

## THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND INTENTIONALITY

Some philosophers have recently argued for *prioritism*: phenomenology is in some sense explanatorily prior to intentionality. This view may seem in conflict with *intentionalism*, which explains phenomenology in terms of intentionality. This paper puts forward a view that combines elements of both views.

My plan is as follows. First (§§1–4) I will develop an argument for intentionalism that depends on a claim that is in the same spirit of prioritism, namely that experiences play a role in grounding the intentionality of other mental states, especially *perceptual beliefs*. I will argue that the best account of how experiences can play this explanatory role is that they are themselves intentional states of a kind more basic than belief. This argument is my response to philosophers such as John Campbell and Bill Brewer who have recently argued that we should not explain experience in terms of intentional content.<sup>1</sup> Then (§5) I will suggest that this argument rules out what I will call “global prioritism.” However, I will suggest that intentionalists may accept what I will call “restricted prioritism.” Restricted prioritism helps to illuminate how intentionalism accommodates the “grounding intuition” on which my argument for intentionalism is based.

### 1. PRELIMINARIES

Although I believe that the argument generalizes, here I will argue for a version of intentionalism restricted to visual experience:

There is a distinctive intentional relation  $R$  such that for every property of the form *having a visual experience with minimal phenomenal character  $K$* , there is some intentional content  $c$ , such

<sup>1</sup>“The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality” by Adam Pautz, *The Monist*, vol. 91, no. 2, pp. 250–272. Copyright © 2008, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354.

that the property of the form *having a visual experience with minimal phenomenal character K* is identical with the property bearing *R* to *c*.

Some clarifications. First, *K* is the *minimal phenomenal character* of an experience *E* iff there is no more specific phenomenal character that *E* possesses. Second, I understand 'contents' broadly to include *complex properties* as well as propositions. Some (e. g., McGinn, this issue of *The Monist*) hold that having a "red-round" experience, for instance, is a matter of standing in some relation *R* to the complex property or "property-cluster"  $[\lambda x](x)[\text{red, round}(x)]$ . In the non-veridical cases, the property exists and one is related to it, but it is uninstantiated. Since I count complex properties as contents, this counts as a version of intentionalism in my sense. I will informally refer to contents with brackets: thus <red, round> is a general proposition or complex property involving redness and roundness. This is only a notational expedient which does not entail that general propositions and complex properties are set-theoretic constructions of properties. Third, I will call the relation which, on intentionalism, we bear to such contents *sensorily entertaining*. On one version of intentionalism, sensorily entertaining a content involves being *aware of* or *acquainted with* the properties that it involves (McGinn, this issue of *The Monist*). But I will remain neutral on this issue.

My argument for intentionalism will be an *inference to the best explanation*. It will focus on an example. Let *E* be the property of having an experience with a certain minimal phenomenal character: the minimal phenomenal character of an experience one might have on viewing a red ellipse, an orange circle, and a green square. Say that someone has *V* iff she has *E* while undergoing a veridical experience, that someone has *I* iff she has *E* while undergoing an illusion, and that someone has *H* iff she has *E* while undergoing an hallucination. Intentionalism is the view that in every case having *E* is a matter of sensorily entertaining the content <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. My argument for intentionalism has three stages. In this first stage, I will argue for a relational view of *H*. In the second stage, I will argue that intentionalism is the best relational view of *H*. In the third stage, I will generalize to *I* and *V*. The argument has a traditional form: it starts with a theory of hallucination and applies it to the other cases.

## 2. THE FIRST STAGE: THE RELATIONALITY OF HALLUCINATORY PHENOMENOLOGY

Just as properties can be conjunctive or disjunctive, so they can be relational. Say that  $P$  is a *relational property* iff the “real definition” or “form” of  $P$  is *bearing  $R$  to  $a$* , or *bearing  $R$  to some  $F$* . By a *relational view* of  $H$  I mean one on which (i)  $H$  is a relational property and (ii) its *relata* involve properties of extended objects. To say that experience is *relational* is not to say that it is *externally-determined*: experience might be relational and yet internally-determined (Pautz forthcoming).

I will consider four relational views of  $H$ . On the *sense-datum theory*, having  $H$  is a matter of being aware of a red and elliptical mental object, an orange and circular mental object, and a green and square mental object (while not seeing any physical objects—a condition I will leave understood). These mental objects are called *sense-data*. Some sense datum theorists take the traditional view that sense data are two-dimensional objects in private mental spaces (Foster 2000, 151–60). Others take the view that sense data are three-dimensional objects (Price 1954, vii–viii) and may even occupy physical space alongside physical objects (Jackson 1977a, 102). On both views, sense data are literally colored and shaped.<sup>2</sup>

On Christopher Peacocke’s (2007) *sensationalism*, having  $H$  is a matter of being related to regions of a *visual field* that have or present shapes and “primed colors” such as red’ or green’. He speaks of “primed colors” because, although he believes that regions of the visual field have shapes, he does not believe that they have colors: only physical objects have colors, in his view. He defines the visual field as a real, curved plane in the space immediately before one’s eyes. It is not the curved plane that coincides with the surface of either retina. Rather, Peacocke says, it is the curved space that *would* coincide with the surface of, in his words, “a Cyclopean eye with a single extended retina” (2007, 7), if one had such a single eye in the place of one’s two eyes. So if an individual has  $H$  while moving around in physical space, the visual field in which the relevant properties are presented is an ever-changing region of physical space immediately before his eyes. Sensationalism is somewhat like the sense-datum theory, with the major difference that it replaces mental objects with regions of actual physical space.

On the *theory of appearing*, having *H* is a matter of some non-mental particulars, some properties, and a person standing in the relation *x presents y to z*. This theory is defended by William Alston (1999). A similar theory is defended by Joseph Levine (this issue of *The Monist*). In the case of veridical experience, Alston holds that the relevant particulars are ordinary physical objects and the relevant properties are their actual properties. But since *H* is hallucinatory, what are the particulars and properties in this case? For the relevant particulars, Alston suggests the regions of *space* or *air* at some distance from the subject. These regions *present* certain color and shape properties without *instantiating* them, according to him. The presented properties are *uninstantiated*. Yet they are properties of extended objects in the sense that, when they are instantiated, they are instantiated by extended objects—namely, physical objects. It would be a category mistake to attribute these properties to non-extended objects. The theory of appearing is somewhat like sensationalism, with the major difference that sensationalism holds that the relevant regions of physical space are immediately before the hallucinator's eyes, while the theory of appearing holds that the regions are farther out in physical space.

Finally, intentionalism is a relational view. It holds that having *H* is a matter of sensorily entertaining the content or complex property <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>, which involves properties of extended objects in the sense that it *attributes* such properties to external objects. Intentionalism is like the theory of appearing, with the major difference that the theory of appearing appeals to both regions of physical space and uninstantiated properties, while intentionalism appeals only to uninstantiated properties.

On a *non-relational view*, having *H* is not a matter of standing in a relation to items involving properties of extended objects. For instance, on the *identity theory*, *H* is necessarily identical with some internal neural property *N*. One can also imagine a Dualist non-relational view, according to which *H* is necessarily identical with some non-physical, non-relational property of people.

My argument for the relational view of *H* is based on the *grounding intuition* about *H*. Suppose you have never before encountered the colors red, orange or green, nor elliptical, circular or square shapes. Intuitively, having *H*, *no less than having its veridical counterpart V*, would endow

you with the capacity to have certain *general beliefs* (some of them false), for instance:

- (1) There is a red ellipse, an orange circle and a green square.
- (2) Red is more like orange than green.
- (3) Ellipses are more like circles than squares.

Further, this does not seem like an accidental fact about *H* that obtains because of *H*'s contingent relations to the world. Maybe a dog incapable of having beliefs at all could have *H* without thereby having the capacity to have the beliefs (1)–(3). But this much seems clear: it is metaphysically necessary that, if an individual who has the general capacity to have beliefs at all has *H*, then he will consequently have the additional capacity to have the specific beliefs (1)–(3). Now the general capacity to have beliefs does not itself entail the capacity to have the specific beliefs (1)–(3). So having *H* adds something: it adds the capacity to have these specific beliefs. Campbell (2002) argues for a relational view of veridical experiences on the basis of the fact that they ground the capacity to have singular beliefs about particular objects. Likewise, I will argue for a relational view of hallucinatory experiences on the basis of the fact that they ground the capacity to have general beliefs such as (1)–(3).

Some clarifications. (i) The grounding intuition is neutral on whether the beliefs involve the ostensible colors of external objects or the colors' of sense data or regions of the visual field. (ii) It is not part of the grounding intuition that *H* might *justify* the relevant beliefs. I believe that this is true as well, but it will not play a role in my argument. (iii) One might worry that a single hallucination *H* could not ground the capacity to have the beliefs (1)–(3) because a single hallucination could not endow an individual with full-blown color and shape concepts. But it is clear that a *series* of real-life hallucinations could do so. And it is clear that the single hallucination *H* would endow the subject with demonstrative beliefs whose truth-conditions are correctly captured with (1)–(3). This is enough for my argument. (iv) The grounding intuition is that *one* way of gaining the capacity to have the beliefs (1)–(3) is by having an experience like *H*. It is compatible with the claim that a blind person might acquire the same beliefs by other means.

The relational view holds that *H* involves a relation to properties of extended objects. The grounding intuition so far says nothing about properties. But I believe that there are good theoretical arguments for believing in properties and for thinking that the beliefs expressed by (1)–(3) involve properties of extended objects, for instance colors and shapes, in the sense that to state their truth-conditions it is necessary to use predicates expressing such properties, or names designating such properties, or quantifiers ranging over such properties (Jackson 1977b). The grounding intuition, together with this theoretical claim, entails that *H* has the following property: being such that, necessarily, if a believer has it, then he thereby has the capacity to have beliefs involving color and shape properties.

Now the argument from the grounding intuition to a relational view of *H* takes the form of an application of Leibniz's Law:

1. By the grounding intuition, *H* has the property of necessarily grounding the capacity to have beliefs involving color and shape properties.
2. There is no non-relational property of human beings—no property that does not consist in standing in a relation to an item involving color and shape properties—that has this property. Only a relational property of human beings that relates them to the relevant properties could *necessarily ground* the capacity to have beliefs involving those properties.
3. So, *H* is not a non-relational but a relational property of human beings.

I have already supported 1. I will now offer an “inference to the only explanation” for 2. Let *Harold* be any monadic, non-relational property. If you like, you might suppose that the event of having Harold has certain “qualia”  $Q_1, Q_2, Q_3, \dots$  which are nothing like color or shape properties or other properties of extended objects. The connection between Harold and any set of beliefs involving color and shape properties would be completely arbitrary. How then could the connection between having Harold and having the capacity to have the relevant beliefs be *necessary* and *explanatory*? Why should having Harold necessarily ground the capacity to have the beliefs (1)–(3) rather than, say, beliefs about *tetrahedrons* or

*elephants?* Of course, one could say that having Harold *necessitates* the capacity to have the beliefs (1)–(3) and there is no explanation of this. This would be to adopt a magical theory of intentionality; it would be akin to saying that a neural state of the brain necessarily represents that  $2 + 2 = 4$  merely by virtue of involving a certain rate of neural firing. But even if this view were coherent it would not accommodate the grounding intuition. For by the grounding intuition the connection between *H* and the capacity to have the relevant beliefs is *explanatory* as well as *necessary*. So Harold, it seems, cannot do what *H* does: necessarily *ground* or *explain* the capacity to have the beliefs (1)–(3). Hence *H* cannot be Harold. Now the only restriction on the choice of Harold was that it be non-relational. It applies equally if we substitute for Harold a non-relational, neural property<sup>3</sup> or a monadic, non-relational, and non-physical property. So it follows that *H* cannot be a non-relational property and must be a relational property.

All four relational views are apparently compatible with the grounding intuition. All hold that having *H* consists in standing in a relation to certain color and shape properties, even if they are not instantiated by the physical objects before one, which might ground the capacity to have beliefs involving those properties. In the second stage, I will argue on the basis of additional considerations that the best relational view of *H* is an intentionalist one.

### 3. THE SECOND STAGE: THE INTENTIONALITY OF HALLUCINATORY PHENOMENOLOGY

The usual arguments for understanding experience in terms of content are based on the transparency observation, the intuition that experiences are necessarily associated with certain accuracy conditions, and the role of experience in justifying belief. In my view, these arguments fail because non-intentional relational views can accommodate these intuitions as well; they will only offer different accounts of them. In my view, the only good argument for an intentional view of *H* over other relational views is that intentionalism provides the best account of two features that hallucinations share with uncontroversial intentional states. First, hallucinations can take place without any suitable *physical particular* before the

subject. Call this *particular-independence*. Second, hallucinations can be contradictory and indeterminate. Call this *indeterminacy/impossibility*.

Since the sense-datum theory of *H* only appeals to *mental* particulars, it is compatible with particular-independence. But, as is well known, it cannot provide a plausible account of indeterminacy/impossibility (Armstrong 1968). Suppose that Mabel has a hallucination *H+* in which it appears that there is a pink object in the periphery of her visual field. She has a vague impression of the color pink, but not of any specific shade of pink. The sense-datum theorist could say that (i) there is some minimal shade of pink that the sense datum of which she is aware (determinately) possesses, but she cannot make it out; or (ii) he might say that the sense datum is pink but no specific shade of pink. Neither option is plausible. Now consider an impossible experience. It is well known that if you look at a waterfall or other moving body for an extended period and then look at stationary objects, they will appear to move and stand still at once. Suppose Maxwell has a hallucination *H-* with the same phenomenal character as this illusion. The sense-datum theorist might claim (i) that the sense datum of which he is aware has one of these properties (moving or standing still) but not the other or (ii) he might say that it has both properties. Again, neither option is plausible.

In the case of the theory of appearing and sensationalism, the situation is reversed. These views might provide an adequate account of indeterminacy/impossibility, but unlike the sense-datum theory they provide an inadequate account of particular-independence.

According to the theory of appearing, when Mabel has *H+*, the region of space in her periphery presents the determinable color *being pink* but no specific shade of pink. But this does not require the counter-intuitive claim that it or anything else actually instantiates *being pink* but no specific shade of pink. Similarly, when Maxwell has *H-*, a region of space presents *moving* and *standing still* to him, which does not require that anything actually instantiates both properties. The sensationalist may provide a similar account of indeterminacy/impossibility. Peacocke (2007) does not, or at least need not, say that regions of the physical visual field instantiate colors (or colors') or properties such as moving and standing still (or moving' and standing still'). Rather, he says that when someone has an experience such as *H+* or *H-* there obtains a three-place



relation between the region, a cluster of properties, and his experience (2007, 4–5). So he could say that, in the cases of  $H^+$  and  $H^-$ , there obtains a three-place relation between the region, the relevant bizarre properties, and the subject's experience. This does not require that the region or anything else actually instantiates the relevant properties. This is all to the good. It is intuitively impossible that anything—especially a region of public physical space—should have the presented properties. This is so even if one calls them 'primed properties', as Peacocke does. Alternatively, since he already seems to concede that in rare cases some phenomenal aspects of experience are determined by intentional content rather than the properties presented in sense-fields (2007, 19), Peacocke might account for such cases, too, in terms of intentional content.

But the theory of appearing and sensationalism do not provide a good account of particular-independence. We may not only have hallucinations and other visual experiences when no physical *object* is present, but also when no suitable physical *region* is present. For instance, a person presumably could have a hallucination of an ostensible object five feet away from him, even though he is at the end of a world that is spatially bounded, so that there is *no region of space* five feet away from him. This goes against Alston's theory of appearing, because in this case there is no region of space which might occupy the first term of the relation *x presents y to z*. We can also have experiences in dreams and imaginings. The proponent of the theory of appearing might say that in such cases it is a *mental object* (Alston 1999) or an *intentional object* (Levine, this issue of *The Monist*) that presents the relevant properties. But the ontological extravagance of these versions of the theory of appearing count against them, especially if there is no reason to prefer them to intentionalism, which only appeals to propositions or complex properties. Sensationalism faces these problems and one further problem. Peacocke defines the visual field in terms of the eyes. So he says that an unfortunate subject with no eyes has no visual field. Nevertheless, such a subject might have vivid hallucinations. For such a subject, Peacocke writes, "it is as if there is something [a visual field] parts of which enjoy the relevant sensational properties . . . , even though . . . there is no such thing" (2007, 12). Peacocke, then, appears to provide a straightforward intentionalist account of the phenomenology of such an individual's experiences: talk of particulars

such as visual field regions and the properties they present takes place entirely within the intentional operator 'it is for the subject as if [. . .]', which is of the same kind as 'the subject sensorily entertains [. . .]'. But if an intentionalist account is suitable for such hallucinations, considerations of uniformity suggest giving an intentionalist account of hallucinations across the board.

So, non-intentionalist relational theories might provide a good account of one of the two features, but not both. It is only intentionalism that provides a good account of both features. Impossible and indeterminate experiences are smoothly accommodated without impossible and indeterminate objects because sensorily entertaining a content involving certain properties does not require the existence of an object (mental or otherwise) that actually instantiates the properties. Particular-independence is smoothly accommodated because on this view, by contrast to sensationalism and the theory of appearing, no physical particulars such as actual regions of physical space need enter into the sensory act in the hallucinatory case: hallucinations only involve propositions or complex properties.

It is worth noting that the intentionalist cannot explain sensorily entertaining in terms of belief. For then the grounding intuition that *H* explains the capacity for belief will not be accommodated. Instead, he will say that sensorily entertaining is a postulated intentional relation to contents (properties or propositions) that is more basic than belief and that is not expressed by any ordinary language predicate. Sensorily entertaining contents is a pre-predicational, non-doxastic mode of intentionality that is not grounded in any further mental properties a person has and that grounds more advanced forms of intentionality. Campbell (2002, 122) might object that this view of hallucination "takes the intentional character of experience as a given." But it is unclear what is wrong with taking intentionality as a given in this case. Of course, *some* forms of intentionality (e.g., an individual's capacity to have certain perceptual beliefs) are grounded in more basic mental features (e.g., an individual's having certain experiences or seeing certain objects). But why think this must be true of *all* forms of intentionality, in particular sensorily entertaining contents? And there is an argument for thinking that hallucinatory experiences (which Campbell ignores) involve such a form of intentionality. The argument for postulating a ground-floor intentional relation of *sensorily enter-*

*taining* that is more basic than belief is that it provides the best explanation of (i) the grounding intuition about hallucination and (ii) particular-independence and indeterminacy/impossibility.

#### 4. THE THIRD STAGE: THE INTENTIONALITY OF ILLUSORY AND VERIDICAL PHENOMENOLOGY

So far, I have not said anything about the general experiential property *E* that is present in the case of *I* and *V* as well as *H*. Two views are compatible with the first two stages:

*Common Factor Intentionalism*: *E* = the property of sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>.

*Intentionalist Disjunctivism*: *E* = the disjunctive property of *either* sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> *or* actually seeing I(red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square).

Here I(red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square) represents the concrete *instantiation* of the relevant properties by physical objects, rather than the content <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. On both views, when one has *E* in the case of *H* or *I*, one has *E* by virtue of sensorily entertaining a (false or uninstantiated) content. (In this way, intentionalist disjunctivism differs from Brewer's (forthcoming) disjunctivism, which gives no positive account of hallucination, and which therefore fails to accommodate the grounding intuition about hallucination.) On intentionalism, in the case of *V* too, one has *E* by virtue of sensorily entertaining an abstract content—only in this case it happens to be true or instantiated. By contrast, on intentionalist disjunctivism, this case is quite different: in the purely veridical case one's experience lacks an intentional content altogether and one has *E* by virtue of seeing the wordly instantiation of the properties. In my view, once we accept intentionalism about hallucination, we should accept common-factor intentionalism over intentionalist disjunctivism. Since the argument here proceeds along familiar lines, I will assume common-factor intentionalism in what follows.

The argument extends to experiential properties besides *E*. It might be said that there are some counterexamples to the claim that all experiential differences can be handled by differences in content, so that in some cases experiential properties involve "qualia" in addition to content. But I believe that the counterexamples are unconvincing (Tye 2000). So while the argument here admittedly only shows that experiential properties *involve* sensorily entertaining contents, the absence of such cases means that the simplest and therefore best view is that they consist in *nothing but* sensorily entertaining contents.

##### 5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Now I turn to what in the introduction I called "prioritism," focusing on the view developed by Horgan and Tienson (in their 2002 and elsewhere). They adopt a view on the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality which they take to be opposed to intentionalism. I will argue that intentionalism rules out "global prioritism." However, I will argue that intentionalism is compatible with "restricted prioritism." This restricted version of prioritism illuminates how sensorily entertaining contents grounds the capacity to have certain perceptual beliefs, in accordance with the grounding intuition.

The following is a rough formulation of a strong form of prioritism:

*Global Prioritism* For every intentional relation *R* involved in human mentality, necessarily, for all *x*, if *x* bears *R* to some content *c*, then *x* bears *R* to *c* by virtue of *x*'s actual or potential experiential properties, in some cases in conjunction with *x*'s relations to his environment.

Some comments. First, by an *experiential property*, I mean any property which is such that there is *something it is like* to have that property. Second, the term 'by virtue of' is Horgan and Tienson's (2002, 520). What does it mean? I assume they would reject a merely modal characterization. For instance, necessarily, everything that is red is extended, but a red object is not extended *by virtue of* being red. Here I will assume that the

“by virtue of” relation is both *modal* and *explanatory*: something has *F* by virtue of having *G* iff, necessarily, everything that has *G* has *F* and its having *G* in some sense “explains” its having *F*. Third, this means that global prioritism entails a *sufficiency* claim as well as a *necessity* claim: it entails that it is *necessary* that if a system has intentional states at all, then it has actual or potential experiential properties (Strawson 1994), and that it has those intentional states *by virtue* of its set of actual and potential experiential properties, so that this set of actual and potential experiential properties is *sufficient* for the intentional states. Third, to handle non-occurrent intentional states, the global prioritist might claim that individuals have such states by virtue of having *dispositions* to have experiential properties (for a different, more instrumentalist view, see Horgan and Kriegel, this issue of *The Monist*). Against this, it might be said that there are possible cases in which an individual has a deeply unconscious intentional mental state that does not even potentially show up in his phenomenal life. But it is unclear that there are convincing cases of this kind.

Let us take some examples. Suppose that Maxwell has the perceptual belief (1) discussed in §2: he believes <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. Horgan and Tienson would claim that he believes this by virtue of his experiential properties alone. They make it very plausible that any individual that has the same experiential properties will have this belief as well.

Of course, an individual has many *wide* intentional properties that do not supervene on his actual or potential experiential properties. Suppose Maxwell believes that gold is yellow. There are phenomenal duplicates of Maxwell who do not: for instance, an individual who has the same experiential properties as Maxwell but who lives on a “Twin Earth” that lacks true gold and only contains fool’s gold. But this is compatible with global prioritism because it may be that Maxwell believes that gold is yellow by virtue of his experiential properties and his relations to his actual environment. Roughly, one might say that Maxwell’s relation to gold supplies the subject constituent of his belief, while his experiential properties supply the predicative constituent.

Now Horgan and Tienson suggest that (at least typical) intentionalists must reject prioritism. The reason they offer is that intentionalists “hold that intentionality is prior to phenomenology” (2002, 520). Apparently, the reasoning here may be unpacked as follows. Typical intentionalists, accord-

ing to Horgan and Tienson, hold that intentionality is prior to phenomenology. Presumably, this means that typical intentionalists hold that a person has his experiential properties *by virtue of* his intentional properties. Horgan and Tienson are reversing the order of explanation. They hold instead that phenomenology is prior to intentionality. Presumably, this means that a person has his intentional properties by virtue of his experiential properties. If we assume that the *by virtue of* relation is asymmetrical (it cannot be that  $x$  has  $F$  by virtue of having  $G$  and that  $x$  has  $G$  by virtue of having  $F$ ), then standard intentionalism and prioritism are in conflict.

This reason for thinking that intentionalism and prioritism are in conflict does not carry over to intentionalism as I formulate it. I formulate intentionalism as an *identity claim*, rather than as a *by virtue of* claim. Nevertheless, I do believe that there is a conflict between intentionalism as I have formulated it and global prioritism. In fact, I believe that even "non-reductive" or "primitivist" intentionalism (discussed below) is incompatible with global prioritism. For if any version of intentionalism is true, then *sensorily entertaining* seems to be a counterexample to global prioritism. Suppose Maxwell has  $E$ . On intentionalism as I have formulated it, his having  $E$  just is his sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. This is apparently in conflict with global prioritism. For sensorily entertaining a content is an intentional relation (even if it is a relation of acquaintance with properties). So if global prioritism is correct, Maxwell sensorily entertains <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> *by virtue of* his experiential properties. But  $E$  is the only plausible candidate to be the experiential property by virtue of which Maxwell sensorily entertains <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. And it seems that on intentionalism Maxwell cannot be said to sensorily entertain <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> *by virtue of* having  $E$ . The reason is that on intentionalism the property *having  $E$*  is identical with the property *sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>*. Where  $F$  is identical with  $G$ , it apparently cannot be the case that something has  $G$  by virtue of having  $F$  but not *vice versa*. A property apparently cannot be explanatorily prior to itself. So intentionalism as I have formulated it (*viz.*, as an identity claim) naturally leads to a "no-priority" view concerning the relationship between sensory phenomenology and sensory intentionality. Of course, the situation is somewhat unclear until the *by virtue of* relation is

explained to us. But, under the explanation I have adopted at least, there does seem to be a conflict between intentionalism and global prioritism.

If so, then we must choose between them. I have argued for intentionalism, so I favor intentionalism over global prioritism. In fact, global prioritism may be a view with internal tensions. We may use a premise global prioritists accept to argue against global prioritism. For global prioritists hold, as I do, that having *E* grounds intentional relations, for instance to the content <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. But if, like *Harold* (§2), *E* were a monadic, non-relational property in no way involving colors and shapes, it could not ground standing in an intentional relation to the content <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. So *E* must be a relational property. I have argued on the basis of indeterminacy/impossibility and particular-independence that the best view is that *E* is an intentional property: having *E* just is a matter of standing in the special intentional relation *sensorily entertaining* to the content <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. But then global prioritism must be false, as we have seen.

But while I reject global prioritism, I am attracted to a restricted form of prioritism. If intentionalism is correct, then it is not the case that a person *sensorily entertains* the contents that he does *by virtue of* his experiential properties. For properties concerning what contents a person sensorily entertains *just are* his experiential properties. Sensorily entertaining contents is a ground-floor mode of intentionality in the sense that it is not grounded in any other mental properties a person has. But it might be that a person stands in all *other* intentional relations to contents by virtue of his actual and potential experiential properties. In particular, it might be that he *believes* and *desires* the contents he does by virtue of his actual and potential experiential properties:

*Restricted prioritism:* For every intentional relation *R* involved in human mentality besides *sensorily entertaining*, necessarily, for all *x*, if *x* bears *R* to some content *c*, then *x* bears *R* to *c* by virtue of *x*'s actual and potential experiential properties, in some cases in conjunction with *x*'s relations to his environment.

To illustrate, suppose Maxwell has *E*. Given intentionalism, this means that he sensorily entertains <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green,

square>. Taking his experience at face value, he comes to believe <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. Now, as I have explained, Maxwell's *sensorily entertaining* <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> cannot be grounded in any experiential properties that he has. This is why I have rejected global prioritism. But, in accordance with restricted prioritism, it may be that his *believing* <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> is grounded in his experiential properties.

I find prioritism plausible for all beliefs and desires. Suppose you believe that  $68 + 57 = 125$ . Your phenomenal duplicate will have had exactly the same experiences of having been taught arithmetic. On having the experience of receiving the same arithmetical questions, he will have experiences of producing the same arithmetical answers. He will perform the same inferential transitions among arithmetical sentences in his internal monologue. Intuitively, he also believes that  $68 + 57 = 125$  and indeed has exactly the same mathematical beliefs. Here I will simply assume that the arguments given by Horgan and Tienson (2002), Strawson (1994) and others provide a case for accepting restricted prioritism once we have accepted intentionalism.

It may be wondered how restricted prioritism differs from the standard view. The standard view holds that one set of physical facts determines a person's experiential properties, and a *separate* set of non-experiential, physical facts (for instance, relations to the environment) determines his beliefs and desires. Consequently, it also holds that a system (e.g., a Zombie or a robot) could have beliefs and desires without even potentially having experiential properties. Restricted prioritism denies these claims. For instance, as will emerge, on the version of restricted prioritism I would favor, what gives Maxwell's perceptual belief the content <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> is not its relation to the outside world, but its relation to the his experience *E*, which consists in his sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. And restricted prioritism implies that having beliefs and desires requires having the potential to have experiential properties.

In the remainder of this section, I will develop a particular implementation of restricted prioritism. I will explain how it might afford an explanation of the grounding intuition. I will argue that it is compatible with both *reductive intentionalism* and *primitivist intentionalism*, but that it fits better with primitivist intentionalism. Finally, I will note some of its unique features.



One might wonder whether there is some explanation of how experiential properties together with relations to the environment determine content. One explanation is provided by *phenomenal interpretationism*. On the usual form of interpretationism (Lewis 1994), what a person believes and desires is determined by causal relations between external physical conditions and internal physical states, causal relations among internal physical states, causal relations between internal physical states and physical behavior, together with the so-called "constraints on interpretation." A chief constraint on interpretation is: assign beliefs and desires so as to rationalize internal transitions between internal states and between internal states and behavioral outputs. The rough idea is that a person has a certain belief or desire iff the best interpretation of him assigns the belief or desire to him, where the *best interpretation* is the one that makes best sense of the physical and behavioral facts about him. Phenomenal interpretationism agrees that a person has a certain belief or desire iff the best interpretation of him assigns the belief or desire to him. But it provides a different definition of the *best interpretation*: it is the interpretation that makes the best sense of the actual and potential *experiential* facts about him rather than the behavioral facts about him. These facts include relations between input-experiences and downstream states, relations among internal experiential states (such as inner speech, inner images, and so on), and relations between internal experiential states and experiences of acting on the world, that is, *apparent* behaviors. (A life-long brain in a vat has experiences of engaging in many behaviors without actually behaving.) As for wide intentional states, they are determined by these factors together with relations to the environment.

To take a toy example, suppose you have an experience of someone asking you 'what is 68 plus 57?', then perform transitions among certain inner sentences in the process of doing mental arithmetic, and then have the experience of uttering '125'. Perhaps the best interpretation of you given countless such actual and potential phenomenal facts assigns to you the belief that  $68 + 57 = 125$ . For another example, suppose that you have *E*. On intentionalism, this means that you sensorily entertain the general content <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. And suppose this disposes you to engage in apparent behavior that is rational on the assumption that this is the way things actually are. Perhaps there is even a phenomenology associated with endorsing your experience and this

phenomenology is present in this case. Then the best interpretation might assign to you a belief with the content <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>.

Phenomenal interpretationism explains how sensorily entertaining contents necessarily grounds the capacity to have beliefs with those and related contents. The facts about what contents an individual sensorily entertains are anchor points that help to determine the best interpretation of him, and hence what he believes and desires. So, for instance, even if it is possible that Maxwell should be in an unusual scenario in which his sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> is normally caused by grey rectangles, he will have the capacity to believe <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. The prioritist will say that the content of the belief will not come from its relation to the outside world. Rather, it will come from its relation to Maxwell's experience.

Restricted prioritism may be combined with two types of intentionalism: reductive intentionalism and primitivist intentionalism. As I formulate intentionalism, all forms of intentionalism are reductive theories in a minimal sense. They hold that experiential properties such as *E* are identical with and in this sense reduce to standing in the *sensorily entertaining* relation to a content. Reductive and primitivist intentionalism differ on the issue of whether this relation may in turn be explained in physical/functional terms.

*Reductive intentionalism* holds that *sensorily entertaining* is a physical/functional relation. For instance, sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> is a matter of being in a state that (i) plays the functional role characteristic of experiences in general and that (ii) *would be* caused by this state of affairs if optimal conditions were to obtain (Tye 2000). This view is compatible with the claim of restricted prioritism that having beliefs and desires requires the capacity to have experiential properties and that a person has the beliefs and desires he does by virtue of his experiential properties. The defender of reductive intentionalism might adopt a two-stage view. First, relations to the environment constitute what contents an individual sensorily entertains. Second, these facts (which are at once phenomenal, intentional and physical), in some cases together with additional relations to the environment (to handle singular beliefs and natural-kind beliefs), determine his other intentional relations to contents, for instance his beliefs and desires, in

accordance with restricted prioritism. In the second stage, the reductive intentionalist might even appeal to phenomenal interpretationism.

But while restricted prioritism could in principle be combined with reductive intentionalism, I believe that it fits better with *primitivist intentionalism*. On this view, *sensorily entertaining* is a primitive relation. What contents an individual sensorily entertains *supervenes on* the physical facts about him (perhaps the internal physical facts), but there is no single codifiable rule for going from the physical facts about the individual to what contents he sensorily entertains of the kind that would be required for a reduction of *sensorily entertaining*. Again, if this view is combined with restricted prioritism, we get a two-stage view. First, the rich facts about what contents an individual sensorily entertains are determined by the physical facts about him without being reducible to those physical facts. Second, these facts (which are at once phenomenal, intentional and primitive), in some cases together with relations to the environment (to handle singular beliefs and natural-kind beliefs), determine his other intentional relations to contents, for instance his beliefs and desires. Of course, this view is not at variance with the grounding intuition. It may be that our capacity to have perceptual beliefs is explained by sensorily entertaining contents, even if sensorily entertaining contents cannot be reductively explained.

Since restricted prioritism is compatible with reductive intentionalism and primitivist intentionalism, additional considerations are needed to decide between them. One reason I favor primitivist intentionalism is that reductive intentionalism faces underdetermination problems. The physical and functional facts about a person alone seem insufficient to pin down the contents of his mental states, especially the rich contents that he sensorily entertains (Pautz forthcoming). Primitivist intentionalism may help here. For instance, I favor the combination of primitivism about sensorily entertaining contents with interpretationism about all other intentional relations. On primitivism, what contents an individual sensorily entertains are primitive facts about him. Concerning this type of intentionality, then, I reject interpretationism. This solves underdetermination problems concerning sensory content. But I am attracted to interpretationism about an individual's other intentional states. Primitivism about sensorily entertaining contents may help to allay underdetermination problems with interpretationism about an individual's other intentional states. For now

not only the functional facts about a person, but also facts about what contents he sensorily entertains, are included in the "given" facts about him that determine a best interpretation. And what fine-grained contents a person sensorily entertains might act as anchor points that help to pin down the contents of his downstream mental states.

Let me close by noting two potential points of difference between restricted prioritism and the view of Horgan and Tienson (2002 and elsewhere). First, it is not committed to the following claim made by Horgan and Tienson:

[P] Every occurrent intentional state has an intentional content by virtue of *itself* having a phenomenal character that goes beyond that of associated inner speech or mental images.

On a strong version of [P], every occurrent intentional state has a *unique* phenomenal character, so that every occurrent intentional property is *coextensive with* a property of the form *being in a state with phenomenal character K*.

Restricted prioritism does not entail [P] because it only says that the non-sensory intentional states of a person are determined by his experiential properties; there is no requirement that the experiential properties attach to those intentional states themselves.

I have two points about [P]. If Horgan and Tienson accept the strong version, then the simplest view is that every property of the form *being in an occurrent state with content p is identical with* the property of the form *being in a state with phenomenal character K* with which it is coextensive. This yields the strongest possible form of "inseparatism." But if this is so, then perhaps they should reject their claim that a person has the intentional property *by virtue of* having the relevant experiential property. For a property cannot be explanatorily prior to itself. So in this case perhaps they even should reject restricted prioritism and adopt a thoroughgoing "no-priority" view concerning the relationship between cognitive intentionality and cognitive phenomenology, one analogous to the no-priority view I have defended concerning the relationship between sensory intentionality and sensory phenomenology. Second, in any case, I believe that [P] is implausible. Even if occurrent beliefs can have a phenomenology that goes beyond the phenomenology of inner speech and associated images, it is far from clear that it is rich enough to determine what their contents are.

But then what does determine the contents of occurrent beliefs? Phenomenal interpretationism provides one answer:

[H] An intentional state does not have its intentional content by virtue of *itself* having a phenomenal character. Rather, what non-sensory intentional states a person has is holistically determined by his actual and potential experiential properties, together in some cases with his relations to the environment. The relevant experiential properties need not attach to the intentional state itself.

For example, Maxwell has a perceptual belief with the content <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> by virtue of having an experience with this content and by virtue of being disposed to engage in apparent behavior that is rational on the assumption that he has this belief. Likewise, his judgment that “ $68 + 57 = 125$ ” has its content by virtue of its *phenomenal role*: its actual and counterfactual relations to other states with phenomenology, ones that are rationalized by assigning to it the content that  $68 + 57 = 125$ . Horgan and Kriegel (this issue of *The Monist*) apply a view similar to interpretationism to non-occurrent intentional states. On the view I have developed, interpretationism applies to occurrent intentional states as well. The only intentional states to which I do *not* apply interpretationism are occurrent sensory states, which involve sensorily entertaining contents. These, in my view, are the only basic intentional states.

A second difference is that restricted prioritism is not committed to Horgan and Tienson’s (2002, 528) claim that, for every wide belief whose content does not supervene on phenomenology alone, there is an underlying belief (perhaps a descriptive one) whose content does supervene on phenomenology alone. Restricted prioritism holds that wide beliefs, for instance singular beliefs and beliefs involving natural kinds, are determined jointly by an individual’s experiential properties and his relations to the environment. This does not entail that there is content-bearing component of every wide belief that is determined by a person’s experiential properties alone. This may be true, but restricted prioritism does not entail it. Analogy: a resultant force  $R$  is determined by two forces  $F1$  and  $F2$ , but this does not entail that there is in any sense a “component” of the resultant force  $R$  that is determined by  $F1$  alone.

On the combination of intentionalism and restricted prioritism I have been developing, phenomenology and intentionality are modally interde-

pendent. By intentionalism, paradigmatic experiential properties consist in sensorily entertaining contents. So phenomenology entails intentionality. By restricted prioritism, all modes of intentionality besides *sensorily entertaining* are dependent on having actual or potential experiential properties. And, of course, by its very nature sensorily entertaining contents also entails having experiential properties. So the reverse entailment holds as well: all modes of intentionality entail phenomenology.<sup>4</sup>

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#### NOTES

1. See Campbell (2002) and Brewer (forthcoming).

2. On the sense-datum theory, physical objects as well as sense data might have colors. But physical objects have colors in a different sense than do sense data: in the sense that they normally produce experiences of sense data that have colors (Jackson 1977a, 128).

3. The connection between a neural property *N* and the capacity to have the relevant beliefs cannot be necessary or explanatory. (i) It cannot be necessary, because the identity theorist must claim that the capacity to have the relevant beliefs requires causal connections to properties in the outside world. A system could instantiate *N* and yet lack the relevant causal connections to the outside world; so, on this view, a system could instantiate *N* and yet lack the capacity to have the relevant beliefs (Pautz MS). (ii) The explanatory component of the grounding intuition is that having *H* alone explains the capacity to have the relevant beliefs; it explains this capacity *simply by virtue of its phenomenal character*. But the identity theory does not accommodate this intuition. For, on the identity theory, having *H* is necessarily identical with having *N* (while not seeing any physical objects). And having *N* alone cannot explain the capacity to have the relevant beliefs; rather, on this view, what explains this capacity is the additional, non-phenomenal fact that *N* is appropriately causally connected to the outside world.

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