iting this article in mind for it is not entirely clear what this an. Is a mind distinct from it inside it? Am I a different is there any interesting sense in n my brain and all its sensorial arguably, these questions made es. In fact, the very word k of as inextricably connected to exist in anything like the modern Philosophers before Descartes oblem because they followed act of being a living entity meant ristotelian and medicval living matter is just matter, aries of scientific reductionism ments and methodological have the philosophical fortitude dful of the fate of his contemed not include the mind in his as a machine. In Descartes' te diagrams of how vision works, y modern idea that memory is ain. But he stopped short at ions, which he took almost confined to an immaterial soul. ized his dualism created one of n philosophy of mind: if the stinct, how do the two interact, er for a human being to be

has taken full form only during the century and is still being elaborated provided by several schools of thou dealt by skeptic philosopher David Hume was still a dualist, and defend basis of what is known as the proper phenomena lack spatial extension a must be non-material. But what is Hume farmously rejected any idea of Descartes) affirming that introspect discover anything but our own permyself at any time without a percep anything but the perception", which concept of mental activity as a 'bun dissolved Descartes' unitary concep of 'things', but had not solved the p immaterial objects can possibly into The next step was taken by Tho often known as 'Darwin's bulldog' evolutionary ideas. Huxley was con evidence strongly suggested that D treating animals as machines (which selection), but -- probably also beca he could not conceive that anima This brought him to the verge of r two roads are open: either animals (though to a lesser degree than hus automata, including Homo Sapiens a desperate compromise: both we a

consciousness, but this is complete

epiphenomenon of the brain's activity

marked by a gradual but steady rep

anisms causing the observable problems. For example, John Sea ed most of what's interesting about "mind = brain" equations is based about somebody sitting in a room in the wall, cards with Chinese ch uthor attempt at a fresh start with hat new approach is now known He looks them up in a big book of Feigl, U.T. Place and J.J.C. pushes other cards out through the pted to go beyond behavioristic observer it seems like the room is or all identify the mind with the questions in Chinese, but to say t aintained, the trick is in which Chinese goes against all our intui ord 'is' one is using while saying produced a thought experiment, or scientist called Mary who grows a In English, we can use 'is' in three tion, or attribution of characterblack, white and grey objects. Sh vore"); in a definition, or stating a the theory of color, but when she is a geometric figure with three enclosure and actually sees a color n, or stating of a contingent our intuition is that she learns so charge of electricity"). Clearly, which she is not prepared. While ie brain" is of the third kind and provocative, thought experiments tal states are identical with questionable assumption that our (not because they logically have unfamiliar situations are reliable. ens in this corner of the speculative scenarios our intuition re, besides the obvious empirical or at most point us only to the pl identity works, is that there are problem of the biases that we have identity seems rather unsatisthinking about the mental. relationship between brain states All of this notwithstanding, wh ne-to-one mapping, so that the turn of the 21st century? It se omorrow is Monday is in the more and more entwined with ne is hardly reasonable and contratheory, perhaps confirming once : plasticity and more in general of philosophy is to mull over proble tich raises serious problems for insoluble and then clear the way t problem if the latter becomes pos eme positions (such as Patricia current excitement in this field co are open to the findings of biolog that mental phenomena such as ply do not exist and we should who are willing to embrace the bi ge to talk only about neuronal philosophy and go beyond the spe ity corresponding to, for example, ing and even praying and ging picture is that distinct kinds arry out different tasks, rejecting he brain as a general purposc seems to be made of diffuse and rly shaped by natural selection to such as identifying objects by their ive secondary qualities a result of guish between food and foes in the relatively sophisticated brain

ion, identification of objects, and

orks of neuron-like elements is

valuable alternative to old


ce while in the process raising a ts own (e.g. we can simulate self-improving neural net, but understanding how actually the net of the mind has to come to terms alth of empirical information study of the mental out of the fog id into some as yet dimly 't know exactly what it means for write this article, but both

have a fresh new century to look

s in this ultimate quest for self-

Professor of Ecology & Evolutionary

nnessee. In his spare time, he is a



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at the same University. His