of skepticism that professional scientists assume when one talks about philosophy (more on this in a future column), they seem to have absorbed with little recalcitrance the teachings of both Popper and Kuhn. In fact, it is rather common for introductory textbooks in the sciences to explain the scientific method in a rather naive Popperian fashion, and it isn't rare to find scientists at meetings or in print who talk or write about 'paradigm shifts' *á la* Kuhn.

Be that as it may, figures like Popper and Kuhn come along only every once in a while, and so do such sweeping analyses of science. Most practicing philosophers of science, on the other hand, tend to publish in the remaining two areas of endeavour. Critical analysis of key scientific concepts is an interesting field at the boundary between philosophy and science, since such analyses can be carried out in the spirit of pure philosophical understanding, but can also at least in principle influence the practice of science. Of course, this can only happen when