I argue that the near exclusion of Indian philosophies from Western philosophies of religion is a part of a larger problem of the exclusion of Indian and non-Western philosophies from the Western philosophical canon in general. There are a number of reasons that have come together to produce this effect, some more pernicious than others. I suggest here that one of the crucial reasons is that, historically, Indian philosophies are seldom viewed as legitimate forms of philosophical inquiry. “Indian thought” is more akin to religion, mysticism, and mythology, based on tradition, superstition, and faith. This is usually contrasted with the reason and rationality of “the West” – which is frequently held to emerge from European cultures and essential to its identity (from Greece to Germany, England, and France) – where one boldly faces self and world without prior and illusory commitments, and is willing to be taken to wherever the arguments and evidence may lead. Reason and rationality, in contrast to tradition and dogma, are the hallmarks of philosophical thinking in the West (see, amongst many, e.g., Kant 1760; Hegel 1830; Husserl 1954). These are generally regarded to be opposed to religion as faith, the acceptance of claims without evidence on the basis of revealed truth, the defining characteristic of religion for Enlightenment Europe. The tendency to equate religion with particular Judeo-Christian self-understandings of faith and God, and philosophy with specific conceptions of reason and rationality, seems to have been adopted as a near self-evident truth.

I suggest that the rejection and outright denigration of Indian philosophies as philosophies proper has, in part, to do with this antagonism. In various Indian contexts, not only is there often the lack of such an adversarial relationship between “reason” and “faith”, but, there appears to exist an intimate connection between the two, at least for major schools of philosophy such as Advaita Vedānta and those of Buddhism. Furthermore, many such philosophies are integrally committed to practice and experience; they are often soteriological and have enlightenment as their goal. Like their Greek counterparts, most philosophers of India in the ancient world engage in reason and argumentation, in reflection, and in contemplation, as a means...
to understanding and living well. Philosophy is integrally interconnected with practice, the purpose of which is to arrive at insight and understanding about, for example, self, world, and the Absolute.

Nevertheless, even if such reflective and contemplative practices are “really religion,” Indian philosophies should at least make appearances in the philosophy of religion, but this too is rarely the case. I contend that many such traditions do not fit neatly well here either, as the basic ontological categories of what constitutes religion are derived from a dominant and pervasive constellation of Judeo-Christian traditions: religion paradigmatically centers on a particular conception of God, revealed in scripture as the wholly distinct other, the omniscient and omnipotent creator of all souls, ex nihilo, their benefactor and ultimate judge, where salvation is achieved through faith in the singular and exclusive Divinity.

In part one of this chapter, I suggest that the exclusion of non-Western philosophies is due, in part, to two dominant historical and conceptual ideas: First, Western philosophy’s self-definition in terms of its victory against faith and dogma on the basis of reason and rationality. The second is a theory of racial hierarchy and the idea that reason and rationality – whatever these consist in – are only possible for the “European races”, hence, ipso facto, non-Western understandings of philosophy cannot be philosophy proper. But as problematically, given that such thought also fails to be truly religious, there is no need to investigate it in the philosophy of religion.

In part two, I explore how Advaitan Vedāntic understandings of self as the Absolute or “God”, from their early inception by philosophers such as Śāṅkara to current “neo”-Vedāntic views, problematize and sit uncomfortably with Enlightenment conceptions of philosophy and religion, and that of their borders. Faith and reason are not conceived of as antagonistic paths to understanding self, world, and the Absolute. Maintaining “faith” or śraddhā and trust in teacher, guru, and God or understanding God through reason and argumentation are preliminary and provisional steps that must be independently corroborated by one’s direct experience (anubhava) of the unity of one’s identity with “God” – conceived of here as self-luminous pure consciousness (cit, caitanya), or Absolute beingness. God or the Absolute here is none other than one’s innermost self, and coming to this realization constitutes enlightenment. On a predominant interpretation of such views, especially those of “neo”-Vedānta, no amount of reading, argumentation, and debate, nor faith in the guru’s words or Vedic text, although instrumentally integral to the path, can bring full insight, which must be experienced by oneself. One must scale both the walls of “faith” and “reason” to achieve enlightenment. As such, I argue that traditional Western notions of self and God, and the demarcation between philosophy and religion on the basis of historically and conceptually specific self-understandings of both reason and faith, often lead to the exclusion and distorted and truncated understandings of non-European philosophies from the canon.
My chapter is a part of a larger project of globalizing both philosophy and religion through engaging with a plurality and diversity of world philosophies, the possibility of which, according to Kant and many of his followers, does not exist. Such an engagement has the potential to enrich and broaden our understandings of not only the discipline of philosophy, but ourselves and the world.

I. Faith versus reason

The predominant tendency of conceiving religion as faith in opposition to reason, evidence, and argumentation has become near commonplace. For example, as Richard Dawkins of the New Atheist Movement says:

If you ask people why they are convinced of the truth of their religion, they don’t appeal to heredity. Put like that it sounds too obviously stupid. Nor do they appeal to evidence. There isn’t any, and nowadays the better educated admit it. No, they appeal to faith. Faith is the great cop-out, the great excuse to evade the need to think and evaluate evidence. Faith is belief in spite of, even perhaps because of, the lack of evidence. The worst thing is that the rest of us are supposed to respect it: to treat it with kid gloves. If a slaughterman doesn’t comply with the law in respect of cruelty to animals, he is rightly prosecuted and punished. But if he complains that his cruel practices are necessitated by religious faith, we back off apologetically and allow him to get on with it. Any other position that someone takes up can expect to be defended with reasoned argument. Faith is allowed not to justify itself by argument. Faith must be respected; and if you don’t respect it, you are accused of violating human rights.3


I am certainly sympathetic to the point made by Dawkins regarding the idea that simply because something is a religious or cultural practice does not and should not make it an Absolute value or right that overrides all other values in a liberal democracy. However, the underlying contrast between faith and reason as antagonistic leaves us in a dangerous rivalry amid the supposedly impermeable borders between public reason and irrational private faith. Here, reason often slides from simply referring to well-established rules of inference and deduction to substantive secular notions regarding the meaning and significance of life and the origin of the cosmos. An irony and danger, I would argue, is that it is the very conception of the impenetrable borders between reason and faith that is in part responsible for the continuation of the cruelty to which Dawkins points: the isolation of the religious as a purely private matter leaves it immune from public reason and scrutiny, as in Rawls’s view of public reason (1999). While isolating
religious citizens, it leaves religion to petrify in the hands of monstrous fundamentalists like Hindutva or Wahhabism – while ignoring that reason and faith can and have worked in tandem – as we see with various religious and spiritual movements, which continue to grow and re-interpret their various doctrines in light of what we continue to learn about the human condition, suffering, and equality.

This is not to mention another distorted assumption that underlies much of such discourse: that of reason and science as somehow intrinsically pristine and virtuous, ethical, and immune from religious dogma that leads to hate and violence. Nagasaki and Hiroshima remind us too well of the falsity of such claims, as do the countless horrors inflicted daily on non-human animals in the name of science (perhaps Dawkins can take up the cause here as well). In addition, let us remember the terror inflicted on the world by Hitler, Mao, and Stalin in the name of secular political ideology. That is, religion alone is not the sole instrument of terror, not to mention the ethical good that religions also promote. Indeed, it was certainly not Enlightened European liberal secular notions of individual freedom and equality that nourished either Gandhi’s Satyagraha movement to free India from the cruel and oppressive British Raj or Martin Luther King’s civil rights movement. In fact, it was the opposite: it was so-called religious or spiritual views that held these emancipatory movements together. The Judeo-Christian concept of equality before the eyes of God, as well as the Jaina concept of non-violence or ahimsā are path-breaking and revolutionary ideals that have and continue to foster human freedom and well-being for many such unfortunate and unenlightened souls.

There are, of course, other deep substantive philosophical issues here, a little hidden perhaps. As is often argued: in any discourse, the chain of reasoning must stop somewhere, for there is no further explanation: be it the law of identity and non-contradiction, or the gravitational, electromagnetic, strong, and weak forces in physics, or the idea that the pain and suffering of others matters. Justifications stop, and a Wittgensteinian might simply say: this is how we do things; no reasons can be given as to why the pain of others (including non-human animals) matters and should matter, as this is the axiomatic assumption upon which many metaethical positions rest. This is along with the idea that value, significance, and purpose are indeed a part of the furniture of the cosmos, yet we cannot squeeze these out of our scientific data, since it assumes it in the first place. Religion is not the only discipline that rests on adherence to assumptions that cannot be “proven”. The naïve realist view of science as giving us the objective, neutral, and universal God’s eye view of reality as it is in-itself leaves out the crucial role that human value plays in scientific inquiry. As well, it leaves out the fact that we can never step outside ourselves to compare our perceptions with the thing-in-itself, or that all our observations rest in human experience from which such inquiry cannot extricate itself. My point is not, of course,
that we should somehow “abandon” science, but that it is not the only, and arguably not the primary, domain that offers insight into the human condition and ethics.

The adversarial dichotomy between faith and reason is not universal or cross-culturally shared (certainly, even within Euro-Western traditions). We thus need to explore in more detail the historically disparate conceptions and self-understandings of reason and rationality, and faith, between philosophers, theologians, and practitioners of religions and spiritualities, within cross-cultural global contexts from inter-disciplinary viewpoints, as well as within European traditions themselves.

Now, in this regard, in Europe, the antagonism between faith and reason was not always so. The great medieval philosopher and theologian Aquinas (1265–1274), provides a systematic and detailed philosophy that attempts to prove the existence of God on the basis of reason (Summa Theologiae, 1a, 2). Although he argues that religious truth based on revelation by God is a higher order truth, reason is indispensable to the inquiry into such truths. His arguments for the existence of God continue to be debated among theologians, as well as philosophers. Such attempts to provide reason and arguments for God or soul are rejected by the English theologian and empiricist William of Ockham (c.1327). The nature of the antagonism between faith and reason has its roots with the work of this English theologian and empiricist who contends that belief in God is never a matter of reason, but solely one of faith. From this the great historical and conceptual divide continues with the Protestant Reformation and Wars of Religion. The chasm deepens with the rise of empiricism and science, instigated by the Copernican revolution, Galileo, and Newton. The rift further expands through the Enlightenment. It is strengthened by the overthrow of the political power wielded by the Catholic Church, which gives birth to liberalism and the modern secular world, and the separation of church and state, grounded in the work of philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Kant. Kant cements the divide by placing religion beyond the objects of possible experience and beyond the ken of knowledge and rationality, as a matter of faith; philosophy is inaugurated as intrinsically tied to reason (see, e.g., Critique 1781/1787, A826/B854).

Whatever reason and rationality are (and how these relate to perception, emotion, and the will) – as accounts vary from Aristotle, Hume, to Kant – they are the central defining feature of human agency in the West, the pinnacle of what it means to be human. Indeed, rationality is intimately connected to the prized value of individual autonomy, which becomes the cornerstone of modern liberalism. Rationality and reason are what make possible human agency and human freedom itself. As Richard King contends, the prevalent tendency that emerges from the Age of Reason is to conceive of rationality in contrast and opposition to custom and tradition in general, and religion in particular (1999, 4). Reason is what comes to define both science and philosophy, where the only and sole authority is
evidence and inference; this is in stark opposition to the authority of the Christian Church where one must accept whatever one is told on the basis of faith – where this acceptance is deemed to be of such intrinsic value that one’s very salvation is guaranteed only in proportion to one’s acceptance of dogma. The demise of clerical authority is no less predicated on the abuse of power by the Church, along with its inability to cope with internal diversity of belief and challenges to its dogma. The tendency then is to conceive of rationality – and philosophy – in opposition to the oppressive authority of the Church, as the secular pursuit of truth. Rationality moves from an instrumental faculty that allows one to infer, deduce, and analyze, to a thick substantive notion that is grounded in secularity and particular conceptions of objectivity.

In the 19th and 20th centuries, emerging from empiricist traditions, with the rise and success of science and technology, philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap, Bertrand Russell, and A.J. Ayer usher in the birth of analytic philosophy, the use of reason to clarify concepts and debunk metaphysical and religious questions as pure mythology. For many such philosophers, there was not much left to do: science, which had been a part of philosophy, becomes an independent enterprise. Even ethics is seen but as a fictional and subjective projection onto an inherently meaningless cosmos, an error of sorts without cognitive value, as later J.L. Mackie would argue. Philosophy is then to concern itself mainly with problems of language and logic, of which Indian thought supposedly contributes little. Philosophy becomes a meta-discipline par excellence: a tool that can be applied to any subject whatsoever to clarify and uncover tacit or hidden assumptions, to unearth the epistemological, ontological, metaphysical, ethical, and logical foundations and flaws in a variety of fields, grounded in secular reason alone: it is applied to science, language, sociology, history, politics, and, of course, religion and faith.

**Reason as will to power**

Rationality and reason do not simply deliver inert truths about what defines our place in the cosmos: they are wedded to power, which justifies the domination of Nature and non-human animals, women, and the inferior non-European savage races (see Mohanty 1992; King 1999; Van Norden 2019; Park 2013). Not only does Kant cement the divide between reason and faith, between philosophy and religion, but, as both Park and Van Norden, convincingly demonstrate, he denies the possibility of rationality to inferior non-European savage races. Kant, his followers, and even his critics (e.g., Hegel), argue that Indians, Chinese, Africans, and other various non-European peoples are not capable of the kind of abstraction that reason and rationality require – and, ipso facto, are thus incapable of doing philosophy (race is a scientific category for Kant). In his *Sublime Waste*, Mark Larrimore discusses Kant’s extended argument...
of this in his lecture notes known as *Menschenkunde* [c.1781–82]. As Kant contends:

The Hindus . . . have a strong degree of calm, and all look like philosophers. That notwithstanding, they are much inclined to anger and love. They thus are educable in the highest degree, but only to the arts and not to the sciences. They will never achieve abstract concepts. . . . The Hindus will always stay as they are, they will never go farther, even if they started educating themselves much earlier. . . . The American people are uneducable . . . for they lack affect and passion. They are not amorous, and so are not fertile. They speak hardly at all . . . care for nothing and are lazy. . . . The race of Negroes, one could say, is entirely the opposite . . . ; they are full of affect and passion, very lively, chatty and vain. It can be educated, but only to the education of servants, i.e. they can be trained. They have many motives . . . are sensitive, fear blows and do much out of concern for honor. . . . The race of the whites contains all motives and talents in itself; and so one must observe it more carefully. To the white race belong all of Europe, the Turks, and the Kalmucks.

(1999, 111)

Now, before Kant, as Park and Van Norden argue, non-Western philosophies, such as Indian and Chinese philosophies, were more or less considered philosophies proper in Europe (however backward non-Europeans were, they were still capable of philosophy). The idea that philosophy originated in Greece was “the opinion of an extreme minority of historians” (Park, 76). Kant, who is considered one of the greatest philosophers of Europe, provides a new “scientific” revelation: Chinese, Indians, Africans, and Indigenous Peoples are not capable of doing philosophy because they, as a matter of biological fact, lack the intellect required for rational thought. Kant’s incredible, absurd, and monstrous claim has a momentous impact on the development and self-understandings of European philosophers and their highly guarded discipline (in both analytic and continental traditions). As Van Norden contends: many “contemporary [American] philosophers [also] take it for granted that there is no Chinese, Indian, African or Native American philosophy. If this is a coincidence, it is a stunning one” (22).8

Indeed, rationality and freedom have commonly been used by European philosophers to justify the theft and dispossession of Indigenous lands: for Locke, freedom involves representative government and private property, and since the savage races lack these, they may be dispossessed of their land. For Mill, the rule of British Empire over India is justified in order to teach backward tradition-bound Indians about the value of liberal individual autonomy (see Parekh 1995; Peetush 2003b). Indeed, there is a singular trajectory that leads to modernity and civilization in the march of historical progress: from Greece to Europe. As Hegel is often quoted: “World history
travels from east to west; for Europe is the Absolute end of history, just as Asia is the beginning” (1830, 197).9

II. Enlightening the unEnlightened or philosophizing with the hammer of Euro-Western philosophy

India’s path to modernity does not travel through the experience of the Enlightenment where reason, rationality, and, indeed, human agency itself, are liberated from the shackles of an oppressive and abusive religious power of a central Church, which proclaims the singular Truth of the nature of self, world, and God for all members of the community. The point of Joseph Nicolas Robert-Fleury’s painting of Galileo before the Holy Office in the Vatican, being condemned by the Tribunal of the Inquisition for having defended the theories of Copernicus, would be lost on classical Indian philosophers, such as Śaṅkara – with tragic irony, not so currently, given Hindutva nationalist movements. Indians already accepted that the earth was not the center of the cosmos long before the violent upheaval that this realization caused in Europe, given the dogmatic theocracy of the Church. In India, there was no central theological power that demanded compliance with the singular Truth, whatever other oppressive features existed in Indian society at the time (and indeed there were many, e.g., caste hierarchy and the treatment of women, but regular religious persecution was not among them).10 This is one of the reasons that various conquerors had a challenge attempting to categorize the “religion” of the Indians or “Hindoos”. The philosophical-spiritual frameworks indigenous amongst Indians diverged so fundamentally, where atheist schools co-existed alongside theistic schools, where monists and dualists heatedly debated with one another (as they had done for millennia, something to which the Upaniṣads attest), yet no one was slaughtered at the end of the exchange on account of such paramount disagreements.

The absence of a Euro-Western style “enlightenment” period in India’s history is not to suggest that India did not value pluralism or diversity. In fact, I would contend that India, for much of its history apart from modern and current forms of nationalism is generally an illustration of concord amongst diverse communities of thought. However, the path to tolerance and concord between such differing sects and perspectives did not emerge through the Enlightenment wall of separation model that comes to be defined as modern secularism, as an antidote to religion’s inability – as faith – to cope with difference. Because one cannot reason about “faith”, religion must be severed from the political as well as the philosophical and scientific sphere. As I have argued elsewhere (2015), in the Indian context, in contrast, toleration emerges organically through various “religious” perspectives themselves. One of the first instances of political toleration and respect of diversity as a political virtue is established by the Buddhist Emperor Aśoka (c. 268–c. 238 BCE) as an articulation of the “religious” principle of ahimsā
or non-harm, which Buddhist and Upaniṣadic schools borrowed from Jaina philosopher-monks:

King Priyadarshi honors men of all sects [pāsanḍāni], and both ascetics and laymen alike, with gifts and various marks of recognition. Yet he does not value either gifts or honors as much as growth in the qualities essential to all sects. This growth may take many forms, but its root is in guarding one’s speech to avoid extolling one’s own sect and disparaging the sect of others improperly or, when the occasion is appropriate, immoderately. The sect of others all deserve to be honored for different reasons. By honoring them, one exalts one’s own sect and at the same time performs a service to the sect of others. By acting otherwise, one injures his own sect and also does disservice to the sect of others. But if a man extols his own sect and disparages another because of devotion to his own and because he wants to glorify it, he seriously injures his own sect. Therefore concord alone is commendable, for through concord men may learn and respect the conception of Dhamma accepted by others. King Priyadarshi desires men of all sects to know each other’s doctrines and to acquire sound doctrines. Those who are attached to their particular sects should be told that King Priyadarshi does not value gifts or honors as much as growth in the qualities essential to all sects. Many officials are assigned to tasks bearing this purpose – the officers in charge of spreading the Dhamma, the superintendents of women in the Royal household, the inspectors of cattle and pasture lands, and other officials. The objective of these measures is the promotion of each man’s particular sect and the glorification of Dhamma.

(Thapar 1997, 255)\(^{11}\)

The Enlightenment antagonism that comes to form the backdrop of religion as faith versus philosophy as reason in Europe does not obtain in the Indian context. Philosophy and spirituality are not conceived of as adversaries.

But the Indian context does not have a word that translates as philo-


\(\text{osophia, the love of understanding or wisdom. Some have tried to find Sans-


krit equivalents that attempt to relate it somehow to the use of reason and logical inference (e.g., ānvikṣikī, see Mohanty 286–287), but this seems to me a misguided approach in important regards. Such attempts are odd to those who think of philosophy, in addition to an intellectual and systematic reflection on areas such as ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and logic, as a kind of organic activity and practice that intrinsically overlaps with other activities and practices. Philosophy is thrust upon oneself in the face of lived experience and suffering that culminates in a search for ultimate meaning, purpose, and significance. Importantly, in trying to appease Euro-


Western analytic philosophers that Indians actually are capable of “abstract thought”, such attempts distort the organic nature of philosophies in India.
by anachronistically attempting to Enlighten the Indian by demarcating the sphere of reason (ānvīkṣikī) and that of faith, of philosophy and religion.

Moreover, etymological equivalences in Sanskrit are even less necessary, given a cursory glance at, for example, various classical Indian texts of Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), Akṣapāda Gautama (composer of Nyāya Sūtras, 6th–2nd CE) or Śāṅkara (c. 788–820 CE), which are filled with the weighing and giving of detailed arguments, objections, and rebuttals on theories of epistemology (e.g., pramāṇas or valid means of knowledge), metaphysics (e.g., self, spatiotemporally, causality, Being), and logic (e.g., valid rules of inference and argumentation). One might object however that such thought significantly differs from its European counterparts: its purpose, its telos, is religious and soteriological, it is the experience of enlightenment. Even if one were to accept, for example, Advaita as “philosophy proper”, there can be no denying that it is, ultimately, a practical enterprise: it is a guide to overcoming suffering and living the Good – defined in specific terms, as with other philosophies. However, philosophy, as Husserl argues, is about theory, and not practice. We should not be “blind” to “essential differences” between Greek philosophy and Indian and Chinese thought, for:

But within their own [Indian and Chinese] framework of meaning this world-view and world-knowledge are and remain mythical and practical, and it is a mistake, a falsification of their sense, for those raised in the scientific ways of thinking created in Greece and developed in the modern period to speak of Indian and Chinese philosophy and science... Sharply distinguished from this universal but mythical-practical attitude is the “theoretical” attitude, which is not practical in any sense used so far... to which the great figures of the first culminating period of Greek philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, traced the origin of philosophy. Man becomes gripped by the passion of a world-view and world-knowledge that turns away from all practical interests and, within the closed sphere of its cognitive activity, in the times devoted to it, strives for and achieves nothing but pure theoria. In other words, man becomes a nonparticipating spectator, surveyor of the world; he becomes a philosopher.

(Husserl 1954, 284–285)

As the eminent philosopher J.N. Mohanty argues, this is a false characterization, a gross exaggeration, of much of ancient Greek philosophy, much of which sees philosophy as integral to the practice of living a good life. It mischaracterizes the distinction between theory and practice for the Greeks and overstates its significance; it is we moderns who have severed the connection between philosophy and life (1992, 284). This approach to philosophy would be alien to much of the Greek world, certainly Socrates as well as Plotinus.
Such an approach not only essentializes over various and vast non-
Euro-Western traditions of philosophy but also the “Western” discipline
of philosophy. Western academic philosophers have little trouble ignor-
ing the practical telos of such philosophies, or their religious context to
retrieve valuable philosophical insight. For example, while reading Par-
menides’ “philosophical poem” on Being (c. 500 BCE), it is commonplace
to abstract away the context of his supernatural journey to the Goddess,
who blesses him with the knowledge of Being; this is just the metaphorical
and figurative foil in which the real “philosophical” insight, or rasa, into
Being is saved. Yet, such “generosity” is rarely afforded Indian texts, as
it is the belief in the Goddesses/Gods that suddenly becomes the critical
message of such texts, and not the philosophical insight they may have
to offer. This is problematic for numerous reasons, the least of which is
that it distorts the fact that many Indian philosophies and spiritualties are
atheistic.

Let us recall that Indian poets and philosophers were among the earliest
to inquire into the nature of self, being, and origin of the cosmos as such,
and some of the earliest to question whether the Gods, or God, have any
valuable insight to impart in this regard. As the Indian poet-philosopher in
Origin Poem or Nāsadiya in the Ṛgveda – the earliest philosophical poem in
the Indo-European traditions (c. 1500 BCE) reflects:

There was not non-Being or not Being then
There was not space nor sky beyond
There was neither death or immortality then, no distinction between
night and day . . .
That one, windless, breathed, self-supported
Nothing other than that was beyond . . .
Darkness was hidden by darkness in the beginning
All this was ocean without distinction . . .
That, coming into being, was which was enveloped by emptiness
Was born . . .
Desire arose for the first time, which was the primal seed of thought
Poets reflected in their heart with wisdom
Found in nothing the bond of Being . . .
There was inherent impulse below, offering above . . .
[but] who truly knows? From where [was this] born? . . .
The Gods came afterwards, who then knows when this came into being
Whence this creation arose, perhaps it formed itself, or perhaps it
did not.
The one who looks down on it, in the highest heaven, only he knows –
or perhaps he does not know.¹⁴

(10, 129)
Let us note that the Rgveda is one of the seminal and critical “religious” or śruti texts for key classical Indian philosophies, as well as Hinduism – what kind of “religious” text questions the Gods or God on high?

All said, Mohanty himself makes a similar claim to Husserl in thinking of Advaita as philosophy. He delineates the boundaries of the philosophical by severing it from practical interest and argues that philosophy stops at reflection or manana in Advaita. Because contemplation or nīdīdhyāsana has the final result of a practical realization (anubhava) and mokṣa, it is “beyond philosophy” as “philosophy is in no interesting sense practical” (280–81). I agree with both Richard King (1999) and Alan Preti (2014) that cutting off certain Indian philosophies, like Vedānta, from their soteriological and practical aims (attempting to “secularize” them) may be a good practical strategy to appease Euro-Western academic philosophers that these are really philosophies proper. And, given the context and time in which Mohanty writes, such a strategy is certainly justified in light of what he was up against. Additionally, bracketing spiritual concerns may be legitimate given one’s particular purpose, certainly Western philosophers do this all the time with regard to Greek “philosophy”. But I am concerned that it also runs the danger of distorting the shape of key schools of philosophies, especially those of Vedānta and various Buddhist schools, for Indian philosophy does not emerge as a battle between the Faith and Reason.

I would even go a step further: perhaps what we need to do is Indianize (or re-Hellenize) Western philosophy; perhaps we need to excavate a more ancient form of the philosophical as integrally connected to lived experience, as fundamentally a form of contemplative practice (see Erin McCarthy’s chapter in this volume), which organically grows out of pervasive and grassroots questions that arise out of lived experience, for the practical purpose of living a valuable life. Certainly, Marx might agree to this extent – the purpose of philosophy is not simply one of interpreting the world, but transforming it. Moreover, current movements in Western philosophy such as philosophical therapy, specifically existential therapy, do not seem to raise deep, enduring, and alarming suspicions about the Western philosophical cannon, even though, for example, existentialism is drenched in practical concerns, and as well, in metaphysical presuppositions about the nature of self and world that must be taken on the basis of trust.

the title of Philosophers. He asks: “have Asians had any of the needs which
have led Western universities to teach Seneca, Ockham, Hume, and Husserl
in the same department” (1989, 333). As such, “philosophy” cannot be
extended to non-Western philosophers, although Rorty himself clearly has
never read any such philosophers in any depth.15 And what point would
there really be, given his theory of interpretation? Because any philosophy
that we saw in them would be to impose upon them our own European
needs and purposes.

One wonders however, what is Rorty doing when he reads Heidegger or
Carnap together as “philosophers” – whom he admits share “almost none”
of the same purposes and needs? As Mohanty contends, if one can com-
pare such fundamentally diverse thinkers as Heidegger and Quine and call
them philosophers, who I would argue shared little more in common than
the fact that they are European intellectuals, then “why not Heidegger and
Śāṅkara – even if neither of the three were responding to exactly the same
needs. If ‘imaginative recontextualization’ is needed to compare Śāṅkara
and Bradley, the same is also needed to compare Plato and Heidegger, Hus-
serl, and Quine” (287). In fact, I would argue that Śāṅkara and Heidegger
share much more in common than do Heidegger and Quine or Carnap; see
Taber’s (1983) work in this regard. Furthermore, even if such traditions
develop in historical isolation that does not mean that they are not doing
similar things and asking similar kinds of conceptual questions, given the
nature of human existence. Yes, Indians too wondered about self, conscious-
ness, causality, God, and meaning – and they came up with sophisticated
arguments and debated heatedly about the valid means of knowledge, rules
of inference, and the like. They share a form of life with Europeans, as
Rorty’s hero Wittgenstein might have put it.

**Philosophy of religion: Faith in God as the supreme other**

However, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the discomfort with
Indian thought as philosophy is right on the mark, philosophies and spir-
itualities are intertwined in Indian traditions such as Vedānta. While this
might explain the reluctance of Western academic philosophers to admit
Indian philosophies into their highly guarded discipline, it still does not
explain why these “religions” are rarely studied in the sub-field of West-
ern philosophy of religion. Indeed, Western philosophy conceives of itself
as the meta-discipline par-excellence, and religious belief and faith is one
such sub-field it aims to lay bare and dissect. So, why then do Indian phi-
losophies rarely make but a nominal appearance even here? Why are they
often excluded from, at least, the philosophy of religion? Andrei Buckareff
and Yujin Nagasawa recently concur in their *Alternative Concepts of God*
(2016, 6–8), analytic philosophy of religion is dominated by categories of
Christian theology, seeking often to ground various Christian concepts of
self and God, and attempting to respond to problems in this context (see also Bilimoria and Irvine, 2009).

I would go further. Perhaps Indian thought/practices fail to be genuinely religious too. In lay terms, such a view is certainly popular: Hinduism and Buddhism are not really religions but more “ways of life” or “philosophies.” This is not usually intended as a compliment. That is, various Indian/non-European philosophies and religions, may not only not resonate well with the basic categories of what counts as Enlightened philosophy, but, additionally, many such traditions may not resonate well with basic categories of what counts as religion too. This is because such categories are often derived from Judeo-Christian theologies. I think this is at least true of various atheistic schools of Buddhism such as Zen, experiential forms of Advaita Vedānta, Nyāya, and Jaina philosophies, to list a few. For a detailed interrogation of the conceptual categories that underlie the concept of religion in Euro-Western traditions (which I cannot provide within the present work), see Masuzawa 2007 and Balagangadhara 2013.

Major schools of philosophies in the Indian context are thus in a double bind. They are not really philosophies because of their supposed dependence on “faith,” but they are not really religions because they do not fit well with Judeo-Christian concepts of the self and the divine. Many are plainly atheistic.

Differences are especially pronounced when exploring the dominant constellation of views of the nature of salvation and the divine among various Christian traditions. Salvation is most often thought to be achieved through faith in the one true God. This is the singular and exclusive ontological source of the cosmos, the creator of the world and of all souls, the transcendently distinct other: the Absolute immutable reality, the Aristotelian uncaused cause, the self-existent Being that is dependent on no other, infinite and unlimited, existing outside of time, who, as Aquinas argues, brings the cosmos and souls into existence out of nothing, *ex nihilo*, in whom essence and existence are one (see Summa Theologica, Question 45 and 46, Article 2). While such a Supreme Being is immanent in His creation, as its efficient cause (as an artist is to her work), and while human beings can become exalted to Sainthood (at least on the Catholic view) by living lives of extraordinary virtue, they cannot become divine. Human beings never lose their status as beings dependent on God. In this, most Christian theologies agree. God is the omniscient and omnipotent other. And whether our relationship to Him is mediated by the Church or not, such a God is a personal God, of infinite compassion and mercy.

I am aware that I am leaving out rich, complex, and sophisticated philosophical and theological debates within Christian traditions. My sketch here is meant to outline only some of the resemblances among the Christian family of views of divine nature. A simple glance at the work of philosophers and theologians such as Pascal, James, Tillich, Buber, Hick, or Plantinga,
shows the diversity among such views – some of whom argue that faith and reason cannot be so neatly severed – and this is apart from thinkers such as Spinoza, Eckhart, and the Christian Mystics. In addition, no doubt, there are Indian views that resonate and overlap here with such conceptions of the divine; in particular, I am thinking of Madhva’s Dvaita Vedānta or the various devotional or bhakti movements, which also form a large and significant aspect of theistic Hinduism, although, let us note that not all bhakti movements are theistic (e.g., Kabir).\textsuperscript{16}

Nevertheless, let me point out that Spinoza’s, Hegel’s, and Eckhart’s views of the divine are but minority views in the Judeo-Christian tradition, whereas similar perspectives in India are in no way marginal. The Advaitic understanding self, world, and God (i.e., the monistic understanding of self as God) form dominant constellations, and critically influence the trajectory and development of what is now understood as Hinduism. Not only are such views, by far, the dominant understanding of Advaita, many of them have inspired and continue to inspire contemporary New Age spiritualities, where practitioners are tired of having to choose, as Sonia Sikka puts it in her chapter, the bundles view of religion as faith: pick a bundle and accept everything that is a part of the bundle, questioning no part of it.

Yet the prevalent constellation of Judeo-Christian categories does not resonate well with many Indian spiritualities. Indeed, various Indian traditions are most properly described as non-theistic or atheistic. This is certainly true of most forms of Advaita and “neo”-Advaita, Mimamsa, Yoga, and Jaina philosophies, which do not give ultimate importance to conceptions of God as wholly distinct from self, as the all-powerful creator of the cosmos and the plurality of souls. Nor, for that matter, is faith or śraddhā conceived of as having the power to independently confer enlightenment. Rather, it is most often understood as a preliminary step towards that which must be corroborated in experience and practice. At the same time, reason is also not viewed as the only/sufficient means to attain enlightenment. Faith, reason, and spiritual experience in various Indian traditions, although overlapping and crisscrossing in some ways with particular forms of Christian theologies, often become uncomfortably dislocating and disorienting.

Approaching Indian traditions with various such categories, can sometimes feel as though one is struggling to force a square peg into a round opening: you need a particularly strong hammer, and when you are done, you either end up breaking the peg and/or totally distorting its shape. But eventually, it is the hammer that breaks, if one is fortunate enough to achieve some insight. Indeed, contra Nietzsche’s injunction, philosophizing with a hammer in searching out hollow idols is foolish when it is the very hammer of Euro-Western Enlightened philosophy itself that has become a meaningless and vacant idol – and perhaps it was all along – under the guise of the neutral, objective, and universal means to knowledge of self, world, and God. That is, our basic conceptual categories, which we may think of
as universal, can, unwittingly, distort the multiplicity, plurality, and the rich diversity of what we are trying to understand.

III. The Self as the Absolute or God in Advaita

Let me explore how dominant self-understandings of self as God in Advaita Vedānta problematize post-Enlightenment conceptions of religion and philosophy, and their demarcation in terms of faith versus reason. Faith or śraddhā, spirituality or religion, and reason or philosophy in Advaita are not conceived of as antagonistic or divergent paths to an understanding of self, world, and the Absolute/God – although conceptualized differently. They are mutually supportive instrumental means that purportedly lead to a direct and immediate self-certifying and self-illuminous experience of pure consciousness, anubhava, where one’s true Self or Ātman is uncovered in its numerical identity with unconditioned Brahma or beingness. Having faith or śraddhā, conceived of as a form of trust, in guru, the Vedas, or God, or arriving at knowledge through reason (anumāna) and perception (pratyakṣa), are preliminary and provisional steps that must ultimately be corroborated through direct experience (anubhava) that verifies the truth of Advaita: the identity of one’s innermost self as God. This is not, however, Anselm’s project of “faith seeking understanding,” where one attempts to make sense of, through reason, that which must be accepted as true without evidence on the basis of the intrinsic good of faith in the omniscient and external God, the good by which one is ultimately saved.

Systematic classical Advaita Vedānta emerges from roughly the 8th century CE with Śaṅkara’s analysis, development, and philosophical defense of Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahmāsūtra (400–450 CE) against rival schools of philosophy, and further evolves through arguments made by Śaṅkara’s students, Śureśvara and Padmapāda. The philosophical monism of Advaita and its account of self or Ātman as Brahma or the Absolute, has a critical impact on the development of what comes to be understood under the umbrella of the diverse schools of Hinduism. Different threads of Śaṅkara’s work – in particular, its experiential component or anubhava – are refined and evolve in various insightful directions by philosophers, practitioners, and rṣis, such as Ramakrishna (1836–1886), Śrī Ramānā Mahārṣi (1879–1850), Vivekananda (1863–1902), and Radhakrishnan (1888–1975). Indeed, Gandhi refers to himself as an Advaitist and uses the identity of self and other at the heart of Advaita to ground his criticism of caste hierarchy and the treatment of women, as do Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan (see Peetush for detailed exegetical arguments 2017). These moderns are Advaitans in their own right, showing how this approach can creatively respond to circumstances, needs, and challenges of a modern world.

Indeed, Advaita is an example of a living and breathing philosophical and spiritual tradition. The various interpretations of Advaita (as with
most Indian schools of philosophy are not simply abstract theories of the nature of self, Being, and the world; they are intimately connected to practice as guides to spiritual understanding and experience. Soteriological aims are not adventitious but their very raison d’être, their purpose; such goals are integral and ground the very enterprise of systematic and reasoned reflection for these schools. It seems to me that this is one of the attractions of Indian philosophies such as Advaita (or the various schools of Buddhism): the phenomenological and practical insight that they may have to offer. Contrary to Husserl, as for most of the ancient Greek landscape, philosophy is not simply about theory: it arises from and culminates in lived experience, as contemplative practice, as self-transformation, as a path to clearer understanding of self and world, and ultimately ethics (indeed the latter of which Śākara himself says little, and which Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan creatively develop, in particular with regard to oppression and inequality; Peetush 2017). Radhakrishnan argues:

It is the intimate relation between the truth of philosophy and the daily life of people that makes religion always alive and real. . . . On account of the close connection between theory and practice, doctrine and life, a philosophy which could not stand the test of life . . . had no chance of survival. To those who realize that the true kinship between life and theory, philosophy becomes a way of life, an approach to spiritual realization.

(Radhakrishnan 1999, 26)

Śākara’s commentary on Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahmasūtra begins with a deliberation on the nature of Being or the ultimate. From the epistemic perspective afforded by ordinary phenomenal existence of spatiotemporality at the level of vyāvahārika, Brahmān or the Absolute may be conceptualized or understood as a personal God or Iśvara. Depending on one’s inclinations, needs, and what resonates most, Brahmān may be personified in a thousand ways, including Kṛṣṇa, Śiva, Durgā, or Sarasvatī. This is Brahmān/Absolute Reality as understood with attributes, or saṅgaṇa Brahmān. From the level of ultimate reality however, or pāramārthika, Brahmān is thought to be unconditioned beingness, the Absolute, self-identical and independent, without properties; it is nir-guṇa, without qualities. It is the underlying state of beingness in-it-self, the “eternal presence”, without beginning or end, of which the empirical world of phenomena or saṃsāra is a reflection (VS I.1.1–4). Yet Brahmān as the Absolute is not a substance or a thing; it is internally undifferentiated and transcends all pairs of opposites such as existence and non-existence, permanence or change, or finitude or infinitude. As Radhakrishnan points out (536–7), Brahmān is not the eternal Being of Parmenides, the motionless mindless unmoving thing; Brahmān as Absolute is eternal in the senses of supra-temporal
or time-less, that which makes time, space, and causality possible in the first place. Because all descriptions of *Brahman* are false from the standpoint of ultimate reality or *pāramārthika*, it is described negatively in terms of what it is not, as all ascriptions are limiting, and strictly speaking, false (VS III.2.22). Śaṅkara uses the well-known dialogue between Yāgñavalkya and Gārgi (the first documented female philosopher of any tradition of which I am aware) in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* to elaborate:

[Yāgñavalkya] said: ‘That . . . Gārgi, the knowers of Brahman, call [it] the Imperishable. It is not gross [coarse] nor fine, neither short nor long . . . neither air nor space, unattached, without taste, without smell, without eyes, without mind, without radiance, without breath . . . having no within and no without.’

(*Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad* III, 4.2; see Śaṅkara VS II.8.8; US 2.1–4)

Yet *Brahman* is often described as *sat* (truth, existence), *cit* (consciousness), and *ānanda* (bliss). This is *Brahman* as perceived by limiting adjuncts of the empirical/phenomenal world of spatiotemporality, through the *pramāṇas* or means of knowledge, such as reason and perception, and text or *śruti*. But *samsāra* is not ultimately real in the sense that it is transient, subject to decay and destruction, and fundamentally a result of *avidyā* or ignorance, of the unreal being taken as the Real by a misperception of sorts, or *adyāsa* — the apparent presentation, to consciousness, by way of memory of something previously observed in some other thing, as when a rope is mistaken for a snake at dawn. The phenomenal world is thus *māyā*, meaning that it has only relative reality, thus all attributive descriptions of *Brahman* are to be understood only figuratively.

What then of the self of everyday existence, the psycho-physical embodied self of identity, culture, and time, with a unique history, personality, inclinations, and desires? This self of the everyday world is understood as *jīva*, the empirical self, or pure consciousness limited by ignorance of its true identity, which is the higher self or uncreated Ātman. The *jīva* is attributed to the false identification of the Ātman/self with the body and the senses. As Śaṅkara again references Yājñavalkya’s response to Uṣasta Cārāyaṇa regarding the inquiry into self:

Uṣasta Cārāyaṇa said: Explain to me the Brahman that is immediately present and directly perceived, that is the self in all things. “This is yourself that is within all things.” Which is within all things, Yāgñavalkya? “It is yourself within everything.” . . . You cannot see the seer of seeing; you cannot hear the hearer of hearing; you cannot think of the thinker of thinking; you cannot know the knower of knowing. This is your self that is within everything. What is other than this is suffering.

(*Bṛhadāranyakaopaniṣa* III, 4.2; see Śaṅkara, VS I.1.4, 32)
The Ātman cannot be fully realized by the intellect or by reason, and for this matter, such realization cannot be brought about by śraddhā or faith either. Such attempts fail as the intellect is bound by the categories of the phenomenal world (samsāra) within which it functions. The self as pure consciousness (caitanya) without object, as the silent witness or sāksīn, as draṣṭā or seer, is obscured by the impermanent self (jīva) in the world of phenomena in the same manner that the reflection that one sees of oneself in a river is distorted by the nature of turbulence. It is merely a reflection; the known self is not the knowing self because it is constrained by the categories within which the intellect and mind operate (space, time, causality). The self underlying the reflection is identical to Brahman, uncreated and deathless. Ātman is Brahman/Absolute:

The highest [Brahman] – which is the nature of seeing [drśtisvarūpam], like the sky, ever-shining, unborn, one alone, imperishable, stainless, all pervading, and non-dual – That am I and I am forever released. I am Seeing, pure, and by nature changeless. There is by nature no object for me. Being the Infinite, completely filled in front, across, up, down, and in every direction, I am unborn, abiding in Myself. I am unborn, deathless, free from old age, immortal, self-illuminous, all pervading, non-dual. I am neither the cause nor effect, altogether stainless, always satisfied therefore [constantly] released.

(US 10.1)

Furthermore, the pramāṇas or the ordinary means for knowledge (perception, inference) cannot establish knowledge of the self. The self is known with certainty, it is the “eternal presence” or pure consciousness prior to the stream of objects of consciousness; its existence cannot be denied, for the very act of denial presupposes its existence:20

For the [knowledge of the Self] is not, in any person’s case, adventitious, not established through the so called means of right knowledge; it rather is self-established. The Self does not employ perception and the other means of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously non-established objects of knowledge. . . . But the Self, as being the abode of the energy that acts through the means of right knowledge, is itself established previously to that energy. And to refute such a self established entity is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted, but not that which is the essential nature; for it is the essential nature of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted [sublated] by fire itself. Let us further consider. . . “I know at the present moment whatever is present; I knew [at former moments] the nearer and the remoter past; I shall know [in the future] the nearer and the remoter future.” Here the object of knowledge changes according as it
is something past or something future or something that is present; but
the knowing agent does not change, since his nature is eternal presence.
(VS II.3.7)²¹

The pramānas or the means for knowledge are only valid until realization
of Brahman dawns, which is anubhava itself: “all the ordinary sources of
knowledge (perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self is ascer-
tained” (VS I.1.4). The understanding of Ātman thus cannot be the effect of
“action” for Śaṅkara, as this would make it a part of the phenomenal realm
of spatiotemporal causality. Rather, it is ontologically prior, it is the unfold-
ing of the eternal presence that is realized by breaking through the distortion
of samsāra of phenomenonal.

Faith, reason, and experience

The realization of one’s innermost self as Brahman—mokṣa or enlightenment—
is purported to be brought about by direct and immediate experience,
anubhava, where the dichotomy between subject and object are overcome
by self-luminosity (sva-prakāśa): “As Seeing is the nature of Ātman, it has
been said that Brahman is directly known. No second lamp is necessary for
illuminating a lamp” (US I.17). In such experience, Brahman-anubhava,
distinctions between knower, the process of knowing, and the known are
superseded, and only self-luminous awareness or eternal presence remains
(VS I.1.4; see also II.3.7). The veil of māyā is thus removed and one breaks
down through the distortion of samsāra, leaving but pure consciousness, cait-
anya, or the identity of self with the wholeness of Being – or from the
saguṇa perspective, Iśvara or God – as one’s true nature. It is the inward
awareness of something that exists all along, beingness as self, or Brahman
as Ātman.²² As such, anubhava is no experience in the ordinary sense: it is
not a “consciousness of” and lacks intentionality, rather it is the enduring
presence in which all empirical objects of experience appear (just as space
is not an object within space, but the “that”/tat in which all objects are
placed).

Śraddhā or faith in śruti is instrumental to the realization of Brahman as it
serves to teach, model, and lead one along the path; it attempts to articulates
the essence of Brahman, which is not accessible to ordinary perception.²³
One is therefore enjoined to hear (śravana), reflect (manana), and contem-
plate (nididhyāsana)²⁴ the poetic verses of the Upaniṣads, the Gītā, and the
Brahmasūtra. They are thought to contain paradigm shifting insight, such as
tat tvam asi or (you are that, i.e., Brahman) or aham brahmāsmi (I am Brah-
man). This insight is thought to serve as a catalyst in correcting erroneous
judgement, similar to the manner in which hearing “this is a rope” serves to
disillusion a person at dawn who thinks they have just seen a snake (VS I.1.4
26). But Śaṅkara’s conception of śraddhā as jñānalabdhyupāya or the means
of obtaining knowledge, as a form of trust, is narrower than the Judeo-Christian concept of faith (Sawai 1987, 21). As with inference and perception, it is preliminary, and must lead one to direct experience of pure consciousness or anubhava. Such experience is itself the final end of the inquiry, and its very basis:

Vedic text [or direct statement] . . . are not, in the inquiry into Brahman, the only means of knowledge . . . but Vedic texts on the one hand, and intuition [anubhava, direct experience] . . . on the other hand are to be had recourse to according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition [anubhava, direct experience] is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry is an existing [accomplished] substance. If the object of the knowledge of Brahman were something to be established, there would be no reference to intuition [direct experience], and text . . . would be the only means of knowledge.

(VS I.1.2)

Śraddhā or faith as trust in Vedic text must be corroborated in direct experience for oneself; indeed, such experience is the culminating end of the examination into self, world, and God. The sweetness of honey can only be known by actually tasting it; the study of its chemical structure or its effects on the brain, or hearing of its wondrous qualities and having faith in the testimony of reliable others (śabda, śruti), while important, can never replace first-person familiarity. There can be no substitute for direct subjective experience – neither śraddhā or trust, nor reason, can take its place. Śāṅkara identifies such “pure experience” or anubhava with the highest Ātman, which sublates/dis-illusions one of the false identification of the phenomenal self with pure consciousness (caitanya):

The “I”-notion [phenomenal self] appears to be Pure Consciousness [caitanya] and exists for Its sake. And it does not do so, when the “this” – portion has been destroyed. [So] the Pure Experience [anubhava] is the highest [Ātman].

(US 5.5)

Hearing, reflecting, and contemplating the verses of the Upaniṣads and Gītā can only take one so far along the path. It must result in anubhava for oneself – such testimony, although an essential step on the ladder towards greater understanding, is still a provisional step, and more is required for realization. Indeed, as Radhakrishnan argues in his development of Advaita, śruti or scriptural testimony is not infallible and is open to debate and contestation, especially if it contradicts perceptions as “hundreds of [Vedic] texts cannot make fire cold” (515). Testimony cannot be taken on faith alone; it is the attempt to give articulation to the spiritual experiences of various
Enlightening the unEnlightened

teachers, and must not be confused with those experiences themselves – just as the finger that points to the moon, is not the moon. Scriptural knowledge is always second-hand at best, it is not meant as a replacement for direct experience (Radhakrisnan 2000, 504). As the author of the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi argues:

How are you to know for certain that you are liberated from bondage of ignorance and have realized the Atman, which is absolute existence, pure consciousness and abiding bliss? The words of the Vedic text, your own power of reasoning and the teaching of your own master should all help to convince you – but the only absolute proof [pramāṇam] is direct and immediate experience [anubhutih], within your own self [475]. . . . Bondage and liberation, satisfaction and anxiety, sickness and renewed health, hunger and so forth – these are matters of personal experience. You know yourself. Others can only guess at your condition. . . . Teachers and scriptures can stimulate spiritual awareness. But the wise disciple crosses the ocean of his ignorance by direct illumination, through the grace of God. Gain experience directly. Realize God for yourself. Know the Atman as the one indivisible Being.

(112)26

But what one has faith in is not external to oneself, it is not a He that is distinct in kind from oneself. Rather, the Absolute/God is one’s innermost self. The difference between self and the Absolute is conceived of as the degree to which one has attained realization. As the shades of darker to lighter blue are but gradations of the same color, so with the difference in realization between self and God. The Absolute is not a noun, it is not a thing, masculine or feminine. God is a verb: it is Seeing, the eternal (time-less), pervasive (space-less) presence, beingness, that which structures all objects of consciousness and perception; and, indeed, phenomenality itself. The Absolute/God as self, in its numerical identity with Ātman, is uncovered when the structure of ordinary experience between subject and object is superseded – an experience intimated in states of deep contemplation and absorption when all divisions fall away and only self remains: when distinctions between singer, the process/practice of singing, and the song dissolve and there is only the music.27 Indeed, what one has śraddhā in, even in saguṇa form, is one’s inner self; it is the trust in teacher and text that one also may uncover the hidden treasure for oneself in oneself; it is a provisional trust that must be consummated in experience, if śraddhā is to bear fruition (Radhakrishnan, 500). That is, faith in scripture, guru, nor God, can free you. You must free yourself. As Radhakrishnan elaborates, “all faith and devotion,” all reflection, argumentation, and contemplation are intended to prepare one for such direct experience of the self. Indeed, the experience of Absolute/Brahman as self, as consummative of both theory and practice, sublates all other experiences; the instrumental
and provisional nature of śraddhā or faith in scripture is apparent in scripture itself:

What is the use of a well in the midst of a flood?
Just as useful are the Vedas for a brahmin [who possess] understanding.
(Bhagavad-Gita II, 46)

In other words: śruti or Vedic text is the raft that one uses to cross the sea of samsāra, but once one reaches the shores of enlightenment, the raft is no longer required, to use a common Indian metaphor. And while reason/inference, and perception, are valid means to knowledge or pramāṇas, they too, like faith or śraddhā, function within the categories of spatiotemporality; they too constitute a part of the raft to cross the sea. Once the destination has been reached however, they too dissolve in the consummate experience of self as the Absolute, the immanent and pervasive presence, or beingness.

Conclusion

My purpose here has been to challenge the continued exclusion of Indian philosophies from the Western philosophical canon on the supposed basis that such philosophies are really religion, mysticism, and mythology. I have argued that Advaita resists and problematizes historically particular Euro-Western conceptions of both philosophy and religion, and the conceptual borders between them, where philosophy is understood as grounded in various substantive notions of reason and rationality, defined as a purely theoretical enterprise. I question the predominant tendency to see philosophy as opposed to religion, which is often presumed to rest on faith in a Judeo-Christian conception of God: The singular and wholly other, creator of all souls, ex nihilo, the ultimate judge of human-kind, where salvation is granted in proportion to the intrinsic value of faith. I have suggested that Advaita challenges these prevailing conceptions. A part of my larger purpose is to dislodge the view that the Euro-Western philosophical enterprise constitutes the universal, neutral, and objective standard from which all other approaches to philosophy are to be judged as legitimate. My hope has been to lay some of the groundwork required to re-think dominant historical and conceptual categories from a broader global perspective, with the aim of developing a deeper and more plural understanding of the diverse nature of philosophical and religious inquiry.

Notes

1 I would like to thank Sonia Sikka, Aroon Yusuf, John Abraham, Joe LaRose, Gordon Davis, Jason Neelis, Bret Davis, Dan Rakus, William Edelglass, Oliver
Astley, Antoine Panaioti, Shyam Ranganathan, Charles Goodman, Philippe Turenne, Kathy Behrendt, Rohit Dalvi, Shawn Solomon, Katryna Wilson, Allen Jorgenson, Angie Brown, Gustavo Moura, Taylor MacNicholas, and the Religion, Reason, and Faith workshop participants at the University of Ottawa, as well as the Canadian Philosophical Association Symposium on Indian and Indo-Tibetan philosophy participants for insightful discussion.

2 Current Western philosophers have the perception that Buddhism does not require faith; see Bret Davis’s and William Edelglass’s chapters in this volume, which offer a nuanced corrective to this perception.

3 See also Dawkins (2006 5, 107, 199).

4 “I claim that if by ‘intellective soul’ one means an immaterial and incorruptible form that exists as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each part, then one cannot evidently know either through reason or through experience that (i) such a form exists in us, or that (ii) an act of understanding proper to such a substance exists in us, or that (iii) such a soul is the form of the body. (/64/ . . . Rather, we merely believe these three things [by faith]. Now it is evident that these cannot be demonstrated, since every argument meant to prove them presupposes things that are doubtful to a human being who is following natural reason. Nor are they proved through experience.” (Quodlibet, I, 10).

5 The equation of philosophy with reason and religion with faith is not only accepted by philosophers but by theologians alike. Luther himself saw reason as subservient to faith and often refers to reason as, for example, “the devil’s bride” (Full 379).

6 “Now, we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal faith. To be sure, as regards theoretical cognition of the world I have nothing available that necessarily presupposes this thought as a condition for my explanations of the world’s appearances; rather, I am obliged to employ my reason as if everything were mere nature. Yet purposive unity is such a major condition for applying reason to nature that I cannot pass it by-[especially] since experience also provides me richly with examples of this unity. But I know no other condition for this unity that would make it my guide for the investigation of nature except the presupposition that a supreme intelligence has arranged everything in this way in accordance with the wisest purposes.” (A826/B854).

7 A. J. Ayer: “[Eastern philosophies] have some psychological interest, but nothing more than that. . . . For the most part they are devices for reconciling people to a perfectly dreadful earthly life. I believe there were one or two seventh-century Indians who contributed a few ideas to mathematics. But that’s about all.” (Taber 1983, 27).

8 Van Norden’s argument is not that contemporary American philosophers are consciously racist, but that philosophy suffers from a form of structural racism, as inaugurated by European philosophers including Kant, Hegel, and G.E. Moore. I agree with this; however I am unable to pursue the argument in more detail here.

9 See Peetush (2003a, 2003b) for detailed arguments regarding how various biased and Orientalist presuppositions (such as the distorted Hegelian view of the march of history and progress) unwittingly and ironically infect contemporary and current liberal philosophies, such as that of philosopher Will Kymlica’s theory of “multiculturalism”. See also Peetush (2014) in terms of Rawls’s view of justice, which I contend is more open to diversity than Kymlicka’s account, but is also problematic in terms of its view of public reason and rationality, which, in principle, excludes the various self-understandings of the Indigenous Peoples of North America.

10 See Fisher (2017) for an insightful study on Hindu pluralism.
11 I have altered Thapar’s translation. The word for “sect” is also sometimes prob-
lematically translated as “faith” or “faiths”, from the Prakrit pāṣaṇḍa, paṣaṇḍa,
pāṣaṇḍa. Thapar (1997) glosses it as “sect” from the Sanskrit/Pali pāṣaṇḍa,
which can also be rendered as “heretic, impious, imposter”. The latter con-
notations I would contend further support the argument that with regard to
pluralism and diversity, Aśoka’s approach is path-breaking both historically,
politically, and conceptually in instituting a form of political recognition to
those that differ fundamentally from one’s self (“heretics”) with the goal of
concord between various such groups (moreover, the translation of Dhamma/
Dharma as “religion” is problematic). I am grateful to Joe LaRose and Jason
Neelis for discussion of Prakrit terms and concepts in the 12th Major Rock
Edict of Aśoka.

12 The philosopher Anthony Flew writes: “philosophy as the word is understood
here, is concerned first, last and all the time with argument. It is, incidentally,
because most of what is labelled Eastern Philosophy is not so concerned –
rather than any reason of western parochialism – that this book draws no
materials from any source east of Suez” (King 1999, 30). It is incredible that
Flew knew so much about “eastern philosophy” – the whole 3000 year history
of Indian thought, as well as Chinese thought – that he was able to draw such
an insightful and sweeping conclusion. Perhaps he should have bothered to
pick up a couple of texts in Indian logic – which were certainly available at the
time he writes this, however, evidently, certain kinds of privilege do not require
this. In a similar vein, Van Norden relates Indian philosopher Surendranath
Dasgupta’s encounter with G.E. Moore when the Indian philosopher presented
a paper on the epistemology of Vedānta at the Aristotelian Society. Moore’s
only remark on the talk was “I have nothing to offer myself. But I am sure
that whatever Dasgupta says is absolutely false.” The British philosophers all
broke out in laughter at the devastating critique offered against Vedānta (Van
Norden, 15).

13 On this point, see Anna Lännström’s and Catherine Collobert’s chapter in this
volume.

14 I am grateful to the Rgveda reading group at McMaster University for discussion
of this translation.

15 As Mohanty argues: “It is indeed sickening to find philosophers argue a thesis
about a field about which they know almost next to nothing – and so inevitably
using arguments that follow a priori from their methodological premises, expect-
ing that no empirical evidence could show them wrong” (288). I would hope
that this has changed, but it does not seem so. See Garfield and Van Norden’s
recent rebuttals against Nicolas Tempio, who, according to Garfield and Van
Norden, apparently admits to not having read either Kongzi or Chandrakīrti
or their interlocutors, but this does not stop Tempio in the least from dismissing
them as not real philosophers (2017, XVII).


17 My main purpose here is basic exegesis of Advaita Vedānta, and I unapologeti-

cally read the tradition in the manner of so called “neo”-Advaitans – which is not
currently in vogue, but for which I would argue there are strong reasons (see, e.g.,
ednote 25). Unfortunately, I am unable to spend time on the dialectical aspect of
Sāṅkara in which he argues forcefully against the other schools of Indian philoso-
phies – so that it may be proved to European philosophers that he is really doing
philosophy. I would suggest taking a cursory glance at the Brahmāsūtrabhāṣya,
translations of which are readily available. In addition, see Ram-Prasad’s (2002)
brilliant Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics, which takes an approach that
will resonate more with Euro-Western analytic philosophy.
18 As Gandhi contends: “In my opinion there is no such thing as inherited superiority. I believe in the rock-bottom doctrine of Advaita and my interpretation of Advaita excludes totally any idea of superiority at any stage whatsoever. I believe implicitly that all men are born equal. All – whether born in India or in England or America or in any circumstance whatsoever – have the same soul as any other. And it is because I believe in this inherent equality of all men that I fight the doctrine of superiority which many of our rulers arrogate to themselves. I have fought this doctrine of superiority in South Africa inch by inch, and it is because of that inherent belief that I delight in calling myself a scavenger, a spinner, a weaver, a farmer and a labourer. And I have fought against the Brahmins themselves wherever they have claimed any superiority for themselves either by reason of their birth or by reason of their subsequently acquired knowledge. I consider that it is unmanly for any person to claim superiority over a fellow being. And there is the fullest warrant for the belief that I am enunciating in the *Bhagavad Gita* . . . He who claims superiority at once forfeits his claim to be called a man.” (Gandhi [1927] 1969, 1–2; see also 102–107)

19 The earliest study of consciousness occurs in Indian traditions; more specifically, such discussions can be found in various Upaniṣads (on this point, see Bina Gupta 2003; Evan Thompson 2015).

20 Śaṅkara’s arguments regarding the ontological ultimate “ground” of Being as pure consciousness (cit, caityana) has interesting similarities and resemblances to current theories in the philosophy of mind, see for example, Philip Goff’s *Consciousness and Fundamental Reality* (2017). However, I have yet to see Western philosophers dismiss Goff and current pan-psychists on the basis that such theories are not really philosophy, only mysticism.

21 It is interesting to compare Śaṅkara’s argument with that of Descartes’ *Cogito* (although Śaṅkara’s argument is presented nearly a millennia before); Śaṅkara, of course, draws the opposite conclusion of Descartes’ radical mind-body dualism.

22 The realization of *Brahman* cannot be the effect of any “action” for Śaṅkara, as this would make *Brahman* a part of the phenomenal realm of spatiotemporal causality; *Brahman* is that from which spatiotemporal causality is made possible.

23 Śaṅkara accepts inference (anumāṇa), perception (pratyakṣa), and verbal testimony (śabda) as valid epistemic means of attaining knowledge (pramāṇa). Verbal testimony includes any second-hand authoritative sources, reports, etc.; in addition, testimony refers to śruti or the corpus of Vedic literature, of which the *Upaniṣads*, the *Gītā*, and the *Brahmasūtra* are seminal for Advaitans as the means for the realization of the Absolute/Brahman as Ātman or Self.

24 The process of hearing, reflecting, and contemplating is first mentioned in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (II, 4, 5) and later adopted by various schools.

25 Some may argue that the emphasis placed on immediate experience by this interpretation of Śaṅkara – for example, by the author of *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, or by “neo”-Vedāntins, such as Śri Ramaṇa, Vivekananda, and Radhakrishnan, is unwarranted in classical Advaita. Rambachan (1994), for instance, contends that śruti is the only valid means of knowledge for *Brahman* for Śaṅkara; see also contrasting arguments by Scoog (1989); Arvind Sharma (1992); and Preti (2014). While I cannot settle the dispute here, let me advance the following considerations. I agree that anubhava cannot be a pramāṇa in the same sense of the other means to knowledge for Śaṅkara, as this would then confine it to the realm of the phenomenal – as a means to an end, which anubhava cannot be, given that it is the prior eternal presence in which phenomenal existence exists and has for its underlying identity. The *pramāṇas* only apply to the phenomenal realm for Śaṅkara (SBS I.1.4). At the same time, one may acknowledge the unique
role of śruti as a pramāṇa in articulating that which is not directly available to perception. Nevertheless, against conservative interpretations of Śaṅkara, one may contend that śruti still constitutes a pramāṇa or one means of knowledge among others within the realm of empirical reality. It exists within the limits of ordinary experience of spatiotemporality and is structured by divisions between subject and object, between knower and known, which are dissolved/destroyed in the consummate experience of Brahman anubhava (e.g., see US 5.5 above, where Śaṅkara is explicit about this). Indeed, such experience is the very purpose of Advaita, for which śruti is supposed to serve as a catalyst. That said however, even if one were to accept that Śaṅkara himself does not place such an emphasis, “neo”-Vedāntins (e.g., Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, Śrī Ramana Mahārṣi, among a host of others) certainly develop the experiential dimension of Śaṅkara’s framework, both philosophically and spiritually, in terms of theory and as practice. Philosophies live, grow, and breathe, and this is how it should be; they are not set in stone, as various philologists, such as Paul Hacker, assume (see Peetush 2017 for a detailed critique of Hacker’s view in this regard). Indeed, it is crystal clear that Śaṅkara is himself guilty of doing the very same thing in elaborating and developing Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahmasūtra in the first place.

Although authorship of the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi is attributed to Śaṅkara, most scholars agree that it is post-Śaṅkarian; however, the text is crucial in its own right as an elaboration of the Advaitan position; it has had and continues to have a critical impact/influence on the tradition; see Forsthoefel in this regard (2002).

Radhakrishnan [1923] (2000, 513) argues that anubhava has “kinship with artistic insight”; this anticipates the current psychological literature on “flow” of states of deep absorption in which distinctions between subject and object, and one’s sense of temporality, dissolve.

Works cited

Primary works in Indian philosophy


**Other works**


Ashwani Kumar Peetush


