

1 **Are we agentially luminous?**

2 Abstract: *Piñeros Glasscock (2020) presents a version of Williamson's anti-*
3 *luminosity argument against the Anscombean thesis that intentional action entails*
4 *knowledge. I defend this argument from recent criticisms by Beddor and Pavese*
5 *(2022) and Valaris (2021). I argue that contrary to what both he and the critics*
6 *suggest, Piñeros Glasscock's conclusion does not rest on the existence of*
7 *essentially intentional actions. His argument can be recast based on the humbler*
8 *premise that agential cognition must represent actions as intentional. I show that*
9 *this claim is well motivated by precisely the considerations of control behind the*
10 *objections.*

11 Word-count: 3,508 (4,712 with footnotes)

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13 A central debate in philosophy of action concerns the following thesis:

14 **Action Entails Knowledge (AEK):** (Necessarily, for all agents and all actions)¹ If S is Φ -
15 ing intentionally, S has practical knowledge that she is Φ -ing.

16 Although its origins date back to Aristotle, the most prominent defense of AEK is attributed to
17 G.E.M. Anscombe ([1957] 1963). This paper focuses on a recent objection to it by Piñeros
18 Glasscock (2020), who offers a version of Williamson's (2000) anti-luminosity argument against
19 AEK. I defend the argument from a recent criticism based on the non-existence of essentially
20 intentional actions, and a general connection between intentional action and control (Beddor and

¹ For simplicity, full domain specifications will henceforth be omitted where clear.

1 Pavese 2022; Valaris 2022).² I shall argue that contrary to what both he and the critics suggest,
2 Piñeros Glasscock’s conclusion does not rest on the existence of essentially intentional actions.³
3 His argument can be recast based on the humbler premise that agential cognition must represent
4 actions as intentional. I show that this claim is well motivated by precisely the considerations about
5 control behind the criticisms, and yields an even stronger conclusion than can be reached based on
6 the claim that some actions are essentially intentional.

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8 Piñeros Glasscock’s argument begins by considering an agent who changes slowly from doing
9 something intentionally to not doing it at all. In a recent version (Piñeros Glasscock 2022), we are
10 to consider a deaf singer, call him ‘Art Cantony’, who strikes a deal with a radio station to collect
11 donation money for every minute he sings.⁴ Since he is deaf, he has no backward feedback about
12 his singing, but he sings for several hours, until he starts to lose his voice. After two days of
13 incessant singing, his voice is completely gone, so he is no longer singing at all. At best he is *trying*
14 to sing. Throughout the whole process, Art Cantony is focused on singing to the best of his ability.⁵

15 Let t_0, t_1, \dots, t_n , be a series of one millisecond intervals from the time Art Cantony starts
16 singing to the time when he is no longer doing so. Let c_i be the case at t_i . Since Art Cantony cannot
17 discriminate between adjacent cases with respect to what he is doing, and since one who knows
18 cannot easily be mistaken, the following principle appears to hold:

² However, like Piñeros Glasscock, I will not be defending the anti-luminosity argument generally. For such a defense see Srinivasan (2015).

³ Carter (forthcoming) recently defends a virtue-theoretic version AEK. Since he agrees that a “strong” virtue-theoretic analogue of the Practical Knowledge Principle (discussed below) would be subject to the anti-luminosity argument, my argument here also speaks against his weaker version of the principle.

⁴ I take some liberties with the example to liven it up.

⁵ This point ensures that the objection cannot be answered by weakening the principles using ‘being in a position to know’ rather than ‘knowledge’.

1 **Margin for error for action (MARA):** (For any time t_i) If Art Cantony knows that he is
2 singing intentionally at c_i , then he is singing intentionally at c_{i+1} .

3 Now, for reductio, suppose:

4 **Practical Knowledge Principle (PKP):** (Necessarily) If S is Φ -ing intentionally, S knows
5 that she is Φ -ing intentionally.

6 Applied to our example, this would mean that whenever Art Cantony sings intentionally, he knows
7 so. Let α be a time at which it is clear that Art Cantony is singing intentionally. By PKP, Art
8 Cantony knows he is singing intentionally at c_α . But then, by MARA, Art Cantony is singing
9 intentionally at $c_{\alpha+1}$. Evidently, through enough iterations of this line of reasoning, we can conclude
10 that Art Cantony is singing intentionally even when he has completely lost his voice, contradicting
11 our initial assumption.

12 On the basis of this argument Piñeros Glasscock rejects PKP. However, as critics point out,
13 PKP is strictly stronger than AEK (Beddor and Pavese 2022; Valaris 2022). After all, it is possible
14 to know that someone is doing something without knowing that she is doing so intentionally. I
15 might know you raised your hand, but not know whether this was the result of a spasm, or a
16 deliberate greeting. Thus, an agent can fulfill AEK if she knows that she is Φ -ing, even if she
17 doesn't know that she is Φ -ing *intentionally*. Given this possibility, however, Piñeros Glasscock's
18 argument won't go through, since the antecedent of MARA is stated in terms of intentional action
19 rather than action simpliciter. As Beddor and Pavese (2022) point out, this leaves room for the
20 possibility that at a certain point Art Cantony is singing intentionally, knows that he is singing, but
21 doesn't know that he is doing so intentionally.

22 Piñeros Glasscock anticipates the worry, and offers two responses. The first is based on the
23 contention that certain actions are essentially intentional (p.1240). That is:

1 **Essentially Intentionally Types of Actions (EITA):** There are some types of actions such
2 that: (Necessarily) if *S* does an action of that type, *S* does so intentionally.

3 If true, PKP and AEK are equivalent for actions falling under EITA; these actions would then
4 constitute a significant class of exceptions to principles tying intentional action with knowledge.⁶
5 Candidate action types include marrying, greeting, and promising. Although the claim that these
6 are essentially intentional has found significant support in the literature, Beddor and Pavese reject
7 it.⁷ Their strategy is two-fold. First, they argue that the most promising candidate types of
8 essentially intentional actions can be tokened non-intentionally. Second, they argue for a general
9 connection between control and intentional agency from which the existence of essentially
10 intentional action appears dubious.

11 I won't directly respond to these challenges. For the sake of argument, I grant that there
12 aren't any essentially intentional actions, so defined. It is worth noting, however, that Beddor and
13 Pavese's arguments leave room for a different kind of position (perhaps Anscombe's), on which
14 token actions, rather than types of actions, are essentially intentional. That is, Beddor and Pavese's
15 position is consistent with:

16 **Token Essential Intentionality (TEI):** (Necessarily) If *A* is an intentional action, then *A*
17 is necessarily intentional.

⁶ Indeed, Anscombe appears to treat essentially intentional actions as paradigmatic of the class (see Setiya (2016)).

⁷ For support, see (Bennett 1988; Moore 2010; Holguín and Lederman 2024; Babakhanian 2024; Schultheis and Baron-Schmitt ms). The attribution to Anscombe is based on section 47 of *Intention*. It is often assumed that Anscombe thinks the verbs on the right-hand column at the end of the section stand for essentially intentional actions. However, the attribution is murky. Although she does say that advertisements are “essentially intentional”, she later seems to qualify the claim, holding that the action types on the right-hand column “can only be voluntary or intentional (except that the first few members could be somnambulist)”. Following Aristotle, Anscombe defines the voluntary as a broader class that includes, for instance, certain known consequences of intentional actions (§49).

1 To see the difference between EITA and TEI, consider again the case of greeting, supposing it to
2 fall under the contested class of actions. EITA says that every token greeting is intentional. By
3 contrast, TEI is consistent with the existence of token greetings that are non-intentional. It says,
4 however, that *if* a token greeting (or an action of any type, for that matter) is intentional, then that
5 very greeting is essentially intentional. (In Lewisian terms: the only counter-parts of an intentional
6 greeting are themselves intentional, even if there are greeting tokens that are non-intentional).⁸

7 TEI strikes me as an attractive principle. Especially so on the Anscombean view that
8 intentional action is defined by the “form of description” that her question ‘Why?’ is meant to fix.
9 If an action has such a structure, it seems plausible that it could not lose it while remaining the
10 same type of thing, just as a multitude could not lose its countability (as defined by the question
11 ‘How many?’) without ceasing to be such a multitude (Ford 2015).

12 Though I won’t defend TEI, having the principle on the table is helpful because it enables
13 us to appreciate an even humbler principle that can be defended on precisely the considerations
14 about control that motivate critics of Piñeros Glasscock’s argument, based on which his version of
15 the anti-luminosity argument can be defended. The idea may be suggested by the second line of
16 response he offers, when he writes: “it would be strange to think that my practical knowledge could
17 be expressed by saying, for instance, ‘I’m walking, but I’m not sure whether I’m doing it
18 intentionally’” (2020: p.1240). I think there is an important insight here, although the appeal to
19 what the agent would *say* raises needless complications that obscure the matter.⁹ The real insight
20 is not about what an agent can *say*, but what she can *think*.

⁸ Compare a claim that some metaphysicians find attractive: although there is no particular material that a table must be made of, if a table is wooden, then it is essentially wooden (if you changed its composition to glass, you would have a new table).

⁹ For example, as Valaris (2021) notes, the oddity of the assertion may be explained on pragmatic grounds: denying that the action is intentional implies that it is unintentional (p.17n37). One problem with this response is that if the

1 Here is the crucial question: Can someone who knows what she is doing *from the*
2 *perspective of agential cognition* be neutral about whether her own action is intentional? We saw
3 this can happen in the third-person (‘Is that a deliberate greeting, or did he have a spasm?’). And,
4 therefore, it is also possible with respect to one’s own actions when not regarded from the first-
5 personal, agential perspective—the sort of knowledge alien-hand syndrome patients might have
6 about the movements of their hands. But precisely because practical knowledge is a form of self-
7 knowledge, this possibility seems closed in the cases at issue. By analogy: while a person who has
8 testimonial knowledge of the fact that a certain wall is painted in a primary colour may be neutral
9 as to which specific colour it is, this possibility seems closed for someone who has visual
10 knowledge of the fact.

11 The intuitive appeal of the proposal is captured by Piñeros Glasscock’s question: it is hard
12 to imagine having agential knowledge of what one is doing, while being neutral about whether one
13 is acting intentionally. However, the matter is too important to settle by such intuitions, so I turn
14 instead to general principles, precisely the ones that motivate AEK itself.

15 Several authors, including defenders of AEK, hold that intentional action requires control
16 (Beddor and Pavese 2022; Shepherd and Carter 2022; Shepherd 2021; Pavese 2022; Small 2012;
17 Thompson 2011; Valaris 2022; Wolfson 2012; Wu 2016), and that this is a matter of expressing
18 knowledge-how. After all, as Beddor and Pavese point out, it is hard to see how one could control
19 what one is doing—guiding the process towards one’s desired end—unless one knew how to carry

explanation was pragmatic, we would expect it to be cancellable. Yet, ‘I’m walking, but I’m not sure if I’m doing so intentionally *or indeed merely non-intentionally*’ hardly sounds better. Perhaps the case from Pavese (2022) considered below makes this attribution felicitous, but it is unclear. In any case, focusing on thoughts rather than explicit assertions avoids these thorny issues.

1 on (p.921 et passim). Practical knowledge on this view is precisely a manifestation of knowledge-
2 how.

3 What, then, are the representational requirements for so cognizing an action? I suggest that
4 a minimal requirement is as follows: one must represent one's action as embedded in an order of
5 means to ends.¹⁰ This suggestion is easy to justify from an intellectualist perspective. According
6 to intellectualism, knowing how to Φ is constituted by knowing of some Ψ , that Ψ is a way to Φ
7 (Stanley and Krakauer 2013; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Stanley and Williamson 2001; Pavese 2022,
8 2018, 2017a). Therefore, if one's knowledge that one is Φ -ing is a manifestation of this knowledge,
9 it must be because it is grounded in representing one's Φ -ing as being done by means of some Ψ -
10 ing or other. Hence, the agential cognition that constitutes practical knowledge will have content
11 of the form \ulcorner I am Φ -ing by Ψ -ing \urcorner (and, correspondingly, \ulcorner I am Ψ -ing in order to Φ \urcorner).

12 For example, suppose Michael knows he is cooking risotto, and he knows this from the
13 agential perspective. Since he knows this in virtue of exercising control/know-how, then he must
14 know it in virtue of representing himself as cooking risotto, *by means of* roasting the rice in the
15 pan, *by means of* moving the lid and wooden spoon so and so. Indeed, even if he was doing a basic
16 action (supposing those exist!) it would still be the case that if Michael was expressing knowledge-
17 how in so acting, he should be representing this action as part of a means-ends structure (e.g., he
18 might represent his ear-wiggling as a means to entertain his father).¹¹

19 A central argument for the claim that knowing how to Φ is constituted by knowledge of
20 means is based on what intellectualists argue is the best semantic analysis of know-how

¹⁰ See (Small 2012; Frey 2019; Pavese 2022) for explicit endorsement of this claim.

¹¹ This sidesteps Setiya's (2012) worry that intellectualism cannot account for basic action. Pavese (2022) suggests an alternative reply: one can take the action itself as the means by which to do it (e.g. one can ear-wiggle by way of ear-wiggling), and this is what a skilled person knows how to do.

1 attributions (Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Stanley and Williamson 2001; Pavese 2017a). However, the
2 claim can be vindicated on purely Anscombean grounds that are neutral with respect to the
3 controversy about knowledge-how.

4 Like recent authors, Anscombe holds that practical knowledge is the “exercise” of know-
5 how, since this is “formally characterized as subject to our question ‘Why?’ whose application
6 displays the A-D order [i.e. an instrumental order] which we discovered” ((Anscombe [1957]
7 1963), §48, p.88). It is easier to see what she has in mind if we remember that corresponding to
8 the special sense of her question ‘Why?’, there is a corresponding sense of the question ‘How?’
9 (Anscombe [1957] 1963, §26, p.46; Ford 2015; Frey 2019). If a man knows he is building a house
10 in virtue of his building skill, he will know that he builds a house *by means of* first digging the
11 ground to lay the foundation, *by means of* operating an excavator, *by means of* pressing such and
12 such buttons, and so forth.

13 It is a difficult interpretative question whether Anscombe would characterize such
14 knowledge as propositional.¹² What is clear is that her claim is compatible with non-intellectualist
15 views. For example, it is compatible with the claim that the content of the thoughts expressed by
16 clauses of the form ‘I am Φ -ing by Ψ -ing’ are non-propositional self-ascriptions (Lewis 1979),
17 or express direct relations to activities (Hornsby 2016). Again, perhaps the canonical form of these
18 thoughts is imperatival: To build a house, dig the ground! To dig the ground, buy a shovel! Etc.
19 (Ford 2016; Hellie 2018). And then, following Ryle, we might hold that such imperatival

¹² Partly on the strength of the views advanced in “The First Person” (Anscombe 1975) some hold that her account is non-propositional (Thompson 2008). However, this is itself a very difficult paper, and its connection to debates about propositionality isn’t transparent. Moreover, Anscombe’s analysis of the content of wanting, key to her understanding of practical reasoning, is propositional (§36); and in a late essay she seems to endorse a propositional analysis of practical truth, the truth involved in practical knowledge (Anscombe 1999).

1 representations are not propositional, but rather ‘inference tickets’, given that propositions, unlike
2 imperatival contents, are truth-assessable (Ryle 1949, 1945; Hornsby 2011).¹³

3 The central claim stands, regardless of how we understand the conditions for the truth of
4 the claim: the agential capacity that we exercise when we represent ourselves agentially as acting
5 in a particular way necessarily involves representing what we do as part of an instrumental order.
6 This instrumental order appears to be taken by Anscombe and many of her followers as definitive
7 of intentional action: An action is intentional if and only if it is part of an instrumental order
8 (Wiland 2007; Thompson 2008; Ford 2015; Setiya 2016; Makin 2024).

9 This Anscombean view, it is worth noting, is weaker than the Davidsonian view on which
10 intentional action is action for a reason. On the one hand, every action that counts as intentional
11 under the Davidsonian view counts as intentional under the Anscombean view. The point is
12 somewhat obscured by the fact that Davidson uses ‘reasons’ to refer to the complex of beliefs and
13 desires (or “pro-attitudes”) that he takes to be explanatory of action (Davidson 2001a, 2001b),
14 whereas Anscombe uses ‘reasons’ to refer to the contents of reasoning, and holds that “it is
15 misleading to include ‘I want’” in the contents of practical reasoning ([1957] 1963, §35).¹⁴
16 Nonetheless, a Davidsonian ‘reason’ will include a desire for a certain end, and an instrumental
17 belief for how to accomplish it. Thus, when an action is rationalized by these mental states, an
18 instrumental order is defined by their content; and this instrumental order ensures it will count as
19 intentional under the Anscombean view. For example, if someone’s flipping of the switch was

¹³ Note, however, that there is an important tradition in linguistics descending from Lewis (1970) that treats commands as truth-assessable. Anscombe flirts with the idea in *Intention* when she asks: “What are the reasons other than a dispensable usage for not calling commands true and false according as they were obeyed or disobeyed” ([1957] 1963, §2; and cf. Anscombe 1999). For an excellent survey of the semantics of commands, see Charlow (2014), and see Pavese (2017b, 2019) for an intellectualist account that incorporates imperatival meaning.

¹⁴ For a helpful early discussion of these and other senses of ‘reasons’, see (Darwall 1983: 26-31).

1 rationalized by her desire to turn on the light and her belief that this is a way to do it, she would be
2 flipping the switch for the sake of turning on the light.

3 On the other hand, some actions will count as intentional under the Anscombean but not
4 the Davidsonian view, since the latter entails that an action done for no reason cannot be
5 intentional. By contrast, Anscombe famously allows that intentional actions can be said to be done
6 “for no particular reason” (§17), when there is no further desired end for which the action is done.
7 This is because the question ‘Why?’ may still find application, just as the question ‘How much
8 money do you have in your pocket?’ finds application even when the answer is ‘none’. But the
9 interpretation of these passages is difficult, and it is disputed whether the two questions are
10 analogous (O’Brien 2023).¹⁵ The emphasis on the instrumental order suggests an alternative
11 Anscombean reply: I may be scribbling intentionally “for no reason” if I am doing it *by means of*
12 moving my hand.

13 What would be harder to accommodate on the Anscombean picture envisaged here would
14 be ‘punctive actions’: actions done for no reason *and* through no means.¹⁶ Yet, it is far from clear
15 that punctive actions could be done intentionally: though people of course sometimes blink their
16 eyes intentionally (e.g. when winking), I cannot think of a clear case where we would say a
17 blinking (or such like action) is intentional but done for no reason.

¹⁵ A referee helpfully suggests that Anscombe’s reply amounts to saying that in some cases ‘I am Φ ing for no reason’ expresses practical knowledge in her sense, and thus is an application of thinking about an action in terms of an instrumental order, even if the ‘I did it for no reason’ can in the case of a hiccup deny application to the question.

¹⁶ As a referee points out, the strong Anscombean equivalence also conflicts with cases where it seems someone does something intentionally even though this wasn’t what she intended to bring about. In a famous example by Harman (1986): “someone who foresees that his attempts to extricate himself from a tight parking spot will dent your fender may reluctantly go ahead, intentionally denting your fender in the process, without having aimed at or intended this in any way” (p.89). However, I’m sympathetic here with a response that simply jettisons these judgments as resulting from the fact that we sometimes use ‘intentional’ to mark culpability. Legal systems are more discerning, and could treat this as a case of recklessness or negligence, rather than acting-with-intent; but it is the latter notion that I think Anscombe and much of philosophy of action aims to understand under the label ‘intentional action’.

1 I would thus be prepared to accept the strong Anscombean definition of intentional action
2 as what is part of an instrumental order.¹⁷ However, the argument I wish to make depends on the
3 weaker principle that:

4 **Instrumental Order>Intentional Action (IO>IA):** If *S* conceives of an action *A* as
5 occurring as part of an instrumental order, then *S* thereby conceives of *A* as occurring
6 intentionally.

7 The intuitiveness of the principle comes out in a phenomenon Makin (2024: 217) recently calls
8 attention to, namely, that sentences of the form ‘I am Φing in order to Ψ, but I am not Φing [
9 Ψing] intentionally’ clash.¹⁸ For example, the following two sentences clash:

10 (1) ??? I am roasting the rice in order to make risotto, but I am not roasting the rice
11 intentionally.

12 (2) ??? I am roasting the rice in order to make risotto, but I am not making risotto intentionally.

¹⁷ Indeed, I would advocate for a methodology that gives priority to expressions like ‘in order to’ over ‘intentionally’ to fix the target of study in philosophy of action. Several considerations recommend this view. First, the teleological structure of a means-ends order seems to be an extremely basic part of infants’s theory of mind that may begin to emerge as early as 5-months, and is well-developed by 9 months of age (Woodward 1998; Csibra et al. 1999; Csibra and Gergely 1998; Kamewari et al. 2005). On the basis of studies of this sort, Levy (forthcoming) provides a persuasive case for the idea that the concept of INTENTIONAL ACTION is prior to the concept of INTENTION. It is no surprise, therefore, that ‘in order to’ is much more common than ‘intentional’ (a Google Ngram search reveals it to be about 100 times more common: https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=knows%2Cintentionally%2Cin+order+to&year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=en-2019&smoothing=0). Moreover, ‘in order to’ contexts seem to be less prone to pragmatic effects (Knobe 2006), or to the well-known moral influences like the Knobe-effect that affect our judgments about whether something is done ‘intentionally’ (Wiland 2007). Thanks to [redacted] for discussion.

¹⁸ ‘Clash’ is a technical term introduced by DeRose (2002), a kind of oddity that need not be a contradiction but has the feeling of one. Makin appeals to the sentential clash as part of a defense of PKP. I lack the space here to reply to this argument, but I don’t see how one can escape the anti-luminosity argument if one grants that intentional action has *some* dependence on the material conditions (Makin ascribes the “implicit proposal” of a very strong dependence to Piñeros Glasscock (p.221), but I don’t see on what basis, especially since the latter emphasizes the openness of the progressive (p.1241)). Indeed, Makin’s argument comes dangerously close to holding that “what happens” has no bearing on intentional action, something Anscombe rightly argued *against*.

1 (IO>IA) provides a straightforward explanation of the clash: these sentences commit the speaker
2 to a contradiction. In support of this verdict, it is worth-noting that the clash arises also in the third
3 person, e.g.:

4 (3) ??? She is roasting the rice in order to make risotto, but she is not roasting the rice [/making
5 risotto] intentionally.

6 Thus, the prospects for a pragmatic explanation of the clash look dim.

7 One might, however, think that cases like the following call (IO>IA) into question:¹⁹

8 **Bomb:** Mr.Lucky knows a bomb will explode in 1 minute unless he cuts the right wire.

9 There are ten wires, all of different colours, and he doesn't know which one deactivates the
10 bomb. Cutting the wrong wire will automatically detonate it. He decides to cut the red wire,
11 and, lo and behold, the bomb is thereby deactivated.

12 It may seem natural to hold that in this familiar case, Mr. Lucky is cutting the wire in order to
13 deactivate the bomb, even though he would not deactivate the bomb intentionally were he to
14 succeed (the deactivation would be too lucky to count as intentional). And if Mr. Lucky can think
15 of his action in these terms, the case seems to conflict with (IO>IA).

16 While this may be a problem for certain views about the connection between the instrumental
17 order and intentional action (Wiland 2007), it leaves (IO>IA) unscathed. For (IO>IA) was stated
18 in terms of how an agent conceives an action as *occurring*.²⁰ This is important to match the aspect
19 and tense in terms of which PKP and suchlike theses are stated to be plausible: the alleged
20 connection between intentional action and practical knowledge is about what the agent is *doing*.

¹⁹ Thanks to [redacted] for discussion and pushing me to address this issue.

²⁰ Even setting this point aside, I believe we should be careful about reaching strong conclusions from intuitions about these bomb cases, which are known to be subject to a Knobe-effect (Pettit and Knobe 2009), and conflict with well-supported principles in philosophy of action (Piñeros Glasscock 2022: 624).

1 However, in **Bomb** the agent conceives of the deactivation as something that might occur, rather
2 than as something that is occurring. If we alter the example to make it clear that the agent views
3 the action as occurring (e.g. as the agent is cutting the right wire, a warning sign reads ‘to continue
4 deactivation, press the red button’), then the agent could no longer plausibly think, ‘I am cutting
5 this wire because I am deactivating the bomb, but I am not deactivating the bomb intentionally’,
6 as predicted by (IO>IA).

7 Given (IO>IA), if an agent conceives of an action as part of an instrumental order, she must
8 conceive of it as intentional. Since practical cognition must represent an action as part of an
9 instrumental order, we obtain:

10 **Epistemically Essential Intentionality (EEI):** (Necessarily) If *S* knows practically that *S*
11 is Φ -ing, then *S* knows that *S* is Φ -ing intentionally.

12 EEI is even weaker than TEI. Like the latter, it makes no claims about action types. It is compatible
13 with the claim that all action types have non-intentional instances. But it is also compatible with
14 the claim that at the ontic level no token action is essentially intentional. What it rules out, however,
15 is the possibility that from the standpoint of practical knowledge one could be neutral about the
16 intentionality of the action. From that perspective, one can represent oneself only as acting
17 intentionally.

18 Despite its modesty, EEI is sufficient to derive a contradiction from AEK, using Piñeros
19 Glasscock’s anti-luminosity argument. To see how, return to the case of Art Cantony. Let α be a
20 time at which it is clear that Art Cantony is singing intentionally. By AEK, Art Cantony knows
21 practically that he is singing at c_α . But then, by EEI, he knows he is singing intentionally. By
22 MARA, Art Cantony is singing intentionally at $c_{\alpha+1}$. And once again, through enough iterations of

1 this line of reasoning, we reach the result that Art Cantony is singing intentionally even when he
2 has completely lost his voice, contradicting our initial assumption.

3 If this argument is sound, Piñeros Glasscock’s practical anti-luminosity argument cannot
4 be resisted through the weakening of PKP into AEC. As we have seen, this conclusion holds
5 independently of the question of whether there are essentially intentional action types. Moreover,
6 we have been able to reach a stronger conclusion than Piñeros Glasscock’s (2020). Whereas a
7 formulation of the argument based on essentially intentional actions types is compatible with the
8 truth of a restricted version of EC—one whose scope includes only non-essentially intentional
9 actions—our strategy applies to intentional actions across the board. *Any* action type can be done
10 intentionally without practical knowledge. Of course, since it is based on principles about practical
11 cognition, the argument leaves open the possibility that to act intentionally an agent must have
12 knowledge of other sorts. But I know of no defenders of, nor good reasons to hold, such a view.

13

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