying degrees in the works of various scholars who provide transliterations of Syriac words. We have chosen to opt for a rather liberal representation of these distinctions.

### 1. Fricativization (spirantization)

Also, the non-phonemic fricativization (spirantization) of the *begadkepat* consonants<sup>1</sup> is indicated by underlining the fricative allophones. For example:

	Phonemic transcription only	Phonemic transcription with fricativization marked
Syriac ܟܬܒܐ	ktābā	ktā <u>b</u> ā

### 2. Schwa epenthesis

Similarly, the non-phonemic epenthesis (insertion) of the schwa sound is indicated by the insertion of a superscript schwa character. Continuing with the previous example:

Transcription without epenthetic schwa	Transcription with epenthetic schwa
ktā <u>b</u> ā	k <sup>ə</sup> tā <u>b</u> ā

---

1. This is the conventional name for the group of consonants subject to fricativization in certain environments: b, d, g, k, p, t.

### 3. Vowel letters

Finally, long /ā/ and /ē/ that are not indicated by a letter are transcribed with a macron over the vowel, while when these vowels are indicated with a letter (usually ܐ for either at the end of a word, but ܐ for â and ܐ, for ê in the middle of a word) they are transcribed with a circumflex accent over the vowel. Once again, the previous example is used:

<p>Transcription not indicating supporting consonants for vowels</p> <hr style="width: 100%;"/> <p>k<sup>o</sup>tābā</p>	<p>Transcription indicating supporting consonants for vowels</p> <hr style="width: 100%;"/> <p>k<sup>o</sup>tābâ</p>
--	--

Since /i/, /o/ and /u/ are virtually always indicated with a Syriac letter (ܐ, for /i/ and ܐ for /o/ and /u/) the addition of a diacritic to show this would be superfluous.

### 4. Silent letters

Consonants that are present in Syriac orthography but that are silent in pronunciation are placed in parentheses. For example:

<u>Syriac</u>	<u>Raw transcription</u>	<u>Transcription with silent consonant marked</u>
ܢܫܐ	'nāšâ	(')nāšâ

### 5. Hyphenation of prefixed one-letter particles

Following established convention, the



transliterations of the prefixed particles ܐ, ܕ, ܘ and ܠ are separated from the following word by a hyphen, whether they are transcribed as <b<sup>o</sup>->, <d<sup>o</sup>->, <w<sup>o</sup>-> and <l<sup>o</sup>-> or as <ba->, <da->, <wa-> and <la->.

### 6. No upper-case and lower-case distinction

The Syriac alphabet does not distinguish between upper- and lower-case letters, so no such distinction will be made in the transliteration. Thus the proper noun ܡܘܠܘܢ ‘Paul’ is transliterated <pawlos>, not <Pawlos>.

### 7. Greek loanwords

#### 7a. Representation of Greek vowels by Syriac consonants

In the case of Greek loanwords, sometimes consonants are used to indicate Greek vowels in a way that is entirely foreign to the way such vowels are indicated in native Syriac words. In such cases, Greek vowels represented by Syriac consonants are *not* transcribed by putting a circumflex accent over the vowel, since such vowels are not necessarily long. Instead, the vowel is transcribed as pronounced in Syriac (whether long or short) and the supporting consonant is written in parentheses after the vowel. The title of this work is an excellent example of this practice.

<u>Greek written in Syriac</u>	<u>Transliteration</u>
ܡܘܠܘܢ ܪܝܗܢܐ ܪܡܐܢܝܐ ܫܘܠܫܐ	pa(h)riha(‘)rma(h)nyā(‘)s

The vowel points shown above are found in the manuscript. We can see that Greek ε is pointed so as to be

pronounced /a/ in Syriac. This is in conformity with the general Syriac convention that changes /e/ to /a/ before a guttural consonant / ʿ h ḥ ʿ / or /r/.

### 7b. Non-spirantization of Greek consonants

It should also be noted that in Greek loanwords the spirantization of *begadkepat* consonants does not take place. In the case of the voiceless consonants /k/ and /t/ this is clearly indicated in Syriac orthography by the use of the consonants ܩ and ܛ, respectively. In the case of the other four consonants, the non-spirantization is sometimes, but not always, indicated by the placement of the *quššāyâ* dot above the consonant, thus: ܦ̇, ܬ̇, ܘ̇ and ܚ̇. Regardless of whether this sign is used in the manuscript or not, the consonant will not be marked as a fricative in the transliteration. Thus:

<u>Syriac</u>	<u>Transliteration</u>
ܩܘܠܘܫ	pawlos
ܩܘܠܘܫ	l <sup>o</sup> -pawlos

### 8. Punctuation marks

The punctuation marks used in the Syriac manuscript do not conveniently correspond to punctuation marks used in the languages that employ the Roman alphabet. For ease of reference, the period (.) will be used where the graphically similar mark is found in the Syriac manuscript. The colon (:) will be used where any mark composed of two dots in a vertical line, whether straight or angled, is found in the manuscript. The symbol of four vertical dots (⋮) will be used to represent the mark consisting of three vertical dots in the manuscript, as it is

the font character closest in form to the mark in the manuscript. The Syriac paragraph mark ✥ will be transcribed by ¶.

**9. Extraneous text**

Very occasionally at the end of a line in the manuscript, a letter appears with a line over it. This is the first letter of the next line of the manuscript. It appears that such letters were probably at the bottom of the page of the source for this copy to indicate the first letter of the following page. Most of the time the copyist of the present manuscript correctly omitted these, but occasionally he left them in. In the transliteration these letters are enclosed in braces { }. They will be ignored in the translation.

**10. Paragraph numbering**

Paragraphs in the transliteration are numbered with the same numbers used by Henri Hugonnard-Roche in his French translation of the text.

**Introductory paragraph**

tub nuhārâ dīleh kad dileh da-k<sup>o</sup>tābâ d<sup>o</sup>-  
pa(h)riha(‘)rma(h)nyā(‘)s da-‘<sup>o</sup>bid b-pāsiqātâ l<sup>o</sup>-pawlos  
parsāyâ. wa-m<sup>o</sup>paššaḡ men lēšānâ parsāyâ l<sup>o</sup>-lēšānâ  
suryāyâ l<sup>o</sup>-sābbukt (‘)nāš d<sup>o</sup>-meṭkannê sēwarê ‘episqopâ  
lam d<sup>o</sup>-qennešrin. māran ‘adrayn(y).

1

barnāšâ men hennên d<sup>o</sup>lâ mell<sup>o</sup>tâ: ba-m<sup>o</sup>liluṭâ  
m<sup>o</sup>yattar. w<sup>o</sup>-kolmâd<sup>o</sup>-lâ yāda‘ w<sup>o</sup>-mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-netīda‘. w<sup>o</sup>-  
šābê d<sup>o</sup>-nedda‘: b<sup>o</sup>-yad m<sup>o</sup>liluṭâ yāda‘ leh. meṭṭul d-  
(‘)organo(w)n d<sup>o</sup>-kolmeddem l<sup>o</sup>-medda‘: m<sup>o</sup>liluṭâ ‘itêh w<sup>o</sup>-  
meṭṭulhānâ qadd<sup>o</sup>māyat la-m<sup>o</sup>liluṭâ zādeq

2

m<sup>o</sup>nāwātâ d<sup>o</sup>-mēmra šet ‘itayhên. š<sup>o</sup>mâ. mell<sup>o</sup>tâ. ḥ<sup>o</sup>lāp  
š<sup>o</sup>mâ. ‘al mell<sup>o</sup>tâ. ‘al s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ. ‘essārâ: š<sup>o</sup>mâ ‘itaw(hy).  
qālâd<sup>o</sup>-ba-s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ s<sup>o</sup>ṭar men zabnâ m<sup>o</sup>šawda‘ meddem. w-  
(‘)en meṭp<sup>o</sup>leg w<sup>o</sup>-lâ meddem {m}<sup>1</sup> m<sup>o</sup>šawda‘. ‘akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-  
barnāšâ. susyâ. margāniṭâ. meṭṭul d-(‘)en margāniṭâ  
meṭpalgâ: l<sup>o</sup>-mar: gâ: niṭâ: haydên w<sup>o</sup>-lâ meddem  
m<sup>o</sup>šawd<sup>o</sup>‘â. b<sup>o</sup>-hay d-(‘)āpen haw :mar: kad p<sup>o</sup>rišâ‘it  
meṭ(‘)amrâ: šu(w)dā‘â meddem ‘itêh. ‘ellâ kad b<sup>o</sup>-  
margāniṭâ. hay law šu(w)dā‘â (h)i d<sup>o</sup>-haw medem..<sup>2</sup>mell<sup>o</sup>tâ  
qālâ ‘itêh d<sup>o</sup>-ba-s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ: d<sup>o</sup>-ma‘b<sup>o</sup>dānuṭâ w<sup>o</sup>-ḥaššâ ‘am

- 
1. At this point, which is the end of a line, the manuscript has a *mim* with a line over it. This is the first of several similar cases in which it appears that the scribe was copying from a manuscript in which the preceding line appeared at the bottom of a page. This letter was inserted to show which letter began the next page. Most of the time the copyist of the present manuscript correctly omitted these, but occasionally he left them in. As mentioned in the introduction to this transliteration, such letters are ignored for the purposes of translation.
  2. The two periods here represent two consecutive dots in the horizontal line in the manuscript.

zabnâ m<sup>o</sup>šawda' meddem ma' b<sup>o</sup>dānutâ: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-pāseq (')nâ. ḥaššâ: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-metp<sup>o</sup>seqnâ. š<sup>o</sup>mâ w<sup>o</sup>-mell<sup>o</sup>tâ: b<sup>o</sup>-t<sup>o</sup>rên z<sup>o</sup>nayyâ 'itayhon. ḥad m<sup>o</sup>tahh<sup>o</sup>mâ. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-barnāšâ pāseq.w-ḥad lâ m<sup>o</sup>tahh<sup>o</sup>mâ: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-lâ barnāšâ lâ pāseq.. ḥ<sup>o</sup>lāp š<sup>o</sup>mâ 'itêh. qālâda-b<sup>o</sup>-taḥlup š<sup>o</sup>mâ met(')amrâ. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-(')enâ. 'a(n)tt. hu. ḥ<sup>o</sup>nan. 'a(n)ttton. hennon. hânâ. haw. 'al mell<sup>o</sup>tâ 'itêh. qālâ d<sup>o</sup>-al mell<sup>o</sup>tâ metqatrag. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-ḥubānâ' it. makkikā' it<sup>1</sup> ḥērā' it.. 'al s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ 'itêh: qālâ d<sup>o</sup>-al mēm<sup>o</sup>râ mett<sup>o</sup>sim. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-mett<sup>o</sup>sim d<sup>o</sup>-bātarken.qadmā' it. l<sup>o</sup>-bar. l<sup>o</sup>-gaww. lâ. 'ên. 'essārâ 'itaw(hy): qālâ d<sup>o</sup>-(')āsar mēm<sup>o</sup>râ 'am mēm<sup>o</sup>râ. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-metṭul. badgun. 'en.man.. 'ātuṭâ. w<sup>o</sup>-men kolhên m<sup>o</sup>nāwātâ d<sup>o</sup>-mēm<sup>o</sup>râ. š<sup>o</sup>mâ w<sup>o</sup>-mell<sup>o</sup>tâ yattir mārānâ' it. w<sup>o</sup>-men hālên tartên. š<sup>o</sup>mâ m<sup>o</sup>yattar.

3

w<sup>o</sup>-badgun ḥakkimê: 'it 'mat(y) da-l<sup>o</sup>-kolhên m<sup>o</sup>nāwātâ d<sup>o</sup>-mēm<sup>o</sup>râ: š<sup>o</sup>māhê m<sup>o</sup>šamm<sup>o</sup>hin. ḥamšâ 'ennon z<sup>o</sup>nayyâ da-š<sup>o</sup>māhê d<sup>o</sup>-met(')amrin 'al meddem. šawyut š<sup>o</sup>mâ 'am š<sup>o</sup>mâ. saggi'ut š<sup>o</sup>māhê. (')ḥ<sup>o</sup>rênayut š<sup>o</sup>mâ men š<sup>o</sup>mâ: šawyay š<sup>o</sup>mâ 'itayhon: t<sup>o</sup>rên 'aw saggi'ê meddem. hānnon d<sup>o</sup>-kad š<sup>o</sup>mâ ḥad k<sup>o</sup>yānayhon: da-b<sup>o</sup>-haw š<sup>o</sup>mâ m<sup>o</sup>šahlap. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-ḥarripūtâ 'al madd<sup>o</sup>'â w<sup>o</sup>-al saypâ w<sup>o</sup>-al sammâ w<sup>o</sup>-al hellakkātâ 'am š<sup>o</sup>mâ 'itaw(hy): t<sup>o</sup>rên 'aw saggi'ê meddem. hennon d<sup>o</sup>-kad š<sup>o</sup>mâ ḥad: 'āp k<sup>o</sup>yānhon da-b<sup>o</sup>-haw š<sup>o</sup>mâ ḥad 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-barnāšâ 'alay wa-'alayk w<sup>o</sup>-al šarkâ da-b<sup>o</sup>-naynāšâ. saggi(') š<sup>o</sup>māhê 'itaw(hy) ḥad meddem. haw da-š<sup>o</sup>meh law ḥad (h)u. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-

1. Here, as occasionally elsewhere in the manuscript, a punctuation mark is missing where it would normally be expected. This is probably due to an oversight on the part of the scribe. Not infrequently punctuation marks are missing at the ends of lines, as if the scribe considered the line break to be the functional equivalent of a dot.

saypâ. sapsērâ. harbâ. (')h<sup>o</sup>rēnyayš<sup>o</sup>mâ 'itayhon saggi'ê meddem wa-m<sup>o</sup>šāhl<sup>o</sup>pê d-(')āp š<sup>o</sup>māhayhon m<sup>o</sup>šāhl<sup>o</sup>pin. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d-(')ar'â mayyâ šemsâ.. men š<sup>o</sup>mâ 'itaw(hy). š<sup>o</sup>mâd<sup>o</sup>-men š<sup>o</sup>mâ (')h<sup>o</sup>rēnâ hāwê. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d-men naggārūtâ naggārâ. w<sup>o</sup>-menqaynāyutâ qaynāyâ..

4

'arb<sup>o</sup>'â meddem 'it. k<sup>o</sup>tibātâ. qālê. hušābê. meddem da-<sup>o</sup>law hāwê hušābâ. k<sup>o</sup>tibātâ šu(w)dā'ê 'ennên d<sup>o</sup>-meddem b<sup>o</sup>-qālâ. w<sup>o</sup>-qālê: šu(w)dā'ê 'ennon d<sup>o</sup>-hušābê da-b<sup>o</sup>-napšâ. w<sup>o</sup>-kol hušābâ: men meddem w<sup>o</sup>-<sup>o</sup>al meddem hāwê. wa-k<sup>o</sup>tibātâ w<sup>o</sup>-qālê: law l<sup>o</sup>-kol hennon kad hennon. hušābê dên w<sup>o</sup>-meddem da-<sup>o</sup>law(hy) meṭḥašš<sup>o</sup>bin: l<sup>o</sup>-kol hennon kad hennon: w<sup>o</sup>-<sup>o</sup>ell<sup>o</sup>tâ hādê (h)i. d<sup>o</sup>-hušābê w<sup>o</sup>-meddem da-<sup>o</sup>law(hy) meṭḥašš<sup>o</sup>bin: k<sup>o</sup>yānâ 'it 'itayhon qālê dên wa-k<sup>o</sup>tibātâ ba-s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ 'itayhên.

5

'it 'emat(y) d-(')it<sup>o</sup>hušābâ b<sup>o</sup>-napšâ w<sup>o</sup>-lâ šarrir w<sup>o</sup>-lâ daggāl. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d-(')en (')nāš neṭḥaššab susyâ š<sup>o</sup>himâ 'it. w-(')it 'emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-šarrir 'aw daggāl 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d-(')en (')nāš neṭḥaššab d<sup>o</sup>-susyâ r<sup>o</sup>bi'ay reglê 'itaw(hy): 'aw susyâ lâ 'itaw(hy) r<sup>o</sup>bi'ay reglê. meṭṭul d<sup>o</sup>-ba-h<sup>o</sup>dâ m<sup>o</sup>nāteh d<sup>o</sup>-mêmra kad l<sup>o</sup>ḥodâ 'it neṭḥaššab 'aw nêmar lâ š<sup>o</sup>rārâ hāwê w<sup>o</sup>-lâ daggālūtâ. 'ellâ kad{ b<sup>o</sup>šir} b<sup>o</sup>-šêd<sup>1</sup> tartên 'emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-<sup>o</sup>am h<sup>o</sup>dādâ<sup>2</sup> 'itayhên: 'aw kad men h<sup>o</sup>dādâ meṭpall<sup>o</sup>gan. hākannâ (h)u hušābâ da-b<sup>o</sup>-napšâ da-l<sup>o</sup>ḥodâ 'it b<sup>o</sup>-qālâ meṭl<sup>o</sup>bek: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ da-š<sup>o</sup>mâ 'aw mell<sup>o</sup>tâda-l<sup>o</sup>ḥodâ 'it b<sup>o</sup>-qālâ meṭ(')amrâ. w<sup>o</sup>-lâhušābâ l<sup>o</sup>ḥodâ meṭ(')amrâ 'itaw(hy): ellâ

1. The braces around *bəšir* indicate that this is the text found in the manuscript, while the following text, *bə-šêd*, has been adopted as an emendation.
2. The word **ܠܚܕܐ** is consistently written without the syāmê in this manuscript, so we have transliterated it *ḥədādâ*. Normally, though, it is written with the syāmê and pronounced *ḥədādê*.

ḥuṣābā balḥod: w-(')āplā š<sup>o</sup>mā 'aw mell<sup>o</sup>tāda-  
l<sup>o</sup>ḥodā'itmet(')amrā mēmrā 'itaw(hy). š<sup>o</sup>mā w<sup>o</sup>-mell<sup>o</sup>tā  
balḥod.

6

mēmrāb<sup>o</sup>-t<sup>o</sup>rēn z<sup>o</sup>nayyā hāwê. ḥad b<sup>o</sup>-maḥšabb<sup>o</sup>tā w<sup>o</sup>-  
metyad'ānā (h)u: w<sup>o</sup>-ḥad b<sup>o</sup>-met(')amrānutā. {w}<sup>1</sup> w<sup>o</sup>-  
metragg<sup>o</sup>šānāyā (h)u. w<sup>o</sup>-kadḥuṣābā da-b<sup>o</sup>-napšā 'am  
ḥuṣābā (')h<sup>o</sup>rēnā metrakkab: haydēn b<sup>o</sup>-haw zabnā mēmrā  
metyad'ānā hāwê. w-(')it 'emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-šarrir 'aw daggāl. w-  
(')it 'emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-lā šarrir w<sup>o</sup>-lā daggāl. metṭul d<sup>o</sup>-law kol  
mēmrā šarrir 'aw daggāl. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d<sup>o</sup>-bātarken 'ām<sup>o</sup>rinan  
w<sup>o</sup>-kad b<sup>o</sup>-qālā š<sup>o</sup>mā w<sup>o</sup>-mell<sup>o</sup>tā 'ak(h)dā<sup>2</sup> met(')amrin:  
haydēn b<sup>o</sup>-haw zabnā: mēmrā metragg<sup>o</sup>šānā hāwê. w-(')it  
'emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-šarrir 'aw daggāl. w-(')it 'emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-lā šarrir  
w<sup>o</sup>-lā daggāl. 'aykannā d-(')āp b<sup>o</sup>-maḥšabb<sup>o</sup>tā.

7

mēmrā 'itaw(hy) qālā d<sup>o</sup>-ba-s<sup>o</sup>yāmā m<sup>o</sup>šawda'  
meddem. w-(')en metpallag haydēn 'āp m<sup>o</sup>nāwāteh  
m<sup>o</sup>šawd'ān. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d<sup>o</sup>-barnāšā napšānā 'itaw(hy). hānā  
(h)u yāteh m<sup>o</sup>šawd'ānā (h)u. haydēn 'āp kolh<sup>o</sup>dā men  
m<sup>o</sup>nāwāteh m<sup>o</sup>šawd'ā. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā da-š<sup>o</sup>mā w<sup>o</sup>-mell<sup>o</sup>tā:

'esrā 'ennon 'adšê d<sup>o</sup>-mēmrā: qāroyā: m<sup>o</sup>ša(')lānā:  
pāqodā: m<sup>o</sup>pisānā: pāsoqā: metdamm<sup>o</sup>rānā: yammāyā:  
mett<sup>o</sup>simānā: sāyomā: metpašš<sup>o</sup>kānā¶ qāroyā 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d<sup>o</sup>-tā  
l<sup>o</sup>-hārkā¶ m<sup>o</sup>ša(')lānā: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d<sup>o</sup>-men 'aymekkā 'ātē  
'a(n)tt¶ pāqodā: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d<sup>o</sup>-zel men hārkā¶ m<sup>o</sup>pisānā:  
'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d<sup>o</sup>-hab li hānā meddem: pāsoqā: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d<sup>o</sup>-šemsā  
nahhirā 'itaw(hy): metdamm<sup>o</sup>rānā 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d<sup>o</sup>-mā nahhir  
šemsā.. yammāyā 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d-(')alāhā yāda' d-nahhir (h)u..

1. Extraneous *waw* with a line over it.
2. The elision of *hêt* is indicated by a supralinear stroke in the manuscript: **ܘܚܝܬܘܢ**. Sokoloff indicates that this is an East Syriac characteristic.

mett<sup>o</sup>simānā: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d<sup>o</sup>-tehwê hay dukk<sup>o</sup>tâ mâ(') 'âmên..  
 sāyomā: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d-(')ên šemšâ {(h)u}<sup>1</sup> nahhir (h)u.  
 metpašš<sup>o</sup>kānā. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nā d<sup>o</sup>-kad hāwê hānā meddem.

8

w<sup>o</sup>-mašyād-(')āp b<sup>o</sup>-ḥamšâ netpall<sup>o</sup>gun. b<sup>o</sup>-qāroyā  
 wa-m<sup>o</sup>ša(')lānā w<sup>o</sup>-pāqodā wa-m<sup>o</sup>pisānā w<sup>o</sup>-pāsoqā: metṭul  
 d<sup>o</sup>-metpašš<sup>o</sup>kānā: m<sup>o</sup>ša(')lānā (h)u d<sup>o</sup>-hu leh m<sup>o</sup>ša'el.  
 metdamm<sup>o</sup>rānā: b<sup>o</sup>-mā balḥod<sup>o</sup> yattir men pāsoqā. 'ellā  
 pāsoqā (h)u. yammāyā b<sup>o</sup>-sāhdutā d-(')alāhā yattir men  
 pāsoqā 'ellā 'āp hu pāsoqā (h)u. mett<sup>o</sup>simānā galyā (h)i d<sup>o</sup>-  
 pāsoqā (h)u: b-(')en balḥod<sup>o</sup> yattir men pāsoqā. 'ellā  
 pāsoqā (h)u. w-idi'ā (h)i. d-(')enhu d<sup>o</sup>-metpašš<sup>o</sup>kānā ba-  
 m<sup>o</sup>ša(')lānā (h)u. w<sup>o</sup>-metdamm<sup>o</sup>rānā w<sup>o</sup>-yammāyā w<sup>o</sup>-  
 mett<sup>o</sup>simānā w<sup>o</sup>-sāyomā b<sup>o</sup>-pāsoqā. 'itayhon: b<sup>o</sup>-hānā z<sup>o</sup>nā  
 'aykannā d-(')āp 'etemar(w). ḥamšâ hāwên 'ādšê {d}<sup>2</sup> d<sup>o</sup>-  
 mēmra.

9

š<sup>o</sup>rārā w<sup>o</sup>-daggālūtā: b<sup>o</sup>-pāsoqā balḥod<sup>o</sup> 'it. metṭul d<sup>o</sup>-  
 haw d-(')āmar d<sup>o</sup>-šemšâ nahhirā 'itaw(hy). b<sup>o</sup>-pāsoqā  
 'āmar š<sup>o</sup>rārā. w<sup>o</sup>-haw d-(')āmar d<sup>o</sup>-šemšâ lā 'itaw(hy)  
 nahhirā: b<sup>o</sup>-pāsoqā 'āmar daggālūtā. 'ellā haw man da-l<sup>o</sup>-  
 (')nāš qārē 'aw m<sup>o</sup>ša'el: 'aw pāqed<sup>o</sup> 'aw m<sup>o</sup>pis. b<sup>o</sup>-hay d<sup>o</sup>-  
 qārē wa-m<sup>o</sup>ša'el w<sup>o</sup>-pāqed<sup>o</sup> wa-m<sup>o</sup>pis: lā š<sup>o</sup>rārā 'āmar w<sup>o</sup>-lā  
 daggālūtā. w<sup>o</sup>-pilāsopā 'al hānā balḥod<sup>o</sup> mēmra pāsoqā 'it  
 l<sup>o</sup>-hon yaššipūtā: b<sup>o</sup>-hay d<sup>o</sup>-šābēn l<sup>o</sup>-medda' metṭul  
 kolmeddem š<sup>o</sup>rārā w<sup>o</sup>-daggālūtā: 'aykannā d<sup>o</sup>-la-š<sup>o</sup>rārā  
 nelb<sup>o</sup>kun wa-l<sup>o</sup>-daggālūtā nešb<sup>o</sup>qun. metṭul d<sup>o</sup>-hānon  
 'arb<sup>o</sup>'ā mēmra d<sup>o</sup>-šarkā: l<sup>o</sup>-meddem (')h<sup>o</sup>rēn ḥašš<sup>o</sup>hin.  
 mēmradēn pāsoqā. l-ida' t̄abalḥod.

- 
1. This ܩܪ has been inserted above the line in the manuscript by a later hand, using a caret. It seems superfluous.  
 2. Extraneous *dālat* with a line over it.



10

pāsoqâ 'itaw(hy). m°nātâd°lâ 'ukāmâ 'emar d°-lâ 'itêh 'ukām°tâ tartayhên š°rārâ 'ām°rân. w°-lâ 'itêh 'antipa(°)sis metṭul (°)h°renāyut m°nātâ. w-(°)enhu da-h°dâ 'āmrâ 'arb°'â pelgê 'itayhon: wa-(°)h°rētâ 'āmrâ 'arb°'â lâ 'itayhon pelgê: w°-hādê d-(°)āmrâ d°-pelgê 'itayhon l°put t°mānyâ 'āmrâ. w°-hay d-(°)āmrâ d°-lâ 'itayhon pelgê: l°put t°rên 'āmrâ tartayhên š°rārâ 'āmrin. w°-lâ 'itêh 'antipa(°)sis. metṭul (°)h°renāyut pēhmâ. w-(°)enhu da-h°dâ 'āmrâ. šabrâg°rammatṭiqâ 'itaw(hy). wa-(°)h°rētâ 'āmrâ šabrâ lâ 'itaw(hy) g°rammatṭiqâ: w°-hādê d-(°)āmrâ da-g°rammatṭiqâ 'itaw(hy) b°-haylâ 'āmrâ. w°-hay d-(°)āmrâ d°-lâ 'itaw(hy) g°rammatṭiqâ b°-ma' b°rānuṭâ 'āmrâ. tartayhên š°rārâ 'āmrin. w°-lâ 'itêh 'antipa(°)sis. metṭul (°)h°renāyut meddem.

11

b°-hay d-idi'â (h)i d-(°)antipa(°)sis haydên hawyâ: 'emat(y) d°-haw meddem d°-sā'em (°)nâ w°-haw meddem da-m°qatreg (°)nâ: hu kaḏ hu nehwe b°-qa(°)ṭapasis w°-b-(°)apopa(°)sis w°-lâ b°-šawuyt š°mâ: w°-lâ b°-'am š°mâ: w°-lâ ba-(°)h°rēnâ w°-ba-(°)h°rēnâ zabnâ: w°-lâ ba-(°)h°rētâ w°-lâ ba-(°)h°rētâ m°nātâ. w°-lâba-(°)h°rēnâ w°-ba-(°)h°rēnâ pehmâ. w°-lâ (°)h°rēnâ wa-(°)h°rēnâ meddem. haw mâ d°-met(°)emar: 'aw 'ihidā'it met(°)amrâ 'akz°nâ d°-suqrātis. 'aw gāwānā'it w°-law 'ihidā'it. w°-hānâ: 'aw lâ m°ṭahḥam: hānaw dên layt leh p°rosdiorismos. d-(°)ā(y)k 'aykân. barnāšâ: 'aw m°ṭahḥam: hānaw dên 'it leh p°rosdiorismos: d-(°)ā(y)k 'aykân: kol barnāšâ.

12

p°rosdiorismos 'arb°'â 'itayhon. kol. ḥaḏ. w°-lâ ḥaḏ. lâkol. w°-men hālên: t°rên b°-qa(°)ṭapa(°)sis hāwên: wa-t°rên b-(°)apopa(°)sis. d-(°)ā(y)k 'aykân: kol barnāšâ

g<sup>o</sup>rammaṭṭiqâ. ḥaḍ barnāšâ g<sup>o</sup>rammaṭṭiqâ. w<sup>o</sup>-lâḥaḍ barnāšâ  
g<sup>o</sup>rammaṭṭiqâ. lâkol barnāšâ g<sup>o</sup>rammaṭṭiqâ.

13

hula(°)s d<sup>o</sup>-ba-k<sup>o</sup>yānâ da-°layhên met(°)amrin  
mêmrê. t<sup>o</sup>lât 'itayhên. 'ālsāytâ. metmašyānītâ. lâ  
mešk<sup>o</sup>hānītâ. 'ālsāytâ 'itêh: haw mâ d-(°)itaw(hy): wa-  
(°)h<sup>o</sup>rênâ l<sup>o</sup>-mehwê lâ mešk<sup>o</sup>hâ. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-tābtâ bištâ: t<sup>o</sup>rên  
wa-t<sup>o</sup>rên 'arb<sup>o</sup>'â metmašyānītâ 'itêh haw meddem d-  
(°)itaw(hy) wa-(°)h<sup>o</sup>rênâ 'it mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-nehwê: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-  
haw da-m<sup>o</sup>hallek netteb: 'aw haw meddem d<sup>o</sup>-lâ 'itaw(hy)  
w<sup>o</sup>-mešk<sup>o</sup>hâ d<sup>o</sup>-nehwê: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-haw d<sup>o</sup>-lâ 'itaw(hy)  
g<sup>o</sup>rammaṭṭiqâ: wa-d<sup>o</sup>-nehwê mešk<sup>o</sup>hâ. lâ mešk<sup>o</sup>hānītâ  
met(°)amrâ: haw d<sup>o</sup>-lâ 'itaw(hy) w-(°)āplâ l<sup>o</sup>-mehwê  
mašyâ. d-(°)aryâ h<sup>o</sup>zirâ: 'aw barnāšâ d<sup>o</sup>-ba-k<sup>o</sup>yānâ r<sup>o</sup>bi'ay  
reglê 'aw t<sup>o</sup>rên wa-t<sup>o</sup>rên 'esrâ..

14

da-l<sup>o</sup>qublāyut s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ d<sup>o</sup>-°al meddem d<sup>o</sup>-kolḥaḍ  
'aminā'it b<sup>o</sup>-kolh<sup>o</sup>dâ men hula(°)s d<sup>o</sup>-ba-k<sup>o</sup>yānâ  
'antipa(°)sis 'ābdâ meṭṭul d<sup>o</sup>-°al k<sup>o</sup>yānâ d<sup>o</sup>-hay 'ālsāytâ  
'aminā'ia qa(°)ṭapasis šarrirâ: d-(°)ā(y)k 'aykân suqrāṭis  
barnāšâ 'itaw(hy) w-(°)aminā'it 'apopasis daggālât: d-  
(°)ā(y)k 'aykân suqrāṭis lâ 'itaw(hy) barnāšâ. w<sup>o</sup>-°al k<sup>o</sup>yānâ  
d<sup>o</sup>-lâ mešk<sup>o</sup>hānītâ 'aminā'it qa(°)ṭapa(°)sis daggālât d-  
(°)ā(y)k 'aykân. suqrāṭish<sup>o</sup>zirâ 'itaw(hy). w-(°)aminā'it  
'apopa(°)sis šarrirâ. d-(°)ā(y)k 'aykân suqrāṭis lâ 'itaw(hy)  
h<sup>o</sup>zirâ. w-(°)āp 'al k<sup>o</sup>yānâ d<sup>o</sup>-metmašyānītâ. h<sup>o</sup>dâ šarrirâ  
wa-h<sup>o</sup>dâ daggālâ. d-(°)ā(y)k 'aykân. suqrāṭis 'alāhāyâ  
'itaw(hy).. w<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis lâ 'itaw(hy) 'alāhāyâ.

15

da-l<sup>o</sup>qublāyut s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ d<sup>o</sup>-°al meddem kolānāyâ d<sup>o</sup>-  
layt leh p<sup>o</sup>rosdiorismos 'al k<sup>o</sup>yānâ d<sup>o</sup>-°alšāytâ. 'antipa(°)sis  
'ābdâ. w-(°)aminā'it qa(°)ṭapasis šarrirâ 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-  
barnāšâ napšānâ 'itaw(hy): w-(°)aminā'it 'apopa(°)sis

daggāltâ: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-barnāšâ lâ 'itaw(hy). napšānâ. w-(')āp  
 'al k<sup>o</sup>yānâ d<sup>o</sup>-lâ mešk<sup>o</sup>hānītâ. 'aminā 'it' antīpa(')sis 'ābdâ  
 w-(')aminā 'it qa(')tapa(')sis daggāltâ. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-barnāšâ  
 ḥ<sup>o</sup>mārâ 'itaw(hy). w-(')aminā 'it' apopa(')sis šarrirītâ:  
 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-barnāšâ lâ 'itaw(hy) ḥ<sup>o</sup>mārâ. w<sup>o</sup>- 'al k<sup>o</sup>yānâ d<sup>o</sup>-  
 metmašyānītâ: mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-tartayhên neh<sup>o</sup>w<sup>o</sup>yān šarrirītâ.  
 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-barnāšâ m<sup>o</sup>hallek: barnāšâ lâ m<sup>o</sup>hallek. w<sup>o</sup>-  
 hādēda-l<sup>o</sup>qublâ 'it simâ balḥod 'itêh. w<sup>o</sup>-lâ hawyâ  
 'antīpa(')sis.

16

'al meddem dên kolānāyâ w<sup>o</sup>-lâ 'ihidāyâ d-(')it leh  
 p<sup>o</sup>rosdiorismos: hāwyâ da-l<sup>o</sup>qublāyutâ da-s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ ba-štâ  
 z<sup>o</sup>nayyâ d<sup>o</sup>-hāšâ 'āmarnâ. ḥad. kol barnāšâ 'itaw(hy) w<sup>o</sup>-lâ  
 ḥad barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). w<sup>o</sup>-ḥad kol barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). ḥad  
 barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). w<sup>o</sup>-ḥad. w<sup>o</sup>-lâ ḥad barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). lâ  
 kol barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). w<sup>o</sup>-ḥad. ḥad barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). lâ  
 kol barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). w<sup>o</sup>-ḥad kol barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). lâ kol  
 barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). w<sup>o</sup>-ḥad. kol barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). w<sup>o</sup>-lâ  
 ḥad barnāšâ 'itaw(hy).

17

w<sup>o</sup>-hay da-l<sup>o</sup>qublāyut s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ: d-(')it bāh kol w<sup>o</sup>-lâ  
 ḥad. d<sup>o</sup>-saqqublāyê rawrbê meštamm<sup>o</sup>hâ. w<sup>o</sup>-hay d-(')it bāh  
 kol w<sup>o</sup>-ḥad. qa(')tapis da-t<sup>o</sup>hêt ḥ<sup>o</sup>dādâ metqaryâ. w<sup>o</sup>-hay  
 d-(')it bāh w<sup>o</sup>-lâ<sup>1</sup> ḥad lâ kol 'apopa(')sis da-t<sup>o</sup>hêt ḥ<sup>o</sup>dādâ  
 meštamm<sup>o</sup>hâ. w<sup>o</sup>-hay d-(')it bāh ḥad w<sup>o</sup>-lâ kol d<sup>o</sup>-  
 saqqublāyê z<sup>o</sup>orê metqaryâ. w<sup>o</sup>-hay d-(')it bāh kol w<sup>o</sup>-lâ  
 kol: w-(')āp w<sup>o</sup>-hay d-(')it bāh ḥad w<sup>o</sup>-lâ ḥad tartayhên d<sup>o</sup>-  
 men gonāwātâ: w-(')antīpa(')sis meštamm<sup>o</sup>hân.

18

w<sup>o</sup>-hay d<sup>o</sup>-saqqublāyê rawrbê 'al k<sup>o</sup>yānâ d-(')ālšāytâ  
 w-(')āp 'al haw d<sup>o</sup>-lâ mešk<sup>o</sup>hānītâ: š<sup>o</sup>rārâ w<sup>o</sup>-daggālūtâ  
 m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gān: w<sup>o</sup>- 'al k<sup>o</sup>yānâ d<sup>o</sup>-metmašyānītâ lâ m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gâ

1. *W<sup>o</sup>-lâ* has been inserted above the line.

meṭṭul d°-mašyâ d°-qa(°)ṭapa(°)sis w-(°)apopa(°)sis  
šawyâ'it nehwoyân dagg°lâtâ. d-(°)ā(y)k 'aykân: kol  
barnāšâ ḥ°lim. w°-lâ ḥad barnāšâ ḥ°lim. w°-hay d°-  
saqqublâyê z°'orê 'al k°yānâ d-(°)ālsāytâ wa-k°yānâ d°-lâ  
mešk°hāniṭâ: š°rārâ w°-daggālūtâ. w°-'al k°yānâ d°-  
meṭmašyāniṭâ lâ m°pall°gâ. meṭṭul d°-mašyâ d°-ṭartayhên  
nehwoyân šarrirâtâ. d-(°)ā(y)k 'aykân. ḥad barnāšâ ḥ°lim.  
lâkol barnāšâ ḥ°lim. w°-hay d°-qa(°)ṭa(°)pa(°)sis da-t°hêt  
ḥ°dādâ 'al k°yānâ d-(°)ālsāytâ 'aminā'it' ak(h)dâ mašrê.  
w°-'al k°yānâ d°-lâ mešk°hāniṭâ: 'aminā'it' ak(h)dâ  
m°dagg°lâ. w°-'al k°yānâ d°-meṭmašyāniṭâ 'aminā'it' ḥ°dâ  
mašrê wa-ḥ°dâ m°dagg°lâ. d-(°)ā(y)k 'aykân. kol barnāšâ  
g°rammaṭṭiqâ. ḥad barnāšâ g°rammaṭṭiqâ. w°-hay d-  
(°)apopa(°)sis da-t°hêt ḥ°dādâ. 'al k°yānâ d-(°)ālsāytâ.  
'aminā'it' ak(h)dâ m°dagg°lâ. w°-'al k°yānâ d°-lâ  
mešk°hāniṭâ 'aminā'it' ak(h)dâ mašrê. w°-'al k°yānâ d°-  
meṭmašyāniṭâ 'aminā'it' š°rārâ w°-daggālūtâ m°pall°gâ. d-  
(°)ā(y)k 'aykân. w°-lâ ḥad barnāšâ g°rammaṭṭiqâ. lâkol  
barnāšâ g°rammaṭṭiqâ.

19

w°-ṭartayhên 'anṭipa(°)sis: 'aminā'it' 'al kol hulê d°-  
ba-k°yānâ: š°rārâ w°-daggālūtâ m°pall°gân. wa-ḥ°dâ š°rārâ  
šāqlâ wa-ḥ°dâ daggālūtâ. w°-hay man d°-saqqublê rawrbê.  
lâ m°tom hawyâ šarrirâtâ 'ak(h)dâ. 'ellâ 'it'emat(y) d-  
(°)ak(h)dâ m°dagg°lâ. hay dên d°-saqqublâyê z°'orê. lâ  
m°tom hawyâ daggālūtâ 'ak(h)dâ 'ellâ 'it'emat(y) d-  
(°)ak(h)dâ mašrê. w°-hay d°-qa(°)ṭapa(°)sis da-t°hêt ḥ°dādâ.  
w°-hay d-(°)apopa(°)sis. 'it'emat(y) d-(°)ak(h)dâ mašrân.  
w°-'it'emat(y) d-(°)ak(h)dâ m°dagg°lân. 'it'emat(y) d-  
(°)ak(h)dâ š°rārâ w°-daggālūtâ m°pall°gân.

20

balḥod dên hānên d°-men gonāwātâ 'ābdān  
'anṭipa(°)sis: meṭṭul d-(°)aminā'it' š°rārâ w°-daggālūtâ

m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gān. w<sup>o</sup>-‘ell<sup>o</sup>tā hādē (h)i. d<sup>o</sup>-saqqublāyē rawrbē: b- (‘)aynāyutā balḥod da-l<sup>o</sup>qublāyē. b<sup>o</sup>-hay da-h<sup>o</sup>dā qa(‘)ṭapasis wa-h<sup>o</sup>dā ‘apopa(‘)sis. ba-k<sup>o</sup>māyutādēn: laytēh da-l<sup>o</sup>qublā. meṭṭul d<sup>o</sup>-tartayhēn: koleh meddem h<sup>o</sup>dā sāymā wa-h<sup>o</sup>dā m<sup>o</sup>rimā w-(‘)āp hay d<sup>o</sup>-saqqublāyē z<sup>o</sup>‘orē bāh ba-d<sup>o</sup>mutā: wa-h<sup>o</sup>dā m<sup>o</sup>nātā meddem sāymā: wa-h<sup>o</sup>dā m<sup>o</sup>nātā meddem m<sup>o</sup>rimā. w<sup>o</sup>-hānēn da-t<sup>o</sup>hēt h<sup>o</sup>dādā: tartayhēn b-(‘)aynāyutā man lā da-l<sup>o</sup>qublin: meṭṭul d<sup>o</sup>-tartayhēn qa(‘)ṭapasis ‘aw ‘apopa(‘)sis. ‘ellā balḥod ba-k<sup>o</sup>māyutā da-l<sup>o</sup>qublin. meṭṭul d-(‘)aminā ‘it h<sup>o</sup>dā koleh meddem. wa-h<sup>o</sup>dā lā koleh meddem sāymā ‘aw m<sup>o</sup>rimā. hānēn dēn d<sup>o</sup>-men gonāwātā tartayhēn: w<sup>o</sup>-b-(‘)aynāyutā ‘akḥad w<sup>o</sup>-ba-k<sup>o</sup>māyutā. da-l<sup>o</sup>qublā ‘ennēn. meṭṭul d-(‘)aminā ‘it h<sup>o</sup>dā qa(‘)ṭapa(‘)sis. wa-h<sup>o</sup>dā ‘apopa(‘)sis. wa-h<sup>o</sup>dā kolānāytā. wa-h<sup>o</sup>dā lā kolānāytā.

21  
w<sup>o</sup>-rušmayhēn ‘itaw(hy) hānā.

<p style="text-align: center;"><i>‘al l<sup>o</sup>tāyehēn ‘aminā ‘it</i></p>	<p>hay d<sup>o</sup>-saqqublāyē rawrbē. ‘al k<sup>o</sup>yānā d-(‘)ālšāytā. w<sup>o</sup>-hay d<sup>o</sup>-lā mešk<sup>o</sup>hānītā {š} š<sup>o</sup>rārā w<sup>o</sup>-daggālūtā m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gān. w<sup>o</sup>-‘al k<sup>o</sup>yānā d<sup>o</sup>-metmašyānītā tartayhēn m<sup>o</sup>dagg<sup>o</sup>lān.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>‘i. gūttu. usq<sup>o</sup>ṭāpā. ‘i. ‘e.</i></p>
<p>hay d-(‘)apopa(‘)sis da-t<sup>o</sup>hēt h<sup>o</sup>dādā. ‘al k<sup>o</sup>yānā d-(‘)ālšāytā. tartayhēn m<sup>o</sup>dagg<sup>o</sup>lān. w<sup>o</sup>-‘al k<sup>o</sup>yānā d<sup>o</sup>-lā mešk<sup>o</sup>hānītā tartayhēn mašrān. w<sup>o</sup>-‘al k<sup>o</sup>yānā d<sup>o</sup>-metmašyānītā. š<sup>o</sup>rārā w<sup>o</sup>-daggālūtā m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gān.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>‘antipal(‘)iqa ‘it</i> <i>‘i. gūttu. usq<sup>o</sup>ṭāpā. ‘i. ‘e.</i></p>	<p>hay d<sup>o</sup>-qa(‘)ṭapasis da-t<sup>o</sup>hēt h<sup>o</sup>dādā. w<sup>o</sup>-‘al k<sup>o</sup>yānā d-(‘)ālšāytā. tartayhēn mašrān. w<sup>o</sup>-‘al k<sup>o</sup>yānā d<sup>o</sup>-lā mešk<sup>o</sup>hānītā tartayhēn m<sup>o</sup>dagg<sup>o</sup>lān. w<sup>o</sup>-‘al k<sup>o</sup>yānā d<sup>o</sup>-metmašyānītā š<sup>o</sup>rārā w<sup>o</sup>-daggālūtā m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gān.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>uḡā ‘iṭā ‘u. ‘i. gūttu. usq<sup>o</sup>ṭāpā. ‘i. ‘e.</i></p>	<p>w<sup>o</sup>-hay d<sup>o</sup>-saqqublāyē z<sup>o</sup>‘orē: ‘al k<sup>o</sup>yānā d-(‘)ālšāytā. w-(‘)āp ‘al haw d<sup>o</sup>-lā mešk<sup>o</sup>hānītā š<sup>o</sup>rārā w<sup>o</sup>-daggālūtā m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gān w<sup>o</sup>-‘al k<sup>o</sup>yānā d<sup>o</sup>-metmašyānītā tartayhēn mašrān.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>š<sup>o</sup>rārā w<sup>o</sup>-daggālūtā m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gān</i></p>

22

'it 'emat(y) da-b<sup>o</sup>-qa(')ta(')pasis w<sup>o</sup>-b(')apopa(')sis  
 ḥad š<sup>o</sup>mâ wa-ḥ<sup>o</sup>dâ mell<sup>o</sup>tâ 'it. w-'it 'emat(y) da-b<sup>o</sup>-  
 tartayhên: t<sup>o</sup>rên š<sup>o</sup>mâhê 'it. w-(')enhu man d<sup>o</sup>-ḥad š<sup>o</sup>mâ 'it  
 p<sup>o</sup>roṭa(')sis hay p<sup>o</sup>šittâ. hānaq dên mēmrâ (h)u p<sup>o</sup>šitâ. w-  
 (')enhu dên da-t<sup>o</sup>rên š<sup>o</sup>māhin. p<sup>o</sup>roṭa(')sis hay m<sup>o</sup>rakkabtâ.  
 hānaw dên mēmrâ (h)u m<sup>o</sup>rakk<sup>o</sup>bâ. bel'ad men mell<sup>o</sup>tâ. lâ  
 qa(')ta(')pa(')sis ma'b<sup>o</sup>dâ w<sup>o</sup>-lâ 'apopa(')sis. kolḥ<sup>o</sup>dâ  
 qa(')ṭapasis: la-ḥ<sup>o</sup>dâ 'apopa(')sis da-l<sup>o</sup>qublâyâ. w<sup>o</sup>-kolḥ<sup>o</sup>dâ  
 'apopa(')sis: la-ḥ<sup>o</sup>dâ qa(')ṭapa(')sis.

23

b<sup>o</sup>-mēmrâ pāsoqâ 'aminā'it kad lâ 'am š<sup>o</sup>mâ  
 meṭemar: qa(')ṭapa(')sis hawyâ. w<sup>o</sup>-kad 'am mell<sup>o</sup>tâ  
 meṭamrâ: 'apopa(')sis hawyâ: meṭṭul da-l<sup>o</sup>-mēmrâ haw d-  
 (')āmar: suqrāṭis barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). 'apopa(')sis dileh hādê  
 (h)i. d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis barnāšâ lâ 'itaw(hy). w<sup>o</sup>-mēmrâ haw d-  
 (')āmar: suqrāṭis lâ barnāšâ 'itaw(hy). qa(')ṭapasis (h)u. w-  
 (')apopa(')sis dileh (h)i suqrāṭis lâ barnāšâ <lâ><sup>1</sup>  
 'itaw(hy). kol qa(')ṭapasis d-(')it bāh lâ: 'apopa(')sis  
 m<sup>o</sup>ḥaww<sup>o</sup>yâ d-(')itêh. 'ellâ <lâ><sup>2</sup> b<sup>o</sup>-mell<sup>o</sup>tâ lâ 'āmrâ. w<sup>o</sup>-  
 kol 'apopa(')sis d-(')it bāh t<sup>o</sup>rên lâ: {suqrāṭis}<sup>3</sup>  
 qa(')ṭa(')pasis m<sup>o</sup>ḥaww<sup>o</sup>yâ d-(')itêh. w<sup>o</sup>-bāh ba-d<sup>o</sup>mutâ b<sup>o</sup>-  
 mell<sup>o</sup>tâ lâ 'āmrâ. b-(')apopa(')sis d-(')it l<sup>o</sup>hên  
 p<sup>o</sup>rosdiorismos. 'aminā'it lâ 'am p<sup>o</sup>rosdiorismos 'āmrinan.  
 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-lâ kol. w<sup>o</sup>-lâ ḥad 'emat(y) da-b<sup>o</sup>-pāsoqâ t<sup>o</sup>rên  
 š<sup>o</sup>mâhê 'it. lâ m<sup>o</sup>tom 'āmrinan p<sup>o</sup>rosdiorismos: 'am haw

- 
1. This *lâ* was clearly omitted due to a scribal error. It is essential for this sentence to make sense.
  2. This is another indispensable *lâ* omitted by the scribe.
  3. This *suqrāṭis* seems to have been inserted entirely randomly. Hugonnard-Roche does not include it and makes no comment about omitting it. It clearly does not belong here and it is ignored in the translation.

š<sup>o</sup>mâ d<sup>o</sup>-metqatreg. 'ellâ 'aminâ'it 'am haw š<sup>o</sup>mâ d<sup>o</sup>-sim.  
'āmrinan. metṭul d<sup>o</sup>-law 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-mešk<sup>o</sup>hâ kad 'āmrinan.  
d<sup>o</sup>-kol barnāšâ hayuṭâ 'itaw(hy). Hāk<sup>o</sup>wāt w-(')āp  
kad 'āmrinan: d<sup>o</sup>-barnāšâ kol hayuṭâ 'itaw(hy) māšrinān.  
b<sup>o</sup>-hay d<sup>o</sup>-hādê daggāltâ (h)i.

24

'aykannâ da-t<sup>o</sup>lāt 'ennên m<sup>o</sup>nāwāteh d<sup>o</sup>-zabnâ:  
hākannâ w-(')āp mēmrê. b<sup>o</sup>-hay d<sup>o</sup>-kol mēmrâ: ba-t<sup>o</sup>lātâ  
zabnê hāwê. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrātis 'itaw(hy): suqrātis  
'itaw(hy) (h)wâ. suqrātis hāwê 'itaw(hy).

25

kol { 'an }<sup>1</sup> 'antipa(')sis: 'aminâ'it š<sup>o</sup>rārâ w<sup>o</sup>-  
daggāluṭâ m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gâ 'aykannâ d-(')et(')amrat. 'ellâ law  
'aminâ'it bāh ba-d<sup>o</sup>muṭâ. metṭul d<sup>o</sup>- 'al meddem d-  
(')itaw(hy): w<sup>o</sup>-meddem d<sup>o</sup>-lâ mešk<sup>o</sup>hâ d<sup>o</sup>-nehwê:  
hāk<sup>o</sup>wāt m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gâ 'aykannâ d-(')āph<sup>o</sup>nan yād<sup>o</sup>inan. w-  
(')aydâ šarrirâ w-(')aydâ daggālâ. 'ellâ 'al k<sup>o</sup>yānâ d<sup>o</sup>-  
metmašyānitâ w<sup>o</sup>- 'al meddem da-'tid d<sup>o</sup>-nehwê. w<sup>o</sup>-  
law 'aminâ'it bāh ba-d<sup>o</sup>muṭâ hāwê: hākannâ m<sup>o</sup>pall<sup>o</sup>gâ.  
'aykannâ da-h<sup>o</sup>nan lâ yād<sup>o</sup>inan: d-(')enqa(')tapasis šarrirâ  
'aw 'apopa(')sis: 'dammâ d<sup>o</sup>-hi hāwyâ: 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ da-h<sup>o</sup>dâ  
'āmrâ: d<sup>o</sup>-la-m<sup>o</sup>hār metrâ 'aw q<sup>o</sup>rābâ hāwê: wa-  
(')h<sup>o</sup>rētâ 'āmrâ da-m<sup>o</sup>hār metrâ 'aw q<sup>o</sup>rābâ lâ hāwê..

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t<sup>o</sup>lāt 'ennên m<sup>o</sup>nāwātâ da-k<sup>o</sup>yānâ d<sup>o</sup>-metmašyānitâ.  
h<sup>o</sup>dâ (h)i d-(')ā(y)k da-b<sup>o</sup>-sogâ(') hāwyâ: wa-q<sup>o</sup>dim lāh  
k<sup>o</sup>yānâ: wa-h<sup>o</sup>dâ (h)i d<sup>o</sup>-dallilâ'it wa-l<sup>o</sup>-ruḥqâ hāwyâ: wa-  
q<sup>o</sup>dim lāh gedšâ. wa-h<sup>o</sup>dâ (h)i d<sup>o</sup>-meš'ā'it. d-(')it 'emat(y)  
d<sup>o</sup>-hākannâ w-(')it 'emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-hākannâ hāwyâ: wa-q<sup>o</sup>dim  
lāh šebyānâ dilan. wa-b<sup>o</sup>naynāšâ 'al hādê m<sup>o</sup>nātâ balḥod

1. A pair of letters inserted at the end of the line in anticipation of the beginning of the next line.

m<sup>o</sup>ša ' 'lin la-h<sup>o</sup>dādā w<sup>o</sup>-metmall<sup>o</sup>kin w<sup>o</sup>-sā<sup>o</sup>rin. 'it (')nāšīn d-(')āmrin d<sup>o</sup>-al meddem 'ananqā 'it h<sup>o</sup>wā w<sup>o</sup>-hāwê. metṭul d<sup>o</sup>-metmašyānītā men 'ananqê 'it leh beh ba-k<sup>o</sup>yānā: d<sup>o</sup>-nehwê 'aw d<sup>o</sup>-lā nehwê metṭul d-(')ananqê 'itêh m<sup>o</sup>hār. d<sup>o</sup>-nehwê metrā 'aw lā nehwê. w<sup>o</sup>-d-(')enā 'ezal l<sup>o</sup>-hendu 'aw lš 'ezal 'ellā h<sup>o</sup>nan 'dammā d<sup>o</sup>-hawyā lā yād<sup>o</sup>inan. w<sup>o</sup>-kolmeddem 'aykannā d<sup>o</sup>-(')itaw(hy) hu b<sup>o</sup>-yāteh n<sup>o</sup>hur beh: w<sup>o</sup>-law 'aykannā da-h<sup>o</sup>nan yād<sup>o</sup>inan. 'ellā 'enhu d<sup>o</sup>-kolmeddem 'ananqā 'it h<sup>o</sup>wā w<sup>o</sup>-hāwê: w<sup>o</sup>-meddem b<sup>o</sup>-gedšā wa-b<sup>o</sup>-šebyānā lā hāwê. melkê w<sup>o</sup>-šu'ālê d<sup>o</sup>-am h<sup>o</sup>dādā. wa-'bādā w<sup>o</sup>-pulhānā: wa-m<sup>o</sup>yatt<sup>o</sup>ruṭā w<sup>o</sup>-bišutā da-b<sup>o</sup>naynāšā. wa-m<sup>o</sup>sām b<sup>o</sup>-rēšā w<sup>o</sup>-šappirūṭ pur'ānā. da-g<sup>o</sup>hānā w<sup>o</sup>-malkutā men yattiru 'ennên: w<sup>o</sup>-hādê b-(')aylên da-p<sup>o</sup>ên tetl<sup>o</sup>bek hay da-š<sup>o</sup>kirtā (h)i. 'aw law kolmeddem 'ananqā 'it h<sup>o</sup>wā w<sup>o</sup>-hāwê: 'ellā w-(')āp b<sup>o</sup>-gedšā wa-b<sup>o</sup>-šebyānā hāwê.

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'emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-ḥad š<sup>o</sup>mā w-(')ak(h)dā mell<sup>o</sup>tā 'ak(h)dā met<sup>o</sup>(')āmrin 'arba hawyān da-l<sup>o</sup>qublāyut s<sup>o</sup>yāmā. h<sup>o</sup>dā 'al meddem d<sup>o</sup>-kolḥad. wa-h<sup>o</sup>dā 'al meddem d<sup>o</sup>-kolānāyā d<sup>o</sup>-layt leh p<sup>o</sup>rosdiorismos. w<sup>o</sup>-tartayhên 'al meddem kolānāyā d-(')it leh p<sup>o</sup>rosdiorismos. w<sup>o</sup>-hālên 'arba 'al t<sup>o</sup>lāt hula(')s d<sup>o</sup>-ba-k<sup>o</sup>yānā. hawyān tarta'esrê. w<sup>o</sup>-hālên tarta'esrê 'al hālên t<sup>o</sup>lāt zabnê: hawyān t<sup>o</sup>lātīn w<sup>o</sup>-šet. w<sup>o</sup>-tub 'emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-ḥad š<sup>o</sup>mā wa-h<sup>o</sup>dā mell<sup>o</sup>tā: b<sup>o</sup>ram dên š<sup>o</sup>mā lā m<sup>o</sup>taḥh<sup>o</sup>mā. hawyān da-l<sup>o</sup>qublāyut s<sup>o</sup>yāmā (')h<sup>o</sup>rānyātā beh kad beh b<sup>o</sup>-qānonā: t<sup>o</sup>lātīn w<sup>o</sup>-šet. w-idi'ā (h)i d<sup>o</sup>-kolhên da-l<sup>o</sup>qublāyāt s<sup>o</sup>yāmā da-p<sup>o</sup>roṭa(')sis p<sup>o</sup>šitātā. hawyān šab'in w<sup>o</sup>-tartên. w<sup>o</sup>-ba-p<sup>o</sup>roṭa(')sis m<sup>o</sup>rakk<sup>o</sup>bātā b<sup>o</sup>-hānên d<sup>o</sup>-trên š<sup>o</sup>māhin 'it b<sup>o</sup>hên: 'it da-l<sup>o</sup>qublīt s<sup>o</sup>yāmā (')h<sup>o</sup>rānyā(')tā mā(') w-(')arb<sup>o</sup>in w-(')arba metṭul d<sup>o</sup>-beh kad beh b<sup>o</sup>-qānonā haw d<sup>o</sup>-men l<sup>o</sup>-el 'amir. 'emat(y) da-š<sup>o</sup>mā haw d<sup>o</sup>-sim w<sup>o</sup>-haw d<sup>o</sup>-metqatreg: t<sup>o</sup>rayhon



m<sup>o</sup>tahh<sup>o</sup>mê met(‘)amrin: ‘akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrâtiš napšânâ  
 ‘itaw(hy): barnāšâ napšânâ ‘itaw(hy): kol barnāšâ napšânâ  
 ‘itaw(hy): ḥad barnāšâ napšânâ ‘itaw(hy). hawyān t<sup>o</sup>lātin  
 w<sup>o</sup>-šet. w<sup>o</sup>-tub ‘emat(y) da-š<sup>o</sup>mâ haw d<sup>o</sup>-sim m<sup>o</sup>tahh<sup>o</sup>mâ  
 ‘itaw(hy). w<sup>o</sup>-haw d<sup>o</sup>-metqatreg lâ m<sup>o</sup>tahh<sup>o</sup>mâ: hawyān  
 (‘)h<sup>o</sup>rānyātâ t<sup>o</sup>lātin w<sup>o</sup>-šet. w<sup>o</sup>-tub ‘emat(y) haw d<sup>o</sup>-sim lâ  
 m<sup>o</sup>tahh<sup>o</sup>mâ ‘itaw(hy). w<sup>o</sup>-haw d<sup>o</sup>-metqatreg m<sup>o</sup>tahh<sup>o</sup>mâ.  
 hawyān (‘)h<sup>o</sup>rānyātâ t<sup>o</sup>lātin w<sup>o</sup>-šet. w<sup>o</sup>-tub ‘emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-  
 tartayhên lâ m<sup>o</sup>tahh<sup>o</sup>mê. hāwên (‘)h<sup>o</sup>rānyātâ t<sup>o</sup>lātin w<sup>o</sup>-šet.  
 w-(‘)arba‘ zabnin t<sup>o</sup>lātin w<sup>o</sup>-šet. hawyān mâ(‘) w-(‘)arb<sup>o</sup> in  
 w-(‘)arba‘ ¶ w-(‘)ak(h)dâ dên da-p<sup>o</sup>šitâtâ wa-m<sup>o</sup>rakk<sup>o</sup>bātâ  
 hawyān da-l<sup>o</sup>qublīt s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ ma(‘)tên w<sup>o</sup>-sett<sup>o</sup>‘ esrê.

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haw d<sup>o</sup>-men l<sup>o</sup>‘el ‘al mell<sup>o</sup>tâ ‘et(‘)emar. ‘akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-  
 ḥubānâ ‘it makkikā ‘it. z<sup>o</sup>nâ ‘itaw(hy) d<sup>o</sup>-mêmrâ. meṭṭul d<sup>o</sup>-  
 kad šāma‘ (‘)nâ d<sup>o</sup>-mêmrâ ḥubānâ ‘it ‘aw makkikā ‘it  
 meṭ(‘)emar: yāda‘ (‘)nâ d<sup>o</sup>-b-(‘)aynâ z<sup>o</sup>nâ meṭ(‘)emar ¶ z<sup>o</sup>nâ  
 ‘itaw(hy): ‘aykannāyutâ d<sup>o</sup>-haw {d<sup>o</sup>-haw}<sup>1</sup> d<sup>o</sup>-sim meddem  
 d<sup>o</sup>-meṭ(‘)emar. meṭṭul d<sup>o</sup>-haw d-(‘)āmar: d<sup>o</sup>-haw gabrâ  
 ḥubānâ ‘it m<sup>o</sup>mallel. hādê m<sup>o</sup>ḥawwê: d<sup>o</sup>-haw gabrâ haw  
 mêmrâ ‘aykan mallel. wa-z<sup>o</sup>nayyâ d<sup>o</sup>-d-(‘)ā(y)k hālên  
 saggi‘ê ‘it. w<sup>o</sup>-lan lâ m<sup>o</sup>sayy<sup>o</sup>kâ ‘ennon. ‘ellâ hānon d<sup>o</sup>-  
 yattirâ ‘it meṭbā‘ên: t<sup>o</sup>lātâ ‘ennon. ‘ananqê. meṭmašyānâ. lâ  
 mešk<sup>o</sup>hānâ. wa-z<sup>o</sup>nayyâ d<sup>o</sup>-mêmrê: men hula(‘)s d<sup>o</sup>-ba-  
 k<sup>o</sup>yānâ. da-‘alayhên meṭ(‘)amrin p<sup>o</sup>roṭa(‘)sis: b<sup>o</sup>-hādê  
 m<sup>o</sup>šahī<sup>o</sup>pin. d<sup>o</sup>-hula(‘)s d<sup>o</sup>-ba-k<sup>o</sup>yānâ bāh b<sup>o</sup>-yāteh d<sup>o</sup>-  
 meddem ‘itayhên. meṭṭul d<sup>o</sup>-kolmeddem d<sup>o</sup>-‘al meddem  
 (‘)h<sup>o</sup>rēn meṭ(‘)emar: ‘aw ‘aminā ‘it ‘ammeh (h)u. w-  
 (‘)ālšāytâ (h)i: ‘aw lâ m<sup>o</sup>tom ‘itaw(hy) ‘ammeh: w<sup>o</sup>-lâ  
 mešk<sup>o</sup>hānitâ (h)i. ‘aw ‘it ‘emat(y) d-‘ammeh: w-(‘)it  
 ‘emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-law ‘ammeh (h)u. meṭmašyānitâ (h)i.  
 meṭṭulhādê d<sup>o</sup>-ba-k<sup>o</sup>yānâ meṭ(‘)amrān: meṭṭul d<sup>o</sup>-beh b<sup>o</sup>-

1. This second *d̄h-haw* appears to be entirely superfluous.

meddem 'itayhên z<sup>o</sup>nayyâ dên b<sup>o</sup>-met(')amrânūtâ balḥod  
d<sup>o</sup>-mêmrâ mettaws<sup>o</sup>pin men l<sup>o</sup>-bar 'al š<sup>o</sup>mâ w<sup>o</sup>-mell<sup>o</sup>tâ. wa-  
k<sup>o</sup>mâ zabnin: 'it 'emat(y) d<sup>o</sup>-hulâ k<sup>o</sup>yānaytâ d<sup>o</sup>-mêmrâ  
šarrirtâ. 'ellâ metṭul z<sup>o</sup>nâ lâ hawyâ. 'akz<sup>o</sup>nâ d<sup>o</sup>-(')emat(y)  
d<sup>o</sup>-met(')emar d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis makkikā'it m<sup>o</sup>mallel. metṭul d-  
(')enhu da-m<sup>o</sup>mallel w<sup>o</sup>-mārānā'it m<sup>o</sup>mallel: haydên hādê  
d<sup>o</sup>-mallel šarrirâ. 'ellâ hay d<sup>o</sup>-makkikā'it daggālâ. b-  
(')apopa(')sis da-z<sup>o</sup>nâ: 'aminā'it lâ 'am z<sup>o</sup>nâ met(')emar.  
metṭul d-(')enhu d<sup>o</sup>-'am š<sup>o</sup>mâ 'aw mell<sup>o</sup>tâ met(')emar.  
qa(')ṭapasis hawyâ w<sup>o</sup>-law 'apopa(')sis.

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da-l<sup>o</sup>qublīt s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ d<sup>o</sup>-'am z<sup>o</sup>nâ hākannâ hawyâ. z<sup>o</sup>nâ:  
'aw ba-p<sup>o</sup>roṭa(')sis d<sup>o</sup>-men ḥad š<sup>o</sup>mâ wa-ḥ<sup>o</sup>dâ mell<sup>o</sup>tâ  
met(')emar: 'aw b<sup>o</sup>-hay d<sup>o</sup>-men t<sup>o</sup>rên š<sup>o</sup>māhin wa-ḥ<sup>o</sup>dâ  
mell<sup>o</sup>tâ. wa-š<sup>o</sup>mâ 'aw m<sup>o</sup>tahḥmâ 'itaw(hy) 'aw lâ  
m<sup>o</sup>tahḥmâ. 'aykannâ d<sup>o</sup>-men l<sup>o</sup>'el 'amir. w-(')enhu men  
ḥad š<sup>o</sup>mâ wa-ḥ<sup>o</sup>dâ mell<sup>o</sup>tâ. hawyān da-l<sup>o</sup>qublīt s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ  
'arba' hākannâ. mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâ mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-  
suqrāṭis n<sup>o</sup>hallek. mašyâd<sup>o</sup>-lâ suqrāṭis n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâmašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-  
lâ suqrāṭis n<sup>o</sup>hallek. mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis lâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâ mašyâ  
d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis lâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâ mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-lâ suqrāṭis lâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek.  
w-(')enhu dên da-t<sup>o</sup>rên š<sup>o</sup>māhin wa-ḥ<sup>o</sup>dâ mell<sup>o</sup>tâ. hawyān  
da-l<sup>o</sup>qublīt s<sup>o</sup>yāmâ t<sup>o</sup>mānê hākannâ. mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis  
pilāsopâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâ mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis pilāsopâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek.  
mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-lâ suqrāṭis pilāsopâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâ mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-lâ  
suqrāṭis pilāsopâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis lâ pilāsopâ  
n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâ mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis lâ pilāsopâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. mašyâ  
d<sup>o</sup>-lâ suqrāṭis lâ pilāsopâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâ mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-lâ suqrāṭis  
lâ pilāsopâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis pilāsopâ lâ  
n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâ mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis pilāsopâ lâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek.  
mašyâd<sup>o</sup>-lâ suqrāṭis pilāsopâ lâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâ mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-lâ  
suqrāṭis pilāsopâ lâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis lâ pilāsopâ  
lâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek. lâ mašyâ d<sup>o</sup>-suqrāṭis lâ pilāsopâ lâ n<sup>o</sup>hallek.

masyâ d°-lâ suqrātis lâ pilāsopâ lâ n°hallek. lâ masyâ d°-lâ suqrātis lâ pilāsopâ lâ n°hallek¶ 'ak(h)dâ dên 'al meddem d°-kolḥad. hawyān da-l°qublīt s°yāmâ tarta'esrê w°-'al meddem d°-kolānāyâ d°-layt leh p°rosdiorismos: (')h°rānyātâ tarta'esrê. w°-'al meddem d°-kolānāyâ d°-(')it leh p°rosdiorismos d°-kol w°-lâ kol met(°)emar 'ammeh. (')h°rānyātâ tarta'esrê. w°-'al haw d°-ḥad w°-lâ ḥad met(°)emar 'ammeh: (')h°rānyātâ tarta'esrê d°-hawyān 'ak(h)dâ 'arb°'in wa-t°mānê. w°-hālên 'al t°lātâ zabnê: hawyān mâ(°) w°-(°)arb°'in w-(°)arba°. w°-hālên 'al t°lāt hula(°)s d°-ba-k°yānâ. 'arba' mâ(°) wa-t°lātīn wa-t°rên. wa-z°nayyâ d°-mêmrê 'aykannâ d-(°)et(°)amrat hawyān t°lātâ. w°-'al hālên t°lātâ zabnê: hawyān 'ālep w°-ma(°)tên w°-teš'in w°-šet hawyān da-l°qublīt s°yāmê<sup>1</sup> hānên da-s°tar men z°nâ: p°šitātâ man: šab'in w°-tartên. m°rakk°bātâ dên. mâ(°) w°-(°)arb°'in w-(°)arba°. 'ak(h)dâ dên ma(°)tên w°-šetta'esrê. kolhên dên da-l°qublīt s°yāmâ 'ak(h)dâ dên matên w°-šetta'esrê. 'ālep w°-ḥammešmâ(°) w°-tarta'esrê. wa-p°rota(°)sis qa(°)ta(°)pa(°)sis 'am 'apopa(°)sis: hawyān t°lātâ 'alpin w°-'esrin w-(°)arba'¶ meṭṭul d°-kolhên da-l°qublīt s°yāmâ 'ak(h)dâ 'ennên.

w°-qānonâ (')h°rēnâ d°-mêmrâ da-š°rārâ w°-dagḡalutâ. hāwê beh layt. w°-kol mēmrâ d°-šarkâ da-b°-pāsoqâ met(°)emar: men hānâ qānonâ šappirā'it meṭida¶ š°lem nuhārâ da-k°tābâ d-pa(h)riharma(h)nyā(°)s da-'°bid l°-pawlos parsāyâ. wa-m°paššaq l°-sēwarê sābbukt..

1. The presence of the *s°yāmê* over this word is anomalous in comparison with other cases of it in the manuscript.

## **Greek Text of Aristotle's**

### ***Peri Hermeneias***

#### **A Word about the Greek Text**

So that the reader may compare Paul the Persian's exposition on *Peri Hermeneias* with Aristotle's Greek original, the Greek text is given in this section. The chapter numbers here are those conventionally assigned to the Greek text. The paragraph numbers given in Paul the Persian's text do not correspond to the chapter numbers of the Greek, since Paul did not translate the Greek directly, but rather adapted it for his purpose of explaining the constructions found in Syriac.

The Greek text presented here was transcribed from the Loeb Classics edition prepared by Harold P. Cook and published in the volume that includes *The Categories* and *On Interpretation* (prepared by Cook) and *Prior Analytics* (prepared by Hugh Tredennick). For publication details see the bibliography.

## ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ

I. Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι τί ὄνομα καὶ τί ῥῆμα, ἔπειτα τί ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφανσις καὶ λόγος.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταὶ ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτως, ταῦτα πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα, πράγματα ἤδη ταῦτά. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς· ἄλλης γὰρ πραγματείας.

Ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὅτε μὲν νόημα ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὅτε δὲ ἤδη ᾧ ἀνάγκη τούτων ὑπάρχειν θάτερον, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ· περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἐστὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ἔοικε τῷ ἄνευ συνθέσεως καὶ διαίρεσεως νοήματι, οἷον τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἢ τὸ λευκόν, ὅταν μὴ προστεθῇ τι. οὔτε γὰρ ψεῦδος οὔτε ἀληθές πω. σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦδε· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τραγέλαφος σημαίνει μὲν τι, οὔπω δὲ ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος, εἰ μὴ τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι προστεθῇ ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ κατὰ χρόνον.

II. Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιπος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἵππος. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοῖς συμπεπλεγμένοις· ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέρος οὐδαμῶς σημαντικόν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις βούλεται μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐδενὸς κεχωρισμένον, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἐπακτροκέλης τὸ κέλης οὐδὲν σημαίνει καθ' ἑαυτό.

Τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην, ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὅταν γένηται σύμβολον, ἐπεὶ δηλοῦσί γέ

τι καὶ οἱ ἀγράματοι ψόφοι, οἷον θηρίων, ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὄνομα.

Τὸ δ' οὐκ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ὄνομα. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κεῖται ὄνομα ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτό· οὔτε γὰρ λόγος οὔτε ἀπόφασις ἐστίν. ἀλλ' ἔστω ὄνομα ἀόριστον, ὅτι ὁμοίως ἐφ' ὅτουοῦν ὑπάρχει καὶ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος.

Τὸ δὲ Φίλωνος ἢ Φίλωνι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ὀνόματα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ὀνόματος. λόγος δὲ ἐστίν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ τὰ αὐτά· ὅτι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἐστίν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται οὐκ ἀληθεύει ἢ ψεύδεται, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ἀεὶ· οἷον Φίλωνός ἐστίν ἢ οὐκ ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ πω οὔτε ἀληθεύει οὔτε ψεύδεται.

III. Ρῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρὶς, καὶ ἐστίν ἀεὶ τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον. λέγω δ' ὅτι προσσημαίνει χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνει ρῆμα· προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν. καὶ ἀεὶ τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖόν ἐστίν, οἷον τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.

Τὸ δὲ οὐχ ὑγιαίνει καὶ τὸ οὐ κάμνει οὐ ρῆμα λέγω· προσσημαίνει μὲν γὰρ χρόνον καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τινος ὑπάρχει, τῇ δὲ διαφορᾷ ὄνομα οὐ κεῖται· ἀλλ' ἔστω ἀόριστον ρῆμα, ὅτι ὁμοίως ἐφ' ὅτουοῦν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος.

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑγιανεν ἢ τὸ ὑγιανεῖ οὐ ρῆμα, ἀλλὰ πῶσις ρήματος· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ρήματος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα προσσημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ τὸ πέριξ.

Αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα τὰ ρήματα ὀνόματά ἐστι καὶ σημαίνει τι (ἴστησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν), ἀλλ' εἰ ἐστίν ἢ μὴ, οὐπω σημαίνει· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖόν ἐστὶ τοῦ πράγματος, οὐδ' ἐὰν τὸ ὄν εἴπῃς αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ψιλόν. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστίν, προσσημαίνει δὲ σύνθεσίν τινα, ἢν ἄνευ τῶν συγκειμένων οὐκ ἐστὶ νοῆσαι.

IV. Λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνή σημαντική ἥς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστι κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις. λέγω δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐάν τι προστεθῆ. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου συλλαβὴ μία. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μῦς τὸ ὕς σημαντικόν, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ ἐστὶ νῦν μόνον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς διπλοῖς σημαίνει μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ καθ' αὐτό, ὡς προεῖρηται.

Ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, οὐχ ὡς ὄργανον δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς προεῖρηται, κατὰ συνθήκην. ἀποφαντικός δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει. οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μὲν, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀληθῆς οὔτε ψευδῆς. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειότερα ἢ σκέψις· ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικός τῆς νῦν θεωρίας.

V. Ἔστι δὲ εἷς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικός κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πάντες συνδέσμων εἷς.

Ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικὸν ἐκ ῥήματος εἶναι ἢ πτώσεως ῥήματος· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος, ἐάν μὴ τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται ἢ τι τοιοῦτον προστεθῆ, οὐπὼ λόγος ἀποφαντικός. διότι δὴ ἔν τί ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐ πολλὰ τὸ ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ σύνεγγυς εἰρηῆσθαι εἷς ἔσται. ἔστι δὲ ἄλλης πραγματείας τοῦτο εἰπεῖν.

Ἔστι δὲ εἷς λόγος ἀποφαντικός ἢ ὁ ἐν δηλῶν ἢ ὁ συδέσμων εἷς, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἐν ἢ οἱ ἀσύνδετοι.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα φάσις ἔστω μόνον, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν οὕτω δηλοῦντά τι τῇ φωνῇ ὥστε ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἢ ἐρωτῶντός τινος, ἢ μὴ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν προαιρούμενον.

Τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀπλῆ ἐστὶν ἀπόφανσις, οἷον τι κατά τινος ἢ τι ἀπό τινος, ἢ δὲ ἐκ τούτων συγκειμένη οἷον λόγος τις ἤδη σύνθετος. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἀπλῆ ἀπόφανσις φωνή

σημαντική περι τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τι ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ὡς οἱ χρόνοι διήρηνται.

VI. Κατάφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσις τινος κατὰ τινος. ἀπόφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσις τινος ἀπὸ τινος.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ὡς μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον ὡς ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ὡς ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον ὡς μὴ ὑπάρχον, καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἐκτὸς δὲ τοῦ νῦν χρόνου ὡσαύτως, ἅπαν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο καὶ ὁ κατέφησέ τις ἀποφῆσαι καὶ ὁ ἀπέφησέ τις καταφῆσαι. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πάση καταφάσει ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις ἀντικειμένη καὶ πάση ἀποφάσει κατάφασις. καὶ ἔστω ἀντίφασις τοῦτο, κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι· λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, μὴ ὁμωνύμως δέ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων προσδιορίζομεθα πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις.

VII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον (λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὁ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ ὁ μὴ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον)· ἀνάγκη δὲ ἀποφαίνεσθαι ὡς ὑπάρχει τι ἢ μὴ ὅτε μὲν τῶν καθόλου τινί, ὅτε δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. εἰ μὲν οὖν καθόλου ἀποφαίνεται ἐπὶ τοῦ καθόλου ὅτι ὑπάρχει τι ἢ μὴ, ἔσονται ἐναντία αἱ ἀποφάνσεις. λέγω δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθόλου ἀποφαίνεσθαι καθόλου, οἷον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός. ὅταν δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου μὲν, μὴ καθόλου δέ, αὗται μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐναντία, τὰ μέντοι δηλούμενα ἐστὶν εἶναι ἐναντία ποτέ. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὴ καθόλου ἀποφαίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου, οἷον ἔστι λευκός ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔστι λευκός ἄνθρωπος· καθόλου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἄνθρωπος οὐχ ὡς καθόλου κέχρηται τῇ ἀποφάνσει· τὸ γὰρ πᾶς οὐ τὸ καθόλου σημαίνει ἀλλ' ὅτι καθόλου. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου κατηγορεῖν τὸ καθόλου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀληθές· οὐδεμία γὰρ κατάφασις ἀληθῆς ἐστὶ, ἐν ἣ



τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου τὸ καθόλου κατηγορεῖται, οἷον ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος πᾶν ζῷον.

Ἀντικειῖσθαι μὲν οὖν κατάφασιν ἀποφάσει λέγω ἀντιφατικῶς τὴν τὸ καθόλου σημαίνουσαν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐ καθόλου, οἷον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός — οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός — ἔστι τις ἄνθρωπος λευκός· ἐναντίως δὲ τὴν τοῦ καθόλου κατάφασιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ καθόλου ἀπόφασιν, οἷον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός — οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος — οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος.

Διὸ ταύτας μὲν οὐχ οἷον τε ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ ἀντικειμένας αὐταῖς ἐνδέχεται ποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, οἷον οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός καὶ ἔστι τις ἄνθρωπος λευκός, ὅσαι μὲν οὖν ἀντιφάσεις τῶν καθόλου εἰσὶ καθόλου, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐτέραν ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἢ ψευδῆ, καὶ ὅσαι ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός — οὐκ ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός· ὅσαι δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου μὲν, μὴ καθόλου δέ, οὐκ αἰεὶ ἢ μὲν ἀληθῆς ἢ δὲ ψευδῆς. ἅμα γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός, καὶ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος καλός καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος καλός· εἰ γὰρ αἰσχροῦς, καὶ οὐ καλός· καὶ εἰ γίνεται τι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἐξαίφνης ἄτοπον εἶναι διὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι σημαίνειν τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἅμα καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός· τὸ δὲ οὐτε ταὐτὸν σημαίνει οὔθ' ἅμα ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

Φανερόν δὲ ὅτι καὶ μία ἀπόφασις μιᾶς καταφάσεώς ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ δεῖ ἀποφῆσαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν ὅπερ κατέφησεν ἢ κατάφασις, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά τινος ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν καθόλου τινός, ἢ ὡς καθόλου ἢ ὡς μὴ καθόλου. λέγω δὲ οἷον ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός — οὐκ ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός. ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀπ' ἄλλου τὸ αὐτό, οὐχ ἢ ἀντικειμένη ἀλλ' ἔσται ἐκείνης ἐτέρα. τῆ δὲ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἢ οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, τῆ δὲ τις

ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἢ οὐδείς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, τῇ δὲ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μιᾷ καταφάσει μία ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται ἀντιφατικῶς, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὗται, εἴρηται· καὶ ὅτι αἱ ἐναντία ἄλλαι, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὗται, εἴρηται· καὶ ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα ἀληθῆς ἢ ψευδῆς ἀντίφασις, καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ πότε ἀληθῆς ἢ ψευδῆς.

VIII. Μία δὲ ἔστι κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἢ ἐν καθ' ἑνὸς σημαίνουσα, ἢ καθόλου ὄντος καθόλου ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, οἷον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἔστιν — οὐκ ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός — οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός, οὐδείς ἄνθρωπος λευκός — ἔστι τις ἄνθρωπος λευκός, εἰ τὸ λευκὸν ἐν σημαίνει. εἰ δὲ δυοῖν ἐν ὄνομα κεῖται, ἐξ ὧν μὴ ἔστιν ἓν, οὐ μία κατάφασις· οἷον εἴ τις θεῖτο ὄνομα ἱμάτιον ἵπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ ἔστιν ἱμάτιον λευκόν, αὕτη οὐ μία κατάφασις οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις μία. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτο εἰπεῖν ἢ ἔστιν ἵππος καὶ ἄνθρωπος λευκός. τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ εἰπεῖν ἔστιν ἵππος λευκός καὶ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός. εἰ οὖν αὗται πολλὰ σημαίνουσι καὶ εἰσὶ πολλά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἤτοι πολλὰ ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνει· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἵππος. ὥστε οὐδ' ἐν ταύταις ἀνάγκη τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ εἶναι ἀντίφασιν.

IX. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὄντων καὶ γενομένων ἀνάγκη τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν καθόλου ὡς καθόλου αἰεὶ τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, ὡσπερ εἴρηται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθόλου μὴ καθόλου λεχθέντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ μελλόντων οὐχ ὁμοίως. εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀληθῆς ἢ ψευδῆς, καὶ ἅπαν ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε εἰ ὁ μὲν φήσει ἔσεσθαι τι ὁ δὲ μὴ φήσει τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι

ανάγκη ἀληθεύειν τὸν ἕτερον αὐτῶν, εἰ πᾶσα κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀληθῆς ἢ ψευδῆς. ἄμφω γὰρ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἅμα ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκὸν ἢ ὅτι οὐ λευκὸν ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη εἶναι λευκὸν ἢ οὐ λευκὸν, καὶ εἰ ἔστι λευκὸν ἢ οὐ λευκὸν, ἀληθὲς ἦν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι· καὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει, ψεύδεται, καὶ εἰ ψεύδεται, οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ὥστε ἀνάγκη ἢ τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἢ ψευδῆ.

Οὐδὲν ἄρα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε ἀπὸ τύχης οὔθ' ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν, οὐδὲ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἅπαντα καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν. ἢ γὰρ ὁ φᾶς ἀληθεύσει ἢ ὁ ἀποφᾶς. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο ἢ οὐκ ἐγίνετο· τὸ γὰρ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἔξει.

Ἔτι εἰ ἔστι λευκὸν νῦν, ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν πρότερον ὅτι ἔσται λευκὸν, ὥστε ἀεὶ ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὖν τῶν γενομένων ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται, οὐχ οἶον τε τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲ μὴ ἔσεσθαι. ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶον τε μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀδύνατον μὴ γενέσθαι· ὃ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι· ἅπαντα οὖν τὰ ἐσόμενα ἀνάγκαῖον γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν ἄρα ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τύχης ἔσται· εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὥς οὐδέτερόν γε ἀληθὲς ἐνδέχεται λέγειν, οἶον ὅτι οὔτε ἔσται οὔτε οὐκ ἔσται. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὔσης τῆς καταφάσεως ψευδοῦς ἢ ἀπόφασις οὐκ ἀληθῆς, καὶ ταύτης ψευδοῦς οὔσης τὴν κατάφασιν συμβαίνει μὴ ἀληθῆ εἶναι. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκὸν καὶ μέγα, δεῖ ἄμφω ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ ὑπάρξει εἰς αὔριον, ὑπάρξειν εἰς αὔριον. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἔσται μήτε μὴ ἔσται αὔριον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν, οἶον ναυμαχία· δέοι γὰρ ἂν μήτε γενέσθαι ναυμαχίαν αὔριον μήτε μὴ γενέσθαι.

Τὰ μὲν δὴ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἕτερα, εἴπερ πάσης καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων ὡς καθόλου ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἶναι τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ, μηδὲν δὲ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις, ἀλλὰ πάντα εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὥστε οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δεοὶ ἂν οὔτε πραγματεύεσθαι, ὡς ἐὰν μὲν τοδὶ ποιήσωμεν, ἔσται τοδί, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοδί, οὐκ ἔσται τοδί. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ εἰς μυριστὸν ἔτος τὸν μὲν φάναι τοῦτο ἔσεσθαι τὸν δὲ μὴ φάναι, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσεσθαι ὁπότεροισιν αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν τότε. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἢ μὴ εἶπον· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει τὰ πράγματα, κἂν μὴ ὁ μὲν καταφήσῃ τι ὁ δὲ ἀποφήσῃ· οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφαθῆναι ἢ ἀποφαθῆναι ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, οὐδ' εἰς μυριστὸν ἔτος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ὀποσοῦν χρόνῳ. ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ οὕτως εἶχεν ὥστε τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τοῦτο γενέσθαι, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν γενομένων ἀεὶ οὕτως εἶχεν ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενέσθαι. ὅ τε γὰρ ἀληθῶς εἶπέ τις ὅτι ἔσται, οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ γενέσθαι· καὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀεὶ ὅτι ἔσται.

Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα — ὀρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλευέσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράξαι τι, καὶ ὅτι ὅλως ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ὁμοίως· ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι. καὶ πολλὰ ἡμῖν δῆλὰ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα, οἷον ὅτι τουτὶ τὸ ἰμάτιον δυνατόν ἐστι διατμηθῆναι καὶ οὐ διατμηθήσεται, ἀλλ' ἔμπροσθεν κατατριβήσεται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι δυνατόν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑπῆρχε τὸ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτὸ κατατριβῆναι, εἴγε μὴ δυνατόν ἦν τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι. ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενέσεων, ὅσαι κατὰ δύναμιν λέγονται τὴν τοιαύτην. φανερόν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ἐξ

ἀνάγκης οὐτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀληθῆς, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μὲν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ θάτερον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι καὶ θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μὴ.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ ὄν ὅταν ἦ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι ὅταν μὴ ἦ, ἀνάγκη· οὐ μὴν οὔτε τὸ ὄν ἅπαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ταυτὸν ἔστι τὸ ὄν ἅπαν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅτε ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. εἶναι μὲν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἔσεσθαι γε ἢ μὴ· οὐ μέντοι διελόντα γε εἰπεῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον. λέγω δὲ οἷον ἀνάγκη μὲν ἔσεσθαι ναυμαχίαν αὔριον ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἔσεσθαι γε αὔριον ναυμαχίαν ἀναγκαῖον οὐδὲ μὴ γενέσθαι· γενέσθαι μέντοι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι ἀναγκαῖον. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως οἱ λόγοι ἀληθεῖς ὥσπερ τὰ πράγματα, δῆλον ὅτι ὅσα οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε καὶ τάναντία ἐνδέχεσθαι, ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ἀντίφασιν.

Ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ οὔσιν ἢ μὴ ἀεὶ μὴ οὔσιν· τούτων γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν θάτερον μόνον τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος, οὐ μέντοι τόδε ἢ τόδε ἀλλ' ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν ἑτέραν, οὐ μέντοι ἤδη ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη πάσης καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως τῶν ἀντικειμένων τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων μὲν δυνατῶν δὲ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

X. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶ τι κατὰ τινος ἢ κατάφασις σημαίνουσα, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ ὄνομα ἢ τὸ ἀνώνυμον, ἐν δὲ δεῖ εἶναι καὶ καθ' ἐνὸς τὸ ἐν τῇ καταφάσει (τὸ δὲ ὄνομα εἴρηται καὶ τὸ ἀνώνυμον πρότερον· τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ὄνομα μὲν οὐ λέγω ἀλλ' ἀόριστον ὄνομα· ἐν γὰρ πῶς σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον· ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ οὐχ ὑγιαίνει οὐ

ῥῆμα ἀλλ' ἀόριστον ῥῆμα), ἔσται πᾶσα κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἢ ἐξ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος ἢ ἐξ ἀόριστου ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος. ἄνευ δὲ ῥήματος οὐδεμία κατάφασις οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις· τὸ γὰρ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἦν ἢ γίνεται, ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, ῥήματα ἐκ τῶν κειμένων ἐστὶ· προσσημαίνει γὰρ χρόνον. ὥστε πρώτη ἔσται κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις τὸ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα ἔστιν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, πάλιν ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, ἔστι πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστι πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς δὲ χρόνων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.

Ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἔστι τρίτον προσκατηγοῖται, ἤδη διχῶς λέγονται αἱ ἀντιθέσεις. λέγω δὲ οἶον ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος· τὸ ἔστι τρίτον φημὶ συγκεῖσθαι ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα ἐν τῇ καταφάσει. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο τέτταρα ἔσται ταῦτα, ὧν τὰ μὲν δύο πρὸς τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν ἔξει κατὰ τὸ στοιχοῦν ὡς αἱ στερήσεις, τὰ δὲ δύο οὐ· λέγω δ' ὅτι τὸ ἔστιν ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ προσκείσεται ἢ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἢ ἀπόφασις, τέτταρα οὖν ἔσται. νοοῦμεν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τῶν ὑπογεγραμμένων. ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος· ἀπόφασις τούτου, οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος. ἔστιν οὐ-δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος· τούτου ἀπόφασις, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ-δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος. τὸ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι τῷ δικαίῳ προσκείσεται καὶ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγεται, οὕτω τέτακται. ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει κὰν καθόλου τοῦ ὀνόματος ἢ ἢ κατάφασις, οἶον πᾶς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος. ἀπόφασις τούτου, οὐ πᾶς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος. πᾶς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος οὐ δίκαιος — οὐ πᾶς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος οὐ δίκαιος. πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως τὰς κατὰ διάμετρον ἐνδέχεται συναληθεύειν· ἐνδέχεται δὲ ποτέ.

Αὗται μὲν οὖν δύο ἀντίκεινται, ἄλλαι δὲ δύο πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ὑποκείμενόν τι προστεθέντος, ἔστι δίκαιος οὐκ-ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος οὐκ-ἄνθρωπος,

ἔστιν-οὐ δίκαιος οὐκ-ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ-δίκαιος οὐκ-ἄνθρωπος. πλείους δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔσονται ἀντιθέσεις. αὐταὶ δὲ χωρὶς ἐκείνων αὐταὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰς ἔσονται, ὡς ὀνόματι τῷ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος χρώμεναι.

Ἐφ' ὅσων δὲ τὸ ἔστι μὴ ἀρμόττει, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνει καὶ βαδίζει, ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ οὕτω τιθέμενον ὡς ἂν εἰ τὸ ἔστι προσήπτετο, οἷον ὑγιαίνει πᾶς ἄνθρωπος — οὐχ ὑγιαίνει πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, ὑγιαίνει πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος — οὐχ ὑγιαίνει πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λεκτέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐ, τὴν ἀπόφασιν, τῷ ἄνθρωπος προσθετέον· τὸ γὰρ πᾶς οὐ τὸ καθόλου σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ὅτι καθόλου. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦδε, ὑγιαίνει ἄνθρωπος — οὐχ ὑγιαίνει ἄνθρωπος, ὑγιαίνει οὐκ ἄνθρωπος — οὐχ ὑγιαίνει οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκείνων διαφέρει τῷ μὴ καθόλου εἶναι. ὥστε τὸ πᾶς ἢ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἄλλο προσσημαίνει ἢ ὅτι καθόλου τοῦ ὀνόματος ἢ κατάφησιν ἢ ἀπόφησιν. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τὰ αὐτὰ δεῖ προστιθέναι.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐναντία ἀπόφασίς ἔστι τῇ ἅπαν ἔστι ζῶον δίκαιον ἢ σημαίνουσα ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστι ζῶον δίκαιον, αὐταὶ μὲν φανερόν ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἔσονται οὔτε ἀληθεῖς ἅμα οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, αἱ δὲ ἀντικείμεναι ταύταις ἔσονται ποτε, οἷον οὐ πᾶν ζῶον δίκαιον καὶ ἔστι τι ζῶον δίκαιον. ἀκολουθοῦσι δὲ αὐταὶ, τῇ μὲν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος οὐ δίκαιός ἔστιν ἢ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος, τῇ δὲ ἔστι τις ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος ἢ ἀντικειμένη ὅτι οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι τινα.

Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, εἰ ἀληθὲς ἐρωτηθέντα ἀποφῆσαι, ὅτι καὶ καταφῆσαι ἀληθές· οἷον ἄρα γε Σωκράτης σοφός; οὐ· Σωκράτης ἄρα οὐ σοφός. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθόλου οὐκ ἀληθῆς ἢ ὁμοίως λεγομένη, ἀληθῆς δὲ ἢ ἀπόφασις, οἷον ἄρα γε πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σοφός; οὐ· πᾶς ἄρα ἄνθρωπος οὐ σοφός· τοῦτο

γὰρ ψεῦδος. ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐ πᾶς ἄρα ἄνθρωπος σοφός ἀληθές· αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀντικειμένη, ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ ἐναντία.

Αἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἀόριστα ἀντικείμενα ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄνθρωπος καὶ μὴ δίκαιος, ὥσπερ ἀποφάσεις ἄνευ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος δόξειαν ἂν εἶναι. οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν ἀνάγκη ἢ ψεύδεσθαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὃ δ' εἰπὼν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰπόντος ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἦττον ἠλήθευκέ τι ἢ ἔψευσται, ἐὰν μῆτι προστεθῆ. σημαίνει δὲ τὸ ἔστι πᾶς οὐκ-ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος οὐδεμιᾷ ἐκείνων ταυτὸν, οὐδὲ ἡ ἀντικειμένη ταύτη ἢ οὐκ ἔστι πᾶς οὐκ-ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος· τὸ δὲ πᾶς οὐ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος τῷ οὐδεὶς δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ταυτὸν σημαίνει.

Μετατιθέμενα δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ταυτὸν σημαίνει, οἷον ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτό ἐστι, τοῦ αὐτοῦ πλείους ἔσονται ἀποφάσεις. ἀλλ' ἐδέδεικτο ὅτι μία μιᾶς. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἀπόφασιν τὸ οὐκ ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος· τοῦ δὲ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός, εἰ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῆ ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἔσται ἀπόφασιν ἢτοι τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἢ τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός. ἀλλ' ἡ ἑτέρα μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπόφασιν τοῦ ἔστιν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος λευκός, ἡ ἑτέρα δὲ τοῦ ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὥστε ἔσονται δύο μιᾶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μετατιθεμένου τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος ἢ αὐτὴ γίνεται κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν, δῆλον.

XI. Τὸ δὲ ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν ἢ πολλὰ καθ' ἑνὸς καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τι ἢ τὸ ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν δηλοῦμενον, οὐκ ἔστι κατάφασιν μία οὐδὲ ἀπόφασιν. λέγω δὲ ἐν οὐκ ἐὰν ὄνομα ἐν ἢ κείμενον, μὴ ἢ δὲ ἐν τι ἐξ ἐκείνων, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ ζῷον καὶ δίπουν καὶ ἡμερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τι γίνεται ἐκ τούτων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ βαδίζειν οὐχ ἔν. ὥστε οὔτ' ἐὰν ἐν τι κατὰ τούτων καταφήση τις μία κατάφασιν,



ἀλλὰ φωνὴ μὲν μία κατάφασεις δὲ πολλαί, οὐτ' ἐὰν καθ' ἐνὸς ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως πολλαί.

Εἰ οὖν ἡ ἐρώτησις ἢ διαλεκτικὴ ἀποκρίσεώς ἐστιν αἰτησις, ἢ τῆς προτάσεως ἢ θατέρου μορίου τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, ἢ δὲ πρότασις ἀντιφάσεως μιᾶς μόριον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀπόκρισις μία πρὸς ταῦτα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐρώτησις μία, οὐδ' ἐὰν ᾗ ἀληθής. εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν. ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἐρώτησις ἐστὶ διαλεκτικὴ· δεῖ γὰρ δεδόσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἐλέσθαι ὀπότερον βούλεται τῆς ἀντιφάσεως μόριον ἀποφίνασθαι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα προσδιορίσαι πότερον τόδε ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ οὐ τοῦτο.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν κατηγορεῖται συντιθέμενα, ὡς ἐν τὸ πᾶν κατηγορήματα τῶν χωρὶς κατηγορουμένων, τὰ δ' οὐ, τίς ἢ διαφορά; κατὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν καὶ χωρὶς ζῶον καὶ χωρὶς δίπουν, καὶ ταῦτα ὡς ἓν, καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ λευκόν, καὶ ταῦθ' ὡς ἓν. ἀλλ' οὐχί, εἰ σκυτεὺς καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ σκυτεὺς ἀγαθός. εἰ γὰρ, ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἀληθές, εἶναι δεῖ καὶ τὸ συνάμφω, πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ἔσται. κατὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἀληθές καὶ τὸ λευκόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἅπαν. πάλιν εἰ τὸ λευκόν αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἅπαν, ὥστε ἔσται ἄνθρωπος λευκός λευκός, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον. καὶ πάλιν μουσικὸς λευκός βαδίζων· καὶ ταῦτα πολλάκις πεπλεγμένα. ἔτι εἰ ὁ Σωκράτης Σωκράτης καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος· καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος καὶ δίπους, καὶ ἄνθρωπος δίπους.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἴ τις ἀπλῶς θήσει τὰς συμπλοκάς γίνεσθαι, πολλὰ συμβαίνει λέγειν ἄτοπα, δῆλον· ὅπως δὲ θετέον, λέγομεν νῦν.

Τῶν δὴ κατηγορουμένων, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς κατηγορεῖσθαι συμβαίνει, ὅσα μὲν λέγεται κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ θάτερον κατὰ θατέρου, ταῦτα οὐκ ἔσται ἓν, οἷον

ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἐστι καὶ μουσικός, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔν τῷ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μουσικόν· συμβεβηκότα γὰρ ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ. οὐδ' εἰ τὸ λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἀληθές εἰπεῖν, ὅμως οὐκ ἔσται τὸ μουσικὸν λευκὸν ἔν τι· κατὰ συμβεβηκός γὰρ τὸ μουσικὸν λευκόν, ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν μουσικόν ἔν τι. διὸ οὐδ' ὁ σκυτεὺς ἀπλῶς ἀγαθός, ἀλλὰ ζῶον δίπουν· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

Ἔτι οὐδ' ὅσα ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ· διὸ οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν πολλάκις οὔτε ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ζῶον ἔστιν ἢ δίπουν· ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ζῶον καὶ τὸ δίπουν. ἀληθές δέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν κατὰ τοῦ τινός καὶ ἀπλῶς, οἷον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὸν τινὰ λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον λευκόν· οὐκ αἰεὶ δέ, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ἐν τῷ προσκειμένῳ τῶν ἀντικειμένων τι ἐνυπάρχη ᾧ ἔπεται ἀντίφασις, οὐκ ἀληθές ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος, οἷον τὸν τεθνεῶτα ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνυπάρχη, ἀληθές. ἢ ὅταν μὲν ἐνυπάρχη, αἰεὶ οὐκ ἀληθές, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνυπάρχη, οὐκ αἰεὶ ἀληθές, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρός ἐστὶ τι, οἷον ποιητής. ἄρ' οὐκ καὶ ἔστιν, ἢ οὐ; κατὰ συμβεβηκός γὰρ κατηγορεῖται τοῦ Ὀμήρου τὸ ἔστιν· ὅτι γὰρ ποιητής ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ καθ' αὐτό, κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ Ὀμήρου τὸ ἔστιν.

Ὡστε ἐν ὅσαις κατηγορίαις μήτε ἐναντιότης ἐνεστίν, ἐὰν λόγοι ἀντ' ὀνομάτων λέγονται, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ κατηγορῆται καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ τί καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀληθές ἔσται εἰπεῖν. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ὅτι δοξαστόν, οὐκ ἀληθές εἰπεῖν ὄν τι· δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν.

XII. Τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων σκεπτέον ὅπως ἔχουσιν αἱ ἀποφάσεις καὶ καταφάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας αἱ τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ δυνατὸν, καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον, καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου τε καὶ ἀναγκαίου· ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίας τινάς. εἰ γὰρ τῶν συμπλεκόμενων αὐταὶ

ἀλλήλαις ἀντίκεινται ἀντιφάσεις, ὅσαι κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τάττονται, οἷον τοῦ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀπόφασις τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, οὐ τὸ εἶναι μὴ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὴ εἶναι λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ εἶναι μὴ λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον. εἰ γὰρ κατὰ παντὸς ἢ κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, τὸ ζύλον ἔσται ἀληθές εἰπεῖν εἶναι μὴ λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως, καὶ ὅσοις τὸ εἶναι μὴ προστίθεται, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσει τὸ ἀντὶ τοῦ εἶναι λεγόμενον, οἷον τοῦ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει οὐ τὸ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει ἀπόφασις ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐ βαδίζει ἄνθρωπος· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπον βαδίζειν ἢ ἄνθρωπον βαδίζοντα εἶναι· ὥστε εἰ οὕτως πανταχοῦ, καὶ τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀπόφασις ἔσται τὸ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι.

Δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ δύνασθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν τέμνεσθαι ἢ βαδίζειν καὶ μὴ βαδίζειν καὶ μὴ τέμνεσθαι δυνατόν. λόγος δέ, ὅτι ἅπαν τὸ οὕτω δυνατὸν οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥστε ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις· δύναται γὰρ καὶ μὴ βαδίζειν τὸ βαδιστικὸν καὶ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι τὸ ὁρατόν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀληθεύεσθαι τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις· οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀπόφασις ἔστι τὸ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι. συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἅμα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ μὴ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὰ προστιθέμενα γίνεσθαι φάσεις καὶ ἀποφάσεις. εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνο ἀδύνατον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη αἰρετόν.

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόφασις τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τούτου ἀπόφασις τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ὁμοιοτρόπως, οἷον ἀναγκαίου τε καὶ ἀδυνάτου. γίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐκείνων τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι προσθέσεις, τὰ δ' ὑποκείμενα πράγματα τὸ μὲν

λευκὸν τὸ δ' ἄνθρωπος, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ὡς ὑποκείμενον γίνεται, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι καὶ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι προσθέσεις διορίζουσαι, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐκείνων τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ὁμοίως αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι δυνατόν καὶ εἶναι οὐ δυνατόν.

Τοῦ δὲ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι ἀπόφασις οὐ τὸ οὐ δυνατόν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ δυνατόν εἶναι οὐ τὸ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι. διὸ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν ἂν δόξειαν ἀλλήλαις αἱ τοῦ δυνατόν εἶναι καὶ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ δυνατόν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἀντιφάσεις ἀλλήλων αἱ τοιαῦται, τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι καὶ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι καὶ μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι οὐδέποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἅμα ἀληθεύονται· ἀντίκεινται γάρ. οὐδέ γε τὸ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι οὐδέποτε ἅμα ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀληθεύονται.

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀπόφασις οὐ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· τοῦ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι. καὶ τοῦ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οὐ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἀδύνατον εἶναι· τοῦ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι τὸ οὐκ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι.

Καὶ καθόλου δέ, ὥσπερ εἴρεται, τὸ μὲν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι δεῖ τιθέναι ὡς τὰ ὑποκείμενα, κατάφασιν δὲ καὶ ἀπόφασιν ταῦτα ποιοῦντα πρὸς τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι συντάττειν. καὶ ταύτας οἶεσθαι χρή εἶναι τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις, δυνατόν — οὐ δυνατόν, ἐνδεχόμενον — οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον, ἀδύνατον — οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἀναγκαῖον — οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀληθές — οὐκ ἀληθές.

XIII. Καὶ αἱ ἀκολουθήσεις δὲ κατὰ λόγον γίνονται οὕτω τιθεμένοις· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δυνατόν εἶναι τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδύνατον εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· τῷ δὲ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι

καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι τό μὴ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τῷ δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, τῷ δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι. θεωρεῖσθω δὲ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς ὡς λέγομεν.

δυνατὸν εἶναι	οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι
ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι	οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι
οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι	ἀδύνατον εἶναι
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι	ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι
δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι	οὐ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι
ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι	οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι
οὐκ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι	ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι	ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀδύνατον τῷ ἐνδεχομένῳ καὶ δυνατῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐνδεχομένῳ καὶ μὴ δυνατῷ ἀκολουθεῖ μὲν ἀντιφατικῶς, ἀντεστραμμένως δέ· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἢ ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἀδυνάτου ἀκολουθεῖ, τῇ δὲ ἀποφάσει ἢ κατάφασις· τῷ γὰρ οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι· κατάφασις γὰρ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀποφάσις.

Τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον πῶς, ὁπτεόν. φανερόν δὴ ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' αἱ ἐναντίαι ἔπονται· αἱ δ' ἀντιφάσεις χωρὶς. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἀνάγκη μὴ εἶναι τὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀληθεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀμφοτέρως· τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐτέροις, ὅτι ἐναντίως τὸ ἀδύνατον τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ ἀποδίδεται, τὸ αὐτὸ δυνάμενον. εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτο οὐκ εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τοῦτο ἀνάγκη εἶναι· ὥστε εἰ ἐκεῖνα ὁμοίως τῷ δυνατῷ καὶ μὴ, ταῦτα ἐξ ἐναντίας, ἐπεὶ οὐ σημαίνει γε

ταῦτόν τὸ τε ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρεται, ἀντεστραμμένως.

Ἡ ἀδύνατον οὕτως κείσθαι τὰς τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἀντιφάσεις; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δυνατόν εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μή, ἢ ἀπόφασις ἀκολουθήσει· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι· ὥστ' εἰ μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι, ἀδύνατον εἶναι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα εἶναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τῷ γε δυνατόν εἶναι τὸ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀκολουθεῖ, τούτῳ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ δυνατόν εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται συμβαίνειν, τούτων δὲ ὀπότερον ἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἐκεῖνα ἀληθῆ. ἅμα γὰρ δυνατόν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, οὐκ ἔσται δυνατόν ἄμφω. λείπεται τοίνυν τὸ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ δυνατόν εἶναι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη γίνεται ἀντίφασις τῇ ἐπομένῃ τῷ οὐκ δυνατόν εἶναι· ἐκεῖνῳ γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι, οὗ ἢ ἀπόφασις τὸ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι. ἀκολουθοῦσί τε ἄρα καὶ αὗται αἱ ἀντιφάσεις κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβαίνει τιθεμένων οὕτως.

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις εἰ τῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι ἔπεται. εἴ τε γὰρ μὴ ἔπεται, ἢ ἀντίφασις ἀκολουθήσει, τὸ μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι· καὶ εἴ τις ταύτην μὴ φήσειεν εἶναι ἀντίφασιν, ἀνάγκη λέγειν τὸ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι· ἄπερ ἄμφω ψευδῆ κατὰ τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι δοκεῖ δυνατόν τέμνεσθαι καὶ μὴ τέμνεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε ἔσται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος. φανερόν δὲ ὅτι οὐ πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν ἢ εἶναι ἢ βαδίζειν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύναται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐφ' ὧν οὐκ ἀληθές,

πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ κατὰ λόγον δυνατῶν, οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμαντικὸν καὶ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄλογον. αἱ μὲν οὖν μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις αἱ αὐταὶ πλειόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, αἱ δ' ἄλογοι οὐ πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ πῦρ οὐ δυνατόν θερμαίνειν καὶ μὴ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα ἐνεργεῖ ἀεί. ἔνια μέντοι δύναται καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀλόγους δυνάμεις ἅμα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δέξασθαι. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν τούτου χάριν εἴρηται, ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα δύναμις τῶν ἀντικειμένων, οὐδ' ὅσα λέγονται κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος.

Ἔναι δὲ δυνάμεις ὁμώνυμοὶ εἰσιν. τὸ γὰρ δυνατόν οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἀληθὲς ὡς ἐνεργεῖα ὄν, οἷον δυνατόν βαδίζειν ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ὅλως δυνατόν εἶναι ὅτι ἤδη ἔστι κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὃ λέγεται εἶναι δυνατόν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἐνεργήσειεν ἄν, οἷον δυνατόν εἶναι βαδίζειν ὅτι βαδίσειεν ἄν. καὶ αὕτη μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς κινητοῖς ἐστὶ μόνοις ἢ δύνάμεις, ἐκείνη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκινήτοις. ἄμφω δὲ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν τὸ μὴ ἀδύνατον εἶναι βαδίζειν ἢ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ βαδίζον ἤδη καὶ ἐνεργοῦν καὶ τὸ βαδιστικόν. τὸ μὲν οὖν οὕτω δυνατόν οὐκ ἀληθὲς κατὰ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θάτερον δὲ ἀληθές. ὥστε ἐπεὶ τῷ ἐν μέρει τὸ καθόλου ἔπεται, τῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντι ἔπεται τὸ δύνασθαι εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι πᾶν. καὶ ἔστι δὴ ἀρχὴ ἴσως τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον πάντων ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τᾶλλα ὡς τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦντα ἐπισκοπεῖν δεῖ.

Φανερόν δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄν κατ' ἐνέργειάν ἐστιν, ὥστε εἰ πρότερα τὰ αἴδια, καὶ ἢ ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως προτέρα. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄνευ δυνάμεως ἐνέργειαι εἰσιν, οἷον αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι, τὰ δὲ μετὰ δυνάμεως, ἃ τῇ μὲν φύσει πρότερα τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ ὕστερα, τὰ δὲ οὐδέποτε ἐνέργειαι εἰσιν ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις μόνον.

XIV. Πότερον δὲ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἢ κατάφασις τῇ ἀποφάσει ἢ ἢ κατάφασις τῇ καταφάσει, καὶ ὁ λόγος τῷ λόγῳ ὁ λέγων ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῷ οὐδεὶς

ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος, ἢ τὸ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῷ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἄδικος, οἷον ἔστι Καλλίας δίκαιος — οὐκ ἔστι Καλλίας δίκαιος — Καλλίας ἄδικός ἐστι. ποτέρα δὴ ἐναντία τούτων; εἰ γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐναντία δόξα ἢ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῇ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἄδικος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ καταφάσεων ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐκεῖ ἢ τοῦ ἐναντίου δόξα ἐναντία ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἢ κατάφασις τῇ καταφάσει ἔσται ἐναντία, ἀλλ' ἢ εἰρημένῃ ἀπόφασις. ὥστε σκεπτέον ποία δόξα ἀληθῆς ψευδεῖ δόξη ἐναντία, πότερον ἢ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἢ ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον εἶναι δοξάζουσα. λέγω δὲ ὧδε. ἔστι τις δόξα ἀληθῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἄλλῃ δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν ψευδῆς, ἕτερα δὲ ὅτι κακόν. ποτέρα δὴ τούτων ἐναντία τῇ ἀληθεῖ; καὶ εἰ ἔστι μία, καθ' ὅποτέραν ἢ ἐναντία;

Τὸ μὲν δὴ τούτῳ οἶεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας δόξας ὀρίσθαι, τῷ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι, ψευδός· τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὅτι κακόν ἢ αὐτὴ ἴσως καὶ ἀληθῆς ἔσται, εἴτε πλείους εἴτε μία ἐστίν. ἐναντία δὲ ταῦτα. ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐναντίως.

Εἰ δὴ ἔστι μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν δόξα, ἄλλῃ δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἄλλο τι ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρχει οὐδ' οἷόν τε ὑπάρχει, τῶν μὲν δὴ ἄλλων οὐδεμίαν θετέον, οὔτε ὅσαι ὑπάρχειν τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον δοξάζουσιν οὔθ' ὅσαι μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχον (ἄπειροι γὰρ ἀμφοτέραι, καὶ ὅσαι ὑπάρχειν δοξάζουσι τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ ὅσαι μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχον), ἀλλ' ἐν ὅσαις ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπάτη· αὐταὶ δὲ εἰσὶν ἐξ ὧν αἱ γενέσεις. ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων δὲ αἱ γενέσεις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀπάται.

Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐ κακόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (συμβέβηκε γὰρ αὐτῷ οὐ κακῷ εἶναι), μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκάστου ἀληθῆς ἢ καθ'



ἑαυτὸ, καὶ ψευδῆς, εἴπερ καὶ ἀληθῆς. ἢ μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑπάρχοντος ψευδῆς, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ὅτι κακὸν τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥστε μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη ψευδῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἢ ἢ τοῦ ἐναντίου δόξα. διέψευσται δὲ μάλιστα περὶ ἕκαστον ὁ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔχων δόξαν· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν πλείστον διαφερόντων περὶ τὸ αὐτό. εἰ οὖν ἐναντία μὲν τούτων ἢ ἐτέρα, ἐναντιωτέρα δὲ ἢ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, δῆλον ὅτι αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐναντία. ἢ δὲ τοῦ ὅτι κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν συμπεπλεγμένη ἐστὶ· καὶ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἀνάγκη ἴσως ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν αὐτόν.

Ἔτι δέ, εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως δεῖ ἔχειν, καὶ ταύτη ἂν δόξειε καλῶς εἰρησθαι· ἢ γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἢ οὐδαμοῦ· ὅσοις δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἐναντία, περὶ τούτων ἔστι μὲν ψευδῆς ἢ τῆ ἀληθεῖ ἀντικειμένη, οἷον ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐκ ἄνθρωπον οἰόμενος διέψευσται. εἰ οὖν αὗται, ἐναντία, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως.

Ἔτι ὁμοίως ἔχει ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν. τῆ οὖν τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἀληθεῖ οὔση δόξη τίς ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐναντία; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἢ λέγουσα ὅτι κακόν· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ποτε εἴη ἀληθῆς, οὐδέποτε δὲ ἀληθῆς ἀληθεῖ ἐναντία· ἔστι γὰρ τι μὴ ἀγαθὸν κακόν, ὥστε ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι. οὐδ' αὖ ἢ ὅτι οὐ κακόν· ἀληθῆς γὰρ καὶ αὕτη. ἅμα γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἂν εἴη. λείπεται οὖν τῆ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντία ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν. ψευδῆς γὰρ αὕτη. ὥστε καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τῆ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν.

Φανερόν δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν διοίσει οὐδ' ἂν καθόλου τιθῶμεν τὴν κατάφασιν· ἢ γὰρ καθόλου ἀπόφασις ἐναντία ἔσται, οἷον τῆ δόξη τῆ δοξαζούση ὅτι πᾶν ὃ ἂν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθόν. ἢ γὰρ τοῦ

ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, εἰ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῆ  
ὅτι ὁ ἄν ἢ ἀγαθὸν δοξαζούση ὅτι ἀγαθόν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν  
διαφέρει τοῦ ὅτι πᾶν ὁ ἄν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστίν. ὁμοίως  
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ.

Ὡστε εἶπερ ἐπὶ δόξης οὕτως ἔχει, εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ ἐν τῇ  
φωνῇ καταφάσεις καὶ ἀποφάσεις σύμβολα τῶν ἐν τῇ  
ψυχῇ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ καταφάσει ἐναντία μὲν ἀπόφασις ἢ  
περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθόλου, οἷον τῆ ὅτι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν ἢ  
ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθὸς ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἢ οὐδεὶς,  
ἀντιφατικῶς δὲ ὅτι ἢ οὐ πᾶν ἢ οὐ πᾶς. φανερόν δὲ ὅτι καὶ  
ἀληθῆ ἀληθεῖ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐναντίαν εἶναι οὔτε δόξαν  
οὔτε ἀντίφασιν. ἐναντία μὲν γὰρ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα,  
περὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐνδέχεται ἀληθεύειν τὸν αὐτὸν· ἅμα δὲ οὐκ  
ἐνδέχεται τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ.



## Appendix: Key Terms

### General and logical terms

نوع جمل	types of sentences
أداة (ὄργανον)	tool
الفرق...	the difference of...
الفرق، المختلف	difference, different
على سبيل	e.g.
القيمة	quality (= rank, worth)
النوع	quality (= kind, type)
على سبيل	for example
معاً	together
الضرورة	necessary
بالتناقض، بطريقة متناقضة	contradictorily, in a contradictory manner
التناقض (ἀντίφασις)	contradiction
و	conjunction
النفي (ἀπόφασις)	negation
النفي البديل	subalternate negation

كُلٌّ	generically (as opposed to سَجْدًا 'specifically')
مِنْ خَفِئَةً	based on angles
ذِيكُ	speak falsehood; be false
ذِيكُ	false
دَلٌّ مَكْرٌ	without speech (animals)
مَقْدُومٌ	1. materials 2. In ¶28 it is used in the sense of the core constituents of a clause or proposition, i.e., the verb and its arguments.
وَكْرٌ	1. kind 2. modifier
سَلٌّ مَكْرٌ	pronoun
بُيْعٌ	passive (voice)
سَجْدًا	specifically (as opposed to كُلٌّ 'generically')
سَجْدًا	unique
بُيْعٌ	adjuratory (in the form of an oath)
تَبُّ	essence
تَبُّ : تَبُّ عَدُّ صَعْدٌ د	nature: natural(ly) in the case of what is (possible, impossible...)
(مَوَكَّلٌ) جُكَّتٌ	universal
لَا حَكْ	no [+ noun]
كَمَبَتُّ	(something) that is opposed
كَمَبَتُّ	opposite
كَمَبَتُّ مَبَتُّ	opposition

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صَلَاةٌ	utterance
صَلَاةٌ	logic
صَلَاةٌ	verb
صَلَاةٌ عَلَى الْمَوْتِ	based on the angles 5 = حَلَاةٌ حَلَاةٌ 6 = حَلَاةٌ حَلَاةٌ
صَلَاةٌ	paronymy, paronymous
صَلَاةٌ دَلَالَةٌ	part of speech
صَلَاةٌ	1. active (voice) 2. action
صَلَاةٌ	persuasive
صَلَاةٌ	compound (proposition, opp. صَلَاةٌ 'simple')
صَلَاةٌ	interrogative
صَلَاةٌ : صَلَاةٌ	impossible
صَلَاةٌ	exclamatory
صَلَاةٌ	possible
صَلَاةٌ	equivocal
صَلَاةٌ	optative
صَلَاةٌ	endowed with a soul
صَلَاةٌ : صَلَاةٌ	polyonymy, polyonymous
صَلَاةٌ : صَلَاةٌ (Peal act. part., ≠ noun صَلَاةٌ )	assert (opp. صَلَاةٌ 'denies' (ذَهَبَ))
صَلَاةٌ : صَلَاةٌ (Peal pass. part.)	serves as the subject
صَلَاةٌ : صَلَاةٌ (Ethpe.)	is placed
صَلَاةٌ	affirmative
صَلَاةٌ	statement

مُضَادَّةٌ كُتِبَتْ وَكُتِبَتْ	minor opposites
مُضَادَّةٌ كُتِبَتْ وَكُتِبَتْ	major opposites
كَلِمَةٌ	adverb
كَلِمَةٌ	adsentential adverbial
كَلِمَةٌ	identity, identical
مُضَادَّةٌ كُتِبَتْ وَكُتِبَتْ (Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας)	Peri Hermeneias
قَوْلٌ	declarative
قَوْلٌ	imperative
قَوْلٌ (πρότασις)	proposition
قَوْلٌ مُضَادَّةٌ كُتِبَتْ وَكُتِبَتْ (προσδιορισμός)	determinative expression
قَوْلٌ	simple (proposition, opp. <b>مُضَادَّةٌ</b> 'compound')
قَوْلٌ (κατάφασις)	affirmation
قَوْلٌ مُضَادَّةٌ كُتِبَتْ وَكُتِبَتْ	subaltern affirmation
قَوْلٌ : قَوْلٌ	1. is applied to 2. is predicated, serves as the predicate
قَوْلٌ	1. expression (in discussion of parts of speech) 2. spoken sound (in 4-part hierarchy)
قَوْلٌ	calculation
قَوْلٌ	vocative
قَوْلٌ : قَوْلٌ (Aphel part.)	denies (opp. <b>قَوْلٌ</b> 'asserts' < <b>قَوْلٌ</b> )
قَوْلٌ	diagram (i.e., the diagram in 5 squares)

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تَمَعِبَة سَمَعِبَة	polysemy, polysemous
سَمَعِبَة	noun
سَمَعِبَة (سَمَعِبَة , سَمَعِبَة)	transmit
سَمَعِبَة (سَمَعِبَة)	speak the truth; be true
سَمَعِبَة : سَمَعِبَة	determine (grammatically): determined

**Place names**

سَمَعِبَة	India
سَمَعِبَة	Qenneshre

**Personal names**

سَمَعِبَة	Socrates
سَمَعِبَة سَمَعِبَة	Severus Sebokht
سَمَعِبَة سَمَعِبَة	Paul the Persian

**Animal names**

سَمَعِبَة	Lion
سَمَعِبَة	Pig
سَمَعِبَة	Donkey
سَمَعِبَة	Horse



**Six parts of speech**

اسم	noun
فعل	verb
سك اسم	pronoun
كك فعل	adverb
كك مفعول	adsentential adverbial
وهد	conjunction

**Five kinds of nouns**

اسم واحد	polysemy, polysemous
اسم كك	identity, identical
اسم واحد اسم واحد	polyonymy, polyonymous
اسم واحد اسم واحد	difference, different
اسم كك	paronymy, paronymous

**Ten kinds of sentences**

فعلية	Vocative
سؤالية	interrogative
فعلية	imperative
مقابلة	persuasive
فعلية	declarative
مقابلة	exclamatory

بُحْتٌ	adjuratory (in the form of an oath)
مُحْتَبٌ	Optative
مُؤَكَّدٌ	affirmative
مُحْتَمِلٌ	equivocal

**Six kinds of oppositions**

مُضَادَّةٌ كَبِيرَةٌ	major opposites ح د - ك ز س ج
مُضَادَّةٌ صَغِيرَةٌ مُؤَكَّدَةٌ	subalternate affirmation ح د - س ج
مُضَادَّةٌ صَغِيرَةٌ مُنْكَرَةٌ	subalternate negation ك ز س ج - ح د
مُضَادَّةٌ صَغِيرَةٌ مُؤَكَّدَةٌ	minor opposites س ج - ك ز ح د
مُضَادَّةٌ صَغِيرَةٌ مُنْكَرَةٌ	contradiction ح د - ك ز ح د. س ج - ك ز س ج.



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