

# Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science

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## Abstract

In the philosophy of science, it is a common proposal that values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted whenever they drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions. Drawing on recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Advocates of it have overlooked that values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level even when they negatively affect an individual's cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. It also suggests that advocates of that proposal assume a narrow, individualistic account of science that threatens to undermine their own project of ensuring reliable belief formation in science.

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## 1 Introduction

Science involves different kinds of values. Cognitive and non-cognitive values are often distinguished (Longino [1996]; Douglas [2013]).<sup>1</sup> Cognitive values include truth, empirical adequacy, consistency, simplicity, fruitfulness, and explanatory power. They are taken to be legitimate in and constitutive of science (Lacey [1997]). I shall here set them aside.

I want to focus on non-cognitive values. Non-cognitive values are, for example, moral, prudential, political, and aesthetic values. It is now widely accepted that they too may play legitimate roles in science. They are taken to be acceptable, for instance, as reasons to investigate particular scientific problems and endorse certain conceptualizations (Alexandrova [2018]), as ethical constraints on scientific studies and research protocols (Elliot [2017]), as arbiters between underdetermined theories (Longino [2002]), or as determinants of standards of confirmation (Douglas [2009]).

They might, however, also pose problems in the sciences. As Anderson ([2004]) notes,

Yet surely some uses of values [in science] to select background assumptions are illegitimate. Feminists object to the deployment of sexist values to select background assumptions that insulate the theoretical underpinnings of patriarchy from refutation. Critics of feminist science similarly worry that feminists will use their values in ways that insulate feminist theories from refutation. We need criteria to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate ways of deploying values in science. (p. 2)

Many philosophers have written on the question as to how we should distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of values in science (Anderson [2004]; Douglas [2009]; Hicks [2014]; Intemann [2015]; Elliot [2017]). I here want to assess the tenability of one common criterion to draw the distinction. It is the view that values are illegitimate in science and their influence should be counteracted when they drive inquiry to the confirmation of favoured, predetermined conclusions. I shall refer to values that have this functional profile as *confirmatory values*, and I shall call the view at issue the *confirmatory value* (CV) view.

The CV view is widely accepted in the philosophical literature on values in science (Anderson [2004]; Brown [2013]; Douglas [2016]; de Melo-Martín and Intemann [2016]; Elliott [2017]), and it is *prima facie* highly plausible. For it seems clear that when values impel scientists to corroborate already endorsed claims rather than impartially assess the evidence for and against them, this threatens the reliability of belief formation in science, as it contributes to one-sided information processing.

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<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that philosophers working on values in science generally endorse this distinction. Some are critical of it (Rooney [1992]; Longino [1996]).

But are confirmatory values always epistemically problematic in science, and is the CV view in its generality tenable? The question is important, because our answer to it is directly relevant to how science should be done, and either helps support the reliability of science or weakens it.

I shall argue against the CV view. I want to do so by relating the view to recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias. The research at issue indicates that even though confirmation bias is epistemically detrimental for individual reasoners, it can be epistemically beneficial for a group of them (Mercier and Sperber [2011], [2017]).

Epistemically imperfect mental processes or states that have such group-level benefits have been called *Mandevillian* cognitions (Morton [2014]; Smart [2018]), after Bernard Mandeville ([1705]), who was the first to propose that an individual's private cognitive and moral shortcomings can promote public goods.<sup>2</sup> The implications of work on Mandevillian cognition, in general, and confirmation bias, in particular, for the normative debate in the philosophy of science on how to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate values in science have so far not been explored.

This is unfortunate because, as I shall argue, Mandevillian aspects of confirmation bias in scientific inquiry suggest that confirmatory values too can be epistemically beneficial and contribute to the reliability of science at the group level even though they negatively affect an individual's cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. Moreover, it suggests that advocates of the CV view assume a narrow, individualistic account of scientific inquiry that threatens to undermine their own project of ensuring reliable belief formation in science.

In sections 2 and 3, I provide textual evidence of the CV view in the debate on values in science before specifying the version of the view that I will focus on and outlining my argumentative strategy to assess it. In section 4, I then introduce research on human reasoning and the Mandevillian character of confirmation bias in science. In section 5, I use that research to argue against the CV view, qualify that argument, and rebut an objection to it. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the discussion.

## 2 Advocates of the CV view

Given the *prima facie* plausibility of the proposal that values (or value judgments)<sup>3</sup> are illegitimate in science when they direct inquiry to pre-existing conclusions, it is not surprising that many philosophers of science endorse the CV view. For instance, Anderson ([2004]) holds that

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<sup>2</sup> In his fable *The Grumbling Hive*, Mandeville ([1705]) wrote (*inter alia*): 'every part [of the hive] was full of vice, yet the whole mass a paradise.'

<sup>3</sup> Values are not value judgments, but the difference does not matter here and the two can be treated interchangeably.

We need to ensure that value judgments do not operate to drive inquiry to a predetermined conclusion. This is our fundamental criterion for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate uses of values in science. (p. 11)

We need to make sure, Anderson continues, that the ‘evaluative presuppositions brought to inquiry do not determine the answer to the evaluative question in advance, but leave this open to determination by the evidence’ ([ibid]). ‘If a hypothesis is to be tested, the research design must leave open a fair possibility that evidence will disconfirm it’ rather than direct scientists towards its confirmation (Anderson [2004], p. 19). These comments suggest that Anderson endorses the CV view.

Douglas ([2016]) seems to subscribe to it too, writing that

[m]ost problematically, values in a direct role during evidential assessment would be equivalent to allowing wishful thinking into the heart of science. If values could play a direct role in the assessment of evidence, a preference for a particular outcome could act as a reason for that outcome or for the rejection of a disliked outcome. (p. 618)

And this, Douglas holds, is ‘unacceptable’ (ibid).

Similarly, she maintains that while values might play a legitimate role in the early phases of science, for instance, in the selection of research topics and methodologies,

One cannot use values to direct the selection of a problem and a formulation of a methodology that in combination predetermines (or substantially restricts) the outcome of a study. Such an approach undermines the core value of science – to produce reliable knowledge – which requires the possibility that the evidence produced could come out against one’s favoured theory. (Douglas [2009], p. 100)

When values play a direct role in evidential assessment or in the choice of a methodology (that corroborates a favoured view), values are illegitimate for Douglas because they incline scientists to accept (or reject) a particular conclusion on the basis of a preference for (or aversion against) it, rather than on the basis of the evidence alone. *Via* their involvement in the assessment of evidence or in the choice of methodology, values would skew inquiry and direct it to pre-existing, preference-based outcomes. Douglas ([2009], [2016]) too thus endorses the CV view.

Other philosophers follow suit. For instance, Brown ([2013]) writes that the ‘main concern’ about values in science is that ‘value judgments might “drive inquiry to a predetermined conclusion”’, leading ‘inquirers [to] rig the game in favour of their preferred values’ (p. 835). The ‘key to the problem’ posed by values in science, Brown adds, is to ensure that we do ‘not predetermine the conclusion of inquiry, that we leave ourselves open to surprise’ ([2013], p. 838). Elliot ([2017]) agrees, writing that ‘values [are] unacceptable [in science when they lead to practices such as] ignoring evidence that conflicts with one’s preferred conclusions [and] using “rigged” methods that generate predetermined outcomes’ ([2017], p. 13).

Even philosophers who hold that objectivity is not a property of an individual but of a group, and who maintain that individuals' preferences and values can be epistemically beneficial for the group as a whole (for example, in sustaining intellectual diversity), still tend to wish to control the influence of preferences and values in ways that suggest an endorsement of the CV view. For instance, Longino ([1990], [2002]) argues that objectivity is not to be found in individual scientists since their cognition is limited and affected by subjective idiosyncrasies. Rather, it results from social interactions involving an extensive and comprehensive mix of different subjective preferences and values that cancel each other out in a process of social criticism (Longino [1990], p. 73).

Crucially, on Longino's view, for social criticism to be able to 'limit' the 'intrusion [of] subjective preferences' in science, individual scientists must not be driven to the confirmation of favoured, predetermined conclusions but need to 'take up', and be responsive to, critical social feedback, leaving their conclusions open to it (Longino [1990], p. 78, [2002], p. 130). That is, Longino too views subjective preferences, which include confirmatory values, as epistemically detrimental to science and calls for them to be kept in check by each scientist's adherence to the just mentioned 'uptake' condition.

It is fair to say, then, that many if not most philosophers in the debate on values in science accept the CV view (for further examples, see Haack [2003]; de Melo-Martín and Intemann [2016]). There are, however, different versions of the latter. It will be useful to consider some of them before specifying the one relevant here.

### 3 Versions of the CV view

The CV view can take different forms for at least three reasons. First, confirmatory values might direct an individual's, a group's, or both an individual's and a group's inquiry to predetermined conclusions. Relatedly, due to social interaction effects, these values might negatively affect the outcome of an individual's cognition without negatively affecting the outcome of the group's cognition, or *vice versa*. Depending on how we specify the effect of confirmatory values, we arrive at different versions of the CV view.

Second, the influence of confirmatory values on cognition comes in degrees (Wilholt [2009]). For example, they might lead an individual, a group, or both to (1) intentionally manipulate methods of collecting and assessing data<sup>4</sup> so that the findings support their favoured, pre-existing conclusions. Or they might lead them to (2) unintentionally adopt methods of collecting and assessing data that are significantly skewed toward confirming such conclusions, (3) somewhat skewed toward them, or only (4) slightly prefer them. Again, depending on how we construe the influence of confirmatory values on cognition, different versions of the CV view result.

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<sup>4</sup> I use the term 'data' broadly to refer to empirical evidence, theoretical considerations, and arguments.

Finally, the CV view might be interpreted to apply to all cases in which confirmatory values affect cognition in science. Or it might be taken to hold only for some cases.

I have no objection to the proposal that values that drive group inquiries to predetermined conclusions are epistemically detrimental and should be illegitimate in science. I shall also not object to the view that sometimes, perhaps frequently, values affecting an individual's and/or group's inquiry in the ways described in (1) to (4) are epistemically problematic and should be illegitimate.

The version of the CV view that is the target here is different and more general. It says that whenever values drive an individual's and/or a group's inquiry to predetermined conclusions by leading them to an unfair processing of information, these values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted because they threaten to undermine the 'core value of science [the production of] reliable knowledge' (Douglas [2009], p. 100). The passages cited in the preceding section suggest that, for instance, Anderson ([2004]), Douglas ([2009], [2016]), Brown ([2013]), Elliot ([2017]), and Longino ([1990], [2002]) endorse this general and at first glance highly plausible version of the CV view. That is not to say that they have explicitly argued for that version of the CV view. Rather, their comments on illegitimate values are in line with an acceptance of it, and they have so far not attended to the distinctions just drawn, nor clarified that they endorse only a more restricted variant of the CV view.

In what follows, I shall take the just mentioned general version of the CV view to be the sole referent of the term 'CV view'. The project of the paper is to investigate whether it is tenable. Do values, when they drive inquiry to predetermined conclusions, always undermine the reliability of belief formation and should so be illegitimate in science?

The answer is not obvious. In some cases, confirmatory values might incline subjects to confirm predetermined conclusions that are in fact (possibly without anyone knowing it at that point) true. It is not clear that in such cases, these values are epistemically detrimental. After all, they incline subjects toward supporting correct claims and lead them more swiftly to the truth than a more critical mindset would, because they dispose subjects to ignore contradictory considerations. To settle whether values that direct inquiry to predetermined conclusions are always epistemically pernicious and so illegitimate in science requires thus further research. As noted, many philosophers seem to assume that these values are indeed always problematic. I shall argue that this assumption is mistaken even if we set aside instances in which confirmatory values happen to move scientists toward truths. I want to make the point by relating the CV view to research on Mandevillian cognition.

#### **4 Mandevillian Cognition and Why it Matters in Science**

In everyday and scientific reasoning, we are sometimes affected by less-than-admirable epistemic states such as nosiness, obsessiveness, denial, partisanship, and various sorts of cognitive and social biases (Morton [2014]; Kahneman [2011]; Peters [2016], [2018]). While it is well known that, as a result, our individual judgment- and decision-making is often sub-

optimal ([ibid]), some social epistemologists have explored the possibility that cognitive factors which are epistemically problematic at the individual's level of information processing may be conducive to epistemic success at the group level (Kitcher [1990]; Solomon [1992]; Rowbottom [2011]).

For instance, Morton ([2014]) argues that while nosiness, obsessiveness, and denial tend to be epistemically problematic in individuals, they can have desirable epistemic effects for a group of them. Morton ([2014], p. 163) calls this a 'Mandevillian' effect, as he sees the idea already nascent in Mandeville ([1705]). Developing Morton's line of thought further, Smart ([2018]) offers an interesting overview of a range of cognitive phenomena that he conceptualizes as instances of 'Mandevillian intelligence'. So far, the implications of this epistemological research on Mandevillian cognition for the normative theorizing in the philosophy of science on values, in general, and the CV view, in particular, have not been investigated. I want to change this.

I shall do so by drawing on cognitive scientific research on a psychological phenomenon that corresponds to the functional profile of confirmatory values, namely 'confirmation bias' (Nickerson [1998]; or 'myside bias', Stanovich *et al.* [2013]; Mercier and Sperber [2017]). Confirmation bias is typically taken to be people's tendency to search for information that supports their own pre-existing views and to ignore or distort evidence or arguments that contradict them (Myers and De Wall [2015], p. 357; Nickerson [1998]).

Confirmation bias and confirmatory values aren't the same. For instance, for some scientists, social justice and equality are political values that might be confirmatory ones. They are when they underlie the scientists' judgment- and decision-making in the way mentioned above. In contrast, confirmation bias is not itself a value, but a cognitive tendency to respond to information in the way just specified. Confirmation bias can be viewed as one of the effects of a confirmatory value, but the two shouldn't be conflated; social justice, equality, or other values aren't cognitive tendencies.

Despite these differences, as their names suggest, confirmation bias and confirmatory values share a crucial functional property. They both drive both individuals in inquiries to predetermined conclusions and impede an impartial assessment of the relevant data.

With these points in mind, the argument that I shall develop in the remainder is the following. Research on human reasoning and confirmation bias suggests that because of the just mentioned functional role, confirmation bias is sometimes Mandevillian in nature, contributing to the reliability of belief formation at the group level. Since confirmatory values functionally overlap with confirmation bias, they too have that property and banning them from science in these cases has thus epistemic costs. It risks weakening the reliability of scientific inquiry. Since the CV view rests on the assumption that confirmatory values always threaten the reliability of science without contributing to it, we should reject the view.

The first step in developing this overall argument is to introduce work on human reasoning suggesting that confirmation bias has in some cases, even in scientific inquiries, a Mandevillian profile. That is what I'll do next.

#### 4.1 Recent Research on Human Reasoning and Confirmation Bias

I shall focus on Mercier and Sperber's ([2011], [2017]) work on human reasoning, in particular. On the basis of empirical findings and theoretical considerations, Mercier and Sperber argue that unlike it is commonly assumed, the evolved function of human reasoning is not so much to serve each individual as a means to discover and track the truth. Rather, human reasoning was primarily selected for allowing us to produce arguments to convince others, and evaluate their arguments so as to be convinced only when the latter are compelling. This evolutionary thesis is the key component of what Mercier and Sperber ([2011], [2017]) introduce as their *argumentative theory of reasoning*. It gives rise to a number of predictions. The following two, and the empirical evidence pertaining to them, will be relevant for my discussion below.

Mercier and Sperber hold that if human reasoning evolved to help us convince others then we should have a confirmation bias when we engage in it, because if, say, my goal is to convince you then I have little use for arguments that support your view or that rebut mine. Rather, I will benefit from focusing mainly only on information corroborating my point.

Mercier and Sperber ([2011], pp. 63–65) emphasize that the prediction of a confirmation bias in human reasoning is borne out by the data. Many psychologists hold that the bias is 'ubiquitous' (Nickerson [1998]) and 'perhaps the best known and most widely accepted notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning' (Evans [1989], p. 41). It is found in everyday and abstract reasoning tasks (Evans [1996]), even if subjects are asked to be more objective (Lord *et al.* [1984]) or paid to reach the correct answer (Johnson-Laird and Byrne [2002]). Its impact seems also mostly independent of intelligence and other measures of cognitive ability (Stanovich *et al.* [2013]).

The experimental findings of a confirmation bias in human reasoning challenge the view that human reasoning has the function to facilitate the acquisition of accurate beliefs in lone thinkers, for the bias leads to partial, and therewith for the individual less reliable, information processing. The data are, however, exactly as expected, if the purpose of human reasoning is to produce arguments that are to persuade others, Mercier and Sperber ([2011], [2017], pp. 206–220) maintain.

Their claim might seem too quick, because if the function of human reasoning is to allow us to better convince others, it should help us to device strong arguments. Developing strong arguments, in turn, often requires anticipating and addressing counterarguments. Yet, confirmation bias hinders us in doing just that. It thus seems that if human reasoning evolved for helping us better convince others, then *pace* Mercier and Sperber's claim, we should not have such a bias.

Mercier and Sperber ([2017]) respond to this point by noting that anticipating and rebutting objections to one's own view so as to develop compelling arguments for it takes lone thinkers significant effort and time. While they could invest that effort and time, they might, and do in fact, adopt a more economical approach, Mercier and Sperber argue. Lone thinkers 'outsource' the cognitive labour at issue by exploiting the interactive nature of dialogue, refining justifications and arguments with the help of the interlocutors' feedback, 'tailoring their arguments to the specific objections raised' (Mercier and Sperber [2017], p. 228). This has the advantage that individual reasoners will only expend as much cognitive effort as they need to in order to persuade others in any given situation (Trouche *et al.* [2016]). And it explains why people are 'lazy' in anticipating objections to their own view and susceptible to confirmation bias, even if the function of human reasoning is to help us better convince others (*ibid.*).

Turning now to the second prediction of the argumentative theory, if, as Mercier and Sperber propose, reasoning evolved so that we can better convince others and evaluate their arguments so as to be persuaded only when they are good ones then people should be particularly apt at detecting bad arguments proposed by others. And reasoning should yield superior results in groups than when individuals engage in it alone.

The data support this prediction too, Mercier and Sperber ([2011], [2017]) hold. They review a range of studies suggesting that we are indeed skilled at spotting weaknesses in other people's arguments and even in our own, provided we take them to be someone else's. For example, Trouche *et al.* ([2016]) asked their test subjects to produce a series of arguments in answer to reasoning problems and quickly afterwards had them assess other people's arguments concerning the same problems. Strikingly, about half of the participants didn't notice that by the experimenter's slight of hand in some trials they were presented with their own arguments as if they were someone else's. Moreover, among the subjects who accepted the manipulation and thus believed that they were assessing someone else's argument, more than 50% rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Crucially, they were more likely to do so for invalid than for valid ones. Trouche *et al.* ([2016]) conclude that people tend to be 'more critical of other people's arguments than of their own'; they are 'better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's than their own' (p. 2122).

These data cohere well with the results of studies involving individual *versus* group comparisons in reasoning tasks. Studies of this kind found that groups exhibit a superior performance compared to the average individual, often performing even better than the best group member (Minson *et al.* [2011]; Maciejovsky *et al.* [2013]). Unsurprisingly, the social exchange of arguments turns out to be critical for improvements in performance (Woolley *et al.* [2015]; Besedeš *et al.* [2014]; Mellers *et al.* [2014]).

Do these considerations hold for the field of science too? Reasoning, understood as the production and evaluation of arguments, is a pervasive process in science. Furthermore, Mercier and Sperber ([2017], pp. 315–317) review experimental (Mahoney [1977]), ethnological (Dunbar [1995]), and historical evidence (Mercier and Heintz [2014]) showing that scientists too are just as everyone else subject to confirmation bias, and better at evaluating

other people's arguments than their own. In supporting an extension of the preceding points to scientific reasoning, the data support an account of the latter in which confirmation bias plays a key, Mandevillian role. Building on Mercier and Sperber ([2011], p. 65; [2017], pp. 320-27) and Smart ([2018], p. 4190), I'll now elaborate on that role.

#### **4.2 Mandevillian confirmation bias in science**

Consider an example. Suppose there is a group of five scientists trying to answer one of the still open questions in science such as, for instance, where life comes from ('primordial soup', a meteorite, etc.). Each of the scientists has a confirmation bias toward a different explanation of the phenomenon. As it happens, none of the five proposals enjoys all empirical success. Suppose the scientists have four weeks to explore the issue and determine the most plausible account among the five views. What would be an epistemically beneficial distribution of research effort within the group? I shall consider two proposals.

Suppose that each of the five scientists can, and is instructed to, impartially assess all five views, and then determine the most plausible one of them through group discussion. Suppose too that they all follow the instruction. They suspend their confirmation bias toward their own view and dispassionately consider each of the proposals in equally critical ways.

While this might seem to be the epistemically best distribution of research effort, it has a significant side effect. The reason is that a confirmation bias towards a particular view  $V$  pushes a scientist to persistently search for data supporting  $V$  and to invest effort in defending it. Importantly, in the light of contradictory information that cannot be accommodated by  $V$ , the bias may incline a scientist to consider rejecting auxiliary assumptions to  $V$  rather than the proposal itself. In contrast, scientists without the bias are less invested in and committed to  $V$ , making it more likely that they engage in a less thorough search for supporting data for it. Additionally, when encountering information contradicting  $V$  or when pressed in group discussions, they may more readily reject the proposal itself, as they simply care less about it. As a result, if all five scientists were impartial with respect to all five proposals, there is a risk that each view remains less supported and all theoretical avenues with respect to it less explored than otherwise.

Consider, then, a second way of distributing research effort. Suppose the scientists are allowed to abandon the attempt to even-handedly assess all five proposals and to give in to their confirmation bias towards their own favoured view, while also being instructed to determine the most plausible proposal by group discussion such that the winning view is the one surviving the most criticism by most of the scientists.

In the process of social criticism, their individual confirmation bias will incline each scientist to invest effort in gathering data supporting their own view and in responding to counterevidence and objections to it in ways that lead to a careful exploration and development of their proposal rather than to a swift rejection. As a result, since each of the scientists favours one of the five proposals, after four weeks, the group will have accumulated more support for the five

proposals. And they will have more thoroughly explored them than in the first scenario, putting the group as a whole in an epistemically better position to determine the correct view among the five proposals.

A problem remains though. Confirmation bias does not reliably track truths (Evans [1989]), and assuming that only one of the five proposals is correct, in most of the scientists, the bias will drive reasoning to erroneous conclusions. Less invested, less one-sided information processing than reflection geared only toward corroborating their favoured, pre-existing views might thus seem to be more epistemically beneficial for each scientist in their individual reasoning to help them avoid exploring misguided proposals.

However, notice that each individual scientist's confirmation bias won't necessarily also negatively affect the group's project of determining the most tenable view. Because if, as psychological studies suggest (Trouche et al. [2016]), each individual's weakness in critically assessing their own view is offset by a particular strength in detecting flaws in others' reasoning, then the same should hold for the scientists under consideration (Mercier and Sperber [2017], pp. 315–317). As long as the group of them as a whole pursues the goal of tracking truths and remains flexible,<sup>5</sup> social criticism within the group will help correct, and prompt refinements of, each individual's reasoning, ensuring that the group's conclusions are not too far off target. That is, while confirmation bias may undermine the reliability of belief formation in each lone individual, possibly directing most of the five scientists toward mistaken conclusions, the corresponding epistemic risks for the group will in the situation at issue be kept in check *via* social feedback.

Given the specific distribution of epistemic weaknesses and strengths in each individual's reasoning, it now becomes the epistemically most efficient option to distribute research effort in the group so that the five scientists are allowed to give in to their confirmation bias and encouraged to actively criticize each other's views. This is because if each of the scientists instead suspended their confirmation bias and engaged in impartial information processing, their cognitive resources would be allocated such that the entire hypotheses space is ultimately more superficially explored than otherwise. Additionally, the superior ability that each individual scientist has to assess others' arguments would not be as effectively exploited as it could be, for that ability could then only be applied to less corroborated (*qua* less passionately and thoroughly defended) positions.

Since confirmation bias can thus contribute to the analytical depth of scientific explorations, it can have significant epistemic benefits for scientific groups despite being epistemically detrimental in each individual's reasoning (Mercier and Sperber [2011, 2017]; Smart [2018]). In ensuring a thorough investigation of hypotheses, it can increase the reliability of scientific belief-formation and help maximize the acquisition of true beliefs at the group level, provided

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<sup>5</sup> This is compatible with most individual scientists being dogmatic. I'll return to the point in section 5.

there is, as in the case at hand, a diversity of viewpoints and plenty opportunity for social criticism in the group.<sup>6</sup>

### 4.3 Situating the argument

The argument introduced is related to but also crucially different from a point Solomon ([1992], [2001]) made in an intriguing discussion of case studies from the history of science. Solomon argued that in situations when many theories or research programs enjoy some empirical successes (for example, successful predictions of new phenomena, new explanations of already known phenomena, or successful control and manipulation of processes) but none garners all, it is rational to allocate research effort so that each theory or research program attains its fair share of attention ([1992], pp. 445–446, [2001], pp. 76–78, pp. 117–119). This will lead to the development of different theories standing in competition with each other, which in turn advances and helps settle scientific debates. Solomon ([1992], p. 443, p. 452) maintained that in that situation cognitive factors such as confirmation bias are epistemically important for groups of scientists, because if each scientist has a confirmation bias toward their own pet theory, this will ensure an equitable distribution of research effort, facilitating the development of and competition between theories.

The argument from the previous section coheres well with Solomon's point. But it is also different from it in two important respects. First, it suggests that confirmation bias is epistemically beneficial not only in producing a diversity of competing positions but also in ensuring more careful scientific explorations in which proposals are better supported and critiques of them more effective than without it. Second, Solomon's suggestion that confirmation bias can be epistemically beneficial in science in ensuring a fair distribution of research efforts is relatively weak, because this effect seems to be equally achievable by alternative, perhaps less epistemically problematic, means such as, for instance, social systems of reward and sanction (Kitcher [1993]). The argument just mentioned helps improve Solomon's point by providing reasons to believe that confirmation bias is likely to be more effective in that respect than these alternative means. For the bias does the distributional work by harnessing the particular epistemic weaknesses and strengths of each scientist and by doing justice to what might well be the evolutionary function of human reasoning (Mercier and Sperber [2017]).

Notice too that alternative mechanisms are likely to rely on the use of money, praise, or other external prompts. These are *extrinsic* motivations for investing research effort. They are typically contrasted with *intrinsic* motivates, which are involved when we act without any obvious external rewards (Brown [2007]). Importantly, extrinsic rewards have been found to diminish intrinsic motivation, as subjects tend to interpret them as an attempt to control behavior (Deci *et al.* [1999]), and studies suggest that they are frequently less effective than intrinsic motives (Lepper *et al.* [1973]; Benabou and Tirole [2003]). This provides another reason to believe that the mentioned alternative ways of ensuring an epistemically beneficial

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<sup>6</sup> There are other conditions that may need to be met. I will return to this point in section 5.1 below.

distribution of research resources will be less effective than letting confirmation bias operate, for they are likely to depend on extrinsic motivations whereas the bias typically involves a pre-existing, intrinsic motive (for example, personal, or political values) to advocate a particular view. This completes my argument for the claim that confirmation bias in science has in some cases a Mandevillian character. I shall now relate the point to the normative debate on illegitimate values in science.

## 5 Against the CV View

The CV view rests on the assumption that because of their functional role (of driving reasoners to predetermined conclusions and hindering an impartial assessment of the data), confirmatory values are epistemically detrimental *per se*, undermining the reliability of scientific inquiry. The preceding discussion on confirmation bias provides reason to question the plausibility of the CV view, suggesting that the functional role at issue can in fact be epistemically beneficial contributing to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level. The CV view is thus arguably too strong.

It will be useful to illustrate the point by re-considering the abovementioned claims by Anderson ([2004]), Douglas ([2009], [2016]), Brown ([2013]), Elliot ([2017]), and Longino ([1990], [2002]). As noted, Anderson ([2004]) holds that we ‘need to ensure that value judgments do not operate to drive inquiry to a predetermined conclusion. This is our fundamental criterion for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate uses of values in science’ (p. 11).

The considerations from the previous section cast doubts on this criterion. Since confirmation bias in science is in some cases epistemically beneficial and its suspension epistemically costly, we need and arguably should not ensure that there is no such bias and, by extension, no confirmatory values in science. *Pace* Anderson, in the cases at issue, doing so would be epistemically counterproductive, because the standard proposal on what should be put in their place, namely impartiality, is unsatisfactory. It is likely to result in an overall more superficial exploration of the hypothesis space that scientists encounter. Anderson’s ([2004], p. 11) ‘fundamental criterion’ for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate uses of values in science is hence problematic.

The same applies to Douglas’ ([2016]) view that values should not be allowed to play a direct role in evidential assessments as this may give rise to wishful thinking. Granted, when confirmatory values affect scientists’ reasoning, they may indeed incline scientists to treat evidence that contradicts their favoured hypothesis as less convincing and evidence that supports it as stronger than it is. This does correspond to wishful thinking (Steel [2018]). But these values also equip scientists with a special sensitivity to a subset of data that more critical researchers lack and that helps them tenaciously develop that data into a strong case for their favoured conclusion, yielding the mentioned epistemic benefits at the group level. The

implication that confirmatory values might lead to wishful thinking<sup>7</sup> is hence no longer a fully convincing reason to prevent them from playing a direct role in science.

Douglas ([2009]), Brown ([2013]), and Elliot ([2017]) also hold that values are ‘unacceptable [in science when they lead inquirers to use] “rigged” methods that generate predetermined outcomes’ (Elliot [2017], p. 13), because they will then undermine the ‘core value of science – to produce reliable knowledge – which requires the possibility that the evidence produced could come out against one’s favoured theory’ (Douglas [2009], p. 100). When scientists rely on confirmatory values (or are affected by confirmation bias), their method of inquiry is indeed also to some extent (typically unconsciously, unintentionally) ‘rigged’, as these scientists are in that situation in a mindset that aims to generate support for predetermined conclusions. But while Douglas, Brown, and Elliot seem to assume that this threatens reliable belief formation in science *per se*, the Mandevillian account of confirmation bias and (by extension) confirmatory values suggests that in some scientific inquiries, the opposite is the case. Confirmatory values might lead scientists to adopt a ‘rigged’ method by equipping them with a confirmation bias, yet still, partly because of that very property, at the group level contribute to a thorough investigation of a phenomenon. And even if these values affect a lone scientist in ways that make it impossible for the evidence that s/he collects to ‘come out against [his/her] favoured theory’, this does not necessarily undermine the ‘core value of science’ (to produce reliable knowledge) (Douglas [2009], p. 100). For the evidence could then still come out against their favoured theory at the group level.

Finally, even Longino ([1990], [2002]), who rejects the assumption that objectivity is found in individuals and argues that it is a group-level property, has difficulties accommodating the group-level benefits of individuals’ confirmatory values. Her proposal is to ‘limit’ the influence of subjective preferences by calling on scientists to ‘take up’ and respond to critical social feedback and, therewith, contradictory data (Longino [1990], p. 78, [2002], p. 130). Longino’s uptake condition is meant to ensure that scientists leave their conclusions open to criticism and revision, rather than anchor their inquiry and response to criticism on a preferred outcome (Biddle [2009]).

But it is important to distinguish two kinds of uptake, or responsiveness to criticism. There is what I shall call *comprehensive uptake*, which involves responding to criticism in ways that leaves abandoning the preferred view as an option, and *restrictive uptake*, which involves responding to criticism in ways that does not leave this as an option. Restrictive uptake is clearly required for a group to attain many of the epistemic benefits mentioned in the discussion above on the argumentative theory of reasoning. For an individual’s refinement of a favoured position often relies on an ‘outsourcing’ of cognitive labour (Mercier and Sperber [2017], p. 227-34), and individuals tend to be ‘lazy’ in developing support for their views until pushed to do so by other people’s objections (Trouche *et al.* [2016]). Comprehensive uptake, however, which seems to be what Longino calls for, is arguably not required. In fact, since it involves being less

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<sup>7</sup> In the theorizing on values in science, there has recently been a flurry of research on wishful thinking (de Melo-Martín and Intemann [2016]; Steel [2018]; Hicks and Elliot [unpublished]). Given the connection between confirmatory values and wishful thinking, the argument developed here offers a contribution to this research.

committed to one's favoured view, for the reason introduced above, it is likely to reduce the depth of analysis of scientific groups.

But even when it comes to comprehensive uptake, Longino's condition does capture an important point. It is that if such uptake never occurred among scientists, the epistemic benefits from confirmatory values could not arise in the group either. For this would preclude the group as a whole from converging on the correct proposal; such convergence presupposes a readiness among group members to update their conclusion(s). However, in order for the group to benefit from confirmatory values, it is not required that each individual exhibit this readiness. It only requires that most of them, or the group as a whole, do so. In proposing (comprehensive) uptake as an epistemic guideline for each individual scientist, Longino's condition is likely to overshoot if we aim to restrict the influence of confirmatory values to ensure that scientific inquiry is as reliable and epistemically efficient as possible.

### 5.1 Qualifications and clarifications

The just mentioned argument against the CV view rests on an abstract analysis of the potential epistemic benefits of confirmatory values. It sets aside many aspects of the social context in which science is actually taking place and assumes scientific environments with (*inter alia*) a diversity of viewpoints, social criticism, and an equal distribution of power and resources among scientists. These conditions are frequently not met in actual scientific inquiries.<sup>8</sup> Since the social conditions in which science takes place play a crucial role in determining whether confirmation bias and confirmatory values are epistemically beneficial, the preceding argument against the CV view needs to be qualified. It applies specifically to situations meeting the envisaged conditions.

This qualification does not undermine the relevance of the argument. For it is not implausible to hold that some social environments in science do approach the conditions assumed. Moreover, advocates of the CV view do not limit the latter's application only to contexts in which this is not the case. And it is an open question as to whether the CV view is satisfactory in situations where these conditions are met. The argument offered helps answer that question.

It is in need of another clarification, however. This is because the particular cases of value-laden research that have made many philosophers concerned about confirmatory values and biases are cases where, for example, private interests (of, for instance, pharmaceutical companies, chemical companies, and the fossil fuel industry) have disproportionate power to fund research, and suppress or obscure evidence that would challenge the actors' favoured conclusions (Elliot [2017]). These are cases in which the CV view with its call for restrictions on the influence of values in science is highly plausible.

Still, the CV view holds that values directing individuals towards predetermined conclusions are epistemically problematic *per se* and a constraint on them is thus always warranted. The

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<sup>8</sup> I'm grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this and the following points in the section.

argument offered here is intended to challenge this particular claim only. It is meant to motivate the view that such values can also in some cases be beneficial and curbing them would then be epistemically costly. It may not be easy to strike a balance between letting confirmatory values operate and limiting their operation to avoid the pursuit of unpromising views or other epistemic costs. But if, in response to this difficulty, we treat confirmatory values in line with the CV view as always illegitimate in science, then in many cases, we risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Unless the view is revised so as to be sensitive to the difference between epistemically beneficial confirmatory values and detrimental ones, putting it into practice is likely to create possibly important epistemic costs for science.

## 5.2 An objection – The dogmatism problem

The argument against the CV view just introduced suggests that in some cases confirmation bias and confirmatory values are epistemically beneficial, and should thus not be illegitimate in science *per se*. One might object that if we grant that confirmation bias acceptable, we run the risk of allowing *dogmatism* in science. Because if scientists may ignore evidence and arguments contradicting their favoured conclusions and may limit their search for data to those confirming these conclusions, they may retain their conclusions in the light of contradictory information and become closed-minded. Yet, dogmatism in science ought to be prevented at all cost. Hence, unlike the argument against the CV view suggests, confirmation bias and confirmatory values are likely to be more epistemically pernicious than beneficial and should be illegitimate in science. Or so the objection concludes.

Before assessing the point, it is worth clarifying the difference between confirmation bias and dogmatism. As noted, confirmation bias is the tendency to process information about an issue so that one's pre-existing view about that issue is confirmed, where this also involve ignoring or downplaying contradictory evidence or arguments (Myers and De Wall [2015]). Dogmatism is different. While there are many versions of it, the one I shall focus on here, *epistemic dogmatism*,<sup>9</sup> is commonly taken to be the tendency to hold a belief 'unquestioningly and with undefended certainty', where this involves a resistance to revise the belief in light of counterevidence (Blackburn [2008], p. 139).

One might be dogmatic in this sense with respect to a certain view without having a confirmation bias related to it. For instance, one might dogmatically hold on to a particular conclusion no matter what data one is presented with and so without having the tendency to seek information confirming one's conclusion. Similarly, one might have a confirmation bias with respect to a certain view yet not be dogmatic about the view. For instance, one might tend to confirm one's favoured conclusion and overlook contradictory data while being open to

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<sup>9</sup> Epistemic dogmatism pertains to a scientist's response to, and search for, data within the confines of scientific inquiry. There is also what might be called *institutional dogmatism*, which may involve a scientist's going out of the scientific field to convince non-scientific actors, institutions, advocacy groups, and individual people of his/her position(s), to gather funding to support research outside the field of legitimate academic research, to initiate campaigns to promote his/her view(s), etc.

revise the conclusion when the data are noticed and become strong. Confirmation bias and dogmatism are hence distinct.

They are, however, also closely related. For instance, if one systematically ignores or downplays counterevidence to one's predetermined conclusion, one will not revise that conclusion in the light of counterevidence. This is a feature of dogmatism (Anderson [2004]). It is the feature of dogmatism to which confirmation bias can clearly contribute and to which the above objection appeals.

The objection would be weak if there was no widespread agreement among philosophers working on values in science that dogmatism about values and viewpoints is indeed generally detrimental to and ought to be prevented in science. But there is. For instance, Longino ([2002]) proposes the 'uptake' condition as a guard against dogmatism in science and often notes that there should be no dogmatism in science (Biddle [2009]).<sup>10</sup> Anderson ([2004]) also insists on the danger of dogmatism. She writes that what is 'worrisome about allowing value judgments to guide scientific inquiry is [...] that these judgments might be held dogmatically' ([2004], p. 11). Similarly, Rolin ([2012]) holds that values are an 'epistemic problem for science insofar as they lead scientists to dogmatism' (p. 211). In the same vein, Brown ([2013]) writes that the 'real problem [of values in science is] dogmatism about values' (p. 838).

No doubt, dogmatism is often problematic in science. But it seems that philosophers who hold that it should always be prevented overlook that dogmatism can also have epistemically beneficial effects in science (Kuhn [1963]). Preventing it regardless has thus epistemic costs, costs that in some cases might be worth paying to sustain reliable belief formation in science. I shall introduce three epistemic benefits that dogmatism might have.

Zollman ([2010]) mentions one of them. By using a model for network simulation that operates on the basis of a Bayesian update mechanism, Zollman shows that in well-connected networks of undogmatic individuals, false or misleading data can propagate rapidly in the network and is more likely to have a lasting effect on the members' convergence behavior. In contrast, less well-connected networks or networks with more dogmatic members do not face this epistemic risk. Zollman gives a concrete example from the history of medical research on peptic ulcer disease (PUD).

In the 1950s, scientists had to choose between two accounts of PUD. One was the bacterial hypothesis and the other the hyper-acidity hypothesis. The bacterial hypothesis was the correct one, and also enjoyed early evidential support. Yet, in 1954, a prominent gastroenterologist, Eddy D. Palmer, published a study that suggested that bacteria are incapable of colonizing the human stomach (he had looked at more than 1000 patients' biopsies and detected no colonizing

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<sup>10</sup> Biddle ([2009]) offers a critique of Longino's proposal that is well in line with my argument. He objects to Longino's assumption that dogmatism is always epistemically problematic, writing that: 'Progress in science is best ensured not by demanding of individuals that they be open to everything but, rather, by distributing the resources of a community into various lines of research and letting each of these programs doggedly pursue its own course' (Biddle [2009], p. 622). Biddle does not provide much support for the claim that progress is best ensured if these conditions obtain, however.

bacteria). The result of this study was the widespread abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in the scientific community. It was not until the 1980s that it became clear that Palmer was wrong. He did not use a silver stain when investigating his biopsies but instead relied on a Gram stain. This matters because *Helicobacter Pylori* are most visible with silver stains and are difficult to see when Gram stain is used.

Zollman argues that the disproportionate influence of Palmer's publication was partly grounded in the scientists' readiness to abandon competing ideas, and in a lack of dogmatic mindset among advocates of the bacterial hypothesis. This readiness and lack of dogmatism among these researchers (together with belief perseverance among advocates of the hyper-acidity hypothesis) hindered intellectual progress in the research on PUD for three decades, Zollman holds. He uses this as an example illustrating that dogmatism can in some cases contribute to the epistemic success of a scientific community by reducing the effect of misleading data and sustaining the search for new ideas, methods, and information. It can be a means of protection against epistemically problematic kinds of early scientific convergence and consensus (Kuhn [1963]; Smart [2018]).

Notice that the nature of the epistemic contribution of dogmatism that Zollman points to is likely to depend on social conditions and power relations. The PUD example, in particular, illustrates that dogmatism pertaining to consensus views (for example, hyper-acidity hypothesis) can be less epistemically beneficial and more problematic than dogmatism pertaining to dissenting views (for example, the bacterial hypothesis).

Turing now to a second positive role that dogmatism might play in science, Popper ([1994]) notes,

[a] limited amount of dogmatism is necessary for progress. Without a serious struggle for survival in which the old theories are tenaciously defended, none of the competing theories can show their mettle – that is, their explanatory power and their truth content. (p. 16)

For Popper, some dogmatism contributes to progress in science, prompting opponents of the dogmatist to make fully explicit, elaborate, and hone their counterarguments and alternatives. Indeed, even if the dogmatically held views are entirely misguided, they might still help strengthen and invigorate the deliberative efforts of those who embrace alternatives, stimulating them to make their own proposals more convincing (see also Mill [1859/1998], pp. 22–24, pp. 42–44).

Finally, just as confirmation bias, dogmatism may benefit science in inclining individuals who encounter strong counterevidence to their pet theory to consider abandoning supplementary hypotheses of the latter when their less dogmatic counterparts would be poised to give up the whole theory instead. As a result, there may be situations in which dogmatism, just as confirmation bias, is crucial to push scientists to investigate avenues that would be ruled out by more open-minded individuals (Rowbottom [2011]).

Dogmatism in science is thus not necessarily and always epistemically problematic. It can be beneficial by serving (1) as a protection against premature scientific convergence and consensus, (2) as a motivation to push opponents of dogmatically held views to develop their objections and alternatives, or (3) as a way of ensuring that all research avenues are explored. These are Mandevillian effects, because in each individual, dogmatism remains epistemically pernicious (it reduces one's sensitivity to a subset of incoming data) while facilitating (1) to (3), which benefit the group (Smart [2018]).

If dogmatism in science can be epistemically beneficial then the view that it should always be prevented may need to be revised, for preventing dogmatism in these cases will incur the epistemic cost of undermining the effects related to (1) to (3). The abovementioned objection that confirmation bias and confirmatory values should never be admitted into scientific inquiry because they lead to dogmatism will then need to be reconsidered too.

## **6 Conclusion**

Dogmatism, confirmation bias, and confirmatory values are perhaps frequently epistemically highly detrimental in science. The argument of this paper was not meant to deny that. The aim was to critically assess the CV view, which says that whenever values drive an individual's and/or a group's inquiry to predetermined conclusions by leading them to skewed, partial processing of information then these values are epistemically problematic and illegitimate in science. I argued that this view, which many philosophers working on values in science endorse, is too strong. For research on human reasoning and confirmation bias suggests that the bias and, by extension, confirmatory values can have a Mandevillian character in inquiries, including scientific ones. That is, despite being epistemically detrimental for individual scientists, in some cases, they contribute to the reliability of scientific belief formation at the group level. They facilitate a more in-depth exploration of a given problem space than would otherwise be likely. Since advocates of the CV view endorse the latter because their goal is to ensure that scientific inquiry is reliable, in arguing that confirmatory values should be illegitimate in science, they run the risk of undermining their own goal. To become more plausible, the CV view needs to be modified so as to make room for the possibility that confirmatory values (and dogmatism) can have epistemic benefits that might make it worth considering them as legitimate parts of science.

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