

The dynamics of scientific theories.  
Structuralism and the logical-formal understanding of Kuhn's epistemology

Contents

Preface, by <i>Carl Ulises Moulines</i>	p.	9
Introduction	»	15
1. The structuralist model and the logical understanding of the dynamics of theories	»	23
1.1 Descriptive contexts	»	23
1.1.1 Core and intended applications of theories	»	23
1.1.2 Theory models and constraints	»	31
1.1.3 Frame, core, and expanded core	»	35
1.2 Theories as set-theoretical structures	»	39
1.3 Scientific theories and temporality	»	48
1.4 The axiomatization of theories on the basis of CPM system	»	51
1.4.1 Theoretical models and constraints	»	51
1.4.2 Empirical claims of theories	»	56
1.4.3 The axiomatic method	»	59
1.5 The problem of theoretical terms	»	63
1.5.1 Explanation of the problem	»	63
1.5.2 Sneed's hypothesis	»	66
1.5.3 Stegmüller's hypothesis	»	75
1.6 Summary	»	84
2. The dynamics of theories as dynamical non cumulative advancing of normal science and scientific revolutions	»	87
2.1 The constitutive process of the phenomenal world	»	87
2.2 Paradigms and disciplinary matrixes	»	95
2.2.1 The notion of paradigm and of disciplinary matrix	»	95
2.2.2 Applications of a theory in the Kuhnian sense	»	98
2.3 Dynamics of theories, normal science and scientific revolutions	»	99
2.3.1 Normal science as puzzle-solving practice	»	99
2.3.2 The emergence of anomalies: the <i>extraordinary</i> science	»	102
2.3.3 The nature of scientific revolutions	»	105
2.4 Incommensurability, incomparability and discontinuity	»	107
2.5 Epistemic progress and scientific revolutions	»	114
3. Reconsidering the core aspects of Kuhn's epistemology through set-theoretical predicates	»	117
3.1 Kuhn's theory of science in critical perspective	»	117
3.2 Stegmüller's analysis of the notion of paradigm	»	120
3.2.1 Wittgenstein's notion of <i>game</i>	»	120
3.2.2 Kuhn's notion of paradigm	»	122
3.3 Intended applications	»	125

3.3.1	Extensional and intensional descriptions	p.	125
3.3.2	The Kuhnian acceptance of a physical theory	»	128
3.4	Normal science and scientific revolutions	»	130
3.4.1	The static nature of normal science	»	130
3.4.2	Basic theories vs. derived theories	»	133
3.4.3	Paradigmatic cases of theory replacement	»	134
3.4.4	Dynamical reduction of theories	»	137
3.4.5	The logic of theory change in the dynamics of sciences	»	141
3.5	Post-rationalism and pseudo-relativism of Kuhn's epistemology	»	145
4.	On pragmatic and informal semantics	»	151
4.1	Informal semantics as necessary integration of Bourbaki's program	»	151
4.2	Pragmatic evolution of theories	»	155
4.3	Scientific advances and rationality	»	158
4.4	Formal appendix	»	166
Conclusion			» 173
References			» 179