

## Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?

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The standard arguments for explaining visual experience in terms of intentional content are based on the transparency observation, physicalism about the mind, or the analysis of statements describing how things look. Recently, some have questioned these standard arguments for the intentional view of visual experience. I agree with the critics that the standard arguments fail. In my view, there is no quick and easy argument for the intentional view.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, there is an argument to be made for the intentional view of visual experience. It takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Both veridical and nonveridical visual experiences can ground the capacity to have beliefs about the external world. Visual experiences, like standard intentional states, can be indeterminate and depict impossible

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1. For recent skepticism about the case for the intentional view, see Burge (2003) and Travis (2004). I agree with Tyler Burge that the transparency argument fails, but for reasons other than those he gives (Pautz 2007). For a response to Travis (2004), see Pautz (2008b: §2). Byrne (2001) provides an argument that, like the argument I develop here, depends on neither transparency nor physicalism. For criticism, see Pautz (2008b). It should be noted that here my aim is not to argue for the weak claim that experiences merely *have* contents in some sense, a claim that I elsewhere (Pautz 2008b) suggest may be established easily. Indeed, I argue that this claim is compatible with nearly every view on experience, including disjunctivist (or “naive realist”) views. Rather, my aim is to argue for the stronger claim that experiences are *identical with* relations to contents, so that there is a deep link between content and phenomenology. For this distinction, see Pautz (2007: 497; 2008b). Siegel (chapter 12, this volume) draws a similar distinction and addresses the weak claim. For more on this issue, see note 11.

scenarios. The best explanation of these and other features of visual experience, I argue, is that both veridical and nonveridical experiences are themselves intentional states of a kind more basic than belief. Making good on this argument for the intentional view requires seriously engaging with rival views.

My plan is as follows. In sections 1 and 2 I develop an interpretation of the debate over the nature of visual experience and formulate the main rival views. Then in sections 3–6 I argue that, among these views, the intentional view best explains the features of visual experience. Finally, in section 7 I show how the intentionalist can handle *blur* and *attention*.

## 1. THE INTENTIONAL VIEW AND RIVAL COMMON FACTOR VIEWS

There are many questions in the philosophy of perception. The *success question*: What is the correct analysis of perceptual success? For instance, what is it to perceive an object? The *epistemic question*: How does perceptual experience justify beliefs about the external world? The *phenomenal question*: What determines the phenomenology of visual experience? I am mainly concerned with the phenomenal question in this chapter.

It is not clear how to interpret the phenomenal question. On one interpretation, it concerns the analysis of “looks” reports. But this interpretation is problematic. Many such reports do not describe phenomenology at all. Rather, they are doxastic in the sense that they describe visual evidence or inclinations to form beliefs on the basis of visual experience. Some say that there are nondoxastic, phenomenological “looks” reports, but this is unclear, and even if there are such “looks” reports, they do not describe phenomenology *alone*. For instance, ‘the apple looks red to Jones’ also encodes perceptual success, entailing that there is an apple that Jones sees. For these reasons, there is no straightforward connection between the analysis of looks-reports and the nature of visual phenomenology.

On another interpretation of the phenomenal question, it concerns the nature of properties expressed by predicates of the form ‘has an experience as of \_\_\_,’ where the blank is filled by some description of the ostensible objects of the experience. This interpretation, too, is problematic, for two reasons. First, some “qualia theorists” hold that ‘has an experience as of a red object’ does not describe visual phenomenology at all but, rather, intentional content, which they think can vary independently of visual phenomenology. For instance, they would say that in an inverted spectrum case, two individuals might both have experiences as of a red object while having quite different color experiences. Second, the thesis that experiences can be fully described with such predicates, so that there is a one-to-one mapping between such predicates and possible experience-types, is arguably false. For instance, as I discuss in section 7, some say that the distinction between blurry and clear visual experiences cannot be captured with such predicates.

In my view, the phenomenal question should be taken to be a question about the real definition of certain properties of people that we can get a grip on through examples. Since the properties are introduced by example, no questions are begged at the outset. For instance, imagine you first experience a red and round tomato in normal circumstances, so that it looks red and round to you. Then you experience a green and oval tomato in abnormal circumstances, so that it looks red and round to you. Finally, you have a hallucination of a red and round tomato. And suppose that in all three cases your experience is, as we would put it, exactly the same. Intuitively, despite the differences between the cases, there is a salient property you have in all three of them. Further, this property is one that a person would possess in any experientially identical case and lack in any experientially different case. Call it *R*, and call such properties of people *visual experience properties*. Everyone can accept that individuals have visual experience properties in both veridical and nonveridical cases. This, I suggest, is a pretheoretical datum. It is left open whether these properties can be fully characterized by predicates of the form ‘has an experience as of \_\_\_,’ where the blank is filled by some description of the ostensible objects of the experience. Since I have introduced visual experience properties by example, the correct account of such properties is also left open. In the case of visual experience, the phenomenal question can be taken to be, What is the correct account of visual experience properties?

One major division is between common factor views and disjunctive views. I provide a more exact formulation of how I think this division should be understood in section 2 on disjunctive views, but very roughly, common factor views hold that visual experience properties are nondisjunctive properties common to veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory cases, whereas disjunctive views hold that they are disjunctive properties. In this section, I formulate the common factor views that I will discuss in this chapter, including the intentional view. In section 2, I formulate some disjunctive views.

First, the traditional *sense datum view*: This common factor view holds that, in both hallucinatory cases and cases of genuine seeing, having *R* is a matter of being aware of the redness and roundness of a mental object.

Next, the *sensationalist view* defended by Christopher Peacocke (see Peacocke 2008): Having a visual experience is a matter of being related to a region of a *visual field* that has certain properties. This view is similar to the sense datum view, but his visual field is not an array of mental sense data, as many commentators have supposed. Rather, it is a real, curved plane in the *physical space* immediately before one’s eyes. More exactly, it is the curved plane that *would* coincide with the surface of, in his words, “a Cyclopean eye with a single extended retina,” if one had such a single eye in the place of one’s two eyes (Peacocke 2008: 12). So if an individual has *R* while moving around in physical space, then his visual field is an ever-changing region of physical space immediately before his eyes.

According to Peacocke, when one has *R*, one senses a physical region that is round. Further, it is red’ with respect to one’s visual experience.

Why the primed notation? Because, according to Peacocke, only physical objects are red. Why the qualification “with respect to one’s visual experience”? Because, according to Peacocke, the property of being red’ is some kind of relational property of visual field regions: A region of physical space is red’ just in case it stands in some relation (which Peacocke does not explain) to an individual’s experience. On this view, in hallucination, one is related to a region of the visual field with certain properties, but there is no corresponding physical object before one that has these properties.

Next, the *multiple relation view*, also known as the *theory of appearing* (see Alston 1999): There is a three-place relation  $x$  presents  $y$  to  $z$  such that having a visual experience consists in an object (or  $n$ -tuple of objects), an external property (or  $n$ -place relation), and a sentient individual standing in this relation. So, for instance,  $R$  is identical with the relational property of being such that some object presents the property of being red and round to one. In veridical and illusory cases, the relevant object is an ordinary physical object, for example, a tomato. And, in such cases, the relevant property, the property of being red and round, is an abstract item that may exist even if it is not instantiated. In the veridical case, the tomato happens to instantiate the property. In the illusory case, the tomato does not instantiate the property.

What is the object that presents the property of being red and round to the subject of a hallucination? On one version of this view, here the relevant object is a nonstandard object, such as a *region of physical space*. In this version, the multiple relation view is a common factor view, holding that in every case having  $R$  is a matter of being such that some object presents one with the property of being red and round. (However, in section 2 I introduce a disjunctivist version of the multiple relation view that denies that hallucination can be explained in terms of an object presenting properties.)

Note that, on both the sensationalist view and this version of the multiple relation view, having  $R$  in the hallucinatory case involves being related to a region of physical space. But, whereas on the sensationalist view the relevant region is immediately before the subject’s eyes, on the multiple relation view it is at some distance from the subject, namely, where the property of being red and round is ostensibly presented to him. Intentionalists often ignore this view, but there is something very intuitive about it. When Macbeth hallucinates the dagger, a fairly natural description of what is going on is that a cluster of properties is presented to him at a certain region of physical space.

Next, the *intentional view*: All visual experience properties are at least partly identical with properties of the form *standing in relation  $R$  to content  $c$  involving external properties  $P, Q, R, \dots$* <sup>2</sup> Here by “external properties” I mean properties that are not instantiated by visual experiences themselves. When I refer to “intentional contents” I mean both propositions that can

2. See, e.g., Tye (2000), Dretske (1995), and Byrne (2001). The intentional view is typically formulated in terms of supervenience. In Pautz (2008b) I provide reasons to prefer the identity formulation used here rather than a supervenience formulation.

be true or false and property complexes that can be instantiated or uninstantiated. Therefore, the so-called the *property-complex* view of visual experience counts as a version of intentionalism in my sense (see Bealer 1982; Johnston 2004; for discussion, see Pautz 2007).

For convenience, in general I assume that all visual experience properties involve the same intentional relation, even though some versions of intentionalism deny this, as I describe below. Unlike believing and desiring, this intentional relation has no name in English. But we may introduce a theoretical term for the relation, defined according to the Ramsey-Lewis method for defining theoretical terms: “Sensorily entertaining” refers by description to the relation *S* such that, for every visual experience property *E*, having *E* is at least partly identical with bearing *S* to some content or other. If intentionalism is false, then there is no such relation (for the Ramsey-Lewis method, see Lewis 1970).

The intentional view departs from the views considered so far in an important respect. On the intentional view, when an individual has *R*, there need not exist a mental object or a region of space or anything else that instantiates or presents the relevant external properties.

Intentionalism comes in a bewildering variety of forms. In particular, there are various views on what the contents are—singular propositions or general propositions, Fregean or Russellian propositions, and so on. On the property-complex view, the contents are not propositions at all but property-complexes. The argument I develop is neutral between all these views. But I must explain the distinction between strong intentionalism and qualia-content intentionalism, since it comes up in section 7.

*Strong intentionalism* (*intentionalism* for short) maintains that every visual experience property is *wholly identical with* standing in some intentional relation to a content. It comes in two versions. On *pure intentionalism*, there is a single intentional relation, *sensorily entertaining*, involved in all visual experiences. All differences among visual experience properties are explained by differences in content. On *relation-content intentionalism*, different visual experience properties might involve different intentional relations, so that in some cases differences among visual experiences properties can be explained by differences in the relation as well as differences in the content. We might call the intentional relation the *intentional mode*. What unites both versions of strong intentionalism is that they hold that visual experience properties are wholly intentional, so that all differences among them can be explained in purely intentional terms—in terms of intentional content or intentional mode. My aim in this chapter is to establish strong intentionalism.

*Qualia-content intentionalism*, by contrast, holds that there are counterexamples to strong intentionalism. There are different visual experience properties that involve the very same intentional mode and intentional content. As I describe in section 7, some would say that a clear experience and a blurry experience of the same object are a case in point. According to qualia-content intentionalism, such visual experience properties are

only *partly identical with* standing in a relation to a content; they also involve nonintentional qualia, which explain the difference between them.

Despite their differences, the common factor views considered so far have something important in common. Say that a property is *relational* when its real definition is *bearing R to a* or *bearing R to some F*. The common factor views considered so far agree (1) that visual experience properties are relational properties and (2) that their *relata* involve *external properties*, that is, properties that need not be instantiated by the experience itself in the head of the experiencer. Call them *relational views*. For instance, on the sense datum view, visual experience properties are relations to sense data having certain external properties. These properties count as external in my sense because they are not instantiated by the experiences themselves; they are instantiated by the sense data that are the objects of the experiences. The intentional view counts as a relational common factor view as well. On the intentional view, experience properties are relations to intentional contents that involve external properties in the sense that they have external properties as constituents, or attribute them to external objects. The common factor views considered so far differ only in whether visual experiences relate the subject to external properties by relating him to a particular existing object that instantiates or presents those properties, with intentional views rejecting this assumption and other relational views endorsing it.

There is also an entirely different category of common factor views: nonrelational common factor views. They maintain that all visual experience properties are entirely *nonrelational properties* of persons in the sense that they are not even *partly identical with* standing in a relation to an item that involves properties external to the experience. I call such views *pure qualia views*, or *qualia views* for short. They go beyond the qualia-content version of intentionalism mentioned above in claiming that *all* differences among visual experiences consist in differences in *qualia* rather than intentional content or intentional mode. They are compatible with the claim that in some sense visual experiences *have* contents, but they deny that *any* differences among visual experience properties *consist in* differences in content. They come in physicalist and dualist versions.

A physicalist version is the *type-type identity theory* of visual experience. By this, I mean the view that *R* is *necessarily* identical with some neural property *N* of persons, not merely contingently realized by such a property. In general, on the identity theory, all visual experience properties (types) are necessarily identical with neural properties. So, all differences among visual experiences consist in neural differences. Different versions differ in what kind of neural property *R* ought to be identified with. On some versions, the relevant neural property *N* is a fairly local neural property *L* that a normal person possesses when and only when he has *R*. On others, it is a more global neural property: the property of having *L* while satisfying some global background condition requiring that *L* be part of a normally functioning brain. On some versions, *N* is a very low-level neural property.




Figure 10.1

On other versions,  $N$  is a more abstract, functional-computational property realizable in creatures with quite different neurophysiologies. In what follows, I use *neural properties* broadly to include all such properties.<sup>3</sup>

A dualist version of the qualia view might hold that  $R$  is identical with undergoing a nonphysical experiential event that has a reddish quale and a roundish quale, where these properties are nothing like the associated external properties. On another version, each visual experience property is an entirely unstructured, primitive property.

Common factor views are represented in Figure 10.1.

Among common factor views, the great divide is between relational and nonrelational views. As an intentionalist, I favor a relational view. As I describe below, relational views can accommodate (among other things) the obvious fact that experience grounds the capacity for thought involving external properties, while nonrelational views are unable to do so.

## 2. DISJUNCTIVE VIEWS

Disjunctivists reject the basic approach to perception taken by common factor theorists. Traditionally, common factor theorists first develop an exotic theory of what happens when you have  $R$  while hallucinating a tomato and then apply this theory to the case of actually seeing a tomato. By contrast, disjunctivists start with the naive intuition that, when you have  $R$  while seeing a tomato, you do so simply by virtue seeing the tomato and its characteristics (an intuition I return to in section 6). I will be in a position to offer a better formulation at the close of this section,

3. For the identity theory, see Block (2003), Churchland (2007: ch. 9), McLaughlin (2007), and Polger (2004).

once I have discussed the versions of disjunctivism, but for starters I roughly define disjunctive views as views that attempt to retain this naive intuition by analyzing visual experience properties in terms of success properties. By a “success property” I mean one that is such that, necessarily, if one has that property, then one sees a mind-independent object. Such views are called *disjunctive* views because the simplest such analyses are disjunctive in form: Having *R* is a matter of *either* seeing the redness and roundness of an object *or* satisfying some other condition.

Disjunctivism comes in many different versions. One division concerns what kind of success property is invoked to analyze *R*. According to *VIVH disjunctivism*, *R* is analyzable in terms of a success property that one possesses in both the veridical case *V* and the illusory case *I* but not in the hallucinatory case *H*. For instance, one version of *VIVH* disjunctivism appeals to the same success property invoked by the multiple relation view (section 1): being such that some object presents with the property of being red and round. Above, I discussed a common factor version of the multiple relation view, according to which hallucinatory experience has the same basic structure as veridical and illusory experience but with a nonstandard object presenting the relevant property. But what I have in mind now is a disjunctivist version of the multiple relation view, according to which in hallucinatory cases one has *R* by virtue of satisfying some quite different condition, not involving the presentation of properties by an object. This version of the multiple relation view would be an example of *VIVH* disjunctivism. On *VIVH* disjunctivism, the great divide is between veridical and illusory cases, on the one hand, and hallucinatory cases, on the other.<sup>4</sup>

According to *VVIH disjunctivism*, by contrast, *R* is analyzable in terms of a success property that one possesses in veridical cases only, for instance, the property of seeing the redness and roundness of some mind-independent object. On this version of disjunctivism, in illusory and hallucinatory cases one has *R* by virtue of satisfying some quite different condition. So, on this version of disjunctivism, the great divide is between veridical cases, on the one hand, and illusory and hallucinatory cases, on the other. This version appeals to what we might call *state-seeing*, for instance, seeing the redness and roundness of some mind-independent object. This differs from fact-seeing (‘John sees that the tomato is red’) and object-seeing (‘John sees the tomato’). It is a nonconceptual mode of seeing: Seeing the redness of a tomato does not require having the concept *red*. And it is directed at states of the world, otherwise known as *conditions*, *property-instantiations*, or *tropes*, rather than propositions about the world or mere objects. For instance, the redness and roundness of a tomato are concrete states of the world that go out of existence when the

4. For an example of *VIVH* disjunctivism, see Langsam (1997). My terminology here, as well as the “negative” and “positive” terminology introduced below, comes from Byrne and Logue (2008). However, I differ from them in the distinctions I mark with this terminology and in my general understanding of disjunctivism (see notes 7 and 39).

tomato ceases to be red and round. In what follows, I focus mainly on versions of *VVIH* disjunctivism that analyze *R* in terms of state seeing the redness and roundness of something.

There is a second, orthogonal division among versions of disjunctivism that concerns the following question: How can *R* be analyzed in terms of some success property, for instance, seeing the redness and roundness of something, given that we can have *R* even in unsuccessful cases in which we do not have this success property? We may distinguish between two methods for carrying out the analysis in the light of this fact.

According to *negative disjunctivism*, *R* is defined in terms of standing in some *relation* to the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of something, where you can bear the relevant relation to the success property even in unsuccessful cases in which you do not actually possess the success property. Negative disjunctivism comes in epistemic and non-epistemic versions (see figure 10.2 at the end of the present section).

*Epistemic versions* define the relevant relation to the success property in epistemic terms. To illustrate, suppose you have *R* while hallucinating a tomato. You do not then have the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of an object, but you do bear a certain epistemic relation to this property: You cannot know by reflection that you do *not* have it. Of course, in successful cases in which you *do* have this success property, you also cannot know by reflection that you *do not* have it. So, in both successful and unsuccessful cases, you bear this negative epistemic relation to the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of an object. On a very simple form of epistemic negative disjunctivism, having *R just is* bearing this negative epistemic relation to the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of an object. Note that this view identifies *R* with a nondisjunctive property. Nevertheless, as I understand disjunctivism, it still counts as a form of disjunctivism.

By contrast to epistemic versions of negative disjunctivism, *nonepistemic versions* hold that having *R* is a matter of bearing some *nonepistemic* relation to the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of an object. There are different variants of the epistemic version and the non-epistemic version of negative disjunctivism (see figure 10.2), and I turn to these in section 4.

Negative disjunctivism is so named because it says that, when you hallucinate a tomato, there is no more positive characterization of what is happening with you than that you are standing in some relation to the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of something (see Martin 2004; Brewer 2008: 15).

This is in contrast to *positive disjunctivism*, which proposes a quite different method for handling the unsuccessful cases. This view holds that *R* is a disjunctive property of *either* having the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of something *or* having some “quite different” property *U*, which, contrary to negative disjunctivism, is not simply a

matter of bearing some relation to the success property. The idea is that *U* may be given a more positive characterization that is not parasitic on the success property.<sup>5</sup>

To explain *U*, the positive disjunctivist might appeal to any one of the views listed under common factor views in figure 10.1. But, whereas the common factor theorist applies one of these views across the board, the positive disjunctivist would apply it to the unsuccessful cases only. A version that will loom large in section 6 is *disjunctive intentionalism*. On this view, *R* is identical with the disjunctive property of *either* actually seeing the worldly instantiation of redness and roundness by a mind-independent object (the perfectly veridical case) *or* sensorily entertaining an intentional content involving redness and roundness (illusory and hallucinatory cases). As I discuss in section 6, this view differs profoundly from common factor intentionalism (see section 2), which explains visual phenomenology in terms of sensorily entertaining contents across the board.<sup>6</sup>

Now I am in a position to say what disjunctive views have in common. At the start of this section I offered a first-pass formulation of disjunctive views as views that analyze visual experience properties such as *R* in terms of success properties. There is a counterexample to this formulation. On the version of the multiple relation view discussed in section 1, *R* is analyzed in terms of the success property of being such that there is an object presenting one with the property of being red and round. Nevertheless, it counts as a common factor view, since it maintains that hallucination has the same basic structure, with a nonstandard object presenting the relevant properties. Therefore, a better formulation is this: *Disjunctive views analyze visual experience properties in terms of success properties, and they deny that we have the relevant success properties in the bad cases, so they must invoke the negative or positive method for analyzing visual experience properties in terms of success properties.* I can now provide a

5. It might be wondered whether *singular intentionalism* counts as a version of positive disjunctivism. This view holds that having *R* is a matter of sensorily entertaining a singular content of the form a *is red and round* (the veridical and illusory cases) or a nonsingular (general or gappy) content involving redness and roundness (the hallucinatory case). For discussion, see Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006); for a defense, see Tye (2007). I do *not* count this as a form of positive disjunctivism but rather as a form of common factor intentionalism, because the properties that are the disjuncts here are not “quite different.” Further, it is simple to formulate the view in a way that reveals that it is a common factor view: Having *R* is a matter of sensorily entertaining some (singular or nonsingular) content involving redness and roundness (see Pautz 2007: 497; Tye 2007: 608). Singular intentionalism should not be confused with what I below call *disjunctive intentionalism*, which holds that having *R* is a matter of either seeing the redness and roundness of something (a completely nonintentional property) or sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness (an intentional property). On disjunctive intentionalism, by contrast to singular intentionalism, the disjuncts of *R* are radically different. Consequently, I do count disjunctive intentionalism as a form of positive disjunctivism. For more on singular intentionalism and how it differs from disjunctive intentionalism, see section 6 and note 35.

6. On one interpretation, John McDowell accepts disjunctive intentionalism (see Hawthorne and Kovakovich 2006: 161), but according to Johnston’s interpretation (2006: 269), McDowell does not. Instead, he accepts the *fact view*, which is just a version of common factor intentionalism. For more on this issue, see Pautz (2008c: n. 14).




Figure 10.2

more exact formulation of common factor views than the one offered in section 1. *Common factor views* may be defined *via negativa* as views that deny that visual experience properties are analyzable in terms of success properties according to the negative method or the positive method.<sup>7</sup>

The versions of disjunctivism are represented in Figure 10.2.

Among disjunctive views, the great divide is between negative and positive disjunctivism. As I describe below, negative disjunctivism, which is probably the more discussed version, faces counterexamples and cannot

7. In my opinion, the formulation of disjunctivism offered in the text is superior to more standard formulations. As Byrne and Logue note (2008: 80), Michael Martin sometimes seems to formulate disjunctivism as a claim about *fundamental kinds* (2006: 354; 2004: 53), although this may not be his official formulation. But I do not understand this notion (Pautz 2007: 528). Following a fairly widespread formulation, Byrne and Logue (2008) themselves identify *disjunctivism* with the view that there is no common “mental state” between successful and unsuccessful cases of perception; they themselves accept the *moderate view* that there are mental commonalities and also mental differences. This formulation makes disjunctivism a verbal issue. Everyone admits that there are commonalities and differences between the cases. How are we to decide whether these count as “mental” or not? And why should we care? There is another problem with both the “fundamental kinds” formulation and the “no common mental state” formulation of the distinction between disjunctive views and common factor views. These views are typically understood to concern the *nature of phenomenology*. (I am excluding what Byrne and Logue [2008] call *epistemological disjunctivism*.) But, on these formulations, they are not views about phenomenology at all. Therefore, these formulations strike me as too weak. For instance, a common factor theorist could accept the fundamental kinds claim (see section 6; see also Pautz 2007: 528–529). And a disjunctivist could accept that there is a mental state common to successful and unsuccessful cases of perception (see note 39). I hope that my formulation avoids this problem by making the distinction between disjunctive views and common factor views one that concerns the real definition of visual experience properties.

account for the fact that unsuccessful experience might play a positive explanatory role in grounding the capacity for thought involving external properties. This leads me to consider the relatively unexplored category of positive versions of disjunctivism, in particular, disjunctive intentionalism.

### 3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT

Now that I have presented the lay of the land, I may commence the main business of the chapter: arguing for the superiority of the intentional view of visual experience over rival common factor views and disjunctive views. I continue to focus on *R*. Let *H* be the property of having *R* while hallucinating, let *I* be the property of having *R* while undergoing an illusion, and let *V* be the property of having *R* while having a veridical experience. Note that here and throughout, *R*, *H*, *I*, and *V* are *properties* (or types) rather than particular *experience-tokens*. The argument comes in four installments. Following tradition, I begin by defending an exotic account of hallucination and then apply it to the other cases:

1. Against negative disjunctivism and pure qualia views, we have reason to accept a positive, relational view of *H* (section 4).
2. Additional considerations favor an intentional relational view of *H* over nonintentional relational views such as the sense datum view (section 5).
3. At this point, we might accept positive disjunctivism, agreeing that in hallucinatory cases having *R* involves sensorily entertaining a content but providing a naive realist account of nonhallucinatory cases. But this view is unsatisfactory: We should generalize intentionalism across the board (section 6).
4. Additional considerations favor strong intentionalism over qualia-content intentionalism (section 7).

While the argument starts with hallucination, it does not depend on the assumption that the analysis of hallucination is the fundamental problem for a theory of perception. On the contrary, I present the argument in stages for expository purposes. The argument for the intentional view is simply that it provides the overall best account of visual experience. In each stage, I rely on certain *intuitions* about experiences, by which I simply mean claims that we have some pretheoretical reason to accept.

### 4. FIRST STAGE: IN FAVOR OF A POSITIVE RELATIONAL VIEW OF HALLUCINATION

Typically, arguments for a positive relational view of hallucination, as against negative disjunctivism and qualia views, depend on one of the following two intuitions: *Price's intuition* that in all cases of *R*, even *H*,

there is an external item involving redness and roundness of which the subject is aware; or the *transparency intuition* that in all cases of *R*, even *H*, the subject knows what his experience is like by focusing on an external item, for instance, a tomato or the property of being red and round.<sup>8</sup>

I reject these arguments. The intuitions are compelling, but there are also good reasons to doubt them. What is the relevant external item of which one is aware in the case of *H*? One option is a strange particular: a sense datum, a visual field region, a region of physical space, or a Meinongian object. But, as I will show in section 5, this option is implausible. Another option is the uninstantiated property of being red and round. But it is strange to say that uninstantiated universals might be objects of awareness (see Pautz 2007).

In what follows, I develop three alternative arguments. The intuitions they depend on require that *H* is in some sense essentially *externally-directed*, without presupposing the doubtful claim that in having *H* there actually is an external item of which one is *aware*. First I wield these three arguments against qualia views. Afterward, I argue that the first argument also tells against negative disjunctivism.

In arguing against qualia views I focus on the type–type identity theory. This view holds that *R* (a property or type) is necessarily identical with some nonrelational neural property *N* and that *H* is necessarily identical with having *N* as the result of some aberration, or *N&A* for short. Like early arguments against the identity theory, all three of my arguments are applications of Leibniz's law. But, unlike early Leibniz law arguments, they depend on the modal properties of visual experience properties.

The first argument depends on the *grounding intuition* about *H*. Intuitively, having *H* endows certain individuals with the capacity to have certain kinds of color and shape beliefs. Maybe a dog lacking the capacity for conceptual thought altogether might have *H* and yet lack the capacity to have such beliefs. And maybe having *H* does not endow individuals with the capacity to have singular beliefs about particular objects. But, intuitively, it is necessary that, *if* an individual who has the capacity to have belief at all has *H* (for a sufficient period of time), then he will thereby have the additional capacity to have a general belief that is true only if something or other is present that is red and a general belief that is true only if something or other is present that is round. He himself might express these beliefs by saying 'something is that way' and 'something is this way.' For these beliefs to be true, it is not enough that the individual's experiences be a certain way: Items other than his experience must be a certain way.<sup>9</sup>

8. For Price's intuition, see Price (1932), Smith (2002: 224–225), and Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006: 178). For transparency, see Tye (2000). Martin (2006) argues that the kind Pricean intuition discussed by Smith and Hawthorne and Kovakovich does not provide a good argument against negative disjunctivism.

9. The grounding intuition is similar to intuitions expressed by Heck (2000: n. 15), Horgan, Tienson, and Graham (2004), and Johnston (2004). But there are also important differences, and I do not think that the intuitions these philosophers discuss could be used to provide a good argument against the qualia view. For more on the differences, see Pautz (2008c: n. 23).

Given the existence of properties, the grounding intuition entails that *H* necessarily endows believers with the capacity to have a belief that is true just in case something has the property of being red and a belief that is true just in case something has the property of being round. Let us say that a belief *involves* a property *P* iff it is true just in case something has *P*. Then the grounding intuition entails that *H* necessarily endows believers with the capacity to have beliefs *involving* external properties. It may seem that this presupposes a Russellian view according to which the contents of beliefs have properties as constituents, as opposed to a Fregean view according to which they have concepts of properties as constituents. But this is not so, for the Fregean no less than the Russellian holds that the truth-conditions of the relevant beliefs are specified by mentioning external properties. For instance, an individual might have a belief that is true only if something has the property of being round. So, in my sense, the Fregean can allow that some beliefs and their contents “involve” the property of being round. The Fregean will just provide a different analysis of this than the Russellian: for him it means that the contents of the beliefs have as a constituent a concept that *determines* the property of being round. In this chapter, I remain neutral between Russellian and Fregean views.

The grounding intuition differs from the *justification intuition*: the intuition that having *H* necessarily provides individuals with a *justification* for believing that something red and round is present. I think that the justification intuition as well as the grounding intuition could support an argument against a qualia view of *H* and for a relational view. But the grounding intuition is more fundamental. How does having *H* endow individuals with the capacity to have such beliefs at all, whether justified or not?

The qualia theorist might reject the grounding intuition about *H*. Instead, he might offer a surrogate: Necessarily, if a believer with the capacity for introspection has *H*, then he will merely have the capacity to have beliefs about the qualia of his own experiences, where these might in turn be identified with neural properties. This seems wrong. Since his experiences do have those qualia, such beliefs would be true. But, intuitively, whoever has *H* would thereby immediately have the capacity to have some *false* beliefs about the world, describable in terms of expressions like “red” and “round.”

Now some relationalists say that *H* is necessarily identical, not with a relation to the color “red” as I maintain, but with a relation to a colorlike property not named in public language. We might call it *phenomenal red*. This is not a quale possessed by the experience but an external property: a primed property of the visual field, an appearance property of external objects, the property of having some property that plays the red-role, or an uninstantiated perfect color.<sup>10</sup> Such philosophers would agree with the

10. For primed properties of the visual field, see Peacocke (2008). For appearance properties, see Shoemaker (1994). For the property of having some property that plays the red-role, see Chalmers (2004). For uninstantiated perfect colors, see Chalmers (2006).

grounding intuition in spirit but not in letter. They would reformulate the grounding intuition in terms of *phenomenal red*. Although I formulate the grounding intuition and the other intuitions introduced below in terms of the public term “red,” the argument to be given is neutral on this issue.

The grounding intuition entails that *H* necessarily possesses the following second-order *grounding property*: being a property that is such that, if a believer has it, then he thereby has the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness. The argument against the identity theory is now this:

1. *H* has the grounding property necessarily.
2. *N&A* does not have the grounding property necessarily.
3. Therefore, *H* is not identical with *N&A*.

The case for premise 2 is based on a thought experiment. Suppose we discover an alien creature, Slug. Slug has no visual system, but he has a taste system and an auditory system. Further, Slug has the general capacity to have beliefs, for instance, beliefs about tastes and sounds. In fact, he is very intelligent. Neuroscientists give Slug whatever neural assemblies are involved in having human neural property *N* and artificially make them fire in such a way that Slug himself has *N&A*. If the identity theorist says that *N* is a global nonrelational neural property, then the neuroscientist gives him this global neural property. Now, in humans, *N* is apt to be caused by a red and round object and is apt to cause behavior appropriate to such an object. In other words, *N* realizes a certain long-arm dispositional, functional property. But, we may suppose, this is not so in Slug. In fact, when Slug has *N*, he bears no interesting physical or functional relations to redness and roundness of the kind that could ground the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness. This is possible because *N* is a nonrelational property that is wholly distinct from any relational property with redness and roundness as *relata*. Since (irrelevant counterexamples aside) distinct properties are modally separable, Slug might have *N* but lack any such relational property. Finally, we add a totality clause to the effect that there are no relevant additional, nonphysical facts of the case. If the capacity to have beliefs involving properties is grounded in primitive intentional relations to those properties, then Slug also does not bear such relations to redness and roundness.

Here now is how this case provides an argument for premise 2. If Slug has the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness, then there must be something about him that could plausibly make this the case. But there is nothing that could make this the case. By stipulation, he bears no interesting physical or primitive relations to these properties. Therefore, Slug has the general capacity for belief, and he has *N&A*, but *N&A* does not give him the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness. So, unlike *H*, *N&A* does not have the grounding property necessarily. Hence, *H* is not identical with *N&A*.

My second argument against nonrelational, qualia views of  $H$  depends on what I call the *matching intuition*. If one has a hallucination of a square, and there happens to be a square present, then one's experience *matches the world*, even though it is hallucinatory. We have no expression in English for this notion. Nevertheless, we have pretheoretical grip on it. This is shown by the fact that, given some examples, we quickly catch on. Of course, there may be some vagueness in the notion. But this does not mean that there are no truths about what must be the case in order for an experience to match the world. One such truth is the matching intuition about  $H$ : Necessarily, if one has  $H$ , then one is in a state that matches the world only if a red and round object is present.

Some may think that the matching intuition presupposes the intentional view that  $H$  is a relation to a content involving redness and roundness, that experiences, like beliefs, have a "mind-to-world direction of fit" or "purport to represent the world," and that experiences are the sort of things that can be in error. This is not so. The matching intuition presupposes none of these things.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, the matching intuition is consistent with all relational views and all disjunctive views. Matching need not be explained in terms of truth of content. For instance, a sense datum theorist could say that, when we say that an experience matches the world only if an  $F$  is present, what we are implicitly picking up on is that it consists in the presentation of an  $F$  sense datum. And the negative disjunctivist might say that, when we say that an experience matches the world only if an  $F$  is present, what we are implicitly picking up on is that in

11. The notion of matching the world is the same as notion of accuracy<sub>c</sub> (accuracy as introduced by example) introduced in Pautz (2008b). There I explain that the claim that experiences can be accurate in the sense I have in mind does not presuppose that experiences have a mind-to-world direction of fit (a claim that is evidently false if to say that a state has such a direction of fit is to say that it is normatively responsive to the acquisition of evidence). Nor does it presuppose that experiences, like beliefs and unlike hopes, are "committal" or "purport to tell us what the world is like." Here I differ from Siegel (chapter 12, this volume). For Siegel, the issue of whether experiences are accurate or inaccurate and have contents turns on the issue of whether these slogans are correct, so that experiences are more like beliefs than hopes. The reason I work with a notion of accuracy that does not presuppose the correctness of these slogans is that I am not entirely sure how to understand them. Evidently, they should not be taken literally, since only agents literally commit or purport to tell things. And, since they are supposed to be controversial, I assume that they should not be taken to mean merely that experiences compel belief. Therefore, the claim that experiences are accurate, or match the world, with respect to various situations, in the sense I have in mind, is extremely thin. In an analogous sense, a reflection of a scene in a puddle of water can be said to be accurate with respect to the scene. Now, it might be said that, once we grant that experiences are accurate under certain conditions, it immediately follows that they have contents, so the aim of this chapter has been accomplished. This is not so. Granted, it does follow that experiences have contents in some weak sense (*viz.*, in the sense given by what in Pautz [2008b] I call the *accuracy conception* of content). In this sense, sense datum theorists and disjunctivists can agree that experiences have contents. In an analogous sense, a reflection of a scene in a puddle of water can be said to "have" various propositional contents. But this does not mean that the aim of this chapter has been established, for the aim of this chapter is not to argue that experiences have contents in this extremely weak sense—a claim that I think can be established quite easily. Rather, my aim is to argue for the stronger claim that experiences are *identical with* relations to contents.

having the experience the subject bears some (epistemic or nonepistemic) relation to actually seeing the *F*-ness of something. What the matching intuition is not consistent with are qualia views such as the identity theory. The argument parallels the previous one:

1. *H* has the matching property necessarily.
2. *N&A* does not have the matching property necessarily.
3. Therefore, *H* is not identical with *N&A*.

The case for statement 2 is again based on Slug. If Slug is in a state that matches the world only if a red and round object is present, then there must be something about him that makes this the case. But, when he has *N&A*, he does not bear any relations to redness and roundness that could make this the case. So Slug has *N&A*, but he is not in a state that matches the world only if a red and round object is present. So, unlike *H*, *N&A* does not have the matching property necessarily. Hence, *H* is not *N&A*.

My third argument is founded on the *characterization intuition*: Necessarily, if someone has *H*, it is correct to characterize her as having a hallucination of a red and round object. In other words, *H* has the following *characterization property* necessarily: If someone has it, then 'has a hallucination of a red and round object,' as we use this predicate, applies to her. This goes beyond the often-made point that we use the same words to describe visual experience properties that we use to describe external objects. The point is that visual experience properties are essentially thus describable. This is not something that is true of mere neural properties, which refutes the identity theory:

1. *H* has the characterization property necessarily.
2. *N&A* does not have the characterization property necessarily.
3. Therefore, *H* is not identical with *N&A*.

Again, the case for premise 2 depends on Slug. He has *N&A*, but there is nothing that could make it the case that 'has a hallucination of a red and round object' as we use it applies to him. For instance, you might think that satisfying this predicate depends on being in a state which, among one's kind, is caused by a red and round object under normal conditions. But Slug is not in any such state.<sup>12</sup>

Although I have focused on the identity theory, the arguments generalize to dualist qualia views holding that *R* is necessarily identical with a

12. I have justified the second premise of each of my three arguments by appealing to the case of Slug in which *N* plays no interesting functional role. But the second premise of each argument could also be justified by considering cases in which *N* plays a radically different functional role than it does in actual humans. Imagine, for instance, a case in which it is caused by green and square objects and causes behavior appropriate to such objects. In that case, it is implausible that *N* has the same externally-directed properties that it has in actual humans. For instance, it is implausible that it matches the world only if a red and round object is present. What could make this the case? Therefore, whereas *H* necessarily matches the world only if a red and round object is present, this is only a contingent feature of *N&A*. Hence, *H* cannot be identical with *N&A*.

primitive nonrelational property  $P$  and  $H$  is necessarily identical with  $P\&A$ . As we saw, intuitively,  $H$  necessarily possesses the following three *externally-directed properties*: the grounding property, the matching property, and the characterization property. Not so  $P\&A$ . To see this, consider a case in which Slug has  $P\&A$  but bears no interesting physical or primitive relations to redness and roundness.

These, then, are the three arguments. They differ from the standard arguments against the identity theory. They obviously differ from the argument from multiple realizability. Although it may be less obvious, they also differ from another functionalist argument against the identity theory. Suppose that the identity theory is true, so that  $R$  is necessarily identical with  $N$ . Then, since an individual like Slug has  $N$ , he must also have visual experience property  $R$ . But an individual like Slug lacks the *R-functional properties*: the functional properties that typically accompany  $R$ , such as being in a state that is caused by red and round objects and that causes behavior appropriate to red and round objects. And, according to the argument, we have the *functionalist intuition* that having  $R$  requires having the *R-functional properties*, so an individual like Slug cannot have  $R$ , contrary to the identity theory.<sup>13</sup> My arguments nowhere invoke the functionalist intuition. Indeed, my arguments are consistent with the *falsity* of this intuition. Granted, by my arguments, Slug, *as originally described*, cannot have  $R$ , since I argued that having  $R$  requires being in a state with certain externally directed properties, and I stipulated that Slug does not bear any physical or primitive relations to redness and roundness of the kind that might ground his being in such a state. But my arguments are consistent with the supposition that that  $R$  should be possessed by an individual who is *like* Slug in failing to possess the *R-functional properties*. For instance, maybe  $R$  is identical with standing in a *primitive* intentional relation to a content involving redness and roundness. Further, maybe there are no functionalist constraints on bearing this primitive relation to such a content. Then an individual like Slug might have  $R$  by bearing this primitive relation to such a content, even though he fails to possess the *R-functional properties*. In that case, the functionalist intuition is false. But the intuitions on which my arguments rely are still true, for even in such a case, the state of bearing the relevant primitive relation to a content involving redness and roundness (and hence  $R$ ) might possess the grounding property, the matching property, and the characterization property.

Note that the modal formulation of the three arguments is crucial. Qualia views are consistent with  $H$ 's *contingent* possession of the externally-directed properties. For instance, it is perfectly consistent with the identity theory that in the actual world a bit of mental paint such as  $N$  realizes the representation of a red and round object because in the actual

13. For this argument against the identity theory, which is just the reverse of the argument from multiple realizability, see Jackson (1993).

world it is normally caused by a red and round object. If that is so, then in the actual world *N* brings with it the capacity to have certain beliefs as well as the other externally-directed properties. But, as I have discussed above, qualia views are inconsistent with the intuition that *H necessarily* brings with it the relevant externally-directed properties, for this is something no mere neural property such as *N* could do.

The matching argument and the characterization argument are analogous to arguments one might give against an identity theory of belief properties. Consider the property *B*: the property of believing that a red and round object is present. One bizarre view is that *B* is necessarily identical with a certain neural property *N*. The view I have in mind is not that *B* is a long-arm functional property that is *realized by N*; rather, the view is that *B* is *necessarily identical with N* itself. No one would accept this view. For one thing, *B* has a certain truth-theoretic property necessarily, somewhat as *H* has a certain matching property necessarily. For another, *B* has a certain characterization property necessarily. Like *H*, *B* is necessarily describable in terms of the same expressions that we use to characterize external objects, such as *red* and *round*. But, evidently, no mere nonrelational neural property like *N* has these properties necessarily. Therefore, *B* is not identical with a mere neural property. Contrary to the identity theory, *B* must be a relation to an item involving redness and roundness, such as a proposition. Perhaps belief properties are *realized by* neural properties, but since belief properties have certain properties necessarily that neural properties do not have necessarily, it cannot be said that belief properties are necessarily *identical with* neural properties. What identity theorists fail to appreciate is that exactly parallel considerations apply to visual experience properties such as *H*. Such properties might be realized by neural properties but cannot be strictly identical with neural properties. Phenomenology, like belief, isn't in the head.<sup>14</sup>

By contrast to the qualia view, the intentional view is consistent with the fact that *H* has certain externally-directed properties necessarily. On the intentional view, *H* is necessarily identical with sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness. The intentionalist will say that this intentional property already incorporates the links to redness and roundness required to have beliefs involving them. And he will say that sensorily entertaining a content matches the world just in case the content is true. Finally, he will say that 'has a hallucination of a red and round object' simply picks out the relevant intentional property and that here "red" and "round" have their usual meanings and are characterizing the properties that enter into the intentional content. Therefore, the relevant intentional property, like *H*, has all three externally-directed properties *necessarily*.

14. To say that visual phenomenology isn't in the head, in the sense of being relational, is not to deny that what goes on in the head has a significant role in configuring visual phenomenology. See Pautz (2010).

But we cannot yet conclude that the intentional view of *H* is correct. Nonintentional relational views are also consistent with the intuition that *H* has the three externally-directed properties necessarily. Defenders of nonintentional relational views will simply provide different accounts of how experience grounds general belief, of matching, and of predicates such as ‘has a hallucination of a red and round object.’ For instance, on the sense datum view, *H* is necessarily identical with a relation to the redness and roundness of a sense datum. The sense datum theorist might say that whoever has the general capacity for belief also has the capacity for abstraction. So he might say that, necessarily, if a believer is aware of the redness and roundness of a sense datum, then he will have the capacity to abstract out the redness and roundness, and so he will have the capacity to have general beliefs involving redness and roundness. The sense datum theorist might also say that being aware of the *F*-ness of a sense datum matches the world just in case an *F* object is present. Finally, he will say that ‘has a hallucination of a red and round object’ simply picks out the relevant sense datum property; and that here “red” and “round” have their usual meanings and are characterizing the properties of a sense datum. In short, the property of being aware of the redness and roundness of a sense datum, like *H*, might have the three externally directed properties necessarily. Therefore, additional considerations are needed to support the acceptance of the intentional view of *H* over nonintentional relational views. I provide such additional considerations in section 5.

I said that the aim of the first stage of the argument is to argue against negative disjunctivism as well as qualia views concerning *H*. I now turn to negative disjunctivism. This view is invulnerable to the matching argument and the characterization argument. On this view, *H* is necessarily identical with standing in some relation to the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of something. A proponent of this view might say that having this relational property is just what it is to have an experience that “matches the world” only if a red and round object is present. And he might say that this state is essentially describable in terms of “red” and “round”, because it is defined in terms of a relation to seeing the redness and roundness of an object.

Nevertheless, we should reject negative disjunctivism. As I will discuss in section 6, there is no strong argument for this view, since there is no strong argument for any form of disjunctivism. There are, on the other hand, persuasive arguments against it. First, it is open to counterexamples. Second, while it is invulnerable to the matching argument and the characterization argument, it is vulnerable to the grounding argument. I elaborate these points in turn.

It is helpful to begin by raising counterexamples to the simplest version of epistemic negative disjunctivism (section 2), even though no one has ever actually defended it. Recall that on this version having *R* is just a matter of not being able to know by reflection that one is not seeing the redness and roundness of something. Similarly for *H*. Against this, a rock

cannot know by reflection that it is not seeing the redness and roundness of something. But it does not have *R*. A blind dog incapable of reflection likewise cannot know this by reflection. But it does not have *R*.<sup>15</sup> Again, it is well known that if one looks at a waterfall for an extended period of time, and then looks at a stationary object, then the stationary object will appear to move and stand still. This is called the *waterfall illusion*, even though it is not an experience of a waterfall but an aftereffect produced after seeing a waterfall. Now suppose that for some reason Charlie often has hallucinatory experiences that are exactly like the waterfall illusion. In each case, he has a certain visual experience property, *W*. This raises a challenge for the epistemic negative disjunctivist. Any adequate theory of experience must provide some account of this property. But what account might the epistemic negative disjunctivist provide? He cannot say that *W* is the property of not being able to know by reflection that one is not veridically seeing something moving and standing still. Since it is possible to know by reflection that nothing can move and stand still, it will always be possible to know by reflection that one is not veridically seeing something moving and standing still. Nor can I see what other account the epistemic negative disjunctivist might provide, since it is possible to know by reflection that Charlie is not seeing *any* actual state of the world.<sup>16</sup>

15. Counterexamples involving cognitively unsophisticated individuals to epistemic analyses of mental states originate with Timothy Williamson (1995: 562). Williamson considers an epistemic analysis of believing, and he rejects it as hopeless owing to such counterexamples. In the case of the epistemic analysis of experience, such counterexamples are discussed by Martin (2004: 76), Siegel (2004), and Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006). It might be thought that the rock counterexample is avoided by the following version of the epistemic analysis: *x* has *R* iff *x* undergoes an experience such that *x* cannot know by reflection that the experience is not a veridical experience of the redness and roundness of something. For since a rock undergoes no experiences, in the case of a rock the right side as well as the left side of this biconditional is false. But, even if this helps with the rock, it would not help with the dog, since we may suppose that the dog has, for example, taste experiences. In fact, it does not even help with the rock, for *x* has an experience iff *x* has an experience property, and on the epistemic analysis, having an experience property is presumably analyzed in terms of satisfying a negative epistemic condition. Such a negative epistemic condition will trivially be satisfied in the case of the rock.

16. For reasons that I explain elsewhere (Pautz 2008c: n. 27), the waterfall illusion is more troublesome for epistemic negative disjunctivism than are other cases of impossible experiences discussed in the literature (e.g., the cases discussed by Siegel [2004] involving color irrealism and the Escher staircase). It should be mentioned that the negative disjunctivist might identify *W* with the property of being such that it is impossible to know by reflection that one is not having a *possibly illusory* experience in which something *appears* to be moving and standing still. This revised analysis handles the case of Charlie, who has *W* while undergoing a hallucination. For while it is possible to know by reflection that he is not having a *veridical* experience of something moving and standing still, it is *not* possible to know by reflection that he is not having a *possibly illusory* experience in which some actual thing appears to move and still. This would be a version of *VVIH* disjunctivism (see section 2). But this analysis would still face problems about rocks and dogs. And it is not the analysis that Martin (2006: 360–362) defends. He explains having an experience in terms of not being able to know by reflection that one is not having a certain *veridical* experience of an *actual scene*. In other words, he adopts a *VVIH* version of disjunctivism, with illusory and hallucinatory experience being explained in terms of indiscriminability from veridical experience (see Hawthorne and Kovakovich 2006: 161–163; Byrne and Logue 2008: 61). Since Brewer (2008: 173) cites Martin, presumably he accepts the same veridicality-based epistemic analysis. As we have seen, such a veridicality-based analysis inevitably founders on the waterfall illusion.

It may be thought that the counterexamples are avoided by an *idealized version* of epistemic negative disjunctivism. On one variety, having a certain visual experience property *P* is a matter of being such that, if one *were* capable of reflection, then one could not know by reflection that one is not seeing a certain state of the world. But this is unpromising for several reasons. For instance, it is unclear that a rock or a dog *could* be capable of reflection. Further, it does not help with Charlie. While Charlie has *W*, he is capable of reflection, yet he *can* know by reflection that he is not seeing any actual state of the world. On another variety of idealized epistemic disjunctivism, *x* has a certain visual experience property *P* just in case *x* is such that it is impossible that someone *y* in the same experiential situation as *x* could know by reflection that *y* is not seeing a certain state of the world. Evidently, this is circular or leads to an infinite regress, since it appeals to the notion of an experiential situation, which itself must be analyzed in epistemic terms. Further, it again does not help with Charlie. Anyone in the same experiential situation as Charlie could know by reflection that he is not seeing any actual state of the world.<sup>17</sup>

Another response to the counterexamples would be to reject epistemic negative disjunctivism and retreat to nonepistemic negative disjunctivism (see section 2). We can imagine different versions of this view. On the *functionalist version*, having an experience as of an *F* is a matter of standing in a *functionally-defined relation* to the success property of seeing the *F*-ness of something. The idea is that one bears the relevant relation to the success property of seeing the *F*-ness of something, and hence has an experience as of an *F*, iff one is in a state that *under optimal conditions* would be caused by the *F*-ness of something in the manner required for seeing the *F*-ness of something. This version avoids the counterexamples about the rock and the dog because neither the rock nor the dog is in a state that under optimal conditions would realize seeing the redness and roundness of an object. But I do not see how it helps with Charlie. And, while the difference between disjunctivism and intentionalism is thought to be profound, this functionalist version of negative disjunctivism is hardly different from versions of intentionalism that explain content in terms of causal-covariation under optimal conditions (see Tye 2000).

Another version of nonepistemic negative disjunctivism, the *primitivist version*, postulates a completely primitive, nonepistemic, nonphysical relation *P* and identifies having *R* with bearing *P* to the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of something. In my view, disjunctivists who answer counterexamples by appealing to “impersonal unknowability”

17. Although he ultimately rejects epistemic negative disjunctivism, Sturgeon (2006: 195–197) argues that counterexamples concerning rocks and dogs and the like can be avoided by appealing to a certain type of idealization. But elsewhere (Pautz 2008c: n. 28) I argue that the analysis he suggests faces the same problems I raise in the text.

are primitivist disjunctivists in disguise.<sup>18</sup> The primitivist version avoids the counterexamples about the rock and the dog, provided that neither the rock nor the dog bears the postulated primitive relation *P* to the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of something. And it avoids the problem about Charlie, provided that Charlie bears *P* to the success property *seeing something moving and standing still*, even though it is knowable by reflection that this success property is *necessarily uninstantiated*. (As I discuss in section 5, intentionalism provides a similar account of impossible experiences in terms of bearing the relation of sensorily entertaining to a content that is *necessarily false*.) So, the primitivist version of negative disjunctivism avoids the counterexamples.

What then is my argument against primitivist negative disjunctivism? Many would object to its primitive ontology. But I cannot endorse this objection, since, for reasons that I will not explain here, I myself accept a nonreductive, primitivist version of intentionalism, according to which *R*

18. For impersonal unknowability, see Martin (2006). In his comments on an earlier version of this chapter, Bill Brewer also appealed to impersonal unknowability to handle counterexamples to epistemic negative disjunctivism about hallucination. The disjunctivist who appeals to impersonal knowability says that *x* has visual experience property *E* iff *x* stands in the following relation to some success property *y*: It is impersonally unknowable of *x* and *y* that *x* does not have success property *y*. Further, he says that there is no interesting analysis of this relation—it is some primitive relation. In particular, he insists that to say that something is impersonally unknowable is *not* to say that someone could not know it under certain circumstances (Martin 2006: n. 44). This analysis avoids counterexamples about rocks and blind dogs, provided it is “impersonally knowable” that they do not see any worldly states, even though neither they nor anyone else could know this. But I do not see how it helps with Charlie, for it is “impersonally knowable” by reflection that he is not seeing something moving and standing still. And it is unclear what ‘it is impersonally unknowable of *x* and *y* that *x* does not have success property *y*’ means. After all, this predicate contains technical jargon (‘impersonally unknowable’) that is not part of ordinary language. This technical jargon must somehow be explained before we can understand the view. One response is that impersonal unknowability can be explained *by example*. For instance, it might be said that when a mathematician says that a mathematical proposition *p* is unknowable, he has the alleged impersonal sense of unknowability in mind (example due to Bill Brewer). Against this, I would have thought that when a mathematician says that it is unknowable that *p*, he means what the rest of us mean: It is not possible that someone or other should know it, even under idealized circumstances. Another response is that ‘it is impersonally unknowable of *x* and *y* that *x* does not have success property *y*’ can be understood as a theoretical predicate and its meaning can be given *by description* in accordance with the Ramsey-Lewis method for defining theoretical terms: It expresses the supposed primitive relation *P* such that having an experience property *E* consists in bearing *P* to some success property. As far as I can see, this is the only explanation that makes impersonal disjunctivism comprehensible. Evidently, according to this interpretation, impersonal disjunctivism is just primitivist disjunctivism. Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006: 166–167) also favor this interpretation of Martin’s impersonal disjunctivism, but I differ from them on two points. First, they still count the view as a version of *epistemic* disjunctivism. By contrast, I count it as a form of *nonepistemic* disjunctivism in disguise. A relation is an epistemic relation only if it can be explained in epistemic terms. Granted, impersonal disjunctivists refer to the relevant relation using *epistemic language*. But I think that this is misleading, for they deny that the relevant relation can be explained in epistemic terms or indeed in any more basic terms at all: They hold that the relevant relation is wholly primitive. In what sense, then, are they advocating an *epistemic* analysis? Second, Hawthorne and Kovakovich object to primitivist disjunctivism on the grounds that it is *ad hoc* (2006: 167). In my view, this objection is not sufficiently strong. I develop a quite different objection based on the potential explanatory role of hallucination in grounding the capacity for belief.

is identical with standing in a *primitive* intentional relation to a content involving redness and roundness. In my view, the real argument against primitivist negative disjunctivism is simply that there is no reason to accept it as well as reason to reject it.

There is no reason to accept primitivist negative disjunctivism, because the only potential argument for accepting disjunctivism of any kind is that it honors the naive intuition that in a veridical case one has *R* by virtue of having the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of something (see section 6), but primitivist negative disjunctivism fails to honor this intuition. This may be seen by contrasting it with epistemic negative disjunctivism, which does honor the intuition. On epistemic negative disjunctivism, in the veridical case, one actually sees the redness and roundness of something. By virtue of actually having this success property, one has the negative epistemic property of not being able to know by reflection that one does *not* have it. So, in the veridical case, the negative epistemic property does not “screen off” the success property from playing a role in determining that one has *R*; on the contrary, one has the negative epistemic property, and hence *R*, by virtue of having the success property. In this way, epistemic negative disjunctivism honors the naive intuition. By contrast, on primitivist negative disjunctivism, it is presumably not the case that, in the veridical case, one bears the relation *P* to the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of something, and thereby has *R*, *by virtue of* actually having that success property. For, on his view, since *P* is a primitive relation, it is presumably not instantiated by virtue of anything more basic. Therefore, on primitivist negative disjunctivism, in the veridical case, the property of bearing *P* to a success property *does* “screen off” the success property itself from determining that one has *R*. Indeed, primitivist negative disjunctivism is even more contrary to the naive view of perception than are common factor views. For, on primitivist negative disjunctivism, in all cases, having *R* consists in standing in a certain relation (*viz.*, *P*) to a *mental state* (*viz.*, seeing the redness and roundness of something), rather than standing in a relation to an *actual or apparent state of the world*.

That is why there is no reason to accept primitivist negative disjunctivism. There is reason to reject it because, while it avoids counterexamples, it is vulnerable to the second problem I advertised for negative disjunctivism. In particular, like all versions of negative disjunctivism, it is vulnerable to the grounding argument.

It is best to begin by stating the problem as it arises for epistemic negative disjunctivism. Suppose that John previously lacked the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness but now has *H* and thereby acquires this capacity. This case affords a simple argument against epistemic negative disjunctivism. The *first premise* is that *H* is such that John’s having it *explains* his new capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness. The *second premise* is that this could not be true of the mere property of failing to satisfy a certain epistemic condition. The conclusion

is that, contrary to epistemic negative disjunctivism,  $H$  cannot be identical with the property of failing to satisfy a certain epistemic condition. Note that the first premise is actually modally weaker than the grounding intuition, since it merely asserts that *in John's case*  $H$  explains the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness. This is all the argument requires. The argument for the first premise is simply that it is very intuitive. Everyone agrees that  $V$  might explain the new capacity to have general beliefs involving redness and roundness. Intuitively,  $H$  has exactly the same explanatory potential.<sup>19</sup> It is difficult to see how one could justify accepting the intuition in the case of  $V$  while rejecting it in the case of  $H$ . As for the second premise, there are a few potential arguments in its favor. First, John's failing to satisfy a certain epistemic condition explains his new capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness only if there exists some explanation going from his failing to satisfy the relevant epistemic condition to his having the capacity to have such beliefs. But I cannot see what that explanation might be. A second argument for the second premise (suggested to me by David Chalmers) is that, irrelevant counterexamples aside, if  $a$ 's possessing  $F$  explains  $a$ 's possessing  $G$ , then if  $a$  had not possessed  $F$ ,  $a$  would not have possessed  $G$ . But it is not intuitively true that, if John *had* satisfied the relevant epistemic condition (*viz.*, being such that it is knowable by reflection that he does not see the redness and roundness of something), then he would have lacked the new capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness. Therefore, by contrast to John's having  $H$ , his failing to satisfy this epistemic condition cannot be said to explain his new capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness, in agreement with the second premise. A third potential argument for the second premise is that, on some views, having a belief involving redness and roundness consists in standing in some physical relation (e.g., causal-covariation under optimal conditions) to redness and roundness. But John's merely failing to satisfy a certain epistemic condition could not explain his standing in such a relation to redness and roundness and hence could not explain his new capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness. By contrast, if, as on some versions of intentionalism, John's having  $H$  itself consists in standing in the same kind of physical relation to redness and roundness, then it might explain his new capacity to have such beliefs (see note 22).

19. It may be objected that it is question-begging to use the first premise in an argument against epistemic negative disjunctivism, because the epistemic negative disjunctivist will deny this premise, as he identifies  $H$  with the property of failing to satisfy a certain epistemic condition, and this property cannot explain John's new capacity to have beliefs. (An objection along these lines was put to me by Michael Martin.) But the argument is not question-begging. If it were, then it would always be question-begging to use intuitions against a theory when the theory is incompatible with those intuitions. And this is not the case. Of course, the epistemic negative disjunctivist could just deny the intuition, but this would be a serious cost. Another objection to the first premise (put to me by Bill Brewer) is that, since having a belief involving redness and roundness requires possessing mind-independent concepts and tracking existing red and round objects, a mere hallucination cannot provide the capacity to have such a belief. I address this objection elsewhere (Pautz 2008c: §5).

The same argument applies against the primitivist version of non-epistemic negative disjunctivism. How could bearing some primitive relation to seeing the redness and roundness of something explain the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness?

Disjunctivists often stress that nonhallucinatory experience explains the capacity to have beliefs involving particular objects (Campbell 2002: 122). (Although, as I describe in section 6, this is in fact quite compatible with a common factor view and consequently offers no support for a disjunctive view.) But we must also account for the potential thought-grounding role of hallucinatory experience. There do not merely exist particular objects; there also exist such things as general properties. (Try analyzing 'reds resemble oranges more than greens' without properties.) And hallucinatory experience, while it might not ground the capacity to have singular beliefs involving particular objects, does ground the capacity to have general beliefs involving certain properties. To suppose that we must explain the fact that nonhallucinatory experience grounds the capacity to have beliefs involving particular objects but may ignore the fact that hallucinatory experience grounds the capacity to have beliefs involving general properties would be to endorse an unjustified double standard. To account for the explanatory role of hallucinatory experience, we need a *positive, relational* theory of hallucinatory experience, contrary to negative disjunctivism.

I conclude that both the qualia view and negative disjunctivism fail. However, as I have explained, the arguments I have offered so far are quite consistent with nonintentional relational views of *H* such as the sense datum view as well as with the intentional view. So I cannot quite yet conclude that an intentional view of *H* is correct. In the second stage, I draw on additional considerations to argue that the best relational view of *H* is an intentionalist one.<sup>20</sup>

## 5. SECOND STAGE: AN INTENTIONAL VIEW OF HALLUCINATION

In the first stage, I appealed to intuitions about the externally directed properties of *H* to argue that we need a positive, relational view of *H*. However, as I explained, these intuitions are consistent not only with the intentional view of *H* but also with nonintentional relational views of *H*: the sense datum view, the sensationist view, the multiple relation view, and the intentional view. That is because, on all of these views, in having *H*, an individual is necessarily related to redness (or phenomenal redness) and roundness. Such a state might ground the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness; it matches the world only if a red and

20. Elsewhere (Pautz 2008c: §5) I address objections to my arguments against the qualia view concerning brains in vats, inverted spectra, visual agnosia, Sperling-type experiments, rigidification, and magical theories of intentionality.

round object is present, and it is essentially characterizable in terms of the expressions “red” and “round.” Intentional and nonintentional relational views only differ on whether *H* relates an individual to redness and roundness by relating him to a particular existing object that instantiates or presents those properties, with intentional views rejecting this assumption and nonintentional relation views endorsing it

I now argue on the basis of two additional considerations that the intentional relational views are superior to nonintentional ones. First, hallucinations can take place without any suitable *physical particular* before the subject. Call this *particular-independence*. Second, hallucinations can be contradictory and indeterminate. Call this *indeterminacy-impossibility*.

Consider the sense datum view first. Many would rule this view out of court because it is inconsistent with physicalism. But, as I said at the outset, I reject this argument, because physicalism is far too controversial to be the basis of an argument for rejecting the sense datum view in favor of an intentional view. We may, however, appeal to considerations about particular-independence and indeterminacy-impossibility. Since the sense datum view of *H* only appeals to *mental* particulars, it is compatible with particular-independence. But, as is well known, it runs afoul of indeterminacy-impossibility. Suppose that Mabel views a pink object in the periphery of her visual field and has a vague impression of pink. Now suppose that the brain state she then had is somehow produced in the absence of any pink object. Consequently, she has a hallucination *H*<sup>+</sup> in which she has a vague impression of the color pink but fails to experience any specific shade of pink. The sense datum theorist could say (1) that there is some maximally specific shade of pink that the sense datum of which Mabel is aware (determinately) possesses, but Mabel cannot make it out, or (2) that the sense datum is pink but no specific shade of pink. Neither option is plausible. The first option is implausible because, if the sense datum in Mabel’s periphery has some specific color, say, pink<sub>17</sub>, then there must be some neural explanation of why it has this color rather than some other. But there is no such neural explanation. Peripheral vision is subserved by the wavelength-insensitive rods on the retina. So the visual system does not “know” the determinate color of the object. And it is implausible that it arbitrarily produces a pink<sub>17</sub> sense datum but then makes Mabel’s awareness of the sense datum “fuzzy” so that she cannot determine its precise color.<sup>21</sup> The second option is implausible because there intuitively could not be an object that is pink but no specific shade of pink. Now consider as an example of an impossible experience the waterfall aftereffect discussed in section 4. If you look at a waterfall or other moving body for an extended period and then look at a stationary object, then the object will appear to move and stand

21. The speckled hen is the classic illustration of the problem of indeterminacy for the sense datum view. But elsewhere (Pautz 2008c: n. 45) I argue that the sense datum theorist can easily handle the speckled hen.

still at once. Suppose that Charlie has a hallucination  $H^+$  with the same phenomenal character as this illusion. The sense datum theorist might claim (1) that the sense datum of which he is aware has one of these properties (moving or standing still) but not the other or (2) that it has both properties. Again, neither option is plausible. Therefore, against the sense datum view, the best view is that in  $H^+$  and  $H^-$  there is no existing object of which the subject is aware that instantiates the apparent properties. Once we say this, it becomes plausible to say that there is no such object in the case of  $H$ , despite the considerable pull of the intuition that there is such an object.

In the case of the sensationalist view and the multiple relation view, the situation is reversed. These views might accommodate indeterminacy-impossibility. The sensationalist does not say that the regions of physical space constituting the visual field instantiate merely determinable colors or properties such as moving and standing still. And the proponent of the multiple relational view says that a region of space merely *presents* the problematic combinations of properties to the subject, without *instantiating* them. But the sensationalist view and the multiple relation view run afoul of particular-independence.

Consider first the sensationalist view defended by Peacocke, who defines the visual field as the region of curved space that *would* coincide with the surface of, in his words, “a Cyclopean eye with a single extended retina,” if one had such a single eye in the place of one’s two eyes (Peacocke 2008: 12). So he says that an unfortunate subject with no eyes has no visual field. Nevertheless, such a subject might have vivid hallucinations. For such a subject, Peacocke writes, “it is as if there is something [a visual field] parts of which enjoy the relevant sensational properties, . . . even though . . . there is no such thing” (Peacocke 2008: 15). Peacocke, then, appears to provide a straightforward intentionalist account of the phenomenology of such an individual’s experiences: Talk of particulars such as visual field regions and the properties they present takes place entirely within the intensional operator ‘it is for the subject as if [ . . . ],’ which is of the same kind as ‘the subject sensorily entertains [ . . . ].’ So Peacocke is in effect admitting that an intentionalist account is suitable in the case of the eyeless man. Indeed, since the eyeless man could have the whole range of human visual experiences, Peacocke is in effect admitting that all human visual experiences could be explained entirely in terms of intentional content. This admission is problematic for two reasons. First, it robs Peacocke of his motivation for preferring his sensationalist account to a strong intentionalist account in the first place, for his motivation is that there are some human visual experiences that cannot be explained entirely in terms of intentional content. Second, once Peacocke allows that a strong intentionalist account is suitable in the case of the eyeless man, considerations of uniformity suggest applying it to the experiences of normal individuals.

Next consider the multiple relation view, focusing on the common factor version introduced in section 1. (In section 6 I consider the disjunctivist version introduced in section 2.) Recall that this view, like the sensationalist view, holds that in both nonhallucinatory and hallucinatory cases *R* consists in a subject standing in a relation to a region of physical space. But, unlike the sensationalist view, it holds that the relevant region of space is at some distance from the subject, namely, where the property of being red and round is ostensibly presented to him, rather than being immediately before his eyes. And, by contrast to the sensationalist view, the multiple relation view does not define the region in terms of the subject's eyes. Therefore, it is invulnerable to the problem of the eyeless man. Nevertheless, this view has difficulty accommodating particular-independence for other reasons. For instance, a person presumably could have a hallucination of an ostensible object five feet away from him, even though he is at the end of a spatially bounded world, so that there is *no region of space* five feet away from him. This obviously counts against a version of the multiple relation view that appeals to regions of space in hallucinatory cases. We can also have experiences in dreams and imaginings. In response, the proponent of this type of view might say that in these cases it is not a region of space but rather a *mental object*, a *Meinongian object*, or an *abstract object* that presents (without instantiating?) the relevant properties (see, respectively, Alston 1999; Levine 2008; Kripke 1973). But such a view would be ontologically extravagant, so the question arises: Why should we accept such a view over the intentional view, which need not appeal to any such object? In response, it might be said that the multiple relation view is more intuitive than the intentional view. But I find these views equally counterintuitive, for I find it counterintuitive to suppose that experiences, as opposed to beliefs, might consist in relations to such *abstracta*. For instance, even though I accept the intentional view, I grant that it is counterintuitive—it is counterintuitive that having *R* might consist in standing in a relation to an intentional content in Plato's heaven involving the possibly uninstantiated universals *being red* and *being round*. I find the multiple relation view no less counterintuitive. It is equally counterintuitive that having *R* should consist in the obtaining of a three-place relation between an object, some possibly uninstantiated universals, and oneself. Therefore, the intentional view and the multiple relation view are on a par, except that the intentional view easily accommodates the particular-independence of hallucination.

I conclude that the intentional view of hallucination is correct. On the intentional view, having a hallucination consists in sensorily entertaining a content involving external properties. The case for this view is that it the best view consistent with the features of hallucinations discussed in section 4 and here. It explains how hallucinations ground the capacity to have beliefs involving those external properties and how they have the other externally-directed properties discussed in section 4. At the same time, unlike rival relational views, it easily accommodates

indeterminacy-impossibility and particular-independence, for on this view, there need not exist any object, such as a sense datum or region of space, that actually instantiates or presents the relevant properties. This view trades problematic impossible and indeterminate objects with innocuous indeterminate and impossible contents. Once we accept this view in the case of the relevant problematic hallucinations, we should accept it in the case of *H* as well.<sup>22</sup>

## 6. THIRD STAGE: AGAINST POSITIVE DISJUNCTIVISM AND FOR COMMON FACTOR INTENTIONALISM

In sections 4 and 5, I argued for a positive, intentional view of hallucination. On this view, in the hallucinatory case *H*, one has *R* owing to sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness. Once this is accepted, it is natural to suppose that, in illusory case *I* and veridical case *V* as well, one has *R* owing to sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness. This would yield the following:

*Common factor intentionalism*: having *R* = sensory entertaining a content involving redness and roundness.

However, nothing I have argued for so far makes such a view compulsory. I have argued that *negative* disjunctivism fails (section 4). But everything I have said is also consistent a *positive* version of disjunctivism of the following form:

*Positive disjunctivism*: having *R* = *either* having some success property *S* not involving intentional content *or* sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness.

The proponent of this version of positive disjunctivism can agree with the conclusion of the sections 4 and 5 that in the hallucinatory case *H* one has *R* owing to sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness. But, on this version of positive disjunctivism, by contrast to common factor intentionalism, in the veridical case *V* and perhaps in the

22. Campbell (2002: 122) rejects intentionalism on the grounds that it “takes the intentional character of experience as a given” See also Brewer (2006). It is unclear what he means—maybe that it violates the vaguely Russellian view that all intentionality is grounded in nonintentional acquaintance with objects. But this Russellian view must be argued for. What exactly is wrong with rejecting this Russellian picture and holding that the mind is intentional “all the way down”? On another interpretation, Campbell’s argument is that, on intentionalism, either sensorily entertaining *something is F* is itself a way of grasping *something is F*, or it is not. Either way, one might think, it cannot explain how it is that we can grasp *something is F*, contrary to the grounding intuition. I want to make two points here. First, disjunctivists like Campbell and Brewer face the same dilemma. In the case of Brewer’s account (discussed in section 6), the dilemma is this: Either seeing an object that looks *F* due to having visually relevant similarities to a paradigm *F* is itself a way of grasping the concept of an *F*, or it is not. Either way, one might think, it can never ground our grasp of such a concept, contrary to intuition. Second, for the intentionalist at least, this dilemma is not serious. See Pautz (2008a, 2008c: §6).

illusory case *I*, one has *R* owing to having some success property *S* not involving intentional content: as it might be, seeing the redness and roundness of an object, or being such that an object in one's environment presents one with the property of being red and round.

So far I have explained how the positive disjunctivist and the common factor intentionalist answer what I have called the *phenomenal question* (section 1). But before we can assess them properly we must also know how they answer the *success question*. According to these views, what is the nature of successful perception? What is it to see a tomato, for instance?

The common factor intentionalist will most likely accept a *factorization account* of such success properties. He holds that sensorily entertaining a tomato-like content is common to both seeing a tomato and hallucinating one. The most obvious difference is that, when one sees a tomato, one's sensorily entertaining a tomato-like content is caused by the presence of tomato. This suggests that the property of seeing a tomato is a conjunctive property that can be factored into two components: sensorily entertaining a content that sufficiently matches the tomato, and doing so as the appropriate causal result of the presence of the tomato.

However, it is important to realize that a common factor view of phenomenology, such as common factor intentionalism, does not *entail* a factorization account of perceptual success. The two often go together, but they are in fact completely separable. Therefore, even if the factorization account of perceptual success failed, this would not in the least support the rejection of a common factor view of phenomenology. The proponent of the common factor view could always retreat to a *nonfactorization view*. Consider an analogy. Believing is a common factor between knowing and merely believing. This might naturally suggest a factorization view of knowledge in terms of having a belief meeting certain further conditions, but it does not strictly speaking require one. It is consistent with this that knowledge is a wholly different state, whose essence involves the world (see Williamson 1995: 563). Likewise, according to the common factor intentionalist, sensorily entertaining a content is a common factor between seeing and merely hallucinating. This does not strictly require factorization view of seeing in terms of sensorily entertaining a content and meeting some further conditions. Consistently with this, the common factor intentionalist could accept the view that seeing is a wholly different state whose essence involves the world.

For the common factor intentionalist, then, it is extremely natural, although not compulsory, to adopt a factorization account of perceptual success. By contrast, for the positive disjunctivist—indeed, for the disjunctivist of any kind—the factorization account is ruled out from the beginning. Suppose, for instance, that the positive disjunctivist analyzes *R* in terms of *either* seeing the redness and roundness of something *or* else

sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness. Since this account explains *R* in terms of the success property of seeing the redness and roundness of something, it renders circular a factorization account of this success property in terms of having *R* while meeting some further conditions.

Some objections to common factor views such as common factor intentionalism are founded on the notion that they cannot adequately explain perceptual success. But in my view they are based on misunderstandings. One objection relies on the history of failed attempts to specify a complete, counterexample-free analysis of seeing that factorizes it into having a matching experience and some causal condition. There are two responses available to the common factor intentionalist. First, he might say that seeing reduces to matching and causation but that there is no algorithm that *we* can specify codifying exactly what kinds of matching and causation are required for seeing. Second, he might simply grant that the factorization account of seeing is mistaken. As I argued above, it is a mistake to think that the common factor intentionalist is *committed to* a factorization account of seeing in terms of matching and causation. In response to the history of failure, the common factor theorist could accept a nonfactorization account of seeing like the disjunctivist.<sup>23</sup> A second objection is that a common factor view is in conflict with the slogan that objects are “essential constituents” of nonhallucinatory experiences. This slogan is supposed to motivate a disjunctivist view. This again is not so. There is no obvious conflict between the slogan and a common factor view of phenomenology. There is no conflict even if the common factor view is combined with a factorization account of perceptual success. Of course, the proponent of such a view will grant that, when John *hallucinates* a tomato, ‘John’s experience’ refers to an event not essentially involving any mind-independent object. But he might plausibly claim that, when John actually sees a tomato, ‘John’s experience’ refers to a more bloated kind of event, one that reaches out into the world and essentially involves the particular tomato John sees. Consider an analogy. Kicking is a common factor between John’s kicking a ball and his kicking without hitting anything. And his kicking the ball involves this common factor and some further conditions involving the ball. Nevertheless, when John kicks the ball, the kicking is plausibly an event that essentially involves the ball, in the sense that the very same event of kicking would not have occurred were the

23. For an objection to the factorization account of perceptual success based on a counterexample, see Johnston (2006). I suggest that Johnston’s case can be handled by a safety-based factorization account in Pautz (2007: n. 1). The first of the two alternative responses I consider in the text is based on the idea that reductions do not require explicit analyses. For this idea, see Jackson and Chalmers (2001: §3). Consider an analogy: The gestalt properties of a pixel screen, for instance, the property of making a face, are identical with some extremely complicated, disjunctive properties definable in terms of the pixels. But we cannot specify the relevant reductions.

ball not present.<sup>24</sup> A third objection is that a common factor view, together with a factorization account of perceptual success, is in conflict with the evident fact that *V* and *I* (which involving seeing an object that looks red and round) ground singular thought involving a particular object. This is supposed to motivate a disjunctivist view that rejects the factorization account of perceptual success. But, again, there is no obvious conflict here. On the factorization account, there is a common factor running through *V*, *I*, and *H*: They all involve sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness. This accounts for the overlapping cognitive powers of *V*, *I*, and *H*: The fact that they all ground the capacity to have *general* thoughts involving redness and roundness, in accordance with the grounding intuition (see section 4). But, on this view, there is an additional factor present in *V* and *I* that is not present in *H*, namely a causal link to a particular object. This accounts for the fact that *V* and *I* ground the additional capacity to have *singular* thoughts involving a particular object.<sup>25</sup>

Now that I have described common factor intentionalism and positive disjunctivism, I begin to address the issue of which we should prefer. Like

24. For the intuition that objects are essential constituents of nonhallucinatory experience, see Martin (2006: 357). Occasionally, Martin formulates the intuition using the notion of a fundamental kind (2006: 361). These formulations are not equivalent, because the notion of a fundamental kind differs from the notion of an essential property (Pautz 2007: 528). Here I focus on the essential properties formulation, because the notion of a fundamental kind has not been sufficiently clarified (Pautz 2007: 528). It should be mentioned that my suggestion concerning how the common factor theorist might accommodate the essence claim does not require him to say that in the veridical case John undergoes *two* experiential events, one that consists in the instantiation of a success property and essentially involves the tomato and another that consists in the instantiation of an intentional property and does not essentially involve the tomato. This is a view that Martin (2004: 59) criticizes in a different connection. To see this, consider again the analogy with kicking. In the good case in which John kicks something, he does not undergo two kicking events.

25. For the claim that the common factor theorist cannot explain singular thought, see Campbell (2002: ch. 6). Brewer has recently raised a number of objections to common factor intentionalism, but his fundamental objection also involves perceptual success (2006: 172): If intentionalism is true, then we do not “genuinely” perceive physical objects. Alston (1999: 193–195) says the same. (Pautz [2007] addresses a related but distinct objection to intentionalism.) What Brewer means is unclear, but I think there is an argument in the vicinity. The ordinary concept of seeing is such that, when one sees a tomato, one has a certain visual experience property (e.g., *R*) directly by virtue of seeing the tomato and its character (e.g., its redness and roundness). In other words, what I call the “naive intuition” below is built into our very concept of seeing. Since (as I discuss shortly) intentionalists must reject the naive intuition, they must deny that we see things in exactly the way demanded by our pretheoretic concept. But to conclude that intentionalists must deny that we see things would be a *non sequiter*. Consider an analogy: Given the atomic theory of matter, no physical relation perfectly satisfies our concept of contact. But there is a relation that satisfies this concept well enough to count as contact. So the proponent of the suggested argument faces a question: Why think we see things in *exactly* the way demanded by our pretheoretic concept? Further, a *tu quoque* looms. Brewer *says* that, on his own visual similarities account (a version of disjunctivism to be discussed below), the object of an experience helps to constitute the experience’s phenomenology. But he does not specify the sense in which this is so. It looks as if all that matters are its “visually relevant similarities” (analogous to the intentionalist’s “how it is represented”). Below I argue that *no* version of *VIVH* disjunctivism, such as Brewer’s, accommodates the “naive intuition.” So the intentionalist

any version of disjunctivism, positive disjunctivism comes in *VIVH* versions and *VVIH* versions (see section 2). I begin by arguing against three *VIVH* versions of positive disjunctivism. Then I look in greater depth at a *VVIH* version of positive disjunctivism, arguing that it is somewhat better motivated but that nevertheless common factor intentionalism is ultimately preferable.

The three *VIVH* versions of positive disjunctivism are as follows. First, on the *visual similarities version*, having an experience as of an *F* object is a matter of *either* perceiving an object with “visually relevant similarities” to a paradigm *F* object (covers *V* and *I*) *or* sensorily entertaining a content to the effect that an *F* object is present (covers *H*). Roughly, a perceived object *o* has *visually relevant similarities* to a paradigm *F* object iff a paradigm *F* object would have similar effects on the visual system as the perceived object *o*. *Paradigm F objects* are those whose association with ‘*F*’ partly constitutes our understanding of ‘*F*,’ given our training. This view is open to clear counterexamples:

(a) The *periphery*: Suppose that an object in the periphery of one’s visual field looks red but no specific shade of red. On the visual similarities view, this is so only if a paradigm object that is red but no specific shade of red would normally have similar effects on the visual system as the object perceived. The problem is that there could be no such paradigm object.

(b) The *waterfall illusion*: In this illusion (see section 4), an object appears to move and stand still. On the visual similarities view, this is so only if a paradigm object that both moves and stands still would normally have similar effects on the visual system as the object perceived. Again, the problem is that there could be no such paradigm object.

(c) *Standard variation*: John and Jane look at a pure blue object. Due to slight innate differences that are entirely within the range of normal, it looks pure blue to John, but it looks *green-blue* to Jane. How does the visual similarities account explain the object’s looking green-blue rather

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view and Brewer’s view are in the same boat. In fact, Brewer’s view seems very similar to *singular intentionalism*. Brewer has other objections to intentionalism: (i) In discussing the *problem of falsity*, Brewer asks why, on intentionalism, one cannot see a circular object as square (2006: 171–172). My reply is that, on intentionalism, seeing an object requires not merely causation but also a suitable degree of match between the object and experiential content. In his comments on an earlier version of this chapter, Brewer asked just how much matching is required for seeing and why. A difficult question—but this does not undermine the account. It is likewise hard to say just what nonbeautiful features are required for beauty. Further, the disjunctivist faces an analogous question: Just how much deviancy is required to turn a perceptual experience into the (according to him) radically different state of hallucination? Indeed, the fact that the issue seems *indeterminate* favors a common factor view. (ii) In discussing the *problem of generality*, Brewer considers whether the intentionalist might provide a “procedure” for determining the content of an experience (2006: 175ff.). This amounts to a request for a reductive psychosemantics. But the intentionalist is not committed to a reductive psychosemantics. Again, a *tu quoque*: Does the proponent of the visual similarities account have a hard-and-fast procedure for going from wholly nonperceptual facts to visually relevant similarities? (iii) Brewer has a number of objections concerning the Müller-Lyer illusion. For a response, see Pautz (2008b: §2).

than pure blue to Jane? The problem is that it seems that the perceived object has for Jane visually relevant similarities to a paradigm *pure blue* object, since a paradigm pure blue object would (indeed, does) produce in her the very visual state she is in.

(d) *The pigeon*: Consider a world in which all and only paradigm red objects, which normally look red to us, normally look *F* to pigeons, where *F* is other than red. Indeed, suppose that all and only paradigm red objects are also paradigm *F* objects, and suppose that in this situation redness and *F*-ness are realized by, and coextensive with, the very same reflectance property, which is processed differently by humans and pigeons. Then, when a viewed object looks *F* to a pigeon, the object has visually relevant similarities to a paradigm red object as well as to a paradigm *F* object, since such an object would have the same effects on the pigeon's visual system as the viewed object. Indeed, given that redness and *F*-ness are constituted by the same reflectance property, in this case a paradigm red object has visually relevant similarities to the viewed object (would reflect the same light, etc.) *by virtue* of being red no less than by virtue of being *F*. But it does not look red to the pigeon.

(e) *No paradigms*: Suppose it turned out that, in the actual world, although there are sentient creatures, there are no concept users. Then there would be no paradigm *F*s, but things could presumably look *F* to the sentient creatures.

The intentional view easily handles all of these cases.<sup>26</sup>

A second *VIVH* version of positive disjunctivism is the *points of view version*. This version holds that having an experience as of an *F* object is a matter of *either* seeing an object relative to a certain type of "point of view" (covers *V* and *I*) *or* sensorily entertaining a content to the effect that

26. For the visual similarities account of nonhallucinatory experience, see Brewer (2008). The *pigeon* is what I have elsewhere (Pautz 2010) called a *coincidental variation case*, and the problem such cases pose for Brewer's account is similar to the problem they pose for optimal cause accounts of content. This is unsurprising, since at a certain level of abstraction Brewer's account is similar to an optimal cause account of content. In Pautz (2007, 530–531) I develop but do not defend an alternative disjunctivist account, the *matching causation account*, which handles *standard variation* and some versions of the *pigeon*. In response to the *waterfall illusion*, Brewer might say that it not the case that one has an experience of an object as moving and standing still iff the object has visually relevant similarities to an impossible object that both moves and stands still, as I assumed in the text. Rather, one has an experience of an object as moving and standing still iff (a) the object has visually relevant similarities to a moving object and (b) the object also has visually relevant similarities to an object that stands still. There are two problems with this reply. First, as Brewer explains visually relevant similarities, they are "identities in such things as, the way in which light is reflected and transmitted from the objects in question, and the way in which the stimuli are handled by the visual system" (2008: 172). So, in the waterfall illusion, the perceived object has visually relevant similarities to an object that moves (i.e., condition (a) is met) iff the perceived object reflects light and produces a neural response that are similar to the light reflected by, and the neural response produced by, an object that is moving. But this is simply not so. In the waterfall illusion, the perceived object is in fact not moving, so the light coming from it is radically different from the light that would come from a moving object. Further, it produces a neural response that codes for stillness as well as for movement. By contrast, a moving object would produce a neural response that only codes for movement. The second problem with this reply is that it in any case does not carry over to the other counterexamples.

an *F* object is present (covers *H*). Here *point of view* is to be understood broadly to include not only the perceiver's location but also his internal state and the viewing conditions. The idea is that in illusion one's "point of view" is a bit askew. This version is unsatisfactory because it does not accommodate the grounding intuition. Suppose a green and oval tomato looks red and round to an individual. This grounds the capacity to have the (false) belief that the tomato is red and round, which involves the tomato, the property of being red, and the property of being round. On this view, the tomato is a constituent of the experience, so it explains how the experience grounds the capacity to have a belief involving the tomato. But, on this view, the property of being red and the property of being round are *not* constituents of the experience, so it fails to explain how the experience grounds the capacity to have a belief involving these properties. The proponent of this view seems to think we need to explain how nonhallucinatory experience grounds thought involving particular objects, but we do not need to explain how it grounds thought involving general properties. This is an unjustified double standard. In fact, although I believe that we must admit properties (think of 'reds resemble oranges more than greens') and so put the point in terms of properties, even the disjunctivist who is a nominalist has an explanatory burden here: How can a nonhallucinatory experience involving a certain "point of view" ground the capacity to think that something is *F*?<sup>27</sup>

A third *VIVH* version of positive disjunctivism is the *multiple relation version*. This version holds that having an experience as of an *F* object is a matter of *either* being such that some object presents one with the (possibly uninstantiated) property of being *F* (covers *V* and *I*) *or* sensorily entertaining a content involving the property of being *F* (covers *H*). This is a *VIVH* disjunctivist version of the multiple relation view (see section 2). It is superior to the visual similarities version of *VIVH* disjunctivism as well as the points of view version. Unlike the visual similarities version, the multiple relation version avoids the counterexamples about peripheral vision and the waterfall illusion. Unlike the points of view version, the multiple relation version accommodates the grounding intuition, for on this version, if a green and oval tomato looks red and round, then the tomato, the property of being red, and the property of being round are all constituents of the experience. Hence, this view explains how the

27. For the points of view account, see Campbell (2009). Brewer says that his visual similarities account is a version of the points of view account (2008: 171), although this is unclear. The points of view account is evidently very similar to the multiple relation account defended by Langsam (1997) and Alston (1999). On both accounts, nonhallucinatory experiences consist in obtaining a three-place relation among an object, a subject, and a third item. But whereas on the points of view account the third item is a "point of view," on the multiple relation view it is an apparent property of the object. In fact, Alston's argument is similar to Brewer's (see note 26). Despite the similarity, neither Campbell nor Brewer considers the multiple relation account, so it is unclear why they prefer their own accounts to it. I argue below that the multiple relation account has some important advantages over the visual similarities account and the points of view account.

experience grounds thought involving these properties as well as the tomato. In addition, this disjunctivist version of the multiple relation view has an important advantage over the common factor version of the multiple relation view criticized previously (see section 5). Whereas the common factor version explains hallucinatory experience as well as veridical and illusory experience in terms of particular presenting properties, the present disjunctivist version explains hallucinatory experience in terms of intentional content. Therefore, unlike the common factor version, the present disjunctivist version accommodates the particular-independence of hallucination.

But the multiple relation version of *VIVH* disjunctivism is poorly motivated. Why accept disjunctivism of any kind? In my view, the standard arguments fail. For instance, one argument relies on the slogan that external objects are essential constituents of nonhallucinatory experiences. Another relies on the fact that nonhallucinatory experience can ground singular thought. I criticized these arguments above. In my view, the most interesting argument is based on the naive intuition that when one sees a tomato one has *R* simply by virtue of seeing the actual redness and roundness of the tomato. This argument will be examined in detail when we look at *VVIH* disjunctivism, since this version of disjunctivism honors the naive intuition. But for now it suffices to note that all versions of *VIVH* disjunctivism fail to honor the intuition. This includes the multiple relation version of *VVIH* disjunctivism. By definition, on *VIVH* disjunctivism, in the veridical case *V*, one has *R* by virtue of having some success property *S* that one also has in the illusory case *I* when no red and round object is present. Hence, *S* is other than the property of simply seeing the actual redness and roundness of the tomato, for one fails to have this property in the illusory case *I*. On the multiple relation view, *S* involves being presented with a possibly uninstantiated universal. On the visual similarities view, *S* involves visual relevant similarities to a paradigm red and round object. On the points of view version, *S* involves one's point of view. All such views violate the naive intuition that, in the veridical case *V*, one has *R* by virtue of simply seeing the redness and roundness of an object, rather than by virtue of having some property *S* that one could also have in an illusory case when there is no red and round object before one. Hence, the multiple relation view and, indeed, all versions of *VIVH* disjunctivism cannot be motivated by appealing to the naive view concerning the ground of visual phenomenology. In fact, as I discussed in section 5, the multiple relation view is no less counterintuitive than intentionalism.

On the other hand, there is reason to reject the multiple relation version of positive disjunctivism, for all versions of positive disjunctivism are complicated and peculiar. However, I postpone development of this point until my evaluation of *VVIH* disjunctivism, to which I now turn.

In my view, *VVIH* disjunctivism may be somewhat better motivated than the three versions of *VIVH* disjunctivism just discussed. Therefore I consider in some detail what I take to be the best version of *VVIH*

disjunctivism. On this view, *R* is identical with the disjunctive property of *either* seeing the redness and roundness of something (covers *V*) *or* sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness (covers *I* and *H*). Previously, I called this *disjunctive intentionalism* (see section 2).

Disjunctive intentionalism accommodates all of the intuitions so far discussed. For instance, it accommodates the grounding intuition. On this view, in every possible case having *R* grounds the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness. In the illusory and hallucinatory cases, the ground of the capacity to have such beliefs is sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness; in veridical cases, it is seeing the actual instantiation of redness and roundness by some object before one.

Given that both disjunctive intentionalism and common factor intentionalism accommodate all of the intuitions so far discussed, how we are to decide between them? First I examine an argument for preferring disjunctive intentionalism to common factor intentionalism based on naive intuitions concerning the ground of visual phenomenology. Then I examine an argument for preferring common factor intentionalism to disjunctive intentionalism based on the fact that the former is far simpler than the latter. I suggest that between these arguments the simplicity argument in favor of common factor intentionalism is by far the more persuasive.

Consider first the argument for disjunctive intentionalism. As noted above, I believe that the standard arguments for disjunctivism fail. But I will now consider a very simple but overlooked argument that is based on the type of naive intuition about the ground of visual phenomenology that I have already alluded to. I arrive at the argument in steps: I begin by considering a general version of the intuition I have in mind. This version of the intuition is compelling, but it is arguably false and cannot be used to support disjunctivism. This leads me to consider a different version of the intuition, which might be thought to lend some support to disjunctivism but that is problematic in the end.

The version of the intuition that I consider first is that having *R* is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of something. In other words, it is a matter of what in section 2 I called *state-seeing* the state of an object. Let us call this the *general naive intuition*, since pretheoretically it is the natural view concerning the nature of the general visual experience property *R*. And let us call the property of seeing the redness and roundness of something a *naive realist property*. By the general naive intuition, *R* is identical with a relation to an item that is very different from an intentional content, namely, an actual state of the world. This item has the following properties:

- It exists only if a red and round object is present.
- It is located in space before one.
- It is not true or false.
- It is *seen* by the subject.

Some clarifications are in order. First, some say that intuition supports the further claim that the relevant item involves a *mind-independent*

object. I disagree. After all, some sense datum theorists would have said that sense data are three-dimensional and located in physical space, so they are naturally mistaken for mind-independent objects. This view cannot be ruled out on the basis of mere reflection on our experience.<sup>28</sup> Second, against my formulation of the general naive intuition, some would say that what intuition supports is *not* that having *R* is a matter of seeing a *state* or *condition* involving an object, namely, the redness and roundness of an object. Rather, they would say, what intuition supports is that having *R* is a matter of simply seeing the *object itself*, an object that is red and round. I disagree. This object-seeing version may seem plausible at first blush, but it is ruled out by further reflection. For instance, one might see an object that is in fact red and round but fail to have *R* because one is subject to an illusion in which the object looks otherwise than red and round. Intuitively, in this case, one does not have *R* because, although the object is red and round, one does not see its redness and roundness. In fact, the object-seeing version is arguably false even if what we most directly see are sense data. For, presumably, one could be aware of a sense datum that is in fact red and round for a brief moment and yet fail to have *R* because in this brief moment one was not aware of its redness and roundness. Therefore, on reflection what intuition supports is indeed that having *R* is a matter of being aware of the redness and roundness of an object, not merely an object that is in fact red and round. Third, the general naive intuition is an intuition about *R* only. I do not say that we have analogous intuitions about all visual experience properties. For instance, where *B* is just like *R* except that it is blurry, I would not say that it is intuitive that having *B* is just a matter of seeing the blurriness, the redness, and the roundness of an object (see section 7).

The intentional view is inconsistent with the general naive intuition. Suppose that you have *R* while viewing a tomato. The general naive intuition is that having *R* is a being related to *an actual state of the world*, namely, the redness and roundness of an object. By contrast, on the intentional view, having *R* is a matter of being related to an *intentional content*. Such an intentional content is radically different from a state of the world. Indeed, it lacks all the properties enumerated above:

It would continue to exist even if there were no red and round objects.  
 It is unextended and is not located in space before one.  
 It is true or false.  
 It *cannot be seen*.

28. For the view that sense data are three-dimensional and located in physical space, see Jackson (1977: 77–78, 102–103). In claiming that the mind independence of the objects of experiences is not supported by mere reflection on our experience, I differ from Martin (2004: 42).

Pretheoretically, the intentional view that your having *R* consists in being related to such a peculiar item, as opposed to the concrete redness and roundness of the object before you, is very counterintuitive. It would be a mistake to think that the general naive intuition only counts against reductive physicalist versions of intentionalism, so that it is merely a special case of more general antiphysicalist intuitions. It counts equally against “primitivist” forms of intentionalism, which maintain that the relevant relation is a primitive, nonphysical relation. The intuition that such a view cannot be correct finds expression in the apparent conceivability of an individual who bears the relevant primitive relation to such a nonextended intentional content but does not have *R*, that is, is not ostensibly presented with an extended, red and round object. By contrast, intuitively, an individual could not see the redness and roundness of something without having *R*. I grant that the general naive intuition is very compelling and provides a reason for rejecting intentionalism. But I believe that impossible and indeterminate hallucinations (see section 5) provide a more powerful reason for rejecting the intuition. For instance, having an experience of something moving and standing still cannot be a matter of being aware of any actual condition.

So, the general naive intuition provides some reason, albeit defeasible reason, to reject common factor intentionalism. But it could not be used to support the acceptance of disjunctivism intentionalism instead, because the disjunctive intentionalist, no less than the common factor intentionalist, rejects the general naive intuition. For the disjunctive intentionalist agrees with the common factor intentionalist that in illusory and hallucinatory cases one has *R* owing sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness, rather than owing to seeing the redness and roundness of something. The only type of view that the general naive intuition supports is a *common factor* act-object view such as the sense datum theory, which I rejected previously on the basis of impossible and indeterminate hallucinations.<sup>29</sup>

However, it might be thought that a different type of intuition in the same ballpark lends some support to disjunctive intentionalism. The *general naive intuition* is framed in terms of the identity relation: The intuition is that the property of having *R* is *identical with* the property of seeing the redness and roundness of something. But it may be thought that there is a weaker *by-virtue-of* relation that can hold between properties. In a certain specific case, an object might have *P* by virtue of having *Q*. This does not mean that *P* is *identical with* *Q*, for in another case an object might have *P* by virtue of having some property other than *Q*: A property can have a plurality of grounds. If there is such a relation, and if we have an intuitive grip on it, then it might be said that, in addition to the single general naive intuition, we have indefinitely many *specific naive intuitions* about *R*. In particular, for every possible

29. McGinn (2004) accepts this type of view, but he holds that in every case the relevant object is a nonexistent, Meinongian object rather than a sense datum. For criticism, see Pautz (2007).

case in which someone has *R*, we would have the intuition that in that case he has *R* by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of something.

Common factor intentionalism apparently never honors these intuitions (but see below). This view maintains that in every case one has *R* by virtue of being related to a content involving redness and roundness, an abstract object that exists even if no red and round object is present. Indeed, even *singular intentionalism* never honors specific naive intuitions. On this view, when viewing a tomato, one has *R* by virtue of sensorily entertaining the *singular* content ⟨the tomato, being red and round⟩. Such a content has none of the properties enumerated above. It is not located before one, it would exist even if no red and round object were present (as in illusion), and it is not something one sees. The view that while one views the tomato one has *R* by virtue of being related to such a peculiar entity, rather than by virtue of simply seeing the actual redness and roundness of the tomato, is counterintuitive.<sup>30</sup>

The situation is otherwise with disjunctive intentionalism. On this view, *R* is the disjunctive property of *either* seeing the redness and roundness of something *or* sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness. Like common factor intentionalism, this view does not honor naive intuitions in cases of illusion or hallucination, since it agrees that in these cases one has *R* by virtue of satisfying the second disjunct. Only the sense datum view honors these intuitions across the board. But disjunctive intentionalism does at least honor specific naive intuitions in the veridical cases. It holds that in such cases one has *R* by virtue of satisfying the first disjunct, that is, by virtue of simply seeing the redness and roundness of something—which, as we saw above, is quite different from a content. Indeed, on this view, in the veridical cases one presumably does not sensorily entertain a content at all. In this case, something very special happens: The concrete world itself is simply laid bare to one, and this determines the character of one's experience. Therefore, unlike Siegel (chapter 12, this volume), I understand the naive view and the intentional view (roughly, what she calls 'the strong content view') in such a way that they are apparently incompatible.

In short, on both common factor intentionalism and disjunctive intentionalism, the general naive intuition is false. But when it comes to specific naive intuitions, disjunctive intentionalism has a slight advantage over common factor intentionalism. According to the latter, specific naive intuitions are always false; according to the former, they are at least

30. Schellenberg (forthcoming) argues that singular intentionalism shares some of the advantages of the kind of disjunctivist view defended by Martin (2004, 2006) and others. However, if I am right, singular intentionalism does not accommodate the intuition that I regard as providing the best argument for disjunctivism, the naive intuition.

sometimes true. This, it might be said, provides an argument for accept disjunctive intentionalism over common factor intentionalism.<sup>31</sup>

My guess is that when disjunctivists invoke the slogan that objects are essential constituents of nonhallucinatory experiences (or that objects are “immediately present” in experience without cognitive distance), they are attempting to give expression to what I have called *naive intuition* about ground of visual phenomenology. But this slogan misidentifies the naive intuition. Indeed, this slogan is not even about the ground phenomenology. By contrast, common factor intentionalism is only a claim about the ground of phenomenology, so the slogan about essential properties (or immediate presence) is not even incompatible with common factor intentionalism, as I argued above. By contrast, the naive intuition is about the ground of phenomenology, and it is genuinely incompatible with the common factor intentionalist’s view about the ground of phenomenology. Therefore, it is this intuition, rather the intuition about the essential properties of nonhallucinatory experiences, that should be the focus of discussion.

However, the argument for disjunctive intentionalism from naive intuitions is subject to two objections. The first objection is not entirely persuasive. But the second objection identifies a serious flaw in the argument.

The first objection is that, contrary to what I have suggested, common factor intentionalism can honor naive intuitions no less than disjunctive intentionalism. In other words, the intentionalist can have his cake and eat it too, for, it might be said, the common factor intentionalist might adopt a special version of intentionalism. On all versions of intentionalism, in *nonveridical cases* of *R*, it is not the case that one sensorily entertains a content involving redness and roundness by virtue of having any more basic mental property. What mental property could it be? Therefore, on all versions of intentionalism, in nonveridical cases, sensorily entertaining contents is a basic form of intentionality that is not grounded in any further mental properties a person has and that grounds more advanced

31. As I have said, this argument is strangely overlooked. For instance, Martin’s (2002) main argument for disjunctivism appears to be that it is the only view that accommodates the committal nature of imagination. For a critical discussion, see Pautz (forthcoming). Martin also claims that the intuition that objects are essential constituents of nonhallucinatory experiences supports disjunctivism (a claim I criticized above). In neither argument does Martin use the naive intuition. However, he does seem to endorse this intuition, for he says that the naive aspects of an experience are explanatorily relevant to the phenomenal aspects of the experience (Martin 2004: 59, 63, 71). This provides the materials for an extremely simple argument for disjunctivism that is discussed in the text, which differs from Martin’s (in my view) more problematic arguments about the committal nature of imagination and the essential properties of nonhallucinatory experiences. For if this naive intuition is to be honored, then as you look at a tomato you must have *R* simply by seeing the redness and roundness of something. Since, contrary to the sense datum view, in nonveridical cases you do *not* have *R* by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of an object, it would follow that some kind of disjunctivism must be true. Byrne and Logue (2008: 87) ask why would it be “bothersome” or “problematic” to reject the naive intuition. I think that a good answer is that it is just very intuitive.

forms of intentionality. But, on the special version of intentionalism I have in mind, in *veridical cases* the situation is quite different. On this version of intentionalism, in veridical cases, one sensorily entertains a content involving redness and roundness by virtue of possessing a more basic mental property, namely, *seeing the redness and roundness of something* (perhaps together with performing some kind of abstraction). In short, in veridical cases, one has *R* by virtue of sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness, and one sensorily entertains a content involving redness and roundness by virtue of actually seeing the redness and roundness of something. By the transitivity of the by-virtue-of relation, it would follow that in veridical cases one has *R* by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of something, as well as by virtue of sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness. Accordingly, we might call this *naive realist intentionalism*. If naive realist intentionalism is viable, then the argument from naive intuitions for preferring disjunctive intentionalism to common factor intentionalism fails, since there is a version of common factor intentionalism that accommodates naive intuitions just as well as disjunctive intentionalism does.

But naive realist intentionalism is inconsistent with a factorization account of seeing the redness and roundness of something. And I think we should accept such an account because it allows us to avoid the view that seeing is a primitive mind–world relation. The factorization account is inconsistent with naive realist intentionalism for the following reason. On this account, the naive realist property *seeing the redness and roundness of something* is a conjunctive property: having the intentional property of sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness *and* doing so as the appropriate causal result of something's being red and round. Intuitively, given that the naive realist property has the intentional property as a *conjunct*, it cannot be said that one might have the intentional property (and hence *R*) *by virtue of* having this naive realist property, contrary to naive realist intentionalism. In general, it cannot be said that *a* is *F* by virtue of being *F* and *G*. That would be like saying that John is a man by virtue of being an unmarried man. Therefore, if it is combined with a factorization account of seeing, common factor intentionalism inescapably violates naive intuitions. So far, I have yet to identify a flaw in the argument from naive intuitions for preferring disjunctive intentionalism to common factor intentionalism.

In my view, the main objection to this argument is simply that naive intuitions are very dubious. Therefore, it is no great loss if common factor intentionalism cannot accommodate them. Naive intuitions are dubious for three reasons. (1) They are formulated in terms of an alleged "by-virtue-of" relation, but it is not clear that we have a grip on such a relation.<sup>32</sup> (2) It may be that intuition does not directly support specific claims to

32. This reason for thinking that naive intuitions are dubious can be put as a dilemma. We attempt to explain 'by virtue of' either by example or by definition. Suppose first that we attempt to explain 'by virtue of' by example. Then it is unclear that we succeed in giving 'by virtue of' any meaning. One alleged

the effect that in veridical cases one has *R* by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of something. Instead, it may be that intuition directly supports the general claim that *R* is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of something, which in turn supports the more specific claim about the veridical case. But, as I have argued, considerations concerning indeterminate and impossible hallucinatory experiences defeat whatever intuitive justification we may have for accepting the general claim. If this is right, then they also defeat whatever indirect justification we may have for accepting the more specific claims about veridical cases. (3) Even if intuition somehow directly supports the specific naive realist claims about the ground of *R* in the veridical cases, rather than supporting it *via* the discredited general naive intuition about *R*, there is a reason to doubt intuition on this matter. In nonveridical cases no less than in veridical cases, one has the strong intuition that one has *R* by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of something. But then such intuitions are false, since then we are not seeing the redness and roundness of anything. On this point the disjunctivist agrees. Of course, just as perception may provide fallible justification for beliefs about the nature of the external world, intuition may provide fallible justification for beliefs about the nature of perception. But the extreme fallibility of this particular type of intuition does at the very least significantly defeat whatever justification it may provide for accepting a naive realist account only in the special case of perfectly veridical experience.<sup>33</sup>

Having considered the argument for disjunctive intentionalism, I now turn to the argument against it. The standard argument against positive

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example is the relation between a disjunctive property and one of its disjuncts. Another is the relation between a determinable property and a determinate falling under this determinable. The trouble is that it is not clear that a single 'by virtue of' relation is involved in these examples. Rather, there are different relations involved in the different examples. Next suppose that we attempt to explain 'by virtue of' relation by providing a stipulative definition; for instance, we might say that an individual has *P* by virtue of having *Q* iff it follows from the analysis or "real definition" of *Q* that if an individual has *P* then the individual has *Q*. Then we definitely succeed in giving 'by virtue of' a meaning. The trouble is that the content of the naive intuition is now a highly theoretical claim about the real definition of the visual experience property *R*. It is unclear that pretheoretical intuition can be used to support this claim.

33. There is, I think, an interesting alternative argument for disjunctivism that does not rely on naive intuitions about experience in the actual world. Isn't there at least a "possible world" in which whenever one has *R* one has it simply by virtue of actually seeing the redness and roundness of a mind-independent object—something like David Chalmers's (2006) *Eden world?* In this world, there is never perceptual error, and hence no need to account for experience in terms of intentional content. If such a world is possible, then *R* must be a disjunctive property: *either* sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness *or* actually seeing the redness and roundness of something. In the actual world, we always have *R* by virtue of satisfying the first disjunct, so our naive intuitions are always false. In the Eden world people have *R* by virtue of satisfying the second disjunct, so their naive intuitions are always true. Indeed, perhaps we should be *pluralists* about phenomenology: In some worlds the naive realist view is true, in some worlds the multiple relation view is true, in other worlds the sense datum view is true, and so on. This would lead to *multijunctivism* about *R*. It would avoid a problem Martin (2004: 50–52) raises for the common factor theory, namely, that such a theory might be too restrictive in its account of experience. Now, if naive realist worlds are really possible, so that *R* is a multiply disjunctive property, then I would

versions of disjunctivism such as disjunctive intentionalism concerns a “screening off” worry. In the case of disjunctive intentionalism, the argument is as follows. Suppose that John sensorily entertains a content involving redness and roundness in nonveridical cases. Since his physical state is relevantly similar in the veridical cases, John presumably also sensorily entertains such a content in the veridical case. But then in the veridical case John’s sensorily entertaining such a content will “screen off” the naive realist property of seeing the redness and roundness of something from explaining why John has *R*. In this way, disjunctive intentionalism entails that naive realist properties are explanatorily redundant to the phenomenal aspects of experience, so it does not after all honor the naive intuition that in the veridical case one has *R* by virtue of simply seeing the redness and roundness of something, even though the main argument for it was supposed to be that it honors this intuition (for this argument, see Martin 2004: 59, 64).

Although I reject disjunctive intentionalism and other versions of positive disjunctivism, I believe that this standard argument against it fails. To see this, I first examine the only two possible versions of disjunctive intentionalism. Afterward I show that neither faces the screening off worry.

Consider first the *overdetermination version*. It combines disjunctive intentionalism with the claim sensorily entertaining a content (a proposition or property-complex) involving redness and roundness is not necessitated by some positive condition that is present in the case of *V* as well as in the case of *I* and *H*, for instance, being in a state that is optimally caused by a red and round object or that has the biological function of indicating a red and round object. The overdetermination version entails that, in the veridical case *V*, John has both of the properties that, on disjunctive intentionalism, are disjuncts *R*: He sees the redness and roundness of something, and he sensorily entertains a content involving redness and roundness. In this sense, in the veridical case *V*, his having *R* is overdetermined.

Consider next the *restrictive version* of disjunctive intentionalism. By contrast to the overdetermination version, this version combines disjunctive intentionalism with the claim that sensorily entertaining a content (a proposition or property-complex) involving redness and roundness is *not* necessitated by some positive condition that is present in the case of *V* as well as in the case of *I* and *H*. Rather, there is a strange necessary condition on sensorily entertaining contents that prevents one from sensorily entertaining contents in cases of perfect successful perception, namely, that *one is in an unsuccessful case*. On the restrictive version, in the

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retreat to *actual-world common factor intentionalism*: In the *actual* world, at least, whenever one has *R*, it is by virtue of being related to an abstract object, namely, an intentional content. This goes against *actual-world disjunctive intentionalism*, which says that in the actual world one sometimes has *R* by virtue of standing in a primitive seeing relation to the redness and roundness of a mind-independent object. The argument for accepting actual-world common factor intentionalism over actual-world disjunctive intentionalism is simply the argument in the text: It is vastly simpler, and there is no strong argument for any form of actual-world disjunctivism.

perfectly veridical case *V*, John's having *R* is not overdetermined, for in this case, John does *not* sensorily entertain a content involving redness and roundness. He simply sees the redness and roundness of something. It is owing to this alone that he has *R*.<sup>34</sup>

These are the only possible forms that positive disjunctivism might assume, and neither is vulnerable to the screening off argument. This is obvious in the case of the restrictive version. On this version, as he views the tomato, John does not have the intentional property at all. He only has the naive realist property, and it is by virtue of this alone that he has *R*. Although it may be less obvious, the overdetermination version is also invulnerable to the screening off argument. On that version, *R* is the disjunction of a naive realist property and an intentional property. Further, when John views a tomato, he satisfies both disjuncts. The screening off worry for the overdetermination version is that John has *R* by virtue of having the intentional property rather than by virtue of having the naive realist property. But the proponent of the overdetermination version will rightly reply that, whatever the problems for his view, this is not among them. For him, the naive realist property and the intentional property are entirely on a par: Each is a disjunct of *R*, and John has each of them. Therefore, there is no reason to say that John has *R* by virtue of having one of the disjuncts but not the other. Instead, the proponent of the overdetermination version might say that, in general, if *F* is the disjunction of *P* and *Q*, and if an individual has both *P* and *Q*, then the individual has *F* by virtue of having *P* *and* the individual has *F* by virtue of having *Q*. If this is right, then the present version of positive disjunctivism entails that John, as he views the tomato, has *R* by virtue of having the intentional property *and* he has *R* by virtue of having the naive realist property, so the intentional property does not screen off the naive realist property from explaining why John has *R*.

Therefore, the argument against versions of positive disjunctivism such as disjunctive intentionalism cannot be that they make naive realist properties explanatorily redundant to the phenomenal aspects of experience. In my view, the best argument against them is simply that they are peculiar and complicated. On overdetermination version, there is a bizarre overdetermination of phenomenology in veridical cases. On the restrictive version, it is a brute modal fact that, necessarily, one can sensorily entertain a content only if one is in an unsuccessful case.<sup>35</sup>

By contrast, common factor intentionalism is attractively simple. It provides a simple account of sensorily entertaining on which sensorily entertaining a content supervenes on a positive condition present in the

34. Johnston (2004: 171) flirts with the restrictive version. Elsewhere (Pautz 2010: §12) I explain how the restrictive version might work.

35. Singular intentionalism faces the same dilemma, even though I do not count it as a form of disjunctivism (see note 5). On one version of this view, having *R* is a matter of either sensorily entertaining a singular content involving redness and roundness (covers *V* and *I*) or sensorily entertaining a gappy

case of *V* as well as in the case of *I* and *H*. At the same time, it avoids the bizarre overdetermination of phenomenology in the veridical case *V*. Granted, on this view, in the veridical case *V*, John has both the intentional property and the naive realist property. However, in this case as in other cases, his having *R* consists in his having the intentional property.

There is a second respect in which disjunctive intentionalism is complicated. As I argue above, the disjunctive intentionalist must deny that seeing the redness and roundness of something can be factorized into having *R* and meeting some further, causal condition. Elsewhere I argue on the basis of variation in color vision that he must also say seeing a state of the world is not a complex relation constructible out of more basic physical and topic-neutral ingredients. He must say that it is a *simple* or *primitive* mind–world relation that supervenes on a certain kind of causal process proceeding from external states to the mind. This is something disjunctivists themselves seem to accept on independent grounds.<sup>36</sup>

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content involving redness and roundness (covers *H*). Either sensorily entertaining a gappy content involving redness and roundness supervenes on a positive condition that is present in the cases of *V* and *I* (e.g., tracking redness and roundness under optimal conditions), or it does not. If sensorily entertaining a gappy content supervenes on such a positive condition, then in cases of *V* and *I*, one sensorily entertains both a singular content and a gappy content, so that one's having *R* is overdetermined. If it does not, then we must explain why one can sensorily entertain a gappy content only in the case of *H*. Of course, general intentionalism faces no such dilemma, since it holds that having *R* is in all cases simply a matter of sensorily entertaining the same general content involving redness and roundness. Further, in my view, there is no reason to accept singular intentionalism over general intentionalism. Tye (2007: 604) supports the acceptance of singular intentionalism over general intentionalism on the grounds that singular intentionalism avoids counterexamples to general intentionalism in which the general content of an experience is true but the experience is intuitively nonveridical. But the generalist may avoid the counterexamples by appealing to *centered contents* (for this notion, see Lewis 1994). For instance, if John hallucinates a red and round object, then the general, centered content of his experience will be the property of being in front of a red and round object. This content is false when evaluated with respect to the time and place of John's hallucinatory experience, even if it is true when evaluated with respect to some other time and place. Tye raises some objections to a similar, Kaplan-style view, but they do not carry over to the centered contents suggestion. Alternatively, the generalist may avoid the counterexamples by appealing to a *complex account of veridicality* (Pautz 2008b: §3). Tye (2007: 608) also supports the acceptance of singular intentionalism over general intentionalism on the grounds that singular intentionalism accommodates what he calls the "singular phenomenology" of visual experience, whereas general intentionalism does not. But I am unsure what he means by this. If a veridical experience has a singular phenomenology, then presumably so too does an indistinguishable hallucinatory experience. On one interpretation, to say that a hallucinatory experience has a singular phenomenology is to say that there is some object *x* such that it seems to the subject of the hallucinatory experience that *x* is present (a *de re* interpretation). But on this interpretation the claim is false, at least if we set aside sense datum views and Meinongian views. On another interpretation, to say that a hallucinatory experience has a singular phenomenology is to say that it seems to the subject of the hallucinatory experience that there is some specific object *x* such that *x* is present (a *de dicto* interpretation). On this interpretation, the claim may be true, but it is precisely the claim made by the generalist.

36. For why I think the disjunctivist must say that the seeing relation is primitive, see Pautz (2009: §12). Campbell (2002: 117–118) and Johnston (2004: 138–139, 2006) appear to accept this conclusion on independent grounds. In Pautz (2010: §12) I also argue that, even if realism about color is correct, we probably never see the actual colors of objects, so naive intuitions are probably never true. This would provide yet another reason to doubt the argument for disjunctivism based on naive intuitions.

By contrast, the common factor intentionalist does not have to postulate a primitive seeing relation in order to account for veridical phenomenology. He accepts a seeing relation, but he does not need to take it as a primitive. As I argued at the start of this section, the common factor intentionalist can accept a factorization account of seeing the redness and roundness of something in terms of having *R* (i.e., sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness) and doing so as the appropriate causal result of something's being red and round.

To sum up, the best version of positive disjunctivism is disjunctive intentionalism. This version satisfies all of the intuitions so far discussed as well as the kind of common factor intentionalism that I favor. I considered an argument for accepting disjunctive intentionalism over common factor intentionalism based on naive intuitions about the ground of visual phenomenology. But these intuitions are dubious for a number of reasons. For one thing, it is agreed by both sides that they are false in nonveridical cases. Once this is admitted, we have little reason to accept the complicated disjunctive theory in order to accommodate them in veridical cases. And there is strong argument against accepting such a theory: We get a vastly simpler theory if we provide an intentional account across the board.

## 7. FOURTH STAGE: IN FAVOR OF STRONG INTENTIONALISM

I have focused on *R*, but the arguments I have developed would clearly apply to other visual experience properties. However, these arguments are neutral between strong intentionalism and qualia-content intentionalism (see section 1). I now argue that there can be no clear counterexamples to strong intentionalism. In other words, all differences among visual experience properties can be *associated with* different intentional contents or different intentional relations. I do not say that this alone establishes strong intentionalism. In other words, I do not say that this alone establishes that these experience properties are *identical with* relations to the intentional contents. For instance, the sense datum theorist would grant that reddish experiences and greenish experiences can be associated with different propositions about the colors of objects, but he would maintain that the experiences are identical with relations to sense data rather than with relations to propositions. It was my aim in sections 4–6 to establish that some version of intentionalism is correct, so that every visual experience property is at least partly identical with a relation to a content. My aim in this section is merely to establish that there are no clear counterexamples to the strong intentionalist view that every visual experience property is *wholly* identical with a relation to a content, so that strong intentionalism emerges as the best version of intentionalism.

The argument depends on the *spatial characterization intuition*. This intuition is related to the characterization intuition discussed in section 4. The characterization intuition was that *R* is essentially characterizable in

external terms. The spatial characterization intuition is both more general and more specific. The spatial characterization intuition is that, for all visual experience properties  $P$  and  $Q$ , if  $P$  and  $Q$  differ, then the difference is partly characterizable in *spatial terms*. For instance, suppose that one undergoes a change in mood while viewing an object. It is difficult to see how this phenomenological difference can be explained in terms of content. But this is not a problem for intentionalism about visual phenomenology, for it is also difficult to see how the difference counts as a difference in *visual* phenomenology, the type of phenomenology that the intentionalist about visual phenomenology is trying to give an account of, because the difference in phenomenology cannot be characterized in spatial terms.

If the difference between having  $P$  and  $Q$  can be partly characterized in spatial terms, then there are two possibilities concerning the nature of the difference:

- A. In having  $P$  and  $Q$  one would perceive an ostensible difference at some place in one's visual field.
- B. The difference between  $P$  and  $Q$  is a covert attentional difference: In having  $P$  one would be focusing *here*, and in having  $Q$  one would be focusing *there*.

I maintain all visual differences are A-type or B-type. (Even in a case of change blindness, I would maintain that one perceives a difference, in the sense that one perceives something that is different: One just does not perceive it *as* a difference; that is, one does not perceive *that* there is a difference.) Further, both A-type and B-type differences can be explained as differences in intentional content or intentional mode. This is why there can be no clear counterexamples to strong intentionalism.

Suppose first that the difference between  $P$  and  $Q$  is an A-type difference. Then in having  $P$  and  $Q$  one would perceive an ostensible difference at some place in one's visual field. Now all differences are differences in properties. Therefore, the ostensible difference will be an ostensible difference in some property  $F$  at some place in one's visual field. But then the strong intentionalist can explain the difference between  $P$  and  $Q$  by saying  $Q$  but not  $P$  relates one to a content associating  $F$  with the relevant place. So if the difference between  $P$  and  $Q$  is an A-type difference, then it cannot constitute a clear counterexample to strong intentionalism.

In fact, whatever account the nonintentionalist adopts, the strong intentionalist can transform it into an intentionalist account. For instance, where the sensationalist would say that  $F$  is a property of a region of the visual field, the strong intentionalist can simply say that  $F$  is a property entering into the intentional content of the experience. In this way, he avoids appealing to visual fields, which we previously found to be problematic (see section 5).<sup>37</sup>

37. This point has the consequence that it is not possible to justify the acceptance of sensationalism over pure intentionalism on the basis of possible cases, contrary to Peacocke (2008). I argued in section 5 that Peacocke's account of the "eyeless man" has the same consequence.

This argument does not assume that we will always be in a position to say what the different property *F* is. For instance, if one views a penny straight on and then at an angle, is the new property *being round and tilted* or *being elliptical*?<sup>38</sup> Or again, suppose that one experiences the Mach diamond now as a diamond and now as a square on its side. This would be an A-type difference because one would perceive an ostensible difference where the figure is. But what is the new property? If the difference between *P* and *Q* is an A-type difference, then it may be a difficult theoretical issue what the new property is. But we can nevertheless be justified in believing that there is *some* new property involved.

It may be objected that some A-type differences cannot be handled by strong intentionalism and require qualia-content intentionalism. Suppose you take off your glasses while viewing a tomato. This is an A-type spatial difference, because you perceive an ostensible difference *everywhere* in your visual field. But what might the new content of the experience be? It may be thought that the intentionalist is committed to the *object-determination thesis*: A property enters into the content of an experience only by being attributed to some object (for a discussion of the object-determination thesis and blurry vision, see Smith 2008). If so, then the only option for the strong intentionalist is to say that the new content is of the form *the tomato has the B-type property*, where the B-type property is the new property that seems to permeate your visual field. Against this, when you take off your glasses, you have no inclination to believe that the tomato or any other object in your field of vision has acquired a new property. Therefore, it might be said, the case is best handled with a non-intentionalist view. For instance, the sensationalist will say that, when you take off your glasses, every region of your visual field presents you with the B-type property. And the proponent of qualia-content intentionalism might say that, while most phenomenal differences consist in differences in intentional content, the phenomenal difference you undergo when you take off your glasses consists in a nonintentional neural difference in your brain.

This objection fails. I grant that visual blur is unique, for when you take off your glasses while looking at a tomato it is true that you have no inclination to believe that the tomato has acquired a new property. The waterfall illusion (discussed in section 4) is unique in a similar way. According to one fairly apt description of this illusion, one has a sense of movement, but the movement does appear to attach to anything, so one has no inclination to believe that anything is moving. The strong intentionalist needs to account for this, but I think that he can do so by rejecting the object-determination thesis. Contrary to the objection, the intentionalist is not committed to this thesis. For instance, in the blur case he might say that

38. For the view that the new property is *being round and tilted*, see Tye (2000: 79). For the view that the new property is *being elliptical*, see Peacocke (2008). For an argument that the new property is being elliptical, see Pautz (2008b: §3).

the new content is correctly rendered as *there is blur everywhere*. Similarly, in the waterfall illusion, he might say that the content is simply *there is movement going on*. On this view, the relevant content of your blurry experience is in a sense nonpredicational, like 'it's raining.' Hawthorne and Cortens (1995) have shown that such *feature-placing* contents need not and should not be treated as predications on objects or locations. This would explain why the experience gives you no inclination to believe that the tomato or any other object *has* the B-property. Alternatively, the strong intentionalist might take a leaf from the property-complex theorist's book (see section 1) and say that, in this case at least, the content is not a complete proposition but simply the property *being blurry everywhere*. Similarly, one might say that the content of the waterfall illusion is simply the property *moving*, where this property is not attributed to anything by the experience. Since on this view too the B-property is not attributed to the tomato by experience but simply is presented, we again have the needed explanation of why one has no inclination to believe that the tomato has the B-property. On these intentionalist accounts, sensory intentionality does not always involve attributing properties to objects. Similar intentionalist accounts would be natural for nonvisual experiences (gustatory experiences, olfactory experiences, bodily experiences) that appear to lack the rich predicative structure of visual experiences. It is worth mentioning that versions of intentionalism that reject object determination in some cases need not be inconsistent with the "transparency observation," for in one formulation the transparency observation is neutral on object-determination: We always know what our experiences are like by attending to properties that are not instantiated by our experiences (on physicalism, events in the brain).

Not only is an intentionalist account of visual blur available once we reject the object determination thesis, but such an account is preferable to the nonintentionalist alternatives. Unlike a sensationalist account, an intentionalist account avoids the problematic reification of visual fields. As for qualia-content intentionalism, it is vulnerable to the arguments about external-directedness presented in section 4. For instance, it is inconsistent with the characterization intuition, for when you take off your glasses the phenomenal difference is essentially describable in external terms, specifically, in spatial terms: One perceives blur *everywhere*. However, as the case of Slug (see section 4) shows, no mere neural difference is essentially describable in external terms. Therefore, the phenomenal difference cannot be a mere neural difference. By contrast, a strong intentionalist account is quite consistent with the characterization intuition. On this account, having a blurry experience consists in sensorily entertaining a spatially articulated content along the lines of *there is blur everywhere*. The experience is essentially characterizable in spatial terms because the content of the experience is essentially so characterizable.

So much for A-type differences. Now suppose that the difference between *P* and *Q* is a B-type difference, that is, a covert attentional

difference. For instance, suppose that you look at two pinpoint red lights and shift attention from left one to the right one, without moving your eyes (Chalmers 2004: 161). Plausibly, you have two different visual experience properties *L* and *R*. Since strong intentionalism comes in two versions (see section 1), the strong intentionalist has two options.

First, the strong intentionalist might adopt a pure intentionalist account. The phenomenal difference between *L* and *R* is a difference in content: for instance, a difference in how determinately they represent the dots or in the representation of contrast. I reject pure intentionalism about attention. Maybe in all actual attentional shifts there is such a difference in content. But, of course, strong intentionalism as I have formulated it is an identity thesis that would require a much stronger modal thesis—that there is some cluster of properties such that, necessarily, one's attending to an object *just is* one's representing the object as having those properties. This is intuitively implausible. Suppose that the two red dots in our case are *very close together*. If one focuses on one and then the other, *must* there be a difference in content that constitutes the attentional difference?

Alternatively, the strong intentionalist might adopt relation-content intentionalism. This is the option I favor. On this view, *L* and *R* might have the same content. But, in having *L* one is *quasi attending* to the property *being a red dot on the left*, whereas having *R* one is *quasi attending* to the property *being a dot on the right*. In that case, there is a difference in intentional mode rather than content. I take attention to properties to be more basic than attention to objects. The reason is that '*a* attends to *b*' entails 'there is something *a* attends to.' Further, attentional shifts could presumably occur in hallucination. Since I reject Meinongian objects, I take attention shifts to be directed on clusters of properties in this case. Such properties exist, although in this case they are not instantiated. And since I am a common factor theorist, I apply the same account to nonhallucinatory cases. I use "quasi attending" because one might worry that since properties are unextended abstract objects, it is not literally true that we can visually attend to them. It is worth mentioning that many empirical models also take properties to be the fundamental objects of attention (for an overview, see Chun and Wolfe 2001).

This is a thoroughgoing intentionalist account of attention, because quasi attending is an intentional relation that takes possibly uninstantiated properties as objects. No appeal to qualia is made. Note, however, that it is inconsistent with a strong *transparency thesis*, since it maintains that some introspective phenomenal differences are not differences in the properties given to one but are rather are differences in the intentional mode.

As in the case of visual blur, an intentionalist account seems preferable to a qualia-based account. For instance, identity theorists such as Ned Block (2003) would presumably say that attentional differences just are neural differences in the head. Against this, attentional differences are

essentially externally-directed and characterizable in spatial terms. As the case of Slug (see section 4) shows, this is not true of any mere neural difference, so attentional differences cannot be mere neural differences.

What is quasi attending? Maybe it is simply the relation  $x$  *demonstratively cognizes y on the basis of experience*. (Again, because of hallucination, the *relata* would be properties rather than objects.) This cognitive account of attention would be especially plausible if attention shifts can occur outside of the sensory domain. If one accepts that, one might reject my initial assumption that attentional, B-type differences are essentially differences in visual phenomenology while granting that in the actual world they are often accompanied by phenomenological differences in determinacy or contrast. In my twist on the two-dots case in which the dots are very close, the attentional difference might simply be a nonphenomenal difference in what visually presented elements one is thinking of. (Michael Tye suggested to me in conversation that in this case one has greater speed and accuracy with respect to possible changes in the attended dot. This is compatible with my suggestion because it can be taken as a functional account of what makes it the case that one is demonstratively thinking of this dot as opposed to the other dot.) But to me this seems to be a verbal issue. The important point is that we have an account of the situation.

I conclude that there can be no clear counterexamples to strong intentionalism. In fact, phenomenal differences among visual experiences are explained *better* by strong intentionalism than by qualia-content intentionalism. Therefore, once we accept that some version of intentionalism is correct, we should opt for strong intentionalism.

## 8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I have presented an argument for the intentional view that depends neither on the transparency intuition nor on physicalism about the mind. I have presented the argument in stages only for expository convenience. I accept the intentional view simply because it is superior to disjunctive views as well as rival common factor views. I conclude by summarizing my reasons for thinking this.

Consider common factor views first. Qualia views such as the identity theory, in my view, cannot be ruled out on the basis of Price's intuition or the transparency intuition, since there are reasons to doubt these intuitions. Instead, I argued against these views on the basis of their inconsistency with the intuition that  $R$  (and hence  $H$ ) necessarily possesses certain externally-directed features. Phenomenology isn't in the head: The only viable common factor views are those of relational variety (section 4). I then argued on the basis of impossibility-indeterminacy and particular-independence that the intentional view is superior to rival relational views

such as the sense datum view. The intentional view, then, is superior to all alternative common factor views (section 5).

Common factor intentionalism is also superior to rival disjunctive views. Like intentional views and unlike qualia views, disjunctive views rightly hold that phenomenology isn't in the head. But arguments for preferring these views to common factor intentionalism are unpersuasive. I believe that the standard arguments fail, and I criticized an overlooked argument based on naive intuitions (section 6). Once we admit that naive intuitions are false in unsuccessful cases, we have little reason to accept a complicated disjunctive theory in order to accommodate them in successful cases.

On the other hand, there are strong arguments for preferring common factor intentionalism to disjunctive views. Consider *negative* disjunctivism first. It faces several problems. In section 4 I mentioned only two: it is open to counterexamples involving rocks, dogs, and impossible experiences; and it is vulnerable to the grounding argument. The intentional view avoids these problems and is to be preferred.

This led me to consider the somewhat unexplored category of *positive* versions of disjunctivism, in particular, disjunctive intentionalism (section 6). This view accommodates the "data" about visual experience as well as common factor intentionalism: external directedness, particular independence, and indeterminacy impossibility. But it is poorly motivated and extremely complicated. Again, a simple common factor intentional view is to be preferred.<sup>39</sup>

39. Byrne and Logue (2008: §9) develop a different argument against disjunctivism (or at least *VIVH* disjunctivism). First, they argue that, in cases of *V*, *I*, and *H*, when one has a visual experience property (e.g., *R*), one's experience represents a certain general content (e.g., that there is a red and round object present). Second, they suggest that, if this is so, then disjunctivism fails, since there is then a "common mental element" among *V*, *I*, and *H*. It would be surprising if this argument were sound because it would mean that disjunctivism may be swiftly refuted. In my view, it is not. One question about this argument is, How do we demonstrate the first premise? This depends on what Byrne and Logue mean by saying that an individual has an experience that "represents" that a red and round object is present. Byrne and Logue (2008: 89) do not explain what they mean, but they appear to be working with either the *appears-looks conception* or the *accuracy conception*, in terminology I introduce in another paper (Pautz 2008b). As I explain in that paper, these are fairly lightweight conceptions of what it means to say that experiences have contents, so under these conceptions the first premise can be justified fairly easily. The real problem with this argument, I think, concerns the second step. It seems to me that the presence of a common representational content is quite consistent with disjunctivism, for a disjunctive view with the following two components is coherent: (1) Necessarily, whenever one has *R*, one has an experience that represents that a red and round object is present, in some fairly lightweight sense. In other words, possession of *R* is *accompanied by* representing this general content, so there is a common mental element between successful and unsuccessful cases of *R*. (2) *R* is not *identical with* the common content-theoretic property: Phenomenology is not to be explained in terms of content. Rather, disjunctivism about the nature of phenomenology is correct. In other words, *R* is a disjunctive property, for instance, the property of either seeing the redness and roundness of an object or not being able to know by reflection that one is not seeing the redness and roundness of an object. This is compatible with clause 1, because both disjuncts might be accompanied by a common content-theoretic property.

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