

In these words we ~~find~~^{see} - it seems to me - a definite picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words of ~~the~~^{human} language ~~are~~^{have} objects - sentences are combinations of such ~~words~~^{meanings}.

In this picture of language we find the root of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word. It is the object which the word stands for.

Augustine does not speak of a distinction between parts of speech. ~~He~~^{He} describes the learning of language in this way, ~~we~~^{we} think - I should imagine - primarily of substantives, like "table", "chair", "bread" and the names of persons; and of the other parts of speech as something that will ~~come~~^{come} out all right ~~eventually~~.

2. Consider this application of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which ~~I have written the signs~~^{I have written the signs} "five red apples". He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens the ~~door~~^{door} that has the ~~sign~~^{sign} "apples" on it; then he looks up the word "red" in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now ~~recalls~~^{recalls} the series of cardinal ~~numbers~~^{numbers} - I assume ~~that~~^{that} he knows them by heart - up to the word "five" and with each numeral he takes an apple ~~that~~^{that} has the colour of the square. ~~He then says to~~^{He then says to} ~~me~~^{me} "five red apples" with words. - "But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he has to do with the word 'five'?" - Well, I am assuming that he ~~acts~~^{acts} as I have described.

3. Explanations come to an end somewhere. ~~What is~~^{What is} the meaning of the word "five"? - There was no question of ~~it~~^{it} here; only of the way in which "five" is used. // Nothing of that sort was being discussed, only the way in which "five" is used.

4. That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive ~~language~~^{language} and the way in which language functions. But ~~we~~^{we} might also say it is ~~the~~^{the} picture of a more primitive language than ours.

Let us ~~imagine~~^{imagine} a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language ~~is~~^{is} to be the ~~idea~~^{idea} of a ~~communicator~~^{communicator} in the ~~presence~~^{presence} of a ~~receiver~~^{receiver} and ~~the~~^{the} ~~receiver~~^{receiver} is to be a ~~builder~~^{builder} A ~~to~~^{to} ~~be~~^{be} ~~understood~~^{understood} by ~~an~~^{an} assistant B.

WITTGENSTEIN

in/on translation

COLEÇÃO CLE
Volume 86



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Picture: Cristiane Gottschalk



In memoriam: Arley Moreno, Alois Pichler and Paulo Oliveira at the V National / II International Wittgenstein Conference — Unicamp 2008

Foreword *in memoriam*:
Translating the language of Arley Moreno's thought

Antonia Soulez
Université Paris 8, emeritus

I met Arley Moreno in Paris a long time ago thanks to Joëlle Proust, who was, like him, a student of Gilles Granger. At that time, I think in the well marked 1990s, we were engaged in a pioneering work of translating, presenting, commenting the founding texts of the Vienna Circle at the *Institut d'Histoire des Sciences* IHPST, a work that went against the current of French philosophy in the spirit of the 1960's. Informal seminars owed their necessity only to our passion for working together on the subject matters. The seminar – which initially took place informally during the time when Jan Sebestik (CNRS) worked closely with Suzanne Bachelard (IHPST) – stem from proposals by publishers who had agreed to our plans of translating the founding texts of the Vienna Circle, followed by Wittgenstein's untranslated 1930s texts, and held also symposia and lectures by foreign scholars whom we invited to speak when they were passing, including several times Gordon Baker (Oxford), whose presence always brought something new and friendly to the collective work. I name Baker because Arley began to read his work and then wanted to meet him in Brazil. We no doubt shared this magnetic effect that very great commentaries have on you, similar to musical performances that make a great impression on you. I called Gordon the Glenn Gould of Wittgensteinian studies.

It is indeed in those years that Arley arrived among us. We knew each other already at the time when I became program director at the *Collège International de Philosophie* in Paris and established links with Brazil through missions supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Capes-

Cofecub). Concerning the philosophy of language, philosophers very marked by the French culture brought me to their country a little later, particularly Bento Prado Jr., who played an important role in the exchanges that began to set out around the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

I met Arley again at a time when our Wittgensteinian endeavors crossed. I was engaged with my team in a long-term work on the Wittgenstein of the 1930s, when Brian McGuinness introduced me to Gordon Baker at Oxford. This was the source of the book *Dictées de Wittgenstein à Waismann et pour Schlick* (1997-98, now reissued by Vrin 2015 [translations from *The Voices of Wittgenstein*]). That Arley would meet Gordon Baker again is quite natural. I believe Gordon Baker spoke to me about this trip to Brazil. Then it was Alois Pichler's turn to be invited to Campinas. I had met him at the Wittgenstein Archives in Bergen, Norway. For me, the Norwegian source of these meetings was first of all Arild Utaker, who was in contact with the researchers who worked there. The meetings, which started in 1995, very soon after the fatal accident with my husband Philippe Soulez, had been decisive for my work on the freedom of the will, published in the 1998 book in the Epiméthée collection by PUF, then directed by Jean-Luc Marion. It contained a translation of two of Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Free Will*, followed with a personal text on "The Free Game of Assumption".

Coming from the Greek philosophy, I was not directly part of Jacques Bouveresse's group of students. I followed his lectures from time to time, but in a non-systematic way; moreover, there was already some rivalry between Granger and Bouveresse – which I did not see at that time and only came to realize much later. These seminars also welcomed my student researchers from Paris 8. I then began to occasionally attend the seminars of Gilles Granger, whose broader views helped me to develop certain aspects of my work on language, which interested me more than the questions developed solely from the writings of Wittgenstein.

Granger, also author of a book on Aristotle and the theory of science, whose reception remained thin among the French specialists of Aristotle, had introduced Wittgenstein very early already in the 1960s, and we can say against the current, because the reception in France was hardly favorable at first to this Viennese author – who was initially criticized for introducing the ugly logical neo-positivism, by people who had not really read or understood him. By focusing on the Conversations with Schlick and later on the Dictations, I discovered that Wittgenstein was particularly critical of Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Science, but also of Moritz Schlick’s sort of illuminism (see his theory of *Konstatierungen*). Friedrich Waismann then appeared to me an interesting figure, who saw the interest of looking at mathematical signs and the operators through the “aspects” which were already making their way since the *Blue Book*).

I loved reading Granger. His works on *Formal Thought and the Sciences of Man*, *Langage et épistémologie* and *Essai d’une philosophie du style* were of highest importance for me. I appreciated the approaches of Joëlle Proust and Hourya Sinaceur, the works that Joëlle in particular devoted to Granger’s thought. Their reading has shaped some arguments that I developed in my *Comment écrivent les philosophes?* published by Kimè 2003, the same year that my *Wittgenstein et le tournant grammatical* appeared at PUF. Thus I became acquainted with a philosophy from which the thought of Arley took shape.

Like the tributaries of a river, all these tracks eventually fed a thorough research that led to joint work with Arley. From my point of view, he got on the bandwagon, and from his, I think I got on *his* bandwagon. I do not know if he followed the musical thread of my work. But I knew his interest in music. Congruence of projects, concordance of phase, favorable opportunities, convergent meetings, and above all mutual sympathy, all this worked in favor of a shared conviction: the essential grandeur of the philosopher Wittgenstein, whose thought illuminated the whole 20th century, an obviousness that few reckoned fast enough for our taste. In France, as I said above, for some time people didn’t realize

this, as there were so many philosophical trends and adjunct, sometimes conflicting, schools.

As sometimes happens when the exchanges are in full swing and the research reaches its cruising speed, I do not remember the exact moment when we “started” to work together. It seems to me that from the first day the contact of friendship and work was established. I liked Arley’s enthusiasm, his skill and depth, as well as his taste for argument and thought. It was a bit like Gordon Baker, a ballet of travels overseas, but with Arley to a more southerly America than with our Oxford colleague. There were international meetings organized by Arley and, on the French side, by what I called “my group”: mainly Jan Sebestik, but also some researchers, including younger ones, who worked with me at *Dictées de Wittgenstein à Waismann et pour Schlick*, including François Schmitz and Jean-Pierre Cometti, both very active, not to mention the ones we brought to or met at international symposia – be it in Kirchberg in Austria, or Bergen in Norway), ended up weaving a network with several poles, Arley being one of the most important for me.

It was not just a matter of organization or institutionally advantageous exchange, because in this he was no better than me, I think. But, besides the administrative aspects for which neither of us were really made, there were our exchanges of mails, sometimes with tense flows, animated controversies, pointed answers which mingled the irony, the funny, the dream to go further in the work, the associations. Our exchanges of views on the French language are worth their weight in gold, because it is clear he knew the French language almost better than me, or rather: what he sought to express in “his French”, his phrasing and syntax reached a beyond, conveying his own thought, that hardly any French expression of current usage, really acceptable, could deliver. That is why there was with him a “translation” to be made, a “translation” of the conceptual language that he forged to capture projections of Wittgenstein’s thought and its “movements”. He struggled in trying to make me understand it, and I struggled to stretch French as far as the language

of his thought required. It was somehow necessary to “translate one to the other”, and this was not a smooth deal. This interesting difficulty connected us more strongly to Wittgenstein, but in a struggle. And we spent a lot of energy translating, explaining, understanding each other. If semantic disagreements appeared, it was always in the end to refine a most exciting friendly exercise, one that we are not ready to jump in with just anyone. In a game of balances and concessions, with adjustments, we confronted the building sites by the translation of our thoughts from different linguistic experiences. The result was that ultimately we always came to weigh a difference in our languages – natural sources on which usage is necessarily based. O usage, the great, the beautiful, most supple, most elusive word, fluid, always escaping the grip that he wanted to make the “epistemology” of. We have practiced this epistemology for the sake of the better, by scraping the soil of our linguistic strolls on the borders of our respective natural languages – necessarily testing the language of which Wittgenstein said one has to shake the superstructures, as resulting from the pathological idealization of the substantiated concepts and from the propensity to the hypostasis denounced by Nietzsche.

We worked together in the organization of *La Pensée de Gilles Granger*, whom Arley affectionately called “Gilles” since the time he was his student in Aix-en-Provence. I still hear him say “Gilles” in a tone of voice that betrayed a great friendship, a proximity that was a connecting force across the oceans. Arley remained, I believe, still after the enthronement of the master at the College de France, his Brazilian darling.

At the time when I met Bento Prado Jr. in Brazil, so much later, a whole world of work around Granger had been somehow partially displaced if not reinstated in Brazil. I was struck by the seriousness and intensity of the works devoted to Wittgenstein in a clear Grangerian spirit, in years when other writings were revealed after the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, *Philosophical Investigations*, *On Certainty*, then *Philosophical Grammar* and the writings of the 1930s and the first translations of the *Big Typescript*.

A second book that counted a lot for me, and I suppose for Arley too, and that we organized together, is *Grammatical-Transcendental*, our *Cahiers de philosophie du langage* volume 8. We decided to make out of our substantive disagreements about *GramTal* – as we said with a smile both accomplice and irredentist – a work that is, I believe, the best of all issues published in these *Cahiers* then supported by the University of Paris 8. One must read our “argument” at the end of the volume, where each one remained firmly and without concession on his/her position – the one resolutely transcendental (Arley) and the other (myself) resolutely “grammatical” – in the philosophical sense of the word. For me, the transcendental pragmatism, which he claimed as a disciple of Gilles Granger, was not far from resembling what Gerard Lebrun described as “transcendental narcissism” (about Granger). But there was also Karl-Otto Apel and it reminded me of the philosophical contortions to reconcile Peirce’s pragmatism in the 60s and 70s with a bridge of specular self-reflexive view that could be found in German thought. But Arley’s transcendental pragmatism was still of another kind. Let us recall the context of the geo-political conflicts between transatlantic philosophy and continental philosophy, which crossed the iron between Explanationism (von Wright) and the party of the understanding, of German tradition stemming from Dilthey and Schleiermacher. Beyond this opposition between *Naturwissenschaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft*, I wanted once and foremost to get out of these models inherited from the quarrels of method around the comprehension of history, and nourish again and especially today the conviction that Wittgenstein is not a pure analytic philosopher! On that, I think Arley and I fully agreed. We actually did not even need to recall ourselves about it. Clearly, in our eyes, Wittgenstein, who claimed to be unoriginal, was the initiator of an unprecedented method of, in the formalistic sense, non-analytic analysis. It remains that, irreconcilable, but motivated by an entire commitment, neither of us gave to the other an inch of one’s own land. We used to warm up,

raise the tone and it ended with a laugh. We “heard” the fight in our emails. The tone crossed the ocean. But never angry!

I almost forgot to name Michaël Soubbotnik, important also in these exchanges, when he began to translate Arley’s book entitled *Epistémologie de l’usage*, published by L’Harmattan (2012), which Arley then presented in one of my seminars at the MSH in Paris in 2012. However, the controversy remained between Arley and me alone. For some reason X that none of us could explain, my preface to his book published by L’Harmattan never appeared. Here I catch up!

I have always bitterly deplored the lack of echoes of Arley’s book in France and the fact that, despite my efforts to introduce his work, the “Wittgensteinians” of Paris have turned their noses up. However, as long as I could act and decide, Arley could speak among us. The last time he did it was in Paris on “*Image du Monde*” (*Weltbild*), a meeting I organized with Pierre Fasula at *Maison des étudiants de Belgique et du Luxembourg*, which was the source of our last issue (*Cahiers* number 9) under the same title. We would have liked more. Nothing was more exciting than being abroad, out of one’s own country for him and for me. We had a few opportunities for this, especially Kirchberg in Lower Austria, in the region where Wittgenstein had practiced his primary school teaching, and where it was really a pleasure to meet for a Wittgenstein symposium surrounded by our friends.

Arley’s texts are here on my table, in Portuguese and in French. I remember the work on *The Album*, an inspiring project which, while gathering us around the *Philosophical Investigations*, also revealed some differences, especially between Alois Pichler and Arley. I sometimes had difficulty grasping Arley’s point, but it was always deep and personal, focused on transcendental pragmatism. Alois also came to our seminars in Paris to present his work. As for Arley, it was his “pragmatism” that was to be grasped, and regardless of the other forms of patent pragmatism developed by others who were well established in the field of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly in France. Arley was stubborn and passionate.

Even if I did not always follow him, it was worth trying to understand him.

I forget here, no doubt, many episodes showing how philosophy is also a way of life, a genre of life, a form of life, anything but an absurd and arbitrary network that the institution finances or not. On that we agreed fully. In Paris, I still see a big table full of people around a conference of Arley. He had brought some colleagues and friends to him, for the presentation I asked him to do at the *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme*, as mentioned above. Around him, there was this big and beautiful table for a nice session. I was happy, and I believe he too. Like him, I had began the first years of my emeritus. We had eternity for us.

Last summer, I was thinking of going to Kirchberg one last time. I was particularly expected by Juliet Floyd, philosopher of mathematics at Boston University. But the idea that Arley was going to London to accompany Cristiane to a conference on Wittgenstein's philosophy of education, where she was to speak, made me change my mind. I decided to join them there. Unfortunately, the disease took away our friend and their trip had to be canceled. My only small consolation is Arley's office in their wonderful house in Cotia, which I reviewed in early February, located in the greenery that dominates the city of São Paulo, where Cristiane welcomed me for almost two weeks on the occasion of an invitation from the University of São Paulo to teach at the Summer Lectures coordinated by Vladimir Safatle. Thanks to Arley I understood at my canonical age what could be the look of an animal that lost its master, I understood what peace he could feel when he saw Achilles lying in a sofa near his office table, and shared in his absence, I believe, the quiet atmosphere of a thought at work, bathed in the light of a lavish garden filled with palms and banana trees. The company of Arley's books brought me a presence. I discovered that we had almost the same books, proof that our ideas were stealing from the same sources.

Paris, February 23-24th 2019

Introduction

Paulo Oliveira & Alois Pichler

Most of the contributions collected in this volume are revised versions or alternative discussions of the papers presented in June-July 2017 at the Department of Philosophy from the University of Bergen/ Norway, in the context of the workshop *Wittgenstein in/on translation*, held under the auspices of the *Strategic Programme for International Research and Education* (SPIRE). Natasha Gruver and Miguel Quesada Pacheco were also invited, but their contributions could not be delivered at that time, for different reasons. We are glad to include them here, as well as a completely new one from Rafael Azize, who has always kept a close dialogue with the Brazilian guests that came to Bergen. Interestling, all these three additional texts deal somehow with endeavors that have, to some extent, the character of an experiment – be it like a pure Wittgensteinian *thought experiment* or its application to pragmatic or expressive praxis.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss existing and new approaches to the theory and practice of translating Wittgenstein and philosophy. Wittgenstein is one of the most profound thinkers about language; his *Nachlass* includes a substantial corpus of his own translations of his writings from German to English or English to German, as also comments and corrections to translations by others of his own writings. Taking this into account, part of the expected results of the project is the production of exemplary studies of the subject, e.g., using Wittgenstein's own translations or own revisions of translations of his works: *Wittgenstein on translation*. A complementary line is to look at how his work has been or can be rendered into other languages (or research areas): *Wittgenstein in translation*. This task can be accomplished through a general overview involving several languages, or looking at special cases. The project

took both perspectives into account. Special cases that received a closer look are, on the one hand, English as the most translated into language, notably in connection with Wittgenstein's own revisions of his work; on the other hand, already existing translations into Portuguese and a project-produced Ameriindian translation of Wittgenstein.

Another approach to the general task of the project is to ask how Wittgenstein's conception of language and philosophy can impact the way one thinks about translation itself. If it is to be acknowledged that his work went through significant changes from one phase to the other(s), then one aspect to be considered are the consequences of those changes themselves. From the perspective of the radically pragmatic view developed in the later work, some questions to be answered would be, for example: What does 'translating' actually mean, if seen under the aegis of the therapy of thought/concepts? How should one conceive the practical task of translating in a post-therapeutical sense? What concepts of Wittgenstein's can be mobilized for a better understanding of the notion and the practice of translating in different fields of application? Translation Studies and Philosophy would be here two cases among others, like Literature, Linguistics, Semiotics, and so on.

Finally, one can also take the concept of translation in a broader sense and ask about how Wittgenstein's philosophy has been or can be translated into other fields of investigation, like the aforementioned – that deal with the practice of translation as one of their contents – or in ventures of other nature, regarding, e.g., Education, Aesthetics and so on. How does one understand Wittgenstein under such a prism, how can his work be made productive for such endeavors?

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1993 [1968]) once stated, in a paper where he points to an unsuspected proximity of his own work to the insights of the later Wittgenstein, that there is an unescapable dimension of *application* in any understanding. According to him, the "application structure of the understanding" exposes the conditions under which understanding

stands in each case and “which are always – as our preconception – in application, when we invest efforts to understand what a text says.” So will philosophical hermeneutics come to the conclusion that “understanding is only possible in such a way that whoever understands brings her own preconditions into play.” In other words: “the productive contribution of the interpreter belongs in an inescapable way to the meaning of understanding itself” (cf. p. 108-109).¹

A common attribute of the authors in this volume is, notwithstanding slight variations in minor aspects, a large experience of reading Wittgenstein – on the terms of their own respective research interests. Most of them have also been somehow involved in translation projects, be it translating itself, reviewing, editing or simply discussing the implications of translational choices for the reading of specific passages or even whole texts. As the fields of application change, some topics may gain or loose relevance for the ongoing discussion in the respective area. In some cases, the philological and/or genetic dimension(s) will play a crucial role and thus deserve especial attention. In others, these aspects will be kept in the background, and other topics as the learning process or the expressive function of language will receive the main focus. To some extent, it may be said that all contributions gathered here move along an axis that goes from the strict philosophical discussion to the implications that philosophical tenets may have in the different areas they come into application – as a substract for specific practices.

This does not mean that the volume lacks congruity, nor that the different contributions go past the others without any common ground. On the contrary: as the meeting itself was a result of previous exchanges, there is indeed a dialogue going on and the different papers can be better read on the ground of their complementarity or – in some cases – disputing views, even when there is overt distance between the objects they deal with on the surface. One might expect that some of the divergences

¹ Our translation.

will mitigate in the future, while others turn out to be the result of irreconcilable perspectives. Looking at the subject ‘translation & philosophy’ from such diverse Wittgensteinian stances is, at any rate, an attempt to gain a perspicuous view of the field, leaving aside the one-sided diet to which Wittgenstein attributed the origin of so many conceptual confusions in philosophy – and in other areas of human knowledge, we can add. In what follows, we provide a first glance at the papers of the volume (preceded by a short summary about the contributors and their research, in order to situate their relation to our subject here, when deemed appropriate). Here and there, we also provide some hints about how the various contributions might be interrelated.

Arley Moreno is one of the most distinguished readers of Wittgenstein in Brazil. For almost three decades, he crafted patiently a – yet to be published – rigorous commentary of the so-called Part I of *Philosophical Investigations*, from a stance that certainly sheds a different light on the book than similar ventures which are famous in the English-speaking community. In the mean time, he also developed his own philosophical project, which can be understood, to a large extent, as an unfolding of Wittgenstein’s thoughts, tackling mainly epistemological questions that the anti-theoretical attitude of the Austrian philosopher in the later writings refrained him to deal with. This project was first labeled “Philosophical Pragmatics” and then “Epistemology of the Usage”, as one can read in some book publications and numerous articles and chapters. Moreno’s contribution to the present volume is a summary of some aspects of this broader project that were considered most relevant for an approach of translational questions which pays tribute to what he calls a “post-therapeutical” way of making philosophy. In his rather short – but dense – exposition, Moreno does not tackle the topic of translation directly, but one will find echoes of his thinking in other contributions to the volume, notably in those of the Brazilian participants who had been lately working with him in a closer manner (Gottschalk; Azize; Oliveira),

but references will also be found in the contribution of Almeida. Brusotti's hint at the importance of focusing on the actual usage of language when talking translation can also be read as a possible bridge. The most evident topics Moreno explores here are the notions of 'context', 'usage' and 'aspect', dealt with mainly at a level where the linguistic signs are still being constructed – and this through their pragmatic *use* in concrete *applications*. So, in order to unfold Wittgenstein's thoughts, Moreno goes back to a level Wittgenstein himself had left unanalyzed. The implications of the work done at these different levels are certainly relevant for both the theory and the practice of translation.

Marco Brusotti explores in his paper some specific aspects of topics he has been dealing with in various broader studies, to a great extent under the aegis of what has been labeled the “ethnographic approach” (*ethnographische Betrachtungsweise*) of the later Wittgenstein, partially also reading him against the background of the work of other major thinkers in the Western tradition as, e.g., Malinowski and Nietzsche. Brusotti's contribution illustrates very well the above-mentioned axis that goes from a philosophical discussion to translation matters and the other way around – with the advantage of taking the whole axis into account. He acknowledges the importance of the shift(s) in Wittgenstein's conception of language and philosophy from the early to the later work, and asks about what 'translation' amounts to within the different perspectives – whilst also always reminding that the philosopher wasn't interested in presenting a 'translation theory' proper, nor in advocating for a universalistic or a relativistic stance.

The argument takes the genetic and philological dimension(s) very seriously, albeit not reducing the discussion to them, and tries to explore the implications of relevant details for Wittgenstein's conception(s) of language, philosophy and translation. This results in a very vivid picture of the role the so-called translation questions (or problems) play in Wittgenstein's philosophical project, as well as of what kind of translation

problems might emerge when one transfers his work from one language to another. Brusotti concludes his paper pointing to a strategy that might be important when one deals with the task of solving conceptual confusions in the target language (and culture) of the translation – what could be read as part of his proposed *skopos* for an adequate translation of (the later) Wittgenstein.

Dinda Gorrée has dealt with the reception of Wittgenstein in many different countries, scrutinizing the way his work was translated into the respective languages for over decades, as a part of her project of developing a theory of “Semiotranslation” – to a large extent based on Peirce’s semiotics, but also on Wittgensteinian readings. One can with a great degree of certainty say she is one of the few people who are at the same time well acquainted with the work of the Austrian philosopher and the ongoing discussion in Translation Science / Studies as autonomous academic area(s) – be it in its more recent trends or in classical approaches. In her contribution to this volume, she retakes and deepens some of the theses she developed within the aforementioned project, in a very detailed manner and with a great number of practical examples, taken from numerous translations of various texts by Wittgenstein, including the special case of a text being rendered a second time by the same translator. As the argument embraces a large array of perspectives, coming from different areas such as Logic, Semiotics and Linguistics, the paper is the longest in this volume. Gorrée makes a strong case for a formal approach to translation, discussing her examples at sentence, word or even punctuation level, partially with the help of differentiations as, e.g., the ones between ‘propositions’, ‘quasi-propositions’ and ‘pseudo-propositions’. A main point in the argument is the distinction of “good” vs. “bad” translations (e.g., “overtranslations” and “undertranslations”), the “good” ones being those that render “the intellectual and spiritual senses of Wittgenstein’s source text”, the “bad” those that express “rather the translator’s taste and value”. Building on a semiotic

reflection, the author understands that the use Wittgenstein made of ordinary language in his philosophy has misled many translators to the pitfall of more “literary” rendering strategies, with the result that “Wittgenstein’s metalanguage has been textually misread and contextually misunderstood”. As a remedy against such a problem, she suggests the construction of a glossary of “philosophical key-concepts or stylistic key-terms (not words)” by Wittgenstein – since “for the translation of philosophical texts, the formal logic between source and target texts requires for the translator the technoscientific strategy of synonymy.”

João José de Almeida comes to the discussion about the translation of – or in line with – Wittgenstein within the context of an already dense experience of translating the Austrian philosopher. As he explains in his paper, his own translation of the *Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘Golden Bough’* was intensively discussed in the research group “Philosophy of language and knowledge” at CLE/ Unicamp in Brazil before its technical revision by Nuno Venturinha and the publication in Portugal. He has also finished a translation for a bilingual Brazilian edition of the first part of *Philosophical Investigations* – to be published soon – and is currently working on the translation of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. His contribution to this volume is a discussion about the proper way to translate (philosophy, and Wittgenstein), departing from the notion of ‘physiognomy’ as applied to a text and its translation – an idea proposed by Philip Wilson, who is also, according to Almeida’s review of the topic, one of the very few people to develop a systematic reading of Wittgenstein in the realm of Translation Studies. Almeida develops his argument in a direct dialogue with Brian McGuinness’ view on Wittgenstein’s writing style, taking into account philological and genetic details, as well as some discussion by other commentators – and by Wittgenstein himself.

After proposing two approaches to the ‘physiognomy’ in translation, which he labels, respectively, “B-McGuinness and McGuinness-B types of translation”, the latter being the style he favors, Almeida makes a

description of how this translation strategy has been applied in his own practice of translating the aforementioned titles, as well as of other research outcomes of the project. The overall picture that emerges from this description is akin to the spirit of critical editions, especially as regards taking the genetic process and the literature about the respective work very much into account. Almeida concludes resuming a distinction Alois Pichler had made of different narration perspectives – labeled as *olympic* vs. *partaker* – and applying it to the concept of ‘physiognomy’, as discussed in his paper regards possible translations strategies and their implications.

Alois Pichler, head of the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, is intimately acquainted with Wittgenstein’s original writings, to which he has been giving digital, widely accessible form, for over three decades. Part of this work involves translation in its multifarious dimensions, such as the technical revision of the German-English renderings of important Wittgensteinian textual resources, and also other kinds of digital editorial philology, writing and text theory, as well as document ontology and Digital humanities.

Pichler’s contribution to this volume deals with one of the main targets of the global project that gave rise to the Bergen meeting, in the aforementioned approach of providing a close look at how Wittgenstein dealt with translational questions himself, be it translating or revising the translation of his work(s). The paper highlights some crucial aspects in the genetic process of *Philosophical Investigations*. Working within a strict philosophical environment, Pichler comes so into an area that has received much attention in contemporary Translation Science / Studies, namely the complex *process* that leads from a source- to a target-text, going through a myriad of moments where writing or translational *decisions* have to be taken – as registered in the great number of variations within different versions of the same text.

Under especial scrutiny are samples of translation from Ts-239 (German) to Ts-226 (English), which are presented in an *en face* comparison with annotation of variants. Additionally, Pichler provides a text version where the variations Wittgenstein used in the process of writing, translating and/or revising can be clearly seen. Finally, he presents the same samples as they appear in the diplomatic transcription of Ts-226. Exemplary as it may be, the short study certainly sheds light on the questions of (1) how (un)stable the text was at its origin and (2) how far the reader of the translation must/might be taken into consideration. The first aspect is akin to the well-known idea of Wittgenstein's "*Denkbewegungen*". The second relates to the opposition of target- vs. source-orientation in translation – and their eventual compromises. The combination of the two questions evokes the crucial differentiation Wittgenstein made of surface and deep grammar in language use, and poses the further question of how to deal with this in translating.

Nuno Venturinha has deep and long-lasting ties to the Wittgenstein Archives in Bergen, where he has worked at various research periods, adding up to a long time in the house. His commitment to the importance of the electronic files is best – but not exclusively – registered in the organization of a meeting to the topic which resulted in a publication under the significative title of *Wittgenstein after his Nachlass* (2010). So it is no surprise that he gives special attention to genetic aspects also in the contribution to this volume, looking at how Wittgenstein himself dealt with translation questions that came up in the different attempts to render his German writings into English. The main focus on the first period – especially the *Tractatus* – might be read as a greater adherence to the philosophical perspective of that time, despite the shorter references to the intermediary and the later phase.

The approach is a strong case for a sense-for-sense translation, in opposition to a word-to-word translation – as it goes in the classic dichotomy established by Jerome (347-420 AD), the Patron Saint of transla-

tors. In as far as Venturinha discusses different renderings of the same text (samples) and evaluates them, he ventures in a similar enterprise as Dinda Gorlée's, albeit advocating for a different translational strategy. It may also be said that the focus on Wittgenstein's first writings places Venturinha's contribution in a different stance than Marco Brusotti's, whose stress – or proposed translation strategy – is akin to the philosophical approach of the later writings.

Venturinha's paper also highlights the fact that translation questions are interwoven with epistemological issues, of which it deals briefly with five, leaving aside the – here not viable – idea of a throughout discussion: 'definitionality', 'presuppositional knowledge', 'rule-following', 'translation of facts into propositions' and 'thinking without speaking'. In doing so, it delivers a good example of understanding (of 'translation') as *application* of a philosophical stance, here very indebted to the notion of 'logic' – albeit the term undergoes some variations of meaning along the argument, as referring to the different phases of Wittgenstein's writings.

Paulo Oliveira came to Translation Studies through Philosophy and vice-versa: the interest in hermeneutical questions from a prior study in Germany led to an enrollment in the first Brazilian postgraduate program with a dedicated focus in *translation theory* (under deconstructivist approaches), after having already acquired large experience in translating/interpreting. Wittgenstein came into this picture after the doctorate, with the engagement in Moreno's research group and two post-doctoral internships in the interface of the two areas: Philosophy of Language and Translation Studies. Oliveira's overall project targets a translation theory that questions the traditional essentialism in Translation Studies without falling into the pitfalls of post-modern relativism. Since the turn of the millennium, he has presented numerous contributions to this theme, in conferences, articles and book chapters.

Accordingly, his paper here takes up the aforementioned question of “how Wittgenstein’s conception of language and philosophy can impact the way one thinks about translation itself”. If, as he poses, “[t]ranslation scholars are used to be confronted with philosophical questions and easily recognize them as relevant”, whereas “[p]hilosophers (...) seem barely to account for the existence of TS as an autonomous field of research”, it might not be idle to recall that what is under scrutiny here are not concrete solutions for specific translation issues, but rather what happens when one translates and how this process can be grasped in an adequate translation theory. Three central points in this general venture are also object of the passages of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* whose genetic process Pichler addresses in this volume: the ‘essentialist conception of language’, ‘family resemblance’ and ‘exactness vs. vagueness’ in the nature of concepts.

The paper starts with a thesis about what is understood as the necessary relation of any *theory of translation* whatsoever to its underlying *conception of language*. Oliveira then sketches a summary of the development of Translation Studies in the last decades, in order to point out central concepts of the area deemed relevant also for Wittgensteinian scholarship, e.g., the notion of *norm*, the relation of *use* to *structure*, and *aspect perception*, building up on authors as Gideon Toury and Arley Moreno, among others, but also establishing a direct dialogue with some contributors of this volume – especially in the closing, somewhat polemic last section of the paper.

Cristiane Gottschalk addresses the role Wittgenstein’s experience as primary-school teacher in rural Austria might have played in the development of his later philosophy – a theme commentators usually give rather scarce attention to. Gottschalk has been studying the relevance of Wittgenstein’s thought for education since her doctorate, to which she came after a large experience in teaching Mathematics. As one of the founders of the discussion group at CLE/ Unicamp, she has partaken in

all debates involving translation matters in this context, from Almeida's translation of the *Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough* to more recent ones. Her contribution here builds on the experience of organizing a volume dedicated to Wittgenstein's orthographic dictionary for primary schools (*Wörterbuch für Volksschulen*) – with the translation of its preface into Brazilian Portuguese (by Paulo Oliveira) and various related articles by members of her research group in Philosophy of Education.

Gottschalk's notion of "translation in a broader sense" embraces both educational and epistemic aspects, the first targeting the nature of the learning process, the latter focusing on how understanding of distant cultures is made possible – in a dialogue with Wittgenstein's critic on Frazer's stance. In a bold move with enlightening results, she discusses the *Wörterbuch* in its original context of an "intermediary phase", and then turns the perspective around, jumping to *On Certainty* and reframing the question of normativity that stood at the center of the orthographic dictionary venture. Her conclusion suggests that "the emphasis on the effective use of the words" as a primary-school teacher "would lead Wittgenstein some years later to his new conception of language".

In the last sections of the paper, Gottschalk addresses the level of culture, resuming some of Wittgenstein's analogies of our own to foreign forms of life, and then aggregates a new finding of anthropological research that sheds light on the notion of *time* – as it appears in Wittgenstein's comments on Augustine and then under the aegis of her broader concept of translation. Even if also dealing with a genetic dimension regarding the notion of *normativity*, a main feature in Gottschalk's paper is the attitude of not only wanting to *understand* the philosopher, but especially to make this understanding *productive* in the field of application – which recalls the question of "why" translations come about.

Natascha Gruver's contribution to this volume goes back to "a musical-experimental exploration" by Molly McDolan, in which the musician resumes Wittgenstein's questions on reading and understanding, as they

are dealt with in *Philosophical Investigations* (§§ 156-169), “in order to discuss differences between mere mechanical rule following and mental processes of reading and (...) understanding.” The piece premiered at the *Festival for Performative Philosophy* in Naumburg, Germany, at the Nietzsche Dokumentationszentrum, in September 2013, but a further academic discussion was yet to be published. The presentation in the Bergen meeting, which was programmed to be done over the internet, to some extent as a reenacting of the original performance, had to be canceled, due to schedule and technical reasons. Its inclusion in this volume will finally make the discussion available to a larger audience.

Gruver’s initial role in the performance was a deployment as the “reading machine” itself, with the task of reading aloud the same sample of text in three different languages, starting with familiarity and then coming into increasing strangeness. The discussion proper begins with a characterization of the problem, as posed by Wittgenstein, and a comparison with the stances of other authors – especially Turing’s mechanical approach. A detailed description of the performance, as it was structured and put in practice, with the reading versions in three languages and an additional track of an instrument (oboe), follows.

Gruver then proceeds to an analysis of the effects the performance has on actors and public, coming to the conclusion that “[t]he piece brilliantly stages Wittgenstein’s thought experiment because it translates his concept of a reading machine into a sensual, emotional and mental experience for all subjects involved”. Comparing the different readings, with or without understanding, with “right” or “fake” pronunciation, she brings these variations under the hat of the (broadly understood) concept of translation. The last sections are dedicated to an evaluation of the philosophical implications of the performance, ending with a hint at the general potential of artistic research for philosophical endeavors, and stating, in particular, that “the piece *Lesemaschinen* renders insights [which] a purely intellectual analysis of the *Philosophical Investigations* would

never be able to provide” – especially as it leads one to *experience* what is meant in the book.

Rafael Azize’s paper is to a large extent in some kind of dialogue with various contributors to this volume, be it by simply taking up similar topics, as the role of *experience*, or addressing common references, as the *Bemerkungen über Frazer’s ‘Golden Bough’* and *On Certainty*, which build part of the background for his own reflection, be it by referring directly to interpretations taken from other sources (as in the case of Moreno), or even texts published in this volume (as in the case of Brusotti and Oliveira). The thought experiment he brings here is of his own, but it certainly stays in line with the way Wittgenstein reasoned in his later work. Azize targets understanding the role of aesthetic experience, as imbedded in our forms of life, and takes into account representative contributions to the contemporary discussion on the topic.

The paper starts with a proposition about what “grasping an expressive work” is about, resumes some of Wittgenstein’s views deemed relevant to this topic and then goes over to a thought experiment about the role of basic propositions in a system of shared beliefs. As the argument goes, if a farmer claims to “know that this is a tree” in a non-metaphysical context where trees are to be trimmed, the normal reaction should be to “pass that proposition over in silence”, since “to do otherwise in this particular case would somehow call for a non-existing criterion, i.e., it would suggest the need for verification in ignorance of what would count as verification.” In what follows, the paper explores the role of criteria – and their eventual call for explication – in aesthetic experience. In the last section, Azize makes an approximation of the former discussion with translational issues as treated by Brusotti and Oliveira, and concludes by means of a further analogy with what Stanley Cavell calls the “representative speaker” – a figure that evokes “cues which are ultimately claims to community.”

Miguel Quesada Pacheco was invited to contribute to the project with a discussion of the results and insights of the experience of translating a selection of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* into an Amerindian language from Central America. The undertaking is an attempt at researching the limits for the translation of philosophical texts, taking into account that Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* is written in everyday language, tries to avoid abstract talk and terminology and includes many simple "language games" that are intended to be used as objects of comparison for all possible languages. So should the translation into an Amerindian language show that philosophy, especially in Wittgenstein's later writings, does not depend on a technical apparatus accessible only to a few people who master the "special" language of professional philosophers.

The intended translation was not yet available at the time of the Bergen meeting in 2017. Its consecution by Ali García Segura, a native speaker who works with the Bribri language at the University of Costa Rica, was made possible through additional SPIRE support in June 2018, fortunately in time for the inclusion in this volume.

Quesada Pacheco tackles the task with the classical apparatus of comparative linguistics, first situating the language and its area of use, and then highlighting the characteristics of Bribri that present special difficulties for the translation. He takes the levels of word and sentence into consideration, and also discusses relevant aspects of semantic and pragmatic order. One feature that serves as a good example is the fact that Bribri is an ergative language, with a different relation between grammatical subject and predicate than that of Indo-European languages – which recalls once more the question of 'surface vs. deep structure'. On the other hand, the Bribri culture doesn't have the concept of "person", nor even the concept of (a philosophical) "concept", so that the translator had to introduce/create their "equivalents" in the Bribri language/culture – through the act of translating itself. Quesada Pacheco concludes that (1) it was, indeed, "possible to translate Wittgenstein's

texts into Bribri” language and culture, but (2) the question of how far Wittgenstein’s ideas now expressed in Bribri “are understood and assimilated to their worldview (...) remains, for the time being, unresolved”.

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An Epistemology of Usage (*Gebrauch*) of Language

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Abstract: Wittgenstein's later philosophy had exclusively *therapeutic* character, as he, at this point, refrained himself from putting up any philosophical *thesis* – probably aiming not to repeat the dogmatic attitude he then ascribed to the *Tractatus*. This should not refrain *us* from the elaboration of an *epistemology of usage* of post-therapeutical character, whose theses depart from the prophylactic work made in advance by the therapy of confused thought. It has been said that such an approach could be helpful in the search of an understanding of *translation* as a fact of usage. This paper makes a summary of some aspects that might be of greater relevance for such an understanding, without addressing the question of translation itself in a direct way. While Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy deals with a level of language where the signs are already fully at work, the epistemology of usage will direct its attention to a level where the linguistic signs are still being constructed. In other words: to investigate the application of the sign was the route taken by Wittgenstein in his later philosophy, but the *application* of the sign presupposes its prior *construction* – which is the route along which the epistemology of use, in turn, aims to proceed.

Keywords: Philosophy of Language, Philosophical Pragmatics, Epistemology of Usage, Wittgenstein, Translation

1. Introduction

Wittgenstein did not define the concept of Usage, but he shows instead, very well, his conception of use of words, through his activity of creating examples of applications of the words in different situations – from standard to non-standard ones and even nonsensical applications. That activity may be interpreted according to two distinct aspects:

- a) The activity of giving/creating examples aims at obtaining a panoramic view of the senses.
- b) The activity of describing techniques of teaching and learning to talk, which are more or less elementary – such as training (*Abrichtung*) by ostensively associating objects and sounds – and to grasp the function and meaning of words – by ostensive explanations (*Erklärung*) or by definitions (PI, § 6). That activity led Wittgenstein to describe the construction of somewhat elementary linguistic tools – such as tags, paradigms, samples – applied as norms, or rules of sense.

My point concerns the second aspect: these techniques could also be applied to the *construction* of *signs*, with the aim of showing the process of construction of these elementary norms or rules of sense. Thus, one can perform the analysis of a very general and elementary relation supposed by the use of words as signs, which I would like to call *symbolic addressing* – i.e., the evoking movement of something B from A. My interest here is limited to the construction of *linguistic* signs, and it is not directly concerned with other forms of symbolic non-linguistic instruments.

1.1. First problem

The sign presents two aspects: a physical one and a symbolical one, and this raises the question of understanding the symbolic process of incorporation of the physical aspect. E.g., to what extent physical elements can give rise to other physical elements that have a new form, a *meaning*, when they are combined – as it happens when one passes from phonemes – i.e., a set of physical vocal articulations and physical vocalic points of production – to meaningful vocal sequences as the monemes and words.

My reply is that the first set of physical elements already has a form inside a certain *context of forms*: i.e., recurrent sets of production and articulation of sounds that can be expressed in accordance to certain rules, phonological and perceptual ones.

1.2. *Second problem*

What is the nature of these recurrent sets of actions, that one can express as “rules” which give rise to contexts inside which are created symbolic forms? How does one pass from physical actions to meaning?

My reply is that these actions play the role of norms according to the interest we attach to them in our current life: by their repetition, they may become *criteria* to *recognize* certain vocalizations and to distinguish them from the others, regardless certain immediate communicative and expressive goals.

Actually, that elementary normative and criterial function is already one of the first steps that mark the detachment of behaviour concerning its empirical contents. The behaviour becomes an action by expressing a norm or criterion as a principle for organizing the contents of experience.

That process allows the rise of what I call “context of forms”, i.e., sets of actions whose function become relatively autonomous concerning their origin. The same process is in play for the construction and perception of symbolic tools. Recurrent actions become rules, and perception is organised according to these rules – as when we spontaneously articulate the vocal apparatus to produce phonemes in speaking a certain language, and also when we spontaneously perceive “good forms”, and not only sequences of stimuli, when looking at a sequence of points. In both cases, the rise of the normative function is the basis for the symbolic incorporation of empirical contents of experience – and consequently also for the learning of norms inside a context of forms – i.e., of other norms.

In other words, these sets of actions may be conceived as instructions (*Unterricht*), or rules to which one attributes the criterial function of norms of perception, action, and reaction, in order to discriminate shapes, positions, weights, colours, and then combining all these distinctions among them to achieve different goals. When behaviour becomes an instruction, i.e., an action – e.g., when perceptual behaviour becomes a perceptual norm to distinguish forms, shapes or colours – one passes from the empirical level to the symbolic one. That marks the passage

from the reflex behaviour to the operant behaviour – in our terms, the passage from the reflex behaviour to the operant reaction and action.

It is important to observe that the rules are created and developed during the process of constructing symbolic forms itself, i.e. the rules are not *a priori*. As in the case of perception, action and reaction are interwoven with the practice of these activities, which are themselves the source of their own norms. Afterwards, as a consequence, the activities may be directed to achieve several and different goals.

1.3. *Third problem*

It seems to me that the rise of the linguistic sign helps to show the conditions of possibility for the symbolic assimilation of empirical material, through the analysis of the elementary relation of *symbolic addressing*. In other words, that is a great philosophical question dealt with in terms of a modest linguistic situation: the correlation between the terms of the sign, the significant and the signifier, considered inside the pragmatic context of use of language may show the traditional – philosophically mysterious – relationship between body and mind, or extension and thought, without any mystery.

1.4. *Some perspectives*

The *symbolic addressing* is an intuitive relation – between at least two elements – that we generally take for granted, without deeper analysis. I consider it important to analyse this relation as a correlation between two general *functions* that are reciprocally *constituted*: the *significant* function and the *signifier* function – or, on the second case, widely speaking, the *addressed content* function, to distinguish it from the semantical reference or designation (*Bezeichnung*). Each function is the symmetrical opposite of the other: respectively, to evoke abstractly some content for thought, and to be the content of a thought abstractly evoked. Any fragment of our experience can play the evocative function, according to certain conditions, and, reversely, any fragment of our experience can play the evoked content function. In both cases, the same fragment of experience can play these functions alternatively – e.g., that pencil is evoked by the word

“pencil” and can evoke the work of a writer, or the operation of addition is evoked by the arithmetical sign “+” and can evoke the behaviour of collecting things.

The function played in each case is always relative to the other, and that correlation is constitutive of each one. To each *signifier* corresponds at least one *addressed content*, and vice versa. If that correlation were absent, there wouldn’t be any symbolic addressing, and the fragments of experience would be mere physical ones, thus not playing the symbolic function.

On the other hand, the symbolic correlation presents several different levels of complexity, from the simpler substitution of a content by a signifier to a more complex conceptual addressing of meaning. The first case is comparable to pasting a tag on an object, where the substitution of the object by the tag doesn’t lead to addressed *properties* of the object – in that case, we can appreciate the zero level of the symbolic addressing played by the words. Like a tag on the object, a *proper name* is pasted on the individual and doesn’t evoke any property – unlike the *concepts*, whose addressed content are properties of the object it abstractly evokes.

That elementary level of symbolic addressing should allow us to clearly perceive the minimal conditions which are in play in the constitutive correlation between the two functions, the signifier and the addressed content. I will consider that elementary level in the pragmatic domain where language is interrelated with persons, situations of interlocution, actions, empirical objects, facts, mental states, etc. – briefly, what Wittgenstein has called the “language games”. It should be possible to appreciate more elementary forms of epistemic activity in turning our attention to the elaboration and application of norms in the pragmatic context of use of language.

2. Re-elaboration of a Wittgensteinian heritage

2.1 Context

Briefly speaking, the Fregean idea of *context* is limited to the propositional context. That idea is essential to the Fregean critique of psychologism and empiricism. In the *Tractatus*, the idea of logical space of propo-

sitions takes the place of the Fregean propositional context. During the 1930s, the conception of context, in Wittgenstein's thought, is gradually expanded with pragmatic elements. We can find in PI several occurrences of that concept from different perspectives: the idea of *Unterricht* is the context of instructions which allows the *adequate* applications of very simple rules, as, e.g., the interpretation of the ostensive gesture. The context of application of words, the *language-games*, is the theoretical context where these applications are *tested* and *compared* to each other. The *Umgebung* is the broad institutional context where the rules acquire or *lose* sense. Through these transformations, one may appreciate the critical Fregean heritage of that concept transmuted in terms of the therapeutic philosophical Wittgensteinian activity. I will consider just the pragmatic nature of that concept.

The idea of context, in my view, is well covered by the concept of **structural system**, namely, a situation in which a set of any elements enables the establishment of criteria for the set's closure. In other words, the set is organized through internal relationships of codetermination among its elements, and the criteria for closing allow the identification of the respective elements, including or excluding them from the set. These criteria can range from the strictest – those applied to formally organized sets – to those that are applied to sets whose closure is simply virtual, allowing for the integration of initially unforeseen elements, like, for example, natural languages with their neologisms, and non-linguistic symbolic systems through the relations of contiguity and similarity.

Based on this general idea of context as a structural system, one must highlight its *pragmatic* aspect: each context is a system determined by *circumstantial* elements that start to act when *applied* – as in the example of linguistic meaning that depends on the situations of its effective enunciation. This determination has at least two important aspects.

First, the openness of the sets thus constructed: their boundaries are not exhaustively determinable; rather, they are provisional, insofar as they are relative to the regional circumstances of applying the elements of the set. Thus, taking an image of Wittgenstein's, the application of a rule does not take place in a vacuum, inasmuch as, we can add, the thought of the rule itself does not take place in a vacuum, either. Applying a rule and understanding it assumes that it is possible to think about

a given context that would allow requiring that rule – so that it becomes possible to understand and apply it. Given that this process can be reiterated indefinitely, it can be affirmed, by generalizing, that application and understanding of a meaning assume and correspond to the ability to insert it properly in several different contexts, including those initially unforeseen. From there will arise the limits between what is possible and what is impossible for the thought, or rather, the boundaries between the conceptual applications that we accept and those that we reject, the identity criteria that we are willing to broaden, or not, according to the circumstances. We are thus, from this point of view, *far beyond* the conditions provided by transcendental logic in the sense of the *Tractatus* – the logical form, the principle of non-contradiction, the referential model – now that multiple activities closely linked to the manipulation of words start to be taken into consideration. Not just the virtual character, but mainly the circumstantial context of application and understanding of the rules are thus emphasized and assumed.

The second aspect, complementary to the previous one, consists of the possibility of inserting each of the individual contexts into other, always broader contexts, through its composition with other individual contexts – without the possibility of determining *a priori* an upper limit to this process. This aspect has the primary function of interrupting the indefinite chain of new individual contexts that could be presented as legitimate candidates for the application of a concept. It is a holistic principle that enables the indication of a set of habits and conventions as *sufficient* criteria for identifying the correct or appropriate application of a rule, or rather, that allows us to decide which general context is *sufficient* so that the application of the concept can be judged as correct or appropriate. If each individual context always allows the creation of new ambiguities, then its insertion into a richer context could lead to disambiguation. It is this aspect, in fact, that allows us to discard the skeptical Kripkean observation (Kripke 1982), according to which it will never be possible to decide whether a rule is being followed or not, a concept properly applied – by placing this observation in the position of the divine look, i.e. by characterizing it, against the claims of skepticism, as being essentialist. Faced with limit-situations, in which it is no longer possible to provide reasons for the action, it must simply be recognized, as Wittgen-

stein says, that *this is how* we act – and seek to provide causes for the action, but no more justifications. This complex aspect of the relationship among different contexts is what Wittgenstein indicates through a still very vague metaphor: *'forms of life'*.

2.2 Usage

The second idea that I would like to introduce is that of *usage*, in order to emphasize two important aspects of conceptual meaning: the *construction* and the *application* of the sign. In the case of the construction of the sign, the first step is to examine the elementary forms of organizing the experience in *addressed objects*. Whatever these elementary forms of organization are, they must assume situations that become typical through their repetition, their steadiness. To elucidate this idea, I propose the following distinction: first, there is what I call a 'situation' – briefly speaking, a set of objects, actions and habits; then there are one or more fragments of the situation which are elected as *relevant* for certain purposes – what I call 'aspects' of the situation. Thus, the symbolic organization of experience focuses on *situations*, highlighting in them the *aspects* considered to be relevant for achieving certain ends in general. These are the ends that allow fixing, in each case, the criteria of relevance for the selection of the *aspects*. In our case, it is about investigating the conditions for the elementary forms of assigning the function of *addressed object* of the sign, with respect to fragments of experience, that are the *aspects* considered as linguistic rules for applying words. Secondly, the construction of the sign also allows studying the conditions for the attribution of the sign's *signifying* function to the *aspects*. In this latter case, we must address the matter of the relevance of the pragmatic conditions for the constitution of the *signifier*: to what extent does the relative independence of the *signifier* with respect to the *addressed object* make it autonomous and thus, free, *in principle*, of pragmatic determinations? It should be noted that the pragmatic aspect of the construction of the *signifier* is unarguably relevant for the different empirical semiological descriptions, but it may become a problem for the reflexive activity, as is the case with philosophical pragmatics.

In fact, from my point of view, it is a matter of asking, not only whether the pragmatic conditions allow saying just what the signifiers are in such and such cases – as well in the semiological empirical descriptions, or when the signifier is empirically involved with the addressed object, as an index of it – but also if, prior to this, they also enable the legislation of a field of operative possibilities. – That is, if they impose *a priori* regulatory conditions of possible operations on the *aspects as signifiers*, as when it matters of expressing the uttering meaning – as in “I am happy” or “I promise” – or the utterance meaning concerning utterers in different points of space and time – as in the deictic. It would thus be necessary to distinguish different levels of approach.

On the one hand, the relative independence of the signifiers in relation to the addressed objects, regarding the arbitrary character of their association with the addressed objects. On the other hand, the construction of the *signifier* has a correlative function to that of the addressed objects: it is a matter of interpreting the relation of co-determination between these two different functions, and, in this case, of knowing to what extent the relationship is pragmatically regulated.

Finally, regarding the *application* of the sign, the research area of Pragmatics is most traditionally focused on conditions concerning empirical circumstances and communicative habits as principles for the creation of new conventions that can, at any moment, contrast or even contradict the former ones. Taking distance from this view, I consider, concerning the application of the sign, the elementary forms of symbolically organizing experience that are entirely linguistic, since their foundation is the sign as an already well-established symbolic instrument. The communicative function, as all the several other goals, seem to be circumstantial effects of the application of the sign, but not constitutive conditions of the meaning. This is, incidentally, the route taken by Wittgenstein’s therapeutic activity. However, the *application* of the sign presupposes its prior *construction*. This is the route along which I, in turn, aim to proceed.

2.3 *Aspect*

Let us briefly take a look at how Wittgenstein introduces the notion of *aspect*. This notion was only systematically developed from the late 1930s in the context of the experiments conducted by Gestalt psychologists regarding the differences between physical and perceptive space. What first interested Wittgenstein in these experiments, in the late 1920s, was checking the possibility (soon abandoned) of a phenomenological language that would enable the description of the immediate information of current perception, or rather, the perceptive space. Then, what interested him were the different uses we have of the concepts of *view* and *view as*: by directly identifying a particular figure, we apply the words ‘to see’, introducing the idea of direct apprehension of the identity of the object; or, by identifying the figure after making comparisons with other figures, or following someone’s suggestion, we apply the expression ‘to see as’, introducing, thus, the idea of apprehension mediated by a thought, by a mental representation, or, perhaps guided by will. By comparing immediately perceived objects with other known objects, we start to see the objects’ *aspects*, i.e. new facets which had previously escaped our attention.

Distancing himself from the context of experiments on perception and having abandoned the idea of a primary or phenomenological *language*, Wittgenstein maintains, however, his interest in *phenomenological questions*, these being justified by the difference between physical and perceptive space in the *constitution* of the conceptual meaning. In fact, the perceived aspects are a result of the different techniques that we apply for comparing objects, and these, in turn, are not subject to the properties that each compared object had previously. In other words, the comparisons are not governed by rules derived from the objects; instead, they only depend on the circumstances that, within situations, lead us to compare objects for specific purposes: testing perception, suggesting new organization systems, creating new measurement instruments, influencing an interlocutor through argumentation, suggesting new metaphors – or, still, therapeutically, checking the power of our imagination concerning necessity, or the expressive power of language for describing new and unexpected aspects, or the interlocutor’s will to accept the sug-

gested comparisons, etc. It is important to stress that in every case the purposes are exterior to the objects compared; they have nothing to do with their properties. There will be as many criteria and as many different techniques for comparison as there are circumstantial elements passing through the forms of life that are the language games.

Now I would like to highlight some ideas that therapy suggests to us with respect to the notion of *aspect*.

Firstly, the aspects of the object or the situation actually result from comparisons that can be drawn according to the most diverse techniques, such as measuring the surface, measuring transparency, grouping in series, adding without losing shape, arranging figures in relation to the background or vice versa, using psychological states to compare physiognomy and colours, or colours and sounds, etc. Operations applied to objects will be able to suggest similarities and analogies among the objects, or to consider them significant relative to the different contexts where they are introduced. It is important to note, in this method of variation of applying words to the different situations, that the salient aspects in the object do not arise from causal or mechanical relations, but strictly from our own judgment about their relevance within contexts. The perception of aspects depends on the grammatical experience of individuals, or rather, their skilfulness and their willingness to construct internal connections between objects and situations that are set before them, as in the well-known example from Exupéry: ‘see the elephant as a hat!’ There are no predetermined rules for discerning aspects. Instead of assigning aspects *to* the object, it would be more accurate to say that the object is being compared with other objects so that the possibly significant similarities and analogies can be suggested to the observer. The aspects of the object do not mirror their physical properties in anything, and are, in this sense, constructed by the observer according to his own experience of inserting objects in different contexts – the caricature of a characteristic facial expression, for example, does not express a property belonging to the drawn face, but to the person bearing the face, or better, to the individual’s personality. The caricature expresses a *meaning*, which can be understood if the context in which it was presented is known.

Secondly, from the therapeutic perspective, presenting aspects actually corresponds to introducing different ways of *constituting* meanings for objects, or rather, constituting *objectivity*, and not – unlike the Husserlian phenomenological attitude that, at this point, would seem to border on the grammatical – thoroughly scrutinizing the object, *discovering* the points that characterize its identity. For the description of the uses of words, unlike the phenomenological description, it is not a matter of seeking objects' meanings within a wonderful, yet mysterious, universe of intentional acts of consciousness, but rather, in different situations where the language is used, since it is there that norms are constructed and applied. When it comes to describing the uses of words, it is a matter of showing that the *constitution* of meaning depends on norms and criteria that are diverse and furthermore, variable. This diversity and variability are functions of the comparison techniques created and reformulated according to the whims of the wise conventions. The universe of the practice of language is as wonderful as that of intention, but with no more mystery.

Thirdly, I propose applying the notion of *aspect* as a principle that enables the characterization of operational procedures for *identifying* objects. To this end, based on the ideas of family resemblance and of analogical connections between different language games, the aspect will indicate similarities and analogies between objects and between situations that permit establishing *criteria for comparison*, or *norms* for organizing experience into objects and situations. These analogies, as we have seen, are not the properties of compared objects, but they arise from comparison techniques whose rules correspond to operations applied to experience. The emergence of an aspect of an object or a situation corresponds, as such, to the use of an analogy as a criterion. This may include, for instance, the operations of comparing the relative positions of certain elements of facial expressions (the position of the eyes in relation to the mouth, the shape of the mouth in relation to the nose, etc.); or considering the situation of figures in relation to the contexts of objects, or in relation to the background against which they are perceived; or measuring quantities relative to the shapes of objects, or to their weight, or to their length. There are as many operations allowing the organization of experience and the creation of analogical connections as there are ways of excluding objects from these comparisons. A new aspect may emerge

every time an analogy is constructed based on a new comparative operation. As a matter of fact, this is how we have interpreted the therapeutic task of the Wittgensteinian description of the praxis of language.

Fourthly, from our point of view, the *aspects* allow us to point out the symbolic operations that underlie both the comparison techniques, leading to the creation of analogical intermediaries, and the criteria that will be established upon the analogical connections. Thus, for example, one technique for identifying objects consists of presenting formal characteristics – that is, defining barely sufficient conditions, necessary conditions, or both, such that it is possible to identify their occurrences. This is done through the presentation of aspects as criteria that prescribe those conditions: for example, *to be a table* is to present these aspects, and this *form* supposes that such comparisons are conducted between objects, by way of the application of these operations which are codified in techniques. Actually, empirical objects (i.e. occurrences of conceptual objects) are not identified, although conditions are provided for identifying them through aspects.

It is thus a matter of understanding, and of establishing the *operations* that underpin the aspects, which, from this perspective, will be treated as complex and heterogeneous *pragmatic units*. Guiding the direction of these symbolic operations, aspects are units composed of individuals and their actions, experiences of objects (*Erfahrung*) and experiences of life (*Erlebnis*), their mental states, by the empirical, psychological, and social processes in which they are inserted, and even by the abstract and ideal entities they create by developing scientific theories, philosophical systems, or works of art. These are the raw material for the praxis of the language.

3. Conclusion

In those contexts where the symbolic activities of addressing are dominant, i.e., the activities involving meaning, the concept of aspect, conceived as a pragmatic unity, is the result of a set of actions that produce norms and, at the same time, are regulated by them. For example, in elementary symbolic situations, the meaning may result from the choice of a casual gesture, or of a physical body's expression, but also of any peculiarity of the physical environment that strikes us – like a sonori-

ty, a bright detail or a figure's shape of an object. In these situations, the meaning may result from assignment of the normative function to these actions in such a way that their repetition may evoke the contents we want to communicate or express – like objects, facts, actions, ideas, sensations, etc. In more complex symbolic situations, the processes of norms creation concern the applications of signs to the elements of experience as, for instance, in the linguistic organization of perception through comparisons between objects and between facts, whose names we know and have mastered. We are able to identify or to express a figure X standing out from a background, and the background cropped by the figure, as we are able to identify a sensation by applying a linguistic expression, even without any extra-linguistic criteria to individualize it. Actually, I identify the sensation I'm now feeling by applying a conventional linguistic expression as I learned to do in that kind of situation.

Understood as a pragmatic unity, the concept of aspect focuses on the elementary forms of organization of our experience, especially the linguistic organization, inside the contexts I call situations, that are systems with closure criteria, including virtual ones. The rules of sense are not precisely applied since the rules themselves are not precisely defined. In those cases, the consequences of the applications of the rules allow us to decide which are to be considered adequate excluding the others as being inadequate. There is always a large space of adequacy for the applications, contrarily to the cases where the criteria are exactly defined prior to the application.

That plasticity power of natural languages enables the rise of impertinent questions about the precise points of application of the rules. For example, the cases of concepts that we may call accidentally undetermined, as in the famous figure of Sorites, where one may ask from which grain of sand a set of grains starts to form a heap; or inversely, from which grain a heap ceases to be considered a heap. We may add the case of concepts constitutively undetermined where one may ask to which specific points of a series are applicable, for instance, the expressions “etcetera” and “and so on”. In the first example, the concept of a heap of sand can be determined at any time by means of an arbitrary decision, while in the second case the determination of the expressions leads to the alteration of their meaning. The closing criteria for the meaning,

inside the situations, are a function of the applications of meanings, and hence their nature is pragmatic – and that shows the limits we are willing to accept, or not accept.

As pragmatic units, the aspects allow us to follow the variations and the passages between the different meanings attributed to the objects and facts – the variations of aspects according to Wittgenstein – but also allow the clarification of the several variations and passages between the meaning of signs – those, for instance, having the same reference and different connotations in the same and in different linguistic systems. The contexts where a fact is inserted, or the situations where different comparisons between facts are carried out, bring with them the marks of the forms of life in which the objects and the facts are inserted, and those marks suggest the allowed and excluded range fields of variations for the aspects. In other words, they establish the closure virtual criteria of the symbolic system – the fields of variations and passages between the language games.

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“You should like to say...”: Wittgenstein and translating temptations

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Abstract: If ‘translating’ is ‘replacing’, what are the criteria of correct replacement? According to Wittgenstein’s *Brown Book*, translations can be justified in the context of a more general comparison between the two forms of life involved (§ 1). In this sense, natural languages are always comparable. However, philosophers could be tempted to draw skeptical consequences from the insight into the plurality and variety of natural languages (§ 2). The problems they have to deal with resemble ‘composite portraitures’, to which different languages each contribute their own myths, myths which are peculiar to their particular languages and yet related at the same time (§ 3). The question of the comparability of languages also arises in discussions about translating Wittgenstein’s own texts into languages that are remote from the source language. How is this translation possible? Is it because both ‘depth grammar’ and philosophical problems are universal? Wittgenstein may assume that forms of life are somehow comparable and that such a comparison allows us to justify translations. However, he does not commit himself to any theory about the universality (or particularity) of ‘depth grammar’ (§ 4).

Keywords: Philosophy of language, Philosophy of translation, Ethnology, Culture, Malinowski, Wittgenstein.

Introduction

In a well-known remark, Wittgenstein compares translation to a mathematical ‘task’.¹ Ultimately, however, the analogy between solving a mathematical ‘problem’ and translating a poem or a joke boils down to

¹ “Translating from one language into another is a mathematical task, and the translation of a lyrical poem, for example, into a foreign language is quite analogous to a mathematical *problem*. For one may well frame the problem ‘how is this joke (e. g.) to be translated (i. e. replaced) by a joke in the other language?’ and this problem may have been solved; but there was no systematical method of solving it.” (Z., § 698)

the fact that both tasks are accomplished by replacing expressions with other expressions. ‘Übersetzen’ is ‘Ersetzen’: ‘translating’ is ‘replacing’, ‘substituting’.² However, Wittgenstein himself hints at a relevant difference between solving a mathematical problem and translating a poem or a joke: mathematical problems are solved by repeatedly replacing expressions with equivalent ones, whereas in the case of translation there is no algorithmic method or formal system of substitution. Thus, it may be right to replace a pun with a quite different one: “What is the correct German translation of an English play on words? Maybe a completely different play on words.” (LS 1, § 278) But how might one decide whether or not this “completely different” play on words correctly translates the original one?

‘Translating’ is ‘replacing’, but the concept of translation, though quite open, is actually narrower than the concept of ‘replacement’. It is tempting to say that ‘translation’ is a kind of ‘replacement’ – or, rather: a ‘family’ of ‘substitutions’. In that case, in our actual usage, ‘translation’ designates a ‘family concept’. This openness of the concept partly shows itself in the fact that criteria of translation are sometimes stricter and sometimes more liberal. On the one hand, we cannot simply take for granted that a certain English poem can be translated into German in a way that is to our liking (and, under certain circumstances, we may very well call a poem or a joke ‘untranslatable’); on the other hand, every English sentence can somehow be translated into German, even if it is obviously not true that anything goes.³ That translation is in general possible is not due to any magical property of sentences or translations, but rather to a feature of our everyday usage of the word ‘translation’. The replacement in which translation consists is not a ‘reduplication’ of the original text.⁴ Whereas the concept of ‘replacement’ is too broad, the

² Cf. f. i. Kroß 2012, p. 44. On the same remark, cf. also Wilson 2016, f. i. p. 57, 63 ff., 80.

³ “[...] (Wer sagt, daß sich dieses englische Gedicht zu unsrer Zufriedenheit ins Deutsche übersetzen läßt?!) / (*Wenn* es auch klar ist, daß es zu jedem englischen Satz, in *einem* Sinne, eine Übersetzung ins Deutsche gibt.)” (MS 117: 251; RFM III, § 85; cf. Wilson 2016: 84 f.)

⁴ Thus Kroß (2012, p. 44); Wilson (2016, p. 57).

concept of ‘reduplication’ is, rather than too narrow, fundamentally inadequate. For this reason, it may be right to replace a pun with a quite different one. Yet to come back to our original question: what are the criteria of correct replacement here? Can one plausibly speak of ‘criteria’ and ‘correctness’ at all in this case?

In the *Brown Book*, Wittgenstein deals with just this issue: translations can be justified in the context of a more general comparison between the two forms of life involved (§ 1). In this sense, natural languages are always comparable. However, Wittgenstein replaces his earlier conception of an essentially unchanging language with the picture of a ‘superposition’ of many different, even if somehow related, languages. From this insight into the plurality and variety of natural languages, philosophers could be tempted to draw sceptical consequences: although these consequences may be justified, they do not resolve our misunderstandings (§ 2). The problems philosophers have to deal with are like ‘composite portraitures’, to which different languages each contribute their own myths, myths which are peculiar and yet related at the same time (§ 3). Languages also overlap in the way Wittgenstein deals with philosophical problems. Thus, the same question of the comparability of languages also arises in discussions about translating Wittgenstein’s own texts. His conception of how philosophical problems arise and are solved confronts the translator of the *Philosophical Investigations* with a demanding task. How difficult is it to translate the text into languages that are remote from the source language? Katalin Neumer has dealt with just this issue in her investigation of translations of Wittgenstein’s texts in Russian and Hungarian: are there languages into which it is in fact impossible to translate the private language problem, its sources and the distinctive kind of Wittgensteinian therapy that (dis)solves it? Is her universalistic answer – both ‘depth grammar’ and philosophical problems are universal – really warranted by her investigation? Wittgenstein may assume that forms of life are somehow comparable and that such a comparison allows us to justify translations. However, I do not take him to be committing himself to any theory about the universality (or particularity) of ‘depth grammar’ (§ 4).

1. Wittgenstein and ethnological translation⁵

In the *Brown Book* and its German revision, Wittgenstein deals with just this issue of how translations can be justified. Translation involves comparing two forms of life.

That is to say, whether a word of the language of our tribe is rightly translated into a word of the English language depends upon the role the word plays in the whole life of the tribe; the occasions on which it is used, the expressions of emotion by which it is generally accompanied, the ideas which it generally awakens or which prompt its saying, etc. etc. (BrB, p. 103)⁶

The translation is adequate if the foreign sentence and its English rendition have a somewhat similar role “in the whole life” (BrB, p. 103) of the respective community. Thus, the criterion of correct translation is the “role the word plays in the whole life of the tribe”, and – as specified even more clearly in the German version – this role consists in an open list of aspects, which includes, among other things, occasions of utterance, expressions of emotion, as well as ideas related to the word in question. The list is open-ended. It includes these features without being exhausted by them. Hence, Wittgenstein does not give a formal definition of this role. Instead, he specifies that we should always consider “the *whole language game*” (BrB, p. 108) that is “played with these words, not the phrases in which they are used” (BrB, p. 109). A linguistic analysis of the sentences in which the word recurs is bound to fall short of what is required.

⁵ This section is based on Brusotti (2007, pp. 102ff.; 2014, pp. 346ff.; 2018, pp. 68ff).

⁶ “Also, ob ein Wort eines Stammes richtig durch ein Wort der deutschen Sprache wiedergegeben wurde hängt von der Rolle ab, die jenes Wort im ganzen Leben des Stammes spielt; das heißt von den Gelegenheiten, bei welchen es gebraucht wird, den Ausdrücken der Gemütsbewegung, von denen es im allgemeinen begleitet ist, den Eindrücken, die es erweckt, etc. etc.” (L. Wittgenstein: EPB, p. 149.)

Wittgenstein does not intend to provide anything like a theory of translation. Rather, he is looking for a new method that, by taking into account the use of linguistic expressions in the broader context of the life of the community and against the background of its shared activities, allows philosophers to escape the conceptual pitfalls of their own language. What is at stake is this new philosophical method, not a theory of translation. However, this new approach involves an important shift of attention: the main difficulty of translation consists in correlating two *communities* that may be quite different, and such correlation may afford a complex and detailed description of the foreign form of life.

This idea is stated most clearly in *Logik, Sprache und Philosophie* [Logic, Language, and Philosophy], the German version of Friedrich Waismann's book. If we have no word corresponding to a given word of another language, the best way to explain the meaning of the foreign word would be to describe the life of that community and the role the word plays in its activities. Weismann summarises Wittgenstein's conception thus:

When we have to translate into our language a word from the language of a foreign culture, it often happens that our language does not have a word with the corresponding meaning. If one wanted to describe the meaning of such a word, the safest way to do it would be to describe the whole life of the community and to explain exactly which role the word plays in this life. (WLP 1976, p. 273)⁷

Waismann explicitly calls our attention to “Malinowski's investigations into the meaning [Sinn] of words in an indigenous language in the Supplement to Ogden's and Richards' *The Meaning of Meaning*” (WLP

⁷ My translation. This passage is absent in the English version (Waismann 1965) as well as in Wittgenstein's dictates to Waismann (Wittgenstein/Waismann 2003). Here the German original: “Wenn man ein Wort aus einer Sprache eines uns fremden Kulturkreises in die unsrige übersetzen soll, so kommt es oft vor, daß unsere Sprache kein Wort von entsprechender Bedeutung hat. Wer die Bedeutung eines solchen Wortes beschreiben wollte, der würde am sichersten gehen, wenn er das ganze Leben der Gemeinschaft beschriebe und genau erklärte, welche Rolle das Wort in diesem Leben spielt” (Waismann 1976, p. 273).

1976, p. 273).⁸ Wittgenstein was sharply critical of this book and, since he fiercely attacked its causal theory of meaning, we may safely assume that he took notice of Malinowski's chapter on "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages". It is probable that Wittgenstein's conception is indebted to Malinowski's approach to translation. However, the question of whether the anthropologist, and more precisely this particular text, really is Wittgenstein's point of reference is not especially relevant. More important is that the view underlying Wittgenstein's methodological approach is not far from the conception based on what Malinowski calls the 'principle of Symbolic Relativity'.

The Ethnographic view of language proves the principle of Symbolic Relativity as it might be called [...] Since the whole world of 'things-to-be-expressed' changes with the level of culture, with geographical, social and economic conditions, the meaning of a word must be always gathered, not from a passive contemplation

⁸ My translation. On Waismann's reference to Malinowski cf. Brusotti 2007, pp. 102f.; Brusotti 2014, pp. 349f.; Brusotti 2018, pp. 68f. – Malinowski was widely known beyond disciplinary boundaries, and Waismann was no exception among his contemporaries. Wolfe Mays, who attended Wittgenstein's lectures, outlines the following connection between the philosopher and the ethnologist: "Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning [...]. His comparison of words to tools having different uses, i. e., meanings, in different contexts, reminded me strongly of the views of Malinowski. Malinowski noted that a cultural object such as a fish hook could have different functions according to its context of use. It could, for example, be used in one context for fishing and in another for ritual purposes. As far as I know, Wittgenstein did not actually regard words as cultural objects, but talked much more of the use of words in a fairly abstract way" (Mays 1978, p. 83). Even Raymond Firth (1901-2002), Malinowski's successor in the chair of Social Anthropology at the London School of Economics, sees affinities. He refers to Malinowski's Supplement to *The Meaning of Meaning* (Firth 1995, p. 15) and mentions Sraffa, but does not deem it likely that the Italian economist liaised between Wittgenstein and Malinowski (Firth 1995; cf. Firth 1957, pp. 94, 96). Cf. the comparison between Wittgenstein and Malinowski in Gellner 1998, p. 151 ff. Further evidence for Wittgenstein's knowledge of Malinowski is given in Brusotti 2007: 102 ff.; Brusotti 2014, pp. 346ff.; Brusotti 2018, pp. 68ff.; Rothhaupt 2011, pp. 143ff.

of this word, but from an analysis of its functions, with reference to the given culture. (Ogden / Richards 1994, p. 454)⁹

Waismann's reference to Malinowski makes clear that the 'replacement' that 'translation' consists in has to be taken in a very broad sense. In the case of an unknown culture, it would not be enough to replace a sentence by another sentence; the replacement sentence would not be comprehensible unless it was accompanied by a thorough cultural description. In his paper, Malinowski begins by giving an interlinear translation of an actual utterance taken down from a conversation between natives of the Trobriand Islands.¹⁰ This "verbatim English translation" "sounds at first like a riddle or a meaningless jumble of words". The utterance chosen by Malinowski is "not a mere statement of fact, but a boast, a piece of self-glorification". A scholar who simply studied the language with a grammar and a dictionary, i.e. someone, as Malinowski puts it, "acquainted with the language, but unacquainted with the culture of the natives", would not even understand "the general trend of this statement". Unless she was informed about the "situation in which these words were spoken" and had them "placed in their proper setting of native culture", she would not even realise that the 'speech act' is a boast. Thus, the actual translation includes the page-long cultural description that follows in Malinowski's article; only against this background can the utterance be properly understood.

In the *Brown Book*, Wittgenstein claims that we should always consider "the *whole language game*" (BrB, p. 108) "played with these words, not the phrases in which they are used" (BrB, p. 109). Employing a pair of concepts introduced in the *Philosophical Investigations*, one might say that the translator should go beyond the 'surface grammar' of the words and take their 'depth grammar' into consideration;¹¹ the justification for transla-

⁹ On Malinowski's "Supplement, cf. Stocking 1995, pp. 284f.

¹⁰ Ogden / Richards 1994, p. #.

¹¹ "In the use of words, one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the sentence structure, the part of its use – one might say – that can be taken in by the

tion has to be sought in ‘depth grammar’, not in ‘surface grammar’. (‘Surface grammar’ and ‘depth grammar’ are two aspects of the use of words. ‘Surface grammar’ consists in the way the ‘forms’ of our language are used in the syntax of the sentence, in the ‘Satzbau’ (the way the sentence is constructed, put together); whereas ‘depth grammar’ involves the extremely variegated use of the quite monotonous ‘surface forms’ of our language.) We could say that, in general, a translation must be close to the ‘depth grammar’ of the original sentence. ‘Depth grammar’ sets the standard of justification, whereas ‘surface grammar’ can be misleading.

Thus, whether a new play on words, even if completely different, counts as a correct replacement for the original one, is less a question of sentence structure than of more general analogies between the role the two plays on words could have: could they be used in similar speech situations? How profoundly would the two language games differ? Deciding this requires at least a partial comparison between the two forms of life.

2. “Today, in Europe, nobody has only *one* language.”¹²

In this sense, natural languages are always comparable. According to the *Tractatus*, they are comparable in virtue of their common logical syntax. In the early thirties, however, Wittgenstein gives up this conception. From their insight into the plurality and variety of natural languages, philosophers could be tempted to draw sceptical consequences. In a late remark, Wittgenstein deals with such a sceptical consequence.

Our knowledge of many different languages lets us dismiss as inessential the differences in the ways of seeing that show themselves in them. ¶//prevents us from taking seriously the philos-

ear. – And now compare the depth grammar, say of the verb ‘to mean’, with what its surface grammar would lead us to presume. No wonder one finds it difficult to know one’s way about’ (PI, § 664).

¹² Ms 133, 10r. This section is based on: Brusotti 2012, pp. 215-237.

ophies laid down in the forms of the languages.// \neg But here we are blind to the fact that \neg we ourselves \neg have a prejudice in favour of certain forms of expression; that we look at this *mixture* of languages \neg //this connection of superposed languages //this superposition of...// \neg from a particular standpoint and that especially the *language games* we take into consideration \neg take seriously \neg are selected in a very partisan way. \neg (Today, in Europe, nobody has only *one* language, not even someone who understands only one.) \neg (Ms 133, 10r)¹³

At first, Wittgenstein criticises philosophers, including himself: just because we know many different languages, we “dismiss as inessential the differences in the ways of seeing that show themselves in them”.¹⁴ Who exactly is to be reproached for showing such disdain towards differences? Does Wittgenstein address this self-criticism expressed in the first person plural to his own early philosophy? The *Tractatus* does indeed consider the differences between languages to be only superficial; and it

¹³ “Unsere Kenntnis vieler verschiedener Sprachen läßt uns die Unterschiede der Betrachtungsweisen \neg //läßt uns die Philosophien// \neg die sich in ihnen zeigen, als unwesentlich geringerschätzen. \neg in den Formen der Sprachen niedergelegt sind, nicht ernst nehmen. \neg Dabei [sehen] sind wir aber blind dafür, daß [bei uns] \neg wir selbst \neg dennoch ein Vorurteil zu Gunsten gewisser Ausdrucksformen haben, daß wir eben auch dieses *Gemenge* von Sprachen \neg diese Verbindung übereinandergelagerter Sprachen //diese Übereinanderlagerung von ...// \neg von einem besonderen Standpunkte aus betrachten, & daß insbesondere die *Sprachspiele*, die wir in Betracht ziehen \neg ernst nehmen \neg sehr parteiisch ausgewählt sind. \neg (Niemand in Europa hat heute nur eine Sprache)<,> auch der nicht<,> der nur eine versteht.) \neg ” (Ms 133, 10r) The reading of the last sentence in the *Bergen Electronic Edition* (“zuckt” instead of “nicht”) does not make sense.

This first draft, which contains many alternative variants, and a reworked second draft (Ms 133, 10v), were written both on the 29th October 1946. This second draft was then transcribed in a typescript (Ts 229, p. 322; published as RPP I, § 587), which then was cut in slips (Ts 233; published as *Zettel*; the slip with Ts 229, p. 322 is Ts 233, p. 67, published as Z, § 323). It was also typed in Ts 245, a “Typescript beginning in the middle of remark 689 of 244 and containing the rest of 244 and the whole of 229. Date unknown.” (Wright 1993, p. 491.) Here, the remark is in Ts 245, p. 239.

¹⁴ Ms 133, 10r, 29.10.1946. This is the first of two alternative versions of the introducing sentence. The whole remark is quoted in n. 13 above.

regards the corresponding differences in their respective worldviews as no less negligible, insofar all philosophies are equally nonsensical. Even natural languages that may seem very ‘far’ from each other actually share the same logical syntax; thus, philosophical problems, in whatever language they may emerge, always arise through a misunderstanding of the same universal syntax and can all be cleared up by the same logical method: by bringing to light this deep structure common to every possible language. In principle, this insight into logical syntax can be acquired through a symbolic language à la Frege/Russell. Thus, since both philosophical problems and the methods for solving them are universal, the diversity of natural languages is not really important and does not fall under the scope of philosophy. To this extent, linguistic difference and plurality are surface phenomena; hence, in the *Tractatus*, mastering many languages is not a philosophically relevant skill. This disdain for differences does not seem to go back to Wittgenstein’s acquaintance with different languages.

On the contrary, it is just this widespread acquaintance with many different languages which lies behind the core assumption expressed in October 1946: “Today, in Europe, nobody has only *one* language, not even someone who understands only one” (Ms 133, 10r).¹⁵ In his first diagnosis, Wittgenstein reproaches ‘us’ – including himself – because ‘we’ – like the philosopher of the *Tractatus* – neglect differences and presuppose that essentially the same way of looking [Betrachtungsweise] obtains everywhere. Already in the first draft of the remark, however, he adds a new, alternative version of this first sentence, swiftly modifying the target of his criticism. He formulates a *new* diagnosis: instead of claiming that ‘our’ universalism underestimates differences, Wittgenstein now detects a sceptical attitude: we draw a sceptical consequence from our insight into the plurality and variety of natural languages. What we disparage as inessential are now less the differences in ways of seeing than these ways of seeing themselves. We consider irrelevant not the differences between the many different languages we know of, but the philosophies laid down in each of them. “Our knowledge of many (dif-

¹⁵ The first draft of the remark ends with this sentence.

ferent) languages prevents us from really taking seriously the philosophies laid down in the forms of each of them [...]” (Ms 133: 10v).¹⁶

This sentence is not a claim. It merely registers a widespread attitude in contemporary Europe. However, the sentence seems to involve the assumption that the philosophies laid down in the peculiar forms of each language are as different as the languages themselves. Every language suggests or contains (at least) one philosophy in its specific forms. These philosophies, each conditioned as they are by the idiosyncrasies of the corresponding natural language, may be different from language to language. Thus, these diverging philosophies relativize each other or, rather, they are all manifestly ill-founded, and we do not really take them seriously.

Wittgenstein expresses substantial reservations about this attitude. Are they meant as self-criticism? The first person plural should be taken literally: Wittgenstein is not speaking only about himself. There is a whole tradition of philosophy of language whose late exponents – or at least a few of them – hold that such a sceptical conclusion is mandatory. We could count Herder, Humboldt, and Max Müller as belonging to this tradition – and sceptical conclusions are drawn by Nietzsche and Mauthner as well as by Whorf and Sapir.

Nietzsche encapsulates this kind of scepticism about the “philosophy of grammar”:

[...] The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing is explained easily enough. Where there is affinity of languages, it cannot fail, owing to the common philosophy of grammar – I mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical functions – that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world interpretation. It is

¹⁶ This is the new version of the first sentence as Wittgenstein transcribes it in the second draft of the remark (for the versions in the first draft see above n. 13). With only slight modifications, he will keep it in the later transcriptions.

highly probable that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altai languages (where the concept of the subject is least developed) look otherwise into the world and will be found on paths of thought different from those of the Indo-Germanic peoples and the Muslims [...]. (BGE 20)

Nietzsche is not Humboldt; he does not really know Ural-Altai languages in the sense of being able to speak and understand them; however, from the features he has learned about through the linguistics of his time, he drives philosophical conclusions about the relativity of the corresponding worldviews – as well as of our diverging ones. Nietzsche’s general theory about the “spell of certain grammatical functions” (BGE 20) ascribes to grammar the power to give birth to specific philosophies of broader language families that share structural features, rather than of single languages. Accordingly, in the Indo-European languages, the well-developed function of the grammatical subject (Nietzsche: the “concept of the subject”) leads to peculiar grammatical illusions, possibly foreign to the Ural-Altai family.¹⁷ Even if this aphorism does not focus on single natural languages, but rather on whole families, Nietzsche is a good example of how, as Wittgenstein says, “[o]ur knowledge of many (different) languages prevents us from really taking seriously the philosophies laid down in the forms of each of them” (Ms 133, 10v) – and especially in the forms shared by our own language and the broader family to which it belongs.

¹⁷ Another aphorism expands on this example. Shouldn’t we, as Lichtenberg suggests, instead of ‘I think’, rather say “*It* thinks” (BGE 17)? Substituting the first person with the third would not be really satisfactory as solution: then in doing so, we would still be misled by a “grammatical habit”; hence we should perhaps try to “accustom ourselves [...] to get along without the little ‘it’ (which is all that is left of the honest little old ego)” (BGE 17).

As aforementioned, Wittgenstein does not wholly endorse this attitude.¹⁸ Philosophers, even if they may be right not to take those philosophies seriously, tend to overestimate themselves. Critics of language are confident of being able to see through the idiosyncrasies of every language, their own included. However, a sceptical standpoint towards language does not yet immunize them – ‘us’ – against linguistic traps. It does not resolve our misunderstandings. This is the core reservation formulated in the sequel of our remark.

3. The mythology in the forms of our language

In 1946, Wittgenstein assumes that different philosophies are “laid down” in the diverging “forms of each” of the “(different) languages” (MS 133, 10v) we know of. Accordingly, the forms of each language are as different as the philosophies laid down in them. This assumption is not obvious. It was foreign to the *Tractatus*. At the beginning of the thirties, Wittgenstein had made a similar sounding claim, but only in the singular: “An entire mythology is laid down in our language.” (TS 213, p. 434)¹⁹ Accordingly, a “mythology” in the singular – not philosophies in the plural – “is laid down” (TS 213, p. 434) in the “Forms of our Language” (TS 213, p. 433)²⁰ – and more specifically in its “primitive forms” (TS 213, p. 434).²¹ In 1931, Wittgenstein tends towards the idea that language (in the singular) and its forms have remained almost constant and with them the corresponding ‘mythology’.

Thus, he still discovers philosophical misunderstandings similar to those in Plato’s dialogues even in his own *Tractatus*. He quotes the thesis that philosophy has not made “any progress” since Plato (TS 211, p. 82). Wittgenstein does not directly contradict this claim; on the contrary, he

¹⁸ Nietzsche is only an example of the attitude criticized by Wittgenstein. I do not assume that Wittgenstein has Nietzsche in mind. On Wittgenstein’s Nietzsche cf. Brusotti (2009).

¹⁹ With some modifications, the English translations are from Wittgenstein 2005.

²⁰ “The Mythology in the Forms of our Language. ((Paul Ernst.))” (TS 213, p. 433)

²¹ “The primitive forms of our language – noun, adjective and verb – show the simple picture to whose form language tries to reduce anything.” (TS 213, p. 434)

agrees “that the same philosophical problems that occupied the Greeks keep occupying us” contemporary philosophers; but this has a very simple “reason” those advocates of Plato seem to overlook: “our language has remained constant and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions” (TS 211, p. 82). Accordingly, in the millennia that separate Plato’s Greek from Wittgenstein’s German, ‘our’ language has not undergone considerable changes: the many differences between ancient Greek and contemporary German do not really seem to be philosophically relevant. Hence, in philosophy, we have to do with conceptual difficulties that are far from being strictly peculiar to a single natural language. But up to what point are they thus non-specific? To what extent has ‘our’ language – the language of Western philosophy – really undergone no relevant changes? Has it remained substantially the same in the sense that Ancient Greek and German are not really remote from each other? That they, in some sense or other, belong to the same family of languages? Then the traps of language enumerated by Wittgenstein, even if they may be similar in Greek, German and other languages, for instance in those belonging to the Indo-European family, are surely not universal; “a verb ‘be’ that seems to function like ‘eat’ and ‘drink’” (TS 211, p. 82) does exist in Greek and in German, but not necessarily in every language. On the other hand, in Wittgenstein’s eyes, “[t]he primitive forms of our language” – namely: “noun, adjective [Eigenschaftswort] and verb [Tätigkeitswort]” (TS 213, p. 434) – are more general; they force everything into the ‘form’: substance, property [Eigenschaft] and activity [Tätigkeit]. This “simple picture” (TS 213, p. 434) is the mythology laid down in the primitive forms of ‘our’ language. Are these forms ‘primitive’ in the sense that they make up a universal basis of language beyond cultural boundaries? Is the corresponding mythology – substance, property and activity – universal? Is “[t]he Mythology in the Forms of our Language” (TS 213, p. 433) merely the Western mythology of ‘our’ European languages or rather the universal mythology of ‘our’ human language?

In Wittgenstein’s texts, the first person plural (‘we’, ‘us’, ‘our’) has no stable referent; and at the beginning of the thirties, his statements on this matter are far from unequivocal. Thus, he highlights some crucial analo-

gies between ‘our’ own (‘superstitious’ as well as ‘learned’) vocabulary and the heterogeneous languages of the peoples mentioned in James Frazer’s *Golden Bough*. Here, ‘our’ vocabulary is specifically English and German vocabulary, but one might think that it is ‘Western’ vocabulary more generally.²² Wittgenstein remarks that in order to convey the views of those peoples, Frazer employs current English terms like ‘ghost’ or ‘spirit’. According to Wittgenstein, the anthropologist is right in doing so, but does not draw the right conclusion from the fact that translating their views into our language does not present him with real difficulties. This (alleged) fact shows the deep affinity between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and Wittgenstein reproaches the anthropologist for ignoring this affinity and overstating the differences.

Among those peoples, Wittgenstein finds pictures, analogies and similes close to those that lead Western philosophers astray. The mythology that confounds ‘us’ modern philosophers and does so *grosso modo* in the same way it misled Plato – just this very mythology can be read off the customs Frazer ascribes to his ‘savages’. Why does this mythology remain the same? Is it only the mythological pictures that are similar; or are there even similarities between the forms of language in which they are laid down? Is the mythology universal because it is laid down in language, i.e. in *all* languages? With this last assumption, Wittgenstein would still be very close to the approach of the *Tractatus*. In 1931, however, he does not see his task as deciding this question; in any case, he tends to play down translation problems.

He underscores “our kinship with those savages” (T’s 213, p. 433) as well as with their conceptions. He looks for analogies between ‘metaphysics’ and ‘magic’, but essentially only in order to shed light on our (his) own errors: in magic, the same similes are not only more transparent and thus less insidious than in contemporary philosophy, where they

²² On the difference between the earlier version in Ms 110 and the transcription in T’s 211 cf. Brusotti (2012, p. 220, n. 7). In another context, Gordon Baker makes a similar remark: the question of whether the expression “die Sprache” stands for ‘language as such’ or rather for some given language (for instance for a fictive language game, such as the well-known example of the builders) can only be answered contextually; each case requires a specific decision (cf. Baker 2004).

take on sublimated forms, but are also used differently. In 1931, Wittgenstein seems to assume (and it is rather an assumption than a theory) that the same mythology is involved everywhere: a mythology in the singular, laid down in universal forms of language that remain basically unchanged. ‘Our’ language forms stay the same through the millennia; and even today they keep projecting the old misleading pictures.

In the late remark we are discussing, the place of such mythology in the singular is taken by philosophies in the plural, each of them being laid down in the specific forms of a different language.²³

We disparage the “differences in the ways of seeing”²⁴ or these ways of seeing themselves²⁵ as irrelevant. The sequel of the first draft explains why. It is because we take note only of a very limited part of every language. We may know different natural languages, but in all of them, we orientate ourselves by a narrow choice of kindred language games. This selection is biased; “especially the *language games* we take into consideration [take seriously] are selected in a very partisan way.”²⁶ For this reason, our knowledge of many languages does not immunize us against linguistic pitfalls. Thus, Wittgenstein does not criticize our limited knowledge of alien natural languages; he does not point out that philosophers do not take account of the differences between natural languages. Even improving our knowledge of remote languages would be of little help as long as we remain blind to the intrinsic plurality of every natural language, ignoring the variety of language games within each of them and preferring one-sidedly the same kind of language games. Actually, all standard speakers master the most varied language games – and, in this sense, even those who speak only one natural language do not speak only one language.

²³ I leave aside the question of whether Wittgenstein still means the same by ‘form’ as he did in 1931.

²⁴ Ms 133, 10r, 29.10.1946. First version of the first sentence of the remark.

²⁵ Ms 133, 10r, 29.10.1946. Alternative version of the first sentence (see above n. 13).

²⁶ Ms 133, 10r, 29.10.1946.

In philosophy, however, we lose this multifarious variety of language games from view: “A main cause of philosophical diseases – a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example” (PI, § 593). It is precisely for this reason that philosophers must find new kinds of examples and go beyond their previous restricted choice of ‘primitive images’. Philosophers need new objects of comparison²⁷ and, to this end, they can even invent imaginary language games belonging to purely fantastical forms of life.

Thus, in 1946, the earlier conception of a common essence of ‘our’ language or of forms of language that remain stable (1931) is *replaced* by a new idea. Wittgenstein formulates it in the second draft of our remark in the next page of Manuscript MS 133 (Ms 133, 10v). Here is a later transcription:

Our knowledge of many //different// languages prevents us from really taking seriously the philosophies laid down in the forms of each of them. But here we are blind to the fact that we (ourselves) have strong prejudices for, and against, certain forms of expression; to the fact that this very superposition of several languages results in a determinate //particular// picture. That, so to speak, we do not arbitrarily cover up *one* particular form with another one. (Ts 229, p. 322)²⁸

For the mutual relation of these different languages, Wittgenstein uses a simile that we often encounter in his texts: the *composite portraiture*, a

²⁷ Cf. Ms 133, 10r, 29.10.1946.

²⁸ “Unsere Kenntnis vieler //verschiedener// Sprachen laesst uns die Philosophien, die in den Formen einer jeden niedergelegt sind, nicht recht ernst nehmen. Dabei sind wir aber blind dafuer, daß wir (selbst) starke Vorurteile fuer, wie gegen, gewisse Ausdrucksformen haben; daß eben auch diese Uebereinanderlagerung mehrerer Sprachen fuer uns ein bestimmtes //besonderes// Bild ergibt. Dass wir, sozusagen, nicht beliebig die eine Form durch eine andere überdecken.” (Ts 229, p. 322; cf. BPP I, § 587). In this and the then following transcriptions of Ms 133, 10v, the remark undergoes only slight modifications.

photographic technique invented by Francis Galton. A composite portraiture is created by superposing negative images. Around 1928, the photographer Moritz Nähr made a composite portraiture of Ludwig and his three sisters: Hermine, Helene and Margarethe.²⁹ Superposed, the single portraits give a composite picture with a peculiar *family look*, a composite portraiture that aims at showing the ‘family resemblance’ of the siblings. Galton’s technique suggested to Wittgenstein the simile of ‘family resemblance’.³⁰ But Galton actually thinks in a quite traditional fashion that the composite portraiture particularly accentuates the traits common to *all* members of the family, setting apart the essential from the accidental features. Only Wittgenstein emphasizes that the traits highlighted in the composite picture, even if they recur relatively often, do not need to be common to *all* members of the family.

This concept of ‘family resemblance’ is not the topic of the present paper. Of interest here is only the specific application of the simile to our acquaintance with many languages [“Kenntnis vieler Sprachen”]. The superposed portraits of Ludwig and his sisters result in a particular picture that could also stem from a real individual. This unclear composite portraiture has a similar effect on the observer to the portrait of a single existing person.³¹ The different languages a philosopher knows are similar to the Wittgenstein siblings in Moritz Nähr’s composite portraiture: superposed, these languages result in a peculiar image that could also stem from one single language and can just as well lead the philosopher astray. In this context too, the comparison with the composite portraiture neutralises the idea of a common essence: here, the idea that ‘our’

²⁹ Cf. Nedo (2007). The composite photograph is in p. 174.

³⁰ Galton (like other authors) instead used the expression ‘family likeness’, as does Wittgenstein in his English texts. Anscombe follows Wittgenstein and translates ‘Familienähnlichkeit’ with ‘family likeness’, whereas Schulte and Hacker prefer ‘family resemblance’. On ‘Familienähnlichkeit’ cf. Brusotti 2014, pp. 262ff., 305ff.

³¹ “Das undeutliche Bild eines Menschen zu sehen hat eine bestimmte Wirkung, ob es nun von einem wirklichen Menschen ausgeht oder nicht.” (MS 156a, p. 99). Cf. Rothhaupt (1996, p. 187).

language (in the singular) has remained the same in its essential traits. In 1946, Wittgenstein assumes a ‘family resemblance’ between the languages we know; these languages do show certain similar traits. Thus, the conception of an essentially unchanging language is replaced by the picture of a ‘superposition’ of many different, but somehow related, languages.

The philosopher may be able to resist the influence of an expression of his mother tongue, allowing expressions of other languages to act as a counterbalance, thus availing himself, in Wittgenstein’s simile, of the possibility of ‘cover<ing>’ up one expression with others. However, the superposed forms of many languages, rather than cancelling one another, result in a new picture. This composite picture, which takes the place of the old one, can be no less misleading than any picture laid down only in a single language. Thus, those who master a few languages, even if they may be able to see through the philosophical peculiarities of each language, normally do not notice that the different ways of seeing, rather than relativizing each other, result in a composite picture whose effect is similar to that of a picture stemming from a single language. The languages may diverge, and each of them may have a particular effect on us, but they do not really neutralize one another; instead, they may all mislead us in a similar direction. Hence, multilingualism alone is not enough to free us from any mythology, even if it may help philosophers to detect this or that trap laid for us by language; for instance, where there is some particular trap only in German, but not in English. However, the persisting composite picture, with its related prejudices and biases, still casts a spell over us. Thus, philosophers tend to overestimate the independence they may have gained through multilingualism.

Why does the composite picture still hold us captive? In the first draft of the remark, the spell the picture casts upon us is explained by the fact that philosophers, even if they may know many different languages, keep orientating themselves by a narrow choice of language games. The unambiguous effect of the composite picture is due to the fact that even polyglots consider only a very restricted variety of language games. Even

if multiplying the forms (and the philosophies laid down in them) may make sense, what philosophers actually need is something else: they need to gain insight in the actual usage of the form. They must move from ‘surface’ grammar to ‘deep grammar’, from the ‘forms of our language’ to their usage. Simple language games are more apt for this task than natural languages, which may be extremely complicated.

For Wittgenstein, broadening the spectrum of language games under consideration is a better way to do philosophy. However, the later versions of the remark no longer mention that the selection of language games we actually take into account is too restricted. The last version does not even touch on the *difference* between the many languages we know (Wittgenstein crosses out the word “*different*” in the typescript). Thus, even if he claims that other languages suggest other philosophies, , he simply assumes that the languages the philosopher knows lead her, if not in the same, then at least in a similar direction.

There is a greater overlap between the composing pictures, and the effect of the composed picture is less equivocal than one might assume.³² Is this ‘mixture of languages’ [“*Gemenge von Sprachen*”] a restricted plurality? Does the composed picture have this unambiguous effect only because no alien languages from very remote cultures belong to the superposed strata? Wittgenstein, who was acquainted with Russian, does not indicate whether, amongst the many languages that contemporary Europeans know, there are any that consistently diverge from the others. In this last case, one would think, the contours could become blurred and the composite picture unfocussed. Would this vague, indefinite picture be unable to lead us astray in any particular direction? Could we, by adding further languages, let the composite picture evaporate, thus freeing ourselves from the spell it cast upon us? Wittgenstein does not consider this possibility at all. Only the first draft of the remark holds out the prospect of a solution. The later revisions merely describe a problem rather than providing an answer.

³² For more details on the metaphor of the *composite portraiture* in the different versions of this remark cf. Brusotti (2012, p. 228, n. 10).

4. A particular translation problem: translating ‘grammatical’ misunderstandings and insights

Philosophers have to deal with ‘composite portraitures’, to which different languages each contribute their own myths, myths which are particular and yet related at the same time. Usually, the problems and theories of Western philosophy, insofar they have linguistic sources, have them in many languages at the same time. They belong to a multilingual tradition, having been formulated and reformulated in different languages: Greek, Latin, French, German, English, etc. Thus, these problems and theories transcend each individual European language; they have similar, related sources, but they mostly do not have exactly the same source in each language. Taking up Wittgenstein’s simile of the composite portraiture, we could say that these languages overlap in the philosophical tradition. In general, philosophical problems do not stem from one false analogy, but from a *cluster* of superposed analogies, which strengthen one another and often have their origin both in different languages and in different strata of the philosophical tradition.

Wittgenstein implicitly takes account of this fact. His attempts to give a perspicuous representation of relevant language games exhibit a peculiar grammatical syncretism. A good example is the conceptual field of ‘intentionality’.³³ In this case, the background is common to many languages; against this shared background, the more specific peculiarities of certain languages come to play a role. Common to many languages are a series of apparently ‘psychological’ verbs that are easily misunderstood. The English verb ‘to mean’ (in sentences like ‘whom do you mean?’), for instance, seems to suggest a mysterious ‘mental’ action. Those who misunderstand the corresponding German verb ‘meinen’ wrongly assume a similar mysterious ‘mental’ event. But could a ‘psychological’ theory of

³³ I have dealt with the issues involved in translating the conceptual field of ‘intentionality’ in Brusotti (2012, pp. 227 ff).

meaning arise from this misunderstanding? The idea that the misunderstood use of ‘to mean’ misleads us into developing senseless theories about ‘meaning’ does immediately suggest itself in English. However, this connection is absent in German. Consequently, the fact that the *Philosophical Investigations* concentrate on the verb ‘meinen’ and emphasize the relevance of this analysis for the theory of meaning betrays the influence of English. In this sense, languages overlap not only in the genesis and evolution of philosophical problems and theories, but also in the way Wittgenstein himself deals with these questions.

Wittgenstein does not assume that these problems are restricted to the natural language(s) his texts happen to be written in. However, philosophical problems make their appearance in a single language and must be solved in it; for Wittgenstein, this means conducting a ‘grammatical’ investigation in and of this natural language – mostly German – as in the case of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

A peculiar difficulty involved in translating this book is related to Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy. In dealing with any classic of philosophy (say, with Kant, Hegel or Husserl), one will often come to puzzle about the right translation of the author’s technical terminology. There are many such questions regarding Wittgenstein’s vocabulary.³⁴ However, there is also a more specific difficulty that stems from the task he sets himself: philosophical problems that are “produced by grammatical illusions” (PI, § 110) and arise “through a misinterpretation of our forms of language” (PI, § 111), “are solved through an insight into the workings of our language” (PI, § 109).

This way of solving philosophical problems confronts the translator with a difficult task. She has to move from the misleading surface grammar at the root of the misunderstanding to the insights in deep grammar that solve the problem. She has to translate the philosophical problems, their source in grammar, and the ‘grammatical’ insights that allow these

³⁴ As an example, consider the technical term ‘Familienähnlichkeit’, cf. n. 30 above.

problems to disappear. Thus, the translator must be able to find plausible replacements for the difficulties of linguistic usage with which the source text is struggling; she must find (or come up with) real ‘grammatical’ difficulties in the target language, the false analogies that need to be cleared up to solve the philosophical problems Wittgenstein struggles with in the original German text. The luring seductions he deals with in the source language must be translated in such a way that, even in the target language, they look like real temptations. “You should like to say...” is a phrase that recurs again and again in the *Philosophical Investigations* in the most different variations. What “You should like to say...”³⁵ must really be something natural for you to say in your own language. Thus, the translator must make plausible to the reader that everyday usage of the target language can be misunderstood and given the mythological interpretation the *Philosophical Investigations* deal with. Thus, the translated Wittgenstein must talk the reader out of moves that are a real, ‘spontaneous’ temptation for her in her own language – and not only in German. He must convince the reader to see things differently and bring her around to a new way of thinking. ‘Grammatical’ considerations in and about the source language (German) must be replaced by ‘grammatical’ considerations in and about the target language. Thus, the translated Wittgenstein must give a perspicuous representation of the target language, albeit in a punctual, piecemeal manner. Patterns in which rules of *philosophical* grammar are expressed (“Sensations are private”) or, on the contrary, contravened (“For a second he felt deep grief”) have to be translated in the target language.³⁶

How difficult is this? In 2010, at a conference in Vienna on ‘Translating Wittgenstein’, I discussed this particular translation problem, showing how these difficulties can be mastered quite well in Italian. However, could the same result be achieved in languages that are further away

³⁵ “Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should like to say [möchten wir sagen], is a *spirit*.” (PI, § 36). Cf. PI, §§ 50, 99, 140, 156, 165, 168 etc.

³⁶ Cf. PI, § 248, PI II, § 3.

from the source language? As I was dealing with a language relatively close to German, I left this question aside – cf. Brusotti (2012, p. 216). It was taken up, however by another contributor to the same volume, Katalin Neumer, who had translated the *Philosophical Investigations* into Hungarian. In her paper (2012), she used the Russian translation as an ‘object of comparison’ for her own Hungarian translation. Are there languages in which, she asked, the private language problem, with its particular sources and its distinctive mode of Wittgensteinian therapy, is impossible to translate? And if so, are Russian and Hungarian amongst these languages? Whilst she lends her questions a fairly – perhaps too – radical formulation, she nevertheless ends up dismissing the option of untranslatability.

Neumer tries to answer her question about the adequate translation of the private language problem by using the distinction between ‘superficial grammar’ and ‘deep grammar’. She concludes that if the philosophical problem of private language simply arose from false analogies in ‘surface grammar’, Hungarian and Russian speakers would be quite safe; at least in this specific case, the ‘surface grammar’ of their respective language does not tend to lead them astray (Neumer 2012, p. 267, cf. p. 266). But, in fact, Hungarian and Russian speakers are anything but indifferent to the issue of private language. The reason is, she claims, that, even if the respective surface grammars of German and Hungarian are quite different, their depth grammars are more similar; and it is ‘depth grammar’ that is of paramount importance for translation.

According to Neumer, ‘depth grammar’ is more widely shared than surface grammar. She gives two possible, and conflicting, reasons for this assertion: (A) ‘Depth grammar’ is not only ‘linguistic’, but also historic, sociological. Austria (but also Germany) and Hungary share depth grammar because of a common cultural background. This first path leads Neumer to question Wittgenstein’s assumption that the problems of philosophy go back to linguistic misunderstandings. Here, I will leave this subject aside.

Turning to Neumer's second thesis: (B) 'depth grammar' is universal. On this explanation, 'philosophical' problems are not parochial; and the late Wittgenstein does indeed assume that 'depth grammar' has a certain grade of commonality. But must it be universal? In a sense, his rather open-ended considerations about 'depth grammar' apply to language in general and not only to determinate languages. We are not able to interpret an unknown language (or even to say that it is a language), unless we can recognize in the speakers something like a "shared human way of acting" (PI, § 206).³⁷ To this belongs, for instance, a certain amount of "regularity" (PI, § 207) in speaking and acting. The way of acting is not only the criterion for justifying the substitution of one expression with another, but the basis of a more general and basic form of understanding (interpretation), namely of the ascription of a determinate kind of speech act or of language at all.³⁸

Thus, these two remarks (PI, §§ 206-207) address a more general issue than adequate translation. They have been the object of much controversy. I think that this disagreement, like many others, is due to a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's approach. Interpreters try to pin down his position by ascribing to him either a relativistic or a universalistic standpoint, whereas he in fact tries to avoid committing himself to a theory of either kind. Wittgenstein mentions a "[s]hared human way of acting" (PI, § 206). Who shares it with whom? The people mentioned in PI, § 206 share it among themselves and at least partly with us. There must be such overlaps. But is this "human way of acting" "shared" (PI, § 206) in the sense that it is common to mankind as a whole (in the sense of a closed set of features common to all humans)? Maybe, but I do not think that Wittgenstein wishes to commit himself to any theory about the universality (or particularity) of 'depth grammar'.

³⁷ I prefer this translation to "[s]hared human behaviour".

³⁸ "[...] Suppose you came as an explorer to an unknown country with a language quite unknown to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on? / Shared human behaviour is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language" (PI, § 206). "[...] Are we to say that these people have a language: orders, reports, and so on? / There is not enough regularity for us to call it 'language'" (PI, § 207).

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How to wrestle with the translation of Wittgenstein's writings

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Abstract: The translations of Wittgenstein's German philosophy requires the translator's full judgment, precision, and experience to re-imagine and reconstruct the source text into other languages and cultures. There exists no "authoritative" interpretation of any text or manuscript, so translation can turn into overtranslation and undertranslation in revision, re-translation, and self-translation. To bring the material of translation to life, the examples taken from Wittgenstein's works are accompanied by critical comment to reveal the "good" or "bad" nature of translating Wittgenstein's philosophical texts. Wittgenstein wrote in readable language, but "ordinary" language differs radically into specialized metalanguage of philosophy. The ideal goal of translation of philosophical texts is to deconstruct the metatexts within the synonymy of words and sentences to rebuild meaningful propositions. The sameness of source and target texts creates for the translators the personal, regional, or national paradox of equivalence. The proposed glossary imposes absolute accuracy of source and target vocabulary and terminology to generate the synonymy of the collective translations of Wittgenstein's writings.

Keywords: Philosophy, Translation Theory and Practice, Metalanguage, Deconstruction, Synonymy, Glossary

1. Twists and Turns of Translation

Translation has the goal to recreate the perfect one-way replacement of textual material of the source text in one language into equivalent textual material in another language. The recreation in a different language is made by a human agent working in relative isolation to rebuild (re-adapt, re-imagine, refashion, reconstruct, or rebuild) the thematic, space-time, and conceptual qualities of the source text into the different language and culture of the target text.

In the working definition, imagine the original Hebrew and Greek Bible translated into “a thousand languages” (Nida 1972). Bible translation, originally composed by priests or missionaries, hovers between the sacred and the profane to apply the readers’ mind to allegorical meaning and material belief. The content is the collection of religious messages as prophecy with emotional tendency and poetic flavor. The Hebrew and Greek Bible is dictated by the cultural antiquity of the Near East history between the sixth century B.C.E. and the first century A.D. The effect of the allegorical puzzle is the choice of the Bible translators to make contemporary translations of sermons, parables, visions, symbols, and allusions to understand the symbolic standards of present-day languages. Language and culture change all the times, so that the contemporary translation depends on the cultural experience of the own folklore, myths, and legends to understand the historical details of Jewish and Christian faith in the translation. The strategy of the translator must make a more solid foundation about old or modern style to write for believers and unbelievers, adults or children, and so forth.

The symbolic puzzle of Bible translation gave rise to the religious and social structure of contemporary translation studies and translation criticism as the concept-in-change. The adaptation of translation has formal correspondence or dynamical equivalence between the source and target texts (Nida 1964, p. 156-176). *Formal equivalence* is the closest possible equivalent generating the lineal structure of *technical* and *legal translation*. The translator fully identifies with the knowledge of the technical and legal culture of the source text to compare and approximate the syntax and fixed idioms of the structure closely to the target text. *Dynamical equivalence* aims at complete naturalness of expression in the target text, creating the artistic skill of *literary* and *vocal* translation. The fiction of poems and songs gives the translator the liberty to move somewhat away from the source text to identify oneself entirely with the linguistic referents of language and cultural idioms of the target language.

Philosophical texts are not regarded as literature, instead they give logical reasoning to understand the philosophical truth as purpose of science (Scheffler 1967). The translation of philosophical text belongs to the standards of formal equivalence against vagueness to characterize the translation. This purpose is clear in the technical terminology (Scheffler 1967, pp. 36-38, 123). The example of Wittgenstein's philosophy shows that to a degree the formal terms build the vocabulary and terminology. Examples are: *Sprachspiel* becomes literally "language-game", *Familienähnlichkeit* becomes "family resemblance", *Grammatik* "grammar", and *Lebensformen* "forms of life". The symmetrical units become difficult with *Bild* translated as "image" and "picture" (discussed in Gorlée 2012, pp. 140-143). Sometimes we see dynamical equivalence, for example when translator Frank Ramsey translated for Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* the word *Sachverhalt* into "atomic fact", which was then a new thing (Gorlée 2012, pp. 140-147). The method of formal equivalence becomes less clear in the translation of Wittgenstein's language philosophy, especially since Wittgenstein worked in ordinary language. In contrast to the complexities of earlier philosophy, Wittgenstein announced the new style of contemporary philosophy in postmodern fashion with questions and answers and often with the ironic tendency of punctuation marks. The translation of Wittgenstein's philosophy turned into the educational policy of something like an evolutionary process deciphered by the translators into momentary inclinations of happiness (or unhappiness) (Scheffler 1979, 1985).

The specialized field of the translation of Wittgenstein's philosophy from the original German into other modern languages has been neglected in the scholarship of translation studies (Venuti [1998] 1999, pp. 106-115). Despite the neglect, it requires absolute judgment, precision, and experience, based on the translator's personal knowledge of the linguistic framework embedded in the communication of philosophical reasoning. The translation of philosophical texts could be described as a boxing term in professional wrestling, in which the translator gets to

bodily grips with the author of the original work (Sebeok [1994] 2001, p. 20). The translator, who works alone, considers himself (herself) as secondary author or co-author, competing as it were hand-to-hand with the author in self-creating and editing the “good” translation. But, to be honest, translation is not a bodily language-game with sportive rules between competing wrestlers, but rather a war-game scenario of literate minds to win the contest (from *con-testare*) between “rivals”, the translator and the author (Weiss 1969, pp. 150-151). Fighting rough in the contest has turned into a sportsmanship of the intellectual struggle of the translator against the competitor (author) to neutralize his actions and act himself (herself) in the translation.

The translator speaks from the personal, or even local and national, isolationism of his work. He may imagine himself (herself) sometimes as a critic of the author, freeing himself (herself) of the social constraints and wrestling free from the “enemy”. The goal is to win the translational race as an individual. The superiority of the role of the translator is demonstrated by the complexity and variety of the alternating wordplay (here, the activities of the mind showing the varied skill of linguistic statements) to correctly determine the wrestler’s intuition, experience, and knowledge. Who could be the good, better, or best “rival” in the activity of translating Wittgenstein’s works? Who wins the actual conflict between the dominant word-game of the translator as co-author, or should the translator serve and advance the original author?

Can one conclude that the translation of philosophy is a “scandal of translation” (in the terminology of Venuti [1998] 1999)? The variants and alternatives of Wittgenstein in translation are regarded in modern translation theory as moving from “good” and “bad” into “in-between” versions of partially “good” and partially “bad” translations.

In the early *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (TLP 1922), Wittgenstein solved the conflict or struggle between translator and author in his *self-translation* (*auto-translation, authorized translation*) serving as author and translator. When the *Tractatus* was translated, author Wittgenstein collab-

orated as co-translator of the English translation, overruling the other translators. The numbered paragraphs of the *Tractatus* had been translated into English by the mathematical and philosophical insights of Frank P. Ramsey and edited by Charles Ogden (Gorlée 2012, pp. 28-29, 62, 90-91, 152). In 1920-1924, young Wittgenstein himself took an active part in the process of translation. He wrote extensive annotations, commentaries, and corrections to give his own rule of translation to the new English material (CCO 1973).

In Cambridge, Wittgenstein discussed with Bertrand Russell some details of the translational project. Russell remembered that Wittgenstein did not require an “exact translation” of the German text, but was “open to anybody to make a new translation in a more modern idiom; but it would be misleading to suggest that such a translation gave a more accurate rendering of Wittgenstein’s thought at the time than that which was published“ (Russell qtd. in CCO 1973, p. 10). The result of the German-English parallel texts was that the bilingual *Tractatus* became Wittgenstein’s formal (or formalized) theory of language philosophy for the future. This included Ramsey’s technical vocabulary, such as the expression of “atomic fact” (for *Sachverhalt*) as argued, but the terminology was checked overall by Wittgenstein in his auto-revisions.

After Wittgenstein’s death (1951), the trustee members (Elizabeth Anscombe, George Henrik von Wright, and Rush Rhees) assumed authority over the editing of his works, including the translations. After the fiat of the trustees, the editors and translators of his work claimed responsibility for the editorial anticipations of interpretation of the translations, but the translational work remained a free enterprise to publish Wittgenstein’s works and writings. Despite Wittgenstein’s earlier work as co-translator, Ramsey’s and Ogden’s English translation of the *Tractatus* deserved a re-translation, which was written by David F. Pears and Brian F. McGuinness and published in 1961, modified in 1963 (TLP [1961] 1963). Pears and McGuinness were interpreters of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but in those days not professional translators.

The transitional cahiers of *The Blue and Brown Books* (BBB 1958) were dictations of Wittgenstein's English lectures in Cambridge during the sessions of 1933-1934 and 1934-1935. The text of the notes had been prepared before by students Francis Skinner and Alice Ambrose, the edition is essentially unknown, but in the *Blue Book* we find the first working definition of Wittgenstein's technical term of "language-games" (BBB 1958, pp. 17, 81), which was further specified into the teaching practices of the *Brown Book* (Glock 1996, pp. 193-198).

The Blue and Brown Books were translated into many languages. The French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Swedish, and German translations shed some light upon the ideological decisions of the translator (see Gorlée 2012, pp. 237-253). The interest of the translators have shown two conflicting trends, one a remarkable conservatism, as required in the lexical "fixities" of philosophical language, the other a remarkable fickleness of fashion. Both of them were against the will of author Wittgenstein. One can stress that the circumstances of the global translators do not create the ideological framework for translating Wittgenstein's philosophical work, used by other translators. Instead, the translation is marginally localized into the personal, regional, or national use of the target language involved, and the grammatical and lexical alternatives of the source text into the target text were very sensitive to the translators. The personal genius of language and culture of the target translations no longer reflects the intellectual and spiritual senses of Wittgenstein's source text, but rather the translator's taste and value. This creates puzzling problems, as we may see.

The French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Swedish, and German translations are neither copies nor echoes, dependent on each other, but are "free" from each other, independent works reformulated into different target languages (discussed in Gorlée 2012, pp. 237-271). The "worst" rendering would be the French translation composed by writer, translator and artist Pierre Klossowski, published in 1961. Klossowski's translation has broken up Wittgenstein's philosophy into an elegant

“novel” in the French literary style of philosophy of that period. Presented with morphological order and context of French narratives, Klossowski’s French translation is provided with lexical *overtranslations* and *undertranslations*, pretending *as if* this translated novel was Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

Opposed to Klossowski’s artistic transformation of Wittgenstein, the later Dutch translation of *The Blue and Brown Books* (written by Wilfried Oranje in 1996) is a “good” attempt to keep Wittgenstein’s internal structure of clues and metaphors. At the same time, the Dutch target context, in close proximity to German language, allows for movement into different semantic complements, sometimes deviating with “good” reason from Wittgenstein’s source original. The Spanish translation (written by Francisco Gracia Guillén in 1968, later followed by the Italian one by Aldo Gargani (1983), can be highly lauded as “good” translations. Dealing with the qualification of the morphological and semantic priority of Wittgenstein’s original keywords and clues, those translations accept Wittgenstein’s ideological way of mentioning and rementioning the radical catchwords for repeated entry into the source and target versions.

The French, Spanish, Italian, and Dutch material is drawn from one source (BBB 1968), while the German and Swedish translations (one translated by Petra von Morstein in 1970, the other translated by Lars Herzberg and Aleksander Motturi in 1999) come from Wittgenstein’s later source version (*Umarbeitung*) of the *Brown Book* to supplement some parts for inclusion into the *Philosophical Investigations*. Therefore both target alternatives are not the same as the first source text. Usually, it seems that the first translation loses interest and urgency for the foreign readers as soon as a re-translation is produced. However, Wittgenstein’s re-touched and remodelled new version did not overcome the first translation, edited by Rush Rhees. The insecurities and ambiguities of the errors in the possible narrowness, shifts, and limitations formulated in the first version and its translations, stay there in the translations, further obfuscating Wittgenstein’s writings.

Wittgenstein's self-translation refers to the "historicist" act of translating one's own literal version, but the translation of his writings is freely used as the proper and unilateral second reversion of the translator as if the translation were his (her) own. In the second part of the *Brown Book*, von Morstein's translation produces some errors by not paying attention to Wittgenstein's catchwords and clues, that are freely translated into a variety of German terms. Von Morstein's translation reasoned backwards into Wittgenstein's German language, which appeared adequate but, as argued in most of the other translations, the translation is (over)burdened by the use of Wittgenstein's common language to construct its own philosophical underlanguage (or sublanguge) on top of Wittgenstein's source text. The *overtranslation* of terminology gives rise to all kinds of German variants and alternatives in the target text. The same practice of relative freedom seems to have been followed by the Swedish translators. Instead of the precise rules, their alternatives give an even more loose and improvisatory air to these translations.

2. Translating *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1953, 2009)

Wittgenstein's masterpiece, the *Philosophical Investigations*, had been translated and re-translated into English (PI 1953 with revised eds., PI 2009). Wittgenstein's student Elizabeth Anscombe dedicated herself to translating Wittgenstein's legacy into English. For the occasion, she learned German language, but was never a proficient linguist of German language. Anscombe's background of knowledge illustrated the "marginality of translation in the discipline of philosophy" (Venuti [1998] 1999, p. 107, see pp. 107-115). Without a background as translator, Anscombe translated on her own the *Philosophical Investigations* into English. In the *Editors' Note* (qtd. in PI 1953, p. vii), Anscombe and Rush Rhees remarked that they needed to "decide between variant readings for words and phrases through the manuscript", but they stated that their "choice never affected the sense" (qtd. in PI 1953, p. vii). Anscombe's editorial

superiority to write such a sentence was grounded in Wittgenstein's routine of fragmentary writing in short paragraphs, migrating from one context (one manuscript) to another, but Anscombe did not follow Wittgenstein's lexical meaning of German words. Anscombe and Rhees rationally maximized their linguistic constraints, stating that: "The passages printed beneath a line at the foot of some pages are written on slips which Wittgenstein had cut from other writings and inserted at these pages, without any further indication of where they were to come on" (qtd. in PI 1953, p. ix; see Wittgenstein's PI 1953, p. ix).

Was it true that the translator's choices never affected Wittgenstein's sense? The full repetition of words and sentences takes place as an unlikely operation of leaving an empty word or sentence as variables for the translator's invariables. For Wittgenstein, the words and phrases can have multiple meanings, open and latent, to shape and form his own mind of writing. Wittgenstein's combination of German words in his works had a special significance to be applicable and make special sense. This causes the strong statement of translator Anscombe to seem problematic and doubtful for present-day translation theory. Anscombe's translation of the *Philosophical Investigations* into English has banished Wittgenstein's philosophy from the "hard" science in the formal logic of the *Tractatus* to embrace the exile of the "soft" skepticism of the 1953 translation in the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1953). Following Kripke's critical remarks ([1982] 1985, pp. 48-49fn, 74fn), the key-concepts in clues of language and keywords of the English translation of the *Philosophical Investigations* turn out to be, in comparison with Wittgenstein's original, the own invention of translator Anscombe.

Briefly, Anscombe's non-truth-functional logical relations do not actually contradict with each other in Wittgenstein's lexical "grammar" (Glock 1996, pp. 150-155), but the mathematical equations of words logically and stylistically exclude each another. The series of counterexamples from his works expresses the new rule of the analytic or empirical synthesis *a priori*, as Husserl already suggested (Glock 1996, p. 83). In

Wittgenstein's notion of linguistic grammar, the combination of words was considered false practice, because he wanted to test and re-test the non-sensical pseudo-propositions to study the emotional-dynamic significance, but the pseudo-propositions had no real cognitive meaning (*Bedeutung*) (Glock 1996, pp. 236-239, 258-264).

As example, Wittgenstein imagined the descriptions of the “beetle” (*Käfer*) story as the philosophical problem of *Philosophical Investigations*. He wrote that

Angenommen, es hätte Jeder eine Schachtel, darin wäre etwas, was wir ‘Käfer’ nennen. Niemand kann je in die Schachtel des Andern schau; und Jeder sagt, er wisse nur vom Anblick seines Käfers, was ein Käfer ist. — Da könnte es ja sein, dass Jeder ein anderes Ding in seiner Schachtel hätte. Ja, man könnte sich vorstellen, dass sich ein solches Ding fortwährend veränderte. — Aber wenn nun das Wort ‘Käfer’ dieser Leute doch einen Gebrauch hätte? — So wäre er nicht der Bezeichnung eines Dings. Das Ding in der Schachtel gehört überhaupt nicht zum Sprachspiel; auch nicht einmal als ein Etwas: denn die Schachtel könnte auch leer sein. — Nein, durch dieses Ding in der Schachtel kann ‘gekürzt werden’; es hebt sich weg, was immer es ist. (PI, § 293, from MS 124, pp. 256-257, 1944).

The image of the beetle is a bold experiment of metafiction used as narrative in Wittgenstein's philosophy. The “beetle” with the lack of meaning and emphasis of quotation marks conveys the private “thing” trapped in the creative stasis of the invariance of derivative meaning. The translation extends the reader from the fairy tale, provoking the impossible “thing” of private non-communication to others, like a bug in amber, to announce the “something” or “nothing” of the public language-games. Translated by Anscombe, the first version (PI 1953) is that:

Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can ever look into anyone's else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is just from looking at *his* beetle. — Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. — But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? — If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a *something*: for the box might even be empty. — No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (PI, § 293, 1953)

Wittgenstein's German grammatical structure is to a large extent conditioned by the system of formal oppositions of yes/no. "*Ja, man könnte sich vorstellen (...)*" is translated into "One might even imagine", but without mentioning Wittgenstein's positive yes. The three cases of "*So wäre er nicht der Bezeichnung eines Dings. Das Ding in der Schachtel gehört überhaupt nicht zum Sprachspiel; auch nicht einmal als ein Etwas*" are translated correctly as "If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a *something*" is the expression that contains the negation, stressed in "*Nein, durch dieses Ding (...)*" in "No, one can (...)" (the underlining is here emphasized).

The formal opposition from indicative to subjunctive ("*bätte*", "*wäre*", "*kann*", "*sagt*", etc.) followed the initial word "*Angenommen*" translated into "Suppose". The subjunctive modality of Wittgenstein's fairy tale depended on the open condition of adverbial clauses by means of a verb, adverb, and noun of similar meaning. The optative parallelisms of subjunctive attributes in "*Da könnte es ja sein*" is transformed into the deictic and demonstrative expression "Here it would be"; the potentiality of "*Aber wenn nun das Wort (...)*" is the impersonal expression "One might even imagine"; and the modality of verbal irrealis of "*So wäre er nicht*" is

translated by Anscombe as the unreality of the grammatical construction in “If so it would not”.

Problematic is the correct translation of the last sentence. The inter-connecting sentence linked with a semi-colon “*Nein, durch dieses Ding in der Schachtel kann ‘gekürzt werden’; es hebt sich weg, was immer es ist*” has been translated into “No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is“. To express Wittgenstein’s comparative yes/no conversation, translator Anscombe repeated for the grammatical subject the general prop-word “one”, omitting the grammatical object (the “thing” of the beetle). The qualifying verb of the beetle’s “*gekürzt werden*” with quotation marks is reconstructed in the metaphor, naturalized in “*hebt sich weg*”. Anscombe incorrectly translated the sentence into ““divide through”“ with quotation marks, showing how the “thing” of the beetle can be “canceled out”. The flexibility of adding prepositions to verbs in the English language includes the verb “to divide” with the complementary prepositions “among“, “between“, “with“, “by“, “from“, and “into”, but Anscombe’s “to divide through” is an improvised category of the verb with intransitive and uncertain objects (Kevelson 1976, pp. 9-23; Makkai 1987, pp. 175-178). A person (agent) can share the thing (object) into equal parts, split, or break it up; things (objects) can separate into parts and form fractions. But the object of the beetle cannot “divide through’ against oneself.

A similar paraphrase from personal to reflexive idiom happens with the “thing in the box” that “*hebt sich weg, was immer es ist*”. Anscombe’s translation “it cancels out, whatever it is”, probably means that whatever is left of the beetle is reduced to nothing. In German, “it” seems to refer to the “thing in the box”, but the use of the nonpersonal pronoun alone is unusual in English and must be substituted by a specific subject. The comma is also confusing, since the transitive verb “cancel out” demands an attribute (object) after the preposition “out”. To avoid the use of intransitive verbs without object in English, “to cancel out” can be re-

placed by a reflexive verb, “to cancel itself out”, in which “itself” is the grammatical object.

Retranslated by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte for the 4th edition (PI 2009), the re-version is:

Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we will call a ‘beetle’. No one can ever look into anyone’s else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at *his* beetle. — It would then be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. — Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing — But what if these people’s word ‘beetle’ had a use nonetheless? — If so, it would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all; not even as a *something*: for the box might even be empty. — No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (PI, § 293, 2009)

Unfortunately, the new translation offers no real modification to Anscombe’s earlier version, and is, I would say, a disappointing re-translation of Anscombe’s beetle story. Now I have translated myself this story into a modern-day version, close to Wittgenstein’s original as well as rectifying the errors of Anscombe’s judgment and choice:

Let’s assume that everyone had a box with something in it which we will call a ‘beetle’. No one can ever look into anyone’s else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is just by looking at *his* beetle. — It would then be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. — But what if the word ‘beetle’ used by those people had a use nonetheless? — If so, it would not

be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn't belong to the language-game at all; not even as a *something*: for the box might even be empty. — No, this thing in the box can be annulled; it cancels itself out, whatever it is. (PI, § 293, my trans.)

Anscombe's English translation of *Philosophical Investigations* should follow Wittgenstein's own syntactic practice of writing and the semantic style in Austrian-German to a certain degree. Instead, Anscombe's target translation was, at least for me as reader, uncomfortable about her translational strategy. The English version was only comprehensible when simultaneously comparing Anscombe translation with Wittgenstein's original German source. Anscombe's translation underwent a delicate transaction of re-thinking Wittgenstein's clear source language into the fertile imagination of the translator to produce her own target language. Unfortunately, Anscombe's personal work and theory as translator of Wittgenstein portrayed how the ripples of translation can turn into the blind waves of the metaphorical meaning in the troubled waters, by which Anscombe demonstrated the possible vagueness of English as target language.

Avoiding the skeptical danger of Wittgenstein's repeated clues and keywords, Anscombe's translation navigates the English readers through the altered "landscape" of Wittgenstein's works. Instead of the actual "*Landschaftsbild*" (PI 1953, p. ix) of the German original, Anscombe's English translation plays off against the imaginary transformation into what can be called the "*Phantasielandschaft*" (PI 2009, § 398; see PI/PPF 2009, pp. 138, 160) absorbing the idealized flights of the translator's self-fantasy. Wittgenstein himself made a general statement, that the translator's criticism suggested the comfortable evasion or personal refinement from the source text to be extracted into the lexical and semantic "plan" (PR 1975, § 20) of the proposed work, *Philosophical Investigations*. Did the "plan" of attack for this translation come from author Wittgenstein or

from co-author Anscombe? Or honestly, was there any preparatory “plan” at all?

Wittgenstein claimed the philosophy of truth in the challenge to establish the totality of the translation in the social term of language-games. He wrote that “A wrong conception of the way language functions, of course, the *whole* of logic and everything that goes with it, and doesn’t just create some merely local disturbance” (PR 1975, § 20). What could happen is losing the social “intention from language”, when the acute awareness of the translator’s attitude of Wittgenstein’s language-game “collapses” (PR 1975, § 20) under the heavy weight of the translator’s global or local, parochial, or individual signatures. The translator’s mental role of bilingual person leads the readers into the crystallized form of vocabulary and terminology giving his (her) personal meaning. The translator’s ideas can possibly throw the plans for the readers into utter confusion (PI/PPF 2009, § 196). Fortunately, Anscombe’s *Philosophical Investigations* had been retranslated for the 4th edition (PI 2009). The translators include the teamwork of P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, who worked together as close teammates on the new work. Certainly, their translative work secures a “better” agreement with the philosophical analysis and literary style of Wittgenstein’s textuality. The translators have brought the variety of manuscripts together into one volume. Moving Part II into the separate part of the *Philosophy of Psychology: A Fragment* ([PPU] PI 2009, pp. 182-243) is already a major advance in illuminating Wittgenstein’s ideological viewpoint. Yet the translation itself has hardly changed.

3. Translation and Self-translation of *Culture and Value* (CV 1980, 1998)

Compared to the “stories” in Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*, the findings of *Culture and Value* (*Vermischte Bemerkungen*) are a complex case of extracts (*Ausschnitte*) from Wittgenstein’s documents, made by

editor Georg H. von Wright with changed title (1977). *Culture and Value* has also been translated twice by the same translator, Peter Winch (CV 1980 with revised eds., CV 1998) (discussed in Gorlée 2012, pp. 187-201, 201-212). Winch's *translation* and *self-translation* change the "bad" translation of 1980 into a really "good" one in 1998. Winch was a Wittgensteinian philosopher, but no translator. In the "Note by translator," translator Winch remarked that there were two reasons behind the "quite extensive revision of my original translation" (1998, p. xviii) in the self-translation. The first reason was the later publication of *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, with further additions by editor Alois Pichler (1994). The "new material" with unknown "textual detail" in German supplemented by Pichler had to be translated into English.

The second reason was that Winch attempted to "stick much more closely to the original grammatical structure of Wittgenstein's texts than I had thought appropriate in my earlier version" (1998, p. xviii). Winch's first translation had shown that "the relative values of words which are roughly synonymous in German are not mirrored in the English counterparts of these words" (Winch 1998, p. xviii). The self-discovery of words had motivated Winch's noble effort of *self-translation*. The effort of renewed variants was not to compose a "word for word presentation into a weird 'translatese'" (Winch 1998, p. xviii), but rather to compare and change the pairings of the words, the propositional or sentential level; and at a higher level, to serve as a bilingual "album" of Wittgenstein's maxims, in which each sentence of the language should be paired with its meaning. This linguistic comparison was, it seems, for Winch not the issue of the auto-translation, inspired instead by the attempt to spot errors in the previous translation and correct them.

Among the most useful resources for translators and translation theoreticians are the examples of, on the one hand, the new paragraphs and, on the other hand, the parallel discourses of Wittgenstein's critical extracts (*Ausschnitte*). Wittgenstein highlighted important key-concepts to explain shifts in critical thinking. But the grammatical place can extract

the meaning of referential signs of vocabulary, phraseology, and textology to do justice to the assemblage of Wittgenstein's epigrams. For this article, let me extract from my argument of the book *Wittgenstein in Translation* (Gorlée 2012, pp. 187-201) to get to the key points showing that the "upward" proposition from words to quasi-propositions was exemplified by the "weak" units of single names. The word types in quasi-propositions do not happen in quasi-propositions, but combined in complexified propositions.

Although frequent especially in German language, the most common word types — "the," "of," "is," "that," "to," "a," "and," "this" — are not discussed as philosophical words. In English, they could play a major role only when determined with some context. Other single words and elements of words with syllables, initials, numerals, ordinals, abbreviations, prepositions, and punctuations symbols link words together. In terms of meaning, the small word-elements begin the "false guess" of the hypothesis to gradually understand the small words standing alone, to progressively enable with the context at a meaningful quasi-propositions. The "soft" meaning becomes clearer ("harder") when combined with used names and phrases in propositions to form unitary sentences. Wittgenstein's meaning of the sign game of small words was merely "*ein Begriff mit verschwommenen Rändern*" (a concept with blurred edges) (PI, § 71; also PR, §§ 260: 209; see Gorlée 2012, pp. 91-92). The practice of the fuzzy edges of words are exemplified by Wittgenstein in the following examples of single quasi-propositions.

The interjection "*Lebt wohl!*" with imperative verb, adverb, and exclamation point, is translated as "Fare well!" or "farewell" (CV 1980, pp. 52-52e, 1998, pp. 60-60e) expressed in two or one word with exclamation point. "*Und was?*" is a propositional conjunction with punctuation of interrogative pronoun, stress, and question mark is translated by Winch as "*What exactly?*" (CV 1980, pp. 51-51e) and retranslated as "*Well, what?*" (CV 1998, pp. 59-59e). The short exclamation "*Nicht das!*" is the jumble of negative particle, demonstrative pronoun with punctuation of

exclamation point, is *overtranslated* by Winch as “No, I *won't* tolerate that!” (CV 1980, pp. 60-60e). In the new edition, Wittgenstein’s exclamation changed emphasis in “Not *that!*” (CV 1998, pp. 69-69e), closer it seems to Wittgenstein’s original. Finally, the three words in “— *Stimmt das aber?* —” in personal verb, demonstrative pronoun, conjunction, question mark, and hyphens is an enclosed exclamation reflecting Wittgenstein’s silent message of strangeness. Winch translated into “— It that true though? —” (CV 1980, pp. 73-73e) and retranslated as “— But is that true? —” (CV 1998, pp. 83-83e). The combined meanings of single words in quasi-propositions have still various meanings and confuse the readers into “good” and “bad” interpretations (see Gorlée 2015).

The translation of different words and elements of words in sentences applies for translator Winch the mechanism of *over- and undertranslation*. Some abbreviations arise in Wittgenstein’s writings: “*D.h.*” is rephrased in first translation with “in other words” (CV 1980, pp. 5-5e) and back to “i.e.” (CV 1998, pp. 7-7e); or the whole term “*Das heißt?*” translated as “What that means” (CV 1980, pp. 9-9e) and later to the more specific “This means that” (CV 1998, pp. 12-12e). At times the ordinals (“next”, “last”, “other”, “further”) are simplified in the translation, from negative to positive sense. Please consider the play of the tricks of the trade in the full sentence “*Wenn man in der Logik eine Trick anwendet, wen kann man tricksen, außer sich selbst?*” (If you use a trick in logic, whom can you be tricking other than yourself?) (CV 1980, pp. 24-24e) (If you use a trick in logic, whom can you be tricking but yourself?) (CV 1998, p. 28e). Here, the emphatical trick word “other” is omitted by Winch from the second translation.

As discussed before with the translation of Anscombe’s *Philosophical Investigations*, the under- and overtranslation of prepositions and other smaller words in reflexive and personal pronouns indicate in German language the place, direction, and distance of the whole sentence, but can shift or disappear in the English translation, replaced by common words. Wittgenstein’s “*Bei Mendelssohn, z.B., nicht?*” was translated by Winch as

“Not with Mendelssohn, for example” (CV 1980, pp. 37-37e) and retranslated as “Not, e.g., in Mendelssohn” (CV 1998, pp. 43-43e) to show firstly the personal life of Mendelssohn and secondly his musical work to others. The personal and possessive pronouns are shifted into other words. Wittgenstein’s short fragment saying that “*Nicht ist so schwer, als sich nicht betrügen*” is translated as “Nothing is so difficult as not deceiving oneself,” a riddle since the reflexive pronoun is emphasized, but then retranslated in “Nothing is so difficult as not deceiving yourself” (CV 1998, pp. 39-39e). Wittgenstein’s “*Welches Gefühl hätten wir ...*” is translated as “What should it feel ...” (CV 1980, pp. 13-13e) without the personal pronoun, and retranslated as “How should we feel ...” (CV 1998, pp. 15-15e), exchanged around by translator Winch into the interrogative proposition.

Wittgenstein’s common German term “*man*” is translated indiscriminately into the English mixture of impersonal and personal pronouns derivative from Wittgenstein’s trend of solipsism (self-knowledge) and self-expression (personal forms of life) in his writings. “*Man*” is translated literally in a collective sense of the pronoun into “a man” (in- or excluding woman?) (CV 1980, pp. 50-50e). For the same reason, the effect of the indefinite personhood of “*man*” is replaced in Winch’s second translation by the impersonal “one” (CV 1980, pp. 9-9e, 1998, pp. 12-12e) or “someone” (CV 1998, pp. 57-57e, see 69-69e). To balance the indefinite effect of self, “*man*” is also translated by the definite personal pronoun “we,” “you,” or “he,” and replaced in the second translation by the indefinite “one” (CV 1980, pp. 5-5e, 58-58e, 84-84e, CV 1998, pp. 7-7e, 66-66e, 95-95e) in the confusing over- and undertranslation in English. A backwards translation happens where “it” is retranslated as “we” (CV 1980, pp. 56-56e, CV 1998, pp. 64-64e). See also the translation of “people” (CV 1980, pp. 44-44e, 60-60e, 1998: 95-95e), but the sweeping generalization is also retranslated backwards into the first-person plural pronoun “we” (CV 1998, pp. 50-50e, 69-69e).

Retaining the collective sense of indefinite “*man*”, Wittgenstein’s “*Das größte Glück des Menschen ist die Liebe*” is translated with the indefinite “*man*” (“*Man’s greatest happiness is love*,” CV 1980, pp. 77-77e) and retranslated with “*human being*” (“*The greatest happiness for a human being is love*,” CV 1998, pp. 87-87e), including man and woman. The sentence “*Wie Gott den Menschen beurteilt, ...*” is translated as “*How God judges a man, (...)*” (CV 1980, pp. 86-86e) in singular, and retranslated as “*How God judges people, (...)*” (CV 1998, pp. 98-98e). “*Menschheit*” also remains translated as “*mankind*” (CV 1980, pp. 85-85e) and is retranslated as the collective self of “*humanity*” (CV 1998, pp. 96-96e), perhaps a more adequate solution in today’s English. As backward translation, “*man*” is used to translate “*der Mensch*” (CV 1980, pp. 5-5e) and “*mankind*” to translate “*die Menschen*” (CV 1980, pp. 18-18e) but is also replaced in Winch’s self-translation by the definite “*human being*” and “*human beings*” (CV 1998, pp. 7e, 26e).

Adjectives are used in philosophical discourse, but sparingly, since they affect the discourse poetically and aesthetically. Wittgenstein’s personalized adjective in German “*Es ist nicht Unerhörtes darin, daß ...*” was overtranslated by Winch in “*There is nothing outrageous in saying that ...*” (CV 1980, pp. 84-84e) and retranslated as “*It is not unheard that ...*” (CV 1998, pp. 95-95e), keeping closer to Wittgenstein’s “*usual*” and “*unusual*” forms of negation. Wittgenstein described the composer Mendelsohn “*der nur lustig ist, wenn alles obnebin lustig ist*” in Winch’s overtranslation of “*who is only jolly when the people he is with are jolly anyway*” (CV 1980, pp. 2-2e). The high spirits are restructured in the self-translation as “*cheerful only when everything is cheerful anyway*” (CV 1989, pp. 4-4e). Mendelsohn’s joyful temper has changed its character. Wittgenstein’s “*rätselhaften Schwierigkeiten*” is translated as “*puzzling difficulties*” (CV 1980, pp. 15-15e) but, since Wittgenstein was dealing with the cryptograms of journal *Simplissimus*, retranslated by Winch as “*cryptic difficulties*” (CV 1998 pp. 22-22e). “*Welche seltsame Sachlage*” becomes

“What a strange situation” (CV 1980, pp. 13-13e) and is retranslated as the more familiar “What a singular situation” (CV 1998, pp. 22-22e).

Translator Winch surprised with the qualification of masked theater expressing “*eines spiritualistischen Characters*” translated and self-translated by Winch as the bizarre expression of “an intellectual character” (CV 1980, pp. 12-12e, 1998, pp. 14-14e). Using contrasted pair of adjectives is, as Wittgenstein wrote, to bring the reader in “*die unrichtige Atmosphäre,*” transferred to the more logical term “*das richtige Element,*” but the first term is translated as “the wrong atmosphere” and the second element as “his proper element” (CV 1980, pp. 42-42e) but re-translated in “his right element” (CV 1998, pp. 48-48e). Wittgenstein’s two adjectives in “*große, sozusagen breite, Visionen*” are translated as “large-scale and, as it were, wide-ranging, visions” (CV 1980, pp. 54-54e) and re-translated as the simple original, “large, as it were broad, visions” (CV 1998, pp. 61-61e). The contrast between a “*weit talentierter Schriftsteller*” (“a writer far more talented”) is a “*geringeres Talent*”, translated as a “minor talent” (CV 1980, pp. 75-75e) and retranslated as “little Talent” with a capital T (CV 1998, pp. 86-86e).

As example in philosophical content, the use of adverbials has become Wittgenstein’s crucial element to give a nuance of mood and value to the whole sentence. Adverbs ending with the postfix *-ly* indicates adverbial circumscription of the adjective, but many other possibilities are also available. In *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein meant that the Christian faith is there “*nur*” for those who suffer distress; “*nur*” is overtranslated as “solely,” set apart between commas (CV 1980, pp. 46-46e), and retranslated as “only” fused in the middle of the proposition (CV 1998, pp. 52-52e), as Wittgenstein would have wanted the single soul to be regarded. Wittgenstein’s “*ein Ding mit Kälte zu betrachten*” is translated as “look at something coldly” (CV 1980, pp. 5-5e) and reformulated as “look at something with coldness” (CV 1998, pp. 7-7e). A similar case: Wittgenstein wrote that he could not read Shakespeare’s works “*mit Leichtigkeit*” (Wittgenstein’s italics), translated firstly as “to read him *easi-*

h)" (CV 1980, pp. 49-49e) and retranslated as "read him *with ease*" (CV 1998, pp. 56-56e).

Regarding additional adverbs, Wittgenstein's "*dennoch gut*" is translated informally as "all the same good" (CV 1980, pp. 49-49e) and retranslated in the more formal and stronger contrast of "nevertheless good" (CV 1998, pp. 56-56e). A human problem or act "*lässt sich endgültig verteidigen*" is translated as the meandering clause "can be defended absolutely and definitely" (CV 1980, pp. 16-16e) but brought back to "can be defended definitively" (CV 1998, pp. 23-23e), spoilt by the dual assonance, but closer to Wittgenstein's meaning. The two adverbs in the middle of "*Man hört immer wieder die Bemerkung*" are translated as "People say again and again" (CV 1980, pp. 15-15e) but happily reformulated as "We keep hearing the remark" (CV 1998, pp. 22-22e) with integrated verbal forms.

The combination with single and complex conjunctions introduces the linking of atomic propositions in order to form "molecular" propositions (Wittgenstein 1979, pp. 10f.). Pichler saw "as fixed points ... [yet] nothing more fixed than his own instinct, intuition or taste" (Pichler 1992, p. 229). Three grammatical devices are used to put the weak truth of atomic propositions together to form a harder truth function in molecular propositions: coordination, subordination, and adverbial link. Firstly, coordination uses the single conjunctions "and," "or," "but," "both ... and" and others. Simplifying with short words, the revisions in the self-translation begin with the copulative word "and" (CV 1980), which is in the self-translation changed to the original mark "&" (CV 1998), whereas German "*und*" was firstly be translated as ";" (CV 1980, pp. 7-7e) and then as "&" (CV 1998, pp. 9-9e) — a distortion of names replicated in "*und*" translated as ";" (CV 1980, pp. 50-50e) and retranslated back as "&" (CV 1998, pp. 57-57e). Wittgenstein's idea of genius is not, as he stated, "*Talent und Character*" ("*und*" italicized), which is slightly overtranslated as "talent *plus* character" (CV 1980, pp. 35-35e), but retranslated as "talent *and* character" (CV 1998, pp. 40-40e) including the italics in the conjunction "*and*."

Secondly, subordination introduces subordinate clauses to another, using conjunctions as “when,” “if,” “because,” and such, Wittgenstein’s “*wenn*” is translated as “when” and in the self-translation as “if” in “*Wenn wir an die Zukunft denken ...*” (CV 1980, pp. 3-3e, 1998, pp. 5-5e). “When” indicates real adverbial time, whereas “if” is an interrogative expressing unreal and hypothetical meaning. Conjunctions can be combined: “*wenn auch*” embodies the ideas of condition and contrast, translated as a more formal “even though” (CV 1980, pp. 35-35e) and retranslated as the more common “even if” (CV 1998, pp. 40-40e). Thirdly, the adverbial link connects two ideas by using a linking sentence adverbial such as “but,” “yet,” “moreover,” “meanwhile,” “in fact,” “actually,” “really,” “superficially,” “obviously,” “perhaps,” “technically,” “of course”. Both “really” and “actually” are used to translate Wittgenstein’s “*eigentlich*” (CV 1980, pp. 47-47e, CV 1998, pp. 54-54e), causing some confusion.

In Wittgenstein’s logic, the if-then construction is an obvious device: after a pejorative sentence regarding himself, Wittgenstein stated “*Denn wenn ich es sage, so kann es in einem Sinne wahr sein, aber ich kann nicht selbst von dieser Wahrheit durchdrungen sein, ...*” translated as “Because if I do say it, though it can be true in a sense, this is not the truth by which I myself can be penetrated: ...” (CV 1980, pp. 32-32e) and retranslated as “For if I say it, though it can be true in a sense, still I cannot make myself be penetrated by this truth: ...” (CV 1998, pp. 37-37e) to emphasize the contrast of his argumentation differently, from the informal “because” to “for,” amplifying with “still” (also note the change in the punctuation, from Wittgenstein’s comma to colon to introduce an appositive clause that explains and restates the previous clause).

In the initial positions of German sentences, the particular use of single or complex adverbials and conjunctions serve to personally comment the following (sub)sentence. Wittgenstein’s “*nur dann*,” starting a sub-clause, is translated as “well, then” (CV 1980, p. 65-65e) but retranslated specifying the time-object as “well, in that case” (CV 1998, pp. 75-75e). “*Vielmehr*” is translated with the conjunction “On the contrary” (CV

1980, pp. 24-24e) but retranslated with the adverbial expression “Rather” (CV 1998, pp. 27-27e). “*Er muss daher ...*” is translated as a formal beginning “Hence he has ...” and then retranslated in more common language as “For this reason he has ...” (CV 1980, pp. 26-26e, CV 1998, pp. 42-42e). Sentence adverbials tend to be conceived to initialize the sentences. Wittgenstein’s “*Anständigerweise*” in initial position is overtranslated by Winch as “The honourable thing to do” (CV 1980, pp. 8-8e) and self-translated as “The decent thing to do” (CV 1998, pp. 10-10e). Since the sentence is about riddle-solving, Winch preferred in the retranslation simple expressions closely linked to the original.

The conjunctions can be simple or complex to form “molecular” propositions (Wittgenstein 1979, pp. 10f.). Firstly, coordination uses the single conjunctions “and,” “or,” “but,” “both ... and” as well as others. The copulative word “*und*” was firstly be translated as “;” (CV 1980, pp. 7-7e) and then as “&” (CV 1998, pp. 9-9e) repeated in “*und*” translated as “;” (CV 1980, pp. 50-50e) and retranslated as “&” (CV 1998, pp. 57-57e). Secondly, subordination introduces subordinate clauses to another, using conjunctions as “when,” “if,” and “because.” Wittgenstein’s “*wenn*” is translated as “when” and in the self-translation as “if” in “*Wenn wir an die Zukunft denken ...*” (CV 1980, pp. 3-3e, 1998, pp. 5-5e). “When” indicates real adverbial time, whereas “if” is an interrogative expressing unreal and hypothetical meaning. Conjunctions can be combined, for example in “*wenn auch*”, which embodies the ideas of condition and contrast, translated as the more formal “even though” (CV 1980, pp. 35-35e) and retranslated as the more common “even if” (CV 1998, pp. 40-40e). Thirdly, the adverbial link connects two ideas by using a linking sentence adverbial such as “but,” “yet,” “moreover,” “meanwhile,” “in fact,” “actually,” “really,” “superficially,” “obviously,” “perhaps,” “technically,” and “of course”. Both “really” and “actually” are used to translate Wittgenstein’s “*eigentlich*” (CV 1980, pp. 47-47e, CV 1998, pp. 54-54e), causing confusion to the readers. In Wittgenstein’s logic, the if-then construction is an obvious device: after a pejorative sentence regarding him-

self, Wittgenstein stated “*Denn wenn ich es sage, so kann es in einem Sinne wahr sein, aber ich kann nicht selbst von dieser Wahrheit durchdrungen sein, ...*” translated as “Because if I do say it, though it can be true in a sense, this is not the truth by which I myself can be penetrated: ...” (CV 1980, pp. 32-32e) and retranslated as “For if I say it, though it can be true in a sense, still I cannot make myself be penetrated by this truth: ...” (CV 1998, pp. 37-37e) to emphasize the contrast in his argumentation differently, from the informal “because” to “for,” amplifying with “still” (also note the change in the punctuation, from Wittgenstein’s comma to colon to introduce an appositive clause that explains and restates the previous clause).

Beyond the conjunctions, the singular and repeated verbs and nouns are considered the economic heart of Wittgenstein’s vocabulary, but some verbs and nouns troubles translator Winch. For example, Wittgenstein’s “*Ein Gebäude aufzuführen*” receives the translation “constructing a building” (CV 1980, pp.7-7e) and then “erecting a building” (CV 1998, pp. 9-9e), because the building takes place in the hypothetical sense, without actually putting together parts and materials. The reverse is stated in “*ein großes Gebäude ... aufzuführen,*” translated as “to erect a great building” (CV 1980, pp. 68-68e) and retranslated as “to build a great building” (CV 1998, pp. 77-77e). Wittgenstein commented that “*Wolken kann man nicht bauen,*” using another building verb, “*bauen,*” not literally but metaphorically, translated as “You can’t build clouds” (CV 1980, pp. 41-41e) and then retranslated as “You can’t construct clouds” (CV 1998, pp. 48-48e), emphasizing in this fragment the virtual reality of dreams and fancies.

The translation of single nouns and verbs gave overtranslation and undertranslation. Wittgenstein’s qualities of “*das Drama*” is translated by Winch as a specific “play” (CV 1980, pp. 10-10e) and later as the more general “drama” (CV 1998, pp. 13-13e), to include that dramatology is not one, but all kinds of mimetic performance. The fragments about Schubert’s music spoke repeatedly about his “*Melodien,*” undertranslated

as popular or attractive “tunes” (CV 1980, pp. 47-47e) but retranslated as “memories” (CV 1998, pp. 54-54e). Another metaphorical expression with the umbrella verb “*stechen*” concerns G.E. Moore, Wittgenstein’s colleague at Cambridge: “*Moore hat mit seinem Paradox in ein philosophisches Wespennest gestochen*”, directly translated as “Moore stirred up a philosophical wasps’ nest with his paradox” (CV 1980, pp. 76-76e); in the retranslation, an indirect instrument is used by Winch to raise the problem, see “Moore poked into a philosophical wasp nest within his paradox” (CV 1998, pp. 87-87e).

Winch’s problems lie in handling Wittgenstein’s many religious and biblical metaphors. Wittgenstein’s the “*Dämon*” is overtranslated as “evil spirit” (CV 1980, pp. 71-71e), then accurately retranslated as “demon” (CV 1998, pp. 82-82e). The writer’s original idea can be compared to a living seedling which “*nun er dürr*” and sterile in its natural conditions. The German metaphor is translated from the adjective into the verbal form as the biblical “now it is withered” (CV 1980, pp. 79-79e) from Ps. 37, § 2, but retranslated as “now it is shriveled” (CV 1998, pp. 90-90e). Wittgenstein’s referred to the seedling as the least of all plant seeds in the Kingdom of Heaven, which grew from “*junges Grün*” (Gen. 1, § 11) to a regular tree (Matt. 13, §§ 18-52). The earth yields “fresh grasses” that grew and seeded (Gen. 1, §§ 11-12). Thanks to the biblical verbs of growing plants, the dry seed sown in good soil gave abundant fruit; but if planted in stony soil, it “burned up all the green grass on it” (Rev. 8, § 7).

Wittgenstein’s “*Ein Held sieht dem Tod in’s Angesicht, dem wirklichen Tod, nicht bloß dem Bild des Todes*” is given as “A hero looks death in the fact, real death, not just the image of death” (CV 1980, pp. 50-50e), and the latter phrase is retranslated as “not just a picture of death” (CV 1998, pp. 58-58e). Perhaps a biblical version of the prospect to God “face to face” would be in harmony with an adequate translation: “*Ein Held sieht dem Tod in’s Angesicht*” can be translated into the human vision of the “angels” that, in a heavenly state, “shall see the face of my Father” (Matt. 18, § 10, see Gen. 32, § 30, Rev. 22, § 4). Finally, the “*ewigen Qual*” after death was

translated as “everlasting torment” (CV 1980, pp. 81-81e) and retranslated correctly as “eternal torment” (CV 1998, pp. 92-92e). This 1949 fragment, written shortly before Wittgenstein’s own death, refers to the book of *Revelations*, disclosing and uncovering God’s messages of inflicting pain on humans through the passive verb “*wird gequält*” with adverbs of eternal time (“*in alle Ewigkeiten*”). Thanks to God’s verbs of suffering, the evil man is “tormented five months” (Rev. 9, § 5), “tormented with fire and brimstone” (Rev. 14, § 10), and “tormented day and night for ever and ever” (Rev. 20, § 10).

4. Deconstruction and Reconstruction

Wittgenstein’s translators seem to wrestle with the knowledge of languages to translate the philosophical writings. This is no mystery. From early times, translation was only applied to literary translation, including firstly the sacred writings of the Bible (Nida 1964). The struggles of the metalinguistic texts are regarded as the creation of writing literary texts in pure fiction: novels, poems, and other literary genres. Yet the genre of fictional texts is *more than* verbal grammar of rhetoric, giving a meaningful idiom for specific cultural experience to transmit emotional meaning to the readers. The questions of the translation of scientific and technical texts in astronomy and advances in water technology of agriculture, including philosophical manuscripts originally in Latin, Greek, and Arabic, did not come seriously into question until much later (Montgomery 2000).

Since the Enlightenment, man has liberated himself into the freedom of man as revolutionary citizen in society. The obedient citizenship anchored his liberty not in God as creator, but in the “natural” rights of man itself, realizing the individual humanity of the equality of all citizens in self-knowledge, self-expression, and self-fulfilment. The philosophers of the Enlightenment (Locke, Diderot, Rousseau, Voltaire, Goethe, and others) no longer wrote in “archaic” Latin language, but wrestled with

naming the cultural mechanics of writing in the new technique of modern languages, which were now systematically used as “modernized” instrument of literary writings, the science of mechanics, physics, and mathematics, as well as in the fields of biology, psychology, and history. This revolution causes that the scholars articulate their desire to learn, always entailing a sense of loss of the ancient disciplines of metaphysics, logic, and ethics.

Philosophy is converted into a natural science, beginning with empirical observation and ending with describing human experience. The philosophers speak our language and live in the actual world, but the instrument of textual and cultural criticism does not systematically and coherently substitute the scientific or intellectual practice for the dramatic contrasts of language with cultural overtones. The personal and social language of philosophy reconstructs human thought out of “simple” ideas into the stream of human sensations. Even after the *belle époque*, the passions and imaginations of Wittgenstein’s religious parables and popular metaphors were controversial works in philosophy. His rational and irrational texts were regarded as scientific or unscientific philosophy.

Philosophical texts are neither literature nor fiction, but give meaningful use of reality in the public and personal work-tool of the use of language. Philosophical language contains formal reasoning of logic, but is partially clothed in the fiction and non-fiction of scientific language. Exploring the primary activity is the science of discovery to understand the truth of the philosopher, in this case the truth of Wittgenstein’s forms of reasoning. The exchange of philosophical knowledge through culture in time and place in translation explains that the interpreters and translators had to use different levels of idealistic knowledge to explore scientific language. Wittgenstein’s reasoning is further “ornamented” into the more poetic composition of style in sound, rhythm, image, rhetoric, paragraphs, tone, and voice to reach the accurate understanding of the textual universe of philosophical reasoning.

Philosophy can be defined as the practice of exercising the philosopher's curiosity and intelligence in writing. Philosophy conducts an inquiry into the ultimate reality and vivid essence of things (meaning ideas, phenomena, objects, events) in our environment. Philosophical language has the strict methodology of scientific metalanguage transformed into metascience, in which the logical type of scientific language has turned into the story about the specific metessages of the author-philosopher (Rey-Debove 1986; for prefix meta-, see Hubig 1986). The "ordinary" language is the first "*object language* being any language which is an object for investigation" of the elements of syntactic and semantic facts, while the second "*metalanguage*" is the metmessage of "any language signifying some other language" describing the new object-language of philosophy. This means that "ordinary" language is not designed to state the truth about language, but that philosophical texts are considered as exact cases expressing the signs-about-signs in the sense of "*metasigns*" (Morris 1971, p. 256). In the metasigns, the truth of order (and disorder) of the private meta-vocabulary and meta-terminology is expressed in words and sentences. Paradoxically, metalanguage *directly* analyzes philosophical discourse, but remains *indirectly* formulated in "ordinary" language.

The philosophical translator is a multilingual talent with no problems with the philosophical language. But the translator needs to deconstruct the metalinguistic (or meta-analytic) activity to describe the logical or technoscientific meta-work of the original philosopher. The translator's "art of deconstruction" (Norris and Benjamin 1988, pp. 35-36) explores, *firstly*, the philosopher's cognitive synthesis to be able to analyze the text-generating processes involved in the philosophical arguments; and *secondly*, the description of the rational criteria for evaluating the philosophical metalanguage; while, *thirdly*, attempting to explain the practice of research in the philosophical work involved in the translational work.

The translation of philosophical texts is further constructed with the author's strategy, which the translator needs to examine to discover the "semantic, stylistic, axiological" meaning of the shifts between prototext

and metatext in order to take the decision to translate through the logical and coherent method of translation. After the deconstruction, the constructive policy of the knowledge counts for the translator as the idea of truth (Norris and Benjamin 1988, pp. 16-20), because the translator's "style-forming act" can rival the constant quest of the author's authenticity of the philosophical truth (Popović c.1975, p. 30, see pp. 12-13; see Tötösy de Zepetnek 1998, pp. 233-235). In the translator's system of arguments, the "ratio of meaning [can be transformed from] invariants to variants (...) through semantic shifts" between prototext and metatext and *vice versa* (Popović c.1975, p. 30, see pp. 12-13; see Tötösy de Zepetnek 1998, pp. 233-235). The policy of the translator intends to make the linguistically strange texts reachable for anonymous readers as familiar instrument for their philosophical reasoning.

Popović's translational method states that the expressive and evaluative relation between prototext and metatext can be studied through the "stylistic aspect according to the degree of homology between prototext and metatext" (Popović c. 1975, p. 30; see Tötösy de Zepetnek 1998, p. 234). The art of deconstructing homology is derived from Derrida's writings, who undermined any fixed interpretation to make a conflicting textual meaning (Norris and Benjamin 1988). This method has been applied to the reaction to finding the same word, sentence, or fragment in the source language and reconstruct these again with "different" meanings in another language (Popović c. 1975, p. 30; see Tötösy de Zepetnek 1998, p. 234). Deconstruction in translation involves the "textual scope of the contact between prototext and metatext" questioning of the faculties that reflect "only individual elements or levels of the text or does it refer to the text as a whole" (Popović c. 1975, p. 30; see Tötösy de Zepetnek 1998, p. 234). The logocentric drive for knowledge of the unknown elevates truth above the initial lines of the philosophical text, enabling the translator to construct the next step: the "transformation which the prototext can undergo in the metatext" producing in the translation different syntactic and semantic forms of continuity with

the author — Popovič's "initiative, selective, reducing, and complimentary continuity" (c. 1975, p. 30; see Tötösy de Zepetnek 1998, p. 234). The new translation can mean that the continuity with the author can also imply some discontinuity with no confidence in the author.

These questions are important in the attempt to translate Wittgenstein's new philosophical style, which can be translated or "pseudo-translated" according to Wittgenstein's use of "ordinary" language as his instrument of philosophical metalanguage. Wittgenstein's paradox rewrote the old rhetoric of philosophy to create his special *meta-language*. Imagine Wittgenstein's constant quotation, revision, and retelling of his own words, sentences, and paragraphs to re-construct the fragmentary scripts into the variety of his "movements of thought" (*Denkbewegungen*). The translator's absolute knowledge must be based absolutely on the imperatives of the close observation and intelligent experiment of Wittgenstein's style of language to attempt to describe the hidden pseudo-reality of what his textuality would be significant and meaningful for his philosophy of language. Despite all the quotations of Wittgenstein's expressions in style, his style is not an ordinary-language philosopher and not directly available to ordinary human observation, but can perhaps be known by theoretical inference to study his philosophical works. Wittgenstein seemed to talk in mixed genres of metalanguage about what the readers could possibly understand by his modernized perspective of re-stylizing mathematics, religion, politics, and arts.

Wittgenstein expanded the doctrine of logicism, later called the "logical turn" (Rorty ([1967] 1992) of language. Logicism was advanced by the technical-scientific approaches of Hegel and Carnap, and based on the pragmatic reasoning of language by logico-semiotician Charles S. Peirce as deduction, induction, and abduction (Gorlée 2016). The "linguistic turn" had two aspects: *firstly*, it gave rise to general philosophy as a theory of human language, and, *secondly*, the language of philosophy has itself become a part of its own subject matter and become from object studied the analysis or self-analysis itself. The German-Austrian doctrine

of “logical positivism” or “logical empiricism” worked with Hegel’s dialectical logic of handling one concept (thesis) which inevitably generates its opposite (antitheses) to generate the interaction of these in the new concept (synthesis). Logical empiricism had, in a negative sense, abandoned the previous history of positivism, but, still in the positive sense, it defended the new word-tool of language with culture, whereby no idea has a fixed meaning and no form of reality has a static meaning. The human mind is observed as the active, formative agent of change, developing free ideas in the system of language to realize the changes from the identity of the speaker. The search for truth in language is the eternal goal of the philosopher’s tool of language, whose task is to uplift Wittgenstein’s right or wrong wordplay coming from individual speakers into the public and social language of language-games. The pure reason of logic *and* philosophy (including the field of mathematical formulas) has become for today’s readers the logic *of* philosophy.

The philosophers of the “linguistic turn”, including forerunner Wittgenstein, often had problems in distinguishing philosophy of language from etymology, philology and other general linguistic terms. Indeed, not all conceptual, analytic, or linguistic problems are philosophical; and not all philosophical problems are conceptual, analytic, and linguistic mistakes. Philosophical problems can not always be resolved through wordplay in language, although many ambiguities and contradictions can be abandoned and removed through the logic of philosophy (Scheffler 1979). The truth of science is shared with other disciplines; but uses the firm beliefs of truth in the language-based systems of cultural signs, changing with age and time. This makes philosophy often problematic to distinguish from other scientific disciplines. Consequently, it appears that Wittgenstein’s philosophical style (Schulte 1990) often comes from “elsewhere”: the literary critic, linguist, rhetorician, philologist, and even the theologian, anthropologist, and psychologist (Gray 1969). Wittgenstein created thereby for the readers a grey zone addressed to the mixed science of translation theory.

Wittgenstein thought of himself primarily as the cultural stylist of his times. By the political force of circumstance, he worked in an adopted country and had to write at a distance from, or even outside, his cultural homeland, Austria. In his writings, he did not distance himself from standard Austrian-German language, his native language. Wittgenstein wrote in a *particular* language; his usual metalanguage was the logical variety of his ordinary language. This subregister of actual language made his prose enjoyable for many readers, but it must be stressed that the vital quotations of Wittgenstein's sentences, observed "everywhere" in his writings and documents, must have in philosophy a limited value of truth. Setting off one part of a sentence from another, or drawing artistic attention to a word or phrase, the quoted metatexts can dispute, play, or inspire the readers, but Wittgenstein scholarship is even thick with (self)complaints. This means that Wittgenstein's metalanguage has been textually misread and contextually misunderstood.

This paradox raises many problems as to the translatability of Wittgenstein's philosophical metatexts, which must have its own structure of reality in Wittgenstein's forms of metareality, but can hardly be correctly translated. The translation of Wittgenstein's philosophical discourse must be regarded like a critical discussion with oneself (the reader or outside receiver), dealing with the linguistic interaction between source language and target language. While critical skills of philosophical style in language are crucial elements of this investigation (or auto-investigation), the translation of philosophy is far from a straightforward transaction. The translator must work to generate a logically self-evident version of translation closely following the original piece. Translational training and practice are certainly not marginal aspects of philosophical translation, but absolutely central to the primary job of the translation to approximate the conceptual clarification of the syntactic construction and semantical arguments involved by Wittgenstein.

The translation creates a tension between the clarity of the philosophical concepts in the original text and the *abstract* interpretation of differ-

ent experts of Wittgenstein's language philosophy. The translation is a *concrete* interpretation of the single translator, which is believed as a true document. Nevertheless, the philosopher is not merely a logical individual with a systematic critical discussion. The metalanguage has developed from basic beliefs into the historical presuppositions and linguistic implications of the philosophical text and turned into something else. On the other hand, the philosopher relies on the intuitive judgments of his (her) own rhetorical style, which the translator's must be uncritical to believe in his work. The translator must transact with two different directions in philosophy: *firstly*, the logical analysis which is rational and proved by hypothesis and experiment; *secondly*, the speculative analysis of the personal ideas and preferences. The translator has the same directions of mind and heart, but must try to act as the "unconscious" agent relating directly to the lexis and lyric of the philosopher—with no expression of his own emotions and cultural nuances. The "double message" of the translator is acknowledged and used by contemporary philosophers and "philosophers" in the sense of psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, deconstruction, post-structuralists, semioticians, and other interpreters.

In Wittgenstein's era, Walter Benjamin wrote on the translator's method of "*Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers*" (written in 1923, only published in 1955; translated as "The Task of the Translator" [1968]). The cultural historian Benjamin strove to balance the "mechanical "reproducibility" (Benjamin 1968a) of writing, called by him the "afterlife" for future generations. The "afterlife" reversed the method of literary and philosophical translation after life into the instrument of reasoning. Translation is no longer based on the sacred ritual of artistic production, but focuses on the social capitalism of political economics transformed into world culture to depict the critical horrors of modern warfare (Gorlée 1994, pp. 133-145).

5. Glossary

The translation of Wittgenstein's philosophical texts is the technical mastery of grasping the non-empirical and clear similarity of Wittgenstein's original source text into the forensic precision to reach the target translation. The translator battles heroically onward to wrest the "good" translation from the critical posture to the co-authorship with the many-branched quality of Wittgenstein's mind. The translator moves philosophical language from common language to the attention of present readers to focus on Wittgenstein's metalanguage concentrating around the philosophical key-concepts or stylistic key-terms (not words). Wittgenstein adopted substantive philosophical theses as his metaphilosophical problems to be solved in ideal-language (Rorty ([1967]1992)). In the linguistic wordplay in ordinary language, Wittgenstein did not advance methodological theories or strategies, but he composed the practice of an ordinary experiment of style, which he used extraordinarily in scientific use.

Wittgenstein's literary style does not mean that the translator's main tool is using the "ordinary" bilingual dictionary, such as the *Cassell's German & English Dictionary* [1957] 1964), published in Wittgenstein's later time and revised and re-edited to include the changing times of post-war technological and scientific literature. The lexicographical literature concentrates around key-concepts is grouped into ordinary words, expanded into alphabetical clues or catchwords. The criteria for establishing a set of target catchwords are speculative equivalences of words with definitions and explanations. The words are not arranged at the time and place of the speaker's discourse, but separately arranged in the artificial order of the alphabetic dictionary. The criteria for establishing the set of target expressions are merely speculative equivalences. The reality of the translator has turned from the double edition of two metalanguages to handling the alphabetical work-tool, which gives no great help to the technical or scientific expressions and key-concepts of philosophical texts.

A technical dictionary of scientific language could use the general *interlingua* of abstract symbols of philosophy. The German-English and

English-German *Dictionary of Philosophical Terms*, written by Elmar Waib and Philip Herdina (2011), transformed plain language into the metalanguage of philosophical linguistics, the expert system of scientific language, to ensure the logical structure between the synonymy of words and sentences. In the “ordinary” bilingual dictionary, the semantic features at every entry of each word give some part of the meaning, while the whole meaning has to be guessed at in equivalent renderings of the philosophical key-concepts. The meaning of the lexicon has been functionally and thematically ordered for general use, so that the real discourse of the specific author (in this case, philosopher Wittgenstein) remains the unknown mystery (Rey 1986: 1, pp. 200-201, Eco 1986: 1, pp. 202-203 expanded in Rey 1977, Eco 1984).

Wittgenstein’s “ordinary” language is not ordinary for daily speech, but framed in a specific style: not only ordered in the sequence of syntactic words in sentences, but arranged in single paraphrases consisting of words, sentences, and fragments (Gorlée 2007), which from their deconstruction construct the Wittgensteinian term of “language-games”. The meaningful character of upward and downward rules and linguistic and cultural habits are at work in language-games as Wittgenstein’s coded idea of “grammar”. The problem of meaning was treated in the beginning of *Philosophical Investigations*, when Wittgenstein wrote that “For a *large* class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning — though not for *all* — this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language”, stressing that “the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing on its bearer [speaker]” (PI 2009, pp. 43) . Followed by mathematical symbolism, this meaning of usage gives the truth of Wittgenstein’s formal logic.

Beyond the syntactic “grammar”, Wittgenstein’s concentrated around the semantic description of the key-concepts transliterated from original clues in his semiotic and grammatical keywords — “sign”, “symbol”, “object”, “language-game”, “use”, “grammar”, “fact of life”, “family resemblance”, and so forth (Glock 1996). Wittgenstein justified real

words grouped in meaningful sentences, including his own key-words argued in this article, such as the “beetle in the box”, the “pain”, the “landscape”, the “image” or “picture”, as well as the religious and musical terms he used in his works and writings. Instead, Wittgenstein had a disrespect for short words or simple sentences of signals, exemplified in interjections or exclamations, grouped as pseudo-sentences with a variety of meanings (see Gorlée 2015).

Imagine the word “*Vorstellung*” started as variation of “*Darstellung*” (representation, presentation) meaning the “conception” of the idea or plan, but in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1953, 2009), “*Vorstellung*” is broadened into the “imagination” of the idea of the mind. The word “*Vorstellung*” moves from the linguistic representation of language-game into the cultural images of emotional imagination, even fantasy (Ruthrof 2011, Perloff 1996, pp. 265 fn. 15). In Wittgenstein’s words: “*Die Vorstellung ist kein Bild, aber ein Bild kann ihr entsprechen*” (MS 130, pp. 26-27). In many cases, the translator must choose from a number of obvious equivalences with legitimate rules and unruly images, but to ensure analytic consistency, the overall tactics must be ruled by the ideal of equivalence. This is for the translator a paradox.

For the translation of philosophical texts, the formal logic between source and target texts requires for the translator the technoscientific strategy of synonymy. The symmetrical identity of the translation of Wittgenstein’s metalanguage does not involve the mirror image of two identical sides of source and target systems of language, but deals with re-adapting, re-imagining, refashioning, reconstructing, or rebuilding the equivalence. There are a huge variety of possible symmetries, in which the principle of synonymy can become a logic of variance within invariance (Weinberg 2011). Translation refers to the lexical, phonic (acoustic), and componential (grammatical) practice of words arranged into sentences drawing from unfamiliar source to the familiar target formulas. This implies that both languages have normally the generic and specific applications of the same, but that the syntactic and semantic meaning of

the source language cannot be the same as the different contrastive word or expression of the source language in the target language.

If we analyse language from the information it carries, the translation of philosophical texts cannot restrict the notion of information to the cognitive aspect of using narrative language, which is the duty of the philosopher. The conception of symmetry expands for the translator into the “broken” synonymy in local and temporal solutions dividing the source-target equations, which do not respect the equations themselves, but are merely invariants (Weinfeld 2011, p. 71). Target synonymy can be accomplished and attained in many equivalents, but the equivalents can also rotate or move the “solutions” of the target language in many directions, possibly for political, historical, or cultural reasons. For example, the translator can use target neologisms, dialectal terms, foreign words, different spelling, and other “renormalizable” covariants of speech drawing from other locations and time. As Wittgenstein stated, the accidental invariants can be valid or convincing, but can also be non-valid for all contexts. There will be no single answer to solve the mirror image of synonymy, which can be preserved or changed with different periods or works of the author.

Wittgenstein stressed that if the translation is part of “the world’s future, we always mean that the place it will go to if it keeps going as we see it going now and it doesn’t occur to us that it is not going in a straight line but in a curve & that its direction is constantly changing” (CV 1998, p. 5e). But just as long as we make adjustments as required, the translators secure synonymy as the ideal of the system to deal correctly with Wittgenstein’s “scaffolding” (*Gerüst*) of exchanging source text to target text. In the translation, there can be no doubt to attempt to rule the lexical significance (if not more) of the target text in the rule of synonymy with the source text. In Wittgenstein’s metaphor, translation is “a wheel that he is to catch hold of, the right machine which, once chosen, will carry him on automatically. It could be that something of the sort happens in our brain but that is not our concern” (Z, § 304).

The translator must divide and subdivide between Wittgenstein's use of different equivalents of doing (*Tun, Handeln*) to handle the nouns “*Akt*”, “*Tat*”, “*Tätigkeit*”, “*Handlung*”, “*Verhalten*”, and related words from invariant quasi-propositions to variable propositions (see Gorlée 2012, pp. 179-180). Consulting the bilingual dictionary, the translator's analysis of the source text must be able to dissect “act” from “actions”, “deed” from “activity”, and so forth, including the critical-technical comment, examination, and judgment of the philosophical clues to compose the target translation. As exemplified by the English translations of Wittgenstein (1993) composed by James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, “act” (*Akt*) would be the simple exercise of a single effort, as opposed to rest and tranquillity. While the very “act” happens in one step to mean the thing done in the act of speaking, walking, or writing, “deed” (*Tat*) is an intellectual and responsible idea of moving human process-thought (*Denkhandlung*). “Activity” (*Tätigkeit*) denotes the pursuit of doing the “act” (*Tun*) to conduct seriously the business of work, commerce, or profession (*Handeln*). “Activity” means the process of the series of “acts” in the step by step technique of different “actions” (*Handlungen*). The deliberate efforts of “actions” occupies some time and involves more than one step of energy and intensity using mind or body.

The translation of German “behavior” (*Verhalten*) in philosophical metalanguage causes confusion with the “act”. “Behavior” is more than a single act (*Akt*), but deals with many “actions” (*Handlungen*). It stands for the *intensivum* of “ways of acting” (*Handlungsweise*) or “ways of behavior” (*Verhaltensweise*). The procedure of comporting oneself in ethical (and unethical) conduct is the activity (*Tätigkeit*) of human psychology, visible in the behavioral habits of thoughts, feelings, and intentions (*Gebräuche* or *Gepflogenheiten*) (Gorlée 2016a). The theory and practice of behaviorism developed between 1913 and 1920. The language and thought of behaviorism has formed Wittgenstein's belief to form the translator's knowledge (Glock 1996, pp. 55-58), conditioning and deconstructing the technical keywords of philosophy in “sign” (*Zeichen*), “symbol” (*Symbol*),

“object” (*Gegenstand*), “language-game” (*Sprachspiel*), “use” (*Gebrauch*), “grammar” (*Grammar*), “fact of life” (*Lebensform*), “family resemblance” (*Familienähnlichkeit*), as discussed before (Glock 1996). The storied bulk of knowledge and experience frames the same or similar parts at work in each word, so that the translator can get accustomed to find the plausible reason in the forms of a wider context or even discovering a more detailed target circumstance to clarify the key-word and key-concepts (see Gorlée 2012, pp. 171-218).

Unfortunately, there exists no specialized glossary available as accessory required to translate Wittgenstein’s philosophical linguistics. The more extensive accessory than the general “Glossary of logical forms” of the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Brody 1989) is not personalized to take care of the linguistic terms of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. As help there is available for the philosopher Edmund Husserl the instructive *Guide for Translating Husserl* (Cairns 1973) to adequately translate from German into English philosophical texts. The translation(s) of Wittgenstein’s writing will remain individual work of equivalences performed by individual translator(s), but the totality of annotations form the collective groundwork in all target translations for reasoning Wittgenstein’s arguments for homogenous use for all translators. In the absence of a Wittgenstein compendium, a comparison of proposed translations fills this urgent need for helping the translators of philosophical work.¹

Cairns compiled in his *Guide* (1973) his ample knowledge and experience of 30 years of interpreting Husserl’s work, while translating his

¹ Glock’s terminology in *A Wittgenstein Dictionary* (1996) is a technical glossary with explanations in English, published in the series *The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries*. The same procedure, also without translations, is followed in the Blackwell series regarding Descartes, Hegel, Heidegger, Hobbes, Kant, Locke, and Rousseau. For other philosophers, see Runes’ glossary in *Spinoza Dictionary* (1951), equally without translations. However, Sass compiled a “Heidegger glossary” (1982) and Inwood wrote *A Hegel Dictionary* (1992) including within the explanations of the list of translations of words and terms into English (Hegel) and multilingual glossaries of terms into English, French, Italian, Spanish, Chinese, and Japanese (Heidegger).

German work into English (and at times, French). In the Preface, he explicitly mentioned the main difficulties of the translation he encountered for philosophical discourse, since

the guidance offered by ordinary bilingual dictionaries is inadequate in opposite respects. On the one hand, there are easily translatable expressions for which numerous such dictionaries offer too many equivalent renderings. On the other hand, there are difficultly translatable expressions that any such dictionary either fails to translate at all or else translates by expressions none of which fit the sense. In following such dictionaries a translator must therefore practise consistency on the one hand and ingenuity of the other. (Cairns 1973, p. v)

All terms used by Husserl are listed in alphabetical order and followed by Cairns' translation, as well as other possible translations in English (sometimes with indications why these were rejected). Cairns gave cautionary advice about the requirement of absolute synonymy, explicitly stating that

So far as possible someone who translates such writings as Husserl's into another language should always render the same German expression in the other language. In many cases he must choose among a number of obvious legitimate renderings and, to insure consistency, record his choice. Accordingly this glossary includes German expressions concerning which the only important problem has been that of ascertaining and sticking to the best uniform rendering. For this reason not all renderings rejected in this glossary are, in my opinion, wrong. (Cairns 1973, p. v)

Cairns' perfectly reasonable watchfulness suggests the prudence of generating synonymous words and sentences to translate philosophical

vocabulary. His guidelines will, in the commonly shared expressions, control the mechanism of philosophical reasoning applied to the translations of Husserl and other philosophers' works.

The philosophical norm (or ideal) of synonymy (Alston 1964, pp. 32-49) between source term and target term is the main point of strategy which must be strictly followed, but is often violated. The near synonyms or non-synonyms include many translations of Wittgenstein's work, in which the translator's critical discourse can be liberated from the construction of synonymy and deconstructed into a sense of paraphrase or a deconstructive set of homonyms with shadowed meaning. As argued before, the dimensions of translations to French, Portuguese, or other languages translation can transform into thematic self-criticism of the translator himself (herself) to expect the readers to follow the French or Portuguese target mind of the translator. Thereby, the translator largely obscures the authority of Wittgenstein's source meaning and makes his (her) own conceptual analysis show the reconsidered structure without any reaction.

In contrast with other literary genres with a primarily aesthetic content (say, a lyrical poem or a dramatic novel) in which emotive creativity plays a major role, the construction of synonymy is the job of the conceptual analysis of Wittgenstein's philosophical texts, which form the basic concepts of his thoughts about "good" or "bad" features of language including cultural developments. Philosophical thought is pursued systematically as comprehensive and speculative argument to formally reason some version of existence and truth. Reasoning the conceptual analysis of Wittgenstein's thoughts formulates the source problem of his analytic philosophy, which stands for Wittgenstein's model of logical sameness. When translated into the target language, the translation is without the similarity or equality of reference. The ideational referent of the words and sentences exists to reason the identity (and misidentity) of the translation.

In conclusion, to interpret the vocabulary and terminology of philosophical thought involves conceiving the expository matter as a jigsaw puzzle of translation, but “under a certain name or description and attributing something to the subject according to a fairly specific form of attribution” (Aune 1989, vol. 8, p. 100). The human jigsaw puzzle of translation demands from the translator the general and specific regularity, continuity, and hierarchy to honour the specifications and coherences of the philosopher Wittgenstein. The philosophical knowledge must give relevant and definite answers to construct referential and conceptual identity maintaining the contrast of coherent meaning similarity or dissimilarity with other terms of the same author. The starting point of formal synonymy is the only appropriate basis for the philosophical translator’s ethical belief and opinion. Other constructive forms of “semantic translation” as seen in many translations of Wittgenstein’s writings create quite a wide choice of equally and indistinguishably imperfect but adequate translations: they are considered “wrong” translations. To translate philosophical texts, the translator must wrestle with himself (herself) to run the risk of sinking or swimming.

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Can we translate the character of a text?

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Abstract: In this paper I will initially present an excerpt translated by Brian McGuinness (MS 122: 88r-88v) as a motive for a critical consideration of a Wittgensteinian concept applied to translation processes: the physiognomy of a text. This passage is a codified observation in which Wittgenstein briefly considers the character of all great art as a piece which always has primitive drives of mankind as its ground-bass – something that he thought it was missing in his own work in architecture. McGuinness, commenting from this textual portion on Wittgenstein’s writing style, proposes his own translation as a model that allows us to glimpse the character of Wittgenstein’s texts, which is, according to his view, of an ascetic practice presented as a negative form of ornament. By putting another translation model right beside McGuinness’ proposal, I will discuss strategies adopted for the Portuguese translation of the “Remarks on Frazer’s the Golden Bough” (Wittgenstein 2011), the new Portuguese translation of the “Philosophical Investigations” (to appear), and the project for a Portuguese translation of the “Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics” (work in progress) as works carried out according to that second alternative pattern. Both proposals, however, will be treated in this article as “physiognomies”, for the purpose of such a comparison is merely to ask about the adequacy of using that concept to establish prescriptive guidelines in translating Wittgenstein’s texts.

Key-words: Wittgenstein, translation theory, writing style, physiognomy.

1. Wittgensteinian translation theorists

Wilson’s statement that Wittgenstein is a peripheral figure in translation studies is probably right (cf. 2016, p. 5).

In fact, a quick and random search in some relevant books and handbooks on translation theory (Bellos 2011; Bermann & Porter 2014; Kuhiwczak & Littau 2007; Pym 2010; Venuti 2000) will not reveal any research inspired by Wittgenstein’s concepts or philosophical insights, the only exception being the volume in which Wilson is one of the

editors (Boase-Beier, Fawcett & Wilson 2014). Tymoczko's article in Berman & Porter (2014, pp. 165-178; cf. specially 168-169), for example, just uses the Wittgensteinian notion of "game" as a paradigm of her own "cluster concept". So, as far as we know, there are indeed only a few of Wittgensteinian translation theorists around, and their texts have not yet been sufficiently discussed and systematically compared in the field in order that the average reader could know them, their peculiarities and internal differences. They are just like a newly discovered small group of birds about whose behavior we just have a slight acquaintance. Despite that, however, some yet naïve comparisons could be traced. This could be done just in the same way we tend to think that if no two siblings are the same, not even identical twins, so it still seems interesting to make even a clumsy survey to look for possible differences.

Those that I have read so far (Gorlée 2012; Martins 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2016; Oliveira 2013, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; and Wilson 2016) do have some unlike features. But of course, taking into account that their source of inspiration is Wittgenstein, it seems natural that each one of them had stressed different details and interconnections on the vast, complex, and unfinished philosophical literature bequeathed by the author. As a matter of fact, it is always difficult to choose the best vantage point within a large forest like the *Nachlass*. The philosopher took many distinct paths to approach the varied situations described in his texts. So, in the absence of something that we could choose as the correct spot, variations are to be presumed. Poorly drawn landscape sketches (cf. PI's preface) also take their toll.

In this way, Gorlée underscores the expression "language-game of translation" (eighteen mentions in her book), elicited from PI, § 23, to be presented as a main operative instrument within a semiotized view of translation processes or "signatures" (cf. 2012, pp. 4, 160ff.). She wants, rather, to harmonize "...the semiotic methodology of Wittgenstein and Peirce" (p. 15). Equipped with this semiotized vision her purpose is to

investigate Wittgenstein's own fragmentary style as a sort of "interpretant" (cf. pp. 26, 43), not only for describing the practice of translation, but in particular for evaluating the various forms in which Wittgenstein's texts were rendered by some translators. So, her main point of contention is that pragmatics go well beyond linguistics in terms of benefits to understand translation processes. Mainly because it does not lose track of the sociological and pragmatic dimensions of language, of which Wittgenstein was so cautious to consider. It is for that reason that meaning is to be conceived as a "process of cultural ordering" (p. 174), or as language games containing verbal and non-verbal situations (p. 61), so implying extralinguistic components (p. 160). Thus, for her, "words become deeds" (p. 128), as in Goethe's *Faust*. In terms of the fragmentary style of Wittgenstein's writings viewed as an interpretant, Gorrée highlights its similarities with "a postmodern *pout-pourri*" (p. 62), in which the most different themes are gathered in the same musical piece. This so appropriate characteristic for the current hyper-texts, and at the same time so fundamental to understanding actual processes of translation, is an element that most of Wittgenstein's texts translations, according to her, completely neglect.

Martins' texts also discuss Wittgenstein's writing style, but her concern has instead a much more aesthetic accent than the almost purely theoretical reasons usually put forward by most authors. While for Gorrée, for example, the fragmentary character of Wittgenstein's texts pragmatically corresponds to fragmentary semiotic acts of interpretation and translation (cf. 2012, pp. 64-65), such an unusual writing feature is for Martins part of a number of distinct literary aspects which endow Wittgenstein's texts with a quality of "uncanniness" (cf. 2012b). It is true that what seems odd, weird, strange, in our habitual use of language and in some literary writings, is associated in Martins' papers with situations worked through by Stanley Cavell in his lifelong reflections on the ordinary language (cf. 1988). A philosophical reflection, actually. But her

own treatment of the uncanny is much less tributary to philosophical arguments than to literary references. To the extent that it is there that she takes the examples of the common fact that unsettling conditions remains largely unnoticed or disguised by language speakers, her more atheoretical perspective maintains. In that vein, it is up to the literature or the poetic use of language, in a certain way, to make clear the apparent ambiguities, paradoxes, dichotomies, riddles to which certain uses of expressions or words could lead us to. It is in this sense that Wittgenstein's writings are compared with those of Samuel Beckett's (cf. 2012b), or those of James Joyce's, or the Brazilian novelist Guimarães Rosa's (2011, pp. 112-113). This is because such literature "... permeates a language with a kind of foreign language: and that makes the original language tremble, seeking to conjure up its futures, to release what in it is different from itself, alien to itself." (2011, pp. 121). Martins explores extensively that aesthetic effect of strangeness in her translation criticisms. Some translations of Wittgenstein's texts are then evaluated for disregarding the alleged poetic aspects of his writings, their uncanny character, and for this reason to have lost the power of the aesthetic to bring words back from the metaphysical to their ordinary use.

Oliveira's articles, on the other hand, show a greater concern to elaborate an epistemology of translation in Wittgensteinian lines. However, Oliveira's main reasons for moving in that direction are actually therapeutic applications regarding textual meaning stability of equivalence, and, on the opposite side, relativism and inaccuracies with respect to deconstructionist theories. This is viewed by him as a "dichotomy between the traditional essentialist perspective and postmodern relativism" (2015a). Another field in which therapeutic preventions apply are on propensities coming from descriptive approaches tributary to some form of constructivism which could easily fall prey to an inversion of the principle of charity over the pragmatic instances of the act of translation. In this fashion, epistemological

clarifications should be preventive measures for taking the source text as it presents itself with all its natural difficulties, for actually viewing the process of translation as a human activity in which meaning, rationality and interpretation do not precede the act of translation, but come together with it. Prophylactic procedures of a correct epistemology could avoid the interposition of abstract questions in the place of the “actual praxis of translation”, so hindering that “thinking” prevails over “looking at” (cf. 2015b, pp. 224). To accomplish this task, says Oliveira:

I have been advocating the thesis that a Wittgensteinian understanding of language and translation can provide an alternative to the first opposition [realism vs. relativism] and a philosophical dimension to the third way [descriptive studies], filling gaps and establishing relations that the methodologies of the area prevent us from seeing. (2015b, p. 224)

For him, translation is construction of comparability (2013, pp. 292-293; 2015a, pp. 114-117) in which some equivalence is naturally presumed, but not assumed as a foundational stability, and in which a mutual comprehension between different cultures is no more than a possibility of viewing certain things as equivalents: “we see certain aspects as relevant on the basis of our familiarity with similar objects” (2013, p. 293). In this way, his form of epistemological approach is predominantly derived from Wittgenstein’s reflections on aspect vision. But a bunch of intertwined concepts proposed in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, like language games, forms of life, family resemblance, are, for Oliveira, tools for achieving the task of proposing a reinforced pragmatic and therapeutic theory of translation.

Lastly, Wilson’s book is pretty much a manual of translation practice developed exclusively with Wittgensteinian concepts. Rather than offering a “Wittgensteinian theory of translation”, his aim is just “to

show how a reading of Wittgenstein may be of benefit to the translation theorist and to the practicing translator” (2016, p. 7), even though he does not shy away from discussing a number of theories of translation (cf. pp. 75-100). In such a way, he has a vision on how the work has to be done, a theory of his own without adhering to any paradigm (p. 100), or “a practical philosophizing of translation” (p. 107). He does not think that Wittgenstein addressed “all the philosophical issues that face a translator” nor that his answers could be read off “as if from an almanac” (p. 106). Wittgenstein is not assumed to be right *tout court*, but the point is just that Wilson gives “extended examples from the *Investigations*” and works “through them to show why [he holds] Wittgenstein to be right in his vision of language” (p. 106). The main bulk of his work is thus dedicated on how to read a source text, and, shortly thereafter, on writing and theorizing about a target text. Several examples from the literature and the New Testament are mobilized through the chapters to demonstrate in a practical way how Wittgensteinian concepts such as language-game, forms of life or family resemblances could be applied in each case and in each step of the process of translation. I believe it must be for those reasons that Wilson has put as the main point of his book the physiognomic treatment that Wittgenstein gave to language (cf. pp. 17-23). Wilson’s contention is that the translator must deal with language as it is found in a source text, not as an ideal language (p. 6) in which translation would become just a question of substitution or a pure and simple calculus (p. 42). In his book, seeing a physiognomy means accounting for the phenomenon as a “surveyable representation” (p. 21). This procedure would avoid oscillations and confusion between form and content or between style and substance (p. 17), and would be cautious enough to pick up the source text within an anthropological approach, or, as he says, “appreciating a form of life as a necessary condition for meaning to function as a physiognomy” (p. 33). This matter seems so important for

him that “successful translation” depends on “a feel” for the physiognomy of the source text (cf. p. 22).

So, what could we awkwardly say about differences among these four proposals in translation theory inspired by Wittgensteinian concepts? For me, what stands out in the first place is the large amount of agreement on descriptions of translation processes. Critical notes on essentialist, relativist, empiricist, and formalist perspectives on translation theory seems also to be a common ground. But, after that, what draws me most attention is the fact that all that congruity is made up on different platforms, because, as expected by Wittgenstein’s writing style, their visions of the author are not really the same (cf. Stern 2005)

In the face of such presumed inescapable differences, in what follows I will pick up only the concept of “physiognomy” for the argument I want to hold in this article. That word operates for me as a network in which it should be possible to set and extend multiple comparison threads with regard to meanings, expletive signs, linguistic formalisms, spacings, distribution and arrangement of paragraphs, conception of writing style, biographical, sociological, historical, literary and cultural information, and the varied and complex interlacing of all those elements to conform a determined expression and a certain spirit, something which is accountable on to how some text “appear” to us. An eyesight that is not easily achievable by anyone because it is not a question of interpretation but as how we see the matter (LWL, p. 51). Despite that, I do not have any theory of translation, more than a mere vision on how I did the work I was faced with. So, my insights are closer to Martins’ and Wilson’s than to Gorrée’s and Oliveira’s, although I also agree in general with all the theoretical and philosophical arguments they all maintain. But at the end maybe I also have some differences as regards reading and interpreting Wittgenstein. This is what I’ll try to make clear now.

2. Who can provide the right key?

In the year 1930, in the first of many attempts to come at composing a preface to the new book he always intended to publish in his lifetime, Wittgenstein concluded that he could only be understood by those readers who shared the same spirit in which the text was written. But the book itself would automatically separate those who would understand it from those who would not (MS 109, pp. 206, 208-209; see also CV2, pp. 8-10). In other words, the book would work as a key to its worldview. So far so good, but how could someone particularly understand (or misunderstand) what the spirit of a book is, and, therefore, to have or not to have the key to open it?

Let's take a very specific example and try to get into the problem: Brian McGuinness (2002) published an article about Wittgenstein's writing style, in which he presented a translation of an excerpt from the MS 122, 88r-88v as a practical way to endorse his argument.¹ In that passage Wittgenstein considers some features which would grant the character that any great work of art should have. This is McGuinness proposed translation:

In all great art there is a wild beast – tamed. In Mendelssohn, for example, there is none. All great art has as its ground-bass the primitive drives of mankind. These are not the melody (as they are, perhaps, with Wagner) but they are what gives the melody its depth and power.

This is the sense in which Mendelssohn can be called a 'reproductive' artist.


In this sense too the house I built for Gretl is the product of an extremely sensitive ear, of good manners: it is the expression of a great understanding of a culture etc. But life, primitive, wild life with its tumultuous desires, is missing. One could also say, health is missing (Kierkegaard). (A hothouse plant.)

¹ This case is referred by Martins (cf. 2011).

To explain some options for his version, McGuinness gives the following reasons that I'm going to sever from his text for didactic purposes:

- (a) In this quotation I have omitted all the signs of emphasis.;
- (b) Wittgenstein's so frequent use of them distorts his text. (...)
- (c) ...the attempt to reproduce this form of emphasis in translation invites distortion;
- (d) Anyone who has tried to translate Wittgenstein will admit as much. (McGuinness 2002, p. 22)

It is quite useful to show the original manuscript from which McGuinness translation was ultimately extracted:



MS 122, 88r-88v

This textual portion was composed in January 10, 1940. It was written, as we can see, in the famous Wittgenstein code. The code, roughly, consists in the reversal of the alphabet in the following correlations: read “a as z”, “b as y”, etc. It would be a good idea to start by asking why that passage was codified by Wittgenstein in the context

of the MS 122, a volume largely devoted to mathematics and philosophical logic. But McGuinness passed over that question, what already shows that some hard work had yet to be made in the source text before rendering it in the target language. In fact, McGuinness' footnote 6 on p. 22 (2002) hints that he could have worked out his translation using a ready-made source already published in the 1984's CV1 edition. Peter Winch's translation was there just beside the German face. If that was really so, this also suggests that the resolution to correct what he called distortions of the text could have been addressed to the kind of translation presented by Winch. In this case, McGuinness' attitude would be more an expression of discontent than a simple alternative view of the text.

As "signs of emphasis" do not count as stylistic features for McGuinness, and, conversely, do count for Winch, it could also be quite useful to show both results side by side. But this time with a radicalized Winch's version, closer to the MS 122 itself:

<p>In all great art there is a wild beast – tamed. In Mendelssohn, for example, there is none. All great art has as its ground-bass the primitive drives of mankind. These are not the melody (as they are, perhaps, with Wagner) but they are what gives the melody its depth and power.</p> <p>This is the sense in which Mendelssohn can be called a 'reproductive' artist.</p> <p>In this sense too the house I built for Gretl is the product of an extremely sensitive ear, of good manners: it is the expression of a great</p>	<p>In all great art there is a WILD beast: TAMED.</p> <p>In Mendelssohn, <i>for example</i>, there is none. All great art has as its ground-bass the primitive drives of mankind. These are not the <i>melody</i> (as they are, perhaps, with Wagner), but they are what gives the melody its <i>depth and power</i>.</p> <p><i>This</i> is the sense in which Mendelssohn can be called a '<i>reproductive</i>' artist. –</p> <p>In this sense too: the house I built for Gretl is the product of an extremely sensitive ear, of <i>good</i> manners, it is the</p>
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<p>understanding of a culture etc. But life, primitive, wild life with its tumultuous desires, is missing. One could also say, health is missing (Kierkegaard). (A hothouse plant.)</p>	<p>expression of a great <i>understanding</i> (for a culture, etc.). But life, <i>primitive, wild</i> life with its tumultuous desires – is missing. One could also say: <i>health</i> is missing (Kierkegaard). (A hothouse plant.)</p>
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For didactic purposes again, I will call the kind of translation on the left column as “B-McGuinness”, and the kind of translation on the right column as “McGuinness-B”, personalizing which are but mere procedures. In this way, we have got two “physiognomies”, or two ways to get a text by its character, according to question of this article.

How is that so? How could we say that we have got two physiognomies? Let’s take B-McGuinness, for example. For B-McGuinness, Wittgenstein’s writing style shows the real man to whom those expressions are to be associated. Or rather, this amounts to saying, into a much more elaborated version, that Wittgenstein’s writing is pretty much like his own body. That would exactly be the sense of the De Buffon’s aphorism mentioned by Wittgenstein in the MS 137 (pp. 140a-140b; CV2, p. 89), and faithfully reproduced by McGuinness in the previous paragraph of his translation: “Le style c’est l’homme même” (the style is the man himself). For this reason, B-McGuinness could be a supporter of the “signature thesis”, which says that “every handling by the man (of an impulse or of a circumstance) is a signature, or a sketch that needs no signature for its attribution” (Cavell 2004, p. 32). In another version of the same idea, Wittgenstein has a “work of exile” (Klagge 2011; 2016). After all, for the text to produce the communicative results expected by B-McGuinness, it is necessary that the reader should recognize the author who gives the text its life. Without the man *himself*, how could we expect to understand Wittgenstein’s texts? So, I would say that B-McGuinness’ conception of style is *personalist*: the “subject’s

subjectivity”, or “the image of the body as a picture of the human soul” (Cavell 2004, p. 32) would then be the key to open the book’s door.

But for McGuinness-B, on the other side, the conditions are entirely the opposite, since the so-called “distortions” are to be considered effective, by themselves alone, in breaking expected rules, certain cooperative principles, and producing the necessary communicative results through previous transactions between narrator and reader (cf. Brown & Yule 1983, pp. 4-19; Black 2006, p. 27). The intention of the text could only be recognized if its marks had effects of displacement of expected senses of reading. McGuinness-B finds support in some Wittgenstein’s references like “A kind of writing in which the crossed-out word, the crossed-out sentence, is a sign” (LWPP I, § 54); or “I ought always to hope only for the most indirect of influences” (MS 134, p. 148; CV2, p. 71); or yet “My sentences are all to be read slowly” (MS 134, p. 77; CV2, p. 65). In this case, I would say that McGuinness-B has a *pragmatic* conception of style, as no “man” is actually necessary, but certain empirical features of distortions in the text for the communicative action to begin to gradually unlock the book’s door.

In this way, we can see that, between B-McGuinness and McGuinness-B, what is decisively different is a definite conception of language, or a set of characteristics which would count as language in such cases, one might say. This is not simply a question of how one can edit a text by Wittgenstein. Before deciding edition, or while editing some Wittgenstein’s text, one should have parameters. So, if the meaning of the words is exactly the same in both versions of the MS 122, 88r-88v, then it is easier to see that the question of translation is not merely restricted to the semantic field, but also reaches characteristics that are in the particular history of the author of the text, for B-McGuinness, or in the distortions of writing, for McGuinness-B. It is in this sense that I would say that, in our case, two different grammars resulted in two physiognomies.

The issue, however, is to know which of the two kinds of translation or physiognomies should give to the reader the correct key: how could we decide? The understanding reader is the one who has the key to unlock the room, but who is she? According to the text mentioned above, she has the opposite spirit of the typical Western scientist. Certainly this is someone who is not sympathetic to the idea of technological progress and primacy of rationality over religious or ethical feelings. But how would Wittgenstein's book automatically separate those two types of readers, the understanding from the non-understanding? Probably we would say: "through its writing style".

And again, B-McGuinness is pretty sure that he has provided the effective means of distinguishing both kinds of reader, redeeming the correct soul as if he was separating the wheat from the chaff. But why not McGuinness-B should not be so confident? After all, exclusively from a pragmatic conception, that writing style is in complete disagreement with any rules adopted by the "typical Western scientist". As it seems, no partisan of the faith in technological and scientific progress could stand such "distortions of good writing". So, as far as I can see, we do not yet have a clear parameter to choose between the two kinds of translation.

As a last resort, we could check how Wittgenstein himself practiced translation in his own and other texts, trying to find some definitive clue. This seems to be not only a reasonable and sensible procedure, but also a realistic one, apparently devoid of any preconceived ideas. We could get, for example, several interesting recommendations Wittgenstein gave to Ogden, one of the first translators of the TLP along with Ramsey and Russell, to leave indentations, unexpected punctuations, italics, and layouts as they were originally designed (cf. LO, p. 47; facsimiles on pp. 54-55; pp. 57, 62). Apparently, those suggestions favor McGuinness-B. But B-McGuinness could still retort that the TLP had no such strange writing distortions as we find in the later manuscripts, and that TLP 6.54,

which is a very clear advice that the reader should understand the author, seems to offer an irrefutable evidence for the personalist hypothesis.

Regarding other examples taken from the later manuscripts and typescripts to overcome that situation, we fare no better. These are:

- (a) the MS 115, pp. 118-292, which is an attempt to rework into German the English version of the Brown Book (D 310); – it is a translation just up to p. 205 (Part I of the Brown Book), but from that point up to p. 292 it is all fresh material;
- (b) the TS 226, which is a translation into English of the beginning of the prewar version of PI (TS 220, pp. 1-77);
- (c) and the translation from Latin into German from a passage of Augustine’s *Confessions* in the TS 227, pp. 5.

Through these exercises we could at most learn about some better words and phrases that would be just more proficient choices when translating Wittgenstein. At the same time, nonetheless, we would be very far in them from those “distortions of writing” that we generally find in the later manuscripts. The situation here is almost similar to what we have already observed in LO, nothing more than simple meaning corrections. In fact, there are some details that could even be detrimental to McGuinness-B, because not every emphasis found in the original typescript are strictly reproduced in the English version supervised by Wittgenstein. Even the slightest comparison between TS 226, p. 2 and TS 220, pp. i-ii, can easily show that. Just take, for example, “every word has a meaning” (in TS 226, p. 2), and notice that the italics in “*Bedeutung*” is missing (cf. TS 220, p. i); or before “I send someone shopping” (in TS 226, p. 2), a dash is also missing (cf. TS 220, pp. ii).

So, for the lack of a decisive factor to decide between B-McGuinness and McGuinness-B types of translation, I have to restrict myself to show how I have been developing translations of Wittgenstein’s texts within a

McGuinness-B paradigm without being able take such a physiognomy as a criterion by which an unbiased judgement between the parties could be advanced. Let us look at these descriptions then, and I will evaluate how, under such conditions, such a view could benefit translations from Wittgenstein's texts or theories of translation in general.

3. Three Translations of the Same Kind

The three translations I have been working so far are from the manuscripts and typescripts that match with which was published as GB2, PI (Part I), and RFM.

3.1. Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough

The first work developed within those parameters was “Observações Sobre ‘O Ramo Dourado’ de Frazer/Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘Golden Bough’” (GB1). This project begun in 2007 and had at least three different phases. The earliest stage consisted in preparing a critical edition according to the analysis proposed in Orzechowski & Pichler’s “A Critical Note on the Editions of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough” (1995). After that, the translation was discussed, still in 2007, in the Study Group on Knowledge and Philosophy of Language from the Center of Logic and Epistemology at the State University of Campinas, with Wittgensteinian scholars like Arley Moreno, Cristiane Gottschalk, and Paulo Oliveira. After that period, the third stage only happened between 2010 and 2011, on the occasion of its publication. At this time, the text was revised by Nuno Venturinha, under the coordination of Bruno Monteiro, in Portugal (respectively in Lisbon and Porto).

The main characteristics of the text are:

- (a) a German-Portuguese *en face* presentation;
- (b) any block of text shows its roots in the Nachlass through indications of its sources (MS 110, TS 211, and MS 143);
- (c) variants and notes on the margin of the originals were all included as integral parts of the text;
- (d) the text was provided with an introductory explanation of its origins, purposes, and philosophical relevance;
- (e) there are also 178 endnotes related to translation difficulties, connections between portions of other texts and other developments as well in the Nachlass, clarifications of the most hermetic references, and several correlations with the secondary literature.

3.2. *Philosophical Investigations*

The second work developed within the McGuinness-B paradigm was “Investigações Filosóficas/Philosophische Untersuchungen” (to appear by the State University of Campinas Publishing House in joint edition with Vozes Publishing House). Initially, this project consisted in preparing a first draft and researching for the multitude of details that I had yet to overcome. Beasts and devil live on details and technicalities, so people say, and it was really a hard work. Three books and one article were fundamental at this point: respectively, Pichler (2004), Paul (2007), and Venturinha (2010, 2013), because they all gave me not only a better sense of what could be Wittgenstein’s writing style and the character of an unfinished work. At that point these were the parameters I chose to look at the text. But, perhaps more importantly, those literature were persuasive in considering Wittgenstein’s entire 1929–1951 *corpus* as a “one composite work of art” (Paul, 2007, p. 23). Through this way of looking at the matter, a lot of minute and complex features of the text

got other forms of resolution, and that perspective made it easier to find better ways out of practical embarrassments. Equipped with those guidelines I could revisit virtually all the secondary literature discussions involved and could get my own resolutions to the singularities presented by PI, independently from all the information that I had been collecting so far. So, in 2015 I published a book about the physiognomy of PI (Almeida, 2015), and felt more confident to get to the final stage of the work.

The last phase was a preliminary research on translation theories that seemed appropriate to the kind of work a translator of a Wittgensteinian text normally had to face. So, I went through researching translation of philosophy, rather than philosophy of translation, and learned a lot of good things in Venuti (1998), especially its chapter 6 on Elizabeth Anscombe as a translator (pp. 106-123), Pym (2007 and 2010), and Bellos (2011) as well. After that, in 2016 PI Portuguese translation was submitted to the State University of Campinas Publishing House, and promptly accepted. Ultimately, Vozes Publishing House agreed to make a joint edition of the text.

The main characteristics of the text are:

- (a) a German-Portuguese *en face* presentation;
- (b) PI is presented only as the previous “Part I”, just like Schulte’s German edition from 2003;
- (c) variants and notes on the margin in the originals (Randbemerkungen) were all commented on endnotes;
- (d) slips of paper introduced in the typescript were printed as separated boxes, just like in the Hacker & Schulte edition from 2009;
- (e) the text was provided with an introductory explanation of its origins, purposes, development, and philosophical relevance;
- (f) there are 172 endnotes related to translation difficulties, connections between portions of previous texts and other sprawlings into the Nachlass, clarifications of the most hermetic

references, clarification of cultural references (allusions and quotations), several correlations with the secondary literature as well;

- (g) indexes in German and Portuguese;
- (h) an exhaustive table of comparison among sections from BM I (TS 228), BM II (TS 230) and PI (TS 227).

3.3. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics

Two hypotheses were crucial to form the vision I have from RFM and plan its process of translation. The first is that PI's remaking into an album was set when Wittgenstein gave up translating the Brown Book. Pichler remarked that we begin to have voices bursting into Wittgenstein's writings exactly when he engaged into considerations about the grammar of reading (cf. 2004, pp. 143ff.). Actually, those erratic pages from the MS 115 (pp.195-298) happened to become part of the PI's first version (MS 142). The second is that the later discussions on mathematics should also be included as part of PI (cf. Venturinha 2010: 143-156). This is mainly because TS 220, the MS 142's immediate surrogate, was sent to publication in 1938 together with TS 221, a collection of remarks on that matter composed in 1937 in the MSS 117, 118, and 119.

Considering such assumptions, I begun to prepare a first draft on TSS 221, 222, 223, and 224 (RFM Part I and Appendices I, II, and III) in 2016, and submitted a research project to the São Paulo Research Foundation (Fapesp) for the preparation of a bilingual translation of RFM, and had the grant approved. As a natural sequel to PI, we will have with RFM a complete first series of McGuinness-B's translations around that book finished by 2019. As main sources of information about the nature of Wittgenstein's philosophical discussion on mathematics, I have been following some secondary literature in the area like Maury (2013), Floyd (1995, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2010), Mühlhölzer

(2006, 2010), and Maddy (2014), with which I hope to have a fruitful dialogue.

The principal characteristics of the text will be:

- (a) a German-Portuguese *en face* presentation;
- (b) the text was provided with an introductory explanation of its origins, purposes, development, and philosophical relevance;
- (c) variants and notes on the margin in the originals were all commented on endnotes;
- (d) Up to now the text has 87 endnotes to translation difficulties, connections between portions of previous texts and other sprawlings into the Nachlass, clarifications of the most hermetic references, clarification of cultural references (allusions and quotations), several correlations with the secondary literature as well.

4. Physiognomy of the text

There is indeed good literature coming from the conception of style supported by McGuinness-B, the model that I have been following. Stern (2005, 2017) and Pichler (2004, pp. 199-263) are among the most remarkable so far. But even though I know my proposals are in agreement with those perspectives, I have been working from a physiognomic standpoint about which those works make no mention.

What then could possibly be a physiognomic standpoint in the McGuinness-B model? There are plenty of references on physiognomy throughout Wittgenstein's literary legacy, from 1916 up to 1948. Since the first interrelations established among character, ethics, will, spirit, work of art, artistic way of looking at things, art as complete expression, object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*, that we can read in NB (pp. 83-88), until the final remarks written in the MS 137 (pp. 4b, 31b, 53a). This means a great variety of connections and approaches, including associations in later discussions with aspect perception, language-games and family

resemblances. The most notable are the connection among physiognomy, morphology, synoptic view, and philosophical method that can be viewed in the MS 110 (pp. 256-258) as well as in TS 211 (pp. 281-282, 321-322; cf. GB2, pp. 130-133). A particular correlation between physiognomy and family resemblances when Wittgenstein said that by enumerating a number of synonymous expressions on ethics he wanted to produce a particular impression can be viewed as early as 1929:

... the same sort of effect which Galton produced when he took a number of photos of different faces on the same photographic plate in order to get the picture of the typical features they all had in common (LE, p. 38).

What is remarkable, in my view, about these last elaborations, it is that they could be considered as suggestions about Wittgenstein's disposition to turn out his own work into a sort of physiognomy.

But even if we accept such an argument we cannot solve with it the issue of the choice between B-McGuinness and McGuinness-B visions of Wittgenstein's writing style. And this is solely by virtue of the fact that viewing writing style as a "physiognomy" could be either interpreted as the picture of the man himself (the personalist conception), or as empirical features on the textual corpus which trigger reader's transactions to understand the text (the pragmatic conception). Here we have a clear case of underdetermination of the assumption by the evidence. As for any observationally based hypothesis there will always be at least one rival hypothesis that is also supported by the evidence given, and hence that hypothesis can also be logically maintained in the face of any new evidence.

However, even though "any course of action can be brought either into accord or in conflict with a rule" (PI, § 201), I still would like to pick one of the latest Wittgenstein's ruminations on the subject. This passage

seems relevant, in my view, to clarify what is the responsibility of the translator, since he cannot put together a set of prescriptions for a successful work in translation:

‘The concept is not only a technique, but also a physiognomy’.
 ‘Physiognomy’ here means: ‘something appealing’? Something that can be very well-known? The *center* of a number of associations? – (MS 137, p. 4b)

According to this text, attribution of physiognomic characteristics to a psychological concept is not an uncompromised utterance. So, when the first voice utters his conception, the second voice immediately replies by offering three different options, bringing the attention to the kind of interest a definition would be tied to. For the sake of the argument, I will shift the issue from the plane of psychological concepts to that of concepts of style. So, those three options would then be the *expressive*, the *personalist*, and the *pragmatic physiognomist*. For the first, writing style convey aesthetic values attached to its form of expression; for the second, writing style is an image of her author’s moral values; and for the third, characteristic traits of writing style communicate by themselves aesthetic and moral values. Nevertheless, successful translation, in any one of those versions, provides no key in the text to open its door. That key is in the reader hands, naturally, and our own standards will not tell us how. For no interpretation at all could prescribe conditions that are to be left solely to the reader. The version we have adopted so far will at best be the witness of our own interests.

Let us try to clarify this last point a little bit more in terms of the insights we use when doing translations of Wittgenstein’s texts. For this, I would like to borrow another two images, mobilized this time by Pichler to describe two distinct kinds of narrator in Wittgenstein’s writings of 1936 (cf. 2004, pp. 145-148). In this book, Pichler accounts for a dramatic change which completely transformed the character of

Wittgenstein's texts. That happened in the sections about the grammar of reading from the MS 115 (pp. 195-222), as already mentioned. On the page 292 of MS 115, as we know, Wittgenstein recorded that "This whole 'attempt at a reworking' from page 118 until here is worthless". But surprisingly enough, the whole section on reading was transferred to the first version of PI the next months (cf. MS 142, pp. 138-160). Here's a report Wittgenstein gave to Moore in November 20, 1936:

...When about a fortnight ago, I read through what I had done so far I found it all, or nearly all, boring and artificial. For having the english version before me had cramped my thinking. I therefore decided to start all over again and not to let my thoughts be guided by anything but themselves. – I found it difficult the first day or two but then it became easy. And so I'm writing now a new version and I hope I'm not wrong in saying that it's somewhat better than the last. – Besides this all sorts of things have been happening inside me (I mean in my mind). (McGuinness 2008, p. 257)

So, Pichler describes in the "guided writing" an *olympic narrator*, and in the "free writing" a *partaker* in the dialogue. The former narrator was omniscient and predominant in the text, while the latter was but one of the voices, just a participant in the narrative.

And now, with the new character of Wittgenstein's texts in mind, let us enlarge one of his texts already quoted in this article:

It is not by any means clear to me, that I wish for a continuation of my work by others, more than a change in the way we live, making all these questions superfluous. (For this reason I could never found a school.)

(...) Nothing seems to me more unlikely than a scientist or mathematician, who reads me, should be seriously influenced thereby in the way he works. (...) I ought always to hope only for the most indirect of influences. (CV2, pp. 70-71).

Along these lines, it seems to me that, at least in terms of translation of Wittgenstein's texts in the McGuinness-B paradigm, prescriptions are precluded. If we are in consonance with the olympic account, we should have B-McGuinness *or* McGuinness-B, only one of the two, for a third party would be definitely excluded. But, in line with the dialogical account, on the other side, we should have B-McGuinness *and* McGuinness-B, and a third party would also be welcomed. What would be the consequences? Well, like anything else in life, a translator work would be what she has made of it, something for which there is a responsibility in cause. And life, full of primitive, tumultuous desires, gives us olympic as well as dialogical accounts. The side effects of those practices are entirely out of our control. The only component that seems to be within our control is the possibility of taming the wild beast, but that, again, depends on courage and talent – and a lot of self-reflection, for which translation theories are always welcome and from which translation theories could benefit as long as descriptions are deemed to be useful.

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Wittgenstein Nachlass Ts-226: A case of Wittgensteinian (Self-)Translation

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Abstract: Wittgenstein engaged in translating his Austrian German philosophical writings into English in various ways and at different levels. One notable example is the commitment of R. Rhees' to translate the *Philosophical Investigations* "Frühfassung", and Wittgenstein's revisions to Rhees' translation draft of part of it in Wittgenstein Nachlass Ts-226. The main objective of this contribution is to draw the reader's attention to this relatively little studied and discussed item and to encourage translation research on it. The contribution offers transcriptions of selected portions of Ts-226 in parallel with their sources in Ts-239.

Keywords: Wittgenstein's Nachlass, Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-226, Rush Rhees, Translation Practice, Philosophical Translation, Manuscript and Text Revision

Introduction

Wittgenstein engaged in translating his Austrian German philosophical writings into English in various ways and at different levels. Some notable examples are the following: his input for the translation of the *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (ILP 1921) into English (ILP 1922),¹ the 1935-36 work on a second philosophical book in parallel German-English based on the *Brown Book* (Pichler 2004, p. 130),² his work with T. Redpath on the 1938/39 translation of the preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1953) "Frühfassung" version (Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-247, see

¹ See CCO 1973, WC 2008 and LPA 2016 for primary sources and research studies on this project.

² For a list of correspondences (parallel corpus) between the English original in Ts-310 and the German in Ms-115 see Pichler & Smith 2013.

Venturinha 2010), and finally the 1938 commitment of R. Rhees' to translate the "Frühfassung" itself and Wittgenstein's revisions to Rhees' translation draft of part of it. It is the texts of this translation project of (part of) the "Frühfassung",³ begun but not completed by Rhees and revised by Wittgenstein in cooperation with Y. Smythies, that is the focus of this contribution. This project is preserved in the Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-226.⁴

By the beginning of November 1936 when Wittgenstein was residing at his house over the Eidsvatnet in Skjolden, he had dismissed not only the project of translating the *Brown Book* into German (Ms-115, second part) but also the *Brown Book* project in its entirety (Pichler 2004, pp. 132ff). Then in 1936-37 he wrote a first compact version of what we today know as PI §§1-188. This text is today called the PI "Urfassung" (PI 2001) and preserved in the Nachlass as Ms-142. A typescript with a clean version of Ms-142, Ts-220, was begun and probably also completed in the summer of 1937 at the latest. It is Ts-239, a later version of Ts-220, which eventually formed the basis for Rhees' English translation draft in Ts-226.⁵

Ts-226, as it is preserved in the Nachlass, consists of 72 sheets (plus half a sheet at the beginning containing the famous citation from Augustine's *Confessiones* about the learning of language) and corresponds to PI §§1-107. The entire typescript contains numerous revisions in Wittgenstein's hand, and it is common opinion that these revisions are all corrections to Rhees' translation draft, something that Wittgenstein himself suggests in his letter to G.E. Moore from February 2, 1939 (ICE 2011):

³ The PI "Frühfassung" consists of Ts-220 and Ts-221, the first corresponding roughly to PI §§1-188/189. The latter contains a synopsis of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics 1937-38 and was published in its later version Ts-222 in Part I of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (1956).

⁴ On the Wittgenstein Nachlass see von Wright 1969.

⁵ See Pichler (1996, p. 93) and Schulte in PI 2001: 1100.

Dear Moore,

I had a p.c. on Wednesday from Keynes saying that he would like to see the English version of my book, or whatever is ready of it. I needn't say the whole thing is absurd as he couldn't even make head or tail of it if it were translated very well. But as a matter of fact the translation is pretty awful as I saw today when I tried to go through it in order to correct it before giving it to Keynes. Though I worked quite hard on it the whole day with Smythies we only did 12 pages, because masses of it had to be altered. Tomorrow I must go on with it because tomorrow night Keynes ought to get it. So I'm afraid I shan't be able to come to you in the afternoon. I have written to Keynes that you have read the first half of my first volume & could give him some information about it; for obviously you must be able to get more out of reading the original than Keynes could get out of a bad translation & in a hurry. So I hope he'll ask you to give him your opinion. By the way, please don't mention to anyone that I don't think highly of the translation. Rhees did his very best & the stuff is damn difficult to translate.

I hope to see you soon. Best wishes!

Yours Ludwig Wittgenstein

It must be pointed out that many of Wittgenstein's revisions in Ts-226 may be regarded as revisions to the German source text itself and to introduce new meanings as much as corrections to the translation. Wittgenstein was, at least partly, clearly not only correcting Rhees' translation but also used it as a basis for developing the PI text and project *itself* further. Cases where Wittgenstein introduces new meanings include in my view the following replacements:

- “What is the meaning of the word ‘five’? – There was no question of any here; ...” → “But what's the meaning of the word “five”?” – There was no question of such an entity ‘meaning’ here; ...” (§ 2); Wittgenstein replaces “any” with “such an entity ‘meaning’”.

Ts-239, § 2 the German original had read “Was ist aber die Bedeutung des Wortes ‘fünf’? – Von einer solchen war hier gar nicht die Rede; ...”

- “kinds” → “cases” (§ 8); the German original read “Arten” (Ts-239, § 6)
- “long string” → “a whole lot” (§ 73); the German original read “eine ganze Reihe” (Ts-239, § 70)
- “correspondence” → “similarity” (§ 73); the German original read “Entsprechungen” (Ts-239, § 70)
- “cannot characterize these similarities better than by” → “can’t find a better || a more appropriate name for these similarities than” (§ 74); the German original read “kann diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren, als durch” (Ts-239, § 71)
- “But if someone wished || were to say” → “But if someone said” (§ 74); the German original read “Wenn aber Einer sagen wollte” (Ts-239, § 71)
- “In fact, can one always replace an indistinct photograph by a distinct one to advantage?” → “In fact, is it always desirable to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one?” (§ 78); the German original read “Ja, kann man ein unscharfes Bild immer mit Vorteil durch ein scharfes ersetzen?” (Ts-239, § 75)
- “place” → “street” (§ 78); the German original read “Platz” (Ts-239, § 75)
- “an indirect means” → “an indirect way” (§ 78); the German original read “ein indirektes Mittel” (Ts-239, § 75)
- “expression” → “language” (§ 99); the German original read “Ausdruck” (Ts-239, § 95).⁶

Wittgenstein’s revisions didn’t eventually seem to have any significant bearing on his further reworking of the German text because the final PI “Endfassung” in Ts-227 (1944-46) is in its wording again much closer to Ts-239 than to the revised text of Ts-226. The entire revision project in Ts-226 seemed then to have been more or less simply forgotten or left

⁶ Note that the section numbering of Ts-226, added by Wittgenstein, skips number 99. There is also a mistake in the pagination which jumps from 65 to 67.

aside. This fits with what J. Schulte generally says about Wittgenstein: "... now and then, Wittgenstein disregarded the reworked text and went back to an earlier version." (1992, p. 36)

In the following, I offer transcriptions of selected portions of Ts-226 in parallel with their sources in Ts-239.⁷ I have selected parts of which I thought it was reasonable to assume that they were of considerable importance to Wittgenstein:

- First, the discussion of Augustine's description of the learning of language, including Wittgenstein's transition to using it positively as the framework for introducing "primitive languages" / "language games" as means for seeing clearly the functioning of our language (Ts-226, 3).
- Second, the introduction and discussion of what in Wittgenstein research is standardly called "family resemblance" but Wittgenstein here, correcting Rhees, himself calls "family likenesses" (Ts-226, 48).
- Third, the discussion of the role and nature of achieving a clear view of our language, especially as it relates to the idea of philosophical analysis in the *Tractatus* sense – thus an "übersichtliche Darstellung" which (again in the wording of Wittgenstein's revision) makes the structure of language "capable of being all seen at a glance" (Ts-226, 65).

The transcriptions start with a section here presented *en face*, "I: From German Ts-239 to English Ts-226":

- The verso page offers the German Ts-239 §§1-6, 69-71, 75, 94-96, along with their section numbers (= α239).

⁷ To include the entire Ts-226 along with its counterparts in Ts-220 / Ts-239 would naturally have by far exceeded the limits of this publication. The reader has access to the entire Ts-226 as also all other Wittgenstein Nachlass items edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) through IDP 2016 (transcriptions) and BNE 2015 (facsimiles).

- The recto page offers Rhees' English translation of the same passages, thus Ts-226 §§1-8, 72-74, 78, 98-99, 100-101 (the section numbering deviates from the numbering in Ts-239 *post* §3) – *before* Wittgenstein's revision in hand (= α 226^w).

The subsequent section “II: Wittgenstein's text additions and deletions in α 226” renders the Ts-226 selection *as revised in Wittgenstein's hand* (= α 226^{+w}) on *text* level – text added is marked green, text removed pink. With Sections I and II, it should be possible to study Rhees' translation and Wittgenstein's revisions to it in not too cumbersome a way. At the same time, the first two sections should not be taken as a substitute for a thorough study of the sources for which I in a concluding section offer “III: Diplomatic transcription of α 226^{+w}”. Naturally, the reader is encouraged to take the further step of also consulting the facsimile of Ts-226 on Wittgenstein Source, http://wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ts-226_f, and using the diplomatic transcription as help for reading in the original.

I should add a word about how the text renderings were produced – and how they can be reproduced and verified by the reader:

The transcription of α 239 in *I: From German Ts-239 to English Ts-226* was produced from the Bergen Wittgenstein Archives' (WAB) open access “Nachlass transcriptions” site which offers “interactive dynamic presentation” access to WAB's transcriptions of the Wittgenstein Nachlass (IDP 2016). Here I select “Ts-239” from the drop-down list and run it through the linear transformation scenario (option “Display original line breaks?”⁸ clicked to Yes) thus producing a linear and slightly normalized version of the document. Subsequently I copy the selected portions into a MS Word document. α 239 thus gives a reader-friendly version of the text: orthography is gently normalized; deficiencies due to typewriter limitations (such as “Aepfel” in stead of “Äpfel”, “weiss” in stead of “weiß”) are tacitly

⁸ Phrasing of these options as of January 2019. Please note that the rendering of the original line breaks is not flawless, neither on the online site nor in the transcriptions included here.

corrected; indentation is unified; deleted text is omitted; undecided alternatives are however still retained and marked ... ||

The transcription of $\square 226^w$ on the recto page was produced on the same IDP site by picking “Ts-226” from the drop-down list and likewise running it through the linear transformation scenario (option “Display original line breaks?” clicked to Yes); this time however additionally the option “Exclude handwritten revisions in typescript?” was clicked to Yes. Thus a text was produced that *omits* Wittgenstein’s corrections and revisions. *In toto*, the $\square 239$ and $\square 226^w$ transcriptions permit the reader to easily read the German translation source and Rhees’ English translation in parallel and without being distracted by the many additions in Wittgenstein’s hand since both columns offer linearized renderings.

II: *Wittgenstein’s text additions and deletions in $\square 226$* was produced by running linear versions of both $\square 226^w$ and $\square 226^{+w}$ through the “*Compare two documents*” function of MS Word and having MS Word mark both additions and deletions. Text additions were marked green, text deletions pink and with strikethrough.⁹

⁹ The MS Word “*Compare two documents*” function occasionally produced an unhappy word order that I put right. Please note that pasting the HTML output of WAB’s transcriptions from the web browser into a MS Word document can produce faults in the text rendering; for example, markup features such as colouring of lines and underlinings as well as the lines and underlinings themselves can get lost, and separate words can be joined together by MS Word. Unfortunately this also affects III: *Diplomatic transcription of $\square 226^{+w}$* which does not always distinguish between deletions of typed text made by Wittgenstein in hand (which should consistently be marked by a strikethrough line in olive green) and deletions of typed text already made by Rhees in typewriter (which are marked by strikethrough lines in black). MS Word seems to throughout render strikethrough lines in the colour of the underlying text. For a rendering of the sources as intended please consult the IDP 2016 site. With regard to different writing pens used by Wittgenstein in his typescript revision (see for example Ts-226,65 which contains revisions not only in pencil, but also blue ink and black ink), please note that these currently are not distinguished in WAB’s transcriptions; thus, independent of whether a handwritten revision in typescript is in pencil or pen or this or that colour, all will be rendered in olive green.

The final section III: “Diplomatic transcription of $\square 226^{+w}$ ” was produced by again using IDP 2016 but this time Ts-226 was run through the *diplomatic* scenario (option “Original line breaks” on), and Wittgenstein’s additions in hand included (option “Handwritten revisions in typescript” on). This part thus gives a diplomatic version of $\square 226$ and marks all corrections and additions, be they in typescript by Rhees or the result from Wittgenstein’s later revision. For a detailed guide to the markup please consult the legend available from the output produced on the IDP 2016 site.

The main objective of this contribution is to draw the reader’s attention to the relatively little studied and discussed Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-226 and to encourage translation research on it. Though Baker and Hacker (2009) pays attention to them, a thorough study of Wittgenstein’s changes to Rhees’ translation is to my knowledge still lacking. It could reveal patterns which might help us understand better not only Wittgenstein’s translation and translation revision practices, but also contribute to obtaining better insight into his overall manuscript and text revision and composition practices. My first impression is that some of Wittgenstein’s revisions clearly answer to what often is called the “accessibility” requirement of translation while Rhees’ translation itself seems mostly to have tried to follow the “equivalence” requirement and is thus often simply more faithful to the original than Wittgenstein’s revision.¹⁰

¹⁰ About these two requirements see further P. Oliveira’s contribution in this volume. – I am indebted to Konrad Bucher ad Nivedita Gangopadhyay for comments and corrections to an earlier version of this paper. The transcriptions of selected parts of Ts-226 and Ts-239 are published by kind permission of the Master and Fellows of Trinity College Cambridge and the University of Bergen.

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[Appendix]

I: From German Ts-239 to English Ts-226

■239

(Ts-239: §§ 1-6, 69-71, 75, 94-96
from pages 1-3, 49-51, 53-54, 67-68)

- 1 A u g u s t i n u s , in den Confessionen I/8 cum ipsi (maiores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium, quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, rejiciendis, fugiendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita, quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enuntiabam.
- In diesen Worten erhalten wir - so scheint es mir - ein bestimmtes Bild von dem Wesen der menschlichen Sprache. Nämlich dieses: Die Wörter der Sprache benennen Gegenstände - Sätze sind Verbindungen von solchen Benennungen.
- In diesem Bild von der Sprache finden wir die Wurzeln der Idee: Jedes W o r t hat eine B e d e u t u n g . Diese Bedeutung ist dem Wort zugeordnet. Sie ist der Gegenstand, für welchen das Wort steht.
- Von einem Unterschied der Wortarten spricht Augustinus nicht. Wer das Lernen der Sprache so beschreibt, [[p. 2]] denkt - so möchte ich glauben - zunächst an Hauptwörter, wie "Tisch", "Stuhl", "Brot" und die Namen von Personen, erst in zweiter Linie an die Namen gewisser Tätigkeiten und Eigenschaften, und an die übrigen Wortarten als an etwas, was sich finden wird.
- 2 Denke nun an diese Verwendung der Sprache:- Ich schicke jemand einkaufen. Ich gebe ihm einen Zettel, auf diesem stehen die Zeichen: "fünf rote Äpfel". Er trägt den Zettel zum Kaufmann; der öffnet die Lade, auf welcher das Zeichen "Äpfel" steht; dann sucht er in einer Tabelle das Wort "rot" auf und findet ihm gegenüber ein farbiges Täfelchen; nun sagt er die Reihe der Grundzahlwörter - ich nehme an, er weiß sie auswendig - bis zum Worte "fünf" und bei jedem Zahlwort nimmt er einen Apfel aus der Lade, der die Farbe des Täfelchens hat.- So, und ähnlich, operiert man mit Worten.- "Wie weiß er aber, wo und wie er das Wort 'rot' nachschlagen soll und was er mit dem Wort 'fünf' anzufangen hat?" - Nun, ich nehme an, er h a n d e l t , wie ich es beschrieben habe. Die Erklärungen haben irgendwo ein Ende.- Was ist aber die Bedeutung des Wortes "fünf"? - Von einer solchen war hier gar nicht die Rede; nur davon, wie das Wort "fünf" gebraucht wird.

¶226*

(Ts-226: §§ 1-8, 72-74, 78, 98-99, 100-101
from pages 0-3, 46-49, 64-67 - without Wittgenstein's revisions)

- 1 A u g u s t i n u s , in den Confessionen I/8
cum (maiores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum
secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam,
et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum
eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis
aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium,
quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum
actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in peten-
dis, habendis, rejiciendis, faciendisve rebus. Ita verba
in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita,
quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque
jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enun-
tiabam. [[p. 1]]
In these words we have - it seems to me - a definite
picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words
of the language designate objects - sentences are combinations of
such designations.
In this picture of language we find the root of the idea:
every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word.
It is the object which the word stands for.
Augustine does not speak of a distinction between parts of
speech. Whoever || Anyone who describes the learning of language in this way
thinks - I should imagine - primarily of substantives like "table",
"chair", "bread" and the names of persons; and of the other parts
of speech as something that will work out all right.
- 2 Consider this application of language: I send someone
shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which are the marks:
"five red apples". He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens
the box that has the mark "apples" on it; then he looks up the word
"red" in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now
speaks || pronounces the series of cardinal numerals - I assume that he knows them
by heart - up to the word "five" and with each numeral he takes an
apple from the box that has the colour of the square. - This is
how one works with words. - "But how does he know where and how
he is to look up the word 'red' and what he has to do with the
word 'five'?" - Well, I am assuming that he acts as I have described.
The explanations come to an end somewhere. - What is the meaning of
the word "five"? - There was no question of any here; only of the
way in which "five" is used. // Nothing of that sort was being
discussed, only the way in which "five" is used.

- 3 Jener philosophische Begriff der Bedeutung ist in einer primitiven Vorstellung, von der Art und Weise wie die Sprache funktioniert, zu Hause. [[p. 2a]] Man kann aber auch sagen, es sei die Vorstellung einer primitiveren Sprache, als der unsern.
D e n k e n wir uns eine Sprache, für die die Beschreibung, wie Augustinus sie gegeben hat, stimmt: Die Sprache soll der Verständigung eines Bauenden A mit einem Gehilfen B dienen. A führt einen Bau auf aus Bausteinen; es sind Würfel, Säulen, Platten und Balken vorhanden. B hat ihm die Bausteine zuzureichen, und zwar nach der Reihe, wie A sie braucht. Zu dem Zweck bedienen sie sich einer Sprache, bestehend aus den Wörtern: "Würfel", "Säule", "Platte", "Balken". A ruft sie aus; - B bringt den Stein, den er gelernt hat, auf diesen Ruf zu bringen.
Fasse dies als vollständige primitive Sprache auf.
- 4 Augustinus beschreibt, könnten wir sagen, ein System der Verständigung; nur ist nicht alles, was wir Sprache nennen, dieses System.
(Und das muß man in so vielen Fällen sagen, wo sich die Frage erhebt: "ist diese Darstellung brauchbar, oder unbrauchbar?" Die Antwort ist dann: "Ja, brauchbar; aber nur für dieses eng umschriebene Gebiet, nicht für das ganze, das Du darzustellen vorgabst." Denke z.B. an Theorien der Nationalökonomien.) [[p. 3]]
Es ist, als erklärte jemand: "Spielen besteht darin, daß man Dinge, gewissen Regeln gemäß, auf einer Fläche verschiebt ..." - und wir ihm antworten: Du scheinst an die Brettspiele zu denken; aber das sind nicht alle Spiele. Du kannst deine Erklärung richtigstellen, indem du sie ausdrücklich auf diese Spiele einschränkst.
- 5 Denk' dir eine Schrift, in welcher Buchstaben zur Bezeichnung von Lauten benützt würden, aber auch zur Bezeichnung der Betonung und als Interpunktionszeichen. (Eine Schrift kann man auffassen als eine Sprache zur Beschreibung von Lautbildern.) Denke dir nun, daß Einer jene Schrift so verstünde, als entspreche einfach jedem Buchstaben ein Laut und als hätten die Buchstaben nicht auch andere Funktionen. So einer - zu einfachen - Auffassung der Schrift gleicht Augustinus' Auffassung der Sprache.
- 6 Wenn man das Beispiel (2) betrachtet, so ahnt man vielleicht inwiefern der allgemeine Begriff der Bedeutung der Worte das Funktionieren der Sprache mit einem Dunst umgibt, der das klare Sehen unmöglich macht. Es zerstreut den Nebel, wenn wir die Erscheinungen der Sprache an primitiven Arten ihrer Verwendung studieren, in denen man den Zweck und das Funktionieren der Wörter klar übersehen kann.
Solche primitiven Formen der Sprache verwendet das Kind, wenn es sprechen lernt. Das Lehren der Sprache ist hier kein Erklären, sondern ein Abrichten.

...

- 3 That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive notion of the way in which language functions. But one might also say it is the notion of a more primitive language than ours.
- 4 Let us imagine a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language shall help a builder A to make himself understood by an assistant B. [[p. 2]] A is constructing a building out of building stones; there is a supply of cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the building stones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: "cube", "column", "slab", "beam". A shouts || calls out the words; - B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call. Take this as a complete primitive language.
- 5 Augustine describes, we might say, a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system. (And this must be said in ever so many cases where the question arises, "can this description be used or can't it be used?". The answer is, "Yes, it can be used; but only for this narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you were professing to describe." Think of the theories of the economists.)
- 6 It is as though someone explained: "Playing a game consists in moving things about on a surface according to certain rules ...", and we were to answer him: You are apparently thinking of games played on a board; but those aren't all the games there are. You can put your description right by confining it explicitly to those games.
- 7 Imagine a way of writing || type in which letters are used to indicate sounds, but also to indicate emphasis and as marks of punctuation. (One can regard a way of writing || type as a language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone understood this way of writing || type as though it were one in which to every letter there simply corresponded a sound, and as though the letters did not have other very different functions as well. - An oversimplified view of the type like this one resembles, I believe, Augustine's view of language.
- 8 If one considers example (2) one may perhaps begin to suspect how far the commonly accepted concept of the meaning of words surrounds the functioning of language with a mist that makes clear [[p. 3]] vision impossible. It scatters the fog if we study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application, where the simplicity enables one to get a clear view of the way the words function and of what their purpose is. Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.
...

69 Hier stoßen wir auf die große Frage, die hinter allen diesen Betrachtungen steht. - - Denn man könnte mir nun einwenden: "Du machst dir's leicht! Du redest von allen möglichen Sprachspielen, hast aber nirgends gesagt, was denn das Wesentliche des Sprachspiels, und d.h. der Sprache, ist. [[p. 50]] Was allen diesen Vorgängen gemeinsam ist und sie zur Sprache, oder zu Teilen der Sprache macht. Du schenkst dir also gerade den Teil der Untersuchung, der dir selbst seinerzeit das meiste Kopferbrechen gemacht hat, nämlich den, die a l l g e m e i n e F o r m d e s S a t z e s und der Sprache betreffend."

Und das ist wahr. - Statt etwas anzugeben, was allem, was wir Sprache nennen, gemeinsam ist, sage ich, es ist diesen Erscheinungen gar nicht Eines gemeinsam, weswegen wir für alle das gleiche Wort verwenden, - sondern sie sind miteinander in vielen verschiedenen Weisen v e r w a n d t . Und dieser Verwandtschaft, oder dieser Verwandtschaften, wegen nennen wir sie alle "Sprachen". Ich will versuchen, dies zu erklären.

70 Betrachte z.B. einmal die Vorgänge, die wir "Spiele" nennen. Ich meine Brettspiele, Kartenspiele, Ballspiele, Kampfspiele, u.s.w. Was ist allen diesen gemeinsam? - Sag nicht: "es m u ß ihnen etwas gemeinsam sein, sonst hießen sie nicht 'Spiele'"; sondern s c h a u ob ihnen allen etwas gemeinsam ist. - Denn wenn du sie anschaust, wirst du zwar nicht etwas sehen, was a l l e n gemeinsam wäre, aber du wirst Ähnlichkeiten, Verwandtschaften, sehen, und zwar eine ganze Reihe. Wie gesagt: denk nicht, sondern schau! - Schau z.B. die Brettspiele an, mit ihren mannigfachen Verwandtschaften. Nun geh zu den Kartenspielen über; hier findest du viele Entsprechungen zu jener ersten Klasse, aber viele gemeinsame Züge verschwinden, andere treten auf. Wenn du nun zu den Ballspielen übergehst, so bleibt manches Gemeinsame erhalten, aber vieles geht verloren.- Sind sie alle 'u n t e r h a l t e n d '? Vergleiche Schach mit dem Mühlfahren. Oder gibt es Überall ein Gewinnen und Verlieren, oder die Konkurrenz von Spielenden? Denke an die Patienen. In den Ballspielen gibt es Gewinnen und Verlieren; aber wenn ein Kind den Ball an die Wand wirft und wieder auffängt, so ist dieser [[p. 51]] Zug verschwunden. Schau, welche Rolle Geschick und Glück spielen. Und wie verschieden ist Geschick im Schachspiel und Geschick im Tennisspiel. Denk nun an die Reigenspiele: Hier ist das Element der Unterhaltung, aber wie viele der anderen Charakterzüge sind verschwunden! Und so können wir durch die vielen, vielen anderen Gruppen von Spielen gehen. Ähnlichkeiten auftauchen und verschwinden sehen.

Und das Ergebnis dieser Betrachtung lautet nun: Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander übergreifen und kreuzen. Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen.

72 Here we come up against the big question that lies behind all these considerations: For one might object to me: "You take it easy! You talk about all sorts of language games, but you have [[p. 47]] never said what it is that is essential **to || about** a language game, and that means to language. What it is that is common to all these processes and makes them language or parts of the language. You treat yourself to precisely that part of the enquiry, therefore, which at one time gave you the greatest puzzlement, namely that concerning the general form of the proposition."

And that is true. - Instead of stating something which is common to all that we call language, I say there is **no one thing || nothing** common to these phenomena in virtue of which we use the same name for all of them, - they are **related || akin** to one another in many different ways. And on account of this relationship, or these relationships, we call them all "languages". I will try to explain this.

73 Consider for a moment the processes that we call "games", for instance. I mean games played on a board, card games, ball games, **contests in the ring || prize fighting**, etc. What is common to all these? - Don't say, "there must be something common to them, otherwise they would not be called 'games'"; but look and see whether something is common to all of them. - Because if you look at them you will not see something common to all of them, but you will see similarities, connections, - a long string of them. As I say: don't think, but look. - Look for instance at the games played on a board, with their various connections. Now pass to card games; here you find many points of correspondence to the first class, but many **characteristic || common** features disappear, and new ones appear. If you now pass to ball games, much that is common remains, but a lot is lost. - Are they all "amusing"? Compare chess with . Or is there in every case such a thing as winning and losing or [[p. 48]] rivalry between the players? Think of the games of patiences. In ball games there is winning and losing, but **if || when** a child throws the ball against the wall and catches it again this feature has disappeared. See what part skill and luck play. And what a difference there is between skill in a game of chess and skill in a game of tennis. Think now of round games: here there is the element of amusement, but how many of the other characteristic features have disappeared! And so we may go through the many, many other groups of games. Watching similarities show themselves and disappear.

And now the result of these considerations is: We see a complicated net of similarities which overlap and cross one another. Similarities in large respects and in small.

- 71 Ich kann diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren, als durch das Wort "Familienähnlichkeiten"; denn so übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe, Gang, Temperament, etc. etc. - Und ich werde sagen: die 'Spiele' bilden eine Familie.
Und ebenso bilden z.B. die Zahlenarten eine Familie.
Warum benennen wir etwas "Zahl"? Nun etwa, weil es eine - direkte - Verwandtschaft mit manchem hat, was man bisher Zahl genannt hat; und dadurch, kann man sagen, erhält es eine indirekte Verwandtschaft zu anderem, was wir auch so nennen. Und wir dehnen unseren Begriff der Zahl aus, wie wir beim Spinnen eines Fadens Faser an Faser drehen. Und die Stärke des Fadens liegt nicht darin, daß eine Faser durch seine ganze Länge läuft, sondern darin, daß viele Fasern sich übergreifen.
Wenn aber Einer sagen wollte: "Also ist allen diesen Gebilden etwas gemeinsam, - nämlich die Disjunktion aller dieser Gemeinsamkeiten" - so würde ich antworten: hier spielst du nur mit einem Wort. Ebenso könnte man sagen: es läuft E t w a s durch den ganzen Faden, nämlich das lückenlose übergreifen dieser Fasern.
...
- 75 Man kann sagen, der Begriff 'Spiel' ist ein Begriff mit verschwommenen Rändern. - "Aber ist ein verschwommener Begriff überhaupt e i n B e g r i f f ?" - Ist eine unscharfe Photographie überhaupt ein Bild eines Menschen? - Ja, kann man ein unscharfes Bild immer mit Vorteil durch ein scharfes ersetzen? Ist das unscharfe nicht oft gerade das, was wir brauchen?
Frege vergleicht den B e g r i f f mit einem Bezirk und sagt: einen unklar begrenzten Bezirk könne man überhaupt keinen Bezirk [[p. 54]] nennen. Das heißt wohl, wir können mit ihm nichts anfangen. Aber ist es sinnlos zu sagen: "Halte Dich ungefähr hier auf!" Denk dir ich stünde mit einem Andern auf einem Platz und sagte dies. Dabei werde ich nicht einmal i r g e n d eine Grenze ziehen, sondern etwa mit der Hand eine zeigende Bewegung machen - ganz als zeigte ich ihm einen bestimmten P u n k t . Und gerade so erklärt man etwa, was ein Spiel ist. Man gibt Beispiele, und will, daß sie in einem gewissen Sinne verstanden werden. - Aber mit diesem Ausdruck meine ich n i c h t : er solle nun in diesen Beispielen d a s G e m e i n s a m e s e h e n , welches ich - aus irgend einem Grunde - nicht aussprechen konnte. Sondern - er solle diese Beispiele nun in bestimmter Weise v e r w e n d e n . Das Exemplifizieren ist hier nicht ein i n d i r e k t e s Mittel der Erklärung, - in Ermangelung eines Bessern. - Denn, mißverstanden kann auch jede allgemeine Erklärung werden. S o spielen wir eben das Spiel. (Ich meine das Sprachspiel mit dem Worte "Spiel".)
...

74

I cannot characterize these similarities better than by the expression "family similarities"; for that is the way the different similarities overlap and cross one another which hold between the members of a family: build, facial characteristics, colour of the eyes, walk, temperament, etc. etc.- And I shall say the "games" constitute a family.

And in the same way the kinds of numbers, for instance, constitute a family. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a - direct - kinship with many things which we have called numbers in the past; and thereby, we may say, it receives an indirect connection with other things which we call by the same name. And we extend our concept of number as we twist fibre on fibre in spinning a thread. And the strength of the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the [[p. 49]] whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres overlap.

But if someone wished || were to say, "Then there is something common to all these creations; namely the disjunction of all these common features", then I should answer: Here you're merely playing with a word. One might just as well say: something runs through the entire thread, namely the uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.

...

78

We may say the concept "game" is a concept with hazy edges. - "But is a hazy concept a concept at all?" - Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? - In fact, can one always replace an indistinct photograph by a distinct one to advantage? Isn't what is indistinct often just the thing we want?

Frege compares the concept with a district, and says: a district without clear boundaries you could not call a district at all. That means no doubt, we couldn't do anything with it. But is it meaningless to say, "Stay approximately here"? Imagine I were standing with another person in a place and said this. In doing so I shall not even draw any boundary, but rather make say a pointing movement with my hand, - just as though I were pointing to a particular point. And in just this way we may explain what a game is. We give examples and want them in a certain sense to be understood. - But by this expression I do not mean he is supposed to see what is common in these examples, - which for some reason or other I could not express. Giving examples is not an indirect means of explaining, - in want of a better one. - For any general explanation can be misunderstood too. That just is how we play the game. (I mean the language game with the word "game".)

...

94 Es ist uns, als müßten wir die Erscheinungen d u r c h s c h a u e n : unsere Untersuchung aber richtet sich nicht auf die E r - s c h e i n u n g e n , sondern - wie man sagen könnte - auf die ' M ö g l i c h k e i t e n ' der Erscheinungen. Wir besinnen uns, heißt das, auf die A r t d e r A u s s a g e n , die wir über die Erscheinungen machen. Daher besinnt sich auch Augustinus auf die verschiedenen Aussagen, die man über die Dauer von Ereignissen, über ihre Vergangenheit, Gegenwart, oder Zukunft macht. (Dies sind natürlich nicht p h i l o s o p h i s c h e Aussagen über die Zeit, Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft.)

Unsere Betrachtung ist daher eine grammatische. Und diese Betrachtung bringt Licht in unser Problem, indem sie Mißverständnisse wegräumt. Mißverständnisse nämlich, welche den Gebrauch der Wörter unserer Sprache betreffen und hervorgerufen sind durch Analogien, welche zwischen unseren Ausdrucksformen bestehen. - Und diese Mißverständnisse kann man dadurch beseitigen, daß man gewisse Ausdrucksformen durch andere ersetzt; dies kann man ein "Analysieren" unsrer Ausdrucksformen nennen, denn der Vorgang hat manchmal Ähnlichkeit mit dem einer Zerlegung.

95 Nun aber kann es den Anschein gewinnen, als gäbe es so etwas, wie eine letzte Analyse unserer Sprachformen, also e i n e vollkommen zerlegte Form [[p. 68]] des Ausdrucks. D.h.: als seien unsere gebräuchlichen Ausdrucksformen, wesentlich, noch unanalysiert; als sei in ihnen etwas verborgen, was ans Licht zu befördern ist. Ist dies geschehen, so sei der Ausdruck damit vollkommen geklärt und unsre Aufgabe gelöst.

Man kann das auch so sagen: Wir beseitigen Mißverständnisse, indem wir unsern Ausdruck exakter machen: aber es kann nun so scheinen, als ob wir e i n e m b e s t i m m t e n Z u s t a n d , der vollkommenen Exaktheit, zustreben; und als wäre das das eigentliche Ziel unsrer Untersuchung.

96 Dies drückt sich aus in der Frage nach dem W e s e n der Sprache, des Satzes, des Denkens.- Denn wenn wir auch in unsern Untersuchungen das Wesen der Sprache - ihre Funktion, ihren Bau - zu verstehen trachten, so ist es doch nicht d a s , was diese Frage im Auge hat. Denn sie sieht in dem Wesen nicht etwas, was schon offen zutage liegt, und was durch Ordnen ü b e r s i c h t l i c h wird. Sondern etwas, was u n t e r der Oberfläche liegt. Etwas, was im Innern liegt, was wir sehen, wenn wir die Sache durchschauen und was eine Analyse hervorgehen soll.

' D a s W e s e n i s t u n s v e r b o r g e n ' : das ist die Form, die unser Problem nun annimmt. Wir fragen: "Was ist die Sprache?"; "Was ist der Satz?". Und die Antwort auf diese Fragen ist ein für allemal zu geben; und unabhängig von jeder künftigen Erfahrung.

98

It is as though we had to look through the phenomena: our enquiry, however, is directed not upon the phenomena but rather - as we might say - upon the "possibilities" of phenomena. We recollect, that is, the kind of statements that we make about phenomena. Thus Augustine calls to mind the various statements which one makes about the duration of events, about their past, present or future. (These, of course, are not philosophical statements about time, past, present and future.)

Our view || examination is thus a grammatical one. And this view || examination brings light into our problem by clearing away misunderstandings. Misunderstandings, namely, which concern the use of the words of our language and which are brought about by analogies which hold between our forms of expression. - And one can remove these misunderstandings by replacing a certain form of expression by [[p. 65]] others. We may call this "analysing" our forms of expression, since the procedure sometimes bears a resemblance to taking something to pieces.

It may now seem, however, as though there were something like an ultimate analysis of our forms of speech, one completely analysed form of the expression. That is: as though our usual forms of expression were, essentially, still unanalysed; as though something were hidden in them which has to be brought to light // which has to be brought out into the light. // Once this has been done, the expression is completely explained and our problem is solved.

We may put it also in this way: We remove misunderstandings by making our expression more exact: But it may seem as though we were trying to reach one particular state, that of perfect exactness; as though that were the real aim of our inquiry.

100

This is expressed in the question as to the essence of language, of the proposition, of thinking. - For if we try in our inquiries also to understand the essence of language - its function, its construction - still it isn't that which that question has in view. For it sees the essence, not in something that is already open to view, and which by being put in order becomes visible at a glance. But rather something which lies beneath the surface. Something which lies within; which we see when we look through the thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.

101

"The essence is hidden from us": that is the form which our problem takes now. We ask, "What is language?", "What is the proposition?". And the answer to these questions is given once and [[p. 67]] for all, and independent of all future experience.

II: Wittgenstein's text additions and deletions in $\alpha 226$

- 1 Augustinus, in the Confessions I/8: ~~eum~~ Cum (maiores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum eam vellet ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium, quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum actu, et sonitu vocis indicantem affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, rejiciendis, faciendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita, quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enuntiabam. [[p. 1r]]
- In these words we ~~have~~ get - it seems to me - a definite picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words of ~~the~~ language ~~designate~~ name objects - sentences are combinations of such ~~designations~~ names.
- In this picture of human language we find the root of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word. It is the object which the word stands for.
- Augustine ~~however~~ does not speak of a distinction between parts of speech. ~~Whoever~~ ~~|| Anyone who~~ If one describes the learning of language in this way, one thinks - I should imagine - primarily of substantives, like "table", "chair", "bread" and the names of persons; and of the other parts of speech as something that will ~~***~~ come out all right. ~~eventually..~~
- 2 Consider ~~now~~ this application of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which ~~are~~ I have written the ~~marks~~ signs: "five red apples". He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens the ~~box~~ drawer that has the ~~mark~~ sign "apples" on it; then he looks up the word "red" in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now ~~speaks~~ ~~|| pronounces~~ says out loud the series of cardinal ~~numerals~~ numbers - I assume ~~that~~ he knows them by heart - up to the word "five" and with each numeral he takes an apple ~~from the box~~ that has the colour of the square ~~from the drawer.- In this way & in similar ways.-~~~~This is~~ ~~how~~ one ~~works~~ operates with words. - "But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he has to do with the word 'five'?" - Well, I am assuming that he ~~acts~~, as I have described. ~~The explanations~~ Explanations come to an end somewhere. ~~What is.-~~ But what's the meaning of the word "five"? - There was no question of ~~any such an entity 'meaning'~~ here; only of the way in which "five" is used. ~~// Nothing of that sort was being discussed, only the way in which "five" is used.~~
- 3 That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive ~~notion~~ picture of the way in which ~~our~~ language functions. But ~~one~~ we might also say that it is ~~the notion~~ a picture of a more primitive language than ours.
- 4 Let us imagine a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language ~~shall help~~ is to be the means of communication between a builder A ~~to make himself understood by an~~ and his assistant B. [[p. 2]] A is constructing a building out of building ~~stones~~ blocks; there ~~is a supply of~~ are cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the building stones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: "cube", "column", "slab", "beam". A ~~shouts~~ ~~|| calls~~ calls out the words; - B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call.
- ~~Take~~ Regard this as a complete primitive language.

5 Augustine describes, we might say, a system of communication; ~~only~~ not everything, ~~however~~, that we call language is this system.
(And this one must ~~be said~~ say in ~~ever~~ so many cases ~~where~~ when the question arises, ~~can~~: "is this an appropriate description ~~be used~~ or ~~can't it be used not?~~". The answer is, "Yes, it ~~can be used~~ is appropriate; but only for this narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you ~~were professing~~ ~~professed~~ to describe ~~by it.~~" Think of the theories of ~~the~~ economists.)

6 It is as though someone explained: "Playing a game consists in moving things about on a surface according to certain rules ...", and we ~~were to answer~~ ~~answered~~ him: You ~~are apparently~~ ~~seem to be~~ thinking of games played on a board; but ~~those~~ ~~these~~ aren't all the games there are. You can put your description right by confining it explicitly to those games.

7 Imagine a ~~way of writing~~ ~~||~~ ~~type~~ script in which letters ~~are used to indicate~~ stand for sounds, but ~~are used~~ also ~~to indicate~~ ~~emphasis~~ as accents and as ~~marks~~ ~~of~~ punctuation signs. (One can regard a ~~way of writing~~ ~~||~~ ~~type~~ script as a language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone ~~understood~~ ~~this way of writing~~ ~~||~~ ~~type~~ interpreted our script as though ~~it were one~~ in which ~~to every letter~~ ~~there simply~~ ~~corresponded~~ a sound all letters just stood for sounds, and as though the letters here did not also have ~~other~~ ~~very~~ ~~quite~~ different functions ~~as well.~~ ~~An.~~ - Such an oversimplified view of ~~the type~~ ~~like this one~~ ~~resembles~~ our script is the analogon, I believe, to Augustine's view of language.

8 If ~~one~~ ~~considers~~ we look at our example (2) ~~one~~ we may perhaps ~~begin to~~ ~~suspect~~ get an idea of how far the ~~commonly~~ ~~accepted~~ ~~general~~ concept of the meaning of words a word surrounds the ~~functioning~~ working of language with a mist that makes ~~clear~~ [[p. 3]] ~~vision~~ it impossible to see clearly. ~~it~~ ~~scatters~~ ~~the~~ The fog is dispersed if we study the ~~phenomena~~ workings of language in primitive ~~kinds~~ cases of its application, ~~where~~ ~~the~~ ~~simplicity~~ ~~enables~~ ~~one~~ in which it is easy to get a clear view of the ~~way~~ purpose of the words and of the way they function ~~and of what their purpose is.~~

Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.

...

72 ~~Here~~ And here we come up against the ~~big~~ question ~~that lies~~ lying behind all ~~these~~ ~~considerations.~~ For the enquiries we have been making: for one might ~~object~~ say to me: "You ~~take~~ You're taking it easy! You talk ~~about~~ of all sorts of language games, but you have [[p. 47]] never said what it is ~~that is~~ that's essential ~~to~~ ~~||~~ ~~about~~ to a language game, and ~~that means~~ thus to language. ~~What it is that is;~~ what's in common to all ~~these processes~~ these processes ~~||~~ procedures and makes us call them ~~language~~ languages, or parts of ~~the~~ a language. You ~~treat yourself to precisely~~ That means you don't bother now about that part of the enquiry, ~~therefore~~, which at one time gave you the greatest ~~puzzlement,~~ ~~namely~~ difficulty, that concerning the ~~general form~~ of the proposition and of language."

And ~~that~~ this is true. - Instead of ~~stating~~ ~~pointing~~ out something which is in common to all that we call language, I say there is no one ~~thing~~ ~~||~~ ~~nothing~~ thing in common to these phenomena ~~in virtue of which we~~ that makes us use the same ~~name~~ word for all of them, - they are ~~related~~ ~~||~~ ~~akin~~ to each ~~one~~ another in many different ways. And ~~on account~~ because of this ~~relationship,~~ ~~or~~ ~~these~~ relationships, ~~kinship~~ we call them all "languages". I ~~will~~ shall try to explain this.

73

~~Consider for a moment~~ Let us consider, e.g., the processes that which we call "games", ~~for instance~~. I mean board-games ~~played on a board~~, card games, ball games, athletic contests ~~in the ring~~ ~~prize-fighting~~, etc. What is in common to all these? - Don't say: "there must be something in common to them, ~~otherwise all, or they would not~~ wouldn't be called 'games'"; - but ~~look and see~~ whether something is in common to ~~all of~~ them. - ~~Because~~ all. For if you look at them, though you ~~will not~~ won't see ~~something anything~~ that's common to all of them, but you will see similarities, connections, ~~a long string~~ - a whole lot of them. As I ~~say~~ said: don't think, but look. - Look ~~for instance~~ e.g. at ~~the games played on a board, with their games and the various connections between them~~. Now pass to card games; ~~here you will find~~ many points of ~~correspondence to~~ similarity between ~~this group and the first class~~; but many ~~characteristic~~ ~~common~~ features disappear, and new ones appear. If you ~~now~~ pass to ball games, much that ~~is there~~ was in common remains, but a ~~lot~~ great deal is lost. - Are they all "amusing" 'entertaining'? Compare chess with Noughts & Crosses. Or is there ~~in every case~~ always such a thing as winning and losing or [[p. 48]] ~~rivalry~~ a competition between the players? Think of ~~the games of~~ patiences. In ball games there is winning and losing, but ~~if~~ ~~when~~ a child ~~throws the~~ is bouncing a ball against ~~the~~ a wall and ~~catches~~ catching it ~~again this feature has disappeared~~. ~~See what, there is no winning and losing~~. Look at the part which skill and luck play. And what a difference there is between skill in ~~a game of~~ chess and skill in ~~a game of~~ tennis. ~~Think now of round~~ Now think of singing & dancing games: here ~~there is~~ we have the element of amusement entertainment, but how many of the other characteristic features have disappeared! And so we may go through the many, ~~many~~ other groups of games. ~~Watching- seeing~~ similarities ~~show themselves~~ appear and disappear.

And ~~now~~ the result of these ~~considerations is: We observations is: we see~~ a complicated ~~net~~ network of similarities ~~which overlap and cross one another, overlapping and crossing each other~~. Similarities in the large ~~respects~~ and in the small.

74

I ~~cannot characterize~~ can't find a better ~~||~~ a more appropriate name for these similarities ~~better~~ than ~~by the expression~~ "family ~~similarities~~ likenesses"; ~~for this is how the various similarities, for that is the way the different similarities overlap and cross one another which hold~~ between the members of a family ~~overlap and cross~~: build, ~~facial characteristics, features, the colour of the eyes, walk gait, temperament, etc. etc.~~- And I shall say the "games" 'games' constitute a family.

And in the same way the kinds of numbers, ~~for instance~~, (e.g.) constitute a family. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a - (direct)- kinship ~~with many to some things which we, up to the present, have been called numbers in the past; and thereby, we may say, it receives an indirect connection with gets related indirectly to other things which we call by the same name. And we extend our concept of number, as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre in spinning a thread. And the strength of the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the [[p. 49]] whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres overlap.~~

But if ~~someone wished~~ ~~||~~ ~~were to say~~, ~~someone said~~: "Then there is something common to all these ~~creations, namely objects~~ - the disjunction of all these common ~~features, then properties~~", I should answer: Here ~~you're merely you are just~~ playing with a word. ~~One might~~ You may just as well say: ~~something~~ runs through the ~~entire whole~~ thread, ~~namely~~ - the uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.

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We ~~may~~ might say the concept "game" is a concept with ~~hazy blurred~~ edges. - "But is a ~~hazy blurred~~ concept a concept at all?" - Is ~~an indistinct photograph~~ a blurred photo a picture of a ~~person~~ man at all? - In fact, ~~can-one~~ is it always desirable to replace an indistinct ~~photograph~~ picture by a ~~distinct~~ sharp one ~~to advantage~~? Isn't ~~what is~~ an indistinct one often just ~~the thing~~ what we want?

Frege compares the concept ~~with~~ to a district, and says: a district without clear boundaries you ~~could~~ cannot call a district at all. ~~That~~ This means ~~no doubt~~, I suppose, we couldn't do anything with it. But is it meaningless to say, "~~Stay approximately here~~?" "~~Stand roughly there~~?" Imagine ~~i were~~ yourself standing with another person in a ~~place~~ street with someone and ~~said~~ saying this. In ~~doing so i shall~~ saying it you will not even draw any boundary, but ~~rather~~ just make ~~say~~ a pointing ~~movement with my hand,~~ just gesture - exactly as though ~~±~~ you were pointing ~~to~~ at a particular ~~point,~~ spot. And in just this ~~way we may~~ way || this is how we explain to someone, say, what a game is. We give him examples and want them in a certain sense to be understood in a certain way. - But by this expression I do not mean: that he is ~~supposed~~ how to see what is in common ~~in~~ to all these examples, the common factor being one which, for some reason or other ~~±~~ could not express, I am unable to point out - but I mean that he is to use these examples in a particular way. Giving examples is here not an ~~indirect~~ ~~means~~ way of explaining, ~~in~~ used for want of a better one. - For ~~any~~ general explanation can be misunderstood ~~too.~~ That, just ~~is~~ as examples can. - That's how we ~~play~~ the game ~~is played~~ (I mean the language game with the word "game" →).

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98

It is as though we had to look-see through the phenomena: our enquiry, however, is ~~directed~~ not upon one into the phenomena, but ~~rather~~, as we might say ~~upon~~, into the "possibilities" "possibilities" of phenomena. ~~We recollect,~~ ~~that is~~ That's to say, we call to our mind, the kind of statements ~~that~~ we make about the phenomena. Thus Augustine calls to mind the various statements ~~which one makes~~ made about the duration of events, about ~~their~~ events past, present or future. (These statements, of course, are not philosophical statements about time, past, present and future.)

~~Our view~~ || examination is thus Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. And this ~~view~~ || examination investigation brings light into our problem by clearing away misunderstandings. Misunderstandings, ~~namely, which concern~~ concerning the use of the words of our language ~~and which are~~, brought about by analogies ~~which hold between our~~ between different forms of expression. - And ~~one can remove~~ these misunderstandings can be removed by replacing a certain ~~form~~ forms of expression by [[p. 65]] others. ~~We~~ This may ~~call this~~ be called "analysing" our forms of expression, ~~since~~ for the procedure sometimes ~~bears a resemblance to taking something to pieces,~~ resembles that of an analysis.

It Thus it may ~~not seem,~~ however, as though there were something like an ultimate analysis of our forms of ~~speech,~~ expression, || linguistic forms, & therefore one completely analysed ~~form of the expression,~~ state of these expressions. That is: it may seem as though our usual forms of expression were, essentially, ~~still~~ unanalysed; as though something were hidden in them which has to be brought to light ~~which has to be brought out into the light.~~ // One: if this has been done, ~~the expression is~~ language would be completely ~~explained~~ clarified and our problem ~~is~~ solved.

We may put it ~~also~~ in this way: ~~We~~ || This can be put as follows: we remove misunderstandings by making our expression more exact: ~~But~~ thus it may seem as though we were trying to reach one particular state, ~~that~~ of perfect exactness; and as though ~~that~~ this were the real aim of our ~~inquiry~~ investigation.

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100

This is what's expressed in the question as to the essence || nature of language, of ~~the~~ a proposition, of thinking. - For ~~if we try~~ although in our ~~inquiries also~~ investigations we are trying to understand ~~the essence~~ the essence || nature of language - (its function, its construction -), still it isn't that which ~~that~~ the question has in view. For ~~it sees~~ this question does not see the essence, ~~not in~~ as something ~~that is~~ which already ~~open to view~~ lies open before us, and which by a process of ordering becomes transparent - I mean capable of being ~~put in order~~ becomes visible all seen at a glance. ~~But~~: but rather as something which ~~lies beneath~~ lies under the surface. ~~Something~~, which lies within, which we see when we ~~look through~~ see into the thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.

101

"The essence || nature is hidden from to us" - ~~that~~: || The essence is what's hidden: this is the form ~~which~~ our problem now takes now. We ask: "What is language?", "What is ~~the~~ a proposition?". And the answer to these questions is to be given once and [[p. 67]] for all, and independent of all future experience.

III: Diplomatic transcription of $\square 226^{+w}$

$\square 226^{+w}$

(Ts-226: §§ 1-8, 72-74, 78, 98-99, 100-101

from pages 0-3, 46-49, 64-67 - with Wittgenstein's revisions)

1 A u g u s t i n u s , in ~~(ee)~~ **(the)** Confession~~(ee)~~ **(s)** I/8:
[e|C]um (maiores homines) appellabant rem aliquam et cum
secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam,
et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum
eam vellet ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis
aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium,
quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum
actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in peten-
dis, habendis, rejiciendis, faciendisve rebus. Ita verba
in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita,
quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque
jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enun-
tiabam.

In these words we have seen - it seems to me - [[In these words we are given, it seems to me,]] a definite picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words of the language designate human objects - sentences are combinations of such designations.

In this picture of human language we find the root of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word. It is the object which the word stands for.

Augustine however does not speak of a distinction between parts of speech. He describes the learning of language in this way, one thinks - I should imagine - primarily of substantives, like "table", "chair", "bread" and the names of persons; and of the other parts of speech as something that will work out all right eventually.

2. Consider this application of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which are the marks I have written the signs: "five red apples". He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens the box that has the mark "apples" on it; then he looks up the word "red" in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now says out loud the series of cardinal numbers - I assume that he knows them by heart - up to the word "five" and with each numeral he takes an apple from the box that has the colour of the square from the drawer. This is how one works in this way & in similar ways one operates with words. - "But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he has to do with the word 'five'?" - Well, I am assuming that he acquires, as I have described. The explanations come to an end somewhere. - [What's the meaning of the word 'five'? - There was no question of such an entity 'meaning' here; only of the way in which "five" is used. ~~The notion of the word-as-being-determined-only-by-the-way-in-which-five-is-used.~~- 3. That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive notion of language of the way in which our language functions. But one might also say that it is the notion of a more primitive language than ours.
- 4. Let us imagine a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language shall help to be the means of communication between a builder A to make himself understood by an assistant B.

2

- assistant B. A is constructing a building out of building stones; there is a supply of cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the buildingstones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: "(c)cube", "column", "slab", "beam". A ~~brings~~ out the words; - B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call.
- ~~This~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~a~~ ~~complete~~ ~~primitive~~ ~~language~~.
5. Augustine describes, we might say, a system of communication; ~~not~~ ~~not~~ ~~every~~ ~~thing~~, ~~however~~, that we call language is this system. (And this ~~must~~ ~~be~~ ~~one~~ ~~that~~ ~~sa~~ ~~(y)~~ ~~in~~ ~~every~~ ~~s~~ ~~(i)~~ ~~o~~ many cases whe ~~(i)~~ ~~n~~ the question arises: "Can this ~~an~~ ~~appropriate~~ description be used or can't it be used ~~as~~ ~~a~~ ~~best~~?" The answer is, "Yes, it ~~can~~ ~~be~~ ~~used~~ ~~in~~ ~~appropriate~~"; but only for this narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you ~~use~~ ~~profess~~ ~~(+g)~~ ~~(ed)~~ to describe ~~it~~." Think of the theories of ~~the~~ ~~economists~~.)
6. It is as though someone explained: "Playing a game consists in moving things ab ~~(o)~~ ~~ut~~ on a surface according to certain rules ...", and we ~~were~~ ~~to~~ ~~answer~~ ~~him~~: You ~~are~~ ~~apparently~~ ~~mean~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~thinking~~ ~~of~~ ~~games~~ played on a board; but th ~~(e)~~ ~~se~~ aren't all ~~game~~ ~~s~~ the games there are. You can put your description right by confining it explicit ~~(+y)~~ ~~ly~~ to those games.
7. Imagine a way of writing ~~in~~ ~~which~~ ~~letters~~ ~~are~~ ~~used~~ ~~to~~ ~~indicate~~ ~~stand~~ ~~for~~ ~~sounds~~, but ~~are~~ ~~used~~ ~~also~~ ~~to~~ ~~indicate~~ ~~emphasis~~ ~~in~~ ~~accents~~ and as ~~marks~~ ~~of~~ ~~punctuation~~ ~~sign~~. (One can regard a way of writing ~~in~~ ~~script~~ as a language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone ~~understood~~ ~~interpreted~~ ~~this~~ ~~way~~ ~~of~~ ~~writing~~ ~~in~~ ~~script~~ ~~a~~ ~~(s)~~ though ~~it~~ ~~were~~ ~~one~~ ~~in~~ ~~which~~ ~~to~~ ~~every~~ ~~all~~ ~~letters~~ ~~there~~ ~~simply~~ ~~corresponded~~ ~~to~~ ~~stand~~ ~~for~~ ~~sounds~~, and as though the letters ~~there~~ ~~did~~ ~~not~~ ~~have~~ ~~other~~ ~~very~~ ~~also~~ ~~quite~~ ~~different~~ ~~functions~~ ~~as~~ ~~well~~. - Such ~~(i)~~ ~~n~~ ~~an~~ ~~oversimplified~~ ~~view~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~type~~ ~~our~~ ~~script~~ ~~is~~ ~~like~~ ~~this~~ ~~one~~ ~~resembles~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~analogy~~, I believe, ~~the~~ ~~Augustine's~~ ~~view~~ ~~of~~ ~~language~~.
8. If ~~one~~ ~~considers~~ ~~the~~ ~~example~~ (2) ~~one~~ ~~may~~ ~~perhaps~~ ~~begin~~ ~~to~~ ~~suspect~~ ~~get~~ ~~an~~ ~~idea~~ ~~of~~ ~~how~~ ~~the~~ ~~commonly~~ ~~accepted~~ ~~concept~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~meaning~~ ~~of~~ ~~words~~ ~~surrounds~~ ~~the~~ ~~functioning~~ ~~of~~ ~~language~~ with a mist that makes ~~clear~~

3

clear vision is impossible to see clearly, it scatters the fog is dispersed if we study the phenomena of language in primitive ~~cases~~ ^{cases} of its application, ~~where~~ ^{where} the simplicity enables one in which it is easy to get a clear view of the purpose of ~~way~~ ^{way} the words function and of ~~what their purpose is,~~ ^{the way they function.}

Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.

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72 And [H]ere we come up against the big question that lies ^{lying} behind all these considerations ^{the enquiries we have been making: [F]or one might ~~chide~~ say to me: "You're tak[=ing] it easy! You talk about^{of} all sorts of language games, but you have}

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have never said what it is that's ~~to~~ essential to ~~---~~ a language game, and th[at] [us] ~~came~~ to language[-:][W]hat's ~~to~~ ~~to~~ ^{is} common to all these processes ^{procedures and^{to}} ~~---~~ makes 'us call them languages, or parts of the + language. ~~You treat yourself to precisely~~ ^{That means you ~~---~~ don't bother now about} that part of the enquiry, ~~therefore~~ which at one time gave you the greatest ~~puzzlement~~ ^{difficulty,} ~~namely~~ that concerning the general form of the proposition~~---~~ and of language."

And th[at] [is] is true. - Instead of ~~saying~~ ^{pointing out} something which is in common to all that we call language, I say there is no one thing ~~---~~ in common ^{to these phenomena} ~~---~~ ^{in virtue of which we} ~~---~~ ^{that makes us} use the same ~~name~~ ^{"word for all of them"} - they are ~~related~~ ^{akin} ~~to~~ ~~one~~ ~~each~~ ~~other~~ in many different ways. And ~~on account~~ ^{because} of this ~~relationship, or these relationships,~~ ^{kinship} we call them all "languages". I ~~will~~ ^{shall} try to explain this.

73 Let us ~~(e)consider~~ ~~for a moment~~ ^{---:--} the processes ~~that~~ ^{which} we call "games". ~~for instance~~ I mean games ~~played on a board~~ ^{board-games}, card games, ball games, ~~chess~~ ^{chess} contests ~~in the ring, etc.~~ ^{etc.}. What is ^{is} common to all these? - Don't say: "there ~~must~~ ^{is} something ^{is} common to them" ~~!i, because~~ they would ~~n(=)~~ be called 'games' ⁻⁻⁻ but ~~look and see~~ whether something is ^{is} common to all of them . - ~~because~~ ^{For} if you look at them, though you ~~will not~~ ^{won't} see ~~something~~ ^{anything} that's common to all of them, but you will see similarities, connections - a ~~long string~~ ^{whole lot} of them. As I sa[=id]: don't think, but look. - Look ~~for instance~~ ^{---:R} at the ~~board games played on a board, with and their various connections,~~ ^{similarities between them.} Now pass to card games: ~~here you~~ ^{will} find many points of ~~correspondence~~ ^{similarity} ~~---~~ ^{between this group and} the first ~~class~~ ^[r:]; but many ~~characteristic~~ ^{common} features disappear, and new ones appear. If you ~~now~~ pass to ball games, much that ~~is~~ ^{there was} in common remains, but a ~~lot~~ ^{great deal} is lost. - Are they all ~~still~~ ^{interesting} ~~---~~ ^{interesting}? Compare chess with Noughts & Crosses. Or is there ~~in every case~~ ^{always} such a thing as winning and losing or

~~competition~~ between the players? Think of ~~the game~~ of patience ~~(-[s])~~.
 In ball games there is win[ing] and losing, but ~~if~~ when a child ^{is} ~~throwing~~ ^{bouncing}
~~the~~ ball against ~~the~~ wall and catch[ing] it, ~~again~~ ^{this feature has}
~~disappeared~~ ^{there is no winning and losing,} ~~see what~~ ^{look at the} part ^{which} skill and luck play. And what a
 difference there is between skill ~~(in~~ ^{a game of} chess and skill in
~~a game of~~ tennis. ^{How} ~~[it]~~ ^{link} ~~now~~ ^{of} ~~round~~ ^{playing a dancing} games: here ~~there is~~ ^{we have} the
 element of ~~amusement~~ ^{entertainment}, but how many ~~etc~~ of the other character-
 istic features have disappeared! And ~~each~~ ^{we} may go through the
~~many~~ many other groups of games ~~(- [-])~~ ^{Matching} similarities ~~show~~
~~themselves~~ ^{types} and disappear.

And ~~now~~ the result of these ~~considerations~~ ^{observations} is: ~~[W]e~~ see a
 complicated net ^{of} similarities ~~which~~ overlap ^{and} cross ^{one} ^{another}.
 Similarities in ^{the} large ~~respects~~ and in ^{the} small.

I can ~~be~~ []] ~~characteristic~~ ^{these similarities better than by the}
~~used~~ ^{find a better a more appropriate} ~~name~~ ^{name} for these similarities ^{than} "family similarities ^{likenesses}"; for ~~that~~ ^{it} is ~~the way~~ ^{the}
~~different~~ ^{how the}

various similarities overlap and cross ~~one another~~ which hold between the

members of a family : build, ~~facial characteristics~~ ^{features}, ^{the} colour of
 the eyes, ~~hair~~ ^{eyes}, temperament, etc. etc..- And I shall say the
~~(- [-])~~ games ~~(- [-])~~ constitute a family.

And in the same way the kinds of numbers, ~~for instance~~, ^(- [-])
 constitute a family. Why do we call something a "number"? Well,
 perha[ps] because it has a - (direct) - kinship ~~with many~~ ^{to some} things which,
^{up to the present,} ~~we have~~ ^{been} called numbers ~~in the past~~; and thereby, we may say, it
~~relatives~~ ^{gets} related indirectly ~~connection~~ ^{with} other ~~(- [-])~~ things which we call
 by the same name. And we extend our concept of number, as we twist

fibre on fibre in ~~spinning~~ ^{spinning} a thread. And the strength of
 the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the

through the whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres overlap.

But if someone ~~wishes~~ ^{sees} ~~sa[yr]id~~: "Then there is something ⁱⁿ common to all these ~~creations~~ ^{objects}, namely ~~the~~ ^{the} disjunction of all these common ~~features~~ ^{properties}", then I should answer: Here you ~~are~~ ^{are} ~~merely~~ ^{just} playing with a ~~w[er]ld~~ ^{world}. One ~~might~~ ^{you may} just as well say: ~~something~~ ^{something} runs through the ~~entire~~ ^{whole} thread, ~~namely~~ ^{the} uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.

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We ~~may~~ ^{might} say the concept "game" is a concept with ~~heavy~~ ^{blurred} edges. - "But is a ~~heavy~~ ^{blurred} concept a ~~concept~~ ^{concept} at all?" - Is an ~~indistinct~~ ^{blurred} photograph a picture of a ~~person~~ ^{person} at all? - In fact, ~~can one always~~ ^{is it always} ~~replace an indistinct photograph~~ ^{replace a} ~~by a distinct~~ ^{sharp} one ~~to advantage?~~ ^{to advantage?} Isn't ~~what is~~ ^{indistinct} often just ~~the thing~~ ^{what we want?}

Frege compares the concept ~~with~~ ^{with} a district, and says: a district without clear boundaries you ~~could~~ ^{could} not call a district at all. Th[er]e[is] means, ~~no-one~~ ^{no-one} ~~could~~ ^{could} do anything with it. But is it meaningless to say: "Stay ~~approximately~~ ^{approximately} roughly there"? Imagine ~~yourself~~ ^{yourself} standing ^{in a street}. With ~~another person in a place~~ ^{someone} and sa[yr]id this. In ~~doing so~~ ^{saying it} ~~you will not even draw any boundary, but rather~~ ^{you just} make ~~only~~ ^{only} a pointing ~~movement with my hand~~ ^{gesture} - ~~just~~ ^{just} exactly as though ~~we~~ ^{we} were pointing ~~at a particular point~~ ^{at}. And in just this way ~~this is how we may explain~~ ^{this is how we may explain} ^{to someone, say, what a game is. We give} ~~him~~ ^{him} examples and want them ~~in a certain sense~~ ^{to be understood} ^{in a certain way}. - But with b[er]y this ~~expression~~ ^{expression} I do not mean: that he is ~~supposed~~ ^{now} to see what is ~~in comm[un]ic[ation]~~ ⁱⁿ ^{to all} these examples, ~~the common factor being one which, for some reason or other, I could not~~ ^{as unable to} ~~express~~ ^{point out} - but "I mean that he is ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~use~~ ^{use} these examples in a particular way. Giving examples is ~~there not~~ ^{there not} ~~an indirect means~~ ^{an indirect means} ^{of explaining}, - ~~if~~ ^{used for} ~~you want of a better one.~~ ^{For} ~~any~~ ^{any} general explanation can be misunderstood ~~too~~ ^{too}, ^{just as examples can}. - That's ~~just~~ ^{just} ~~is~~ ^{is} how ~~we play~~ ^{we play} the game ^{is played}. (I mean the language game with the word "game").

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It is as though we had to look through the phenomena: our enquiry, however, does not look into the phenomena, but rather, — as we might say, — opens the possibilities of phenomena. We see (That's to see, we call to order, the kind of statements that we make about the phenomena. Thus Augustine calls to mind the various statements which one makes about the duration of events, about their past, present or future. (These statements, of course, are not philosophical statements about time, past, present and future.)

Our view investigation is therefore a grammatical one. And this view investigation brings light into our problem by clearing away misunderstandings. Misunderstandings, namely, which concerning the use of the words of our language, and which are brought about by analogies which hold between our different forms of expression. — And one can remove these misunderstandings can be removed by replacing some certain forms of expression by

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others. We may call this ^{This may be called} "analysing" our forms of expression, since ^{for} the procedure sometimes bears a resemblance to taking something to pieces, that of an analysis.

It may now ^{That it may seem, however,} as though there were ~~something~~ like an ultimate analysis of our forms of ~~speech~~, ^{expression, linguistic forms}, & therefore one completely analysed ~~form of the expression~~, ^{state of these expressions}. That is: "it may seem" as though our usual forms of expression were, essentially, ~~still~~ unanalysed; as though something were hidden in them which has to be brought to light: ~~which has to be brought out into the light.~~ ~~// // //~~ ^{if this has been} ~~done, the expression is~~ ^{language would be} completely ~~explained~~ and our problem ~~is~~ solved.

We may put it ~~also~~ in this way: ^{This can be put as follows:} [We] ~~we~~ remove misunderstandings by making our expressions more ~~exact~~: ~~is that~~ ^{that} it may seem as though we were trying to reach one ~~particular state~~, ~~that~~ of perfect exactness; ^{and} as though ~~that is~~ were the real aim of our ~~investigation~~.

100

This is ^{what's} expressed in the question as to the essence ^{nature} of language, of ~~the~~ ^{the} proposition, of thinking. - For ~~if we say~~ ^{although} in our ~~inquiries also~~ ~~(~~ ~~investigations we are trying~~ ~~)~~ to understand the essence ^{nature} of language - (its function, its ~~construction~~ ^{structure}), - still it isn't ~~that~~ which the ~~question~~ has in view. For ~~it~~ ^{this question does not see} the essence ~~not in~~ ^{as} something ~~that is~~ ~~(~~ ~~which~~ ~~)~~ already lies open ~~to view~~ ~~(~~ ~~before us~~ ~~)~~, and which by ~~(~~ ~~the~~ ~~process of ordering~~ ~~)~~ ^{being put in order} becomes ~~visible at~~ ~~glance~~. ^{transparent - I mean capable of being all seen at a glance:} [B]ut rather ^{as} something which lies ~~beneath~~ ~~(~~ ~~under~~ ~~)~~ the surface ~~(~~ ~~)~~, something which lies within ~~(~~ ~~)~~, which ~~we~~ see when we ~~look~~ ~~through~~ ~~it~~ the thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.

^{"The essence ^{nature} is hidden ~~from us~~ ^{to us}": The essence is what's hidden: th[is] is the form ~~which~~ our problem ~~takes now~~. We ask: "What is language?", "What is ~~the~~ ^a proposition?". And the answer to these questions is [~~to be~~] ^{to be} given once and}

and for all, and independent of all future experience.

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Wittgenstein on Translation: Sense-for-sense and Epistemological Issues

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Abstract: This paper concentrates on Wittgenstein's conception of translation in his early and later philosophy, with a particular focus on the distinction between sense-for-sense and word-for-word method. In his revision of the English translation of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein clearly defends a sense-for-sense approach, something that has not always been well understood by his translators. In the first part of the paper, I scrutinize different translations of the *Tractatus* identifying some problems that may lead to serious misunderstanding. In the second part of the paper, I briefly examine remarks on translation made by Wittgenstein, both early and late, from an epistemological standpoint.

Keywords: Epistemology – Sense-for-sense – Translation – Wittgenstein

Introduction

In this paper I analyse some of Wittgenstein's remarks on translation both from his early and later thought. In a letter to C. K. Ogden, dated 23 April 1922, written just before the English publication of the *Tractatus*, he said that “[t]he translation [...] was in many points by far too literal” and that all his effort in the revision was made “in order to translate the *sense* (not the words)” (Wittgenstein 1973, p. 19). This brings to the fore the linguistic distinction between sense-for-sense and word-for-word translation, with Wittgenstein giving a number of reasons for rejecting the latter. What he discards is the possibility of a direct, literal translation that operates *verbatim*, or *verbum pro verbo*, i.e. one word at a time, without looking at the whole context. His view is that only a sense-for-sense translation can do justice to the text since one needs to take into consideration what the words mean in the different contexts in which they occur. In the first part of this paper I illustrate Wittgenstein's perspective with examples from the *Tractatus*, accompanied by comments on English and Portuguese

translations of the work. However, I shall argue, Wittgenstein's comments on translation are not limited to its practice but involve other aspects, particularly of an epistemological nature. These include: (i) definitionality; (ii) presuppositional knowledge; (iii) rule-following; (iv) the translation of facts into propositions; and (v) thinking without speaking and the translatability of "wordless thought into words". I concentrate on each of these issues in the second part of the paper. My aim is to draw attention to certain aspects, not to offer a detailed treatment of them.

1. Sense-for-sense in the *Tractatus*

The first case I would like to discuss is the translation of proposition 3.001. The German reads as follows: "‘Ein Sachverhalt ist denkbar’ heisst: Wir können uns ein Bild von ihm machen" (Wittgenstein 1922, § 3.001). Wittgenstein's comment on the original translation of this proposition, in the above-mentioned letter to Ogden, is telling not only in regard to his view of what translating a sentence should be but also in regard to his philosophical standpoint. Ogden had proposed to Wittgenstein the following: "‘An atomic fact is thinkable’ – means: we can make for ourselves a picture of it" (Wittgenstein 1973, p. 38; cf. Wittgenstein 2016a, 10r). He then says:

3.001 I don't know how to translate this. The German "Wir können uns ein Bild von ihm machen" is a phrase commonly used. I have rendered it by "we can imagine it" because "imagine" comes from "image" and this is something like picture. In German it is a sort of pun you see. (Wittgenstein 1973, p. 24)

Accordingly, the final version of this proposition in the Ogden translation – to which Frank Ramsey has decisively contributed¹ – was: "An

¹ See the beginning of a letter from Wittgenstein to Ramsey of 1923 published in Wittgenstein (1973, p. 77).

atomic fact is thinkable’ – means: *we can imagine it*” (Wittgenstein 1922, § 3.001, my emphasis). But this would not be the only translation of the *Tractatus* to appear in English. Some years before the publication of the correspondence between Ogden and Wittgenstein, which testifies to his involvement in the process, David Pears and Brian McGuinness published a new translation of the book. Not surprisingly, the finale of the proposition in question appears there in a much less natural way: “‘A state of affairs is thinkable’: what this means is that *we can picture it to ourselves*” (Wittgenstein 1961, § 3.001, my emphasis). For readers of Portuguese, I ought to say that, in his Brazilian edition, J. A. Giannotti would make this proposition almost unintelligible, rendering it confusingly enough as: “‘Um estado de coisas é pensável’ significa: *podemos construir-nos uma figuração dêle*” (Wittgenstein 1968, § 3.001, my emphasis).

The ending in English would amount to “we can build us a figuration of it”. But even more confusing, to my mind, is M. S. Lourenço’s Portuguese translation of this proposition, a translation that appeared, it must be emphasized, when the Ogden-Wittgenstein correspondence had been published long before. It runs: “‘Um estado de coisas é pensável’, quer dizer: *podemo-nos fazer dele uma imagem*” (Wittgenstein 1995 [1987], § 3.001, my emphasis). This last part would mean in English something like “we can make ourselves a picture from it”! The most recent Brazilian edition by L. H. Lopes dos Santos offers a much clearer version: “‘Um estado de coisas é pensável’ significa: *podemos figurá-lo*” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1993], § 3.001, my emphasis). However, respecting Wittgenstein’s instructions, I would rather translate the final part of the proposition in a more colloquial way as “podemos imaginá-lo”, that is, “we can imagine it”, instead of “we can picture it”.

Another proposition that has raised difficulties for translators is 2.1. It is noteworthy that in the *Prototractatus* manuscript the same proposition has a different wording, one that was retained in the typescripts of the *Tractatus* and only hand-corrected in TSS 202 and 204. Here is the original formulation: “Die Tatsachen begreifen wir in Bildern” (Wittgenstein

2000/2015: MS 104, 3; cf. TSS 202-204, 3r). The final version reads: “Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen” (Wittgenstein 1922, § 2.1; cf. Wittgenstein 2000/2015: TS 202 and 204, 3r). In the Ogden translation this appears as: “We make to ourselves pictures of facts” (Wittgenstein 1922, § 2.1). Interestingly, the first version of the translation was “for ourselves” (Wittgenstein 2016a, 6r). A letter from Ogden that was published only in Wittgenstein’s *Gesamtbriefwechsel* contains an allusion to it:

2.1. “We make for ourselves pictures of facts”. Are you here discussing psychology, or is Russell right in saying that this is an entirely non-psychological set of propositions? In 4.1121 we seem to have statements (a) That you are not concerned with psychology, and (b) That you are studying thought processes (which is commonly regarded as psychology). (Wittgenstein 2004a, 20.3.1922)

But in a questionnaire from Ogden received by Wittgenstein in May 1922, a facsimile of which was included in the 1973 publication of their correspondence, we already find the final translation of 2.1 (Wittgenstein 2016b, 1r). The option adopted by Pears and McGuinness was not considerably different: “We picture facts to ourselves” (Wittgenstein 1961, § 2.1). But Giannotti’s and Lourenço’s translations are again puzzling. I quote the two together: “Fazemo-nos figurações dos fatos” (Wittgenstein 1968, § 2.1); “Fazemo-nos imagens dos factos” (Wittgenstein 1995 [1987], § 2.1). In English they would correspond to “We make ourselves figurations of facts” and “We make ourselves images of facts”, respectively. Closer to Wittgenstein’s sense, Lopes dos Santos’ version runs thus: “Figuramos os fatos” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1993], § 2.1). This is equivalent to “We picture the facts”. But I think that the authority of the Ogden translation should be sufficient to translate this proposition as “Fazemos para nós imagens dos factos”, that is, “We make to ourselves pictures of facts”.

The third and last example I wish to consider is the translation of proposition 4.01. The German original is: “Der Satz ist ein Bild der Wirklichkeit. Der Satz ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit, so wie wir sie uns denken”

(Wittgenstein 1922, § 4.01). This was initially rendered as: “The proposition is a picture of the reality. The proposition is a model of the reality, as we think of it” (Wittgenstein 2016a, 21r). But Wittgenstein replied to Ogden in his letter of 23 April 1922 as follows: “4.01 ‘As we think of it’ isn’t what I mean. What I mean is, roughly speaking, that a prop[osition] is a model of reality as we imagine it (i.e. as we imagine reality)” (Wittgenstein 1973, p. 25). The typescript of the translation was then corrected and this is how the proposition reads in the final translation:

The proposition is a picture of ~~the~~ reality.
 The proposition is a model of the reality; as we ~~think of it~~ think it is.
 (Wittgenstein 2016a, 21r; cf. Wittgenstein 1922, § 4.01)

Pears and McGuinness have captured Wittgenstein’s intentions well, translating the proposition in question in the following manner:

A proposition is a picture of reality.
 A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it. (Wittgenstein 1961, § 4.01)

On the contrary, Giannotti and Lourenço have rendered this exactly as Wittgenstein did not want it. Once again I quote the two translations together:

A proposição é figuração da realidade.
 A proposição é modelo da realidade tal como a pensamos.
 (Wittgenstein 1968, § 4.01)

A proposição é uma imagem da realidade.
 A proposição é um modelo da realidade tal como nós a pensamos.
 (Wittgenstein 1995 [1987], § 4.01)

Lopes dos Santos’ version is preferable here too:

A proposição é uma figuração da realidade.

A proposição é um modelo da realidade tal como pensamos que seja. (Wittgenstein 2001 [1993], § 4.01)

I could add other instances but I am convinced the cases discussed suffice to show that to translate a work like the *Tractatus* one needs to take into consideration all possible sources of explanation of more unclear passages. The correspondence with Ogden is an indispensable tool as it often reveals Wittgenstein's aims in an unparalleled way. Whereas translators before 1973 had no access to it, all subsequent endeavours to render the *Tractatus* cannot pass silently by Wittgenstein's own word on many propositions. Against the background of further materials related to the publication of the work,² we can see that his goal, despite the technicalities of the book, was to use everyday expressions that only a sense-for-sense translation can capture.

² See Wittgenstein 2004b and the more recent Wittgenstein 2016a and 2016b.

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds.).
Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 189-202, v. 86, 2019

2. Epistemological Issues

(i) *Definitonality*

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein wrote: “Definitions are rules for the translation of one language into another. Every correct symbolism must be translatable into every other according to such rules. It is *this* which all have in common” (Wittgenstein 1922, § 3.343). What this means is that symbolism, which includes, besides logical notations, languages like English, German or Portuguese, is not essential. What is essential is a *rule of thought* that enables us, for example, to translate “table” as “Tisch” or “mesa”. But how does this rule work? We do not explicitly define that a table must have this and that ontological characteristic for there can always be empirical innovations. Yet some basic properties must be defined, though inexplicitly, in order to not confound a table with any other object. The definition of “table” as such and such that can be translated as “Tisch” or “mesa” depends indeed on our having a series of aspects in mind that go much beyond the mere identification of the thing in question. This involves the simultaneous definitonality (and translatability) of what can be called *object extensions*, e.g. immobility, solidity, weightiness, etc. Every definition is linked to a set of extensions of which only a few are overtly considered (*O_{ext 1}*, *O_{ext 2}*, *O_{ext 3}*, etc.). The remainder lie at the back of our intricate mental processes (*O_{ext n}*). Needless to say, what happens with the definition of objects applies to that of relations (to the left or to the right of, in front of or behind, etc.) and states (fast or slow, happy or unhappy, etc.). Definition is therefore a form of presupposition.

(ii) *Presuppositional knowledge*

Also in the *Tractatus* we find the following propositions addressing the theme of translation:

The translation of one language into another is not a process of translating each *proposition* of the one into a *proposition* of the other, but only the constituent parts of propositions (*Satzbestandteile*) are translated.

(And the dictionary does not only translate substantives but also adverbs and conjunctions, etc., and it treats them all alike.)

The meanings of the simple signs (the words) must be explained to us, if we are to understand them. (Wittgenstein 1922, §§ 4.025-4.026)

These are preceded in the *Tractatus* by a proposition that reads:

To understand a proposition means to know what is the case, if it is true.

(One can therefore understand it without knowing whether it is true or not.)

One understands it if one understands its constituent parts (*Bestandteile*). (Wittgenstein 1922, § 4.024)

In the *Prototractatus* manuscript (Wittgenstein 2000/2015: MS 104, 49), the proposition corresponding to the first paragraph of 4.025 of the *Tractatus*, numbered 4.0261, is to be found between the one numbered 2.011 in both texts and 5.30222 in the former and 5.454[1] in the latter. They run as follows in the Ogden translation: “It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part (*Bestandteil*) of an atomic fact. In logic there is no side by side (*Nebeneinander*), there can be no classification” (Wittgenstein 1922, §§ 2.011 and 5.454[1]). In the process of translation, we can consult the dictionary in order to be sure about the meanings of some puzzling words, but we do not use the dictionary for every bit of text. We presuppose, for instance, that the German word “in” means the same as the English word “in” and we only *translate* what is not immediately clear to us. The important thing is to understand the “constituent parts” of the

proposition. If I were to translate a sentence written in Chinese, a language that I do not know, I would not even be able to recognize a sentential structure, i.e. its “constituent parts”. It is thus fundamental to presuppose a series of elements exactly as we do in regard to experience in general. That is why translating is first and foremost a cognitive endeavour. What the translator does is to replicate an epistemic situation in which something is grasped. The understanding of each *definiens* is attained by our connecting several *definiencia* in a systematic manner. No surprise then that native speakers, who master their language as a whole, can perceive nuances that are usually lost to non-native speakers.

(iii) *Rule-following*

In the transitional period, Wittgenstein speaks about the “dictionary” in terms of “rule of translation”. Here are two illustrative passages, the first dating from 31 July 1930 and the second from 23 October 1930:

Controlling a translation according to the dictionary is exactly the same as controlling a calculation according to the calculation rules. (Wittgenstein 2000/2015: MS 109, 75, my translation)

The dictionary ~~is~~ gives the general rule of translation. But even the dictionary must be understood ^{so} in first place. Is there an understanding of a general rule ^{as such} except through its application? (Wittgenstein 2000/2015: MS 109, 169, my translation)³

Wittgenstein’s teaching is that we must already be in possession of some knowledge that authorizes us to follow the rule of translation. Again,

³ Wittgenstein’s own words are: “Das Kontrollieren einer Übersetzung nach dem Wörterbuch ist genau analog dem Kontrollieren einer Rechnung nach den Rechnungsregeln.” And: “Das Wörterbuch ~~ist~~ gibt die allgemeine Regel der Übersetzung. Aber auch das Wörterbuch muß ja ^{so} erst verstanden werden. Gibt es ein Verstehen einer allgemeinen Regel als solcher außer durch ihre Anwendung?”

a Chinese-English dictionary would be of no help to someone who does not have a command of the Chinese language. That is why Wittgenstein calls our attention to the analogies between translating and calculating. Imagine that to calculate we had to consult the rules of calculation at all times – it would not work. Take the case of ‘ $200 + 200 + 225$ ’. A straight way of calculating this is to add 200 to 200, obtaining 400, and then add the final 225 to obtain 625. Maybe in our minds we have actually added 200 to 200 and, to make things easier, 400 to 200 adding the final 25 only later to arrive at 625. These calculations are done without looking at multiplication tables or reckoning, for example, that 25×25 or 25^2 equals 625, even if these possibilities can also be considered. We once more have a case of presuppositional knowledge. The rules are obeyed somehow *blindly*. Only in this way can a calculation or a translation be natural. For Wittgenstein, the rules we follow are not laid down permanently before us but our obedience to them flows like our life.

(iv) *The translation of facts into propositions*

Consider now the following remarks dated 10 February 1931 selected for *Culture and Value*:

The limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the fact that corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence.

(We are involved here with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy.) (Wittgenstein 1998 [1977], p. 13e)

What does Wittgenstein mean by “the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy”? He seems to be saying that we cannot, as the *Critique of Pure Reason* claims, arrive at the facts themselves, only at our subjective projections of them. True, the Kantian limits of knowledge are the

Wittgensteinian limits of language. What is at stake is that we cannot go beyond what our language projects. Any attempt to go deeper into the description of a fact leads us to new projections that ultimately do not touch the very same fact we are describing. There exist other passages on translation in the same manuscript volume that are similarly epistemological in nature. One of them was written down on 20 June 1931 and made its way into the so-called *Big Typescript* (TS 213) around 1933. There it reads:

After all, our grammatical investigation differs from that of a philologist, etc.: what interests us, for instance, is the translation from one language into other languages we have invented. In general the rules that the philologist totally ignores are the ones that interest us. Thus we are justified in emphasizing this difference. (Wittgenstein 2005, p. 305e; cf. Wittgenstein 2000/2015: MS 110, 194-195)

Another related passage dates from 1 July 1931 and runs thus:

When I say that every picture still needs an interpretation, then “interpretation” means the translation into another picture or into action. (Wittgenstein 2000/2015: MS 110, 244, my translation)⁴

A leitmotiv of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, both early and late, is the pictorial character of our understanding of the world. No fact is accessed without our integration of it into a proposition that appears before us as an image. We can only think through images and we move from image to image, creating a world picture. Taken as a whole, these remarks make us see that in the transitional period Wittgenstein did not give up entirely the peculiar transcendental solipsism held in the *Tractatus*. Even though he made solipsism coincident with realism, this view encompasses an

⁴ Here is the German original: “Wenn ich sage, jedes Bild braucht noch eine Interpretation, so heißt ‘Interpretation’ die Übersetzung in ein weiteres Bild oder in die Tat.”

indeterminacy or a relativism that has consequences for both epistemology and translation studies. It is only in action that indeterminacy or solipsism disappears. As Wittgenstein's later writings demonstrate, it is a question of logic – the logic of our experience – to reject a sceptical attitude towards the world.

(v) *Thinking without speaking*

In various documents belonging to the *Nachlass*, Wittgenstein discusses, in connection with William James' *The Principles of Psychology*, whether “one can think (*denken*) without speaking” (*sprechen*).⁵ James' problem is how to translate “wordless thought into words”. But can we really articulate thoughts without language? Here is how James saw the problem:

[...] a deaf and dumb man can weave his tactile and visual images into a system of thought quite as effective and rational as that of a word-user. *The question whether thought is possible without language* has been a favorite topic of discussion among philosophers. Some interesting reminiscences of his childhood by Mr. Ballard, a deaf-mute instructor in the National College at Washington, show it to be perfectly possible. (James 1890, p. 266)

According to the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*, thought is only possible within language and that is the reason why metaphysical or mystical thoughts are nonsensical since they go beyond significant language and consequently do not form possible states of affairs. But in his later philosophy Wittgenstein opens the way to the untranslatability of certain thoughts of a psychological nature into language. There are indeed several remarks belonging to the texts on the philosophy of psychology that point to the incapacity we have of verbally expressing some feelings. What they

⁵ Cf. Wittgenstein 2000/2015: MS 165, 195-196; MS 129, 4-5; TSS 241a/b, § 82.

suggest is a priority of thought over language against which the author of the *Tractatus* so forcefully raised his hand.

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Philosophy of language and translation

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Abstract: Departing from the fact that *translating* is a phenomenon of language (use), I argue here that *conception of language* is logically prior to any *theory of translation* one might put up, and then draw some consequences from this argument. After sketching a brief summary of contemporary Translation Studies and highlighting some points of convergence with Wittgenstein's later philosophy, I suggest that the old idea of translation as referring to the (linguistic) *system(s)* should give place to a focus on the *action* – as favored by Wittgenstein. In this, Toury's *translation norms* are compatible with the Wittgensteinian distinction between *normative* and *descriptive use*, also as it's expressed in Moreno's *epistemology of usage*. The ideas of *context enlargement* and of *choice* at different levels help to round up the picture and to set up bridges between Translation Studies and Wittgensteinian scholarship.

Keywords: Philosophy of Language, Translation Theory, Wittgenstein

1. Prologue: bridges

When one tries to set up bridges between Wittgensteinian scholarship and Translation Studies (TS), as is the case in this paper, the tasks to be dealt with in both fields are quite different. Translation scholars are used to be confronted with philosophical questions and easily recognize them as relevant. Here, one of the main difficulties is to make it clear that a Wittgensteinian approach is not a mere variant of Derridean deconstruction or similar kinds of relativism (akin to a skeptical position in Philosophy), but rather a very solid alternative to the dichotomy essentialism vs. relativism (Oliveira 2005). Another barrier in this field is a certain tendency to search the answers to a vast array of questions strictly in the empirical, failing to recognize that the questions to be answered are often pertinent to different domains and levels of discussion. In this case, an exception would be exactly deconstruction, but this approach does not target

convincing answers to practical (or pragmatic) questions, as it mostly remains on the level of the critique on essentialism (often allied with a tendency to psychologism): one disassembles but can not really reassemble – in a broader sense.

Philosophers, on their turn, seem barely to account for the existence of TS as an autonomous field of research that, although multidisciplinary by nature and constitutional history, has solid institutional foundations since at least the 1970s or 1980s.¹ This is probably one of the reasons why philosophers still place *equivalence* in the middle of their reasonings about translation (e.g., Glock 2008; cf. Oliveira forthcoming_a), while in TS the concept has lost its centrality since at least the middle of the 1980s to the early 1990s – which means nearly 30 years by now.

This is not to say that the search for *equivalence* should play no role in our discussion, but we certainly should reevaluate the potentials and shortcomings of this attempt, especially under the light of our understanding of how language actually functions. I'll come back to this point later.

2. Conception of language and theory of translation

In an early contribution to our theme (Oliveira 2007), I stated that Wittgenstein did not address the problem of translation in a systematic way, so that any theory of translation on his line would have to rely on the way he uses the concept in the different phases of his work. As a subsidiary hypothesis to this, I stated that such a theory of translation would have to be intimately linked to the respective conception of language it builds on. More recently, I came across a very solid analysis of the necessary relation between conception of language and translation theory in a book by Anette Kopetzki. In her critical review of the history of translation

¹ The name *Translation Studies* itself goes back to a paper by Holmes (2004 [1972]) usually considered a founding stone of the discipline. An easy accessible summary can be found at the site <<https://dilmanj.com/introducing-translation-studies/name-nature-translation-studies-james-holmes-summary/>>.

sketched by Georges Steiner (1975) in his classic volume *After Babel*, Kopetzki (1996, pp. 21, 26) concludes that, for practical reasons, different traditions try to reconcile a relativistic view of language with a universalistic understanding of translation (Christianism) and vice-versa (Judaism).²

Building on Kopetzki's findings, one can state that this lack of coherence is probably one of the main sources of conceptual confusion in theoretical thinking about translation, leading to the formulation of false problems and, as a logical consequence, of false or inadequate solutions – since there can be no good solution for an inadequately posed problem (unless we understand that dissolving the problem can also be called a solution to it). This leads to the formulation of my main hypothesis:

Translating occurs in language, it is a phenomenon of language (use). Thus, any coherent theory of translation we set up should necessarily build on our conception of language. Conversely, the way one talks about translation gives us information about the conception of language that is being mobilized.

In other words: language and conception of language are logically prior to translation and translation theory. If we ignore this asymmetrical relation, our translations theories are doomed to bear conceptual confusion. As a prophylactic measure against such confusion(s), I suggest a very simple test in the form of three basic questions:

- 1) Is the theory of translation I am mobilizing compatible with my declared conception of language? If not, I should rethink it.
- 2) If yes: what is this conception of language?
- 3) Does this conception of language pass the test of actual use? If not, I should rethink it.

² Kopetzki's reasoning about the quarrel between relativistic and universalistic positions in TS is resumed by Celso Cruz (2012, pp. 37-52), taking also more recent contributions into account.

One can hardly overlook the kinship of the last question with Wittgenstein's attitude in his discussion of the concept of game, when he introduces the notion of *family resemblance* – especially when he tells us to *look* instead of thinking, i.e. instead of setting up (hypothetical) theories and trying to match reality to them (PI, § 66; see also PI, § 107; cf. Oliveira 2015b).

My research program starts up from this set of principles and tries to explore its consequences by applying it to some central questions in TS. The premise is that if we tackle such problems with a conception of language informed by the later Wittgenstein, many of the apparently insurmountable difficulties simply disappear, for the confusions that engendered the problem(s) are dissolved. In other cases, the questions to be answered change, thus demanding different approaches.

On the other end, I propose that a Wittgensteinian reflection on translation – also in Philosophy – shall gain a lot by looking at what kinds of problems are considered central to contemporary TS, thus abandoning the sole question of equivalence (or fidelity) as a central one, and incorporating other dimensions that are often neglected or treated as peripheral – from an idealized point of view that might not be compatible with Wittgensteinian views on language, especially in the case of his later philosophy.

To explore these topics in an appropriate manner, it is advisable to begin situating the question we are discussing here – the translation of Philosophy and the specific case of Wittgenstein – in the broader field of contemporary TS.

3. Research approaches, types of translation

As already stated, the concept of equivalence has begun to lose its centrality in TS from the 1980s to the 1990s. That's the time of the so called *cultural turn*, the first of a series of great shifts in the object of study of mainstream research, and from more local but still significant streams

dedicated to specific topoi. Susan Bassnet and André Lefevere summarize the state of the art at that time:

The object of study has been redefined; what is studied is the text embedded within its network of both source and target cultural signs and in this way Translation Studies has been able both to utilize the linguistic approach and to move out beyond it. Moreover, with the demise of the notion of equivalence as sameness and the recognition of the fact that literary conventions change continually, the old evaluative norms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘faithful’ and ‘unfaithful’ translations are also disappearing. Instead of debating the accuracy of a translation based on linguistic criteria, translators and translations scholars (...) are tending to consider the relative function of the text in each of its two contexts. (Bassnet & Lefevere 1990, p. 12)

In her contribution to the same publication, Mary Snell-Hornby reviews the trends in Germany at that time, making it clear that the cultural turn is not restricted to literary translation, but also applies to linguistic approaches and so called pragmatic texts – academic ones included (also in Philosophy – we can add). After a critique of what she calls “the illusion of equivalence”, the author summarizes:

What is dominant in the series of new approaches recently presented in Germany (in particular Hönig and Kussmaul, 1982; Reiss and Vermeer 1984; Holz-Mänttari, 1984; see also a collection of essays in Snell-Hornby, 1986a) is the orientation towards *cultural* rather than linguistic transfer; secondly, the view that translation is not a process of transcoding but rather as *an act of communication*; thirdly, they are all oriented towards the *function* of the *target text* (prospective translation); fourthly, they view the text as an *integral part of the world* and not as an isolated specimen of language. These basic similarities are so striking that it is not exaggerated to talk of a new orientation in translation theory. (Snell-Hornby: 1990, pp. 81-82)

Thaïs Diniz (1994, p. 4) presents an even more synthetic summary, by stating that the main parameter – or the “translation unity” – has changed, growing up from the word to the sentence, then to the text and finally to the culture. This does not mean that the smaller unities are to be dismissed as parameters, but simply that one acknowledges that they often do not offer enough context for an adequate rendering in the complex task of passing from the source to the target environment. In other words, this means that one is ready to start from the whole instead of restricting oneself to smaller or larger parts – also bearing in mind that culture as this “whole” is a very complex thing.

This movement towards a larger context of analysis is certainly one of the main features of the institutional field of TS and informs a great number of contemporary translation theories. Furthermore, the notion of context enlargement is itself of great value to understand a key difference between the criticism of essentialism made by deconstruction and the one made from the Wittgensteinian stance I would like to reinforce. We’ll come back to this point after our brief historical review.

In *The turns of Translation Studies*, Mary Snell-Hornby (2006) provides a useful synthesis of the different approaches, pointing out the various shifts of mainstream research that aspired to occupy the middle of the field, acquiring the status of a new “turn”. After Snell-Hornby’s description, several new shifts have been proposed, e.g., the sociological (Wolf 2009), the anthropological (Stallaert 2013) and even a philosophical turn of Wittgensteinian extraction (Wilson 2016, p. 6). The last one certainly has not yet become reality and might remain a minor tendency, but it certainly would be the most interesting for us. Due to the ubiquity of electronic tools as localization software, translation memories, automatic translation (partially coupled with artificial intelligence) and so forth, one should also acknowledge the increasing importance of the technological dimension and of the tendencies to globalization. The “translation competence

wheel” from the *European Master in Translation* programs (EMT) gives an approximate idea of the relevance attributed to certain kinds of knowledge, making it clear that translation, as it is practiced by professionals in the real world, demands a larger array of competences as the ones traditionally pictured by laymen (**Picture 1**).



Picture 1: Translation competence wheel (in Torres-Simón & Pym 2017, p. 5)

For the translation of Philosophy, translational hermeneutics might be of special interest, even if this minority stream might never aspire the condition of a “turn” in the sense of occupying a central position in TS. However, the translation of philosophical texts certainly belongs to a specific *kind* of translation. *Skopos theory* suggests the existence of five different uses of the concept, as summarized by Snell-Hornby:

This approach relativizes both text and translation: the one and perfect translation does not exist, any translation is dependent on its skopos and its situation. (...) [T]he skopos approach has identified five broad translation types. The *interlinear version* (or word for word translation), as once used by Bible translators in the form of glosses, merely reproduces the linear sequence of words, irrespective of any rules of the TL [Target Language] language system. The *grammar translation*, as used in foreign language classes to test

knowledge of vocabulary and grammar, observes the rules of TL syntax, and the linguistic meaning itself is clear, but it functions at sentence level, and there is no context. The *documentary* or “scholarly” translation reflects Schleiermacher’s maxim of “moving the reader towards the author” (1.1): the text is here seen in its entirety, but the translation is oriented towards the source text and aims at informing the reader of its content, even by “alienating” or “foreignizing” the target language. The *communicative* or “instrumental” translation is oriented towards the target culture, using its conventions and idioms; the text function typically remains unchanged (as with instructions for use – cf. 2.3) and the text is not immediately recognizable as a translation. With the *adapting* or “modifying” translation, the source text functions as raw material to serve a particular purpose, as with multimedial or multimodal translation (3.1.3) or when news reports are used by press agencies. (Cf. Reiss and Vermeer 1984, p. 134-136, also Reiss 1995, p. 21-23, see too Gawlas 2004). With this approach a translation is seen in terms of how it serves its intended purpose, and the concept of translation, when set against the former criterion of SL [Source Language] equivalence, is **more differentiated and indeed closer to the realities of translation practice**. (Snell-Hornby 2006, pp. 52-53 [bold highlights added])

Translation of philosophical works clearly fits into the category of the “*documentary* or ‘scholarly translation’”, which is the type where the proximity (or adequacy) to the source text plays the most important role. What we should not do, is to equate translation *per se* with this category. Once one has acknowledged that this is only a special kind (under others), the next step is to understand how this kind of translation actually operates, in order not to fall back in the old track of thinking translation as the search for an already given equivalence (that might be found in the linguistic system itself). That’s the point where one has to distinguish the epistemic from the functional level.

In a text where I revisit a classic conference from Schleiermacher (2010 [1813]) under the light of the later Wittgenstein, I suggest that the scholarly

translation has the form of an Ouroboros, as it is designed for a specific purpose of the target public and will be read against the objects of comparison that public has at his/her disposal, even if its overt function is to understand the original text (or author):

to be coherent with Schleiermacher's own conception of language, one must conclude that, *on the epistemic level*, any translation (...) means bringing the source text to the frame of reference of the *translator* and of his/her audience in the target language. This amounts to a reinforcement of Toury's thesis that translations are, first and foremost, a fact of the *target* system. (...) If one wants to look at how things operate *at the same time* on different levels, a very punctual aspect of the *Skopos* theory may be enlightening, (...) especially when one is dealing with a "source-oriented" approach, as is the case [of the documentary or scholarly type of translation] suggested by Vermeer. On the *functional* level, being source oriented is a very significant feature, which distinguishes such a *documentary* translation from the more pragmatic type, such as product instructions or any text type that has to take the target culture into special consideration (...) [In] the reading of philosophical texts (...), what counts is understanding the *original* (...). One could think of such a translation as a kind of *Ouroboros*, the mythical animal that bites its own tail and is often referred to as a symbol of *rebirth* – a figure commonly used in association with the translation of classical texts. On the *epistemic* level, however, the differences vanish, as both text types [documentary and pragmatic] are intended for the target context, no matter how different appearances are on the surface. For (...) the reader will only be able to grasp the contents on the basis of his/her previous experience, within the frame of reference of his/her *world-image*. The reading (of the translated text) itself serves to expand or modify this frame of reference and is, in this respect, surely *target* oriented, especially since such an expansion/modification can *only* be made *from within*, if we assume, as I am proposing here, that Schleiermacher's conception of language is well founded. (Oliveira 2016, pp. 111-112)

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds.).

Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 203-238, v. 86, 2019

Another important point to be stressed is that, even at the functional level, target and source orientation do not appear in a dichotomic, mutually exclusive relation. Gideon Toury, one of the first translation scholars to recognize the relevance of Wittgenstein for TS and to point at the notion of *family resemblance* as a key concept, sums up:

By now, it should have become clear that translation is not a uniform kind of activity. It would be much more revealing to approach it as a class of phenomena which are connected by what Wittgenstein [PI, § 67] called “family resemblance”. (...) [T]here is no single feature that all translations, in all cultures, past, present and future, will ever have in common; hence the insurmountable difficulties in producing a definition of translation (...). The ‘value’ of translation, or the basic tools in a translator’s ‘kit’ (...) may be described as consisting of two principles whose realizations are interwoven in an almost inseparable way:

the production of a text in a particular culture/language which is designed to occupy a certain position, or fill a certain slot, in the host culture,

while, at the same time,

constituting a representation in that language/culture of a text already existing in some other language, belonging to a different culture and occupying a definable position within it.

These two principles have been termed **acceptability** vs. **adequacy**, respectively. Although the discrepancy between realizations of the two in reality may vary greatly, they should be tackled in isolation, as they are different *in principle*. The two cultures involved in a translation event may thus show greater or smaller similarities, whether by sheer coincidence or as a result of a previous history of contacts between them. What they can never be is identical. The normal state of affairs is a degree of incompatibility between adequacy and acceptability, so that any attempt to get closer to the one would entail a distancing from the other. Any concrete case thus involves an **ad hoc compromise** between the two. (Toury 2012, pp. 69-70).

It is a common tenet in contemporary TS that translating is a *decision-making* process, which operates at various levels, from the macro (what and why translate) to the micro one (translation strategies at genre, text, sentence, and word level).³ So, the ad hoc compromises Toury hints at will take place at these various levels and will entail different combinations. It is also important to distinguish the idea of *acceptability* from the actual *acceptance* of real translations. The first one has to do with the prevailing *norms* at a given point – which are to be described *a parte post*, based on the way people really translate(d) at a certain place and time. The second one shows what happened with particular translations. They may have introduced changes that went against the prevailing norms, so that their acceptance might lead to a change in the system of norms (e.g., which ones are central or peripheral) – just as new uses of words or concepts in the same language may lead to a change in the scope of those words and concepts. Or they may fail and not be accepted because of some lack of acceptability (which is a grammatical reason) or as a result of other (empirical or circumstantial) causes.

4. Intermezzo: on becoming a norm

It is interesting to see how different approaches extract different, sometimes contradicting consequences in their analysis of the same phenomena. On the empirical, practical level, the notion of context enlargement as a necessity for suitable solutions in translation theory and practice seems to be common to most areas of contemporary TS, with the notable (and powerful) exception of technology-based approaches, especially translation memories (cf. Stupiello & Oliveira 2015). On the epistemic level (linked to the conception of language), deconstruction comes to an opposite conclusion as the one to be drawn from the Wittgensteinian stance I adopt.

³ I'll come back to this theme in the last section of the paper, for my concluding discussion.

A famous deconstructivist formula states that “meaning is context bound, but context is boundless”, thus pointing to the intrinsic openness of interpretation. In this aspect, deconstruction is akin to the classic hermeneutical position held by Schleiermacher (whose heritage is still very alive in TS) and to Peircean semiology, in its understanding of the process of infinite semiosis. However, the excessive stress deconstruction puts on the gliding of the sense (the *différance*) obliterates the need to establish closure criteria – even virtual ones. Thus, deconstruction has problems in offering concrete solutions for practical questions – e.g., based on what criteria one should evaluate the quality of a certain rendering, without reducing them to the subjective level. This attitude of deconstruction, as it is expressed in some approaches in TS, comes very close to the position of the radical skeptic in Philosophy. Thence, the restrictions that one may present against the latter in Philosophy might also be valid in the case of the first in TS.

In his proposal of an *epistemology of usage*, largely based on his readings of Wittgenstein, Arley Moreno suggests that the idea of context enlargement dissolves the argument expressed by the

skeptical Kripkean observation (Kripke 1982), according to which it will never be possible to decide whether a rule is being followed or not, a concept properly applied – by placing this observation in the position of the divine look, i.e. by characterizing it, against the claims of skepticism, as essentialist. (...) This complex aspect of the relations between different contexts is what Wittgenstein indicates through a still very vague metaphor: *‘forms of life’*. (Moreno 2005, pp. 359-360; 2011, p. 259)⁴

What brings deconstruction to the same place as radical skepticism is the common attitude of assuming “the position of the divine look” in their characterization of closure criteria, with the consequence of stamping any

⁴ Salient aspects of this discussion are resumed, among others, in Moreno (forthcoming) Chap. I.6 and in his contribution to the present volume. If not acknowledged otherwise in the references, all translations are mine.

closure rule (even a virtual one), any norm of sense as “essentialist” (or merely subjective), thus not really accepting the culture (or the forms of life) as the ground of *norms* that are valid on their own rights – against the relativistic claims of deconstruction.

If we take my main hypothesis seriously, i.e., that a coherent translation theory must necessarily build up on our actual conception of language, we’ll conclude that many other aspects of Moreno’s *epistemology of usage* (and its underlying conception of language) have a direct impact on the way we can talk about translation. As translation is a special case of language use, an *epistemology of translating* on this line will most likely deal with similar problems, albeit on a different level. Since one of the central topics in this convergence is the concept of *norm*, linked to the discussion of closure criteria and their nature, that’s one point to be highlighted.

Gideon Toury’s most acknowledged contribution to TS is his concept of *translational norms*, which are to be *described* based on the analysis of concrete translations that have been successful to the point of building the pillars of *acceptability*. In Wittgensteinian terms, this means that they have become the privileged objects of comparison, serving as paradigm(s). Although Toury himself never stated a proximity to Wittgenstein in this matter, having constructed his concept of *norm* upon a sociological reasoning, a closer look at the epistemic level of language conception will show a (not surprising) proximity or, at least, a great compatibility between the two understandings of *norm* – or *normative use* (cf. Oliveira 2010, 2015a-b, 2016, 2019b). It is at this epistemic level that Moreno presents his arguments:

the ability to insert each of the individual contexts into other, always broader contexts, through its composition with other individual contexts – without being able to determine *a priori* an upper limit for this process (...) has the primary function of interrupting the indefinite chain of new individual contexts that could be presented as legitimate candidates for the application of a concept. It

is a holistic principle that enables the indication of a set of habits and conventions as *sufficient* criteria for identifying the correct or appropriate application of a rule, or rather, that allows us to decide which general context is *sufficient* so that the application of the concept can be judged as correct or appropriate. If each individual context always allows the creation of new ambiguities, then its insertion into a richer context could lead to disambiguation. (Moreno forthcoming, Chap. I.6; cf. 2011, p. 259; 2005, p. 359)⁵

The historically given enlargement of the “unit of translation” up to the level of culture is a concrete sign that TS might be receptive to viewing things under the light of a Wittgensteinian perspective – if we only are able to make this plausible by taking the actual problems of the field seriously. The questions raised by Moreno go further (or lie deeper) than the worries of TS, but the exploration of some convergent aspects might bring interesting insights for a translation theory of Wittgensteinian extraction.

5. The *locus* of translation in language

After the detour to get an overview of the field of TS and the intermezzo to point at the kinship of Toury’s concept of *translational norms* with a conception of *normative use* tributary to Wittgenstein, we can now resume my initial hypothesis about the relation between language and translation, or better, conception of language and theory of translation – the former being prior to the latter. I have posed that we need to maintain the coherence between the way we think about language and the place we reserve

⁵ Such a “set of habits and conventions as *sufficient* criteria” is exactly the case of Toury’s translational norms. Thus, Moreno’s argument can be used against the claims of deconstruction also to show that Toury’s stance is not to be considered “essentialist”, as argued, e.g., by Cristina Carneiro Rodrigues (2000). On this matter, see Oliveira (2005). Furthermore, it should be noticed that here context enlargement plays the opposite role as the one ascribed to it by deconstruction, the boundlessness of context being exactly what makes closure criteria possible and above all effective – as a virtual mechanism to be put to work whenever necessary.

for translation in this substract. I also made a pledge to look after the coherence between our conception of language and the way we *see* that language functions in practice, trying not to project the properties of our model upon the object – which was, as one knows, the attitude the later Wittgenstein recognized in his early, dogmatic views on language.

I very much agree with Dinda Gorfée (2012) about the infinite semiosis that goes on in any symbolic process, which naturally includes translation. But I have serious doubts when it comes to the analysis of concrete cases of translation, e.g., the discussion of Peter Winch’s renderings of Wittgenstein in *Culture and value* (Gorfée 2012, Chap. 5; see also her contribution to this volume, Section 3). My point is that the procedure mobilizes very much of what contemporary TS has left behind, from the kind of “the old evaluative norms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘faithful’ and ‘unfaithful’ translations”, in a debate about “the accuracy of a translation based on linguistic criteria”, as Bassnet & Lefevere (1990, p. 12) point out in the passage I quoted above. Certainly, a good deal of the changes in the renderings of Peter Winch can be ascribed to new insights he had after getting access to prior unknown material Wittgenstein wrote on the same or similar topics. But, if we overemphasize this, we might fail to notice that a new translation is *per definitionem* also much indebted to *new readings of already known material* – as the objects of comparison change with time or, to speak with Moreno, as the *circumstances* of the *application* of the signs change. In fact, I think this second aspect is much more akin the idea of infinite semiosis than the first one.⁶

⁶ I resume this discussion with Gorfée in Oliveira (forthcoming_a), in a section with the title “Can terminology halt infinite semiosis?”. On this topic, Kanavillil Rajagopalan (2009, p. 45) summarizes: “[...] a reading of a text is an extension of the very text. That is to say, no text comes out ‘unaffected’ by its successive readings. Each new reading of the text adds something to that text and is fully incorporated into the text’s ‘meaning’ so that the meaning of the text – to the extent there is such a thing – may be described as that which is constantly undergoing change, despite the illusory sensation that it is the self-same object that one is dealing with on successive occasions” (quoted in Rajagopalan 2012, pp. 106-

I also very much agree with most of what Philip Wilson (2016) wrote in his utterly welcome book, that has the merit of stablishing a very direct dialog of contemporary TS with Wittgensteinian scholarship. I am especially grateful for his insight of using the concept of perspicuous representation (*übersichtliche Darstellung*) for the case of translation. Indeed, if there are many different modes of making a perspicuous representation, different adequate translations can be seen as various perspicuous representations of the same object (cf. Oliveira forthcoming_a). On the importance of various other central concepts, as language games, aspects and forms of life, there seems to be a wide convergence. But we seem not to agree about the (im)possibility of combining Wittgenstein's views on language with, for instance, those of Chomsky, giving the privilege to the latter when it comes to language learning, and to the former when it comes to language use, as in the passage:

It would be absurd to claim that a reading of Wittgenstein absolves the linguist from reading Noam Chomsky, for example. It is necessary to see on which level something is being addressed (Schiffer 2006). If somebody wanted to know how language is acquired, I should recommend that he or she reads Chomsky and his followers. If somebody wanted to know how language is used, I should recommend reading Wittgenstein. (Wilson 2016, p. 107)

Wilson recognizes that the task of the linguist and the one of the philosopher are different, as he writes:

107). Rajagopalan's argument is akin to the concept of the *image of a text* put up by André Lefevere (1990) – which, in turn, is certainly compatible with the idea(s) of *image* [*Bild*] and *image of the world* [*Weltbild*] as discussed in much more depth by Wittgenstein. Summing up: what translation actually does is to give a certain reading a new empirical configuration, in another language or system of signs. In the empirical sense, one has here a crystallization of this reading, as it appears in a new, distinctive *form* (for further discussion, see Oliveira 2010). But semiosis goes on, also based on this new form.

It is impossible to divorce the translator from the target text, for language is a part of being human, not a faculty that can be practically isolated. Noam Chomsky (2000) and his followers argue that there is a language faculty, but Wittgenstein's inquiry is different, coming out of philosophy, not cognitive science. (Wilson 2016, p. 58)

But for a discussion of translation that takes the epistemic level seriously, we must decide if we are to give a Chomskyan or a Wittgensteinian stance the preference, for they are incompatible in many ways. I also doubt the possibility of separating the way we learn a language from the way we use it, since there is no single method of language learning or acquisition that can be isolated from use. A look at the case of immigrant children might be enlightening in this aspect. Refugees from conflict areas who leave their countries as babies do not learn the language of their parents on a biological basis, but rather the language they use the most. If they are adopted by a family of the host country, they might even not learn the language their parents spoke at all. Interesting, Chomskyan ideas are often recollected to support hypotheses about the stages of (first) language acquisition – on a biological basis, thus involving the empirical.⁷

⁷ Wilson does not develop any further reasoning on the importance of Chomsky, nor does his approach need it. The very fact that he mentions the subject is to be read as a preventive answer to an eventual criticism coming out of this stance, as part of a general strategy to aggregate as many different visions as possible. My point is that there is a limit to such combinations, and the no-go line in the case of Chomsky and Wittgenstein can be approached from different departing points. In a review of philosophical contributions that anticipate the linguistic turn of the 20th century, Sören Stenlund (2002) makes a harsh criticism of “Chomsky’s theory of language, in which the idea of a biologically grounded universal grammar is central” (Stenlund 2002, p. 34; see also pp. 13, 38, 45). Combining (among others) comparative linguistics with cognitive science, Vyvyan Evans (2014) criticizes exactly the idea of language acquisition as a result of an inborn biological device, proposing instead “the language-as-use thesis” (p. xi, *passim*) as a direct response to the Chomskyan stance. She argues that the thesis of a universal grammar is actually immune to empirical facts (Evans 2014, pp. 68-70, 78-79, 93-94, *passim*) and quotes “[t]wo prominent experts [N. Evans and D. H. Levinson]” who reviewed “the facts of linguistic diversity in 2009”, adhering to the thesis the “[t]he claims of Universal Grammar ... are either empirically false, unfalsifiable, or misleading” (Evans 2014, pp. 69-70). As such, Chomsky’s universal grammar is thus a fine example of what Wittgenstein calls “thinking” instead of

What we call empirical research in TS, on the other hand, has a descriptive (or sociological, anthropological character): one tries to show how people translate(d) in a certain community to a given time, and then to find out the factors that led to this. There is no “empirical evidence” able to prove that a certain rendering is correct or adequate (and other not), because translating is a phenomenon of the understanding and the rendering of the sense/meaning (reasons), in its multifarious dimensions, and as such it does not involve empirical proof (causes) – at least not in the same way one usually recurs to empirical material as proof, e.g. to check the authenticity of a work of art. In this respect, an investigation about translation is radically different than a genetic investigation about the construction of a text – as is the work in a corpus like the Wittgenstein *Nachlass*.

Yes, we may mobilize this or that document to give support to our readings and translational renderings, but the basis for the way we translate

just “looking” in order to *see* how things really stay. Evans makes no mention to Wittgenstein and his later views on language, despite of their large compatibility with her own empirical research (and claims). A branch of linguistics which is akin to Wittgenstein’s later stance is certainly pragmatics, as shown in some contributions to a volume on *Philosophical Perspectives for Pragmatics* (Sbisà; Östman; Verschueren 2011). In spite of a clear tendency to linguistic ‘phenomenology’ or ‘botanizing’, as Marina Sbisà (2011, p. 17) puts it, many of the efforts in this branch go back to broad interpretations of the Wittgensteinian motto ‘meaning as use’ ([IF, § 43] Biachi 2011, p. 58). Joachim Leilich (2011, p. 307) gives an example we can learn from: “Notwithstanding the self-critical character of Wittgenstein’s remarks on games or family resemblance, his discussion inspired linguistics”, because “linguists saw that they could use the idea of family resemblance in the field of semantics. From such a linguistic point of view, Wittgenstein anticipated inadequacies of the classical theory of categorization”, no matter if “such inadequacies in theories of categorization were not at all the problem he was interested in when discussing games.” My provisional conclusion is: one can indeed look for inspiration in other areas of knowledge, but one should be aware of how things are being tackled and always test for compatibility before importing any result, conclusion and especially attitude (e.g., from empirical or theoretical linguistics) into our reasonings in Philosophy of Language or Translation Theory / Studies. Addendum: in a paper I had not yet read at the time of the Bergen meeting, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2017) comes to similar conclusions on the incompatibility of the conceptions of language from Wittgenstein and Chomsky. See also Michael Tomasello (2005).

will be those readings, not the document (or empirical material) that gave support to them. This might seem to be an unimportant differentiation – but, on the contrary, it is a crucial one (cf. Oliveira 2017). There would be empirical proof for the adequacy of a translational solution only if translation could be reduced to an operation at the level of the linguistic system, presupposing *a priori* given equivalence between languages and cultures, regardless of the changing contexts in which one extracts the meaning of a text – or, better, attributes meaning to it.

Yes, it is a common assumption that one could do this reduction, and that is exactly what some linguistic approaches up to the 1970s tried to do, or what laymen usually expect from translation.

Text linguistics played an important role in the expansion of the translational unity from the sentence to the text level in the second half of the last century. The Rumanian linguist Eugenio Coseriu certainly contributed to this expansion, also with his round up criticism on translation theories to his time. One of his main arguments was directed against the idea that translation is a fact of the language system:

A generalized translation ideal is a *contradictio in adjecto*, since there can be no general optimal invariance for translation, just as there is no general optimum for speaking itself. Translation is most analogous to the speech [*parole*], and therefore only finalistically motivated and finalistically differentiated norms apply to translation as well as to speech. There is also no “best translation” for a particular text for the same reason: there is only the best translation of this text for certain addressees, for a specific purpose, and in a particular historical situation. (Coseriu 2010, p. 288 [1976])

A similar thought was put forward in a manual for translation students by Werner Koller (2004, p. 223 [1979]), from the University of Bergen, as he proposed that *equivalence* is not something necessarily given, but rather constructed (*herstellen*). Also for Werner Koller is TS [*Übersetzungs-*

wissenschaft] a science of the *parole*, the translator being a producer of equivalents involving statements or texts in the source and target languages – but not sentences and structures of those two languages. Even if Koller did not assume the full consequences of this insight, as he kept many other (aging) tenets from the linguistic tradition he comes from, we must acknowledge that he recognized the problem (cf. Oliveira forthcoming_b). Symptomatically, Koller’s idea of the translational act as *Herstellen* was rendered by Andrew Chesterman as “attainment” of equivalence – an option that, as Anthony Pym puts it,

could have the translator trying to reach some pre-established goal, ultimately making Koller a theorist of what Mossop (1983) justly criticized as “equivalence seeking”, the kind of activity that condemns the translator to look ever backward. (Pym 1997, p. 75)

Another scholar from the University of Bergen can help us to leap out of this dilemma, as he points to the relation between *langue* and *parole* (in Saussurean terms) or between competence and performance as understood by Noam Chomsky. Arild Utaker (2015, p. 47) reminds us that it is “only by accepting the priority of use that the distinction between the grammatical and the empirical – so important for Wittgenstein – becomes comprehensible”. Utaker argues for a perspectivist view in his critique of the metaphysics of the presence [or the Augustinian model, in Wittgenstein’s terms], as

[t]here is no mirror or reflection [between world and language], but action ([*faire*] “energia”). To misunderstand this implies a conception of use contrary to that of Wittgenstein, namely, that the use refers to a system or a competence from which it derives. Thus, the use will be the effect (or the double) of something that binds it to a reference in the world (truth) or to a capacity in our soul or our brain. According to Chomsky, use becomes a performance which for language will be secondary to our linguistic competence. (Utaker 2015, pp. 46-47)

Consequently, from a perspective tributary to the later Wittgenstein, one must not only understand translation as a fact of the *action* (use, performance, *parole*), looking at *translating* as a phenomenon, but also acknowledge the dialectical relation of this dynamic dimension with the structural properties of the system (cf. also Michael Soubbotnik 2007). In the last decades, much research in TS has been done in this direction – with varying focus. A contribution of Wittgensteinian scholarship to this debate could be the clarifying of conceptual confusion at the epistemic level, exploring paths that TS itself has left less walked – for the main concern here lies upon other objects, which are more visible at the empirical level.

6. Paths for a Translations Theory on Wittgenstein’s Line

It is surely true that Wittgenstein did not advance any theory of translation in a broader sense, as his later philosophy had a therapeutic, not a thetic or systematic character. But this should not prevent us from elaborating a general, post-therapeutic theory of translation on his line. Frank Ramsey once stated: “Wittgenstein has no theory of higher maths but I tried to construct one on his line” (in Nedo 2012, p. 272). More recently, other scholars have proposed epistemological approaches that also advance theses on Wittgenstein’s line (cf. Bezzel 2013; Moreno 2012, 2015, forthcoming). As already noted, when I talk about my proposal of an *epistemology of translating* (Oliveira 2019), I am certainly also building up on Moreno’s *epistemology of usage*, translating being an especial case among many other activities with language. The field that my own approach to translation theory tries to cover stretches from a very basic reflection on the functioning of language (pragmatics) up to descriptive, so called empirical studies in TS proper, embracing in its path also questions of other philosophical traditions, as hermeneutics and deconstruction.

It is gratifying to see that some of the topics I have been focusing on for a long time are now finally receiving some more attention – even if we still have a long way to go. In this, there is one dimension that I only recognized more recently, as a result of dealing with epistemic questions involving perception (e.g., seeing vs. seeing as), as also discussed by Moreno and Bezzel. We are here dealing with what happens when one goes back to the first philosophy of the *Tractatus* and tackles the same questions with a conception of language informed by the later work. I'll point very briefly to this new path, still to be explored in more depth – among others.

There is in Wittgenstein's whole work probably no discussion that comes closer to an actual definition of translation than in some passages of sections 3 and 4 from the *Tractatus*, especially in the famous comparison of the gramophone, the partiture and the symphony (T 4.0141). The German text of T 4.015 states: "*Die Möglichkeit aller Gleichnisse, der ganzen Bildhaftigkeit unserer Ausdrucksweise, ruht in der Logik der Abbildung*". The logic of depiction stands, as one knows, at the center of the tractarian picture theory of language, which was to be abandoned in the later writings, leading then to the conclusion that Utakek summarized in the passage I quoted above: "[t]here is no mirror or reflection [between world and language], but action ([*faire*] 'energia')". Revisiting T 4.015 from the point of view of action, one sees in the word *Gleichnis* the result of a comparison (*vergleichen*), the expressive power of language (*Bildhaftigkeit unserer Ausdrucksweise*) being a result of the analogic procedure of looking for internal relations between different objects – a topic that Wittgenstein explored in various ways in his philosophical therapy.

The search for internal relations in order to set up bridges between what is known to be different lies at the heart of what we understand as *translating*. In the passage quoted above, Gideon Toury (2012, p. 70) reminds us that the cultures and languages involved in translation might show greater or lesser similarity to each other, but "what they can never be is identical". Where there is lack of identity (or even of similarity – or commensurability), one must establish it/them by a process of the

“construction of the comparable”, as Paul Ricœur (2011, p. 64; cf. Oliveira forthcoming_b) has put it in a happy but largely underestimated formula. I would like to call this first comparison of what we know to be different the *analogic* moment in translation (cf. Oliveira 2017). There is also another moment, that we can call the *digital* moment in translation, which is when we try to accommodate our renderings into the target system (Oliveira 2019, pp. 590-592). These two moments are best to be perceived when we deal with radically different cultures, as then the *emic* character of some concepts – that is, what can only be understood in terms of system intern oppositions – reveals itself (cf. Oliveira 2015c).⁸ Any new concept or word, any new form or device we introduce into the target system must accommodate into it, thus occupying “a certain slot” in it – to retake another expression by Toury (2012, p. 69).

Pointing at the epistemic level under the surface of our reasonings is a procedure I have so far adopted to tackle many much-discussed questions in TS, as in the case of the “functional Ouroboros” in the so-called documentary or scholarly translation (in the terms of the *skopos* theory). It is also at this level that we can see the proximity of deconstructivist discourse in TS and the position of the radical skeptic in Philosophy. I’d actually go as far as saying that many of the topics Wittgensteinian scholars (e.g., Bezzel and Moreno) discuss at this level are relevant to dissolve apparently unsurmountable problems in TS. In my exposition, I’ve argued for a proximity or at least compatibility of Toury’s *translational norms* with Wittgenstein’s discussion of the *normative use* – a topic that gains on importance

⁸ Kanavillil Rajagopalan (1992, pp. 116-117) argues that this irreducibility of the *emic* entities reinforces Wittgenstein’s criticism on essentialism, as based on the concept of family resemblance, and then reminds us of the approximation that Harris and his followers made between the Austrian philosopher and Saussure. Soubbotnik (2007) formulates some restrictions to this approximation made by Harris, and I think that the latter’s discussion of *family resemblance* has indeed serious shortcomings. But the idea of *emic* entities holds in both cases, especially if we take the concept of *form of life* to its last consequences. See, for instance, Marco Brusotti’s contribution to this volume, especially his quote of Waismann in n. 7.

with Moreno's proposal of an *epistemology of usage*. But there are many other aspects we could explore to show this relevance. For instance, by embedding the origin of *meaning* in a net of circumstances, Moreno discusses, at this very basic level, many aspects that are dealt with on an apparently empirical level when translation scholars talk about the *skopos* of a text and the need to gain *acceptability* in the target context.

The list could go on and on. But since the space we have at our disposal is not infinite (unlike semiosis), a closer look at these matters will have to be postponed to another occasion. For now, it seems more urgent to make some closing comments on the difficulties of a dialogue involving different areas of research, as in the case of Philosophy and TS.

7. Epilogue: on being an ad-hoc compromise

At the beginning of this paper, I claimed that philosophers seem to barely account for the existence of TS as an autonomous field of research. If this hypothesis is correct, the fact that central aspects of my arguments (specially those coming out from TS) led to some misunderstanding and a certain discomfort in an audience of philosophers should not surprise. It seems to me that one has difficulties in realizing that the whole contemporary discussion in TS takes place in a context completely different from the old dispute for the “best” translation under the aegis of equivalence – a concept that I've described as problematic and mainly marginal in newer approaches. So, it seems appropriate to resume some perspectives of contemporary TS and apply them to a couple of cases under the scrutiny of our Wittgensteinian fellows. I'll highlight the role of *choice* in translation (as already announced in note 3) and the opposition of *source* vs. *target*-oriented translation strategies and/or decisions.

Even before Eugene Coseriu argued that there is “no ‘best translation’ for a particular text”, but “only the best translation of this text for certain addressees, for a specific purpose, and in a particular historical situation”, as quoted above (2010, p. 288 [1976]), Jiří Levý (2005 [1967]) had already

recognized that translation has necessarily to do with choices – from a stance tributary both to Chomskyan linguistics (which was prominent at that time) and to hermeneutics. In more recent empiric approaches in TS, choice has acquired the status of a central category, as Sonja Tirkkonen-Condit writes in her introduction to a thematic volume on this topic already in the 1990s:

The studies reported in the book are all corpus-based and draw on empirical evidence in their theoretical statements and basic assumptions. The way in which the role of choice and decision-making in translation is construed in most of these studies is in itself noteworthy: it is acknowledged that there are legitimate alternatives in translation at various stages and levels of the process. First, there are global choices which result from alternative, often equally justifiable ways of interpreting the source text and its potential uses in the target culture. Subsequently there is a range of alternative strategies of tackling the task at hand as it is construed by the translator, and ultimately, there is a range of justifiable linguistic choices within the scope of each global and strategic decision [p. 5]. (...) However, the notion of choice is not independent of the approach one takes to translation research in general. Choice can be treated either as one between correct and incorrect, or as one between two or more alternatives which can be described as justified or unjustified in terms of the sociocultural constraints which govern translations. Not surprisingly, the two approaches coincide with source-orientation and target-orientation respectively [p. 9]. (Tirkkonen-Condit 1993, pp. 5, 9)

The first point that deserves our attention here is the attitude of respecting the facts, i.e., of accounting for what actually happens when one translates in the real world (*looking*), instead of proposing a translational ideal and expecting facts to match them (*thinking*). Regarding the locus of choice, it is relevant that it happens at different levels, and that there is a hierarchy among them: global choices at a higher level set the initial context, and the subsequent choices at the level of general strategy or local

decisions are expected to be coherent with the prior decisions at higher level. So, any discussion about a choice at a lower level should be placed before the background of higher level decisions – if one wants the discussion to make sense at all.⁹ This means that going back to the original is neither the sole nor necessarily the most important criterium for a translational decision: one must also take the purpose (*skopos*) of the translation into account. To a large extent, it is this purpose which will govern the decision about what is “justified or unjustified in terms of the sociocultural constraints which govern translations”. Let us see a couple of examples.

I mentioned above that I very much agree with Dinda Gorlée (2012) about the process of infinite semiosis that goes on with every new translation, but I criticized the way she evaluates Peter Winch’s first translation of *Culture and Value* under the light of his own retranslation.¹⁰ One aspect that I did not mention before, and that is overtly evident to anyone who looks at both texts, is that they are very different right from the start. The first translation could be compared to a normalized version of the Wittgensteinian *Nachlass*: it is a book to be read fluently, with no hints to variations, corrections etc. It is as if it had been written as such by Wittgenstein himself – in another language, of course. Without going into further details, it is legitim to say that all further decisions concerning translational choices are somehow under the aegis of this general *skopos*. The retranslation, on the other hand, not only takes into account new material and new readings of the old material but is most of all a product of a different time and aims at different purposes. To maintain the analogy, the retranslation was made, to some extent, in a spirit akin to the diplomatic version of the

⁹ The situation here is symmetrical to the case of context enlargement as historically given in TS and as disambiguation mechanism as discussed by Moreno (quoted above). In the interpretation, context enlargement allows for the search after adequate parameters. In the *production* of the target text, it is the larger context (already taken decisions at higher level) what makes it possible to decide which of the existing alternatives at a lower level are to be chosen as adequate or justified.

¹⁰ I resume this discussion with Gorlée in Oliveira (forthcoming_a), taking also the stances of Melika Ouelbani and Hans-Johann Glock under scrutiny.

Nachlass – in its attention to details, variants, the genealogy of the text etc. Should we then say that a diplomatic version is necessarily better than a normalized one? I'd rather say that they are different, as they serve different purposes. So, any comparison we make should also take this into account, if we want to be fair and – most of all – rigorous in our evaluation. Which does not mean that we cannot prefer one to the other, despite of all differences in *skopos*. One factor that will have a great impact on this evaluation is certainly the spirit under which we approach not only the translation, but also the whole work of the philosopher: the *skopos* of our own investigations.

In the case of João José de Almeida (in this volume) about his own and McGuinness's translation of MS 122, we are faced with a very similar situation. While McGuinness sets for a "clean" version, centered on the semantics of the text, Almeida argues for the necessity of marking the elements of emphasis which give additional *force* to what is being said. The two translation strategies are different from the very start, and one will probably be more sympathetic to the one or the other approach depending on what kind of *skopos* one considers more relevant for the ongoing discussion. Advancing an answer to Almeida's question about "which of the two kinds of translation or physiognomics should give the reader the correct key", I'd say: "it depends on what door the reader is trying to open" – what is his/her *reading skopos*. How much detail do we need to understand something? It depends on what we are trying to understand.

One important lesson to retain about this whole discussion is that a translation always and necessarily poses a decision about its own *skopos*: it will never be *the* translation *tout court*, it will always be in the way described by Coseriu and so many after him – "for certain addressees, for a specific purpose, and in a particular historical situation" etc. Which brings us back to the question of *source* or *target* orientation. Tirkkonnen-Condit (1993, p. 9) reminds us that the plain distinction of "correct vs. incorrect" is a typical move of source orientation in translation theory (which seems to be dominant in the discourse of philosophers about translation). In my turn, I've

argued that even in the so-called *documentary translation* (the source-oriented translation *par excellence*) there is an inescapable dimension of *target* orientation, at least at the epistemic level, leading to what was labeled a functional Ouroboros.

Alois Pichler, on the other hand, made in his talk a strong case for what seems to be a radical *source* orientation for translational choices – based on extended readings of the Wittgenstein *Nachlass*. So, Pichler and I are here to be seen as representing, at least to some extent, the quarrel between source and target orientation in translation theory which was pointed out by Tirkkonen-Condit (although we speak from different stances: Philosophy [+ Philology] and TS [+Philosophy], respectively). But how much do we really disagree? If, as posed above, “an investigation about translation is radically different than a genetic investigation about the construction of a text – as is the work in a corpus like the Wittgenstein *Nachlass*”, does this mean that going back to the original and studying its genesis is an obsolete, disposable task? Not at all! When dealing with a *scholarly* (or *documentary*) translation, whose *skopos* is to make a proper understanding of the original possible, going back to the source as close as possible is a necessary step – because there cannot be an adequate translation of a text one did not understand adequately. Yet, this is only the *first* step (the understanding of the source text), which does not solve all the questions to be dealt with in the *second* step: the rendering of the target text. In the long passage quoted above, Gideon Toury (2012, pp. 69-70) poses that *adequacy* and *acceptability* “are different *in principle*” and thus “should be tackled in isolation”. But he also reminded that every single translational decision, every choice we make involves an ad-doc compromise between those two dimensions (p. 70).

A good example of what Toury means in this passage is the discussion about the relevance of distinguishing *Handlung* from *Verhalten* or *Benehmen*, as put forward by Alois Pichler in the conference, which is an argument at the level of *adequacy*. I have no restriction whatsoever to the pertinence of the argument, and the provided textual evidence from the Wittgenstein

Nachlass is overwhelming. So, Pichler and I do agree at level of adequacy, and one could even say that Pichler's approach at this level is compatible with what Toury says about the necessity of tackling things "in isolation". But all this evidence for the philosophical relevance of distinguishing intentional acting (language games) from pure, to some extent only instinctive behavior does not solve the problem of how this or that translational solution will be perceived by the target public – which is where the question of *acceptability* comes into play. In other words: to translate the German expression *Handlungsweise* using the English expression *form of acting* and putting this distinction as a standard option for *all* occurrences (including variants) does not guarantee an adequate understanding by the target public, as there is no control over the objects of comparison the virtual public will mobilize as parameters (or *norms*) for *acceptability* – because the *reading contexts* (i.e., the situations and circumstances of application) change continuously and are, by definition, to some extent different regarding the context of the source text.¹¹

¹¹ It has been put that the English word *acting* also calls into mind the performance of an actor (which in German would be *spielen*), so there is already at the plain level of language a factor of the target system to be dealt with. This is what I've labeled the second, *digital* moment in translation, when the renderings have to accommodate into the target system (or systems, if we want to recall the theory of polisystems developed by Itamar Even-Zohar – an Israeli translation scholar from the same school as Gideon Toury). Another example, at a different level, is the choice about the French title of Arley Moreno's (2005) book *Introdução a uma pragmática filosófica*: it was named *Épistémologie de l'usage* (2011) and the reference to pragmatics was put in a subtitle. The reason for this is the fact that the concept of pragmatics, in the domain of Philosophy, is strongly connected to American pragmatism in the context of the target audience. As such, the choice of the French title was then an editorial decision as many others involving translation in the real world. Situations like this are multitude in real life. On the importance of distinguishing pure behavior from acting, see also Moreno's contribution to this volume. Compare also the idea of *skopos* in translation with Moreno's observation about the communicative *purpose* of a comparison: "There will be as many criteria and as many different techniques for comparison as there are circumstantial elements passing through the forms of life that are the language games. (...) [T]he salient aspects in the object do not arise from causal or mechanical relations, but strictly from our own judgment about their relevance within contexts" (in this volume, p. 43).

If every translational decision entails an ad-hoc compromise between adequacy and acceptability, a translational strategy that aims to be successful will have to take the target context seriously, not restraining itself to seek a maximized adequacy. In this, Pichler and I seem to disagree – if I understand him correctly, when I state that he seems so worried with maximizing adequacy that he forgets to ask after a whole host of factors that have a direct impact on acceptability, beyond the simple question of language. And there also seems to be disagreement (or better: lack or understanding) when our audience of philosophers reacts as if one would be advocating for a full blood relativism by stating – from the instance of contemporary TS – that equivalence is not the measure of all things, when it comes to translation (or that equivalence is actually constructed, instead of being given *a priori* across the different language systems).

Despite of all difficulties in understanding across research areas, the dialogue might eventually not be fruitless – if one only is able to mobilize the will to really listen to each other. For instance, by acknowledging that TS has, indeed, relevant things to say about translation, and that Philosophy can help TS to get a clearer picture of some of its own difficulties. I hope some of the aspects I've addressed here might help to understand the pertinence of setting up bridges between Wittgensteinian scholarship and contemporary TS – especially when it comes to discussing philosophical translations and, even more, of the work of our philosopher. If we take what Wittgenstein says about language in his later work seriously, if we recognize that the way we think about language has a direct and logically inescapable impact in any translation theory we might put up, it will be much easier to understand the relevance of Philosophy of Language for Translation Studies, as it will also be clear that the possibility of learning the other way around is highly plausible.

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A broader sense of the concept of translation inspired by Wittgenstein – from the classroom to cultural issues

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Abstract: From a Wittgensteinian perspective, I intend to present a broader sense of the concept of translation that might be applied to clarify problems of conveying senses, such as the ones occurring in the relationship between teacher and student (although both of them supposedly speak the same language), or the ones that defy the anthropologists, when they face cultures very different from ours, which do not have some of our fundamental concepts. In both cases, some of the problems of comprehension are often seen as a matter of the existence of words with no correspondence at all to the ones in the “foreign” language. I will argue that the experience of Wittgenstein as an elementary teacher in very poor villages in Austria after the First World War, particularly during the elaboration of an orthographic dictionary with his students; and afterwards, his criticism to Frazer’s interpretation of ancient cultures (presented by the British anthropologist in *The Golden Bough*), bring us some crucial elements to understand the passage of the Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* to his new conception of language, now seen by him as having a multiplicity of functions, in addition to a merely descriptive function, expressing a correspondence between propositions and facts.

Keywords: Teaching and Learning, Philosophy of Education, Philosophy of Language, Wittgenstein

1. Introduction

As it is well known among the Wittgensteinians, our philosopher defends in his *Philosophical Investigations* that there is no inner language, which could be translated to any other language, as soon as one is born. There are no autonomous meanings independent of a culture or a form of life. According to him, the idea of an inner language is linked to a referential conception of language, which is strongly criticized by him as of the first paragraph of this book. He chooses Augustine as a major representative

of this conception, who presents the learning of a language as a process of naming objects. In other words, his criticism is addressed to this view of the language where the meaning of the word “is the object for which the word stands” (PI, § 1), whatever this object may be: a mental state, an ideal entity, or an empirical object. In his own words:

Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to *guess* the meaning of these definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong.

And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already *think*, only not yet speak. And “think” would here mean something like “talk to itself”. (PI, § 32)

As we see above, Wittgenstein begins with an example of translation to relativize the referential conception of language, which leads us to believe that pointing to some object would be enough to name it. The Wittgensteinian therapy of this idea starts immediately in the next paragraphs, but what I want to stress is the following: as Wittgenstein states throughout his work, meaning presupposes not a sort of language of thought or something akin, but essentially *a work of the native language* – whatever it is, Chinese, Portuguese, English, Norwegian and so on –, which evolves actions, feelings, interlocutors, samples and habits inside each of these cultures, constituting the multiple language games interwoven among them. *So, the main question which arises from this assumption is how far culture and habits from different communities are limits for understanding a foreign language.* Is it only about guessing, when one points to an object to reach its meaning? Obviously, it is not only a matter of guessing, because even if the foreigner in the above passage guessed right, surely the meaning wouldn’t be exactly the same in the sense that an essential meaning would exist, common to the foreigner and the native. On the contrary, what they would share

probably will be only family resemblances, as our philosopher will point out in further paragraphs (PI, §§ 65-72), and not essential meanings, common to all human beings, later *translated* to other languages.

Despite no essential meaning to be guessed, Wittgenstein presents us with situations which point to some processes that allow us, in large measure, to understand other languages, as we see in a passage from *Lectures on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*¹:

If you came to a foreign tribe, whose language you didn't know at all and you wished to know what words corresponded to 'good', 'fine', etc., what would you look for? You would look for smiles, gestures, food, toys. ([Reply to objection:] If you went to Mars and men were spheres with sticks coming out, you wouldn't know what to look for. Or if you went to a tribe where noises made with the mouth were just breathing or making music, and language was made with the ears. Cf. "When you see trees swaying about they are talking to one another." ("Everything has a soul.") You compare the branches with arms. Certainly we must interpret the gestures of the tribe on the analogy of ours.) (...) We don't start from certain words, but from certain occasions or activities. (LA, 6, p. 3)

As we see through all these imagined situations, we can approach some of the meanings inside the broad context of gestures, empirical objects, and so on, that surround us, mainly making analogies between what we see and what we already know. In order to understand the expression that trees are talking to one another ("Everything has a soul"), their branches swaying about may be compared with our arms. Smiles, food and some gestures may be compared with what we perceive as 'good' or 'fine'. We will compare the moving of the ears of the natives with activities and situations of our Western culture, and so on². In all these examples, what

¹ This publication is a compilation from notes taken by Yorich Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor, and then edited by Cyril Barrett (cf. Wittgenstein 1967).

² Comparing situations does not mean that language does not matter at all. On the contrary, we are supposing that both situations belong to a linguistic context.

surrounds us is more important than the words that may be said, it is the broader context that allows us to make some comparisons and analogies; or, as Wittgenstein says: “We don’t start from certain words, but from certain occasions or activities”. Inside those contexts, some actions, objects and sounds are related in specific ways, sometimes similar (to some extent) to our own techniques of organizing the world around us.

However, the examples above given by Wittgenstein (men looking like spheres with sticks coming out, or trees having a soul) are extreme situations. We do not need to go so far to exemplify difficulties of translation... In our own Western civilization, we have plenty of examples of situations, which demand that we consider more than words to understand what is going on. Most of the time, the context is determinant for this; or, as Moreno (2005, 2011) suggests, there must be *sufficient* contexts for establishing the sense of whatever is being said or done. But how do we identify and learn new techniques that are involved with the words, and what is the role of each context in the process of learning them?

My hypothesis is that one of the reasons that led Wittgenstein to notice different techniques in his own language (which would later explain the enigmatic relationship between a word and an object or an action) was his experience of being a schoolteacher in very poor villages in Austria, which, in principle, belonged to the same culture as his. Although not confronted to aliens themselves, in a certain way he himself felt like a foreigner in the communities where he worked, while being faced with other ways of thinking and even listening to words from dialects, not yet in the official German dictionary. Among many other “foreign” experiences lived by Wittgenstein in this period of his life (cf. Bartley III 1978), I would like to explore some aspects of his attempt to formulate an orthographic dictionary with his students. From my point of view, this very experience contributed towards Wittgenstein seeing the questions raised in *Tractatus* from a pragmatic – and not an essentialist – view of the relations between *language* and *world*. Besides, as I will argue further, his preface to the published

dictionary contributes to enlighten translation issues, from the classroom to the understanding of other cultures.

2. Wittgenstein's *Wörterbuch für Volksschulen*

As soon as Wittgenstein was released from the Italian prison camp after the First World War, he attended a teacher's training school in Vienna during the year of 1920. On September 16 of that same year, he began working as a temporary elementary teacher in Trattenbach. After two years, he moved to Puchberg, and then, he worked two more years in Otterthal. In all these villages, people spoke the local dialect. Since the beginning, Wittgenstein started to pay attention to the vocabulary of his students (WV, p. XVIII) and used to tell them to make compilations of word-lists, aiming at the elaboration of a personal orthography dictionary of around 3,000 words. Later, Wittgenstein himself would organize such a dictionary with the goal of publishing it as an "orthography book of everyday life for the use in rural schools" (WB, p. XX). After an intense process of selecting the most used words, he arranged them in a peculiar form, different from the existing dictionaries of his time. For example, similar words were put together (and not in an alphabetical order), as well as composed words which were derived from base ones. Most of them were written with the definite article in front of them, and a few others also had a short explanation beside them, for example, "der **Jupiter**: Planet", where Jupiter (like all other base words) was written in bold.

The criteria for this new composition of the words were presented in a preface for the dictionary, already pointing to a new conception of language, in so far as words were then seen by him as having a certain kinship with each other, which probably contributed to generate the concepts of the "language game" and "family resemblances" in his later work (cf.

Bartley III 1978; Moreno 2000; Gottschalk 2012)³. In fact, already in the second edition of the dictionary, A. Hübner (1977) wrote a presentation for it, where he states that Wittgenstein's later philosophy has induced several linguists to examine his dictionary for early signs of change in the philosopher's thoughts. Hübner also brings the words of H. Wellmann, who makes the following considerations in this aspect:

Wittgenstein's *Wörterbuch*... stands as a strange relic of the period when Wittgenstein was an elementary teacher between the *Tractatus* and his later philosophical writings. The *Wörterbuch* is alien to philosophy and thus it is considered in the scholarly literature at best as a curiosity. Seen through the eyes of someone born later this period of Wittgenstein's practical working as a schoolteacher – from the dictionary stems – almost seems to be the result of a kind of 'dialectical countermovement' to the looking for pure knowledge and the formulation of this knowledge in Wittgenstein's early philosophy, there are certain indications that support the assumption that experiences which Wittgenstein made in this 'middle period' have flown into the 'synthesis' of his later philosophy. In this context also the *Wörterbuch* becomes important as an evidence. Here it is examined from a linguistic standpoint. One can crystallize certain viewpoints for the arrangement of the dictionary, above all *the principle of analogy, the accentuation of graphemic and phonemic oppositions, and the lexical crossconnections* ("word families"). Instructive are also the selection as such, *the semantic comments, and the instrumental and situative definition of the individual word*. A comparison of the *Wörterbuch* with its preform, a dictated booklet, which has been found by A. Hübner (Wittgenstein-Archives, Kirchberg) results in more accurate insights into the way Wittgenstein put the dictionary

³ This period of Wittgenstein's life was also explored in another text of mine (Gottschalk 2012) focusing, particularly, on the change in his philosophical perspective after his experience as an elementary school teacher. In this current text, I am mainly interested in how his criteria regarding the composition and inclusion of words in his orthographic dictionary enlighten translation questions, which may be considered of great interest in the area of philosophy of education, if translation is also seen as a conveyance of senses between teacher and student.

together. A confrontation of Wittgenstein's dictionary with comparable dictionaries which Wittgenstein discusses critically (...) explains Wittgenstein's ideas on word and vocabulary. From there results, among others, inferences about the dictionary's character as a 'form of work', the pragmatic definition of the word, and also the concept of language in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. (Wellmann, *apud* Hübner 1977, my emphasis).

Beyond the linguists' assumptions, the philosopher K. T. Fann also sees in this transition period of Wittgenstein as an elementary-school teacher a decisive factor in the shaping of his later philosophy, adding the following considerations:

The reality of teaching children how to read, write, calculate, etc., and the experience in compiling a dictionary for elementary schools must have contributed to Wittgenstein's later pragmatic view of language. How else does one find out whether a child knows the meaning of a word or not except by observing how the child *uses* the word? And, doesn't the explanation of the meaning of a word to children consist precisely in teaching them the *use* of the word?

The effects of his teaching experience on his later philosophy is quite evident in both his lectures and writings. He remarked once that, in order to get clear about the meaning of a word, it is very useful to ask oneself: 'How is this word learned?' 'How would one set about reaching a child to use this word?' In a letter on aesthetics he said: 'One thing we always do when discussing a word is to ask how we were taught it. ... Cf. How did we learn "I dreamt so and so"?' The interesting point is that we didn't learn it by being shown a dream. If you ask yourself how a child learns "beautiful", "fine", etc., you find he learns them roughly as interjections. ...' In another context, writing on a similar topic, Wittgenstein asks: 'Am I doing child psychology? – I am making a connection between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning' (Z, § 412). Only an elementary-school teacher could have thought of making this connection. The consequence of this connection constitutes a

most important aspect of his ‘new method’. (Fann 1969, pp. 43-44)

My purpose in this article is also to stress the role of Wittgenstein’s dictionary as evidence of his new concept of language, but mostly as a paradigm of the language amid others that we use to constitute and translate meanings. The dictionary, as we shall see, plays the role of norm, becoming part of the *grammar*⁴ of our *translation games*, in this case, from speech to writing. Wittgenstein himself saw the important role of an orthographic dictionary in a book form, and criticized the two other ones, which were then available for students:

Only the two dictionaries that have been published by the *Schulbücher Verlag* can be considered. The large edition of this dictionary – from now on I will call it the “large dictionary” for short – has various disadvantages with respect to my purposes. Firstly, it is too voluminous and, therefore, often too expensive for our rural population. Secondly, because of its bulk it is hard to use for the children. Thirdly, it contains a large number of words that the child never uses, especially many foreign words. On the other hand, it lacks many words which are necessary for the children. Partly those are words that have not been included perhaps because of their commonness, e.g. *dann* [*then*, etc.], *wann* [*when*, etc.], *mir* [*me*, Dative], *dir* [*you*, Dative], *in* [*in*, *into*, etc.], etc. But it is exactly those most common words that are frequently misspelled by the children, and they are the occasion of the most deplorable mistakes. On the other hand, we look in vain in the large dictionary for many compounds and decompositions of compounds. But those things belong in a dictionary for elementary schools because children recognize them as such only with difficulty. Thus, it often does not occur to them to look up the base noun [*Stammwort*] of a compound (e.g. *Rauchfang* [*chimney*] – the children say *Raufang*). Or they recognize the word to be a compound but make an error when they

⁴ I am interpreting the term *grammar* in Wittgenstein’s work as the set of effective and/or possible uses of words interconnected in different ways, which play a normative role.

decompose it. E.g. for the word *Einnahme* [*receiving, receipt, capture, etc.*] they look up *ein* [*a, one, in, etc.*] and *Name* [*name*], etc. for these reasons, the large dictionary was not suitable for my purposes. But the short edition was entirely useless because it lacked most of the common and important words of everyday life. Indeed, this little volume is almost a glossary of only foreign words and, thus, something I could not use. In this distressing situation I made up my mind to dictate to my students (the fourth grade of a school with five grades) a dictionary. This dictionary contained about 2,500 entries. A dictionary of an even smaller size would not have served its purpose. (WB, p. XXXII)

As a result of the considerations above, Wittgenstein elaborated five criteria presented in its preface, seen by him as viewpoints which were essential:

- 1) Only those words that the students of Austrian elementary schools are familiar with should be listed in the dictionary; with respect to those words the listing should be complete. (WB, p. XXXIII)

Here we already notice his concern about the effective use of a word in a specific way of life. Although the dictionary would include new words for the students, the ordinary words should not be left out. That is, the main criterion for a word to be in the dictionary was its *use* in that community.

- 2) No word is too common to be entered, since I have experienced that *wo* [where, etc.] has been written with the “h” that indicates a long vowel, and *was* [what, etc.] with “ss”. (WB, p. XXXIII)

Every common word should enter the dictionary, even the ones that seemed so simple that no one would search for them. Although their familiarity could induce us to think it would be obvious for the children how to write them, our philosopher calls attention to the different rules we follow for the pronunciation of a word and its spelling. The child must learn the new rules in this “translation” work from speaking to writing,

where there is no natural correspondence between these two domains. Therefore, the priority in choosing the words remains their common use, even if they sound *too* common.

- 3) Compounds should be entered if it is either difficult for the child to recognize them as such or if the looking up of the base word easily leads to mistakes. (WB, p. XXXIII)

This is a very important criterion, since here Wittgenstein recognizes that the structure of language does not necessarily follow an atomic model, as he believed in *Tractatus*. The meaning of a compound word is not derived from each of its parts, but from its *use* in a certain situation. In other words, children do not see the compound word as having separated meanings linked to each other, but rather as having only *one* meaning, which is the reason why it is so difficult for them to find the base words in the dictionaries. Indeed, even today, not all compound nouns can be found in the German dictionaries.

- 4) Foreign words should be entered if they are used universally. They should be translated into German if this is not too cumbersome [*umständlich*] and if the translation is not less understandable than the foreign word itself. (WB, p. XXXIII)

Once again, what counts in the meaning of the words is the effective use of them, even the foreign ones. Although some of them could be translated to German, what should predominate is its current use in language, and not its possible translation.

As we see, these first four criteria point to the crucial notion of *use* that characterizes the second phase of Wittgenstein's philosophy: the words chosen should be familiar to their users; their meanings do not derive from their parts, but in bulk (as happens with the compound words); there are different ways to express the same word, as we see in the case of the gap between their pronunciation and writing; and, finally, the acceptance of foreign words as another legitimate form of expression as long as they are actually used in that community. Therefore, the emphasis on the effective use of the words suggests strongly that this teaching experience would lead

Wittgenstein some years later to his new conception of language: “(...) the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (PI, § 43)

However, Wittgenstein presents, also in his preface, a last criterion, very curious indeed, and from my point of view, one that helps us to understand what I see as the second linguistic turn in Wittgenstein’s ideas.

- 5) Dialectal expressions should be entered only insofar as they have been admitted into the educated language [*gebildete Sprache*], like e.g. Heferl [*Häferl*; mug, little pot, etc.], Packel [small parcel], Lacke [puddle, etc.].⁵ (WB, p. XXXIII)

As we can see, the fifth criterion seems to be paradoxically against the other ones... for example, the fourth one includes foreign words in the dictionary, when they are more used than their translation to German, but at the same time, the fifth criterion excludes some dialectal expressions, when they do not have corresponding ones in the educated German language. As if dialectal expressions were more foreign than the real foreign ones, in the sense that although they are often used, or even more used than the foreign ones, they do not deserve being part of the dictionary. However, foreign words like *Chauffeur*, *Bureau*, *Friseur*, *Bibliothek*, among others, might have been less used in the rural areas than, for example, *Obers* (cream), *Hafert* (little pot) or *Spagat* (string)⁶. So, why were some words in dialect left out, and instead, some foreign ones included? Would it simply be a question of hierarchizing these languages? Is it because the dialect words are not “universal” like the foreign ones? What could be behind these decisions?

Going back to the last criterion, and keeping in mind the entire philosophical work of Wittgenstein, especially his second phase, attention is called to his concern with incorporating dialectal words *only insofar as they have been admitted into the educated language*, or in other words, if they are in

⁵ In the original, the fifth criterion was written as follows: “Ausdrücke der Mundart sind nur soweit aufzunehmen, als sie in die gebildete Sprache Eingang gefunden haben, wie zum Bsp. Heferl, Packel, Lacke, u.a.” (WB, p. XXVIII)

⁶ In particular, these three dialectal words were included in the dictionary, although not understood in Germany. Nevertheless, of course, there was a correspondence among them and other German words belonging to the educated German language (*gebildete Sprache*).

some official dictionary. Let us see closer how Wittgenstein develops this idea just a few years later, before solving the previous apparent paradox.

3. Normative propositions as condition for sense

Back in Cambridge during the thirties, Wittgenstein began to demarcate the difference between two kinds of propositions, the grammatical and the empirical ones. As it is well known by Wittgensteinians, the field of sense now is regulated by the first ones, which have the force of a norm, while the others are just descriptive of empirical facts. In his last writings, published in *On Certainty*, he gives us some examples of grammatical propositions, such as “the world exists”, “this is my hand”, “only I can feel my own pain” and so on, that are propositions from which we cannot even imagine their opposite: I cannot imagine that the world does not exist, that this is not my hand, nor that somebody else can feel my own pains. Whereas the descriptive propositions are contingent, for example, I can describe the objects in a room, saying that there are chairs and tables, but it is possible to imagine that the room could also be completely empty, or that there were other kinds of furniture in it. Of course, as Wittgenstein emphasizes, the same proposition may be used as a grammatical one or as an empirical one: I can point to an object and say, “this is red”, to answer the question, “what is red”, from a child that is still learning the colours; but in another situation, I could say the same thing, “this is red”, but now to *describe* the colour of the pencil that is on my desk. While in the first case we have a grammatical proposition when we are learning what red is, in this last case, we have an empirical proposition. This pen in front of me *described* as red, *could also have been* of another colour. The descriptions are contingent, and not normative. Nevertheless, we are able to tell in each context when we are using a proposition descriptively, or normatively. Until his last writings, he returns to this fundamental difference, and at the same time reminds us about the fluidity of our propositions in the

following paragraphs of *On Certainty*, where he makes an analogy between our language and a river:⁷

It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. (OC, § 96)

Another good example is the proposition “Water boils at 100° Celsius”. Initially it was an empirical assertion describing a characteristic of the mineral substance we call water. At some moment in the history of science, this same assertion becomes a criterion to recognize whether a substance is water or not: “To be water, it *must* boil at 100° Celsius”. So, the proposition that was fluid becomes hard, and the opposite could happen too.

The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. (OC, § 97)

This change happens almost all the time, in different areas of knowledge. Nevertheless, we know when a proposition is being used as a norm or as having an empirical nature. Just like the example given above about the proposition regarding the colour of an object, which can be an answer to the question about the meaning of the name of that colour, or just a description of the object. But this fact does not mean that *all* propositions can be used both ways. As Wittgenstein observes:

But if someone were to say “So logic too is an empirical science” he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get

⁷ Cf. also Stern (1999).

treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing. (OC, § 98)

There are some areas of knowledge that are characteristically normative, such as the field of logic. In this area in particular, all the propositions have the role of rules, similar to the grammatical propositions, in the sense that they are not true or false, but simply conditions of sense. There is no sense, for instance, in saying that “it rains and it doesn’t rain”. So, the form “ p and $\sim p$ ”, regardless of the content of “ p ”, has no meaning, it is simply a form that expresses an impossibility. It is the form of the contradiction. These rules are not isolated from each other, but their force comes from constituting a system, as we see in the areas of logic and mathematics: “It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support (OC, § 142)”.

The same happens with all grammatical propositions, which also form a system, and in a certain way, the orthographic dictionary plays a similar role too. It tells us how words *must* be spelled, and in the case of a regular dictionary, it presents their definitions too. Therefore, they have a *prescriptive use*. In fact, although the words in dictionaries and the way they are spelled or defined may change overtime, the dictionary consecrates, or better, crystallizes the way we write and pronounce our words *correctly*. Even if there is a vocal range to understand some pronunciations, the orthographic dictionary’s role is to establish limits to our verbal expression. It tells us how we *must* write our words, and for the regular ones, not restricted to this dimension as their main function, they also provide the definitions⁸. Wittgenstein’s dictionary had both functions, although it was thought primarily as only orthographic. He noticed the importance of relating some of the words in a logical system, so the students would not spend too much time accessing them, as is the case with traditional dictionaries, which are sometimes too big and difficult, when it comes to

⁸ Furthermore, contemporary dictionaries usually also bring other kinds of information, as examples of use, flecion rules, pronunciation of foreign words etc.

finding some words, especially the composed ones. As he observed in his preface to the dictionary, even the short edition published by the *Schulbücher Verlag* (that was used in some schools at that time) lacked most of the common and important words of everyday life.

In an attempt to avoid those problems of finding in a dictionary the written words corresponding to how people pronounce them, as well as finding the words most used, while elaborating his own dictionary, it is very likely that Wittgenstein started then to recognise the normative function of our concepts, – beyond words, but expressed by words – which would later be seen by him as rules to be followed. In this intermediary period, however, the normative use of a word was still restricted to its place in a dictionary, which dictated how we spell, use and even, in some of them, how to pronounce words; whereas in the later period, he would pay attention also to the *use* of the words as *concepts*, guiding our actions and establishing the limits of sense⁹, that is, having a normative function and constituting a grammar inside our language games. However, there are indications that this grammatical normativity still has a kinship with the prescriptive use of a dictionary¹⁰.

As Wittgenstein will emphasize in his later writings, we gradually constitute a grammar inside of us, and the dictionaries are a part of this as prescriptive norms that we follow, in order to attribute sense to what we think and how we act. The normative aspect of some words and expressions will appear in his later work, with the idea of playing the role of rules in the language-games, when expressing the conditions of sense for our empirical assertions.

⁹ As our philosopher will observe in the next years already in Cambridge to his students, now as a postgraduate teacher, these limits are not exact, but despite their vagueness, they delimitate an area, say, that is legitimized by the normative use we make of our concepts. That is also a crucial point, I believe, in his later conception of language.

¹⁰ In fact, as we can see today in the *Wittgenstein Archives* at the University of Bergen, the word *Wörterbuch* (dictionary) appears 18 times in his writings, sometimes associated with the words “grammar” and/or “limits of language”, or even being simply replaced by the word “grammar”, as in Ts. 213, 80r [2]_4.1.

Returning now to the fifth criterion in Wittgenstein's preface to his dictionary, as previously pointed out, he decided that some dialectal words should be left out, although they had a common use, even more so than some foreign words that appeared in his dictionary. Certainly, this decision had to do with the fact that his role as a teacher was to introduce his pupils to the educated language, which could explain, at least partially, the fifth criterion stipulated by Wittgenstein in his orthographic dictionary. But at the same time, as argued above, that decision also shows that there was already a philosophical reflection going on that may explain his later concern with the normative aspects constructed in daily life.

Indeed, as he emphasizes in the preface, to find the right criteria had not been an easy task. His effort to meet these criteria may have led him to conclude that normativity in language transcends the prescriptive use of a dictionary or the normative use of certain areas of knowledge, such as logic. In fact, he concluded that this normative aspect of our language is profoundly immersed in everyday situations. That is what I consider to be his second linguistic turn.

Thus, I think that the experience of Wittgenstein elaborating this dictionary with his students in the elementary school contributed to his further comments on the fundamental difference between what has the force to regulate our significant actions and words (gestures, samples, paradigms and normative verbal expressions) and what is meaningfully said (inside a specific context) – like the descriptions we make about the facts of the world. But at that time as a school teacher, he was still very close to the ideas of *Tractatus*, where the logical form, common to the proposition and the fact represented by it, was the condition for meaning. Nevertheless, gradually he came to see this same force in other artefacts, for example, the official dictionaries¹¹. Its prescriptive use may become normative in daily life. To say that Jupiter is a planet in a dictionary can acquire the

¹¹ The normativity aspects of the elaboration of the orthographic dictionary were also considered by Paulo Oliveira (forthcoming) in his comments to the Portuguese translation he made of Wittgenstein's preface.

strength of a norm: Jupiter *must be* a planet, in the context of an astronomy class, becoming, therefore, a grammatical proposition, even if it can also be used contingently to describe something, for example, when a teacher asks the pupils what the names of the planets are on an astronomical map.

Therefore, in the school context, it is possible to see a work of translation, through different artefacts, such as the dictionary. The ways we should write and the correct meaning of words, as well as the general contents of the school curricula, are conveyed to the pupils not directly, but intermediated by different techniques, quite beyond pointing to an object, as the Augustinian conception of language may suggest. Although pointing to a figure on the astronomical map can help a pupil to understand that Jupiter is a planet, surely this is not enough for the comprehension of this proposition, unless the word “planet” has already become a concept, that is, when the child is able to *use* it as the teacher expects. Moreover, that it is exactly what the fifth criterion of Wittgenstein’s dictionary ensures: in order to use this word significantly the child must trust the previous information given by the dictionary, whose prescriptive force says that “Jupiter *must be* a planet”; that is, the child learns to follow this “rule” amid others in order to apply the concept “planet” in a significant way in the school context. Dialectal expressions that were not admitted into the educated language did not have a place in the official dictionaries, that is, they were not part of this type of artifact consecrated by the written language. Perhaps for this reason, Wittgenstein decided not to include them in his dictionary either, and in this sense, the above paradox is simply dissolved.

4. Translation of norms between distant contexts

From the detail view, inside the same language, let’s move again to a broader context (in order to have a panoramic view), for example, when we are supposed to describe practices of cultures very different from ours and “translate” them to our own language. I will defend the idea that to

understand them is not so far from the local situation described above, inside the same language. Because in those other cultures, a condition for something to make sense continues to be the existence of some normativity in their language (Gottschalk forthcoming), as certainties that are expressed through words, and cannot be refuted. Just as in a dictionary, they establish the limits of what makes sense, and what does not. Some of these certainties will be very similar to ours, as the foreign words incorporated by Wittgenstein in his orthographic dictionary, while others must be translated, by using analogies and comparisons to similar situations in our forms of life.

For example, recently an Amazonian tribe was found in Brazil, the Amondawa, that has no word for “time”, or indeed of time periods such as “month” or “year”. As age advances, they just change their names: “The change of names occurs at the birth of a new baby and/or when the individual assumes a new position, attribute, or role in social life” (Sinha 2012, p. 21). However, this does not mean that they cannot talk about events and sequences of events:

The word *kuarra* (‘sun’) is preferentially used to denote time interval in general, since it is the movement of the sun that governs the passage of both the *time of day* and the *seasons*. (...) This does not, however, mean that the language lacks a lexicon of time intervals. [p. 22]. The term for ‘day’ in Amondawa, *Ara*, refers only to the daylight hours and also has the meaning ‘sunlight’. There is no Amondawa term for the entire 24-hour diurnal cycle. *Ara*, ‘day’, contrasts with *Iputunahim*, ‘night’, which also means ‘intense black’. (...) Both day and night are further subdivided into intervals that are conceptualised and named on the basis of the daily round of activities. ([27] Sinha 2012, p. 21-27)

Some of the expressions used by the Amondawa to mean what would be near to our time expressions are, for example, ‘when we start working’ to correspond to “early morning”; ‘when we eat’ (lunch time), “the sun is

high” for high noon; “the sun is gone” (twilight), “almost morning” for dawn, and “the sun jumps up now” for sunrise. So, the researchers have concluded that there are many ways of conceptualising temporality, not all of which depend on a “concept of time” (p. 33). We could add to this conclusion that each culture has its own ways to organize general facts of the nature linked to its cultural actions. Besides, we do not need to have a definition of time to say in our Western languages: “Have you just arrived *non?* We are *late* for our appointment!” If someone asks us for the meaning of ‘now’ and ‘late’ we would also be in trouble, as well as if someone asks us about a definition of time. To be late is something linked to our form of life, but perhaps it is not an important word for the Amondawa, although easy to learn if they have contact with people living in cities.

According to Wittgenstein,

Augustine says in the *Confessions* “quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio”. – This could not be said about a question of natural science (“What is the specific gravity of hydrogen?” for instance). Something that we know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it, is something that we need to *remind* ourselves of. (And it is obviously something of which for some reason it is difficult to remind oneself.)” (PI, § 89)

In other words, we just talk about time in some conventional ways; there is no explanation for it as it happens in natural science. To answer Augustine’s question is only a matter of seeing the possibilities of the phenomena of time, the ways in which one talks about it. The role of the anthropologist should be, then, to establish links between the propositions we follow to say something meaningful about time, and the practices from other cultures, which compose a frame similar to ours to some degree. I would call it a kind of translation, this process of establishing links between one frame and another, belonging to different cultures. *See* the different names you use during your life *as* a calendar that I use to separate

facts of my life. We also have our rituals to organize our temporal life, through diverse artefacts, such as clocks, calendars and so on. These rituals are not more evolved than those of other cultures, they are just different.

In his criticism of Frazer's *Golden Bough*, Wittgenstein observes that the rituals described by the anthropologist (considered strange from his Eurocentric point of view) cannot be explained, because these practices themselves are the conditions to any explanation. In other words, they play the role of the grammatical propositions; they have no sense themselves, but are instead conditions of sense. The philosopher, in his remarks about this book by Frazer, presents us with one example of practice that was described by Frazer from a Western point of view, namely, a dogmatic point of view:

The very idea of wanting to explain a practice – for example, the killing of the priest-king – seems wrong to me. All that Frazer does is to make them plausible to people who think as he does. It is very remarkable that in the final analysis all these practices are presented as, so to speak, pieces of stupidity.

But it will never be plausible to say that mankind does all that out of sheer stupidity.

When, for example, he explains to us that the king must be killed in his prime, because the savages believe that otherwise his soul would not be kept fresh, all one can say is: where that practice and these views occur together, the practice does not spring from the view, but they are both just there. (RFGB, pp.1-2)

Therefore, some practices have a normativity force, whether expressed by words or by acts. They do not need explanations, on the contrary, they are the ones that allow explanations. And these practices are learned within a context, interwoven with other practices, constituting what we call a culture.

Returning to the situations imagined by Wittgenstein I referred to at the beginning of this text, to understand them is in fact to recognize activities which play the role of norms: to understand what animates the soul of the trees, we should look at their branches swaying about in the wind as if they were arms of human beings; we can also make analogies of

smiles, food and some gestures with what we perceive as ‘good’, ‘fine’; or make the movements of the ears of the natives correspond to our words, and so on. In all these situations it is possible to look for norms that could be approached to ours, establishing intermediary links between them. We also have metaphysical answers to explain the movement of our bodies, postulating a soul that animates us. Other “axioms” are incorporated in our daily lives, such as the way one smiles, or the way we eat, speak, walk, the ways we greet each other in many different contexts, all these actions are related to other elements linked to them, which is a point of departure for the above comparisons.

So, turning back to my initial question about *how far culture and habits from different communities are limits for understanding a foreign language*, from the Wittgensteinian conception of language we could say that the sufficient condition to understanding another culture is when one is capable of identifying the norms acting in both situations and relating them through some linguistic techniques, finding analogies and making comparisons. This is the first step to translate senses from one culture to another. The challenge is to move from one normative practice to another, which I am referring to as a translation process, intermediated by linguistic tools, which also must be learned. And this process takes place in the various domains of knowledge and in their respective cultures, from the classroom to anthropological research.

5. Translation as an education process

I have no doubt that the activity of teaching is also a matter of translation. There are no essential meanings to be conveyed by education in general, but instead, what we have are different ways of organizing the empirical world, and our task as educators is to introduce children to different language games, from the primitive to the more complex ones. Even inside the same language game, such as teaching numbers, what we have is “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing:

sometimes overall similarities overlapping, sometimes similarities of detail” (IF, § 66). In the next paragraph, Wittgenstein gives us the example of numbers forming a family in such a way:

Why do we call something a ‘number’? Well, perhaps because it has a direct relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. (IF, § 67)

This well-known paragraph of Wittgenstein synthesizes the relevance of his antiessentialist view for understanding the multiple ways of conveying senses, that we can see as a kind of translation: in the “family” of numbers, a natural number has a kinship to the rational numbers. For example, the teacher can suggest that his student *see* p/q as a number also, where p and q are natural numbers. Similarly, we tell the Amondawas *to see* the sequence of the different names they receive during their lives as a kind of calendar, like the other artefacts we use in our Western life, such as clocks, wall calendars, agendas etc., which are techniques underlying what we call past, present and future that we use to express our concept of time. Even though the Amondawa do not have words for past, present and future, they can learn them and incorporate them into their own language, as new rules within the contexts that they already have. Just like Wittgenstein incorporated foreign words into his orthographic dictionary, as well as some of the dialect words spoken in the community where he worked as an elementary teacher. These different ways we use to attribute sense to the world can be interwoven within increasingly broader contexts, through processes of presenting the aspects that are pertinent to each culture and

persuading the other to make new comparisons, from the classroom up to a culture alien to our own¹².

English revision by Oscar Kent Mahar.

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¹² However, it does not mean that in this pragmatic conception of meaning the world does not exist and that only the different languages would exist. The point of Wittgenstein is another one: each language appropriates fragments of the external or internal world in order to attribute sense to what we perceive and do. In other words, language *works*, or better, language-games allow the construction of senses, through different linguistic techniques, as Moreno (2005, 2011) has systematized in his books. In this sense, Wittgenstein is not anti-realistic, or any other "anti" attributed to him. He just showed us some linguistic ways that we attribute sense to our originally chaotic world, either in our Western civilization or in an Amondawa tribe, or still, inside a classroom.

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Lesemaschinen – Reading-Machines

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Abstract: This contribution discusses the performance piece “Lesemaschinen” [Reading Machines] developed by the musician Molly McDolan. The piece is a musical-experimental exploration of Wittgenstein’s questions on reading and understanding he contemplates in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In §§156-169 Wittgenstein introduces the thought experiment of a reading machine [Lesemaschine] in order to discuss differences between mere mechanical rule following and mental processes of reading and hence forward, of understanding. McDolan has staged this thought experiment as a performance piece and deployed Natascha Gruver as a Lesemaschine to read these respective paragraphs *prima vista* in three languages: in German, French, and Hungarian while being audio recorded. In a next step McDolan assembled these three recordings into one audio stream, with each layer of reading on top of each other. The audio program Adobe Audition denominates a primary tone from these layers, thus providing a score for the oboist McDolan to play. That way the voice of the oboe is another kind of Lesemaschine as it sets into music the vocal sound of the audio recordings. In the performance McDolan is playing the oboe live while the readings are streamed from a computer. The result is a blurry sound cloud that passes on the task to the listener: what do I hear, what do I understand? The piece creates an astonishing live experience of processes of reading and understanding and is a compelling example of artistic research opening innovative ways of approaching Wittgenstein.

Keywords: Artistic Research, Meaning, Performance, Philosophy of Language, Reading, Translation, Understanding, Wittgenstein

1. Preliminary Remarks – The Problem Of Reading

“Lesemaschinen”, developed by the oboist Molly McDolan, is a musical-experimental exploration as well as an artistic interpretation and translation of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on reading and understanding as

particularly contemplated in the §§156 to 169 of the *Philosophical Investigations*. The piece premiered at the *Festival for Performative Philosophy* in Naumburg, Germany, at the Nietzsche Dokumentationszentrum, in September 2013.

My contribution to the volume *Wittgenstein on/in Translation* sets itself apart from the volume's general dedication, as it does not deal with the question of how to translate Wittgenstein's work within a linguistic context. It does not deal with the problem of translating Wittgenstein into another language. Yet this article deals with the topic of translation, but in a different context: the context of artistic research and exploration. My aim is to show that artistic research is able to render results a mere academic or mere theoretical study is not able to accomplish. Following Wittgenstein's own style of writing, I do not refer much to secondary literature. The primary reference for this article is Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, being aware that this 'minimalistic' style does not necessarily comply to what is nowadays expected in academic writing.

In the following, I will discuss the performance piece that derived its name from the respective §157, where Wittgenstein introduces the thought experiment of a reading machine/Lesemaschine in order to clarify the difference between reading as mechanical rule following of uttering letters and reading as a mental act in humans. After some introductory remarks in Section 1 on Wittgenstein's problem of reading, Section 2 will introduce the performance "Lesemaschinen" in which I was deployed as a Lesemaschine and describe my experience as such. Section 3 shows how the performance relates to the problems Wittgenstein is occupied with in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Section 4 discusses a few more conceptual aspects of the performance.

In §157 Wittgenstein introduces the thought experiment of a reading machine and due to its importance I am quoting a large part of this paragraph:

157. Consider the following case. Human beings or creatures of some other kind are used by us as reading machines. They are trained for this purpose. The trainer says of some that they can already read, of others that they cannot yet do so. Take the case of a pupil who has so far not taken part in the training; if he is shown a written word he will sometimes produce some sort of sound, and here and there it happens ‘accidentally’ to be roughly right. A third person hears this pupil on such an occasion and says: “He is reading”. But the teacher says: “No, he isn’t reading; that was an accident”. – But let us suppose that this pupil continues to react correctly to further words that are put before him. After a while the teacher says: “Now he can read!” ... Which was the first word that he *read*? This question makes no sense here. ... If on the other hand we use “reading” to stand for a certain experience of transition from marks to spoken sounds, then it certainly makes sense to speak of the *first* word that he really read. He can then say, e.g. “At this word for the first time I had the feeling: ‘now I am reading’.”

Or again, in the different case of a reading-machine which translated marks into sounds, perhaps as a pianola does, it would be possible to say: “The machine *read* only after such-and-such happened to it – after such-and-such parts had been connected by wires; the first word that it read was ...”.

But in the case of the living reading-machine “reading” meant reacting to written signs in such-and-such ways. This concept was therefore quite independent of that of a mental or other mechanism. – Nor can the teacher here say of the pupil: “Perhaps he was already reading when he said that word”. For there is no doubt about what he did. – The change when the pupil began to read was the change in his *behavior*.”

Note that in this paragraph the question is about reading and not about reading and *understanding* of what is read. That the act of reading

does not (always) need to correlate to understanding, Wittgenstein states in the preceding paragraph:

156. First I need to remark that I am not counting the understanding of what is read as part of ‘reading’ for purposes of this investigation: reading is here the activity of rendering out loud what is written or printed; and also [...] playing from a score and so on.

Wittgenstein is interested in our ordinary word of “reading” and the language-games in which we employ it. Paragraphs 156 and 157 however are part of a larger section of the PI, in which Wittgenstein explores the use and meaning of the words ‘understanding’, ‘knowing’, ‘can’ and ‘to be able to’. He asks for the mental processes and internal states (*seelische Vorgänge*) that correlate to these cognitive faculties. From §156 onwards he isolates the faculty of reading and asks for its mental states and specific experience (*besonderes Erlebnis*). This concerns on the one hand the specific internal experience of a reader as she/he reads, on the other hand it concerns the question of how an external observer is able to determine if a reader is really reading, and not just mimicking or uttering sentences learned by hard. As the end of §157 suggests, Wittgenstein concludes that a certain kind of *behavior* indicates if a reader is really reading or not.

§157 conceives human reading machines, pupils trained to utter a certain sound at the sight of certain signs or letters. In that sense, these pupils are comparable to a machine that is programmed to translate certain marks into sound. This suggests that the act of reading is a mere mechanical process, independent from mental or emotional states; yet, according to Wittgenstein, a certain behavior seems to correlate with reading. Although Wittgenstein meticulously explores the mechanisms of reading, knowing and understanding in the §§156-169 and beyond, he

omits the relationship between reading and understanding. We humans learn to read the alphabet, letter by letter, by uttering a certain sound at the sight of a certain sign, but we do not stop there. As we learn how to read a word (like in elementary school) – this word bears meaning to us. By learning how to read a word we do not just learn how to connect the letters A-P-P-L-E to the word “apple”; we at the same time learn that the word “apple” refers to the object apple. For a mechanic (non-human) reading machine however the letter combination A-P-P-L-E does not bear any meaning and for a machine it makes no difference if it gives of the sound of APPLE or EPLPA. A machine executes instructions mechanically. For a machine the question of meaning does not apply. This seems to be important to keep in mind: the concept of reading does not necessarily entail understanding, but understanding that accompanies reading is an important feature in the act of human reading.

Stuart Shanker (1998) relates Wittgenstein’s thought experiment of the reading machine to Alan Turing’s analysis of calculation in ‘On Computable Numbers’. Turing develops a mechanist thesis on the question if human cognitive processes like thinking, learning, or rule following, can be mechanically explained as processes of computation. Turing’s mechanist framework does not shed light on the internal states or inner senses of a human mind, e.g. if these states are conscious, intentional or not. Shanker suggests that Wittgenstein is relating in the PI to Turing’s computing machines, because reading

can serve as an example of a rule-governed procedure at its most mechanical. [...] But, whereas Turing’s goal was to break calculation down into its elementary psychic units, Wittgenstein was looking to clarify the criteria which license us in speaking of possessing a cognitive ability at its most primitive level. (Shanker 1998, p. 54).

Wittgenstein distinguishes between three dimensions of reading: 1. Causal, as it applies to a machine reading signs; 2. Primitive, as it applies to someone who reads but does not understand a word of what she/he is reading; and 3. Paradigmatic, as it applies to reading and understanding what one is reading.

While Wittgenstein argues that in some situations it is difficult to distinguish between 1 and 2, he also questions if a similar ambiguity exists between the reading dimensions 1 and 3. According to Turing's continuum picture, stages 1 to 3 lay on a continuum, where "the internal mechanisms guiding the machine's operations are a simpler version of the internal mechanisms guiding the organism" (Shanker 1998, p. 54). However, this continuum picture (cf. Touring 1936, pp. 117ff) is what Wittgenstein scrutinizes. He responds to this problem by an attempt to clarify the criteria for 'reading' in primitive contexts and by trying to identify the basis on which we distinguish between if someone *reads*, or only *seems to read*, or *reads and understands*.

In any case, the relationship between reading, understanding, internal mental states and external observer is intricate and not clearly spelled out by Wittgenstein. It needed to be explored how reading and understanding are linked with each other. If they are separable, then what are the respective inner mental states of the reader, and what does an external observer observe? How is reading detachable from understanding after all?¹

¹ A similar question could be raised for meaningful versus meaningless speaking. See Wittgenstein Ms-180a,6r: "Insofern sich das gedankenlose Sprechen vom nicht gedankenlosen durch etwas unterscheidet, was während des Sprechens stattfindet, so ist dies von der Art dessen, was ausdrucksvolles vom ausdruckslosen Sprechen unterscheidet". [Insofar as thoughtless speaking differs from non-thoughtless by something that takes place during speech, this is of the kind that distinguishes expressive from expressionless speech.]

2. The Performance Piece “Lesemaschinen”

To tackle these questions, Molly McDolan staged the thought experiment of the reading machine as a musical performance in the following way: I was given instruction to show up at a sound studio at a given time. The only information I had was that I will be given three texts to read out loudly, each at a length of about 15 minutes and that my reading will be recorded. I did not know what kind of texts I will read nor in which language. There was no preparation or rehearsal whatsoever – it would be a *prima vista* reading for me. At the sound studio the operator gave me the first text. It turned out it was the paragraphs §§156–169 of the *Philosophical Investigations* in its original German version. As German is my mother tongue, this task was easy to accomplish and so I read these paragraphs with ease and amusement while being recorded. I did fully understand what I was reading.

After the first recording I was handed the second text: it was the same paragraphs but now in French. Regarding my proficiency in French McDolan knew that I did not speak this language, but that I was able to understand it partially due to my competence in Spanish. When I started to read these paragraphs, I was aware that I didn't know how to pronounce the French words I was reading. Therefore, my reading was in the first sections rather inhibited and stagnated. But what happened after a couple of minutes of reading? I made a decision about how to pronounce the words I was reading. I knew it wouldn't be the correct French pronunciation, but in order to read fluidly I felt I had to make a decision of how to pronounce these words, especially for recurring ones like 'lire', 'entendre' or 'disciple'.

Once a pronunciation decision was made it became a *rule* for the rest of the French reading, no matter if this rule was correct in real French or not. Spontaneously and intuitively I had performed Wittgenstein's con-

cept of rule-making and rule-following. I knew I had made up my own ‘private’ French on the basis of a vague idea of how to pronounce it since I had heard this language before. So I simply mimicked my reading in French, not concerned if pronouncing it correctly or not, and due to my knowledge in Spanish I understood a large part of what I was reading.

After the French reading recording the third text was given to me. It was again the same §§156-169, but this time in Hungarian, a language of which McDolan knew I did not speak nor understand and did not have much contact at all. My first sensation when I looked onto this text was the sight of endless chains of letters. I could not derive any meaning from these strings of letters I now started to read. At this point I realized I had become Wittgenstein’s *Lesemaschine*: reading one letter after the other, uttering out loud chains of letters I had no clue what they meant. The fact that I could neither understand what I was reading nor derive any (self-made) rules for pronunciation was unsettling. How did this reading sound? It sounded slow and broken in the beginning and developed more fluidity and intonation towards the end as there I tried to fake some speech melody and fluidity when I became aware that I sounded like a robot, like a machine reader indeed. In sum, the entire reading session was about a progression or rather regression from a competent reading and understanding experience (the German reading) to a *Lesemaschine* experience (the Hungarian reading).

In a next step McDolan assembled these three reading recordings into one audio stream with the three layers of reading on top of each other. The result is a blurry sound cloud of voices. However, the audio program Adobe Audition is able to derive a primary tone from that sound cloud, denominating it as a musical note (e.g. D, C, G). This way the program produces a score for a musician to play (see Fig.1 and Fig. 2 screenshots from Adobe Audition calculating the score).



Figure 1: Lesemaschinen Spectral Analysis Frequency



Figure 2: Lesemaschinen Spectral Analysis Pitch – Score

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds).
Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 265-280, v. 86, 2019

McDolan plays this score on the oboe and the oboe playing (=reading) the score is thus another kind of reading machine that sets into music the vocal sound of the recorded readings. The oboe's voice refers to the sound and rhythmic material derived from the readings. That way, the oboe, in itself a voice-like instrument that simulates human voice and the vocal reading recordings enter a dialogue. This transition from vocal sound to musical sound is made possible with the computer program as yet another reading machine – and in fact the only machine involved – that reads the frequencies of the voices and calculates a score from it. Hence the piece's name is "Lesemaschinen" in plural.

First performed in Naumburg (see above) Molly McDolan played the score live on the oboe while the assembled reading voices were streamed from a computer. The live performance is a polyphonic sound cloud of oboe and voices that passes on the task of reading and understanding to the listener: what do I hear, what do I understand?

The piece brilliantly stages Wittgenstein's thought experiment because it translates his concept of a reading machine into a sensual, emotional and mental experience for all subjects involved. Thus, the artistic approach creates a live experience of the problems related to Wittgenstein's reading machine a mere intellectual debate would never be able to render.

3. The Sound of Reading and Understanding

From a musical point of view, it was astonishing that each reading produced a different kind of sound quality as tempo, rhythm, and speech melody varied significantly with the different levels of reading and understanding competences. Thus, Wittgenstein's suggestion in §157 "...The change when the pupil began to read was the change in his *behavior*" can be completed with: this *behavior* shows in a specific *sound*. In fact,

the entire phrase can be reformulated as “the change when the pupil began to read was the change in how it *sounded*”.

Instead of asking for a certain behavior, one can ask: “What does reading sound like? How does it sound, when one reads and understands? How does it sound when one is reading without understanding what is read? – The answer is: it produces different sounds; different sounds in terms of speech melody, intonation, flow and rhythm.

From the internal mental perspective of what is going on in the reader while reading it is remarkable to note, that where no understanding is possible, the effort of ‘trying to understand’ is what sets the human mind apart from a machine. A mechanical reading machine does not try to understand nor does it try to fake that it understands what it reads. The features of *trying to understand*, of *faking* (of speech melody in my Hungarian reading) and *mimicking* and *self-made rule making* (in my French reading) that the live experience of *prima vista* reading brought about, could serve as an compelling argument against Turing’s mechanist approach. Turing was convinced that a machine could computationally model human cognitive states. He viewed the difference between machine and human as a continuum, from simple to complex. Wittgenstein in contrast, who questioned that continuum picture, was looking for the very mental states, the *seelische Vorgänge* (cf. PI, § 154) that occur during reading, but do not occur in machines. With the help of the performance “Lesemaschinen” these mental states/*seelische Vorgänge* can now be identified. In terms of the internal experience of the reader as a “reading machine” they are: the features of *trying to understand*, of *faking* and *mimicking*, of *spontaneous rule-making*. In terms of *behavior* the different reading dimensions (1, 2 and 3) bring about different sound qualities, and an external observer or listener is able to hear.

Hence the performance “Lesemaschinen” delivers a genuine and innovative way to address and answer Wittgenstein’s quest of the behavior and *seelische Vorgänge* of a reader when she *really* reads.

The most important feature of McDolan’s Lesemaschinen piece is that it creates a live experience of processes of reading, understanding and meaning creation at three levels and for three agents: the reader, the musician, and the audience – the listeners. The first level was my experience of a competent reader turning into a reading-machine. The second level is the musical reading, the live oboe that is playing the score translating the vocals into musical tones. Here the correlation of letters and context becomes visible as for example the letter G in a score has a different meaning and causes a different reaction for a musician than the letter G in a text. The letter G in a score produces a musical tone; the letter G in a word produces a particular spoken sound. The third level of reading and understanding concerns the listener: What kind of hearing experience is created for the audience listening to this piece? While the oboe’s tones can be clearly perceived as music, or rather, as the listeners are trying to hear it as music, the blurry sound cloud of three layers of languages is overwhelming and forces the listener to derive meaning on his/her own. For example, listeners capable of French would perhaps hear and understand the French snippets; but what about the fake pronunciation? Would the private rules for pronunciation I had made up during the French reading render it unintelligible for those fluent in French? Listeners with mother tongue Hungarian would perhaps understand the Hungarian snippets but perhaps not the others if not fluent in them, and so on. That way the piece creates an individual hearing experience according to the language capacities of each listener.

These various dimensions of reading could also be understood as processes of translation: e.g. when I simultaneously tried to understand the French text while I was reading it; the experience of failed translation

while reading the Hungarian text; the audio program that translates the recorded readings into a score; the oboe that translates the score into musical sound; and at last the listeners, trying to understand what they hear, trying to translate the sound they hear into what it might mean.

Does this struggle of trying to understand demonstrate how trained, in the Wittgensteinian sense ‘abgerichtet’ we are, to look for meaning whenever we read? It might show that reading and hearing and the effort to understand seem to be intrinsically interwoven within the human mind.

4. Further Conceptual Aspects

McDolan understands her performance as a musical demonstration or musical exploration rather than a musical piece. From her practice in historic performance (early music and baroque) she compares the piece to medieval texts, where one finds marginalia and ornamentation, excesses (*Ausschweifungen*), alongside a text. Due to McDolan, the pieces’ multi-layered polyphony challenges the listener in a similar way as a musician in historic performance practice is challenged: to decide what and where the meaning and importance is in a score: what is marginalia, ornamentation, what is primary text? – This the listener of the *Lesemaschine* piece has to decide like the musician. When an excess of information is provided – three layers of reading recordings plus oboe at the same time – information and thus meaning is disappearing as the auditory overflow overwhelms the brain. As the listeners get everything at once, the hearing experience is such that one finds herself wrestling with listening (as auditory reading), trying to understand and to differentiate as to what is text/meaning, what marginalia, what musical commentary. As the transition from meaning to music is blurry, listeners have to find their own path through the *Lesemaschinen* piece.

Another analogy that McDolan offers for the piece is that of a graffiti picture, loaded with information, yet open to interpretation as viewers have to decide for themselves what is relevant and what is not. In opposition to medieval marginalia as cross-referential texts is the modern idea of clean and clear, unambiguous texts as a sign of improvement and progress. But by deciding for one interpretation or meaning other amazing possibilities are ruled out. By making a text clean and clear, excesses and meanderings and what they could tell us, get eliminated. In that sense, McDolan's piece also asks how the form of a text or piece contributes to its meaning creation. It demonstrates how we are cognitively trained (in the Wittgensteinian sense 'abgerichtet') to find clean and clear solutions when we read or hear, how we seek to determine non-ambiguous meanings and how unsettling it is for us human readers if this process is disrupted or inapplicable.

Regarding the relationship of hearing and understanding in music, McDolan points out that one cannot hear music if one at the same time tries to understand it. From sound to language it is a one-way street: once a sound has been understood and identified as a word, one can never go back to merely hear it as sound. For example, if listeners only spoke German, they would only hear and understand the German as words and the French and Hungarian as sound. But if one told them, that this word in French or Hungarian means this and that, it will from then on be perceived as a word and not any longer as a mere sound.

Back to textual reading, Wittgenstein asks for the characteristic experience and the mental process (*seelischer Vorgang*) of reading (e.g. PI, §§ 165-169) and states: "that the letters and words *come* in a particular way." We are trained (*abgerichtet*) to link a certain visual sight of a symbol, e.g. of an "A" to a particular sound. In §168 Wittgenstein describes the act of reading as: "The eye passes, one would like to say, with particular ease, without being held up; and yet it doesn't *skid*. And at the same time in-

voluntary speech goes on in the imagination.” §169 is dealing with the *feeling* of reading: of how it is tangible that a particular letter, e.g. A causes us the utterance of a particular sound, related to that letter A, as if the sight of the letter A provides us the reason why we read that letter.

Consequently, the performance *Lesemaschine* ends with:

§169. – Denn, wenn mich jemand fragt: “Warum liest du so?” – so begründe ich es durch die Buchstaben, welche da stehen. [For if someone asks me “Why do you read such-and-such?” – I justify my reading with the letters which are there.]

5. Conclusion

In its artistic translation of Wittgensteinian thought into a performative framework the piece *Lesemaschinen* renders insights a purely intellectual analysis of the *Philosophical Investigations* would never be able to provide. As the piece enables a live experience of processes of reading, understanding and meaning creation in the Wittgensteinian sense, it is an ingenious example of artistic research, a growing field that applies alternative ways (sensory, embodied, experimental) of exploration². As a piece of performative philosophy it delivers an innovative approach and

² For similar examples in Experimental Music see: Alvin Lucier: “I am sitting in a room” (1969), or Anri Sala: “Ravel, Ravel, Unravel”, 55th Venice Biennale (2013). In “I am sitting in a room” Lucier records himself reading a text that starts with the lines “I am sitting in a room...”. He then plays the tape recording back into the room, re-recording it. The new recording is then played back and re-recorded, and this process is repeated over and over again, until words and meaning dissolve into a stream of noise and sound.

Anri Sala’s video installation of left-hand piano playing is an exploration of sound spatialization and the silent language of the body. The piece further pushes Sala’s experimentations on the relation of space and sound. The work appeals as much to the viewer’s intellect as to his or her body, creating a powerful physical and emotional experience, submerging the viewer in its music.

a valuable contribution to the academic scholarship on Wittgenstein because it helps us to understand as we *experience* the Wittgensteinian question of what it means, to understand.

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Speaking and Translating: Aesthetics, Aspect-seeing, Interpretation¹

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Abstract: The anthropologist James Frazer investigates the ritual gesture in search of beliefs about the physical world by the native. Wittgenstein considers this a case of aspect-blindness, one that is disruptive of the conditions for understanding the native's most trivial gestures. Unable to cast his glance from within the native situation, this methodological view from nowhere has an arresting effect on experience – in particular, the experience of speaking. This interruption is to be examined by means of a thought experiment. Then, through the interplay of the concepts of Spirit and Aspect, a philosophical tool is described to assess the problem that can also serve as practical guide back to ordinary experience. The next step is to examine this way out in a particularly sensitive kind of experience of meaning: the aesthetic experience, also seen as a ritual. We conclude by alluding to a possibly mutual illumination between aesthetic experience, translation studies and a Cavellian take on ordinary language.

Keywords: Aesthetic experience, aspect-seeing, interpretation, translation, Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell

1. Overture

I start with a proposition: grasping an expressive work is a question of intellectually and affectively approaching an attitude, a ritual given rise by the work or text; it is a question of being courted by a characteristic gesture and its surroundings; it is a question of approaching also – now from the

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viewpoint of reception – the way in which it all connects with forms of perception associated with characteristic reactions, and even approaching the way all this connects with the history of second order discourses (“theories”) through which those forms, on the one hand, and these reactions, on the other hand, are rationalized. Let us distill an aspect of this proposition.

An observer, listener, etc., discerns forms when apprehending objects. Now, which among those forms are those that invite the focus of spirit to dwell on the peculiar mode of reaction we call aesthetic experience, that is, an engagement with aesthetic qualities as such, without further instrumentalizing the object of attention? This question betrays a highly intuitive strategy to determine how aesthetic responses come about, especially when we are in contact with certain types of objects. But if we add a situational dimension, already the strategy sounds less intuitive. And so it should, especially in a time, our time, when the notion of aesthetic experience is often applied in common parlance to refer to an aspect of Marxian exchange value, aggregating symbolic capital (Bourdieu) by way of the aesthetics of modern avant-gardes (cf. John Berger), especially surrealism. Wittgenstein’s approach to this problem in his *Lectures on Aesthetics* is infused with his newly-found anthropological interests in the late 1930s. I propose we follow his cue – which, as we shall see, is suggestive not of a dismissal of the idea that there are attributes inviting aesthetic appreciation of objects, but of a dismissal of the *philosophical reduction* of the intuitive strategy mentioned above, i.e., the philosophical reduction of aesthetic experience to the perception of objective aesthetic qualities.

In his *Remarks on Frazer’s ‘Golden Bough’*, Wittgenstein examines how dismal is the situation of the evolutionary anthropologist faced with a fundamental aspect of the experience of meaning: the ritual gesture. Such situation becomes even more untenable if, as the reader of the *Remarks* suspects, by ritual Wittgenstein implies more than what is often meant by

anthropologists and historians of religion, to encompass the structured intersubjective space of the experience of meaning, within a web of other such structures (he calls these systems *associations of practices*). Consider the blindness of the anthropologist who believes that the rain dance is a mystification, or a downright mistake, implying a childish stage of that cultural group. I want to suggest that this blindness, or at least the attitude behind it, is disruptive of the conditions for understanding even the most trivial of gestures of the natives. Potentially, this is an attitude that *interrupts* practice, disconnecting words from situations in which they express human engagement. Such, by the way, is an anathematic sense of metaphysics for the mature Wittgenstein. In contrast, following Clifford Geertz, we can think of the ethnographer's glance as having to cast itself from within culture, accessing what Wittgenstein calls the intermediary links connecting uses of concepts, unlike the view from nowhere of methodical neutrality.

In what follows, the interruption of practice will be examined by means of a thought experiment (with *On Certainty* as background). A philosophical tool to dissolve the problem that led to the disruption of practice is then offered, in a very summary fashion, by means of the notions of *aspect-perception* (with the *Remarks on Frazer* as background). The next step examines this way back to ordinary experience in a particularly sensitive kind of experience of meaning: the aesthetic experience, also seen as a ritual (with the *Lectures on Aesthetics* as background). Finally, the last section hints at connections of the previous discussion with translation studies.

2. Experience of meaning

In a collectively-owned rural property, a farmer suggests to his comrades the trimming of a number of trees.² The farmer indicates by ostensive gestures which ones are to be trimmed: this one, that and the other. At a certain point, he adds: “And I know that this is a tree” (see OC, § 353). What is thus asserted can be seen as a basic proposition of the farmer’s belief systems, one that is supposed to be held true also by all his interlocutors. We might think that to state such proposition, therefore, should be a linguistic behavior of no consequence. Strangely enough, however, that is not the case. The assertion *should not* be uttered in that non-metaphysical context.

To pass that proposition over in silence, though it still echoes in whatever is uttered, is then part and parcel of the use in question. Why? Because to do otherwise in this particular case would somehow call for a non-existing criterion, i.e., it would suggest the need for verification in ignorance of what would count as verification. We might be tempted to say that the tree itself would do the job, together with an ostensive gesture. But the situation does not provide for this possibility. This can be seen in the fact that verification would be a legitimate linguistic behavior in special circumstances akin to ours (farmer, contractors, trimming, trees): hallucinations, or stage scenes in which real trees would appear indistinguishable from scenographic ones, etc. The situation being perfectly ordinary, though, we find his comrades staring at the farmer, not knowing what to think, not knowing what is really being said, not knowing how to go on in the linguistic exchange.

Imagine that, after a moment of perplexity, one of the farmer’s colleagues now asks himself: “But he simply *knows* that this is a tree, without examining it, or asking us to do so?”. At this point, the unfortunate colleague falls into a trap. An illegitimate sense of verification is instilled in

² Specific sections below are based on Azize (2018; 2016; 2015).

the interlocutors by the tone of the farmer's utterance: "I know that 'p'", 'p' being of common knowledge. And there's the rub. The perplexity would not take hold of the situation, were 'p' clearly absurd, in spite of the epistemic assertion. Faced with the suggestion of a legitimate verification in the absence of operative criteria, practice itself is now arrested, leading to aphasia. Here, there seems to be more than merely not knowing what to respond, as is the case when we have a legitimate doubt.

By uttering a proposition stemming from the most basic layers of grammar in which the experience is anchored – where we find propositions relative to our common phenomenological orientation –, and by doing so with an attitude of certainty (not just "This is an *x*", but "I know that this is an *x*"), the farmer triggered in the spirit of his colleagues more than a mistrust on his judgements: he triggered a mistrust on the meaning of his words. The farmer could be said to want to do justice to the facts of the matter. Does he really know that what he suggested be trimmed is a tree after all? However, perhaps strangely, analysis itself, thus conceived, seems to be the agent of the nullification of the facts under consideration ('trees', 'trimming', 'ostension') in a fog of misplaced philosophy. From perplexity ("Is he implying he could have not known that those are trees in the first place?") we now move towards a transfiguration of experience in a speculation with an aura of deepness ("How does one know anything without verifying it?"). What is at stake here goes beyond the epistemic aspect of the linguistic behavior.

According to Wittgenstein, some assertions are special in that they are impervious to doubt in normal uses, even if they have propositional form, and – strangely enough – these special assertions are fundamental to our webs of systems of belief (see OC, § 417). We can see how these "propositions" work through the following list of examples: "Every rod has a length" [PI, § 251], "The class of lions is not a lion, but the class of classes is a class" [*Rem. on the Found. of Math.*, p. 182], "An order orders its own

execution” [PI, § 458]), “I can’t feel your toothache’ [*Bl. & Br. B.*, p. 49], “You can’t hear God speak to someone else, you can hear him only if you are being addressed’ [*Zettel*, 717]).³ These propositions, which he called grammatical observations, are well glossed on by literature on Wittgenstein’s normative dimension of grammar. What is perhaps less familiar is the idea that, by being made explicit, the assertions implied by those propositions cast a fog of doubt, not over calculation mistakes, measurement imprecisions, memory flaws, etc. – all having primarily to do with belief systems and their operative criteria –, but over the *integration of the speaker* in the very form of life that is supposed to be his. It is interesting to note, for example, that we would not rely on the powers of imagination of someone who would talk like the farmer that suggested the trimming of trees. Is this the sign of a limit to the imagination, instructive of its nature? Or is this rather a limit of our own hearing, that should be able to hear a possible irony in the farmer’s prosody? Are these the good questions to clarify the perplexity of the farmer’s colleagues?

Let us retain this impure⁴ normative dimension, its seating in a form of life, and the idea of interruption of practice as notions to be recovered later, in order to better understand those questions.

3. Aspect

In *The Golden Bough*, James Frazer typifies an attitude in face of beliefs of the other: that of situating those beliefs about the occurrence of states of affairs in a level that is more fundamental than that of the experience of meaning, in which forms are to be found that are expressive of

³ Examples compiled by Debra Aidun (1981). These examples have the virtue of *not* stemming from discourses on logic or mathematics.

⁴ Impure, because it draws transcendental criteria from within the empirical realm itself, lending normative power to empirical elements (as when the biologist, or the priest, or the legislator, point ostensibly to an event, which is transfigured in norm to the concept “beginning of life”, now recursively applicable). See Moreno (2006).

associations of practices (behaviors, rites, symbolism). He could then treat with irony the rain dance of certain “savage” mind, for instance, calling it a mistake. To say that this is a dogmatic limitation that invalidates Frazer’s *tour de force* would be grossly unfair to the many other dimensions of the text of *The Golden Bough* (Strathern 1987). Wittgenstein used to select, as exemplar renderings of ideas to be combatted, pieces of work from writers and thinkers he held dear and admired, and whose texts he visited not just to look for productive mistakes (Plato, Augustine, Frazer, James, Freud, Moore). Still, to my purposes here, we can find in Wittgenstein’s Frazer a gaze that is blind to the full meaning of human engagement, insofar as this perspective interprets gestures as tokens of beliefs. We could say that this is a question of method, in a general scheme of evolutionary stages of civilization – as Frazer’s anthropological scheme goes. But to say this does not mitigate the dogmatism of this perspective. I find it clarifying to think of this blindness to the expression of human engagement in terms of what Wittgenstein called aspect-blindness, and in turn to think of aspectual attributes in terms of what we might call the spirit of a practice. Let us then examine these two notions, aspect and spirit. I should point out that I do not wish to advance a form of phenomenological descriptivism. But I do wish to seek in the philosophical yielding of the notion of *aspect* the idea that the appropriate description of the experience of meaning, though not excluding sensory descriptions, cannot be reduced to them, as this would result in an undesirable paradox: the idea that two sensory experiences could be different with no change in the object or the conditions of perception, even ideally (as a philosophical fiction). The idea, ultimately, is to examine the ways in which possible conceptions of aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgement are crucially influenced by these notions. And this has important consequences to possible notions of aesthetic experience and judgment.

In a long 2009 essay, *Como ler o álbum? (How to Read the Album?)*, Arley Ramos Moreno tackles the idea of the spirit of the new method in Wittgenstein. He starts from Wittgenstein's observations on the nature of rituals:

(...) the feeling of deepness [that we may feel in in connection with a ritual] would stem from the *correlation* we in some way perceive, without being able to admit it, between the rituals and *our own* feelings and thoughts; or better, the similarities and intermediate connections that we *recognize* between the different situations, but are not prepared to perceive as similar. (Moreno 2009, p. 161)

The resonances invited in us by the ritual are not the product of knowledge relative to physical or historical facts pertaining to the ritual – as, for example, the knowledge that remote, original renderings of a particular rite were symbolic substitutions for some tragic event, like famine, pestilence, or a bloody war. For example, even when people build ruins or represent households as ruin-like – Romantic imagery may come to mind –, Wittgenstein writes, “they take the form of collapsed houses” (RFGB, § 78, p. 149). Moreno writes:

The spirit, then, would be a set of known cultural habits whose features we can recognize, at least partially, in unknown cultures as being similar – to the point of being able, when it is a matter of habits of our own culture, of thinking, inventing or imagining situations in conformity with rules we do not know, as they are similar to those we do know. A common spirit or, at least, recognizable as being familiar, is what seems to be at the basis of the capacity to see an object as another – and of the long descriptions Wittgenstein does of the concept of *seeing as*. (Moreno 2009, p. 162)

The spirit of a ritual would have an aspectual nature, and its recognition hinges on our capacity to see internal connections between its components, between this ritual and other rituals, etc. In other words, the notion

of aspect is understood as the way in which the spirit of a ritual lends itself to recognition and expression. The correlation with our aesthetic experience problem should become clear later.

The applicability of the notion of aspect stems in part from the idea, mentioned above, that the proper description of experience of meaning, though not excluding sensory reports, cannot be reduced to these. Let us remember our undesirable contradiction: the notion that two sensory experiences could be different with no change on the object or the conditions of perception, *even ideally as a philosophical fiction*. I claim that the solution, or the dissolution of this paradox must include a dimension of reaction – not only a sensorial one – that be both (1) subjective and (2) “right”. There is a risk here: to replace one paradox for another. If we speak of the right reaction, we speak of rules. On the other hand, such rules for reacting or responding (especially aesthetically) do not operate in isolation of a lived, existential, even emotive dimension. Recent debates on aesthetics⁵ have been shifting attention again to the place of emotions, and even magical thought,⁶ within aesthetic experience. The challenge is to do this without (1) reducing the role of emotions to that of eliciting the experience of beauty, and (2) still leaving room to some cognitive role to be played by artworks, especially in regard to self-knowledge and the expansion of freedoms of the imagination (which do not exclude political dimensions of

⁵ *Emotion and the Arts* (ed. by Sue Laver and Mette Hjort, Oxford U.P., 1997) is a good place to start, as well as recent texts by Kendall Walton, Richard Eldridge, and Jesse Prinz.

⁶ At this point, it is worth recalling some manuscript remarks that, according to Rhees, Wittgenstein probably wanted to add to the *Big Typescript*, and crossed later with his characteristic observation: *schlecht*, bad: “I now believe that it would be right to begin my book with remarks about metaphysics as a kind of magic. But in doing this, I must not make a case for magic nor may I make fun of it. The depth of magic should be preserved.– Indeed, here the elimination of magic has itself the character of magic. For, back then, when I began talking about the ‘world’ (and not about this tree or table), what else did I want but to keep something higher spellbound in my words?” (see Rhees 1967).

artistic production and reception). The conceptual framework around aspects will help us here too, later on.

The notion of *aspect*⁷ and correlate concepts (aspect-seeing, aspect-dawning, aspect-blindness, figurate object, aspect-changing) is explored more intensely in session XI of Part II of the *Investigations* [PPF]. The distinction structuring this constellation of concepts is introduced by way of two categories of objects of visual experience. These two categories of objects of visual experience are suggested by two possible answers to a simple, everyday query: “What do you see there?”. The first answer is: “I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in these two faces” (PPF, § 111).

In the case of the first answer, there is no confusion or paradox generated by the referential model of meaning, the idea that the meaning of a word is always the object it substitutes. The object aimed by the deitic will be ostensibly indicated. But something different happens in the second case. What should be ostensibly indicated? In case the first interlocutor claims not to see what the other sees, what can be offered by way of help? The phenomenological claim that nobody ultimately sees exactly the same thing can be eliminated as irrelevant with a philosophical fiction: imagine that the two of those visual experiences have *the same* access, physically speaking – including the angle of vision, an absolutely static disposition of the subjects, etc. Still, the possibility of discord persists.

Now, this conclusion seems to collide with the application of the very concept of *seeing*. Or better, a surprising tension arises between both uses that seem to collide: the concept of seeing, and the type of object of the visual experience that is suggested by the second answer offered to the query: “What do you see there?”.

⁷ I follow in its broad strokes Marie McGinn’s interpretation (McGinn 1997).

Wittgenstein recognizes this tension within visual experience. Typically, he seeks to understand it by enriching the assortment of examples, so they become more numerous and closer to ordinary language. And he introduces a new philosophical operator: “I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience ‘noticing an aspect’” (PPF, § 113). What happened? There were two visual experiences following each other in time, with no modification in the object seen. However, a change in a visual experience cannot be disconnected from a change in the object seen, unless there is a change in the physical conditions of vision (angle, environment, etc.). But we have already dismissed this change.

If not the object seen, another element should bear change. Enter an element imported from experimental psychology: the ambiguous figures. Jastrow’s ambiguous figure of the duck-rabbit is now well known. It explains our problem better: I see a rabbit, then I recognize, with some surprise, a duck (or the other way around). I thus have two visual experiences. Naturally, however, nothing has changed by way of the figure’s lines and volumes. I say that I see another thing, but this does not imply – as it usually does – that another object lent itself to my sight, at least not in the usual sense, that of objects bearing ostensive indication: the referential “this” of pointing towards something in time and space.

We talk of seeing something as something – applying the concept of *seeing-as* – in circumstances in which we have a visual experience that is not reducible to a (mere) sensory description. One feature of this peculiar visual experience is precisely the occurrence of a temporal marker of change: “yes, *now* I see!”. However, this *change of aspect* – of an anonymous face into a known face, etc. – is articulated in a way that suggests not only a change in visual experience, but also an alteration in the object, its transfiguration into something else. Here is a strange consequence of the paradox mentioned above, perfectly congruent, by the way, with our everyday concepts,

propositions and beliefs around the notion of *seeing*. The verb ‘to see’ now starts to sound quite stranger than its dictionary meanings. It cannot be that an aspectual change in the visual experience implies change in the object in a physical way. When I say: “*now* I see Jastrow’s figure *as rabbit*”, this cannot be a proper perceptual report. But if we are talking about *seeing*, how can we accept this conclusion?

We could find a way out of this in the following terms. There is indeed change in the object, but only in the “organization” of its volumes, lines and colors, i.e., in the structure of the objective properties which we highlighted. The problem is that if we want to talk of *two successive organizations*, they wouldn’t have the same logical category of the structure of volumes, lines and colors as objective attributes – since, surely in our examples, these have not changed.

Wittgenstein then ventures a more positive move. We can talk, not of two objects of two visual experiences, but of two *ways of reacting* to objects of visual experience in general. In this sense, “what I perceive in the lighting up of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects” (PPF, § 247) – and this internal relation is dependent on a dense description of an association of practices. This allows us to find within the verb *to see* an unsuspected complexity: “‘Seeing as . . .’ is not part of perception. And therefore it is like seeing, and again not like seeing” (PPF, § 137). Both *seeing* and *seeing-as* being concepts of visual experience, still they have a different logical structure and this shows up in their relations with sensitivity and imagination.

A new scene is then presented that renders explicit a subtle distinction: “I look at an animal; someone asks me: ‘What do you see?’ I answer: ‘A rabbit.’ — I see a landscape; suddenly a rabbit runs past. I exclaim: ‘A rabbit!’” (PPF, § 138). Remember that we are now trying to better understand how does the visual experience of aspects come about, i.e., a seeing that differs in time from another without there being any change in the object seen, and without reduction to a perception report. Now, here the

second answer is still a perception report, just as the first answer. But it is also more than this: it is expressive – in the manner of a speech act. When I exclaim: What a beautiful day!, the essence of my meaning is not the absence of clouds in the sky, but, rather, my awe, my aesthetic experience. This state of affairs (my awe) is so to speak composed, put forward, realized by the uttering – similarly to clauses like “I baptize you Isabel” or “The session is open”. If someone turned to the world wanting to verify to what state of affairs might the uttering of the exclamation be connected, then the result of such verification, i.e., the new information selected within the world in a state of affairs that could be referred by a perceptual report bore by the exclamation, would not modify the expression of delight – come rain or come shine! Analogously to my delight, the surprise in face of the rabbit that, as I admired the landscape, startled me with its jump out of a bush, is expressed by the uttering “A rabbit!”. We have prosodic markers for this, and also graphic ones (the exclamation mark). But what is essential is that one would no longer do justice to the visual experience of the object of the second answer (“I see a resemblance”) by *pointing* to a rabbit – as would be the case in the first answer, where ostension would suffice. Something is expressed here also to which I cannot point, by contrast with what is demanded by the referential model of meaning (the meaning of a word is the object it substitutes). Remember the case of the face resemblance: it is the same problem. It is a question of aspects. Only, at this point of Wittgenstein’s text, the philosopher draws attention to a crucial fact in the use of linguistic symbolism: the difference in the *form in which the visual experiences are expressed* is an important part of the distinction between them. For this difference is also indicative of a characteristic way of reacting.

The role of the ways of reacting in the determination of the difference of the two visual experiences, correlative to their respective visual objects, become even more explicit in an example like this:

I meet someone whom I have not seen for years; I see him clearly, but fail to recognize him. Suddenly I recognize him, I see his former face in the altered one. I believe that I would portray him differently now if I could paint. (PPF, § 1)

If this difference was the expression of a perceptual report, and not the expression of a way of reacting, no difference would show up in the painting, for there would have been no difference in the object in terms of volumes, lines and colors. Now, in neither case there were objective alterations of the objects, but only in the subject's attitude when reacting to the objects. It is at this moment that a crucial expression is introduced: "Fine shades of behavior" (PPF, § 180).

There is a use of the verb *to see* that points toward the experience of something lending itself to visual, perceptual conscience so that a sensory description of the proper object of the experience is possible. But this use is a limited one, and does not account for the aspectuality of our visual experience. Between both types of object of our visual experience the links between the concepts of seeing and seeing-as are extended. The very expression (for example, when, after looking at someone in a crowd, I recognize an old friend) "which is also a report of what is seen is here a cry of recognition" (PPF, § 145), i.e., is expressive of a characteristic reaction. This attitude of the subject in face of what she sees bears the mark of a spirit which is also constitutive of the object's public identity. Wittgenstein's philosophical description of this linkage is structured by concepts that could be productively applied to the clarification of aesthetic experience and of the tension between aesthetic experience's emotive and cognitive characters.

We are now ready to go back to aesthetic experience.

4. Aesthetic experience

When we say of an object that it is beautiful (or some other such predicate), are we really assigning it a quality? Or do we want in essence to say that it pleases us – perhaps the equivalence, in aesthetics, of meta-ethical emotivism –, or causes some such aesthetic effect in us?⁸ In this last case, we don't describe the object proper, the lines and colors of its volumes (bi- or tridimensional, etc.), but we give it a characterization that depends on our relationship with it, one that is no longer reducible to, or even expressible by means of a sensory description – in contrast to the syllabus of modern aesthetics. As Wittgenstein notes on the effect of certain opera: “You gesture with your hand, would like to say: ‘of course!’” (CV, p. 65e; MS 134, 78; 30.03.1947) – and here we seem to find the same kind of emphatic acquiescence presiding, for example, over the massive acceptance of Darwin's theory of evolution: “The certainty (‘of course’) was created by the enormous charm of [the theory's] unity” (LA, III, § 32). Listening to the minutia of today's debate on evolution, much more detailed than in Darwin's time, it is telling that this effect loses its strength, even if we are *more*, not *less*, in agreement with the basic tenets of the overall theory. It stands to show that the *emphatic acquiescence* has more to do with a particular way of reacting than with truth-seeking engagements (and, by analogy, to significant form – with Isenberg's provisos about the “getting right” of features of an artwork). Wittgenstein calls this an *attitude* – and places this attitudinal dimension on a level that is perhaps more decisive than any considerations of verification might express. However, a cautionary note on this rejection of verification is due.

⁸ For different positions on meta-ethical emotivism, see Ayer, Stevenson, Schlick.

True, one does not want to reduce aesthetic experience as an effect of being exposed to objective, empirical attributes of certain objects or artifacts. Such a reduction would eschew a crucial trait of aesthetic experience: that it seems to be elicited only by way of our sustained, more or less rule-guided attention (attention that, in itself, can be seen as a spiritual exercise in Hadot's sense), and not by causal impression. Also, when our sustained attention is guided by certain criteria, our hope – without assurance – is to find phenomenal traits in the object and to connect those with certain emotions.⁹ By no means this is to suggest an analogy with some mechanism, or an invitation to determinism through some philosophical backdoor. A subtle way of avoiding the choice between two reductions is Arnold Isenberg's notion that we do achieve success in communicating to others our recognition of aesthetic value, properties, etc., in an artwork – and that in so doing we can even, at times, court our interlocutor to appreciate the newfound aspect of the artwork. However, we do so not by way of proof or conclusive evidence, but in an open-ended manner, which he calls “critical”. We shall get back to this later.

A skeptic could doubt the possibility of an absolute standard of taste, occurring through a mode of presentation bearing the mark of certainty (“Of course it is beautiful!”). But suppose the skeptic articulates her intervention in terms of doubting the certainty that I am having an aesthetic experience as such, irrespective of the specific aesthetic quality of the object of such experience from the viewpoint of a regional aesthetics – assuming the Grammar provides for these aesthetic games. All that this intervention could then accomplish is to undermine this particular experience of meaning as such, just as in the case of the farmer who asserts his belief that he is pointing *to trees* when pointing to trees. By wanting to do justice to the facts of the situation with inadequate conceptual instruments,

⁹ I was called attention to this by Richard Eldridge.

the philosopher analyst tears the fabric of the very facts under philosophical description, undoing their characteristic lived experience. This is a typical case of throwing the baby out along with the dirty water. It almost works as a *reductio ad absurdum*: there is something to be said of aesthetic experience that is much more deeply enmeshed with the character of a form of life, so as to resist this type of skeptical analysis. Say a philosopher is skeptical in face of protests of an aesthetic experience by the reasonable man due to some want on his part – for example, lack of aesthetic education (relative to meta-concepts of the artworld), inappropriateness of the object (say, a grotesque, or painstakingly trivial object), etc. One could say that *the philosopher* is the one suffering from a form of aspect-blindness towards a dimension of magical thinking in our relationship with artworks. Therefore, to resist this type of skepticism in order to do justice to the aesthetic experience effectively lived by the interlocutor, should we concede to a kind of irrationalism? Wittgenstein and Arnold Isenberg can help us answer negatively but non-dogmatically.

Wittgenstein begins his only course on aesthetics by noting that its subject matter should not be confused with traditional aesthetics, an investigation of aesthetic qualities and judgments. Running against the grain of the traditional syllabus, he remarks that, in most situations where we find an aesthetic experience, this kind of expression (of attribution of qualities, of judgment) does not occur. On the contrary: we usually find a language much closely associated with the language of right and wrong, typical of games of precise gradations. Now, this seems once again paradoxical, since aesthetic distinctions are seldom precise in the sense of measurement games. But then he says the following:

If I say of a piece of Schubert's that it is melancholy, that is like giving it a face (I don't express approval or disapproval). I could instead use gestures or [Rhees] dancing. In fact, if we want to be exact, we do use a gesture or a facial expression. (LA, I, § 10).

The idiom by which aesthetic experience is expressed shows us that it is not a question of operations of the kind that would be regulated by standards of taste. Recall that in modern times this was the grain of the discipline, spread by institutions like the 17th Century Italian *Academy of the Good Taste*. Much more than standards of aesthetic judgment expressed by aesthetic adjectives, what is at stake is a characteristic lived experience, a special attitude regarding objects and situations, or, as the philosopher says in his *Remarks on Frazer*, an attitude regarding a ritual of a form of life. This mode of description accommodates much better a phenomenon that philosophers of aesthetics in the XXth Century were keen to account for: the fact that certain families of artworks seem to operate not only within identity criteria linked with their facticity (lines and colors of their volumes), but also linked to the situation in which they are presented (the “artworld”) and to the meta-discourses (or “theories”) that may accompany those objects. This accompaniment is not the end of the story though. Knowledge of the art-historical context, or the history of the theories of art (in Morris Weitz’s phrase), might be required for one to recognize the relevance of certain features of an artwork. However, something else is at play *in the object* that can work or fail to work aesthetically or expressively, as Wittgenstein noted in one of his lessons:

The word we ought to talk about is ‘appreciated’. What does appreciation consist in?

If a man goes through an endless number of patterns in a tailor’s, [and] says: “No. This is slightly too dark. This is slightly too loud”, etc., he is what we call an appreciator of material. That he is an appreciator is not shown by the interjections he uses, but by the way he chooses, selects, etc. Similarly in music: “Does this harmonize? No. The bass is not quite loud enough. Here I just want something different....” This is what we call an appreciation.

Wittgenstein then adds:

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds.).
Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 281-308, v. 86, 2019

It is not only difficult to describe what appreciation consists in, but impossible. **To describe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole environment.** (LA, I, § 18-20, my emphasis).

In other words, we would have to describe all intermediary links (*Zwischengliedern*) of the associations of practices (*Association der Gebräuche*) in connection to the situation in which that notion is used (as I have discussed elsewhere; see Azize 2010). Naturally, such description is not feasible. But something interesting is implied by Wittgenstein's remark, beyond the rejection of the clarifying nature of aesthetic adjectives: the fact that the aesthete could describe the environment in which his appreciation can be experienced and appropriately expressed, and at the same time he could not. He could, in the sense that a chess player could state the rules for the game of chess even having read no chess rulebook in her life. He could not, in the sense that, prompted to clarify what is it that to play a game consists in, at some point he would have to resort to an instance of the form of a family resemblance definition: this, and that, and things like these, and so on – inviting a form of understanding on the part of the interlocutor that is dependent on a dense description of practices, affections and imaginative scenarios, *not only rules*. To clarify is here to be able to experience, to know how to go on further in a series without guarantee and open to historical modification at the modal level, i.e., rather radical modifications of the object (for instance, the object “artwork”).

The middle ground of criticizing absolute standards of taste – and the syllabus of beauty to aesthetics (or any such reduction of aesthetic experience) – while retaining some notion of there being features to be found in the object in a successful aesthetic appreciation of it informs Arnold Isenberg's notion of critical communication. In Richard Eldridge's reading of Isenberg's critical stance, the critic can indeed court our special, sustained attention by outlining objective features (lines, contours, patterns of

vowels or gestures) of the object of a possible aesthetic experience, albeit there is no guarantee we are going to “get it”. The invitation, then, is to engage the imagination to *see* (or hear, etc.) *new aspects*. Aesthetic experience seems to imply a continuous expansion or, at least alteration of our perceptual-affective experience.

The critic’s (and philosopher aesthete’s) business is to clarify our interested, historically-situated relation to the objects of our aesthetic experience, and at the same time to alter this relation, to expand our grasp of those objects. In this sense, Isenberg’s critical communication is a spiritual exercise on both sides of the interlocution, an exercise in appreciation and in value-giving. To perceive an aesthetic quality is to partake in a particular, affective reaction by the critic, unlocking, at the same time, the manner in which features of the object “work” right – though not starting from those characteristics in the critical operation (in contrast to aesthetic perspectives akin to the theory of significant form). Such is the counter-intuitive take on aesthetic experience and the critical stance by Wittgenstein and Isenberg. Ultimately, as Richard Eldridge writes,

[t]here is no sensibility-independent deductive or inductive route from formal elements to the determination of expressive and affective significance. (...) To see formal element X as having expressive or affective significance is an act of imaginative perception. (Eldridge 2014, p. 160)

5. Translating afterthoughts, Cavellian hints

I would like to close with a couple of brief notes on the translation process. The idea is to hint at connections between the discussion thus far and the volume’s main subject.

In his claim of a stronger than generally acknowledged interdependence between philosophical takes on language and theories of translation,

Paulo Oliveira (2019) tracks fundamental shifts in the field of translation studies (TS) in recent decades. Here are some of the rough traits of these shifts. Translating is a “decision-making process” (p. 213) whose parameters aim at communicating, not transcoding by way of an equivalence calculus, which would be carried out “at the level of the linguistic system” (p. 221). Also, there is a transfer involved which is cultural, not linguistic. This cultural transfer calls for an enlargement of the “unit of translation” (p. 216), from word to sentence to text to culture itself, hard to pinpoint as *culture* may be. In order to properly understand the phenomenon of translation, one should widen its context of operation and criteria, to include what Wittgenstein named a form of life. Translation, then, is not a fact of the “language system” (p. 221). Translation is a fact of pragmatic finalities of speech (in the realm of the Saussurean *parole*) through the positing, or constructing (*Herstellen*) of an equivalence in the act of translating. Of course, this seems to relativize the very notion of equivalence. However, this practical domain (translation as a fact of finalistic action) should be acknowledge in a dialectical relation “with the structural properties of the system” (p. 223). Paulo Oliveira goes on to detailing the workings of the act of translating, as it is understood in the context of recent shifts in TS – especially given a number of operative concepts, like that of *skopos* (the aim of the target *text* as a genre, as, for example, a scholarly or documentary translation), adequacy (with the source) and acceptability (of the target text as a proper rendering of the source text in what pertains its gender-level *skopos*). This allows him to emphasize the myriad, culture-bound, subtle, almost – say – ritualistic or anthropological factors having “a direct impact on acceptability, beyond the simple question of language” (p. 232). He can then conclude:

If every translational decision entails an ad-hoc compromise between adequacy and acceptability, a translational strategy that aims to be successful will have to take the target context seriously, not

restraining itself to seek a maximized adequacy (Oliveira 2019, p. 232).

Now, this ad-hoc compromise finds its correlate within ordinary language (*any* language?) in what Brusotti (2019) calls “[what] you should like to say”, given Oliveira’s adequacy plus acceptability criteria, in the TS analogue. There is much to be said about the distance between the logical *must* and this clearly Cavellian, pragmatic *should* – to which Cavell usually adds an important temporal marker: *what we should like to say when*. Between the determinate character of rules stemming from strictly linguistic systems and the relative open-endedness of the ways in which we employ our concepts in novel contexts, there emerges a figure Cavell (1976) calls “representative speaker”. No degree of command of rules warrants such a figure, but lived experience makes it so, in cues which are ultimately claims to community. Let me quote from the best general introduction to Cavell:

[For Cavell,] criteria are simply functions of the judgements we (normal speakers) are prepared to make; there is no level existing independently of our actual or potential judgments by reference to which criteria regulate or justify the intelligibility of those judgements: “no concept is ‘bound’ by ordinary criteria” (*Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*, 90). The point of eliciting criteria is therefore not a matter of uncovering the necessary presuppositions of ordinary speech; rather, it is to respond to a crisis in our agreement: for it is “when we are lost with respect to our words and to the world they anticipate [that we declare] the criteria upon which we are in agreement” (*Claim of Reason*, 34). And in doing so, we are able to elaborate on the logic of our judgments, the way we ordinarily agree in judgements and in forms of life. (Hammer 2002, p. 38).

At this point it might be helpful to preemptively dispel a possibly heavier weight given to the acceptability pole of Oliveira’s adequacy/acceptability pendulum. As Espen Hammer is careful to point out, there is a limit

to the flexibility we are to expect of the words for whose application we claim responsibility – just as, in the dialectics of “imaginative perception” that ended our section 4 (Eldridge 2014, p. 160), the critic’s (or any reception’s) imagination is to find *in the aesthetic object’s attributes* features that “work right”, thus limiting his or her departure from what they have before their eyes or ears:

I might say: An object or activity or event onto or into which a concept is projected, must invite or allow that projection; in the way in which, for an object to be (called) an art object, it must allow or invite the experience and behavior which are appropriate or necessary to our concepts of the appreciation or contemplation or absorption . . . of an art object. (Cavell 1979, p. 183).

To stretch our analogy between Oliveira’s TS stance (adequacy plus acceptability) and Brusotti/Cavell’s *what we should like to say when* stance, we should vindicate one of Oliveira’s crucial steps: that of widening the object of translation to culture itself.

Thus, the criterion of correct translation is the “role the word plays in the whole life of the tribe”, and – as specified even more clearly in [Wittgenstein’s] German version – this role consists in an open list of aspects, which includes, among other things, **occasions of utterance**, expressions of emotion, as well as ideas related to the word in question. (...) A linguistic analysis of the sentences in which the word recurs is bound to fall short of what is required (Brusotti 2019, p. 52, my emphasis).

Here is what I wish to hint at, with the Cavellian “representative speaker” in the background: the translator’s task, as a gesture of commitment to *what we should like to say when*, is also tantamount to the reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophical album, at least in the philosophical universe of the 1940s manuscripts, where, as Brusotti says, Wittgenstein focused

on the composite portraiture (Brusotti 2019, pp. 33, 49) showing up within any and every single language. At the same time, the distinction between surface and deep grammar (PI, § 664), and Oliveira's and Brusotti's shifts in Translation Studies, help us to see that this might also be true of any individual that performs as representative of her community of speakers of an idiom. Our farmer not excluded.

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Wittgenstein in Bribri language

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Abstract: This article deals with the translation of a part of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* into Bribri, a language belonging to the Chibcha language family. This language is spoken in Costa Rica and Panama. The idea behind this work was to see which techniques can be used in order to resolve the linguistic and cultural problems which arise from the translation of an Indo-European philosophical text into an American Indian language such as Bribri. The translator was Ali García Segura, who has Bribri as his mother tongue. The basis for his translation into Bribri was a Spanish translation of Wittgenstein.

Keywords: Translation, Wittgenstein, Bribri, Linguistics, Anthropology

1. Introduction

In this small contribution, I would like to comment on the translation of some parts of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) into Bribri language. I would like to draw attention to the difficulties one experiences if one tries to transport an Austrian-German Wittgenstein text into a geographically and culturally vastly distant language such as Bribri.

The translation of the texts was carried out by the indigenous Bribri-speaker Ali García Segura based on a Spanish translation of Wittgenstein. García Segura works with Bribri language and culture at the University of Costa Rica. Within a few weeks of undertaking the task, he managed to turn the Spanish translations of Wittgenstein's philosophical texts into his mother tongue Bribri. Ali García Segura carried out his translation during the month of June 2018.¹

¹ I want to thank, on behalf of the SPIRE project, García Segura for having accepted the challenge by translating the PI text selection to Bribri.

As one could expect, the translation work was not free of difficulties as will be seen throughout this article. But an interesting issue worth-mentioning is that when translated into Bribri Wittgenstein's text breaks with the organizing schemes of a Bribri speech or text. It is not a characteristic text of the Bribri culture and therefore the translator was forced to introduce features alien to the way Bribri-speakers narrate in their culture (see Jara 2006).

Following the classification of P. Newmark (1988) on the methods of translation, the translator used principally the method of the literal translation. According to Newmark (1988: 70),

Literal translation above the word level is the only correct procedure if the S[ource] L[anguage] and T [arget] L [anguage] meaning correspond, or correspond more closely than any alternative; that means that the referent and the pragmatic effect are equivalent, ie that the words not only refer to the same thing but have similar associations.


However, in view of the great linguistic and cultural distance between the source language used (Spanish) and the target language (Bribri), the translator often used linguistic and lexical techniques that distanced him from the translation method used. Thus, the translator sometimes approaches the method called by Newmark "recreational translation" according to which the most important thing is the translation of the meaning and not of the word itself:

Interpret the sense, not the words, is, to my mind, the translator's last resource; essential resource, certainly, and a touchstone of his linguistic sensitivity and creativity, not to mention his alertness and perspicacity, when words mislead (Newmark 1988: 76)

2. Genetic and typological notes on Bribri language

The Bribri language belongs to the Chibchan linguistic family. This family of languages extends from Honduras to Venezuela, and forms, together with the Misumalpa family, part of the so-called Central American Intermediate Area, in opposition to the Mesoamerican Area, which extends from Guatemala along the Central American Pacific coast to the northwestern region of Costa Rica.

According to the latest census (2011),² the Bribri language has approximately 18,000 users, and is spoken in southern Costa Rica, both on the Atlantic and Pacific slopes, plus in an enclave on the Atlantic coast of Panama (Map 1).



Map 1. Bribri communities (Costa Rica and Panama)

² http://www.cipacdh.org/pdf/Resultados_Generales_Censo_2011.pdf.

According to E. Margery (1996: xi), in Costa Rica the Bribri is broadly composed of two dialectal areas that correspond to the Atlantic and Pacific slopes of the country. Both dialectal areas are mutually intelligible.

As for the typological constitution of the Bribri, and following E. Margery's (1996) description of this language, at the prosodic level it is characterized by the tone system (high, low, ascendant and descendant). At the phonetic level, it has seven oral and five nasal vowels, and geminated consonants; for example, *tté* ('speech'), *ppée* ('open'); as well as coarticulated consonants: *tkabè* ('snake').

In terms of grammatical or morphosyntactic features, the Bribri belongs to the languages with the syntactic pattern SOV in transitive sentences. The following examples are taken from the text translated by Ali García Segura:

- (1) Ye' ie' ã yéjkuo' tak mé
 I him to sheet fragment give
 'I give him a piece of sheet'

Bribri has postpositions instead of prepositions:

- (2) ic'pa tso' iwa kaneuk e' ê ã
 they is form use that only for
 'they are only for that circumscribed domain'
- (3) ula wa
 hand with
 'with (one's) hands'

The nominal construction order is *substantive + adjective + numeral*:

- (4) tté'ies
 language this
 'this language'

- (5) manzana má^ˈ ské^ˈ
 apple red five
 ‘five red apples’

As for possession, its order is *possessor + possessed*:

- (6) A ena B ttò^ˈ
 A and B language
 ‘A and B language’

The personal pronoun functions as a possessive determinant:

- (7) se^ˈ tté^ˈ
 our sign
 ‘our signs’

The verbal system presents characteristics of temporality (division of past tense into immediate past and remote past starting at 6 pm the previous day), but also presents aspectual features (imperfective actions, perfective actions). In addition, Bribri is an ergative language and adds to the right of the subject the particle *tō* or *dōr* (depending on the dialects) in transitive affirmative sentences, and *wa* in negative transitive sentences:

- (8) ie^ˈpa tō^ˈile ché^ˈ
 they ERG something say
 ‘they say something’

- (9) Agustín ké^ˈ wã iyè^ˈne tō^ˈ tté^ˈ tso^ˈ wákwa
 Agustín no ERG it.say that language is different
 ‘Agustín does not say that speech is different’

3. Demonstratives

The Bribri language has a demonstrative pattern determined by distance and visual or auditory perception (Table 1).

	Visually perceived			Auditorily perceived	Perceived neither visually nor auditorily
Proximity to the sender	<i>ɨ'</i>			<i>ñé</i>	<i>e'</i>
Proximity to the receiver	<i>sé</i>				
Visual for both sender and receiver	At both sender's and receiver's levels	Beneath the eyes of both	Above the eyes of both		
	First level (close to both)				
	<i>aví</i>	<i>diö</i>	<i>ái</i>		
	Second level (far from both)				
	<i>avì</i>	<i>dià</i>	<i>ài</i>		

Figure 1. Bribri demonstrative system

The Spanish language from which the Wittgenstein texts were translated, distinguishes three degrees of distance in the demonstratives: *este*, *ese*, *aquel* (from the closest to the most distant). The German language has a system made out of two distance levels: *dieser* and *jener*. García Segura translated the demonstratives of the Spanish source text by using the Bribri system of perceiving distance. Thus, for example, the translator uses the demonstrations *sé* and *ɨ*, which correspond to those visually

perceived and mark distance and proximity in relation to the speaker. Thus, in example (10) we observe the use of the demonstrative of proximity, both in Spanish and in German, which was translated into Bribri by the demonstrative *i'*, and marks a proximity to the issuer; its German and Spanish equivalents are as follows:

- (10) Tté ché só*i'* bikeítsōne
 Piensa ahora en **este** empleo del lenguaje
 Denke nun an **diese** Verwendung der Sprache:
 ("Think now about **this** use of language")

However, in example (11), where we can see the Spanish / German uses of the demonstratives of distance *ese* / *jener*, the translation in Bribri uses the demonstrative *e'*, which refers to objects that are not visually or auditorily perceived.

- (11) Ñe' isüé páke **e'**
Ese concepto filosófico del significado
Jener philosophische Begriff der Bedeutung
 ("That philosophical concept of meaning")

Spanish (*ese*) and German (*jener*) demonstratives also allude to a plane equidistant between the sender and the receiver of the message; or something that is close to the receiver but far from the sender, while the demonstrative Bribri used to replace them is used to designate objects not seen or heard by the interlocutors. This choice makes sense because if the demonstrative equivalent to *ese* / *jener* would have been used then we would end up with six demonstration possibilities in Bribri, depending on the plane and the distance (see previous chart). In this case, it was easier to use *e'* in a text where you can interpret the objects that are spoken as entities that are not visible and audible.

A difference between Wittgenstein's use of *diese*, translated into Spanish by 'ese', and Bribri is that the latter applies the demonstrative e':

- (12) Tt'e wa e'
en esos signos
an diese Zeichen
 ('in those signs')

Unlike Spanish or German, Bribri does not have articles. Thus, it is interesting to note that the use of the Bribri demonstrative e' denotes an object not perceived visually or auditorily with an anaphoric value. In a certain sense, it functions as a substitute for the articles - defined or undefined - of Spanish and German:

- (13) tché e' dör bomba ulakita
un cuarto es el manubrio de una bomba
ein vierter, der Handgriff einer Pumpe
 'a fourth one is the handlebar of a pump'

4. Numerals

Bribri has a counting system unknown in Spanish or German. The objects are counted according to their shape and ten classifiers. Margery 1996: xxiii-xxiv, lists the first nine:

1. Humans: human beings.
2. Flat objects: birds, insects, clothing, land, days, months.
3. Round objects: fruits, round body parts, years, seasons.

4. Elongated objects: mammals of greater size, fish, fishing instruments, hunting or war.
5. Packages or packages.
6. Clusters.
7. Species.
8. Sets.
9. Heavy products by pounds, tapirs, wild boars and trees (Figure 2)

Number	Humans	Flat objects	Round objects	Elongated objects	Packages	Clusters	Species	Sets	Pounds
1	éköl	ét	ék	étöm	étluak	étsak	étre	éyök	étka
2	böl	böt	bök	bötöm	böt kuak	bötsak	bötre	böyök	bötka
3	mánál	mánát	mánál	mánátöm	mánát kuak	mánát tsak	mánátre	mánáyök	mánálka
4	tkél	tkél	tkél	tkétöm	tkét kuak	tkét tsak	tkétre	tkéyök	tkélka
5	skél	skél	skél	skétöm	skét kuak	skét tsak	skétre	skéyök	skélka
6	térol	térol	térol	tékötöm	térol kuak	térol tsak	téroté	téyök	térolka
7	kül	kül	kül	kükötöm	kül kuak	kütsak	küté	küyök	külka
8	pákol	pákol	pákol	pákötöm	pákol kuak	pákol tsak	pákolé	páyök	pákolka
9	süfru	süfru	süfru	süfrötöm	süfrülkuak	süfrütsak	süfruté	süfrüyök	süfrülka
10	daböm	daböm	daböm	daböm	dabömkuak	dabömsak	daböpté	dabömyök	dabölka

Figure 2. Bribri counting system

Another classifier has to be added to the chart in Fig. 2., which Margery does not indicate, even though it is included in the dictionary entries: times (‘once’, ‘twice’, ‘three times’, etc.).

For an illustration of the Bribri counting system consider the passages in Wittgenstein's text where the use of the numeral 'five' is observed:

- (14) manzanas má^t skél[́]
 apples red five
 'five red apples'

In example (14) the numeral corresponding to round objects was applied, as per the Bribri rule. However, the remarkable thing is that in other passages of the text there are abstract nouns, such as 'word', 'position' and 'numeral', which do not appear in the list of the quantifying objects of Bribri. To all these nouns, the quantifier that denotes flat objects was applied:

- (15) tté bót 'two words'
 (16) tté tché[́] 'four words' (den vier Wörtern)
 (17) kanèblo bót 'two positions' (zwei Wörter)
 (18) tté skél[́] 'the word five' (zum Worte "fünf")
 (19) shtáwũk skél[́] ena teról 'five or six numerals' (fünf oder sechs Grundzahlwörter)

Furthermore, two ordinal numerals, 'third' and 'fourth', are observed, which were also ordered according to the classifier corresponding to flat objects. In these cases, Bribri does not show a morphological distinction between cardinal and ordinal:

- (20) mãnat el dō iwoklōwãk kléli 'one third is...' (ein dritter ist...)
 (21) tché[́] e' dör bomba ulákita 'one fourth is...' (ein vierter ist...)

In conclusion, it is observed that for abstract objects the Bribri informant applies the category of flat objects either as cardinals or as ordinals. On the other hand, when dealing with the numeral 'one' as an in-

definite, one would expect the numeral corresponding to ‘one’ to be applied in this language; however, this is not the case, since Bribri language, as said before, does not have articles, neither definite nor indefinite:

- (22) Ye' ie' ã yéjkuo' ták mé
 I him to sheet fragment give
 'I give him [a] piece of sheet'

4. Concrete versus abstract objects

The Bribri dictionary used for the present analysis (Margery 1996) does not record a number of words referring to abstract entities that appear in Wittgenstein's text or, consequently, in the Spanish translation that García Segura used for his Bribri version. Therefore, we may infer that these words, unless the author of the dictionary did not include them for some reason, are not commonly used and the Bribri informant applied them to abstract signifiers of the text. For example, regarding the word ‘concept’ (in German ‘Begriff’), the Bribri translator used the verb ‘see’ and applied it in the phrase *i sũē* ‘what we see’. The adjective ‘philosophical’ (‘philosophischer’) was translated to the Bribri noun *páke* ‘explanation’ and the verb ‘to philosophize’, was used with the expression *isũē pákõk* ‘to see it explained’. Moreover, the nominal sentence ‘In the practice of the use of language’ (‘In der Praxis des Gebrauchs der Sprache’) was translated by a temporary subordinate clause *Míkã se 'tõkë* ‘when we speak’.

5. The concept of ‘person’

The concept of ‘person’ translates into Spanish as ‘individual of the human kind’ and into German as ‘Person’. However, the concept does not exist in Bribri. The closest we can come to translating the concept ‘person’ into Bribri is in terms of the word “*apë*”, which applies to people who are not related to each other (Margery 1996: 11).

To translate such a concept, García Segura used the Bribri pronominal system: for the first person plural, this language has two pronouns:

- a) *se'* 'we', which includes all the interlocutors, and
- b) *sá'* 'we' which excludes the interlocutor ('us but not you')

Thus, the nominal phrase in Wittgenstein's text "die Namen von Personen" ('names of people') was translated to 'kiè 'our names', where all the interlocutors are included. The same is the case with the phrase 'You can say', which was translated to *Se' ichémi* 'we can say'.

In addition, as seen above, the personal pronoun functions as a possessive pronoun.

6. Imported vocabulary

Bribri being a minority language within the ethnolinguistic context of a dominant language in Costa Rica (e.g. Spanish), has not been free of lexical imports by the latter language, as shown by Jara (2004) in the everyday Bribri language.

In the case of the text under consideration, it is to be expected that there will be hispanisms; i. e. words of Spanish origin, particularly when dealing with a highly abstract discourse. However, the importation of words of Hispanic origin is very low; as a rule, the translator finds the equivalent word in his language. There are, though, moments when word transfer occurs. When we are faced with a word (in Spanish or German), whose concept does not exist in Bribri, the translator assigns the Spanish word. This is usually the case for objects belonging to the material culture: 'mason', 'clove', 'bucket', 'locomotive', 'apple', 'table', 'bread', 'pillar', 'slab' and others. But sometimes words of abstract value are also included, such as 'to designate', 'example', 'numeral', for which the Bribri translator did not find a similar word or meaning in his language. The

same applies to the disjunctive Spanish conjunction *o* ‘or’, which was transferred into the text. Furthermore, if the Spanish word in question was in plural, in some cases the translator applied it to Bribri with its Spanish plural morpheme: *manzanas* ‘apples’, *numerales* ‘numerals’, etc.

7. Semantic extensions

A technique used by the Bribri translator to secure a satisfying translation was to translate a concept of the source language into a Bribri word that reflects several concepts arising out of its original meaning. Some examples are:

Bribri word	Original meaning	Extension of meaning
<i>bikeitse</i>	think	imagine
<i>kalök</i>	to work	to operate; to use; to position
<i>tabèchika</i>	metal	tool, mechanism, lever, handlebar
<i>ù</i>	house	building
<i>tté</i>	speak	language, sign
<i>chök</i>	to say	to conceive, to mean, to give an order

In the above-mentioned cases, the issues of translation are dealt with by saturating Bribri words of traditionally univocal meaning with new meanings and practically all of the words relate to abstract content (as observed in Margery 1996).

8. Conclusion

In theory, any text of a language can be translated into another language. As Newmark points out, "one ought to be able to say something as well in one language as in another." (Newmark 1988: 5). In the case of translating Wittgenstein's texts into Bribri, there are two challenges. In the first place, the informant commented on the great difficulties he had to face, not only because of the complexity of the philosopher's texts, but also because the translator, apparently, was not familiar with texts of a philosophical nature. However, this challenge was overcome and the translator managed to transfer the philosophical ideas of Wittgenstein to concepts expressed in his mother tongue.

The second challenge has to do with the ability of Bribri speakers to understand the text. Just as Newmark says, one has to think about

The expectations of the putative readership, bearing in mind their estimated knowledge of the topic and the style of language they use, expressed in terms of the largest common factor, since one should not translate down (or up) to the readership. (Newmark 1988: 5).

Thus, in spite of the vast geographical and cultural distance between Austrian-German and Bribri, it was possible to translate Wittgenstein's texts into Bribri. It is now up to the Bribri community to see if the ideas expressed in their language are understood and assimilated to their worldview. That challenge remains, for the time being, unresolved.

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Appendix

Spanish text translated into Bribri

Translator from Spanish into Bribri: Alí García Segura

(Coroma, Bribri community, Costa Rica)

Source of the Spanish/German text: Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1975)

1.

Cuando ellos (los mayores) nombraban alguna cosa y consecuentemente con esa apelación se movían hacia algo, lo veía y comprendía que con los sonidos que pronunciaban llamaban ellos a aquella cosa cuando pretendían señalarla. Pues lo que ellos pretendían se entresacaba de su movimiento corporal: cual lenguaje natural de todos los pueblos que con mímica y juegos de ojos, con el movimiento del resto de los miembros y con el sonido de la voz hacen indicación de las afecciones del alma al apetecer,

1.

Míkã ie'pa (kéképa) tō ile ché wá kaché ena isüé. E' wá rō tō ie' iché e' tté e' wa ie' ilèkié. Emaikiane ie'pa kí e' ché ie' kōwa ena iwà kaché: Se' wéripa ttó wōbla tí wéwa ena é'wéwa wéslè, e's tã syampa ã iórmi tō ile tã se' kè kí ikiàne, se' kí ikiàne, se' wã itso', o se' kè kí ikiàne. Es se' tté tsá éstō kichà, bōtō kichà yésyés éstã se' ena iórmi tō imà iwa, se' imowémi, ésta ie'pa ã ye' ichémi tōikiàne ye' kí. Tté íse ã, ye' isüé tō se' tō sttō wíkol süemi. Iès: tté tō ilèche, e'tã tté malè dōr iki

tener, rechazar o evitar cosas. chókne yé'syè.

Así, oyendo repetidamente las palabras colocadas en sus lugares apropiados en diferentes oraciones, colegía paulatinamente de qué cosas eran signos y, una vez adiestrada la lengua en esos signos, expresaba ya con ellos mis deseos.

De una diferencia entre géneros de palabras no habla Agustín. Quien así describe el aprendizaje del lenguaje piensa, creo yo, principalmente en sustantivos como «mesa», «silla», «pan» y en nombres de personas, y sólo en segundo plano en los nombres de ciertas acciones y propiedades, y piensa en los restantes géneros de palabras como algo que ya se acomodará.

Piensa ahora en este empleo del lenguaje: envío a alguien a comprar. Le doy una hoja que tiene los signos: «cinco manzanas rojas». Lleva la hoja al tendero,

Tté wíkol i' ã se' tō ikiane se' kī
chee e' wí kũemiso: tté ulitane
wa tã. Tté wã e' tso' ē' ã, e'
kũek se' tté tso'.

Agustín kè wã iyène tō tté tso'
wákwa. Yī tō se' ttō ché tō e's
idi, ér ye' ã tã íyi ē bikéi-
tsèkéwék, wés mesa, kula', pan
ena se' kiè. Mík ie' i bikéitsène
e'tã ie' dör ilèwotértã e' o wátã.
Tté malè e' bikéitsèie'tō, tō e'
tchérche wé ikàne ma e'ẽ.

Tté ché sō i' bikéitsöne: Yíle
patché ye' íle tãuk. Ye' ie' ã

y éste abre el cajón que tiene el signo «manzanas»; luego busca en una tabla la palabra «rojo» y frente a ella encuentra una muestra de color; después dice la serie de los números cardinales —asumo que la sabe de memoria— hasta la palabra «cinco» y por cada numeral toma del cajón una manzana que tiene el color de la muestra. Así, y similarmente, se opera con palabras. «¿Pero cómo sabe dónde y cómo debe consultar la palabra 'rojo' y qué tiene que hacer con la palabra 'cinco'?» Bueno, yo asumo que *actúa* como he descrito. Las explicaciones tienen en algún lugar un final.— ¿Pero cuál es el significado de la palabra «cinco»?— No se habla aquí en absoluto de tal cosa; sólo de cómo se usa la palabra «cinco».

yéjkuõ ták mé e'kĩ íyi wíkol tso':
 manzanas má[́]t ské[́]l. Yéjkuõ ták
 mé ie' dali wé wák ã, ie'tō cajon
 wé[́] wã manzana wíkol tso' e' kõ
 ppée; ujkuõkĩ ie' kál ták kĩ tté
 má[́]t yulé, e' shō ie' dōr wóat
 mulé kúe; e' kuõkĩ ie' dōr
 shtáwé, ye' ã tã ie' wã e' tché[́]r
 dōkã tté ské[́]l iwoát, wés numeral
 e'wa ie' dōr manzanas yétsã
 cajón ã, és kanèbleke tté wa.

¿Erē wés ie' wã itché[́]r tō wé ie'
 kówōta tté má[́]t yulók, ena wés
 ie' kówō tã tté ské[́]l úk? Ema, ye'
 ã tã ie' ikanèwé wés ye' ichétche
 és. Ilèpàke e' watã wéle bitáie tã
 ¿Erē ima tté ské[́]l e' wa kiàne
 cheè? I'ẽ se' kè wãie' yéne, se'
 tso' ichók tō wés tté ské[́]l wa
 kanèwéke ě.

2.

Ese concepto filosófico del significado reside en una imagen primitiva del modo y manera en que funciona el lenguaje. Pero también puede decirse que es la imagen de un lenguaje más primitivo que el nuestro.

Imaginémonos un lenguaje para el que vale una descripción como la que ha dado Agustín: el lenguaje debe servir a la comunicación de un albañil A con su ayudante B. A construye un edificio con piedras de construcción; hay cubos, pilares, losas y vigas. B tiene que pasarle las piedras y justamente en el orden en que A las necesita. A este fin se sirven de un lenguaje que consta de las palabras: «cubo», «pilar», «losa», «viga». A las grita, — B le lleva la piedra que ha aprendido a llevar a ese grito. Concibe éste como un lenguaje primitivo completo.

2.

Ñe' isüé páke e' manét se' ttö
wã kó ioiö, e' tã se' wã itchéne
wés se' ttö wã kanèblo. Erë se'
iã iyémi tō se' ttö dioköl e'
tsónébitū kó ioiö, inèse' ichéke
e' yökĩ.

Bikéitsö sö tō tté tso' wés Agus-
tín ichés és: Se' ttö e' wa
kanèormi albañil A ã ie' kímuk
B tã. A tso' ù tã yuwók ák wa;
Ie'pa wã cubo, pilares, losas ena
kál ták tso'. B kówö tã ák
pátchök A ã wés ie' kĩ ikiáne és.
Íes tã tté chéke dör: cubo, pilar,
losa ena kál ták.

A tō ièonèüle B wã ák mí iã wés
ie' wöülane itsúkmi ónèshua. Se
iã iyémi tō i' dör se' ttö ioiö és.

3.

Agustín describe, podríamos decir, un sistema de comunicación; sólo que no todo lo que llamamos lenguaje es este sistema. Y esto debe decirse en muchos casos en que surge la cuestión: «¿Es esta representación apropiada o inapropiada?». La respuesta es entonces: «Sí, apropiada; pero sólo para este dominio estrictamente circunscrito, no para la totalidad de lo que pretendemos representar».

Es como si alguien explicara: «Los juegos consisten en desplazar cosas sobre una superficie según ciertas reglas...», —y le respondiéramos: «Pareces pensar en juegos de tablero; pero esos no son todos los juegos. Puedes corregir tu explicación restringiéndola expresamente a esos juegos».

3.

Agustín ipáke, sō ichémi, iyí páke sō; éré iyi ulitã kè kanèblō ies ē, ichéke sō wés iyèmi míkã stso'tchèipákok e'tã: ¿ ies tã sō iché yésyēs o kè irē ttéie? Iútémi sō: ttō, yésyēs idi; éré i' ie'pa tso' iwa kanèuk e' ē ã, kōs se' éna iwa káchàk e' kè ã bua' idi.

E' dōr wés inèyile páke: Inèdōr iyi skókmi kál ak kī wés iyéulètso' e's, e'tã e' iuté sō: Wésuà be' tso' inéke kál ták kī ése bikítsok; erē e' kè kōs iné tso' éké. Be' ipákémine inèchòk be' tso' e' ē ska yésyēs.

4.

Imagínate una escritura en que las letras sirviesen para designar los sonidos, pero también para designar la acentuación, y como signos de puntuación. (Una escritura puede concebirse como un lenguaje para describir pautas sonoras.) Imagínate ahora que alguien entendiese esa escritura como si cada letra correspondiera simplemente a un sonido y no tuviesen también las letras funciones enteramente diferentes. Una concepción tan simplista de la escritura se asemeja a la concepción del lenguaje de Agustín.

4.

Bé rō bikéitsōne tō se' ishtë e'se
wa se' dōr mík se' tté wés e' tse'
se' és ishtëne, és añièttók yésyēs,
ena dō' wé ikià ché e' dō'. (Íyi
kítulèe' dōr ttò ulárke e' shtóne)
Be' ibikéitōne inèyí mù ã ikítu-
lèe' ñone tō wés ikítulèés ë iu-
láweke, kè ã iñone tō uláito e' wa
tã iwá ë. E' ë ttò kalòwē se' dōr
e' dōr wés Agustín tō sttò che
és.

5.

Si se considera el ejemplo de §1, se puede quizá vislumbrar hasta qué punto la concepción general del significado de la palabra circunda al lenguaje de un halo que hace imposible la visión

5.

Ejemplo 1, mù dōr yésyēs, ãma
siã iñomi tō sttò dōr wés mò
térkã iyí kī és, kè ã iyí wér bua'.
Mò tchòũtsã e' dōr tté wa ã'
yuwók wák wa wák wa kó ióio'
és, mík se' wò ã kó bñène e's

clara.—Disipa la niebla estudiar los fenómenos del lenguaje en géneros primitivos de su empleo en los que se puede dominar con la vista claramente la finalidad y el funcionamiento de las palabras.

El niño emplea esas formas primitivas de lenguaje cuando aprende a hablar. El aprendizaje del lenguaje no es aquí una explicación, sino un adiestramiento.

6.

Podríamos imaginarnos que el lenguaje de §2 fuese el lenguaje *total* de A y B, y hasta el lenguaje total de una tribu. Los niños son educados para realizar estas acciones, para usar con ellas estas palabras y para reaccionar *así* a las palabras de los demás.

Una parte importante del adiestramiento consistirá en que el

tã iwënéwã bua'ie tō iètté dör bua'.

Es alàrlàr tsítsipa yó' mík é'pa ittòkemi. Se' yó' ttòk e' kè dör se' ipákèke, e' se' ã itiwèkèkã ë.

6.

Se' bikéitsèmi tō 2 ttò' e' dör A ena B ttò' séra ã, e's skówakpa wéle ttò' añies. Alàrlàr yò'ule íyi íse kanèuk, ie'pa tã se' tté i' mówéke èriàma és ie'pa tō smalépa ttò' iùte.

instructor señale los objetos, dirija la atención del niño hacia ellos y pronuncie a la vez una palabra; por ejemplo, la palabra «losa» mientras muestra esa forma. (No quiero llamar a esto «explicación ostensiva» o «definición ostensiva», porque el niño aún no puede *preguntar* por la denominación. Lo llamaré «enseñanza ostensiva de palabras». Digo que formará una parte importante del adiestramiento porque así ocurre entre los seres humanos, no porque no pudiera imaginarse de otro modo.) Puede decirse que esta enseñanza ostensiva de palabras establece una conexión asociativa entre la palabra y la cosa. ¿Pero qué quiere decir esto?

Pues bien, puede querer decir diversas cosas; pero se piensa muy de inmediato en que al niño le viene a la mente la figura

Se' wòblàrke tã se' yuwòk bla kówō tã se'aiché ie' e' wa káchok, ala tsir ie' ikáche kuòki tã ie' ikie ché; Ie' iche losa e' dálewa ie' dör iwa káche. (ye' kè' èna i' kiák – íyí káche iwa yuèwa o se' wòblàr iyuwók tche, ema alàr tsítsi kè' ichàkeppa wés iwa. Ye' ikièke – tté wa è' yuwèkókí ena wa kanèwé tã. Ye' ichètō e's tã se' wòblarmi, ema iwablèke sō wíkí iókí. E' kè' warō tō kè' ikanèörpa kuòki.) Se' ichémi tō tté wa è' yuwèkókí ena wa kanèwé tã és tã mík tté tsé se' e'tã se' èna iōne tō idi. ¿ema imà i' wa chè? Ema iyí chémi i tō tsée, erē sō bikéitsè....

Bétkã tō alà èna iōnèbét tō idi mík ie' tté e' tsé. Emà, i'es iwablèrke, ¿e's tã e' kùék tté dékã? – tó, e' kùék idèkã, -. Ye'

de la cosa cuando oye la palabra. Pero entonces, si sucede esto, —¿es ésta la finalidad de la palabra?— Sí, *puede* ser la finalidad.—Puedo imaginarme tal empleo de las palabras (de series de sonidos). (Pronunciar una palabra es como tocar una tecla en el piano de la imaginación.) Pero en el lenguaje de §2 *no* es la finalidad de las palabras evocar imágenes. (Pudiera ciertamente descubrirse que es provechoso para la verdadera finalidad.)

Pero si la enseñanza ostensiva produce esto, —¿debo decir que produce la comprensión de la palabra? ¿No entiende la exclamación «¡losa!» el que actúa de acuerdo con ella de tal y cual modo?—La enseñanza ostensiva ayudó indudablemente a producir esto, pero sólo junto con una determinada instrucción. Con una diferente instruc-

ẽna iõrmi wës tté e' wa ché ke (wës iulár). (tté ché se' e' dõr wës piano kè kũ se' wã e' ulãwë suwõ' ã.) E'rë §2 ttõ ã ã ie' kè kũ tté wa ile wíkol chòk. (éstã se' kũkiã ché e' yërmi bua'ẽme.) tté wa ẽ' yuwèkõki ena wa kanèwé tã, e' tõ se' ã e's ikáche, - çema ye' kowõ tã ichõ tõ'és tã se' ẽna itté õne? çtté losa kè õne iã e' wa chéke ie' wës ikiãne ma és? - tté wa ẽ' yuwèkõki ena wa kanèwé tã e' dõ tã se' kime tté wa kanèuk i'es, e'rë míkã se' ã iwa pákanèe' tã. Ipákene kuõki e'tã tté wa ẽ' yuwèkõki ena wa kanèwé tã i' tõ se' iã ilèkáchemi kuõki.

ción la misma enseñanza ostensiva habría producido una comprensión enteramente diferente.

«Al conectar la barra con la palanca puse el freno.»—Sí, dado todo el resto del mecanismo. Sólo como parte de éste es ella la palanca de freno, y separada de su soporte no es siquiera una palanca, sino que puede ser cualquier cosa o nada.

7.

En la práctica del uso del lenguaje (2) una parte grita las palabras, la otra actúa de acuerdo con ellas; en la instrucción en el lenguaje se encontrará *este* proceso: el aprendiz nombra los objetos. Esto es, pronuncia la palabra cuando el instructor señala la piedra.— Y se encontrará aquí un ejercicio aún más simple: el alumno repite las palabras que el maestro le dice— ambos procesos se asemejan al

Tabèchika wólõ tchéwa ikéli
mík e'stã ye' rõ iwoklõwõk
tchéwã. – Ttõ, és tabèchikã e'
dõr. Ema mík tabèchika e'
tchéule wã és e' ta ie' dõr
iwoklõwõk, mík itér bánet e' tã
kè idõ ie' bua', és tã ilèidi o kè
idi.

7.

Míkã se' ttõke (2) ékõl tõ tté ché
suwõ' ki, e'tã iél iwà kanèwã wés
ie' iché és; Tté páke e' ã se'
ikuémi e' ès: ã'yuwòkbla tó
ilèche. E' dõr, tté che, e' tã se'
yuwòkbla tõ ák kàche. – i'ã se'
isüémi tótòè: ã'yuwòkbla tõ
se'yuwòkbla tõ ie' ã tté che
e'mowéne – e' bõit és se' ttõ.

Se' itsé tõ kós (2) ttõ e' dõr wés
alàrlàrl ã' wòblãu iamì ttõ wa.

lenguaje.

Podemos imaginarnos también que todo el proceso del uso de palabras en (2) es uno de esos juegos por medio de los cuales aprenden los niños su lengua materna. Llamaré a estos juegos «juegos de lenguaje» y hablaré a veces de un lenguaje primitivo como un juego de lenguaje.

Y los procesos de nombrar las piedras y repetir las palabras dichas podrían llamarse también «juegos de lenguaje». Piensa en muchos usos que se hacen de las palabras en juegos en corro.

Llamaré también «juego de lenguaje» al todo formado por el lenguaje y las acciones con las que está entretejido.

8.

Contemplemos una ampliación del lenguaje (2). Aparte de las cuatro palabras «cubo», «pilar»,

Inèi' kièyö; tté inèie etã
 wékèlèye' skòwakpa ttö kièmi
 tté inèie.

Ena ák kièchèena ichèétökicha
 bótokicha e' kîmi añiès tté inèie.
 Be' ibikéitso' mîká se' ttò lólòè
 ér inèie.

Añiès e' kièke yö tté inèie, és
 kôs í ñe se' èn ã e' wa e'se.

8.

Tté kî sũe sô; (2). Tté tchéi cu-
 bo, pilar e' kî, tté tso' e' ã wa
 ñèse'a ã wés dlíwak (1) tó nu-

etcétera, contiene una serie de palabras que se usan como el tendero en (1) usó los numerales (puede ser la serie de las letras del alfabeto); además, dos palabras, que pudieran ser «allí» y «esto» (porque ello ya indica aproximadamente su finalidad) y que se usan en conexión con un ademán demostrativo; y finalmente una cantidad de muestras de colores. A da una orden del tipo: «losa-allí». A la vez le hace ver al ayudante una muestra de color y con la palabra «allí» señala un lugar del solar. B toma del surtido de losas una del color de la muestra por cada letra del alfabeto hasta la « d » y las lleva al sitio que A designa.—En otras ocasiones A da la orden: «esto-allí». Con «esto» apunta a una piedra de construcción. Etcétera.

merales wa kanèwẽ éś tã (wéśwa tã e' dör íyi stók);

es añiès, tté bóť, sēẽ ena íẽ (ema tté e' ñone se' ã tō iwa). E' wa kanèwẽke íyi kachók; Ibitaie tã íyi woát kachók.

A tō tté – losa- sēẽ, ése chè. E' wōsh ie' iwōát kátche i kímuk ã ena ie' iché wía. Ie' ùpa shō kó kátche. B tō losa kalōwẽ ét ét, éś ttéwa dōkã «d» tsémi wé A dör ie' ã kó kátche e' shō.- Etókicha A tō ichéne: «í, wíẽ». «í» wa ák tso' ù yawók e' kaché ie' dör. Éś iskà.

9.

Cuando el niño aprende este lenguaje, tiene que aprender de memoria la serie de los 'numerales' a, b, c,... Y tiene que aprender su uso.— ¿Se encontrará también en esta instrucción una enseñanza ostensiva de las palabras?—Bueno, se señalan, por ejemplo, losas y se cuenta: «a, b, c losas».—Más similar a la enseñanza ostensiva de las palabras «cubo», «pilar», etcétera, sería la enseñanza ostensiva de los numerales que sirven, no para contar, sino para designar grupos de cosas captables con la vista.

Así aprenden de hecho los niños el uso de los primeros cinco o seis numerales.

¿Se enseñan también «allí» y «esto» ostensivamente? — ¡Imagínate cómo podría acaso enseñarse su uso! Se señala con

9.

Míkã alàla éna tté íes óne, ie' káwō tã tté íyi shtáwók a,b,c...e' klúwã wokír a. Es añiéie tté e'rō bua'.- ¿sttó káchèwá yóúle ése sūwè mi sō i'ē? – Ema, sō ika-ché, sū sō isūè, sō ichō losa kuwōkī sō shtáú: «a,b,c losas». – E'rō se' ttò kachèwa yóúle ché-tcha se' «cubo», «pilar», és iskà, i' dör se' ttò kachèwa yó'ule, éré íyi shtawó k dör, kè rō íyi shtawó k, iro'íyi kachók wóbla ē wa.

És alàrlàr tsítsi yó'íyi shtáwük skél ena tèröl e' wa. ¿añièsō «sē» ena «i'» káche wa yuwèke iwó' mi? – Ema be' ibikéitsō wés sō ikáche tō wés iwa Kane wékèl! Íes se' tō kō ena íyi káchemi – éré iē añies se'

ellos a lugares y cosas —pero aquí este señalar ocurre también en el uso de las palabras y no sólo en el aprendizaje del uso.—

10.

¿Qué designan, pues, las palabras de este lenguaje?— ¿Cómo debe mostrarse lo que designan si no es en su modo de uso? Y ya lo hemos descrito. La expresión «esta palabra designa esto» tiene que convertirse también en una parte de esta descripción. O: la descripción debe hacerse en la forma «la palabra... designa...».

Ahora bien, se puede por cierto abreviar la descripción del uso de la palabra «losa» de modo que se diga que esa palabra designa este objeto. Esto se hará si, por ejemplo, se trata meramente de eliminar el malentendido de que la palabra «losa» se

woblàrke wés tté kèyèsyè ena wés se' káwō tã ichòk.

10.

¿Tté íes i kiane e' kí wa che? - ¿Wés i yèrmi yésyès ema skówõtã iwa kachók? Ema e' chétche se' dör. Tté «ttèi' tō ttèi' ché» e' kōwō tã ã' yuwòökne imalèpa kí ie. O: skówō tã ichòk «tté... kũkià che».

Ema és, be' iche se' ã ttè«losa» yèrmi ét ét, eràrma sō iché tō tté e' dör íyi i' ché. I' dōmì és mík, isaũne, mí sō iché tchãã tō tté «losa» e' dör ák tso' ù yáwók kièke sō «cubo» - éré se' wã isũú kule ima ikìe, I' dör, tté i' wa

refiere a la forma de piedra de construcción que de hecho llamamos «cubo» —pero se conoce el modo y manera de este *referir*, esto es, el uso de estas palabras en lo restante.

Y del mismo modo puede decirse que los signos «a», «b», etcétera, designan números; cuando esto, pongamos por caso, elimina el malentendido de que «a», «b», «c» desempeñan en el lenguaje el papel que desempeñan en realidad «cubo», «dosa», «pilar». Y puede también decirse que « c » designa este número y no aquél; cuando con c lio, pongamos por caso, se explica que las letras han de emplearse en la secuencia a, b, c, d, etcétera, y no en la secuencia a, b, d, c.

¡Pero con asimilar así mutuamente las descripciones del uso de las palabras no se vuelve este uso más semejante! Pues, como

chèimalẽ shũ ã. E's añies sō ichèmi tō idōr «a», «b», és iskáa, idiókōl, e' dōr íyi shtáwō; mík i', sō ichèe, tō se' iché tchá ã tō «a», «b», «c» dōr tté ã tã wés «cubo», «dosa», «pilar» és. És sō ichèmi tō «c» dōr i' ché, kè rō awí; Míkã c wa ye' isulùwã kã, sō ã ichè, Sō ikàche tō tté káchèke tō idō a,b,c,d, ésmi, kè rō a,b,d,c.

¡Erè mík se' rō tté ché ñi kēē
 sēra ã ètã tté miãnet étchē

vemos, es totalmente desigual.

tséskua! Ema, wēs sō isüē tō idi
kuō ki kuō ki.

11.

11.

Piensa en las herramientas de una caja de herramientas: hay un martillo, unas tenazas, una sierra, un destornillador, una regla, un tarro de cola, cola, clavos y tornillos.—Tan diversas como las funciones de estos objetos son las funciones de las palabras. (Y hay semejanzas aquí y allí.)

Be' kálkuwō tabèchika séwō e'se bikéitso; e' ã kálwō tók téř étōn, íyi tók téř étōm, íyi woñok téř étōm, clavo yóksa tr éstōm, íyi mówōk téř étōm, íyi bitsók chér ék, clavo ena tornillo, - íyi kōs e' wa kanèblo' kuókĩ kuókĩ, és se' ttó wa kanèblo'. (Erē sō isüēmi wēle ulát ulát tā ñi sū idi.) Ttó, se' woã e' chómi se' itsèet chēidi mík se' ã iyérke o se' iküēwã kítluè.

Ciertamente, lo que nos desconcierta es la uniformidad de sus apariencias cuando las palabras nos son dichas o las encontramos escritas o impresas. Pero su empleo no se nos presenta tan claramente. ¡En particular cuando filosofamos!

Erē wēs iwa kanèwēke e' kē kayërta se' ã yésyēs. ¡míkã se' tso' isüē pákok!

12.

12.

Es como cuando miramos la cabina de una locomotora: hay

E' dör wēs míkã se' dör locomotora sūē ishukka: Tabèchika

allí manubrios que parecen todos más o menos iguales. (Esto es comprensible puesto que todos ellos deben ser asidos con la mano.) Pero uno es el manubrio de un cigüeñal que puede graduarse de modo continuo (regula la apertura de una válvula); otro es el manubrio de un conmutador que sólo tiene dos posiciones efectivas: está abierto o cerrado; un tercero es el mango de una palanca de frenado: cuanto más fuerte se tira, más fuerte frena; un cuarto es el manubrio de una bomba: sólo funciona mientras uno lo mueve de acá para allá.

13.

Cuando decimos: «toda palabra del lenguaje designa algo» todavía no se ha dicho con ello, por de pronto, *absolutamente* nada, a no ser que expliquemos exactamente *qué* distinción deseamos hacer. (Bien pudiera ser que

tso' ishũã sũẽ sõ ñi sũidí. (i' watã ema tabêchika kôs e' kôwõtã wôwẽ ulã wa.) Ére se' dör iulãla tché' e' wôeke ás tchérwã yéstyẽs (e' tã balbula e' kô ppéeke); iét dör conmutador ulãla e' wa kanèblo bótt ème: iár áie o iwò tẽulèwã; màñat èl dõ iwòklòwãk kléli: míkã be' itchéwã darèrè ès tã iwòklòne bua' ie; tché' e' dör bomba ulãkita: míka be' ipatchéke awí kĩ iòkĩ ès ã tã iwa kanèblo.

13.

Míkã se' iché: «míkã se' iche e' wa se' ilèchéke» e'tã kô mi se'iche e' wa, míkã kômi be' ipákõ toikiãne be' kĩ ché ttèe' wa. (se' ichémi tã se' éna (8) ttèyãktsã 'ttèkè' wa tã' e' yók, wës Lewís Carroll poma ã idãtsẽ

quisiéramos distinguir las palabras del lenguaje (8) de palabras 'sin significado' como las que aparecen en poemas de Lewis Carroll o de palabras como «ixuxú» en algunas canciones.)

és o ttè«ixuxù» és, wës dâtsë tsé ã.)

14.

Imagínate que alguien dijese: «Todas las herramientas sirven para modificar algo. Así, el martillo la posición del clavo, la sierra la lorma de la tabla, etcétera».— ¿Y qué modifican la regla, el tarro de cola, los clavos?—«Nuestro conocimiento de la longitud de una cosa, la temperatura de la cola y la solidez de la caja.» ¿Se ganaría algo con esta asimilación de expresiones?—

14.

Be' ibikéitso' yíle tō ichè: «ta-bêchika ulitãne wa íle yõnarmine. És, martillo tō clavo tchéwa, sierra kál ták téé, és iskà». - ¿kál ták téé íyi mówãimanérmi e' wa, i manérmi íyi bitsó wa, clavos? - «ima íle batsi tchéne se' wa, íyi bitsó bá, ena caja yóúle bua' e'.» ¿ttèyéke íés ñikéë tséskua e' wa iyõrmi bua'? -

15.

Más directamente se aplica quizá la palabra «designar» cuando el signo está sobre el objeto

15.

Se' dõr ttè«designar» alèyéyës míkã iwíkol tso'ikiàne se' kî e' shõõ. Ye' ã tã A wã tabechika

designado. Supon que las herramientas que A emplea en La construcción llevan determinados signos. Cuando A le muestra al ayudante un tal signo, éste trae la herramienta provista del signo.

tso' u yuók e' wíkoĩ tso' ie'wã ét
 ét. Mikã A tō ie' moso ã ìle
 wíkoĩ kàche, Ie' wã tabêchika
 sũũle ie' wã iwíkoĩ e' baté.