

logical significance. But it also addresses the common critique that real agents do not have anything like numerically precise degrees of belief. Whereas earlier chapters spoke confidently of metaphysically real epistemic phenomena, Christensen now retreats to a discussion of whether vague beliefs can be *modeled* by a formal apparatus involving the probability axioms. Christensen never offers a final verdict on the metaphysical status of vague beliefs, nor on the choice between unificationism and bifurcationism. The reader is left wondering whether a metaphysical account of graded beliefs is available that respects our psychological experience.

Putting Logic in its Place is a well-written book, made accessible by its brevity and lack of technicality. It will admirably serve both the seasoned hand and the newcomer looking for a survey of the territory. Christensen asks all the right epistemological questions; his answers clear the dialectical space for an intriguing position that sets aside a long-held picture of the nature of belief and its relation to logic. That picture certainly has its problems, not least among them its implications for the Preface Paradox. But in suggesting we replace it, Christensen owes us his own substantive picture subject to equal scrutiny. Absent such a positive account, many philosophers will be reluctant to accept Christensen's thesis about the proper place of logic.

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The Undiscovered Wittgenstein: The Twentieth Century's Most Misunderstood Philosopher, by John W. Cook. New York: Prometheus Books, 2004. Pp. 437. H/b \$59.00.

What more could there be to discover about Wittgenstein? Has another philosopher had such attention paid to his life and work? We can think of few that, in this respect, would come close, particularly in such a relatively short period of time following the publication of their work. So, as John Cook's subtitle suggests, what remains undiscovered about Wittgenstein does so not through lack of attention to his life and work but rather through lack of understanding on the part of those who have devoted their attention to his life and work.

Can so many be so wrong? We mean to say, can it be that Wittgenstein's students, friends and literary executors, G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush, Rhees, and G. H. von Wright were fundamentally mistaken; that Peter Hacker, career-long

student of Wittgenstein's work and author of the magisterial four volume commentary (and numerous other studies) on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* is fundamentally mistaken, as is Michael Nedo, the director of the Cambridge Wittgenstein archive, who has devoted his life to the editing and publishing of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*? Can it be that Stanley Cavell and his inheritors have similarly fundamentally misunderstood? Yes! Indeed, Jerry Fodor, whose early papers took issue with the predominance of what he took to be Wittgenstein's influence on philosophy so as to make space for his own subsequent work in the philosophy of mind, does not misunderstand or fail to learn from Wittgenstein in the manner that, for example Hacker might judge him to have, but rather makes the very same mistake as Hacker, Anscombe, Cavell, Nedo, Rhees and von Wright. Indeed, Fodor and all those who have written against Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians succumb to the same fundamental misunderstanding of Wittgenstein as do those who have sought to defend Wittgenstein the philosopher.

This is the measure of the radicality of John W. Cook's thesis. Everyone who has hitherto read Wittgenstein, friend or foe, Wittgensteinian or self-avowed opponent of his philosophy, has misunderstood him. For they all fail to grasp Wittgenstein's neutral monist version of phenomenalism and his consequent behaviourism. In the book under review, and two preceding it, Cook maintains that Wittgenstein holds that—as the *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, which Cook cites, has it—'empirical statements are synonymous with phenomenal appearances' (p. 23); this is phenomenalism. However, in holding phenomenalism Wittgenstein does not hold sense impressions to be inner or private (as did, for example, Ayer). Rather, Like Ernst Mach, Wittgenstein is a 'neutral monist'. Cook writes, 'An important thesis of neutral monism is that it is wrong to think that that which is mental is private, and there can be no doubt that Wittgenstein shared that view' (p. 29).

Here is the problem. We do not suggest that Cook cannot possibly be correct about Wittgenstein while those (and others) we briefly listed above are all wrong, despite differences between them (and there are many). Still less do we hold Wittgenstein to be beyond criticism. The problem is that at every turn Cook's exegesis is hampered by his complete failure to grasp Wittgenstein's philosophical method and Wittgenstein's purpose in proceeding and writing as he does. For example, Cook seems either extraordinarily uninterested in or blatantly unfamiliar with debates in Wittgenstein scholarship. He simply quotes briefly and without providing context anyone who has discussed Wittgenstein and who happens to serve his purpose at a particular point. We do not mean to suggest here that Cook is deliberately cherry-picking, merely so that he might erect a 'straw-Wittgenstein' to replace with his 'undiscovered' Wittgenstein. Our point is rather that his failure to seriously engage with recent Wittgenstein scholarship is emblematic of his failure to grasp the fundamental significance of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy to an understanding of Wittgenstein. For it is this which is at the heart of disagreements between, for

example, the reading of Wittgenstein advanced by Hacker and his followers and that advanced by Cavell and by Hacker's former co-author, Gordon Baker.

What might an engagement with this literature show Cook?

Well, it might show him that rather than refuting positions through argument Wittgenstein's style was to inhabit different positions and work them through, showing how, ultimately, they should not be a position onto which one would wish to hold. Cook, therefore, might find his attribution of neutral monism to Wittgenstein would be better attributed to one of Wittgenstein's voices in *Philosophical Investigations* and elsewhere in his *Nachlass* and thus be a position not advocated by Wittgenstein, but rather deflated or merely suggested as an alternative picture so as to loosen the grip of other entrenched pictures. Baker, Cavell, Mulhall and Stern (and many others) have all made this point and many readers of Wittgenstein, friend and foe, are unlike Cook alive to this aspect of his philosophical practice.

It might show Cook that his chapter on 'language-games' is misconceived from the outset. In *suggesting* language-games Wittgenstein explicitly says that they are to be used as 'objects of comparison' and, furthermore, he employs the term in different ways throughout *Philosophical Investigations* and elsewhere. Indeed, Cook seems to forget the preceding discussion of 'games' and 'family resemblance' in his own misfiring criticisms of language-games, and in doing so assumes there must be something essential to all employments of the term.

Finally (given our limitations of space), it might show Cook that his discussion of privacy, early in his book (pp. 24–36) collapses together two different things philosophers might seek to pursue when doing philosophy of mind, only one of these being something that Wittgenstein sought to do. Wittgenstein inherited from Frege the latter's anti-psychologism. So, when Wittgenstein turns his attention to the mind it is in a manner which is indebted to Frege. The task of philosophy is to analyse *the* mind through the analysis of the logic of thought. Frege undertook this task through representing thoughts as propositions and subjecting them to analysis. Neither Frege nor Wittgenstein were concerned with theorising the content of individuals' minds, theorising what takes place in a person's mind when they ϕ etc. Put another way, it is not (as it seems increasingly popular to misconceive) that to commit oneself to a formal analysis of the mind, which represents thoughts as propositions so as to subject them to analysis, is to commit oneself to the idea that to have a thought is to have a propositional attitude. If Cook grasped this, he would see that discussion of whether Wittgenstein thought individuals actually had sensations or not is simply not a question in which philosophers of Wittgenstein's ilk, inheriting Frege's anti-psychologism, are remotely interested.

Bearing this in mind, read what Cook writes in the following:

Here is where we can easily misinterpret Wittgenstein if we fail to bear in mind his conviction that philosophy can be expressed in the formal mode of speech. As regards the topic under discussion here [privacy], his position was that there are no private objects, but he would not have formulated his position that way. He had so

diligently trained himself to avoid the material mode of speech (“There are no ...”) that he did not even think in such terms. At times, however, he came very close to doing so, as when in notes made for his own use he dropped his guard and wrote that “... [T]he private experiences which we imagine as [being] ... behind our actions dissolve into mist and into nothing” (PO, p. 243). Do we know what that means in this context? The phrase can’t have been meant to be taken literally but what can it mean? Apparently, it and the phrase “into nothing” were Wittgenstein’s metaphorical way of expressing the material mode version: “There are no private objects.” But when lecturing or when writing for publication, Wittgenstein never allowed himself to speak in this way. Had he not have been so determined to avoid the material mode he might have been better understood. (p. 32)

So, it seems the best Cook can offer us here, is his own—rather tone-deaf—*translation* of a metaphor Wittgenstein deliberately employs. To say one is not obliged to follow Cook’s path here would be something of an understatement. What Wittgenstein is intimating here is that when we gain clarity about the (depth) grammar of mental terms we see that we do not *need* to see them as substantives; as, of necessity, naming some private experience separable from our actions. Cook seems simply not to be alive to the therapeutic nature of Wittgenstein’s method. This is surprising. Not only is it the subject of much discussion in recent exegetical literature. It is of course also something Wittgenstein discussed. To refer to just one instance, at his (minuted) talk to the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club, a fortnight following Popper’s (in)famous visit, Wittgenstein made explicit his debt to Hertz’s *Principles of Mechanics* (Heinrich Hertz, *The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form*, trans. D. E. Jones and J. T. Walley, New York: Cosimo Books, 2007; see the *preface* and the famous discussion of ‘force’) as providing the prototype for his therapeutic method. What Wittgenstein took himself to have pioneered in his later work predominantly (though this should not blind one to it being strongly present in the *Tractatus*), was providing a method of philosophical analysis whereby that method was neither reducible to nor parasitic on science, mathematics or psychology. The method is better understood as an attitude, one of dissolving problems rather than providing theories so as to overcome them. It is based in the suggestion that philosophical problems are self-made through our misunderstanding the logic of our language. The philosophical task is, therefore, to gain clarity.

Many of those who have written on Wittgenstein (though certainly not all) might well have been wrong, even badly wrong. However, on the evidence here, few have been as wrong as the later Cook. Few have so resolutely failed to appreciate his method; few have so bluntly substituted a particular *theory* of mind and world for the delicate dialogues with which he Socratically examined all such theories.

All this is a great shame. In his early writings, when Cook was properly in touch with the literature and the scholarship, and when he was not driven by a seeming mission to persuade us all that Wittgenstein is not only a theorist but an insidious, deeply eccentric, plain wrong and morally dubious one (see the

final chapter of the book under review here for the real attack), Cook had something of genuine philosophical worth to offer his readers. Sadly, that is no longer the case.

We can find precious little reason to recommend the book under review, except as an interesting exercise in just how it is possible to misunderstand and travesty a great philosopher. The remark of Cook's that we quoted earlier serves nicely to illustrate this travesty: 'it is wrong to think that which is mental is private ... there can be no doubt that Wittgenstein shared that view.' On the contrary: Wittgenstein had no views at all, qua philosopher (as he said repeatedly); and the behaviourist theory is one of the views which he strove hardest (and explicitly) to show as being an optional temptation to be worked through, at best a portentous-sounding tautology, at worst a scientific and/or a metaphysical morass.

This is now the third book by Cook making effectively the same point; rather than subject us to more of the same, we would urge that there is something much better that Cook, or perhaps one of his former students, could usefully do: collect Cook's early work, and re-present it to the new generation of philosophers. There is an increasingly-undiscovered Cook worth re-discovering. Such rediscovery would be worth one's time; just as much as the book under review, unfortunately, is not.

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Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology, by Julian Dodd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xi + 286. H/b £42.00.

Anyone even remotely interested in the ontology of music ought to read Julian Dodd's *Works of Music*: Dodd's novel contributions are many, interesting, and impossible to ignore. But the book is also highly recommended to those less than optimistically inclined towards the prospects of the analytical approach to musical metaphysics. Dodd's meticulous and subtle treatment conclusively