

A DISCUSSION OF ALEX WATSON'S
THE SELF'S AWARENESS OF ITSELF. WITH AN
ADDENDUM ABOUT THE TRANSMISSION
OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S PRAMĀṆAVINIŚCAYA*

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If there is any 'central' issue in the debates between Buddhism and the Brāhmaṇical schools, it is that of the existence or non-existence of a 'Self'.

WITH this statement, Alex Watson introduces his rich exploration of the controversy over the existence of a Self (*ātman*) from the point of view of Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha, a 10th-century author writing from within the Śaiva Siddhānta tradition. Rāmakaṇṭha's *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (abbr.: NPP) presents a dense weave of argumentation in favour of the existence of a Self, during which he engages himself in genuine dialogue with other traditions. His aim is to introduce the Śaiva Siddhānta voice into a debate that, according to Buddhist such schools of thought as the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika and Pramāṇa, the Buddha himself initiated. Indeed, he buttresses Śaiva Siddhānta claims in an unprecedented dialectical foray of fully rethinking through previous speculative approaches and achievements (see pp. 74-79 and 84-89). A clear sign of the non-sectarian bent of his discourse – in the NPP, in particular – is his avoiding making use of “ideas that would carry no weight in inter-tradition discourse” (p. 85, n. 125).

In *The Self's Awareness of Itself*, Watson presents this new voice within Indian philosophical debate based on a large selection of passages from the first chapter of NPP (the textual core of Watson's study) and, to a much lesser extent, from the *Mataṅgavyṛtti*. The book opens with a thought-provoking preface and a highly informative introduction. In the latter, Watson limns the core of his investigation in broad brushstrokes; he describes the essential features of the different positions taken on the issue under examination and elaborates on Rāmakaṇṭha's doctrine of the soul within the larger context of the Śaiva Siddhānta tradition. A “Synopsis of the Contents of the First Chapter of NPP” precedes four thematically arranged chapters in which Watson edits, exemplarily translates and comments on the selected passages, which have conveniently been collected in a final section (“Text Passages”) together with textual notes. A helpful index closes the book.

* I would like to thank Alex Watson for reading a previous version of this review article and patiently bringing to my attention some points that I had misunderstood or misrepresented. I would also like to thank Ernst Steinkellner for his careful reading and Philip Pierce for his revision of my English.

In the comments that follow the translation of each passage, Watson explains in detail the arguments being presented, clarifying their background and import, and giving his reasons for interpreting the text under examination one way as opposed to another. At some points, his exposition takes the form of a reconstruction of segments of the history of Indian philosophy – in not only an accurate but also an original way – based on a wide knowledge of secondary literature, but even more on a fresh look at the original sources. As the chapter titles show, the debate about the existence of a Self as engaged in by Rāmakaṇṭha had a marked epistemological character, wherein a great deal of attention is directed to the issue of how to cognize the Self.

The passages analyzed in the first chapter (“Can We Infer the Existence of the Self?”) focus on the Buddhist challenge concerning the possibility of inferring the existence of a Self. As Watson emphasizes, Rāmakaṇṭha’s view in this regard is based on the typically Buddhist view that some phenomena can be explained by cognition, and they do not presuppose the existence of a Self, as the Brahmanical schools assume. Since cognition can be perceived and is accepted by all disputants, it serves to explain those phenomena better than an imperceptible Self does, a Self whose existence is controversial. Rāmakaṇṭha’s exposition of the debate surrounding this Buddhist assumption is a necessary propaedeutic to his innovative version of *ātmavāda*, in which the Self is known directly through perception. If the latter idea may have an antecedent in a verse of the *Mataṅga* (see p. 351, n. 76), other features reflect ideas that can be found in the writings of Sadyojyotis and of Rāmakaṇṭha’s father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha (see pp. 100-102 and nn. 149 and 150 of the Introduction).

The Buddhist assertion of the superior explanatory value of cognition over the Self, in contrast to perceiving cognition, is appropriated to counteract first the Naiyāyika argument in favour of the existence of a Self – based on the Self itself rather than the various constituents of a person – as the only plausible substrate of desire. The Naiyāyika position as expounded by Rāmakaṇṭha agrees with Vātsyāyana and some of his commentators who claim that the Self inferable from desire, inasmuch as this latter can only be an effect of the Self. The vast overview that Watson offers of this debate is a very helpful contribution to the more general topic of the treatment of desire in ancient Indian philosophy; it allows the reader to appreciate the arguments provided by the Vṛttikāra and Kumārila as well as by Naiyāyika authors (pp. 140-165). Watson explains how Rāmakaṇṭha’s Naiyāyika distinguishes between desire and synthesis. For it is not desire but the synthesis (*anusandhāna*) of a present act of seeing an object and a previous experience of pleasure derived from the object that underlies the awareness that both acts (i.e. the present seeing and the previous experience) have the same agent. In the Vṛttikāra’s and Kumārila’s argument(s), desire plays the role that is played by synthesis in other versions of the argument and it is memory, although not ultimately, that requires the same agency (pp. 154-157).

The next target of Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist is the Vaiśeṣika argument that perceptible qualities such as taste must have a substrate, which can only be a Self. The specific Sāṅkhya argument differs in that it takes composites (*saṃhāta*) as having the property of being for another's sake, i.e. the soul, in the sense of "being an object of experience for that other" (p. 196). As Watson observes, Rāmakaṇṭha surprisingly approves the Buddhist refutation of this view, which earlier texts within his tradition considered valid (p. 202). On the other hand, he had silently agreed with a Buddhist, but also Sāṅkhya, view in which "any substrate or property-possessor over and above conglomeration of qualities" is denied (p. 185).

In the NPP passages examined in the second chapter ("Can We Know the Self through Self-Awareness (*Svasaṃvedana*)?"), Rāmakaṇṭha moves on to refute the Buddhist stance, which had held its own against Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya thought. Elaborating on a verse of Sadyojyoti he has been commenting upon, he turns the Buddhist refutation of the Self – based on asserting cognition as the witness of all objects (p. 209) – into a Śaiva view of the Self. He can do this on the strength of their common denial of the Self beyond cognition, and their common understanding of the Self not as "a further entity beyond cognition" (p. 215), but simply as cognition, which reveals itself in its revealing of objects.

Rāmakaṇṭha's specifically Śaiva tack is to equate cognition (*jñāna*), more precisely non-conceptual cognition (see pp. 368ff.), with the Self (pp. 213ff.), and to take being a perceiver (*jñātṛtva*) as the ultimate form of the Self. The critical disagreement between the Buddhist and the Śaiva Siddhānta, then, is – as Rāmakaṇṭha puts it – about the nature of the Self/cognition, namely whether it is stable or momentary, and not about its existence. Against the Buddhist view that the stability of a Self, or a perceiver, or cognition, results from superimposed conceptual cognition, Rāmakaṇṭha asserts a stable and undivided cognition, whose radiance is uninterrupted and self-consciousness unbroken.

The long and detailed Chapter 3 ("Can We Perceive the Self through I-Cognition (*Ahampratyaya*)?") is about Rāmakaṇṭha's discussion of I-cognition (*ahampratyaya*), a form of perception of the Self which, unlike self-awareness, is conceptual and verbal, and not entirely determined by the nature of the cognized object. In order to tackle the questions that this concept of I-cognition raises, Rāmakaṇṭha introduces the so-called argument from necessary co-perception (*sahopalambhaniyama*). His version of this rejects Dharmakīrti's, for according to him the cognition of blue, for instance, can occur without the physical presence of blue (pp. 262-265). This serves to prove that consciousness and an object of perception, though co-perceivable, are not non-disparate, which is crucial to Rāmakaṇṭha's view that the Self is real, being the referent of I-cognition, while at the same time it is not something non-disparate (p. 276). In Rāmakaṇṭha's opinion, this insight ought to force the

Buddhist to accept *ātmasaṃvedanam* (p. 307). Moreover, it entails that consciousness of one's own Self must occur whenever verbal/conceptual cognitions occur – cognitions whose referents are objects of *my* perception (p. 314), which are real (pp. 319ff.). This leads on to speculations that would be worthwhile pursuing further, such as whether the cognition of objects is dependent on the consciousness of one's Self and whether one's own cognitions can be shown to be distinct from those of others, so as to allow *I* and *you* to be contrasted.

The passages collected in Chapter 4 (“The Equating of Self and Cognition”) are taken from NPP and the *Matāṅgavṛtti*. They illustrate Rāmakaṅṭha's thought concerning the nature of cognition, which, given its being equated with the Self, must be unchanging. In order to account for cognition as single both at one point in time (when it illuminates objects within a spatial collocation) (pp. 335ff.) and over an interval of time (pp. 338ff.), Rāmakaṅṭha shows the unwanted consequences of ascribing plurality to cognition – an issue also debated within the Buddhist tradition, in particular between the Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra (p. 336, n. 8). Among other things, Rāmakaṅṭha observes that, if the cognition of different colours at one point in time were due to different illuminations, “an image of a multi-coloured cloth or suchlike could not exist, because every atom[-like pixel] [of the image] would be different” (p. 336). Therefore, a plurality of objects does not necessarily entail a plurality of cognitions. It is the faculty of *buddhi* that is modified by the objects – here including pleasure, pain and the like – and assumes their forms, presenting them to the perceiver (pp. 356ff.).

In the last chapter of the book and in various other places, too (e.g. the comments on the Śaiva view that the Self is an agent, at pp. 90-92), Watson has pointed out specific doctrinal elements of the Śaiva Siddhānta system that have shaped Rāmakaṅṭha's philosophical discourse and imposed limits on its scope. As Watson emphasizes:

The first chapter of NPP represents, if anything, a fringe phenomenon. The heart of Śaiva Siddhānta for Rāmakaṅṭha is its theology and ritual; the philosophical discussion in which theological assumptions are set aside is a thin layer at its outer edge. (p. 88)

Rāmakaṅṭha's original contribution to the development of the Śaiva Siddhānta system emerges distinctively through Watson's observations concerning Rāmakaṅṭha's peculiar interpretations of Sadyojyotis's text, of which the NPP is a commentary (see especially pp. 301 and 318). For, as is often the case in the Indian commentarial tradition, Rāmakaṅṭha expands on, and freely interprets, issues that are sometimes only vaguely addressed in the text commented upon. Our picture of the Śaiva Siddhānta according to Rāmakaṅṭha has been cautiously but reliably enlarged through Watson's scholarly habit of accurately distinguishing between what can be stated with certainty and what cannot. With similar circumspection, Watson provides evidence regarding

authors' sources and trends of thought, often showing how complex respectively identifying and reconstructing them can be (so complex as in some cases to be finally undecidable, given the imponderable weight of the many lost sources). See, for instance, his treatment of the relationship between Rāmakaṇṭha's text and Jayanta's (p. 139, n. 54, and p. 150), the case of a Vaiśeṣika argument (pp. 176ff.) and that of a Sāṅkhya view (not clearly attested in any surviving Sāṅkhya text) (pp. 186ff.).

Watson's statements are consistently based on a critical approach to the sources, accompanied by accurate philological groundwork, especially for Rāmakaṇṭha's texts. This shows once more how exploring philosophical texts in Sanskrit cannot count on the basic requirement of reliable printed editions. Watson does not overly advert to his major editorial work on the selected NPP passages, though; if anything, he underplays it. In his brief sketch of the procedures he has followed in reconstituting these passages (section 5.4 of the Introduction), he outlines the genealogical relationships between the four collated manuscripts. These were not consulted by Madhusudan Kaul for his 1926 edition and do not represent the totality of the surviving NPP manuscripts (see p. 110 for further references). Watson has, to be sure, used the evidence provided by the two available printed editions, and by parallel passages as well, in particular, those from two other works by Rāmakaṇṭha, the *Mataṅgavṛtti* and the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* (p. 110); while the footnotes testify to an even more concerted effort to retrieve sources linked with the NPP, especially among Buddhist texts. Watson clearly aims neither at providing a critical edition of the textual segments he discusses nor at reconstructing an archetype.¹ Nonetheless, the texts he presents definitely improve on those of the printed editions and reflect a mature critical approach to dealing with philological issues (see, for example, n. 30 on p. 221, and n. 82 on p. 237).

For the text segment of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, which is discussed in Chapter 4, Watson has reconsidered the variant readings recorded in the critical apparatus of N. R. Bhatt's edition (and has sometimes maybe too hastily emended the text). The witnesses that he reports in the textual notes are mentioned under "Other Abbreviations and Symbols" (pp. 44-47). Here, in each entry corresponding to a witness of the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (implicitly, the 1977 volume containing the *Vidyāpāda*), Watson informs us that he has "transcribed its readings from the edition". His style of recording the variant readings evidently derives from that of the apparatus in Bhatt's edition, which only records the witnesses that read differently from the edited text and not what each witness reads.² In this type of textual apparatus, referred to as a 'negative

¹ Though Watson mentions the "archetype" from which manuscripts B and P both derive, it is clear from his description that he means their common (reconstructable) exemplar.

² Bhatt does not explicitly state this in the introduction to his critical edition.

apparatus', the witnesses that are not mentioned are in agreement with the edited text, or differ in such a way that the editor has judged it irrelevant to record them. In Watson's textual notes, then, a reading of the *Mataṅgavṛtti* edition does not represent an emendation on the part of the editor (although only the siglum for the edition appears) but the reading of all witnesses that are not mentioned within the same note.

The reading of the Sanskrit texts and the citation of other texts in the book are virtually flawless.³

Throughout *The Self's Awareness of Itself*, textual notes are presented together with lengthy notes to the translation and the comments, so that the footnotes are a necessary complement of what appears in the body of the work. They often contain either further reasons for understanding texts in a certain way or other viable interpretations. Readers are referred to a wide range of Sanskrit sources and secondary literature, and also frequently to private communications with Alexis Sanderson, Harunaga Isaacson, and, for some specific topics, Karin Preisendanz, Lambert Schmithausen, Ernst Steinkellner, and Birgit Kellner. Through his footnotes Watson thus recreates the atmosphere of debate among different scholars, as if they were seated together around a table, discussing the text (as actually occurred, according to the Preface); and, as is to be expected, different judgements surface. How fertile this scholarly approach can be is shown by the invaluable contribution that the book brings to the controversy surrounding the existence of a Self and, more generally, to Saiddhāntika and Tantric studies.

In the spirit of this scholarly approach, I should like to add some observations concerning the Buddhist texts mentioned in the second chapter of the book. The NPP passages presented there are crucial to Rāmakaṇṭha's proof of the Self's existence, which also includes establishing that the soul is undivided and stable, and not momentary. His interlocutor is a Buddhist, Dharmakīrti, of whom Rāmakaṇṭha quotes an evidently challenging verse from the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (henceforth PVā):

mithyādhyāropahānārthaṃ yatno 'saty api moktari |

An effort [must be made] to abandon false superimposition, even though there is no one who is liberated. (PVā 11.192ab)

This verse appears within Dharmakīrti's wider discourse on the possibility of attaining liberation in the first place, as traditionally expressed by the third Nobles' Truth expounded by the Buddha, namely the cessation of suffering.

³ I shall merely signal that contrarily to what is announced on p. 169, n. 155, no other footnote follows in the same section. Probably what was once a footnote beginning with "Preisendanz (1994: 274)" has been incorporated into n. 155 itself. On p. 324, n. 216, there is no mention of Dharmakīrti's use of the term *vināśitvānumāna*, which is relevant for Rāmakaṇṭha's elaboration on the topic. See Steinkellner 1968, especially pp. 363ff.

As Watson explains (p. 233), the verse replies to the question repeatedly posed to Buddhists concerning the discontinuity between the agent who engages in acts and the one who experiences the results of those acts. Such discontinuity – or, more precisely, one's own representation of oneself as discontinuously existing – would preclude action of any kind, including acts directed towards liberation, and would thus render the entire dharma of the Buddha pointless. But, as Dharmakīrti says, a stable agent of liberation is merely an idea, one that wrongly conjures up what is only a continuum of constituents (*skandhas*) into an existent subject that undergoes transmigration. From such a perspective, it makes sense to speak of an effort with one's sights set on liberation as being “unenlightened action that does not accord with reality” (p. 233). Watson's translation of the verse makes it clear that he does not take its content as a general, impersonal statement, but as referring to the Buddha. He thus extends the subject of the preceding NPP passage to the PVā verse quoted thereafter. It may well be, however, that Rāmakaṇṭha, like Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha before him in the *Mṛgendratāntravṛtti* (see p. 233, n. 65), regarded Dharmakīrti's verse as a non-personalized assertion and, unlike the commentators on the PVā, pointed out that such an assertion could, or should, be referred to the Buddha, though this is not the case in the PVā. Furthermore, Rāmakaṇṭha himself does not mention the Buddha in the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, where the NPP passage here under discussion occurs again (see Watson's remark on p. 236, n. 75). In this regard, it might be interesting to examine Tantric authors' re-use of texts foreign to Tantric traditions and see whether a shift from a non-personalized discourse to a personalized one can be observed. Such a shift might be part of a strategy to adapt external views to the more general ideological requirements of the Tantric context.

It is worth noting, that Rāmakaṇṭha, in referring to the type of effort that the Buddha himself undertook, namely meditative experience (p. 230), inserted a remark concerning this spiritual praxis that is universally absent in the commentarial tradition relating to the PVā verse.

Rāmakaṇṭha and Dharmakīrti's commentators, Prajñākaragupta (around 800) and Manorathanandin (ca. 11 cent.) in particular,⁴ might agree on another point too, namely on interpreting the effort towards liberation mentioned in the PVā verse as action based – for the Buddhist, erroneously – on assuming the notion of an existing I.

Watson has suggested that Rāmakaṇṭha sees this action as “resulting from a realization of the falsity of the notion of a continuously existing ‘I’” (p. 234).

⁴ Steinkellner and Much 1995: 74-75 and 105. About Manorathanandin's life there are no precise information, but it is plausible that he lived after Rāmakaṇṭha. When Watson observes that “Rāmakaṇṭha may or may not have known Prajñākaragupta's and Manorathanandin's interpretation” (p. 235) and that both commentators seem to accept a claim made by Rāmakaṇṭha (p. 235, n. 70), he is speaking philosophically, not historically.

However, according to a widely shared Buddhist opinion, reflected in Dharmakīrti's statement, action towards liberation is based on a pre-enlightenment judgement of the type: I am bound, I'll be liberated. The realization⁵ of the falsity of such a judgement indicates, in fact, the attainment of a liberated state. In general, we should consider the possibility that Rāmakaṇṭha either deliberately or unintentionally misrepresented this Buddhist opinion, but he does not seem to do so in this particular context; for he explicitly describes effort towards liberation as addressing the view of a Self, and not as the result of the realization of Selflessness. In Watson's translation, what he says is: '... the Lord Buddha ... undertook effort directed towards Selflessness, in the form of counteracting meditation' (p. 231). Furthermore, if Rāmakaṇṭha presented his Buddhist as stating that the effort towards liberation results from the realization of the falsity of the notion of an I, that Buddhist would be asserting that one should strive towards Selflessness, having already abandoned the idea, which would be contradictory. This would be irrelevant, however, to the point Rāmakaṇṭha wishes to emphasize, namely that the Buddhist himself asserts the non-existence of a Self – realization of which he clearly sets as his goal, while at the same time asserting the necessity of action for liberation.

Again, in his interpretation of such action as that mentioned in PVā II.192ab, Rāmakaṇṭha may not differ from Dharmakīrti's commentators in representing Dharmakīrti's intent, but this is not Watson's opinion (p. 235). The Buddhist who contemplates the necessity of effort and, at the same time, the non-existence of a Self is confronting action from the standpoint of a person who still harbours an ingrained sense of a Self but is no longer intellectually convinced of its actuality – a standpoint that will eventually give way to the truth underlying the conviction. Dharmakīrti's commentators illustrate this with the example of the rope taken for a serpent: those who strive to avoid a serpent, will in the end realize that it is a rope. When this happens, they will simply see reality (*tattvadarśinaḥ*, PVBh 137.16), and their mundane outlook will no longer depend on judgements based on the idea of a Self, on – in Watson's felicitous expression – “our usual unenlightened motivations for acting” (p. 235). Therefore, those who see reality no longer undertake any action, or rather any ordinary action, which includes effort towards liberation (PVBh 137.17: *na hi te kvacit pravartante yatnaṃ vā kurvanti* |). Those who remain in the ordinary state, by contrast, do not act according to things as they are, but according to their own judgement of things, which is based on the idea of a Self (PVV 77,11, quoted by Watson on p. 234). In making such statements, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin are not, I think, providing a “description of action based on selfish motives” (p. 236), but rather repeating

⁵ I take realization, without any adjective, as full realization, and not as intellectual realization.

a Buddhist conception of things that Dharmakīrti and others elaborated through the notion of *adhyāropa*, 'superimposition', typically concerning the notion of an I.

When Manorathanandin comments on the false superimposition (*mithyādhyāropa*) that one needs to abandon (PVā II.192a), he appropriately makes clear that it is related to the objection presented in pāda 190c, *saṃsāritvād anirmokṣaḥ*. For he identifies the content of false superimposition as the determinative cognition that one is characterized by saṃsāric existence (*saṃsāritvādhyavasāya*) – and not, for example, as the more generic idea of *ātman*. The opponent speaking in pāda 190c points out this characterizing feature precisely in order to argue that there cannot be liberation if one accepts the Buddhist denial of the existence of a Self; for the one who is characterized by saṃsāric existence (*saṃsāritva*^o) would disappear when liberation is attained, and in the end there would be nobody who is liberated. Thus, because Manorathanandin is explaining the meaning of the verse in its textual context, he mentions the *saṃsārin*, and not the *ātman*. Watson's understanding of Manorathanandin's commentary differs from my own, especially in not relating *saṃsāritva* to the previous context, but rather in taking it in a more general sense, according to which the commentator "must mean that we are alarmed by the prospect of transmigrating endlessly" (p. 236).

The relevant passages of Manorathanandin's and Prajñākaragupta's commentaries accompanying Watson's discussion of PVā II.192ab are not devoid of textual problems, which Watson takes note of in the footnotes. For the beginning of the PVBh passage quoted on p. 234, n. 69 – *kim iti hetor abhiyogaḥ prekṣāvataḥ* – he suggests the translation "What is the use of causal [actions] for wise people?" Faced with the problematic *hetor*, he offers an alternative interpretation, taking "*kim iti hetor* to mean 'for what reason?' and *abhiyogaḥ* as 'striving'" (*ibidem*). However, following the reading in the PVBh manuscript, *hetor* can be emended to *hetāv*, obtaining the locative expected with *abhiyogaḥ*. The phrase can thus be rendered as 'Why [should] wise people engage in [plumbing] the cause [of suffering] (i.e. since they already have a deep understanding of things as they are)?'

With regard to PVV 77,11, Watson has cast some doubt upon the reading *avasāya*, as if it were semantically equivalent to *adhyavasāya* or *vyavasāya* (n. 68, p. 234). However, there is at least one notable occurrence of *avasāya* in the sense of *adhyavasāya* in Dharmakīrti's work: *idaṃ dr̥ṣṭaṃ śrutam vedam iti yat-rāvasāyadhīḥ* (PVā III.324ab).

Watson has also noted that in PVā II.191c, one might consider the reading *duḥkhitvam*, instead of *duḥkhitam* (p. 235, n. 71), although his own translation is based on the latter. Tilmann Vetter had already offered a translation in which he seems to silently replace *duḥkhitam* with *duḥkhitvam*, thus giving the verse the sense that the combined psycho-physical constituents ascribe to a

Self the fact that they are subject to unpleasant things.⁶ His interpretation seems to find support in Devendrabuddhi's commentary on the PVā text: *gañ gi phyir de ltar rmoñs pa las bdag la sdug bśhal ñid du sgro btags nas | ...*" (PVP 95a1). However, considering that *sdug bśhal ñid* may be used to translate *duḥkhatā* and *bdag la* may have a pronominal function, one might venture to render the sentence as follows: 'Hence, in this way, [the continuum] superimposes a state of suffering upon [it]self, owing to delusion...'. In any case, the word *duḥkhita* is well attested as a qualifier applicable to persons, in the meaning of 'miserable', 'pained', 'sad',⁷ and it is a term that recurs in the context of specific themes of the Buddhist doctrine, much in the same way as the verb *paritasyati* does in pāda b. Thus Dharmakīrti may have chosen to adopt such terminology in the *kārikā*, and use *duḥkhitam* in the function of a substantive, 'something in pain', to refer to the constituents when they are thought of as having, combined, an individual identity.

The Self's Awareness of Itself sheds light on the complex views of a philosopher of the aiva Siddhānta tradition, thereby accounting for the dissemination, reception, and reworking of certain crucial issues, the first seeds of which had been sown some centuries earlier. The book thus yields an outline of a number of theoretical developments within ancient Indian philosophy, a field in which significant texts are not yet available in reliable editions and not yet accompanied by adequately supporting studies. This points up the importance of Watson's study, which includes a new elaboration of textual material and the author's own reflections on it, both of which historians of philosophy will be able to integrate into broader studies. Thanks to it, Rāmakaṇṭha emerges as a more distinct personality, one who infused new energy into Indian philosophical thought at the end of the first millennium.⁸

ADDENDUM

Another of Dharmakīrti's works quoted by Rāmakaṇṭha is the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Until 2007, when Ernst Steinkellner published a critical edition of the first two chapters (abbr.: PVin^E), the Sanskrit text of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* was only known of through references and citations found in other

⁶ Vetter 1990: 93: "[die ... aus den Konstituenten bestehende Person ...] ..., solange schreibt sie [die Tatsache, dass die Konstituenten] von [allerlei] unangenehmen [Dingen] betroffen werden, [diesem nichtbestehenden Selbst] zu, leidet [dadurch]."

⁷ See the notable occurrence in *Paramārthagāthā* 38 of the *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ* (in the *Yogācārabhūmi*): *duḥkhī duḥkhito 'ham asmīty ātmānaṃ sukhito vā punar duḥkhaṃ vyavasyati |* – [By thinking, when one is] pained, "I am pained" – or, on the other hand (*punar*), [by thinking,] when one is pleased, ["I am pleased"] –, one conceives as oneself (i.e. as one's Self?) [what is in reality nothing but] Suffering.' Both the edited version and translation of this passage are Schmithausen's (1987: 232f.).

⁸ Bartley 2011, a recent publication on Indian philosophy, has a separate section on Rāmakaṇṭha titled "Rāmakaṇṭha on the enduring individual self and its experiences" (pp. 199-207); the subsequent section, too, on "Personal agency" (207-209), draws largely on Rāmakaṇṭha's works.

works. This recent edition provides an occasion to reconsider Rāmakaṅṭha's quotations presented by Watson. In the case of NPP 27,4-5,⁹ which corresponds to PVin^E 14,5, Watson (p. 337) does not record any variant reading for *anupalakṣitāḥ*, also attested in the other texts reported by Stern (1991). The reading in PVin^E, however, is *alakṣitāḥ*, which is unanimously supported by the manuscript evidence, no variants being recorded in Apparatus 2 of the edition. Although the reading is plausible enough to pass unnoticed in the context, *anupalakṣitāḥ* of the NPP and other witnesses may be worth reconsidering;¹⁰ for the term *upalakṣaṇa*, which appears in other passages of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* in a very specific sense, seems to be appropriate in PVin^E 14,5 too. In PVin^E 81,1,¹¹ for example, *nimittopalakṣaṇam* corresponds to the *nimittoḍgrahaṇam* mentioned in *Abhidharmakośa* I.14cd, there equated with *saṃjñā*, the third constituent (see Steinkellner 1979: 95, n. 350). The term *upalakṣaṇa*, then, designates the cognizing, or conceptual grasping, of specific features of objects (here including feelings). *Anupalakṣitāḥ* (from *anupalakṣita*, itself derived from this meaning of *upalakṣaṇa*) would perhaps yield a better reading than *alakṣitāḥ* for PVin^E 14,5: 'not being cognized conceptually' as opposed to 'not being characterized in a particular way'. The passage would thus express the fact that notions (*kalpanā*) do not "arise or pass away without being sensed at all so that they might be unnoticed even though they exist" as notions (Watson's translation, p. 337). One may further observe that for "yena satyo 'py alakṣitāḥ syuh'" in PVin^E 14,5 the Tibetan translation has "gan'gis yod kyaṅ mi rtogs par 'gyur ba",¹² and for "nimittopalakṣaṇam" in PVin^E 81,1 it has "mtshan ma ñe bar rtogs pa".¹³ Thus, in both cases, *rtogs pa* appears in the rendering of *upalakṣaṇa*. This seems to be a deliberate choice on the part of the translator, because *anupalakṣaṇa* in PVin^E 5,12, which conveys the completely different meaning of 'not implying another feature', was rendered as *ma mtshon pa*.¹⁴ This translation shows that the translator did not always render *upa* in *upalakṣaṇa*; therefore, the Tibetan translation *mi rtogs par* for the term in PVin^E 14,5 does not imply that the Sanskrit exemplar (τ) available to the translator had the reading *alakṣitāḥ*.

A last remark to suggest a possible explanation for the fact that all manuscripts of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* read *alakṣitāḥ*: They may all be dependent on an exemplar where the *akṣaras nupa* were unintentionally dropped while

⁹ *na cemāḥ kalpanā apratisaṃviditā evodayante vyayante vā yena satyo 'py anupalakṣitāḥ syuh, iti.*

¹⁰ It is worth noting that, in the *Nyāyakusumacandra*, Dharmakīrti's words are used to formulate a refutation: *pratisaṃviditotpattivyayāḥ satyo 'py kalpanāḥ | pratyakṣeṣu na lakṣyeraṇ tatsvalakṣaṇabheda-vat ||* (*Pramāṇābhāsavicāraḥ*, kārikā 24, p. 527); the beginning of the explanation on *kalpanā na lakṣyeraṇ* is: *na ca sataḥ pratisaṃviditāvīrbhāvavināśavato 'nupalakṣaṇam viruddham* (*Nyāyakusumacandra*, p. 528, line 7).

¹¹ PVin^E 80,14-81,2: *tathā viṣayāḥ sukhaduḥkhe nimittopalakṣaṇam rāgādāyo viṣayopalambhaś ca prativid-itaivopayanty apayantīty anityāḥ |* – 'In the same way, each [of these factors, namely] the objects [of the senses]; pleasure and suffering; perception of causes; attachment etc.; and the grasping of objects appear and disappear, being of course individually registered, [and] are thus impermanent.'

¹² PVin p. 50, line 20.

¹³ PVin_T II, p. 30*, line 10.

¹⁴ PVin p. 38, line 3.

copying the segment *sa tyo pya nu pa la kṣi tāḥ*. For given the similarity of an *akṣara* with *ya* and the *akṣara pa* (here following closely on one another), the copyist's eye may have easily jumped from *pya* to *pa*, moving from there on to *la*. The plausibility of the resulting reading would have blinded subsequent copyists to the change that had crept into the text.

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