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Honor as a motive for making sacrifices

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Abstract

This article deals with the notion of honor, and its relation to the willingness to make sacrifices. Especially in Western countries there is a widely shared feeling that the willingness to make sacrifices for the greater good has been on a reverse trend for quite a while, both on the individual and the societal level, being increasingly problematic to the military. After outlining what honor is, the Roman honor-ethic stating that honor was a necessary incentive for courageous behavior, and that it is something worth dying for, is contrasted with today's ruling view in the West, which sees honor as something obsolete and archaic and not as a legitimate motive for courageous behavior. The article then addresses the way honor still has a role in today's military, despite its diminishing role in Western society at large.

Introduction: honor

In Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, courage is defined as having the right attitude concerning feelings of confidence and fear (and especially the fear of death in battle)¹ in the pursuance of a morally just cause. Aristotle is of course still relevant: the military depends on the willingness to make sacrifices, and to accept casualties, for morally just causes such as the defense of one's own country, or to restore peace in others, as can be witnessed today in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq.² This Aristotelian view, giving a central place to virtue, lies at the heart the idea of the citizen soldier and Moskos' institutional model. Pivotal are values like 'duty,' 'honor,' and 'country,' but also the notion of self-sacrifice.³

Yet what if this ideal of making sacrifices for abstract goals as freedom and human rights proves too steep for most of the military men and women? Although the traditional military ethic underlines the importance of courage, some authors point out that the willingness to make sacrifices seems to be rather low in Western countries. The decision to join the military is, according to some, to a considerable extent motivated by posttraditional reasons like salary and the wish for adventure.⁴ Similarly, in actual combat, abstract ideals do not seem to be the motivating actor.⁵ According to Alasdair MacInyre our sense of community has disappeared and people are in general not very willing to make sacrifices for their own country.⁶ It is probably a bit too optimistic then, to think that the global village will be the kind of community we are willing to make sacrifices for. This is a more economic view, stressing that man is rational and egoistic, and central to the occupational model.

Clearly, there is a discrepancy here: what military men ought to do according to their traditional role, making sacrifices for important ideals, is not always the same as what makes them tick according to those who view motivation in economic terms.⁷ The question central to this article is whether it might be possible to close the gap between altruistic and self-serving motives, and to induce soldiers to make sacrifices by appealing to their self-interest, for

instance through non-economic rewards. At first sight, this is not a very good idea for two reasons. Firstly: it seems highly unlikely that soldiers will make the ultimate sacrifice for a reward. And, secondly: a courageous act undertaken for a reward hardly deserves to be called moral, and the term sacrifice seems highly out of place in such a case. Still, it might not be such a bad idea. History abounds with examples of people, soldiers and statesmen alike, who sacrificed their lives for a reward, without the term sacrifice being out of place. In their behavior, the self-serving and more altruistic motives, the spheres of *is* and *ought*, came together. They behaved virtuously and fostered a greater good, but for a motive not devoid of self-regarding elements: they were motivated by their sense of *honor*.

What honor is

The conception of honor central in this article differs from the notion of honor in the well known West Point credo ‘Duty, honor, country’, and in the West Point Honor code (a cadet will not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate those who do). Honor at West Point is synonymous with integrity; the cadet adheres to the code because he accepts it, not because he is concerned about what others might think of him when he breaches it. The notion of honor in this article equally differs from Richard A. Gabriels’ definition of honor as “the ability to recognize moral dilemma’s and to have the integrity an strength of character to act upon one’s perception.”⁸ Both the West Point credo and Gabriels’ definition stress the importance of integrity, a notion that is more demanding than the notion of honor as outlined below, more or less on the same plane as conscience, and presupposing moral autonomy. The same holds true for Ted Westhusing’s definition of honor, in this journal, of honor as a “constancy, harmony, and refinement of the natural virtues of greatness of mind and extended benevolence.”⁹ In this article, it is argued that these definitions are on a par with both the institutional model and the

way most people see themselves in the modern West, but that other, older definitions are sometimes more useful because they are *less* demanding.

One of these older definitions is from Charles E. Cooley, an American sociologist from the early twentieth century. He defined honor as

a finer kind of self-respect. It is used to mean either something one feels regarding himself, or something that other people think and feel regarding him, and so illustrates by the accepted use of language the fact that the private and social aspects of self are inseparable. One's honor, as he feels it, and his honor in the sense of honorable repute, as he conceives it to exist in the minds of others whose opinions he cares for, are two aspects of the same thing. No one can permanently maintain a standard of honor if he does not conceive of some other mind or minds as sharing and corroborating this standard.¹⁰

According to anthropologist Pitt-Rivers someone's honor is "the value in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his *claim* to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, his *right* to pride".¹¹

These definitions show that honor is both the value that we allocate to ourselves and the value others place on us. That makes that honor has everything to do with someone's place in society. Only in his or her relationships to others it becomes clear whether or not someone is a man or woman of honor. In this, it differs from the popular understanding of conscience as the inner voice that might prompt someone to go against social norms. To the definitions of Cooley and Pitt-Rivers it can be added that honor has always involved the choice between higher interests and self-interest. For instance, athletes sacrifice their time, money and peace of mind to shine in the Olympics, others practice relentlessly to become excellent pianists. Finally, honor comes in more dramatic forms: in its ultimate form it might

mean the choice between life and death. The honorable choice is then often, but not always, the choice against life. Under those circumstances honor is the reward for choosing the right thing, for making the courageous choice.

That makes honor as a motive less than altruistic. However, it would be unfair to classify honor as a purely selfish motive: in the end it is more a social motive.¹² So, although at first sight clearly more belonging to the institutional model than to the occupational model, honor as defined here might in fact form a bridge between both models. Yet is such a reward enough to motivate people to put their own existence at risk?

The role of military honor in antiquity

In antiquity this question divided the philosophical community, but, in general, one could say that the view that courage needs a reward was mainly found among the Romans. Where the Greeks pondered on the ideal depth of the phalanx, the Romans addressed the question of what makes men fight.¹³ They did not only discern something noble in the longing for honor and a name that never dies, they also ascribed an important function to it in war. According to the Romans, no one will risk his life and put aside his own interests for the greater good, if there is no fame or honor to be earned. We find this view in the works of not only Roman historians,¹⁴ but also of Roman philosophers, such as Marcus Tullius Cicero. The latter is the best-known and most subtle representative of the Roman honor ethic.

When Cicero wrote on the importance of honor, he was thinking of, and arguing against, both the Stoics and the Epicureans who tried to convince their fellow citizens that honor was not something worthwhile pursuing. According to the Epicureans, happiness was the highest good. Peace, and peace of mind, are the things to be valued in life. The competition for honor and glory, together with human vanity, was seen as endangering those very things. In Cicero's view, Epicurean philosophy was mistaken in presenting men as essentially self-seeking and

hedonistic. The Stoics were equally hostile to the notion of honor. Partly because of reasons put forward by the Epicureans, partly because, in their eyes, any virtuous conduct that is undertaken in exchange for a reward, even in the slightest degree, is not virtuous at all. Honor and fame are rewards, so actions motivated by a desire for honor, or fame, are not to be called virtuous. This is, in Cicero's view, an impossible and even dangerously strict definition of virtue.¹⁵ It takes away the incentive for trying to be virtuous from those who may not be without faults, but mean well. Where Epicurean philosophy asks too little, Stoic philosophy asks too much. Morality is certainly not served by the demand that only behavior that springs from a pure sense of duty is to be called moral.

Despite Epicurean and Stoic thought, most of Cicero's contemporaries stayed convinced that honor was the highest good to men, something with an existence in reality. So, when looking for a third way between Epicurean hedonism and Stoic strictness, Cicero thought that honor might provide a middle ground. In the first book of his *Tusculan Disputations* he wrote that

Again, in this commonwealth of ours, with what thought in their minds do we suppose such an army of illustrious men have lost their lives for the commonwealth? Was it that their name should be restricted to the narrow limits of their life? No one would ever have exposed himself to death for his country without good hope of immortality.¹⁶

And, in the second book:

Nature has made us, as I have said before - it must often be repeated - enthusiastic seekers after honor, and once we have caught, as it were, some glimpse of its radiance, there is nothing we are not prepared to bear and go through in order to secure it. It is from this rush, this impulse from our soul towards true renown and reputation that the

dangers of battle are encountered; brave men do not feel wounds in the line of battle, or feel them, but prefer death rather than move one step from the post that honor has appointed.¹⁷

In Cicero's view, soldiers, although far from selfish, cannot be expected to perform their duties from a sense of duty alone. Both inside and outside the sphere of war, only the perfectly wise act virtuously for virtue's sake. However, those perfectly wise are rare - Cicero himself claimed that he had never met such a person.¹⁸ For the not so wise, that is, most of us, a little help from the outside, consisting of the judgements of our peers and our concern for our reputation, can be of help.¹⁹ The censure from our peers is a punishment we cannot escape and, more importantly, no one is insensible enough to put up with the blame of others - that is a burden too heavy to bear. Virtuous persons are, in general, far from indifferent to praise, and this should not be held against them.²⁰ Those who on the other hand do claim to be insensitive to fame and glory were not to be believed.²¹

Honor in modernity: the Epicurean view

During the tumultuous days that followed the end of the Roman republic and the period thereafter, however, the Epicurean view that happiness and peace of mind are the highest goods would gain in popularity. This does not mean of course, that the end of the Roman republic also meant the end of the honor ethic. The notion of honor for instance still played an important role in the code of chivalry in the middle ages. The ethics of chivalry did not resemble the Roman honor ethic, however. In word she heavily depended on Christian notions of purity, in practice she often resembled the individualistic striving for honor as depicted by Homer. Both elements came together in the favorite pass-time of the mediaeval knight, the crusade. When in the late middle-

ages war started to be characterized by what is called guerilla tactics in our days, the mediaeval form of honor began to dwindle. The canon eventually sealed the fate of chivalry.

In the Renaissance, the rediscovery of classical thought gave the ethics of honor a last impulse. In 1341 Petrarca declared honor to be the highest good. This started the development of an ideology prescribing that young should be educated to be enthusiastic seekers after honor. And at the end of the sixteenth century, Francis Bacon, still adhering to the position that honor is a legitimate and necessary reward for virtue, wrote that “[t]here is an *Honour* (...), which may be ranked among the Greatest, which happeneth rarely: That is, of such as *Sacrifice themselves, to Death or Dangers, for the Good of their Countrey: As was M. Regulus and the Two Decii*.²² Bacon was, as many of his contemporaries were, still standing with both feet in the tradition developed by Romans like Sallust and Cicero.

It was this tradition, however, that was about to become obsolete in Western thought, to be replaced by a more economic view somewhat resembling the Epicurean view on honor. In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes, who in his *Leviathan* (1651) tried to establish a science of man modeled after the natural sciences, stated that people are driven solely by self-interest. This “rival theory about the universality of self-interest” undermined the ethic of honor - most people stopped believing it.²³ Consequently, “[w]ith his bristling code of honour and his continual thirst for glory, the typical hero of the Renaissance began to appear slightly comical in his willful disregard for the natural instinct of self-preservation (...).”²⁴

The Hobbesian view thus proved successful. So successful, that a bit over a century after Bacon, Bernard Mandeville could write about honor as being a chimera, with some instrumental value at best. Bacon and Mandeville represent two diametrically opposed views on the role of honor in war. They are separated by far more than just the century which lies between their formulations. Mandeville, famous in his own time but now slightly forgotten, claimed that honor

is something artificial, which makes soldiers forget their 'real' interests and cynically rhymed: "The Soldiers that were forc'd to fight, If they surviv'd, got *Honour* by't."²⁵

Like Hobbes, Mandeville prided himself on being an author who, unlike others, did not present man to his readers as he should be, but as he is. In *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War* from 1732 he stressed that the Christian ethics of his days, in his view comparable with the Stoic ethics of former times, is completely useless in war because it is incapable of motivating soldiers. In practice, every commander will take recourse to the opposite honor-ethic, and "[t]he men are prais'd and bouy'd up in the high value they have for themselves: their officers call them gentlemen and fellow-soldiers; generals pull of their hats to them; and no artifice is neglected that can flatter their pride, or inspire them with the love of glory."²⁶ The honor-ethics expects us to put high value on ourselves, the Christian ethics demands humility. For most of us, the former comes easier than the latter. For that reason, nowhere pride has been more encouraged than in the army and "never anything had been invented before, that was half so effective to create artificial courage among military men."²⁷

In his *Fable of the Bees*, the work that brought him fame, Mandeville makes some practical suggestions. One makes a soldier courageous by "first to make him own this principle of valour within, and afterwards to inspire him with as much horror against shame, as nature has given him against death." Is in that manner the fundament laid for artificial courage, than the thing to do is to flatter and praise the bold, to reward the wounded and to honor the dead. High-sounding words about the justness of the cause, despising death and the bed of honor, together with uniforms and decorations, provide against little cost the courage money cannot buy. The strongest motive for courageous behavior however, is the wish to avoid being considered a coward by fellow soldiers. If one might be tempted to flee if no witnesses are present, the presence of others makes flight virtually impossible: "One man in an army is a check upon another, and a hundred of them that single and without witness would be all

cowards, are for fear of incurring one another's contempt made valiant by being together."²⁸

However, honor was not seen as something worth dying for by Mandeville himself.²⁹

A century after Mandeville's writings, in the 1840's, Alexis Tocqueville wrote that the notion of honor had disappeared in the egalitarian United States and that, in general, in egalitarian societies there is no place for honor. According to Tocqueville, the notion of honor was exclusively linked to the feudal, hierarchical societies of the past. He was of the opinion that only "some scattered notions" had survived in his days. As far as honor still has a role in modern times, it is the quiet virtues that are held in honor, at the expense of the "turbulent" ones that bring glory but also trouble to a society. Especially "martial valor is little esteemed," according to Tocqueville.³⁰ The utilitarian theory on what drives people had been so influential, that Tocqueville had to conclude that people in his day and age saw only self-interested motives at work in their own behavior, even when it was clear that, according to Tocqueville, more altruistic motives were at play.

Honor in modernity: the Stoic view

Although in decline from the seventeenth century on, from antiquity to Tocqueville's days philosophers always had at least something to say on the theme of honor, and related notions such as fame, reputation, pride and shame.³¹ Most contemporary philosophers are, with some notable exceptions, silent on the subject.³² Insofar as they still write something on the subject of honor, they limit themselves to explaining how and why honor has disappeared from the scene. The explanations given are remarkably similar, echoing those of Tocqueville: honor disappeared with the disappearance of social stratification. As honor presupposes distinction, no distinction automatically means no honor.³³

How has this come about? About half a century after the days of Mandeville, on the continent Immanuel Kant developed a whole different mode of thought, which is still very

influential today. His ideal resembles the Stoic ideal of perfect virtue. According to Kant, any action motivated by vanity or another form of self-interest, however remotely, does not deserve to be called moral. The fear of losing face is not a legitimate motive.³⁴ In addition, Kant, as he himself said, did not care whether there is anyone who can live up to that ideal. His ethics should be free from all that “nur empirisch sein mag und zur Anthropologie gehört.”³⁵ Most of today’s moral philosophers write in a Kantian vein, and are not inclined to be bothered too much by empirical facts about human nature³⁶ Honor is a word they seldom use.³⁷

Most moral philosophers further hold the view that we in the West, contrary to our predecessors and contrary to those living outside the West, live in a guilt culture, not a shame culture. This means that Westerners are less concerned by how their behavior might look in the eyes of others; instead, they are primarily motivated by how it looks in their *own* eyes. Face and reputation are no longer of overriding importance. Anthropologist Ruth Benedict and classicist Eric Dodds are among the best known proponents of this view.³⁸

This shift from a shame culture to a guilt culture is generally seen as a moral improvement, and follows our present-day understanding rather closely. Autonomy is the ideal, the way we want to be, other-directedness on the other hand is seen as the regrettable reality, the way too many people are.³⁹ Most of us believe in a free subject who chooses his or her own way through life, not needing the help judgements of others may offer, nor the check on behavior the sense of shame can be. Instead, we have put their faith in conscience, not in honor. Contrary to Cicero, we emphasize the painful side of shame, not the positive function shame can have or the sense of moral direction it can give. Shame is not a legitimate motive, but the loss of self-respect.

This modern ideal of autonomy resembles the Stoic ideal of perfect virtue: any action motivated by vanity or another form of self-interest, however remotely, does not deserve to be called moral.⁴⁰ Moreover, most of us think that the distribution of honor, status, respect and

reputation is unfair, and that these good things are bestowed upon the wrong people. Social status goes to the rich and mighty, not to the deserving. Virtue is not a way to fame and glory, but precludes it.⁴¹ What was a concern for Cicero and an insight for Machiavelli, namely that reputation not always follows virtue, and that people can gain glory without deserving it, has thus become a truism: reputation is just not based on virtue at all.

So, even though some domains of modern life, such as sports, politics and business, seem difficult to understand without taking honor into account,⁴² clearly honor has lost much of its appeal as guide in matters of morality, and certainly as something worth dying for. Today, according to one author, only some “quaint survivals” of honor are left, like the academic *cum laude* and *summa cum laude*.⁴³ The term itself “has acquired some archaic overtones.”⁴⁴ According to another, the notion of honor has become obsolete altogether.⁴⁵ Lawrence Kohlberg’s influential model of moral development, a three level (and six stage) model, is paradigmatic for this way of thinking. According to this model people are egoistic and calculating at the pre-conventional level, the one thing keeping them from misbehaving being their fear of punishment. Once at the conventional level, people are also sensitive for peer pressure and concerned about their reputation. Adherence to universal ethics is deemed the highest, post-conventional or “principled” level.⁴⁶ In this view, the thinkers of Greek and Roman antiquity like Cicero, are “children, and young children, in a Piagetian tale of moral development.”⁴⁷

Honor in military thought

Is the picture regarding honor just as bleak for military ethics and sociology? Probably not. As Hobbes wrote, the peace and security that civilian society holds as the highest goods, require a military that itself can only exist by the willingness of some to make sacrifices for the security of others.⁴⁸ For the armed forces, both the modern ideology of moral autonomy and the

economic view of man are, in their undiluted form, not workable because both are unable to install this willingness.

The economic view has its evident shortcomings. It was this view that led to the shift to the AVF that presumably did away with the citizen soldier; the type of soldier that came closest to true courage in Aristotle's view. Being a soldier became an occupation, instead of a calling, and self interest became more important than identification with a higher good.⁴⁹ According to one author, the adoption of the All Volunteer Force meant that "the military was to be treated as any other occupation, competing with the civilian sector to attract adequate manpower and quality."⁵⁰ Disturbingly, a truly rational army will run away, Montesquieu claimed.⁵¹ Yet, Montesquieu notwithstanding, modern professional armies, based on volunteers who fight for a salary, do not run away, in spite of the AVF. Evidently, the professional soldier is not motivated by pecuniary motives alone. Moskos' institutional/occupational model can be seen as a criticism of the Army's choice for neoclassical economic theory, that excludes notions as honor and sacrifice and noneconomic rewards as pride in service, as a basis for its recruiting policy, emphasising economic incentives.⁵²

The ideology of moral autonomy, on the other hand, asks to much. One recent military ethicist, echoing Cicero's criticism of the Stoic philosophy, described Lawrence Kohlberg's model, with its emphasis on the morally autonomous individual, as "troublesome" in the military context.⁵³ Not without reason: As is the case outside the military, inside the military most people are probably stuck on the first, pre-conventional level or on the second, conventional level of the Kohlberg model. The honor ethic is clearly at this conventional level. Although this level falls short of the highest, principled level, it might be the best that can be hoped for: if abstract ideals do not do very much to motivate, honor might. This notion that does not fit neatly into the altruistic/egoistic dichotomy, might not be something with deep roots in present-day society at large, but it remains well-suited to make soldiers fight.

After World War II, a number of well-known studies appeared, stating that soldiers are not willing to make sacrifices for lofty ideals alone. In Marshall's famous *Men Against Fire* for instance, it is stated that abstract ideals, like the wish to bring an offer for freedom, democracy of ones own country, seem not to play much of a role.⁵⁴ In his equally well-known *The American Soldier*, Stoufler adds that talking about abstract ideals like freedom is almost a taboo under those circumstances.⁵⁵ Only five percent of the enlisted U.S. men in World War II named idealistic reasons (including patriotism) as incentives.⁵⁶

If abstract notions do not do much to motivate, what does? Religion, the wish to end the war, and group cohesion were mentioned more often in Stouflers studies. And according to Marshall, “[t]he majority are unwilling to take extraordinary risks and do not aspire to a hero's role, but they are equally unwilling that they should be considered the least worthy among those present (...). personal honor is the one thing valued more than life itself by the majority of men.”⁵⁷ When peer pressure crumbles because some flee, others are likely to follow. That the soldiers know each other is crucial, because when “a soldier is unknown to the men who are around him he has relatively little reason to fear losing the one thing he is likely to value more highly than life – his reputation as a man among other men.”⁵⁸ Research from Edward Shils en Morris Janowitz into the motivation of the *Wehrmacht* reaches similar conclusions. Alas, these famous studies are rather old and their methodology and conclusions debated.⁵⁹ Yet, a more recent study by the Israeli Defense Force from 1974 did not look into the role of abstract ideals, but did show that letting dependents, comrades or the unit down was considered “the most frightening aspect of battle” by well over forty percent of soldiers and officers.⁶⁰ A study by Moskos into combat motivation in Vietnam also underlines that lofty ideals don't do much to motivate.⁶¹ Latent ideology does play a role however, according to Moskos.⁶²

Mandeville's insight from the eighteenth century thus got elaborate empirical substantiation in the twentieth century. There is now sufficient evidence, that honor, pride and

shame are important incentives in combat, and that group cohesion does play an important role. Armed forces around the world have adapted their internal organizations to profit from these insights which surfaced in these studies.⁶³ Some authors writing on the subject of military ethics, point to the importance of honor as a check on the behavior on both the battlefield and in modern operations outside the battlefield. Michael Ignatief quotes in his *The Warriors Honor* the words of military historian John Keegan: “There is no substitute for honor as a medium of enforcing decency on the battlefield, never has been and never will be. There are no judges, more to the point, no policemen at the place where death is done in combat.”⁶⁴ Although this warrior code is codified in the Geneva Conventions to make it less particularistic, the “decisive restraint on inhuman practices on the battlefield lies within the warrior himself.”⁶⁵ Ignatief describes how the regimental honor of the Canadian armed forces was badly damaged for quite a while after some Canadian soldiers tortured a Somali civilian.⁶⁶ Shannon E. French writes in her recent *The Code of the Warrior* that “[w]hen there is no battlefield, and warriors fight murderers [terrorists], they may be tempted to become the mirror image of the evil they hoped to destroy. Their only protection is their code of honor.”⁶⁷

Honor's drawbacks

The possible relevance of the honor-ethic today should not make us blind for the drawbacks of the honor-ethic however. Honor still playing a role in today's military, comes at a price, already pointed at by Cicero. He warned that an excess of striving for fame and glory could be dangerous as it could work not only in the interest of the state, but also against it.

Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which Nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon

the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame.⁶⁸

A commander might endanger his men, his mission and even his country when he is motivated by the individualistic and sometimes rather self-interested honor ethic we see in Homer's *Iliad* embodied in the behavior of Achilles and Agamemnon, aimed at personal aggrandizement before anything else. So, although useful, honor as an incentive should be kept within certain boundaries. Roman history provides us with some telling examples of young, ambitious men, such as Coriolanus and Catilina, who brought the republic close to disaster by putting their own personal glory above state interest. Ironically, Cicero himself was forced to witness this same hunger for fame and glory, directed at the wrong objects, causing the end of the Roman republic when Caesar started a civil war because of his *dignitas*.⁶⁹

The Stoics pointed at another drawback: what if there is no relation between honor and virtue? Most modern authors on ethics seem to share this concern that virtue and honor do not go hand in hand.⁷⁰ A related drawback is that honor can be reduced to not being found out. In that case, when no one is around, everything is permitted.⁷¹ Mandeville already pointed out that honor can be used in a rather manipulative way, putting pressure on soldiers to do something definitely not in their own interest.

The main drawback of the honor ethic is that it can also be rather particularistic. For example, in former days it was thought quite honorable not to pay your tailor, to flog a soldier or to be drunk. Not paying your gamble debts or not adequately responding to an insult was however deemed very inhonorable. Even though the former are relatively innocent forms of particularism, such a particularistic ethics of honor might also take less innocent forms. Some insight in the way honor still influences people might lead to a better understanding of the

mechanisms behind terrorism. The rise of the political Islam witnessed in recent years is probably not best understood in religious terms alone.⁷²

What to be done?

The correctness of the view that the West is no longer a shame culture is a matter of some dispute.⁷³ Probably less disputed is that, traditionally, the military is more a shame culture than a guilt culture. Also, too much trust on conscience as an inner voice is not always in place in a military setting (nor is it outside the military, for that matter).⁷⁴ How can we make use of the insights offered by the authors from antiquity, Mandeville, and military sociology? In the first place: we should recognize that we don't only have a Judeo-Christian heritage, but also a Greek-Roman one. Today, the notions belonging to the first heritage, such as guilt and conscience, are probably guiding most people in their private morality. For our understanding of matters lying outside the private sphere it might sometimes be better to take also notions as honor and shame, belonging to the second, older heritage, into account.⁷⁵

This brings us to a second point: the functioning of an ethics of honor very much depends on primary group relations. However, one of the pillars of peer pressure in the military, group cohesion, is difficult to accomplish in the mixed units that are often used in the expeditionary era. Officer rotation policies, aiming at providing as many officers as possible with necessary experience, can also have a negative impact on group cohesion and on the morale of NCO's and enlisted.⁷⁶

Thirdly: an important incentive for honorable conduct form the example set by others. The example of a commander that is respected and whose judgement is valued, can inspire to courageous behavior.⁷⁷ History can also provide examples worthy of following. In the Roman era, this was the role of historians like Plutarch and Sallust, during the Middle Ages

troubadours performed this function. Today, historians sometimes seem to have a preference for pointing out what went wrong.

Fourthly: a willingness to make sacrifices demands a commander that is visible himself, and takes notice of the acts performed under his command. Caesar described how his being a witness on the battlefield motivated his men to a rather extreme degree.⁷⁸ Courageous acts should be seen and, more importantly, be praised extensively.

Conclusion

In the past, the question whether honor was a necessary incentive divided the philosophical community into three kinds of thinkers. Underlying the differing positions is the contrast between three different views on human nature. Those who condemn the striving for honor, sometimes have a view of man that is both optimistic and demanding, and think that people potentially love virtue, and should be able to act accordingly. The Stoics for instance held the view that virtue should be its own reward, and saw nothing in honor but vanity, and a source of turmoil and envy. Others, like the Epicureans and Hobbes, to the contrary have a more negative, economic view of man as essentially egoistic. Those who hold the view that striving for honor, name and reputation has an important function occupy the middle ground. They tend to have a conservative view on human nature, that is, they do not believe that man has a natural tendency to be good, and to act virtuously, but they also reject the economic view of man as self-seeking. Cicero, among others, held this position that virtue is within reach of most people, but needs a reward. In this view, the possibility of individual morality depends on the ability to see our conduct as others see it. Autonomy, as a basis for moral conduct, was not something Cicero thought very highly of.

Although all three positions have been maintained at different times by different authors, the first two positions, of equally old lineage as the latter but highly critical of the phenomenon, have gained ground and are now dominant. The Stoic view on honor can be found in moral

philosophy and our ideals of autonomy and authenticity⁷⁹, while Epicurean and Hobbesian philosophy is still present in the economical view of man. Despite Cicero's writings, the third position, presenting a third, middle way and positive on the notion of honor, has given way.

In the military, both the Stoic position that virtue should form its own reward and the Epicurean, economic position are present. The first is to be found in the institutional model and in the writings of several military ethicists, the second in the occupational model and the work of some military sociologists. However, soldiers do not behave as morally autonomous individuals on the battlefield, and their decision to join (and stay in) the army cannot be explained in economic terms only. Both models give center stage to the individual. The military ethic however, traditionally stresses the supremacy of society over the individual and has a collectivist outlook.⁸⁰ In that respect, it is somewhat at odds with the ethics of Western society at large. Moreover, military men, by nature, seem to share a rather pessimistic and conservative outlook on human nature, seeing man as essentially selfish and weak.⁸¹ That probably explains why honor still finds a more fertile ground in the military than in society at large. They seem to cling to Cicero's position, to be seen in the fact the military ethic leaves some room for honor, although stripped of its aristocratic elements,⁸² as both an incentive to overcome the inherent weaknesses of man and a check to the 'softening' influence of a society that is sometimes seen as lacking in order, hedonistic, and materialistic.⁸³

¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1115a.

² "The soldier will have to develop (...) some sort of humanitarian cosmopolitanism that exists besides feelings of patriotism (...)" Gerhard Kümmel, "A Soldier is a Soldier Is a Soldier Is a Soldier," in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2003), 432.

³ Charles C. Moskos, "Institutional/occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update," *Armed Forces & Society*, 12, 3 (Spring 1986): 378-379.

⁴ See for instance Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (The Free Press, 1960) and Guiseppe Cafario, "Military Officer Education," in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, 266.

⁵ See for instance Samuel Stoufer e.a., *The American Soldier* vol. II. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949).

⁶ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (London: Ducksworth, 1981).

⁷ In Moskos words: "Like every theory, the I/O thesis contains an implicit understanding of motivation. Is motivation rational or subjective, oriented toward moral concerns of altruism, strongly affected, perhaps, by internal emotional concerns, or is it efficient and rational, concerned primarily with objective calculation? The problematics of action are concerned with the relative weight of idealism and materialism. In philosophic terms, it is as old as the struggle between romantics and utilitarians." Charles Moskos and Frank Wood, "Introduction," in *The Military. More than just a job?*, ed. Charles Moskos and Frank Wood, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 25. And, "(...) motivation of members in an institution rests more on values than on calculation, whereas the opposite is true in an occupation." Charles Moskos and Frank Wood, "Institution Building in an Occupational World," in *The Military*, Moskos and Woods, 280

⁸ Richard A. Gabriel, *To Serve with Honor. A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 157

⁹ Ted Westhusing, "A Beguiling Military Virtue: Honor", in *Journal of Military Ethics*, 2003, 2(3), 195.

¹⁰ Charles H. Cooley, *Human nature and the Social Order* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1902/1922), 184.

¹¹ Julian Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status," in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, ed. J.G. Peristiany (Chicago: Midway Reprint, 1974), 21.

¹² See for instance Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, V.vii.5

¹³ Ardant Du Pick, *Battle Studies* (Harrisburg: The Military Publishing Company, 1947) 50-55.

¹⁴ The Roman historian Sallust for instance, wrote that the greatness of Rome was a result of the competition for glory by those young men, who, destined to lead by birth and education, entered the battlefield with a burning desire to beat their peers by being the first to slay an opponent. Sallust, *Catilinae Coniuratio* 1-2, 7. This is rather the opposite of the current state of affairs, according to Moskos. Charles Moskos, 'Reviving the Citizen-Soldier,' in *Public Interest*, spring 2002.

¹⁵ *De Finibus* IV.21, 55, 63-68, 75-77; *Pro Murena* 61-65. Elsewhere, however, Cicero, who considered himself a Stoic, adheres to the Platonic/Stoic position (see for instance *De Re Publica* I.27, *De Off.* III. 33, 36 and 38, and *Tusculan Disputations* II. 52-53).

¹⁶ Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, I.32.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, II.58. Also, "on account of the similarity between moral worth and renown, those who are publicly honoured are considered happy, while those who do not attain fame are thought miserable" (*De Legibus* I.XI). Elsewhere, Cicero argued that the wisdom of the statesman brings fame and is therefor preferable to the wisdom of the philosopher (*De Re Publica* III.iii.5). In Cicero's *Pro Archia Poeta*, a plea in defense of the citizenship of the poet Archias based on the poet's ability to enhance Rome's fame, we read: "For magnanimity looks for no other recognition of its toils and dangers save praise and glory; once rob it of that, gentlemen, and in this brief and transitory pilgrimage of life what further incentive have we to high endeavour?" *Pro Archia Poeta*, 28.

¹⁸ Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, II.51

¹⁹ “We observe others and from a glance of the eyes, from a contracting or relaxing of the brows, from an air of sadness, from a outburst of joy, from a laugh, from speech, from silence, from a raising of a lowering of the voice, and the like, we shall easily judge which of our actions is proper, and which is out of accord with duty and nature” (*De Officiis* I.xli.146) and “[f]or, as painters and sculptors and even poets, too, wish to have their works reviewed by the public (...) so through consulting the judgment of others we find that there are many things to be done and left undone, to be altered and improved.” *Ibid.*, 147.

²⁰ Cicero defined true glory as “the agreed approval of men, the unbiased verdict of judges deciding honestly the question of pre-eminent merit; it gives back to virtue the echo of her voice; and as it generally attends upon duties rightly performed it is not to be disdained by good men.” *De Re Publica* III.ii

²¹ “Many people despise glory, who are yet most severely mortified by unjust reproach: and that is most inconsistently.” *De Officiis* I.xxi.71.

²² Francis Bacon, “Of Honour and Reputation,” in *The Essays* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985) 221.

²³ Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 101.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Bernard Mandeville, *Fable of the Bees*, vol. I, 6.

²⁶ Mandeville, *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War*, 161

²⁷ Mandeville, *Enquiry*, 60

²⁸ Mandeville, *Fable*, remark R.

²⁹ Mandeville stressed the artificial character of the notion of honor: “The excellency of this principle [of honor] is, that the vulgar are destitute of it (...) . In great families it is like the gout, generally counted hereditary, and all lords children are born with it. In some that never felt any thing of it, it is acquired by conversation and reading, (especially of romances) in others by preferment; but there is nothing that encourages the growth of it more than a sword, and upon the first wearing of one, some people have felt considerable shoots of it in four and twenty hours” (*Fable* vol. I 217). Equally outspoken is Mandeville on the selfishness of men of honor: “The Reason why there are so few Men of real Virtue, and so many of real Honour, is, because all the Recompence a man has of a virtuous Action, is the Pleasure of doing it, which most People reckon but poor Pay” (vol. I 246).

³⁰ Alexis Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 620-622.

³¹ “In the history of peoples, shame has always been associated with honor and pride.” G. Kaufman, *The Psychology of Shame* (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1989), 5.

³² Some leading critics of Kantian liberalism though, point out that honor still plays a role. Michael Walzer for instance, writes: “The struggle for honor that raged among the aristocrats, and that played such a large part in early modern literature, is now entered by everyman. It is not, however, aristocratic honor that everyman is after. As the struggle has broadened, so the social good at issue is infinitely diversified, and its names are multiplied. *Honor, respect, esteem, praise, prestige, status, reputation, dignity, rank, regard, admiration, worth, distinction, deference, homage, appreciation, glory, fame, celebrity*: the words represent an accumulation over time and were originally used in different social settings and for different purposes.” Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: a Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 252. If Walzer is correct and only the phrases have changed but the thing itself still exists, this means that, in general, moral philosophers lost interest in what makes human beings tick. A liberal author with an eye for honor is Francis Fukuyama. According to him, “[i]n modern times, this

struggle for recognition has shifted from the military to the economic realm, where it has the socially beneficial effect of creating rather than destroying wealth. Beyond subsistence levels, economic activity is frequently for the sake of recognition rather than merely as a means of satisfying natural material needs.” Francis Fukuyama, *Trust* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 7.

³³ Peter Berger, “On the obsolescence of the notion of honour,” in *Liberalism and its Critics*, ed. Michael J. Sandel (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 153; A. Margalit, *The Decent Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 42-43; Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 616-627. M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 118.

³⁴ “In the scheme of Kantian oppositions, shame is on the bad sides of all the lines.” Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 77.

³⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, BA VIII

³⁶ “[T]he fact-value distinction is taken as a given by almost everyone today, no matter whether they are behavioral scientists or committed revolutionaries.” Allan Bloom, “The Study of Texts,” *Political Theory and Political Education* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 118.

³⁷ Of course, there is more than Kantianism in moral philosophy. But the whole spectrum of moral philosophy, ranging from Kantian liberals to communitarians and proponents of virtue ethics, in one way or another, holds the view that there is something suspicious about honor, fame and name. So also those that are not of the Kantian inclination, don’t hold the aim for honor in a very high regard. They often (the champions of virtue ethics for instance) follow Aristotle who also didn’t think much of honor, because it is a secondary good. It is something that is not in our power, but something that can be taken away from us. And a sense of shame certainly was not a virtue according to Aristotle, who, contrary to Cicero, held that a mature person never goes astray, never commits a shameful deed. Therefore “a good man” doesn’t need

the sense of shame to keep him on the path of virtue - reason keeps him on track. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1095b and 1128b. See for a author on military virtue ethics, following Aristotle on this point: Reed R. Bonadonna, "Above and Beyond: Marines and Virtue Ethics," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 1994, nr. 1, 19. On the other hand, according to Aristotle honor was the most important of the secondary goods and praise an important incentive to perform noble deeds. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1101b, 1113b and 1123b.

³⁸ See Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 156-157; Eric R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 28-50. See also Bernard Williams, *Problems of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 47. But Williams writes elsewhere: "It is accepted that the world of Homer embodied a shame culture, and that shame was later replaced, in its crucial role, by guilt." However, "[t]hese stories are deeply misleading, both historically and ethically" (Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 5).

³⁹ This view has been made popular by authors as Erich Fromm, Abraham Maslow and David Riesman. See for other-directedness: David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

⁴⁰ "In the scheme of Kantian oppositions, shame is on the bad sides of all the lines." Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) 77.

⁴¹ "[N]otoriously the cultivation of truthfulness, justice and courage, the world being what it contingently is, bar us from being rich or famous or powerful. (...) We should therefor expect that, if in a particular society the pursuit of external goods were to become dominant, the concept of the virtues might suffer first attrition and then perhaps something near total effacement, although simulacra might abound." MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 83.

⁴² See on politics and business Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1993), 229, 233.

⁴³ Skinner, *Foundations*, vol. I 101

⁴⁴ Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status," 39.

⁴⁵ Berger, "Obsolescence of honour."

⁴⁶ Lawrence Kohlberg *Essays on moral development : vol 1 the philosophy of moral development: moral stages and the idea of justice* (New York : Harper and Row, 1981).

⁴⁷ Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 77

⁴⁸ "According to Hobbes, the sovereign is able to 'guarantee' the security of all members of society *except* those in the sovereigns army, for they must be sacrificed in order to preserve all else." John Mark Mattox, "The Ties That Bind: The Army Officer's Moral Obligations," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston: McGrwa-Hill, 2002), 308.

⁴⁹ Moskos, "Institutional/occupational Trends," 378-381.

⁵⁰ Gabriel, *To Serve with Honor*, 5-6.

⁵¹ "The people who write about military ethics, mostly moral philosophers and social scientists, are generally in agreement that utilitarian ethics don't work well in the military setting." Bonadonna, "Above and Beyond," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 18.

⁵² Patricia M. Shields, "A New Paradigm for Military Policy: Socioeconomics," *Armed Forces & Society*, 19, 4 (Summer 1993): 514, 515, 519, 525. However, noneconomic rewards as pride in service seem to be more important in the decision to remain in the army than economic rewards, and 78% of USMA cadets perceived military service as a calling.

⁵³ James H. Toner, *Morals Under the Gun. The Cardinal Virtues, Military Ethics, and American Society* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 56-57. However, moral education in the armed forces should aim at reaching a higher "Kohlbergstage." *Ibid.*, 165.

⁵⁴ “Lofty ideas and ideals we must have, if only to assure that man will go forward. But it is unworthy of the profession of arms to base any policy upon exaggerated notions of man’s capacity to endure and to sacrifice on behalf of ideals alone.” S.L.A. Marshall, *Men against Fire* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1947), 153.

⁵⁵ Stoufer, *The American Soldier*, 108, 150.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 108. Edward Shils en Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, summer 1948, 280-315.

⁵⁷ Marshall, *Men against Fire*, 149. The soldiers described by Marshall were clearly on the conventional level: the attitude of troops caught and corrected on flight “is usually not unlike that of a small boy caught in the act of playing hooky.” Ibid., 150

⁵⁸ Ibid. See also John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (London: Pimlico, 1993), 53 and 72,73.

⁵⁹ Marshall supposedly drew his conclusions beforehand, and later fabricated he evidence to support them. See for instance Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought* (Oxford, Oxford University Pres, 2001), 302n98. According to Bartov, and contrary to Shills and Janowitz, ideology did play an important role in the effectiveness of the *Wehrmacht*.

⁶⁰ Ben Shalit, *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 10-13.

⁶¹ But according to Moskos, soldiers are also not very willing to make sacrifices for the benefit of the group either. They develop primary group relations mainly because their chances of survival are best served that way. He needs the support from his fellow soldiers, and the only way to get that is to provide such support himself. So, Moskos states, the Hobbesian picture of man is essentially correct. Charles Moskos, “Why men fight,” *Trans-Action*, November 1969. Blake and Butler however, suggest that in Vietnam enlisted men sometimes did make sacrifices for their in a way that didn’t serve their own survival. Joseph Blake and Suellen Butler, “The Medal of Honor, Combat Orientations and Latent Role Structure in the United States Military,” *The Sociological Quarterly*, autumn 1976

⁶² This gives at least some substantiation to Victor Davis Hanson's remark that modern sociological insights that "soldiers fight only instinctually – largely to preserve their battle comrades, not for some wider abstract and ethical idea," are "cynical". Victor Davis Hanson, *The Soul of Battle* (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 12. According to Hanson Western soldiers, from ancient Greece to our day, do fight for freedom and democracy. A similar point is made by Harry Noyes: the sociological view is a half truth, an incomplete cliché, cynical and dangerous. Harry F. Noyes, "Why men really fight," *Infantry*, 1989, July-August, 23-27. Hanson and Noyes make a straw man of the sociological view however, by assuming that according to this view the buddy group is the *only thing* that matters in combat. In a reaction to Noyes, Fisher pointed out that the evidence provided by Noyes to substantiate his claim, did not amount to much. Mike Fisher, "Why men fight. A Rebuttal," *Infantry*, 1991, January-February, 12-14.

⁶³ Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, 53 and 72,73. But see for an account of honor belonging firmly to the sphere of ought, linking honor to extended benevolence, and debunking the idea of regimental honor because it "tends to pervert and transfigure both greatness of mind and extended benevolence, but especially extended benevolence.": Ted Westhusing, "A Beguiling Military Virtue: Honor," *Journal of Military Ethics*, 2003, 3, 195-212.

⁶⁴ Keegan, cited in Michael Ignatieff, *The warriors honor* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), 118.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Michael Ignatieff, "Handcuffing the Military," in *Military ethics for the Expeditionary Era*, ed. Patrick Mileham and Lee Willett (Royal Institute of International Affairs: London, 2001), 28-29. Clearly, it is not only the honor in the small group that can work as a check, but also the honor of an regiment or of the armed forces as a whole. This is not group cohesion in the small unit consisting of members who know each other well, but *esprit de corps*: the shared

identity of those belonging to a larger unit consisting of people who do not interact with each other on a daily basis.

⁶⁷ Shannon E. French, *The Code of the Warrior* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 241.

⁶⁸ *De Officiis*, I.xix. Cicero than adds, however, that “[w]e are now, to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for glory as a reward for his achievements.”

⁶⁹ Ceasar, *De Bello Civilis*, I.9.

⁷⁰ See for instance MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 83.

⁷¹ According to Williams however, it is not so that “the reactions of shame depend simply on being found out” (Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 81).

⁷² Huntington writes about the Islam as a civilization whose people “are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power”. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster), 217. And Muslims, writes another author, “have a worldview that entitles them to dominate. But to the contrary, they are dominated by others, to whom they feel – thanks to their divine revelation – superior.” Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2002), 61.

⁷³ “It is accepted that the world of Homer embodied a shame culture, and that shame was later replaced, in its crucial role, by guilt.” However, “[t]hese stories are deeply misleading, both historically and ethically” (Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 5).

⁷⁴ Interestingly, the U.S. Army adopted Maslow’s theory of a hierarchy needs, but the 1983 leadership manual did not address Malow’s fourth need: that for esteem and recognition. John W. Brinsfield, “Reality Check: The Human and Spiritual Needs of Soldiers and How to Prepare Them for Combat,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston: McGrwa-Hill, 2002), 403.

⁷⁵ See also Robert. D. Kaplan, *Warrior Politics. Why Leadership demands a Pagan Ethos* (New York, Random House, 2002), 108-109; Bradley C.S. Watson, “The Western Ethical Tradition and the Morality of the Warrior,” *Armed Forces & Society*, 26, 1 (Fall 1999): 55-72.

⁷⁶ Jeffrey L. Thomas and Carl Andrew Castro, “Organizational Behavior and the U.S. Peacekeeper,” in *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper*, ed. Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 140.

⁷⁷ See also Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978).

⁷⁸ Ceasar, *De Bello Gallico*, III.14 and VII.62.

⁷⁹ In many aspects, we are still echoing the Stoics: “Their vocal distrust of the urge to distinction in public life (...), and their paradoxical urge to a fame defined by a turning away from recognition, are all in great part still with us, if only whenever we believe that anyone interested in public office is by definition not suited to it.” Leo Braudy, *The Frenzy of Renown: Fame & its History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 148.

⁸⁰ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 79; James H. Toner, *The American Military Ethic: A Meditation* (New York: Praeger, 1992)

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 63

⁸² Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 215-232.

⁸³ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 248.