nor anyone else fills this need. Pollock is clearly capable of filling this need, and I wish he had done so in a second part to this book. I know of no textbook that illustrates philosophical applications of set theory and model theory, but we have a number of books by philosophers that settle for a survey of logical notions useful to philosophers. Pollock's book is one of the latter. If you need a very concise review of some of the fundamentals of set theory and model theory, Pollock's book is for you.

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Jenny Teichman
*Philosophy and the Mind.*
Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press;
Pp. 136. Cdn $62.50: US $34.95
(cloth: *isbn* 0-631-15752-2);
Cdn $24.95: US $12.95
(paper: *isbn* 0-631-15753-0).

This book belongs to the difficult-thought-made-easy genre. I don't say this disparagingly; there is a place for such books and this one is good of its kind. It doesn't break any new ground; it is simply a critical sketch of post-WW II philosophy of mind. However there are nuggets scattered throughout – plainspoken, no-nonsense arguments, examples, assessments, and asides that bear the stamp of the author's personality and wit. The text does read like it has descended from lecture notes; the style is telegraphic and the message units are often about the length of what would fit on a file card or two. But again this is not a criticism; indeed it may make the book easier to lecture on, or from.

There are four parts to the book. Part I, Materialism, contains chapters called Behaviorism, Physicalism, and Functionalism. Physicalism has a short but lucid discussion of contingent identity and Kripke's opinion of that. Functionalism incorporates discussion of Block's group minds, Searle's Chinese Room, pain (including Lewis's Martian pain), and general worries about the notion of function. Part II, Linguistic Analysis, contains a chapter each on Wittgenstein and
Ryle, the former emphasizing philosophical methodology more than philosophical psychology.

Part III — French Philosophy of Mind — is there 'in order to demonstrate that not all philosophy of mind is proceeding in Anglo-Saxon directions' (3). Yet the chapter on Merleau-Ponty shows that once we get past the system-building theory-of-everything packaging of his opuses we find embedded therein a philosophy of mind that speaks to many of the same issues as English-speaking philosophy of mind. Indeed Davidson, Nagel, Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Ryle are all mentioned by Teichman in this regard. The other chapter on the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss does however indicate a marked difference of direction — so different in fact that 'changing the subject' might be a more appropriate characterization. For structuralists, it seems, are more interested in the social products of the mind, especially the classificatory systems it creates, than in how it works. But perhaps this could be an antidote for some of our ills. As Teichman remarks, 'a strict diet of Anglo-American functionalism can create the impression that the most important workings of the human mind consist in operations like seeing red patches and believing things about cats on mats' (84).

Part IV, Mind, Science, and Explanation, returns us to the English-speaking mainstream. A chapter called Varieties of Dualism, wherein discussions of Davidson’s anomalous monism and Nagel’s critique of materialism occur, addresses various issues of intertheoretic reduction and levels of description and explanation. Another called The Study of Matter and its Laws gives us highlights of Hempel, Kuhn, and Feyerabend on the nature of science, the suggestion being that theories of mind are only as viable as the conceptions of science they rely on. The last chapter, The Study of Mankind, continues with problems of science and reduction, wrapping up with a section on properties and bridge laws. Teichman then closes on a mugwumpian note.

This book (with some omissions) could be used in a full-year Introduction to Philosophy course in which philosophy of mind is not taught until late in the year. It could also be used for a half-year 200- or 300-level Introduction to Philosophy of Mind class, although a fair bit of supplementation would be needed.

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