

Primary Sources in Phenomenology
Early Phenomenology

Witold Płotka

The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein

Descriptive Psychology,
Phenomenology, and Aesthetics

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Early Phenomenology

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Witold Płotka

The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein

Descriptive Psychology,
Phenomenology,
and Aesthetics

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Preface

This book is a partial outcome of my ongoing research on the heritage of early phenomenology and the Brentanian tradition in Central Europe. My interest in this heritage was inspired a decade ago by two independent events. In 2015, I co-organized, together with Peter Andras Varga, in Budapest at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, a conference entitled “Horizons Beyond Borders. Traditions and Perspectives of the Phenomenological Movement in Central and Eastern Europe”; during this event, for the first time, I challenged the problem of historical roots and early developments of phenomenology in Poland, and in this context, I also explored Leopold Blaustein’s contribution. A year later, in 2016, Saulius Geniusas organized at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) an excellent conference on “Productive Imagination: Its History, Meaning and Significance”; there, I had an occasion to juxtapose Blaustein with Edmund Husserl and Roman Ingarden. This being said, I owe to Peter and Saulius an inspiration to explore Blaustein’s position within early phenomenology, and I am grateful to both of them for initiating my research with thought-provoking questions.

Of course, I later presented and discussed my ideas on many occasions with dozens of scholars. Allow me to thank the following scholars: Natalia Artemenko, Thomas Byrne, Cristian Ciocan, Arkadiusz Chrudzinski, Daniele De Santis, Nicolas de Warren, Arnaud Dewalque, Māra Grīnfelde, Michael Gubser, Mirja Hartimo, George Heffernan, Sara Heinämaa, Dalius Jonkus, Søren Overgaard, Ion Tănăsescu, Marek Piwowarczyk, Wojciech Starzyński, Michela Summa, Uldis Vēgners, and Jaroslava Vydrová. I appreciate their interesting comments, questions, and clues, which inspired me to explore many forgotten yet valuable and important topics in the Brentanian heritage or within early phenomenology. I owe special thanks to Anna Brożek for her priceless support of my research on the legacy of the Lvov–Warsaw School and to Guillaume Fréchette for his encouragement to make Blaustein’s contribution internationally visible.

I would like to express my gratitude to Jagna Brudzińska and Thomas Vongher for their help with some of the materials carried out in the Husserl Archives in Cologne and Leuven. In the book, I also use original materials from “Archiwum Kazimierza Twardowskiego w Warszawie” (The Archive of Kazimierz Twardowski

in Warsaw). I am grateful to Jacek Jadacki, the curator of Twardowski's collection in the Archive, for his acceptance of the use of these materials.

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Warsaw, Poland

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Chapter 1

Introduction



Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942 [?]) was a Polish-Jewish philosopher, aesthetician, psychologist, schoolteacher, and educationalist whose thought was shaped on the border between the main intellectual trends in Poland and Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Like a lens, his eclectic but original philosophy focused on new readings in the legacy of descriptive psychology, phenomenology, and Gestalt psychology. Certainly, he was well trained in these divergent yet intertwined traditions. After all, Blaustein was educated in Lvov (Lwów, now Lviv in Ukraine), where his teachers were, among others, Kazimierz Twardowski—a disciple of Franz Brentano in Vienna—who supervised his doctoral dissertation, and Roman Ingarden, who was working at that time on the basics of his phenomenological aesthetics, presented later in 1931 in *Das literarische Kunstwerk* [*The Literary Work of Art*]. Importantly, while working on his thesis in 1925, Blaustein studied for a few weeks in Freiburg im Breisgau under Edmund Husserl, who was lecturing then on phenomenological psychology. In addition, in 1927/28, he spent a few months in Berlin, where he had occasion to attend lectures given by Carl Stumpf or Max Wertheimer, not to mention his visits to the Berlin Psychological Institute. After his return to Poland in 1928, Blaustein published his first monograph in Polish, *Husserłowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia* [*Husserl's Theory of Act, Content and Object of Presentation*], which was devoted solely to Husserl's philosophy.¹ This book is arguably the very first scholarly work which reads Husserl's idea of intentionality in the context of Brentano and Bernard Bolzano. Later, Blaustein worked out an original methodological device which allowed him to study phenomena such as experiencing a theater play, a movie, or a radio drama. He also explored new ideas in humanistic psychology and the latest attempts to implement phenomenological tools in psychiatry. With this in mind, it should come as no surprise which scholars often emphasize the novelty of Blaustein's approach.

¹ Blaustein, *Husserłowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*.

First, in an encyclopedia entry on philosophy in Poland, Jan Czerkawski, Antoni B. Stępień and Stanisław Wielgus identified Blaustein as “a pioneer in psychology pertaining to film and radio.”² Zofia Rosińska³ and Joanna Pluta⁴ also described him as a “pioneer” in studies on media reception. Although Małgorzata Czapiga⁵ and Janusz Łastowiecki⁶ assessed some of Blaustein’s analyses of radio experience as outdated, they see a way to use these analyses in light of studies on today’s technologies. In Eusebio Ciccotti’s view, Blaustein undertook “[...] one of the first organic reflections on the status of the radio play.”⁷ In this vein, Jagna Brudzińska associated Blaustein with, as she put it, the “[...] first phenomenological theory of media.”⁸ Wioletta Miskiewicz saw in Blaustein’s theory an anticipation of Richard Wollheim’s idea of “seeing-in,” or Marshall McLuhan’s “the medium is the message.”⁹ Last but not least, Józef Nawrocki claimed that Blaustein’s project of humanistic psychology was the very source of the tradition of humanistic psychology in Poland, which, interestingly, anticipated the 1960s projects of Abraham Maslov and Carl Rogers.¹⁰ Thus, one can agree with Ingarden, who once called Blaustein “the most distinguished” fellow of the last group of Twardowski’s students.¹¹ In his text on Blaustein, Ingarden added that Blaustein’s original, pioneering and thought-provoking contribution should not be forgotten. However, paradoxically, Blaustein remained unknown to English scholarly literature. In this regard, Rosińska wrote that “[...] Blaustein had no students or biographers and no tributes were made to him. All that remains is a couple of recollections of friends and teachers, some basic information, and a few critical analyses of his philosophical work.”¹² The present book addresses this gap by providing in-depth study on Blaustein’s philosophy. The main ambition of this work is to rediscover his thought by discussing the details of his project and by examining the background which shaped his original ideas in complex polemics. Why, however, should one study Blaustein today? A few remarks are necessary here.

First, this study of Blaustein’s philosophy provides unique insight into a less-known chapter of the development of the history of philosophy before the outbreak of World War II. From this perspective, one is able to track how the philosophical

² Czerkawski, Stępień, Wielgus, Poland, philosophy in.

³ Rosińska, *Blaustein. Koncepcja odbioru mediów*, 22–23.

⁴ Pluta, *Psychologiczne badania nad mediami—droga do powstania nowej dyscypliny*, 239.

⁵ Czapiga, *Problemy współczesnej audiosfery w kontekście rozważań Leopolda Blausteina*, 81–86.

⁶ Łastowiecki, *Rozczarowanie, konsumpcja i niespodzianka—estetyczne uwarunkowania odbioru współczesnego słuchowiska*, 169.

⁷ Ciccotti, *The Philology and Aesthetics of Radio according to Leopold Blaustein*, 147.

⁸ Brudzińska, *Aisthesis*, 11.

⁹ Miskiewicz, *Leopold Blaustein’s Analytical Phenomenology*, 187. Also Rosińska draws a parallel between Blaustein and McLuhan; see Rosińska, *Blaustein. Koncepcja odbioru mediów*, 56.

¹⁰ Nawrocki, *Sześćdziesięciolecie Polskiej Psychologii Humanistycznej. Koncepcja Leopolda Blausteina*, 141–142.

¹¹ Ingarden, *Leopold Blaustein—teoretyk radia i filmu*, 86.

¹² Rosińska, *Leopold Blaustein’s Aesthetics*, 199–200.

heritage of Brentano developed and was reexamined in Central and Eastern Europe or how the phenomenological movement resonated outside Germany. After all, as already noted, Blaustein's philosophy is an interesting borderline example of an original fusion and a reinterpretation of different philosophical traditions. Thus, Blaustein's writings provide an opportunity to follow how the legacy of Brentano was confronted with, among other traditions, early phenomenology, Gestalt psychology, the heritage of Wilhelm Dilthey, or classical German aesthetics. In particular, this study deepens our knowledge of the history of the Lvov–Warsaw School, one of the most important intellectual formations in Poland (and in Europe) in the twentieth century. Against this background, we see that Blaustein's philosophy can be regarded as a nodal point of the complex processes of intellectual life in the early decades of that century before they were brutally interrupted by the outbreak of World War II. Blaustein—because of his Jewish roots—shared the fate of many Polish-Jewish philosophers and died in the Lvov ghetto in 1942 or 1944.¹³ The exact date of his death remains unknown.

Despite the aforementioned merits, the present study also has another important objective. Generally, if one examines a complex theory which was developed at the crossroads of different trends, it is too easy to oversimplify the question of novelty, originality, or, by contrast, the secondary nature of the thought in question. It seems that Blaustein's philosophy falls into this category. The fact that Blaustein was educated by scholars, e.g., Twardowski, Ingarden, Husserl and Stumpf, all of whom represented different philosophical traditions, may suggest that he was influenced by these traditions and thus linked divergent approaches and used various methods. This suggestion had led some scholars to regard Blaustein as a missing link between these trends. In this regard, Blaustein is often called an “analytic phenomenologist” since he seemed to “connect” or “combine” the analytic tradition of the Lvov–Warsaw School with (Husserl's) phenomenology. Jan Woleński, for instance, called Blaustein “a forerunner of analytic phenomenology,” which ought to consist, as he put it, “[...] in combining ideas of Husserl and Twardowski.”¹⁴ However, Woleński's categorization is at best enigmatic since it reveals neither which particular ideas of these philosophers were combined by Blaustein nor what this “combination” is supposed to mean at all. Thus, if one refers to, in this context, Blaustein's doctoral dissertation, which discusses the problem of content, which, in turn, is present in both theories—Husserl's philosophy and Twardowski's texts (*vide* his habilitation thesis)—this may suggest that *any* attempt to interpret Husserl's theory of content has Twardowskian roots, which is incorrect. After all, the question of content arose with Bolzano's analysis of objectless presentations¹⁵ and was later elaborated by Brentano in his studies on intentionality; at best, Twardowski's analysis of the mental act's structure can be regarded as a further elaboration of this line of thought.

¹³ More on this issue, see Woleński, *Jews in Polish Philosophy*, esp. 77–78, 81–82.

¹⁴ Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 310, fn. 11; *Jews in Polish Philosophy*, 77.

¹⁵ Fréchette, *Gegenstandlose Vorstellungen. Bolzano und seine Kritiker*.

In turn, Woleński could reply that by “combining the ideas of Husserl and Twardowski” he meant that in his book *Husserłowska nauka... [Husserl’s Theory...]* Blaustein used *analytical* tools to study (Husserl’s) *phenomenology*. According to this argument, Blaustein seemed to examine the *concepts* of phenomena and *not* the phenomena themselves, and he aimed to formulate their definitions and verify them from an increasingly close perspective, which may imply that Blaustein was indeed close to the analytic approach promoted by Twardowski. This line of reasoning, though not formulated by Woleński explicitly, was recently developed by Marek Pokropski, who also classified Blaustein as an “analytic phenomenologist.” As he stated, “[t]he originality of Blaustein’s thinking is because he synthesized to some extent two philosophical traditions: Twardowski’s analytical philosophy (logical and conceptual analysis) and Husserlian phenomenology (description and analysis of acts of consciousness).”¹⁶ Pokropski developed Woleński’s idea and specified that Blaustein connected the *methods* (and not topics) used in both traditions, i.e., he seemed to combine logical analysis with phenomenological analysis. The former consists in analyzing *concepts*, whereas the latter is focused on *consciousness*.

Although Pokropski’s proposal is more convincing than Woleński’s rough idea, it still seems to be partial. Pokropski clarified that “analytic phenomenology” refers to the fact that Blaustein actually used *two* methods, but this classification is inadequate because it does not address the novelty of Blaustein’s philosophy. By contrast, it should be noted that logical analysis in Blaustein’s writings is at best marginal¹⁷: it sometimes serves as a preliminary and meta-philosophical tool with which to summarize philosophical findings or to analyze theoretical position. This is precisely the main idea of *Husserłowska nauka... [Husserl’s Theory...]*: the book *analyzes* Husserl’s *phenomenology* in regard to his theory of intentionality. Importantly, Blaustein was critical of the scope of the analytic approach—as defined by Pokropski—of the Lvov–Warsaw School. This is evident if one refers in this regard to a critical review of Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s *Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk [The Elements of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology of Sciences]* published by Blaustein in the journal *Przegląd Humanistyczny [Review in Humanities]* in 1930.¹⁸ In his review, Blaustein appreciated Kotarbiński’s attempt to achieve clear language, but he also recognized a number of flaws in his approach, including possible oversimplifications and misinterpretations of analyzed theories. For this reason, Blaustein did not use the same approach in his other writings as in *Husserłowska nauka... [Husserl’s Theory...]*; this early analytical approach is almost absent in his later texts written in the 1930s. At that time, Blaustein was more interested in object-directed descriptions of concrete psychic phenomena, e.g., cinemagoers’ experiences or listening to

¹⁶ Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein’s Critique of Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 94.

¹⁷ See, for instance, Blaustein, *Husserłowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 2, 52. Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 13, fn. 1. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 47, fn. 12.

¹⁸ See Blaustein, Kotarbiński Tadeusz, 456–458.

the radio. With all of that in mind, it is pointless to call Blaustein an “analytic phenomenologist” on the basis of only one of his early writings.

There is another problem with Pokropski’s idea: if the phrase “analytic phenomenology” is supposed to refer to phenomenology, which uses conceptual analysis, it is simply confusing. Pokropski referred to the strict meaning of the term “analysis,” which is defined as a logical and conceptual (or linguistic) approach. If one accepts Pokropski’s suggestion, the phrase “analytic phenomenology” falls into the *contradictio in adjecto* fallacy since it suggests that a philosopher should use a method which is inadequate to analyze phenomena; with analytical tools, as defined by Pokropski, one can only analyze *concepts*. Therefore, if Pokropski is right and an “analytic phenomenologist” adopts analytic tools, then—precisely because of this—one is unable to analyze *phenomena*, only *concepts*; thus, an “analytic phenomenologist” is not a phenomenologist at all. Overall, Pokropski’s reading, which is based on a narrow meaning of “analyticity,” seems to be controversial.

Pokropski noted that the attempt to comprehend Blaustein as an “analytic phenomenologist” comes from Miskiewicz and not from Woleński.¹⁹ Contrary to Pokropski, however, Miskiewicz did not connect Blaustein with Twardowski’s analytic method, which is understood as logical and conceptual analysis. Miskiewicz sketched a more convincing picture since she placed Blaustein’s philosophy instead in the tradition of early descriptive phenomenology—which she interchangeably called “analytic phenomenology”—which is focused on the question of the source and value of knowledge. The key insight of this tradition, according to Miskiewicz, consisted in an emphasis on intentionality. Phenomenology thus understood *analyzes* intentionality, accordingly justifying it being referred to as “analytic phenomenology.” For Miskiewicz, his kind of phenomenology is not limited to the legacy of Husserl, but it is deeply rooted in the Brentanian heritage. She wrote:

There are at least two kinds of phenomenology: hermeneutic and descriptive. The latter rests on the idea that what is given in conscious experience is direct, akin to perception—what most phenomenologists would have called “intuition”—and is therefore a genuine source of knowledge. The theories of early *analytical* phenomenologists were aimed at providing an understanding of the latter. For instance, the well known distinction between the quality, the content, and the object of mental acts elaborated by Twardowski, Husserl and Meinong in the wake of Brentano was meant as a conceptual tool for the purpose of analyzing and describing cognitive processes such as “representation” and “judgment.”²⁰

In the present book, I will argue in favor of Miskiewicz’s position. Interestingly, a comparable point of view was formulated by Guido K ung, who, in Herbert Spiegelberg’s *The Phenomenological Movement*, noticed Blaustein’s interest in Husserl’s philosophy, but he also emphasized his commitments to the legacy of descriptive psychology.²¹ Simply put, it is more appropriate to place Blaustein’s philosophy in the context of the Brentanian tradition and to ask to what extent he

¹⁹Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein’s Critique of Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 94.

²⁰Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein’s Analytical Phenomenology, 181.

²¹Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 262–263, fn. 69.

changed Brentano's and Twardowski's ideas in light of Ingarden's or Husserl's. Thus, if the phrase "analytic phenomenology" is useful in regard to Blaustein, it should refer to the tradition of descriptive psychology and other important contexts which determined Blaustein's philosophy. In other words, the phrase "analytic phenomenology" understood as "combining" analytic philosophy with phenomenology, following Woleński and Pokropski, is misleading and does not fit Blaustein's original project. Blaustein's philosophy primarily arose not from the analytical-*qua*-conceptual line of Twardowski's school but from the analytical-*qua*-descriptive-psychological line of this thought. To see this, one has to analyze these different theoretical frameworks (descriptive psychology, phenomenology or Gestalt psychology), and against this background, it should be possible to understand the depth and originality of Blaustein's position. Otherwise, Blaustein is reduced to a mere epigone of other philosophers, such as Twardowski or Husserl.

Given our discussion thus far, whereas Miskiewicz, in her study on Blaustein, explicitly referred to the heritage of Brentano, Woleński and Pokropski contextualized him only in the framework of both Twardowski and phenomenology without inquiring into their common roots. As already noted, however, the story surrounding Blaustein's philosophy is, as it seems, one with multiple and sometimes obscure contexts which overcomes the contrast between Twardowski and Husserl. Taking this into account, the present book aims to analyze Blaustein's writings in detail to determine in what sense, if at all, one is justified in calling Blaustein an "analytic phenomenologist." In the following chapters, I will discuss the hypothesis that he cannot be regarded either as a mere descriptive psychologist or as a mere phenomenologist. His philosophy is rather an original approach which was developed in permanent polemics. Thus, my task is a decomposition of Blaustein's philosophy into complex discussions, examinations, reinterpretations and (occasionally) misreadings of, among others, Brentano, Twardowski and his students (including Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Tadeusz Witwicki), Husserl, Ingarden, and Stumpf. As a result, I will argue that Blaustein was at once a descriptive psychologist and a phenomenologist, although both classifications should be contextualized in the framework of his original explorations.

To do this, I will proceed as follows. First, I will present Blaustein's intellectual biography with an emphasis on the Lvov–Warsaw School in Chap. 2. Examination of Blaustein's academic life enables one to identify the main context that shaped his thought. This is necessary since at least some of these references, e.g., the thought of Irena Filozofówna, who was Władysław Witwicki's student and formulated an interesting criticism of Blaustein's theory of presentations, are less known and studied in the scholarly literature. Next, in Chap. 3, I will discuss at length Teresa Rzepa's thesis, according to which Blaustein should be regarded as a part of the descriptive-psychological division of the Lvov–Warsaw School.²² In addition to

²²Rzepa, *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*, 38; *Development of Psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 47–48.

Rzepa's juxtaposition with Twardowski, I will juxtapose Blaustein with Brentano, the Gestaltists and Dilthey. Against this background, I will question the idea formulated by Krzysztof Wieczorek, who argues that Blaustein overcame Brentano's heritage by adapting Husserl's phenomenology.²³ It seems that descriptive psychology cannot be excluded from Blaustein's philosophy in favor of phenomenology. Furthermore, in Chap. 4, I support this thesis by tracking and examining the main concepts of Blaustein's descriptive psychology, especially in the context of Twardowski's theory. As we will see, Blaustein's classification of presentations can be regarded as a development of Twardowski's taxonomy. In Chap. 5, I will focus on Wieczorek's idea once again, and I will address the question of the phenomenological dimension of Blaustein's reading of Husserl's method. This topic will also provide an opportunity to analyze Blaustein's critical assessment of Ingarden's method. In the secondary literature, one finds the suggestion that Blaustein was strongly influenced by Ingarden.²⁴ At least in regard to methodological issues, however, Blaustein was skeptical of Ingarden's approach.

Chapter 6 examines the main ideas presented and developed by Blaustein in *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia* [*Husserl's Theory of Act, Content and Object of Presentation*], his most famous book. I will argue that in this book, Blaustein followed Twardowski. After all, for Twardowski, the theory of presentations concerns three elements: act, content, and object. Blaustein also follows Twardowski by referring to Bolzano and Brentano when discussing Husserl's theory of intentionality. In Chap. 7, I explore the limits of Blaustein's account of Husserl. In this regard, I argue that Blaustein misread Husserl's anti-psychologism. However, I will also defend Blaustein's position against the charges formulated by Pokropski and Wieczorek, who both hold that Blaustein's account of Husserl is in fact metaphysical.²⁵ By contrast, one can argue in favor of a metaphysically neutral interpretation of his account by showing that Blaustein analyzes the ways in which phenomena can manifest. He fully developed this idea in the field of aesthetics. Thus, in Chap. 8, I will extensively analyze Blaustein's aesthetics. In this context, it will become clear that he uses the basics of his descriptive psychology, including the theory of presentations (discussed in Chap. 4). In this chapter, I will again discuss the idea that Blaustein was influenced by Ingarden, but this time I will juxtapose their aesthetic theories. My main task in Chap. 8 is to present a model of aesthetic experience in Blaustein's philosophy. In turn, in Chap. 9, I address specific models of aesthetic experiences, i.e., his analysis of cinemagoers' experiences or listening to the radio. Since in both fields Blaustein explicitly postulated analyzing

²³Wieczorek, Leopolda Blausteina interpretacja świata zjawiskowego, 157–158.

²⁴See, e.g., Dziemidok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*, 33; Horecka, The Concept of Iconic Sign in the Works of Selected Representatives of the Lvov–Warsaw School, 286, fn. 4; Ptaszek, Blaustein Leopold, 120; Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 310, fn. 11.

²⁵Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 97; Wieczorek, Leopolda Blausteina interpretacja świata zjawiskowego, 161.

subjective ways in which certain objects manifest themselves, I will argue that this late project of Blaustein's can be regarded as a form of phenomenology, though understood in a broad sense. By examining these divergent frameworks, it will finally be possible to explicate the main elements of Blaustein's philosophy in Chap. 10 and to look at it from a bird's eye view.

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Chapter 2

Blaustein and His Times



Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942 [?]) was educated at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov and graduated under Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), a student of Franz Brentano (1838–1917) in Vienna. Blaustein’s academic activity covered almost two decades—the 1920s and 1930s—when philosophy in Poland was renewed as a scientific discipline and dominated by (but certainly not reducible to) the Lvov–Warsaw School. Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), who was also Blaustein’s teacher in Lvov, once described this renewal as a change in the “philosophical atmosphere” in Poland; for him, Twardowski “[...] did in fact outline in a certain sense a new period of Polish philosophy. Namely, he imposed on philosophical research in Poland a new style of work.”¹ Ingarden explains that this renewal consisted in an attempt to have clear-cut philosophical notions and well-defined language, in addition to solid justifications for discussed theses. To that extent, Twardowski’s efforts can be regarded as a broad meta-philosophical project which was developed in diverging directions, including logic, ontology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.²

Undoubtedly, Blaustein’s writings bore the mark of Twardowski’s training, but his thought was also shaped by other intellectual and philosophical trends or debates in Poland. Of course, one can argue that many of these trends were not specific to Poland, as they tended to mirror the main trends of European philosophical enterprises. As Blaustein had studied under the leading scholars of that time, he referred to and discussed many ideas formulated by German and French philosophers. For instance, he studied in Freiburg im Breisgau for a few weeks under Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), and he held a fellowship in Berlin when it was the epicenter of Gestalt psychology, not to mention that he participated in Carl Stumpf’s (1848–1936) lectures there. Therefore, the main task of the present chapter is to sketch Blaustein’s intellectual biography in the context of the main philosophical trends in Poland and

¹Ingarden, *Main Directions of Polish Philosophy*, 95.

²For an overview, see Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School*; *Lvov–Warsaw School: Historical and Sociological Comments*, 18–22.

Europe. Additionally, I also aim to present the main ideas of selected scholars Blaustein engaged with or to whom he referred. First, I address the idea that Twardowski renewed philosophy in Poland and track the Brentanian themes in his thought. Against this background, I will proceed with a discussion of the development of Blaustein's philosophy, his early accounts and later projects.

2.1 The Lvov–Warsaw School

2.1.1 *The Brentanian Framework of the Lvov–Warsaw School*

Twardowski was appointed a professor of philosophy in Lvov in 1895, when the city was part of the Habsburg Empire. Poland was not an independent country at that time, but Lvov University had relative autonomy and mainly held courses in the Polish language. Twardowski's first courses concerned "Logika" ["Logic"] (WS 1895/6) and "Przegląd dziejów filozofii od czasów najdawniejszych pod koniec wieku XVIII" ["A Survey of the History of Philosophy from the Oldest Period to the End of the Eighteenth Century"] (SS 1896). From the very beginning, his view on philosophy was in fact Brentanian. After all, he studied in Vienna under Brentano from 1885 to 1889.³ He participated in Brentano's lectures at that time, including "Die elementare Logik und die in ihr nöthigen Reformen" (1884), "Praktische Philosophie" (WS 1887) and "Deskriptive Psychologie"⁴ (WS 1887/88, WS 1888/89), not to mention Brentano's seminars.⁵ Twardowski was familiar with Brentano's published works, for instance, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte* or *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*. Both works were quoted by Twardowski in his 1892 doctoral dissertation on Descartes⁶ and in his 1894 *Habilitationsschrift*. Thus, it should come as no surprise that Twardowski noted in "Selbstdarstellung" that his studies in Vienna were dominated by Brentano, and he testified that "Brentano became for me the model of a philosophical researcher."⁷ Indeed, Twardowski used his Vienna teacher's concept of philosophy. In general, according to Twardowski, philosophy ought to be analytic and thus a non-system philosophy; additionally, it has to make scientific claims and maintain a justified methodological

³ See Brożek, *Kazimierz Twardowski. Die Wiener Jahre*.

⁴ The authors of the "Introduction" to the English edition of Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology* notice that "[t]he lectures of 1887–8 and those of 1888–9 were concerned for the most part with problems of the psychology of the senses" (Chisholm, Baumgartner, Müller, Introduction, xvi). This topic was also present in Twardowski's lectures on psychology in Lvov.

⁵ The list of Brentano's lectures that Twardowski attended can be found in: Dąbbska, *François Brentano et la pensée philosophique en Pologne. Casimir Twardowski et son école*, 117–129. The list published by Dąbbska also includes notes on: "Begriff und Empfindung (Escerpt aus Brentanos Psychologie Vortrag)" and notes from the lecture given by Brentano on October 18, 1893.

⁶ Twardowski, *Idee und Perception*, 14–15, 18.

⁷ Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 20.

basis. Due to his teaching activity, this Brentanian thought became, as Ingarden put it, a kind of *opinio communis* for many students trained in Lvov for a few decades of the twentieth century.⁸

Twardowski promoted Brentano's philosophy, but this was not easy because philosophy in Poland was developing in different directions at the turn of the twentieth century and was not oriented toward science. Until the 1870s, idealism played a dominant role. This form of philosophy, which was developed as Polish Messianism (e.g., Józef Hoene-Wroński [1776–1853], August Cieszkowski [1814–1894], or Karol Libelt [1807–1875], a student of Hegel), was based on critical readings of Kant, Fichte or Hegel. It adopted a system approach in philosophy and had a clear metaphysical and speculative background, not to mention irrational tendencies. In the 1880s and later, many scholars attempted to overcome this early idealistic trend. Two main reactions are worth mentioning. Some scholars (e.g., Henryk Goldberg [1845–1915] or Adam Mahrburg [1860–1913]) have referred in this regard to positivism and have tried to bind philosophy with science to begin the reform of philosophy. Other philosophers (e.g., Stanisław Brzozowski [1878–1911]) rejected uncritical positivist approval for science and developed a sort of philosophy of life. For them, the phenomenon of life, though ambiguous and difficult to analyze, addressed the problem of speculative tendencies. However, many projects developed by these philosophers were ultimately irrational. Against this background, Twardowski's project, which was originally formulated in the 1890s with a strong emphasis on rationalism and a non-system, non-speculative approach, seemed to pose radical opposition to these tendencies. Of course, Twardowski was not the only philosopher who attempted to reform philosophy at that time. Ingarden noticed that “[t]he postulate of ‘philosophy as an exact science’ was also raised more and more frequently from various sides in the 1890s. Thus, for example, [this postulate] was raised in Cracow by Stefan Pawlicki (1839–1916), and in Warsaw by Adam Mahrburg (1860–1913), who was known as a connoisseur of Greek philosophy and an adherent of Neo-Kantianism.”⁹ What made Twardowski's attempts unique in this regard was the Brentanian framework of his postulates. Therefore, which themes of Brentano's philosophy were subsequently developed by Twardowski?

First, in Jan Woleński's assessment, Brentano's famous fourth habilitation thesis—which assumes that “[...] the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the science of nature”¹⁰—was the “key” to understanding the concept of philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School.¹¹ It is plausible that Twardowski understood this thesis as an attempt to adopt general scientific procedures in philosophy. Generally, for him, philosophy is not a sort of worldview. It makes scientific claims, so its

⁸This opinion was formulated by Ingarden in: *Die Auffassung der Philosophie bei Franz Brentano*, 2.

⁹Ingarden, *Main Directions of Polish Philosophy*, 95. Translation modified.

¹⁰Brentano, *Über die Zukunft der Philosophie*, 136: “Die wahre Methode der Philosophie ist keine andere als die der Naturwissenschaft.” Trans. Krantz Gabriel, in: *Habilitation Theses*, 433.

¹¹Woleński, *Szkoła lwowsko-warszawska: między brentanizmem a pozytywizmem*, 83.

results are intersubjectively verifiable. This also leads to the adoption of a non-speculative approach. To quote Woleński once again, Twardowski

[...] maintained that being faithful to the facts and principles of logic, understood as the very theory of the scientific method, constitutes a necessary condition to do philosophy as a science and avoid metaphysics. Twardowski used the term “metaphycicism” to refer to the attitude which consisted in considering some philosophical problems in a non-scientific way.¹²

This idea of Brentano may be regarded as the basis of Twardowski’s meta-philosophy, if the term “meta-philosophy” is understood as the study of what philosophy is, what its aims are, etc. In addition to the general remark that Twardowski followed Brentano in understanding philosophy as science, Woleński listed some of Brentano’s specific ideas which can be found in Twardowski’s writings: (1) the idea that mental phenomena are intentional; (2) the division between actions and products; (3) the theory of truth; and (4) the idea of reforming logic.¹³ This list was recently enlarged by Arianna Betti, who added four more ideas: (5) descriptive psychology is the fundamental science; (6) descriptive analysis is the method of descriptive psychology; (7) descriptive psychology precedes genetic or experimental psychology; and (8) ethics has cognitive content based on emotional experience.¹⁴ I will not discuss these references here because they are well examined by Woleński, Betti, and others.¹⁵ Instead, it is worth noting that both Woleński and Betti show that although Twardowski’s philosophical project originated in Brentano’s meta-philosophy, it was strongly inspired by his *descriptive psychology*. Of course, the Lvov–Warsaw School developed in different directions, of which logic was and still is one of the most studied; however, Twardowski’s psychology, which was—like for his Vienna teacher—primarily a *philosophical* enterprise, was a very strong trend within the School.¹⁶ As we will see in the following, this is also of crucial importance for understanding Blaustein’s philosophy.

2.1.2 *The Psychological Trend of the Lvov–Warsaw School*

After Twardowski’s arrival in Lvov, it was clear that philosophy was understood by him in the Brentanian fashion as descriptive psychology. In his inaugural lecture given at the University of Lvov on November 15, 1895, Twardowski defined the

¹² Woleński, *Brentanian Motives in Kazimierz Twardowski and his Students*, 53.

¹³ Woleński, *Brentanian Motives in Kazimierz Twardowski and his Students*, 52.

¹⁴ Betti, *Twardowski and Brentano*, 306–307.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Lukaszewicz, *Polish Metaphysics and the Brentanian Tradition*, 19–31; Płotka, *On the Brentanian Legacy in Twardowski’s Views on Psychology*, 351–370.

¹⁶ See Citlak, *The Lvov–Warsaw School: The Forgotten Tradition of Historical Psychology*, 105–124; Citlak, *The Problem of Mind and Mental Acts in the Perspective of Psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 1049–1077; Citlak, *Brentano’s Psychology and Kazimierz Twardowski School*; Rzepa, *On the Lvov School and Methods of Psychological Cognition*, 141–158.

subject matter of philosophy as mental phenomena (*zjawiska umysłowe*).¹⁷ In Lvov, he held many courses related to psychology; he not only discussed specific topics but also held general courses. From the very beginning, he struggled with other views on psychology. In accordance with Brentano, for many years, he was skeptical about Wilhelm Wundt's (1832–1920) project of physiological psychology.¹⁸ In this regard, he disputed with Mahrburg,¹⁹ Wundt's student, on the relation of psychology to physiology, and with Władysław Heinrich (1869–1957), a student of Richard Avenarius (1843–1896), who established the first psychological laboratory in Poland at Jagiellonian University. For years, Twardowski tried to argue that he had set up the first laboratory in Lvov before Heinrich since he held classes on experimental psychology as early as 1898/99.²⁰ As shown by Włodzimierz Szewczuk, however, Twardowski's claims were unjustified.²¹ Overall, Twardowski promoted Brentanian-style psychology, which descriptively analyzes mental phenomena and attempts to classify them.²² For now, it is important to note that his early psychological writings and teaching activities were the beginning of the psychological trend of the Lvov–Warsaw School.

According to Teresa Rzepa, the development of can be divided into *three* main periods.²³ In general, the *first* period begins with Twardowski's recruitment by the University of Lvov in 1895; however, as Rzepa notices, one could also consider the first period to have begun in 1885, when Twardowski began his studies in Vienna, or it could be 1897, when he published an important article, "Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii" ["Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy"],²⁴ in which he held

¹⁷Twardowski, Wykład wstępny w Uniwersytecie Lwowskim (z 15. listopada 1895 r.), 228. Trans. Chybińska, in: Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 36. To be precise, in his lecture, Twardowski claimed that this definition is valid for psychology, logic, ethics, and aesthetics, though it is irrelevant for metaphysics. For Twardowski, metaphysics has different object, neither mental nor physical phenomena; it aims at, for instance, relationships between different objects, including causal relations.

¹⁸It may be noted that Twardowski had become familiar with Wundt's psychology as early as 1892, when he traveled to Leipzig to study in the psychological laboratory there. Rzepa, *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*, 36.

¹⁹For a summary of the discussion, see Dziedzic, *Filozofia wobec psychologii: Polemika Adama Mahrburga z Kazimierzem Twardowskim*, 29–38.

²⁰Blaustein also noticed this fact in: Kaziemierz Twardowski i jego uczniowie, 124, fn. 1.

²¹Szewczuk, *Pierwsza pracownia psychologiczna w Polsce*, 137–138. Interestingly, in 1913 Twardowski published an article in which he noticed (as it seems, with satisfaction) Wundt's revision of the strict division between descriptive psychology and the physiological approach. The text—"Filozofia a psychologia eksperymentalna" ["Philosophy and Experimental Psychology"]—was reprinted in 1927 in: Twardowski, *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, 324–329.

²²I will discuss the details of Twardowski's view on descriptive psychology and his reformulations of psychology later on in Chap. 4.

²³Rzepa, *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*, 35–38; *Development of Psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 47–48.

²⁴Twardowski, *Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii*, 17–41. Reprint in: *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, 3–32; reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 92–113. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 41–64.

(in the Brentanian fashion) that philosophy, as a scientific enterprise, can be developed only as psychology. In any case, the *first* period ended in 1901, when Władysław Witwicki (1878–1948) defended his doctoral thesis in psychology that had been written under Twardowski’s supervision. When Blaustein studied in Lvov, Witwicki already had a chair in psychology at the University of Warsaw, but his view on psychology was also very popular in Lvov. Witwicki studied philosophy in Lvov and later (in 1901/02) he also studied psychology in Vienna under Alois Höfler (1853–1922) and in Leipzig under Wundt. His concept of psychology was clearly shaped by Twardowski.²⁵ Witwicki’s doctorate—following Wioletta Miskiewicz²⁶—was the first thesis written under Twardowski “in the spirit” of Brentano. It concerned ambition as a mental phenomenon, which was understood by Witwicki as a disposition to certain feelings based upon beliefs.²⁷ He continued the Brentanian line of thought in his 1904 habilitation thesis on the phenomenon of will. Later, Witwicki became one of the key figures of Polish psychology. He was the author of an important handbook on psychology, published for the first time in 1925,²⁸ which was highly rated by, for instance, Ingarden.²⁹ In the mid-1930s, Blaustein explicitly expressed his positive assessment of Witwicki’s project, which was open to interdisciplinary research.³⁰ Moreover, with Irena Filozofówna (1906–1967), one of Witwicki’s students, Blaustein discussed the use of hypotheses in psychological descriptions and the structure of aesthetic experiences—more precisely, the role that assumptions play in experience. Filozofówna was skeptical about parts of Blaustein’s analysis of aesthetic experience. I will write more about Filozofówna in Sect. 2.3.1.

The *second* period, defined by Rzepa, covered the years 1902–1919. This was a time of dynamic development for Lvov psychology. In Rzepa’s opinion, this period was “[...] clearly organized around Twardowski’s psychological views. The specific feature of that period was the work undertaken by the Master [i.e., Twardowski] and his students to establish Polish psychological vocabulary.”³¹ The fact that Polish psychological vocabulary was coined in this period is also connected with attempts at translating texts of leading psychologists of that time into Polish; for instance, Twardowski and his students attempted to translate some works of Théodule-Armand Ribot (1839–1916), a French psychologist, a lecturer at the École Normale

²⁵ See, e.g., Jadczyk, *Mistrz i jego uczniowie*, 29–39.

²⁶ Miskiewicz, *Réalisme gnoséologique contre réalisme sceptique*, 84.

²⁷ Witwicki, *Analiza psychologiczna ambicji*, 40. In this vein, he described ambition as a complex act that is composed of both judgments and feelings. In his doctoral dissertation, Witwicki described different classes of ambition.

²⁸ The book contains many references to Brentano’s and Twardowski’s views on descriptive psychology. See Witwicki, *Psychologia*, vol. 1.

²⁹ Ingarden, [Review of] Władysław Witwicki, 61–62.

³⁰ See Blaustein, [Review of] *Księga Pamiątkowa ku czci Władysława Witwickiego*, 159–170.

³¹ Rzepa, *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*, 37: “Jest to okres rozwoju psychologii ‘lwowskiej,’ wyraźnie zorganizowanej wokół psychologicznych poglądów Twardowskiego. Specyficznym rysem tego okresu jest praca Mistrza i uczniów nad ustalaniem polskiej terminologii psychologicznej.” See also Rzepa, *Development of Psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 47–48.

Supérieur and the Sorbonne, a professor at the College of France, who in his *Essai sur l'imagination créatrice* used the term “schematic presentations” (*images schématiques*), which was later used by Blaustein.³² This period was also important because, in 1910 and later in 1913, Twardowski published two substantial texts on psychology: *O metodzie psychologii. Przyczynek do metodologii porównawczej badan naukowych* [*On the Method of Psychology. An Introduction to the Comparative Methodology of Scientific Research*]³³ and—written as an encyclopedia entry—*O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju* [*On Psychology, its Subject Matter, Aims, Method, Relation to Other Sciences and Development*].³⁴ Both texts redefined Twardowski’s early views on psychology as he presented them in the essay “Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii” [“Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy”]. Both texts also inspired Blaustein in his original explorations, e.g., by defining the subject matter of psychology as psychic life or by emphasizing introspection as the basis of infallible knowledge.³⁵ Despite Twardowski’s attempts, he was unable to establish a chair in psychology in Lvov before 1919, but he succeeded in supervising further doctoral theses in psychology that were written by, for instance, Stefan Baley (1885–1952) (who also studied under Stumpf in Berlin) or Salomon Igel (1889–1942). In 1917, Stefan Błachowski (1889–1962), who was educated in Lvov and Vienna, completed his habilitation thesis in Lvov. According to Rzepa, the *second* period ended in 1919, when Błachowski and Ludwik Jaxa-Bykowski (1881–1948) became professors of psychology in Poznań.³⁶

In Rzepa’s view, the *third* period of the development of psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School was the 1920–1939 period,³⁷ which began with the inauguration of a department of psychology in Lvov. This department was chaired by Twardowski until his retirement in 1928 and later by Mieczysław Kreutz (1893–1971), Twardowski’s student, who received a doctoral degree in 1924. This period was characterized by original developments in psychology by Twardowski’s students, who attempted to expand and sometimes to criticize Twardowski’s theories. Rzepa lists a few of Twardowski’s students who were important for the development of Lvov psychology in this period: Walter Auerbach (1900–1942 [?]), Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein (1905–1942 [?]) (Blaustein’s wife), Helena Słoniewska (1897–1982), and Tadeusz Witwicki (1902–1970), son of Władysław Witwicki. Rzepa lists Blaustein among the members of Twardowski’s last group of students, who were adherents of the descriptive-psychological trend of the School.

³²For more, see Sect. 4.3.

³³Twardowski, *O metodzie psychologii*. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 205–216. Trans. Chybińska, in: *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 61–72.

³⁴Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju*. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 241–291.

³⁵I will discuss this later on in Sect. 3.2.3.

³⁶Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 10.

³⁷Rzepa, *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*, 38; *Development of Psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 47–48.

2.2 The Early Period of the Development of Blaustein's Philosophy

2.2.1 *Blaustein's Studies in Lvov*

Blaustein was born in 1905 into a Polish–Jewish family. Scholars generally agree that his life still needs to be rediscovered; in this vein, Zofia Rosińska holds that “[t]he story of [...] Blaustein’s life is full of question marks and qualifiers like ‘maybe,’ ‘perhaps,’ ‘probably.’”³⁸ For example, it is uncertain when he began his philosophy studies at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov. He became a student at the Faculty of Philosophy around 1923, when Twardowski’s position at the university was very strong. Of course, his thought was not determined solely by Twardowski. Indeed, Mieczysław Andrzej Dąbrowski,³⁹ Ryszard Jadcak,⁴⁰ Rosińska,⁴¹ and, more recently, Miskiewicz⁴² call Blaustein a “student of Twardowski” to emphasize the dominant role of Twardowski in Blaustein’s philosophical education, but they indicate that Ingarden’s and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s (1890–1963) influences are equally important. Indeed, Blaustein’s thought was shaped by Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz, both of whom were Blaustein’s teachers in Lvov. In his early books, in *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]* and *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations]*, Blaustein explicitly referred to these scholars to express his gratitude for the discussions during his student years, which helped him to accomplish both texts.⁴³ With this in mind, one might inquire into the contributions these three scholars made to Blaustein’s philosophical development.

Allow me to start with Twardowski, whom Blaustein always treated with great respect. In Blaustein’s posthumous reminiscences about Twardowski, published in 1939 as “Kazimierz Twardowski i jego uczniowie” [“Kazimierz Twardowski and His Students”], he emphasized that Twardowski’s key contribution in his teaching was that he did not limit his students in their own research but put pressure on them to apply adequate rigor to their work.⁴⁴ In his 1939 text, he called Twardowski the “Socrates of Polish philosophy” and “Master” (*Mistrz*) to emphasize his undeniable contribution to teaching students in Lvov. Blaustein’s letters to Twardowski mostly began with the incipit “Beloved Professor” (*Kochany Panie Profesorze*).⁴⁵ Indeed,

³⁸ Rosińska, Leopold Blaustein’s Aesthetics, 200.

³⁹ Dąbrowski, Bibliografia prac Leopolda Blausteina, 244.

⁴⁰ Jadcak, *Uczeń i nauczyciel*, 19.

⁴¹ Rosińska, Leopold Blaustein—Styk psychologii i estetyki, ix.

⁴² Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein’s Analytical Phenomenology, 181.

⁴³ Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein’s Analytical Phenomenology, 181.

⁴⁴ Blaustein, *Kazimierz Twardowski i jego uczniowie*, 125.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., letters from December 11, or December 19, 1927. See Blaustein, *Letters to Kazimierz Twardowski*. For an overview of the Blaustein–Twardowski epistolary exchange, see Jadcak, *Uczeń i nauczyciel*, 19–27.

Twardowski supported his student. For instance, he planned to finance a private fellowship to support Blaustein when he was in Berlin. However, Twardowski was also critical of some of Blaustein's ideas, including his project of humanistic psychology; although the project was well argued, its main idea was misleading, in Twardowski's view.⁴⁶

Clearly, Blaustein's writings abide by the general rules of Twardowski's meta-philosophical program, as defined above in Sect. 2.1.1. Blaustein was careful to use clear definitions, refined distinctions, and clearly structured arguments, but he also attempted to adopt an adequate methodology. Nonetheless, Twardowski's influence on Blaustein was not limited to meta-philosophical rules but concerned first and foremost his view on descriptive psychology. Blaustein was clear that his own research was conducted on the "border with psychology."⁴⁷ For Blaustein, like for Twardowski, philosophy can be regarded as a scientific discipline if it is taken as a form of descriptive psychology. The main task of psychology thus defined is to descriptively analyze mental phenomena and, against this background, to classify them. In this regard, Blaustein was inspired by, among other things, Twardowski's theory of presentations (images and concepts), which was formulated as early as 1898. Blaustein regarded his own original classification of presentations as an improvement of Twardowski's view on images.⁴⁸

In addition, Twardowski encouraged Blaustein to adopt the frameworks of Bolzano and Brentano in reading Husserl's theory of intentionality. Twardowski was the supervisor of Blaustein's doctoral dissertation, which was defended in 1927 in Lvov. It explores the hypothesis that Husserl's theory of intentionality may be understood by referring to the philosophical legacies of Bolzano and Brentano. This hypothesis was clearly inspired by Twardowski. To show this, one can refer to the 336th meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society, which took place on March 5, 1938, where Blaustein presented a paper entitled "Rola Kazimierza Twardowskiego w filozofii niemieckiej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku" ["The Role of Kazimierz Twardowski in German Philosophy at the Turn of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century"]. In this talk, he claimed that Twardowski was the first of Brentano's students to synthesize his teacher's philosophy with Bolzano's theory. In this vein, Blaustein wrote that Bolzano was "discovered" by Twardowski.⁴⁹ Additionally, in Blaustein's reading of Husserl, the emphasis on the problem of content followed

⁴⁶ See Twardowski's note in his journal: *Dzienniki. Część II: 1928–1936*, 365.

⁴⁷ See the subtitles of Blaustein's main books: "Studies on the Border Between Psychology and Aesthetics"; Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne; Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40, 69. See also Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 136. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 235.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 12. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 43–44. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 212. Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 90–91, fn. 1. See also Chap. 4 below.

⁴⁹ Blaustein, *Rola Kazimierza Twardowskiego w filozofii niemieckiej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku*, 138a. Reprint in 2018: *Rola Kazimierza Twardowskiego w filozofii niemieckiej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku (autoreferat)*, 87.

from Twardowski. In his thesis, Blaustein preferred the phenomenological method defined in Husserl's earlier *Logische Untersuchungen* over that in the later *Ideen I*. Given that the former book defined phenomenology as descriptive psychology,⁵⁰ whereas the latter work defined it as a transcendental enterprise, the emphasis put by Blaustein on the former comes as no surprise. In sum, Twardowski was one of the key figures in determining Blaustein's view of philosophy (understood as descriptive psychology) and his account of Husserl's theory.

Blaustein's philosophical explorations, however, cannot be read only in the context of Twardowski. Some references to Ingarden are just as important. Ingarden studied philosophy and mathematics in Lvov for a year in 1911/12, but he was not regarded as a member of the Lvov–Warsaw School. Even though he was in touch with Twardowski, with whom he corresponded for years,⁵¹ and attempted to attain his habilitation degree in Lvov, his approach was regarded as different from that promoted by Twardowski. Ingarden was commonly regarded as a phenomenologist because of his studies in Göttingen and later in Freiburg im Breisgau, where he met, among others, Husserl, Adolf Reinach (1883–1917), and Max Scheler (1874–1928). Admittedly, Husserl's philosophy was discussed by the members of the Lvov–Warsaw School, e.g., by Władysław Tatarkiewicz (1886–1980),⁵² but Ingarden also made efforts to introduce phenomenology into the philosophical discourse in Poland, e.g., by commenting on Husserl's new publications.⁵³ He also discussed with members of the School, arguing in favor of a phenomenological–eidetic point of view.⁵⁴ In 1925, Ingarden finally received a habilitation degree and became a *Dozent* in Lvov two years after Blaustein's arrival at the university. At that time, Blaustein was familiar with Ingarden's texts. For instance, in his thesis on Husserl, Blaustein—following Ingarden⁵⁵—differentiated objects which are only experienced (*erlebt*) by consciousness and objects given in an intuition (*durchlebt*); this enabled him to criticize Husserl's view on sensations. As we will see, however, Blaustein was skeptical of Ingarden's method which—in his opinion—falls into a vicious circle.

Furthermore, Blaustein's aesthetics can be read in the framework of polemics over parts of Ingarden's philosophy. Of course, these polemics are rooted in Blaustein's student years, when Ingarden started lecturing on the literary work of art. In 1927, Blaustein participated in this course, as well as in Ingarden's later

⁵⁰Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 24, fn. 1. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 176–177. For discussion see Fisette, *Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology*: Brentano, Stumpf, Husserl, 88–104.

⁵¹Ingarden, *Korespondencja Romana Witolda Ingardena z Kazimierzem Twardowskim*. See also Kuliniak, Pandura, “*Jestem filozofem świata*” (*Κόσμον φιλόσοφος εἰμι*). *Roman Witold Ingarden (1893–1970). Część pierwsza: lata 1893–1938*.

⁵²See Płotka, *Early Phenomenology in Poland (1895–1945)*, 83.

⁵³On Ingarden's early readings in Husserl, see, e.g., Byrne, *Ingarden's Husserl*, 513–531.

⁵⁴See, e.g., Richard, *Are There Ideal Objects?: The Controversy Between Kotarbiński and Ingarden*, 149–165.

⁵⁵E.g., Ingarden, *Über die Gefahr einer Petitio Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie*, 556.

seminars on aesthetics in 1934–1939.⁵⁶ Starting from 1927, Ingarden discussed the details of his own theory with his students, which was fully developed later in 1931 in his main book on aesthetics, *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft* [The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature]. Given this, Blaustein had the opportunity to follow Ingarden's considerations *in statu nascendi*. In his post-war reminiscences concerning Blaustein, Ingarden recalled that in his Lvov period, he met Blaustein "almost daily," and they discussed aesthetics extensively. He wrote:

Blaustein was a young man at that time; he began his third year of university studies, but he was mature and advanced in his studies; you could discuss with him as with a colleague. Therefore, from his first visits with me in September 1925 until the outbreak of the war, we met each other almost every day, either when he was still listening to my lectures and participating in my classes and later in a seminar or at the meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society or, finally, in the last years before the war, at the aesthetic seminar that I held from 1934 until the outbreak of the war. However, we also met each other privately at many of the philosophical chats at my house.⁵⁷

Indeed, in Blaustein's writings on aesthetics, one finds some hints and themes which seem to justify the thesis that Blaustein was partly inspired by Ingarden. For example, both Ingarden and Blaustein used the term "representation" to describe the phenomenon of the actor–character relationship in the theater. Therefore, it should not be surprising that Ingarden explicitly referred to Blaustein as "my student" [*mój uczeń*]⁵⁸ in one of his letters. In this vein, Bohdan Dziemidok indeed classifies Blaustein as a "supporter" of Ingarden's theory of the aesthetic object.⁵⁹ For Dziemidok, both Ingarden and Blaustein comprehended the aesthetic object as created by the subject. In contrast to Dziemidok, however, there are important differences between the two approaches, which make it impossible to comprehend Blaustein as a mere follower of Ingarden's aesthetics. Ingarden was aware of these differences, and he later saw a gap between him and Blaustein.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ See Ulicka (ed.), *Lwowskie czwartki Romana W. Ingardena 1934–1937*.

⁵⁷ Ingarden, Leopold Blaustein—teoretyk radia i filmu, 87: "Blaustein był wówczas młodym człowiekiem; rozpoczął trzeci rok studiów uniwersyteckich, był jednak nad wiek dojrzały i posunięty daleko w studiach; można było z nim dyskutować jak z kolegą. Toteż od pierwszych jego wizyt u mnie, we wrześniu r. 1925, aż do wybuchu wojny widywaliśmy się prawie codziennie, bądź to, gdy jeszcze słuchał moich wykładów i brał udział w moich ćwiczeniach, a potem seminarium, bądź też na terenie Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego, bądź wreszcie, w ostatnich latach przed wojną, na konwersatorium estetycznym, które prowadziłem od r. 1934 aż do wybuchu wojny. Ale widywaliśmy się także prywatnie na wielu pogwarkach filozoficznych w moim domu." My translation.

⁵⁸ Ingarden, Letter to Władysław Tatarkiewicz written on 18.03.1959.

⁵⁹ Dziemidok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*, 33.

⁶⁰ After Blaustein's death, in the foreword to the Polish edition of *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (published in 1960), Ingarden once again suggested that Blaustein was inspired by his aesthetic theory. Moreover, he acknowledged Blaustein's attempts to develop the research project presented in *Das literarische Kunstwerk* beyond the limits of the philosophy of literature, e.g., to study radio experi-

In the passage quoted above, Ingarden mentioned that he first met Blaustein in September 1925. Nevertheless, in June, before this happened, he was informed of Blaustein's interest in Husserl's philosophy by Ajdukiewicz, a prominent member of the Lvov–Warsaw School. Ajdukiewicz studied in Lvov in 1908–1912. His doctoral dissertation—written under Twardowski's supervision—concerned Kant's theory of space. After receiving his doctoral degree, he went to Göttingen for two semesters in 1913/14.⁶¹ Ajdukiewicz was less interested in Husserl's phenomenology than in David Hilbert's (1862–1943) views on mathematics and Reinach's theory; for example, he prepared for Reinach a study entitled *Ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Bewegungsbegriffes*. Nonetheless, one can note the themes of Husserl's theory in Ajdukiewicz's semantics, especially in regard to the concept of meanings as the essences of meaning-intending acts.

References to Husserl were also present in Ajdukiewicz's later works, including his lectures on logic given in 1924/25. Blaustein participated in these lectures and referred to them in his book on schematic and symbolic presentations.⁶² More precisely, Blaustein held that he adopted the distinction between the ontological and psychic meaning of the term “representation” in accordance with Ajdukiewicz's concept of ontological and psychological content: whereas the former defines content without reference to psychic life, the latter does establish such reference. It is worth mentioning that during his lectures, Ajdukiewicz used the term “content” in the context of the sematic relation between a name and its object; for him, “content” mediates between a name and its object. As he wrote, “[...] due to it [i.e., content] one *intends* the object.”⁶³ It seems that Ajdukiewicz's view on content as an intending factor also sheds more light on Blaustein's view of Husserl's intentionality as a *de re* relation.⁶⁴ Overall, it may be noted that Blaustein highly valued Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning. In 1930, Blaustein published a review of Ajdukiewicz's *O znaczeniu wyrażen* [*On the Meaning of Expressions*]; in this review, Ajdukiewicz's theory is presented as “original,” “accurate,” and “rigorously formulated.”⁶⁵ In his text, Blaustein is clear that Ajdukiewicz's position is deeply rooted in Husserl's idea that the meaning of certain expressions is a type.

As shown, all three scholars (Twardowski, Ingarden, and Ajdukiewicz) inspired Blaustein's own philosophical explorations, not to mention his examination of Husserl's phenomenology. Surprisingly, it is hard to say why Blaustein was interested in Husserl's theory. Of course, it was discussed at Twardowski's seminars.

ence. See Ingarden, *Przedmowa do polskiego wydania*, 15. Nonetheless, he accused Blaustein of falling into psychologism by reducing the object of consciousness to a mere mental image.

⁶¹ More on Ajdukiewicz's stay in Göttingen, see Głombik, *Die Polen und die Göttinger phänomenologische Bewegung*, 2–7.

⁶² Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 59–60, fn. 1. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40, 69.

⁶³ Ajdukiewicz, *Konspekt wykładów z logiki*, 139.

⁶⁴ I will discuss this later in Chap. 6. More on Blaustein's account of Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning, see Nuccilli, Lewandowski, Husserl, Ajdukiewicz, and Blaustein on Meaning, 95–114.

⁶⁵ Blaustein, [Review of] Ajdukiewicz Kazimierz, 455.

Twardowski valued Husserl's *Untersuchungen*; he even encouraged his students to translate the book into Polish, even though this project never materialized.⁶⁶ Thus, it may be argued that Twardowski recommended Blaustein to confront his theory of content with that of Husserl.⁶⁷ However, as has already been suggested above, Blaustein became a critical reader of both Twardowski and Husserl: he noticed the limits of Twardowski's classification of presentations, or he saw flaws in Husserl's content theory. As early as 1925, during his studies in Lvov, Blaustein went to Freiburg im Breisgau to meet Husserl in person. This fellowship would mark an important point in Blaustein's intellectual biography.

2.2.2 Fellowship Stays in Germany

It was Ajdukiewicz who asked Ingarden to write a letter of recommendations to Husserl to support Blaustein. Ajdukiewicz called Blaustein an "extremely talented" student who was interested in phenomenology. In a letter to Ingarden from June 14, 1925, Ajdukiewicz wrote:

I have the following request for you, the fulfillment of which will not be difficult for you [...]. Well, our student, a very talented one, Mr. Leopold Blaustein (a Jew), a very modest and decent boy, is going to Freiburg in July, to the "messiah" Husserl. He wrote a thesis about "Act, Content and Object" in Husserl's theory and did so very thoroughly. He read the entire pre-Husserlian and post-Husserlian literature devoted to the topic and fell in love with Husserl. He is very shy and very afraid to go to Husserl. Well, I would like to ask you to write to H[usserl] about the fact that such a young man is going to see him, so that H[usserl] welcomes him kindly. This meeting could be useful both for phenomenology and for our philosophy because the boy is very talented and extremely reliable. Moreover, I would ask you to tell me where he could stay and eat cheaply in Freiburg and with whom he could successfully seek contact from among Husserl's students.⁶⁸

⁶⁶On this topic, see Głombik, O niedoszłych polskich przekładach *Logische Untersuchungen*, 89–106; Głombik, *Husserl und die Polen*.

⁶⁷In one of his later letters, Blaustein explicitly claimed that his studies in the field of presentations were inspired in 1924 by Twardowski. Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 1.09.1930, 125r.

⁶⁸Ajdukiewicz, A letter to Roman Ingarden from June 14, 1925: "Mam do Ciebie następującą prośbę, której spełnienie nie sprawi Ci trudności [...]. Otóż nasz słuchacz, bardzo uzdolniony, niejaki p. Leopold Blaustein (żyd), bardzo skromny i porządny chłopiec, wybiera się na lipiec do Fryburga, do »mesjasza« Husserla. Pisał on pracę o 'Akcje, Treści i Przedmiocie' w Husserla, i zrobił ją bardzo porządnie. Poznał całą literaturę przedhusserlowską i pohusserlowską w tej sprawie i zakochał się w Husserlu. Jest on bardzo nieśmiały i boi się bardzo pójść do Husserla. Otóż proszę Cię bardzo, żebyś napisał do H. o tem, że taki młodzian się do niego wybiera, aby H. przyjął go życzliwie. Z tego spotkania może być pożytek i dla fenomenologii i dla naszej filozofii, bo chłopiec jest bardzo uzdolniony i bardzo solidny. Nadto prosiłbym Cię byś mi zaraz napisał, gdzie mógłby on się tanio zakwaterować we Fryburgu i gdzie tanio jadać. Na koniec z kim mógłby z uczniów Husserla próbować skutecznie szukać kontaktu." My translation.

It is difficult to say whether Ingarden replied to Ajdukiewicz's letter. However, Ingarden wrote to Husserl. His letter has been lost, but in his reply from June 27, Husserl wrote:

Of course, Mr. Blaustein will be warmly welcomed, just like anyone recommended by you or your colleague Ajduk[iewicz]. Of course, I cannot devote much time to him, especially now, when so many people want to talk personally with me about their doubts or the work they have begun; the habilitation of Dr. Kaufmann is also in question—and the seminar! Nonetheless, maybe it can be somehow figured out, and he can take part in the seminar. I give lectures until July 30th, included.⁶⁹

In the summer semester of 1925, Husserl held the *Einleitung in die phänomenologische Psychologie* lecture series and a seminar, *Übungen in der Analyse und Deskription rein geistiger Akte und Deskription rein geistiger Akte und Gebilde*.⁷⁰ It seems that Blaustein arrived in Freiburg at the beginning of July, yet the exact date of his arrival is unknown. Unfortunately, Blaustein's name cannot be found in "Quästurakten," which makes it impossible to verify which lectures he attended.⁷¹ In the 1930 text "Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia" ["Edmund Husserl and His Phenomenology"], one finds a suggestion that Blaustein participated in both of Husserl's classes, i.e., in the lectures on psychology and in the seminar. He was aware of the significance of the lectures; he claimed, for instance, that only on the basis of these lectures is one able to understand Husserl's view of psychology in relation to philosophy and to respond adequately to the realism–idealism controversy.⁷² He also noticed that almost half of the group of students who participated in Husserl's seminar came from abroad, including 1 Englishman, 2 Americans, 1 Russian, 1 Hungarian, 1 Ukrainian, 1 Latvian, and 2 Chinese attendees.⁷³ Only 3 women participated in the seminar. Blaustein wrote that Husserl was open to young students and always interested in someone's life and views on theater, literature, or music. According to Blaustein, Husserl recommended individual studies on concrete phenomena but, of course, only in the limits in which they present themselves. Blaustein, however, was skeptical about Husserl's way of teaching; he was dissatisfied with the fact that Husserl wanted to support only students who followed his own philosophical project. In this regard, Blaustein compared the way in which students were educated in Freiburg and in Lvov: in his assessment, students in Lvov

⁶⁹ Husserl, *Die Göttinger Schule*, 226: "Selbstverst<ändlich> wird Herr Blaustein, so wie jeder von Ihnen u. Coll. Adjuk<iewicz> warm Empfohlene, herzlic<h> willkommen sein. Sehr viel Zeit widmen kann ich ihm freilich nicht, zumal jetzt, wo so viele sich persönlich über ihre Zweifel oder angefangenen Arbeiten aussprechen wollen, auch die Habil<itation> Dr. Kaufmanns in Frage ist—u. das Kolleg! Doch wird sichs vielleicht irgendwie machen lassen, u. er kann am Seminar teilnehmen. Ich lese bis 30/VII incl." My translation.

⁷⁰ Schuhmann, *Husserl–Chronik*, 289–290.

⁷¹ I am thankful to Thomas Vongehr for this remark.

⁷² Blaustein, Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia, 235. Reprint in 2013: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna*, 225. In the context of the realism–idealism controversy, Blaustein referred to Celms and his book on idealism in Husserl's philosophy.

⁷³ Blaustein, Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia, 239. Reprint in 2013: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna*, 230.

enjoyed broader research freedom. Husserl presented to Blaustein a concept of philosophy which is rooted in ethical and moral claims. In Blaustein's words, Husserl should say that "[p]hilosophy is heroism" and "[p]hilosophy is a moral objective for mankind."⁷⁴ Only truth enables one to achieve moral value. For this reason, the essence of philosophy lies in the responsibility for doing reliable and rigorous science. In conclusion, Blaustein called Husserl a "dignified priest of philosophy."

Of course, the 1930 text was primarily written as a contribution to celebrate Husserl's seventieth birthday, and it is difficult to argue on this basis about Husserl's alleged influence on Blaustein. Nonetheless, Husserl's ideas became a constant element of Blaustein's writings. As already noted, Blaustein went to Freiburg to study directly under Husserl and to consult with him about his dissertation on acts, content, and objects. Two first parts of the dissertation were sent to Twardowski in June 1925, i.e., before Blaustein's trip to Freiburg; only the third part, which was devoted to a critical assessment of Husserl's theory of intentionality, was written later and sent to Twardowski as late as November 1925.⁷⁵ The version sent to Twardowski and later annotated by him and Blaustein contained a direct reference to Husserl's 1925 lectures in the fragment devoted to the question of the real and intentional parts of conscious acts.⁷⁶ The reference expressed in a footnote was later included in the printed version of the book, published in 1928.⁷⁷ This reference to Husserl's 1925 lectures, however, is the only clear fragment of the dissertation which refers to Blaustein's stay in Freiburg. Interestingly, Blaustein sent a copy of his 1928 book to Husserl with a handwritten dedication.⁷⁸ All things considered, it can be argued that, during his fellowship stay in Germany, Blaustein tried to bridge the gap between Twardowski's descriptive psychology and Husserl's phenomenological psychology.⁷⁹ Blaustein had many occasions to discuss with Husserl in Freiburg, and it seems that he made a good impression on him. In a letter to Twardowski from October 7,

⁷⁴Blaustein, Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia, 241: "Filozofia jest bohaterstwem. [...]. Filozofia jest zadaniem moralnym ludzkości." Reprint in 2013: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna*, 233.

⁷⁵See Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 65, fn. 1.

⁷⁶According to Blaustein, Husserl argued in a private exchange as follows: "Die reellen Teile des adäquat Wahrgenommenen treten im Bewusstseinsstrom auf und verstromen. Die intentionalen Erlebnisse haben aber auch Etwas in sich, was evidenterweise nicht reeller Teil, also ein intentionaler Teil ist, tragen also untrennbar Irreelles in sich. Und doch ist es zur Wahrnehmung selbst gehörig." Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia* [1924/25], 79–80, fn.

⁷⁷Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 83, fn. 1.

⁷⁸"Herrn Geheimrat Prof. Dr. Edmund Husserl, dem großen Philosophen, dessen Werke auch in meinem Leben ein entscheidender Bildungsfaktor war, übersende ich mit den Ausdrücken der Verehrung diesen bescheidenen Versuch, in die Gedankenwelt der Logischen Untersuchungen einzudringen" (Husserl-Archives, BP 18). I am thankful to Thomas Vongehr for this remark.

⁷⁹I will discuss this later on in Chap. 5, and I will attempt to draw a parallel between Blaustein and Husserl's 1925 project.

1927, Ingarden reported his personal exchanges with Husserl and noted that Husserl remembered Blaustein “fondly.”⁸⁰

After his return to Lvov, Blaustein attempted to make progress with his studies on Husserl to complete his doctoral dissertation. In his journal, Twardowski noted a few talks given by Blaustein at that time, including talks on April 21, May 28, June 4, 1926, February 19, 1927, and discussions in the epistemological section of the Polish Philosophical Society on June 14, 1926, February 26, and April 30, 1927.⁸¹ This intense period resulted in Blaustein completing his dissertation. In his review, Twardowski appreciated Blaustein’s attempts to present a holistic account of Husserl’s theory of content, especially the project to situate the theory within the tradition of Brentano.⁸² Twardowski also underlined the author’s efforts to account for the analyzed theories as clearly as possible, even though the theories themselves do not get close to comprehensively and clearly expressing their core object, i.e., the description of the act–content–object relation (in Twardowski’s opinion). Consequently, Twardowski recommended the reviewed thesis for publication and helped his student prepare it for printing.⁸³ Blaustein’s philosophy exam was on May 19, 1927, and—in Twardowski’s assessment—he passed it “very well.”⁸⁴ The final exam took place on November 18, 1927.⁸⁵ Later, he took a job in the ninth gymnasium in Lvov as a teacher of German and philosophy.⁸⁶

According to Twardowski’s recommendations, Blaustein received a fellowship to go to Berlin,⁸⁷ where he had the opportunity to work on the final version of his dissertation, published later in 1928. The stay in Berlin was, as it seems, one of the milestones of Blaustein’s philosophical development at that time. He arrived in Berlin at the beginning of December 1927. In a letter to Twardowski from December 11, Blaustein included the following list of courses he attended in Berlin: Stumpf’s “Hauptprobleme der Philosophie” [“Main Problems of Philosophy”], Max Wertheimer’s (1880–1943) “Logik” [“Logic”], Kurt Lewin’s (1890–1947) “Kinderpsychologie” [“Child Psychology”], Max Dessoir’s (1867–1947) “Philosophie der Kunst” [“Philosophy of Art”], and Wolfgang Köhler’s (1887–1967)

⁸⁰ Ingarden, *Korespondencja Romana Witolda Ingardena z Kazimierzem Twardowskim*, 351.

⁸¹ Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część I: 1915–1927*, 240, 246–247, 249, 295, 305.

⁸² Twardowski, *Ocena rozprawy doktorskiej dotyczącej filozofii E. Husserla*, AKT = P-18-7 = 007r.

⁸³ See Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część I: 1915–1927*, 315, 329.

⁸⁴ Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część I: 1915–1927*, 307.

⁸⁵ Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część I: 1915–1927*, 332.

⁸⁶ Jadczyk, *Uczeń i nauczyciel*, 20.

⁸⁷ Woleński mentions financial problems regarding Blaustein’s stay in Berlin. Woleński, *Jews in Polish Philosophy*, 77–78: “When Blaustein got a scholarship in Germany, it was not very large financially. Some people interpreted that as a result of discrimination against Jews in Poland. Blaustein himself commented on this problem in a letter to Twardowski (December 19, 1927). He informed his professor that he rejected all offers of Zionist organizations to help him, because it would be offensive to his homeland. On the other hand, he explicitly declared his sympathy for a Jewish nation. He also said that he would like to serve both nations, but estimated that three quarters of his work belonged, at least indirectly, to Polish science.”

“Die philosophische Lage der Gegenwart” [“The Philosophical Position of Presence”], as well as his “Biologische Psychologie” [“Biological Psychology”].⁸⁸ He also mentioned the classes of David Baumgardt (1890–1963), Eduard Spranger (1882–1963), and others. He reported to Twardowski that he was very satisfied with his studies in Berlin. He planned to stay there for 3 months or even longer if he had enough money. During his stay, he met with Wertheimer many times and with Stumpf a few times.⁸⁹ On many occasions, Blaustein attempted to promote Twardowski's habilitation thesis from 1894, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* [*On the Content and Object of Presentations*], and other ideas of Twardowski's students, e.g., Ajdukiewicz's axiomatization of classical logic.⁹⁰ Later, Blaustein participated in seminars organized by Wertheimer at the Berlin Psychological Institute, where he discussed phenomenology with the Gestaltists. In his letter to Twardowski dated February 13, 1928, he wrote:

Frequent conversations about phenomenology with Stumpf, Hoffmann, Lewin, Baumgardt, etc. forced me to be increasingly precise about my own position. I have already written to the beloved professor that some of these scholars agreed with some of my theses and have taken a similar position. Now, I have systematically described them and presented them to Köhler. I received lively approval and encouragement to publish [this text]. For now, however, I will limit myself to delivering a lecture at the meeting of the epistemological section [of the Polish Philosophical Society] and initiating a substantive discussion on phenomenology at home [i.e., Lvov]. In this lecture, I try to discover and criticize the basic dogmatic assumptions of phenomenology.⁹¹

Blaustein's commentary expressed in the above quotation shows the background of his polemics against Husserl, formulated after his return to Poland in April 1928. First, his aim was to define his own attitude toward phenomenology. Moreover, to do this, he talked with leading Gestaltists, including Stumpf, Hoffmann, Lewin, and Köhler. Finally, phenomenology, in his opinion, proved “dogmatic” since it accepted unjustified assumptions, and by doing so, it fell into the *petitio principii* fallacy.⁹² All in all, Blaustein's stay in Berlin inspired him in his original studies in other

⁸⁸ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 11.12.1927, 095r.

⁸⁹ See also Blaustein, Karl Stumpf, 34.

⁹⁰ On Ajdukiewicz, see Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 19.12.1927, 097r and Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 2.01.1928, 102r.

⁹¹ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 6.02.1928, 116r: “Częste rozmowy o fenomenologii z Stumpfem, Hoffmannem, Lewinem, Baumgardtem itd. Zmusiły mnie do coraz dokładniejszego sprecyzowania mojego stanowiska. Pisałem już Kochanemu Panu Profesorowi o tem, że ten lub ów z tych uczonych zgodził się na pewne me tezy, zajmując analogiczne stanowisko. Obecnie systematycznie rzecz ująłem i przedstawiłem Köhlerowi. Spotkałem się z bardzo żywą aprobatą i zachętą do druku. Ograniczę się jednak chwilowo do wygłoszenia odczytu na sekcji epistemologicznej, przy tem zainicjowania u nas rzeczowej dyskusji o fenomenologii. Saram się w tym odczycie wykryć podstawowe dogmatyczne założenia fenomenologii i poddać je krytyce.” My translation.

⁹² I will discuss Blaustein's critique of phenomenology later on in Chap. 5.

fields, not just his studies on the theoretical basis of descriptive psychology, e.g., in regard to the question of the use of experiments in descriptive psychology.⁹³

Of course, Blaustein's stay in Berlin was not limited to psychology (the Gestaltists and Dilthey's students) or phenomenology.⁹⁴ While in Berlin, he even wrote a short book on Hebbel's dramas⁹⁵ that was well reviewed by German–Jewish scholars.⁹⁶ At the same time, Blaustein attempted to promote Polish philosophy, e.g., he tried to establish cooperation between two important journals, *Kant-Studien* and *Ruch Filozoficzny* [*The Philosophical Movement*], to encourage German editors to publish summaries of Polish works⁹⁷; he also attempted to organize a Polish–German philosophical symposium.⁹⁸ It is also worth noting another project that Blaustein was focused on in Berlin. In a letter to Twardowski from January 11, 1928, Blaustein noted that three–quarters of his efforts were devoted to Polish philosophy but that he also planned to establish closer cooperation with Hebrew University in Jerusalem.⁹⁹ He wanted to edit and publish a philosophical journal that would publish articles in various European languages and their translations into Hebrew. Blaustein declared that the journal would not be limited to Jewish authors but would be open to all authors. Baumgardt offered to edit the German edition of the journal, and—as Blaustein reported to Twardowski—other philosophers, e.g., Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945), Moritz Geiger (1880–1937), and Levin, were also interested in closer cooperation. The original version of the journal, which was planned to be published in Jerusalem, was to be edited by Hugo Bergmann (1883–1975). Blaustein mentioned that the project was developing, and other scholars from England and the United States wanted to support it. Nonetheless, even though many scholars were involved, the project did not succeed. Despite this, Blaustein's stay in Berlin was apparently successful, as he had much work to do after his return to Lvov.

⁹³ See Sect. 3.3 below.

⁹⁴ Interestingly, in a letter to Twardowski from January 6, 1928, Blaustein reported that he participated in a talk given by Erich Unger (1887–1950) on Lenin's philosophy. Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 6.01.1928, 104r. In Blaustein's assessment, Unger was right in criticizing Lenin's approach, yet he remarked that he expected an in-depth criticism. He noticed that more than 100 participants were present in the audience and the discussion was mainly ideological and focused on attempts to defend communism. Blaustein was sceptical about the level of the discussion. He even participated in the discussion by pointing out that it is hard to justify the idea that philosophical arguments have the economic basis.

⁹⁵ Blaustein, *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*. The book is dedicated to Victor Dollmayr (1878–1964), Blaustein's teacher of German language at the University in Lvov.

⁹⁶ See Barschak, [Review of] Leopold Blaustein: *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*, 396–397; Fels, [Review of] *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*, 127; Schuster, Blaustein, [Review of] Dr. Leopold: *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*, 559–560. For an overview of the book, see Sect. 3.2.3.

⁹⁷ Jadczyk, *Uczeń i nauczyciel*, 23. See also Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 18.02.1928, 117r.

⁹⁸ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 26.01.1928, 112v.

⁹⁹ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 11.01.1928, 109r. See also Woleński, *Jews in Polish Philosophy*, 78.

2.3 Further Developments

2.3.1 Theoretical Considerations in 1928–1931

The last letter to Twardowski sent by Blaustein from Berlin is dated February 18, 1928. After his return to Poland, Blaustein met his teacher a few times to report his studies in Germany in detail.¹⁰⁰ It seems that this was an intense time for Blaustein: he was attempting to complete a number of projects initiated in Berlin, but he first had to finalize publication of his dissertation and other texts he had been working on even before his stay in Berlin. Accordingly, after his return, Blaustein finally published his dissertation, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia* [*Husserl's Theory of Act, Content and Object of Presentation*]. The book met with a range of reactions from reviewers. Whereas Ingarden critically reviewed Blaustein's book (he claimed, e.g., that the book does not take into account Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, as defined in *Ideen I*),¹⁰¹ Walter Auerbach¹⁰² (ca. 1900–1942 [?]) wrote a positive review, and he appreciated the clarity of Blaustein's theses and arguments.¹⁰³

When he was in Berlin, Blaustein planned to write a paper on phenomenology to discuss its methodological basis. A few weeks after his return, he presented two important talks at the 284th and 285th meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov. The meetings were organized on April 28 and May 5, 1928, respectively. During these meetings, Blaustein presented a two-part paper entitled “Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii” [“An Attempt at a Critical Assessment of Phenomenology”].¹⁰⁴ This paper discussed a systematic account of the phenomenological method by defining five theoretical problems in using it. Both talks seemed to address Husserl's phenomenology, yet it seems they were directed against Ingarden. For instance, Blaustein reads Husserl's essences as timeless entities, which is false if one takes into account Husserl's early critical assessment of the modern theory of abstraction or his late theory of eidetic variation; after all, Husserl rejected the practice of hypostasizing ideas as general objects. In turn, one finds a Platonic-style concept of essences in Ingarden's early works on phenomenology.

In any case, these two talks created tension between Blaustein and Ingarden and can be read in a broader context. Radosław Kuliniak, Dorota Leszczyna, and

¹⁰⁰ See *Dzienniki. Część II: 1928–1936*, 15, 17.

¹⁰¹ Ingarden, LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN, 315–316. Reprint in: 2013. *Polska fenomenologii przedwojenna*, 219–222. See Sect. 7.1 for a detailed discussion of Ingarden's critique.

¹⁰² Auerbach studied philosophy at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov in the 1920's. He defended his doctoral dissertation in 1928. Just as Blaustein, he used descriptive tools in psychology.

¹⁰³ Auerbach, Blaustein Leopold, 210. Reprint in 2013: *Polska fenomenologii przedwojenna*, 215–216.

¹⁰⁴ Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii*, 164b–166b.

Mariusz Pandura¹⁰⁵ put forward the hypothesis that Blaustein's 1928 talks were intended to attack Ingarden and to weaken the position of phenomenology after Ingarden's return to Lvov. This hypothesis presents Ingarden and Blaustein as rivals for a chair at the university in Lvov. The story surrounding Ingarden's attempts to receive a professorship in Lvov was, as it seems, one with countless twists and turns and ultimately one of deep frustration.¹⁰⁶ Although he became a *Dozent* in 1925, he was unable to receive a professorship. Even Husserl's intervention, who, in a personal letter, put pressure on Twardowski to employ Ingarden as a professor, did not succeed.¹⁰⁷ In 1928, it was clear that Twardowski would retire soon; arguably, Blaustein wanted to receive Twardowski's chair after his retirement. In Ingarden's eyes, as it seems, in his 1928 talks, Blaustein tried to present himself as an adherent of Twardowski and his psychology. Despite Blaustein's attempts to present himself as the successor to Twardowski, the chair was given to Ingarden in 1931. If Kuliniak and others are indeed right and Blaustein's intention was to weaken Ingarden's position to obtain a chair at the university, his plan did not succeed. The only result was Blaustein's clear declaration of an alleged triumph of descriptive psychology over (eidetic) phenomenology.

In 1928 and 1929, Blaustein worked on two other books that were planned as a development of his account of Husserl. In 1930 and 1931, he published his main theoretical works on aesthetics: *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*] and *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*], respectively. Following Blaustein's self-commentary, his 1928 book on Husserl's theory of content was the basis of his "general theory of presentations" (*ogólna nauka o przedstawieniach*),¹⁰⁸ whereas the two other books used this general theory in the field of aesthetics. His theory was highly rated by the reviewers. Auerbach, for instance, emphasized the novelty of the idea of imaginative presentations and their objects.¹⁰⁹ Bohdan Zawadzki (1902–1966),¹¹⁰ Adam

¹⁰⁵ Kuliniak, Leszczyna, Pandura, Wstęp, 97, 114; Kuliniak, Pandura, "Jestem filozofem świata" (*Κόσμου φιλόσοφος είμι*). *Roman Witold Ingarden (1893–1970). Część pierwsza: lata 1893–1938*, 494, 548–549.

¹⁰⁶ See Ingarden, Dzieje mojej "kariery uniwersyteckiej," 183–201; see also Kuliniak, Pandura, "Jestem filozofem świata" (*Κόσμου φιλόσοφος είμι*). *Roman Witold Ingarden (1893–1970). Część pierwsza*, 452–640; for an overview, see Jadczak, Wokół wniosku o profesurę dla Romana Ingardena, 268–274.

¹⁰⁷ See Husserl's letter to Twardowski from July 13, 1928. Husserl, *Die Brentanoschule*, 181.

¹⁰⁸ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 14.

¹⁰⁹ Auerbach, Leopold Blaustein. *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 215.

¹¹⁰ Zawadzki studied psychology at the University of Warsaw under Władysław Witwicki. In 1928 he defended a doctoral dissertation (written under Witwicki) on the psychology of humor. See Zawadzki, Leopold Blaustein. *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 123–124.

Wiegner (1889–1967),¹¹¹ and others¹¹² praised Blaustein's ideas and theoretical distinctions. An exception in this context was the critical reviews of Blaustein's works which were published by Filozofówna (later: Schiller) in 1931 and 1932.¹¹³

Irena Schiller (*née* Filozofówna) was a psychologist, pedagogue, and theater historian.¹¹⁴ She studied at Warsaw University at the end of the 1920s. There, she met Władysław Witwicki, who, as shown above, was Twardowski's student and one of the leading scholars in psychology in Poland. Filozofówna was inspired by Witwicki to interpret Meinong's idea of assumptions (*Annahmen*) as the basis of theater actors' experiences.¹¹⁵ She received her PhD in 1932 on the basis of her work on the psychological analysis of the actor's play at the stage. Her point was that assumptions are a necessary element of every experience, and for this reason, every mental phenomenon includes judgments in addition to presentations. With this in mind, Filozofówna appreciated the "unquestionable value" of Blaustein's detailed descriptions,¹¹⁶ but she questioned his thesis that presentations differ from judgments, which *can* but *do not have to* accompany aesthetic experience. The Filozofówna–Blaustein debate was very complex and spawned a few polemical texts.¹¹⁷ In addition, it can be read in a few parallel frameworks, as it enables one to define some details of, for instance, Blaustein's view on the phenomenological

¹¹¹Wiegner was a logician and a philosopher who defended his doctoral dissertation at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow in 1923. He would go on to work at Poznań University beginning in 1928, initially at the Institute of Psychology. On Wiegner's view on Blaustein, see Wiegner, Leopold Blaustein: Przedstawienia imaginatywne, 104; L. Blaustein: Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne, 104.

¹¹²See, e.g., a review by an unknown author published in *Przegląd Humanistyczny* in 1931. See Unknown author, Blaustein Leopold, Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne, 225–226.

¹¹³Filozofówna, W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych, 60–65; Filozofówna, Leopold Blaustein. Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne, 74–77.

¹¹⁴For a more detailed biography, see Timoszewicz, Irena Schiller (Schiller de Schildenfeld, z domu Filozof, 1.V. Korzyniewska), 466–467.

¹¹⁵Filozofówna, Uwagi o t.zw. "systemie" Stanisławskiego, 344–345; Próba badań psychologicznych nad grą aktorską, 179–180.

¹¹⁶See Filozofówna, LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN. Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne, 156.

¹¹⁷In chronological order, see (1) Filozofówna's critical review of Blaustein's 1930 *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*] (Filozofówna, W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych, 60–65); (2) Blaustein's extensive (critical) response to Filozofówna (Blaustein, W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych, 180–187) and (3) Filozofówna's short reply to Blaustein (Filozofówna, Odpowiedź [1931], 187–191); (4) Filozofówna's (rather neutral) review of Blaustein's 1931 *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*] (Filozofówna, LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN. Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne, 155–156) and (5) her critical review of the same book, but published in another journal (Filozofówna, Leopold Blaustein. Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne, 74–77); (6) Blaustein's reply to the review (Blaustein, W sprawie przedstawień schematycznych i symbolicznych, 365–367) and, finally, (7) Filozofówna's short comment to Blaustein's response (Filozofówna, Odpowiedź [1932], 367).

method,¹¹⁸ his account of the structure of aesthetic experience, or his view on the Graz School.¹¹⁹

The publication of *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*] marked the end of this early period of the development of Blaustein's theoretical explorations in the field of descriptive psychology. In his letter to Twardowski from September 1, 1930, Blaustein wrote as follows:

I regret to say that with the completion of this book, it seems my work in the field of presentations, which began at the beginning of 1924, so six years ago, ends now; [my work] resulted in four books and 7 lectures in this field of psychology. To my beloved professor, who showed and recommended these studies to me six years ago, I would like to thank you today. As I am now "an author in search of a topic," I would like to ask for advice and guidance, just as in the past [when I asked as] a "new" student.¹²⁰

In light of this passage, one might describe 1928–31 as the period in which Blaustein worked on the basics of his theory of presentations. He attempted to present this theory as his original contribution to descriptive psychology and to philosophy. This was the reason for an exchange with Ingarden, who published *Das literarische Kunstwerk* in 1931. In a footnote to § 57 of the book, which discusses the theater play, Ingarden noted that a theory comparable to that presented in his book can be found in Blaustein's *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*]. However, he wrote that he had not read Blaustein's book before the publication of *Das literarische Kunstwerk*.¹²¹ In response, from 1930 to 1937, Blaustein published three reviews of Ingarden's book on the literary work of art. The details of these reviews are not important here.¹²² Let me only note that Blaustein suggested that the theory of purely intentional objects elaborated by Ingarden was comparable to his own theory of imaginative objects. Ingarden tried to polemicize with Blaustein, and in 1931, he sent a reply to his review to *Polskie Archiwum Psychologii* [*Polish Archive of Psychology*] (the journal in which the review was published), in which he accused Blaustein of plagiarizing his theory of purely intentional objects.¹²³ Nonetheless, Ingarden's reply was never published, as it was blocked by Baley, who was Twardowski's and Stumpf's former student and the editor-in-chief of the

¹¹⁸ See Sect. 5.3.2 on this issue.

¹¹⁹ See Sect. 8.5.3 on both issues.

¹²⁰ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 1.09.1930, 125r: "Z żalem stwierdzam, iż wraz z ukończeniem tej rozprawy, kończy się—jak się zdaje—moja praca w dziedzinie przedstawień, rozpoczęta we wrześniu 1924 roku, a więc przed sześciu laty, której rezultatem były cztery rozprawy i 7 odczytów z tej dziedziny psychologii. Kochanemu Panu Profesorowi, który mi przed sześcioma laty tę dziedzinę wskazał i polecił, najwięcej dzisiaj dziękuję. A będąc obecnie 'autorem w poszukiwaniu tematu,' chętnie bym dziś poprosił o radę i wskazówki, podobnie jak ogień 'nowo-upieczony' seminarzysty."

¹²¹ See Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 329, fn. 1. Reprint in 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 340, fn. 1. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 319–320, fn. 10.

¹²² The reviews were generally neutral, yet they include some critical remarks. More on this issue, see Sect. 8.4.2.

¹²³ I am grateful to Aleksandra Horecka for this remark. Ingarden's reply to Blaustein is listed among Ingarden's *inedita*. See Ingarden, *Spis archiwaliów Romana Witolda Ingardena*, 60, 67.

journal. In a personal chronicle, Ingarden noted that Blaustein referred to Ingarden's ideas without relevant citations.¹²⁴ Although it was easy for Ingarden to call Blaustein a plagiarist, we cannot be sure that this was the case; rather, as already shown, Ingarden and Blaustein came up with the basics of their theories as a result of a long-standing exchange of ideas.

Finally, it may be noted that in 1930 Blaustein married Eugenia Ginsberg (1905–1942), Twardowski's student who wrote a dissertation on Husserl's whole-part theory, translated later by Blaustein into German.¹²⁵ In his journal, Twardowski noted that the wedding took place on June 29.¹²⁶ At this time, Blaustein still worked in gymnasiums in Lvov. In 1931, he probably realized that it was pointless to apply for a job at the university as Ingarden had finally received a professorship. In turn, Blaustein reoriented his studies and consequently enlarged the scope of the topics he discussed.

2.3.2 *Original Explorations in the 1930s*

Blaustein's activity in the 1930s can be described as a series of attempts to apply philosophy in different fields. Since he was working in secondary schools in Lvov, he had studied how philosophy should be taught in schools, and he had explored other pedagogical topics.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, he referred to descriptive psychology as the framework of his pedagogical explorations. For instance, he inquired into the psychological grounds of children's laziness. It should come as no surprise that Blaustein was the chair of the group of teachers who taught philosophical propaedeutics in Lvov's secondary schools; this group cooperated closely with the Polish Philosophical Society. In an official letter from April 22, 1937, Blaustein—on behalf of the members of the group—expressed his gratitude to Twardowski for his help in organizing the group's meetings.¹²⁸ Blaustein was also involved in a philosophical contest for secondary school students that was organized by the Polish Philosophical Society.

Blaustein, who did not have a chair at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov, cooperated with the Society on a few projects. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the talks he gave at the meetings of the Society. For instance, on April 25, 1931, he gave a talk on self-esteem; on October 6, 1934, he gave one on humanistic psychology (the talk, which explored Dilthey's and Spranger's accounts of psychology, was

¹²⁴ See Kuliniak, Pandura, "Jestem filozofem świata" (*Κόσμον φιλόσοφος εἶμι*). *Roman Witold Ingarden (1893–1970). Część pierwsza*, 500.

¹²⁵ Ginsberg-Blaustein, W sprawie pojęć samoistości i niesamoistości, 143–168. Trans. Simons, in: *Parts and Moments*, 261–287.

¹²⁶ Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część II: 1928–1936*.

¹²⁷ The list of Blaustein's pedagogical works include 33 texts, mainly articles and short studies, but also short books. See Dąbrowski, *Bibliografia prac Leopolda Blausteina*, 248–250.

¹²⁸ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 22.04.1937, 136r.

later enlarged and published in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* [*The Philosophical Review*]¹²⁹; on February 22, 1936, he gave a talk on the psychology of feelings.¹³⁰ This list, of course, is longer, but it is worth noting another of Blaustein's projects at that time, namely, a book series called "Biblioteczka Filozoficzna" ["A Philosophical Library"]. This project was initiated in 1933 by Blaustein, who was elected as a member of the board of the book series together with Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz.¹³¹ Later, the board was enlarged, but despite Blaustein's efforts, the project was not fully developed by the outbreak of World War II, and only a few texts were published.

Of course, Blaustein's activity was not limited to the Society. For instance, he translated into German Alfred Tarski's (1901–1983) text on the concept of truth in formalized languages (in German: "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen"), which was later published in 1935 in the first volume of *Studia Philosophica* and became an important study in the field of logic.¹³² More importantly, however, he made progress with his original studies in aesthetics. Whereas in texts published in 1928–31, Blaustein focused mainly on theoretical issues, such as the theory of presentations, later in the 1930s, he adapted these early theoretical tools in the field of aesthetics to examine concrete phenomena. This division mirrors Miskiewicz's idea of two trends in Blaustein's work: *theoretical* and *applied*.¹³³ While his *theoretical* works concerned the main concepts and the methodological basis of describing conscious experiences, Blaustein's *applied* studies used these theoretical tools to analyze concrete phenomena. With this in mind, one can label Blaustein's original explorations in the 1930s as *applications* of descriptive tools in studying concrete aesthetic experiences. In this regard, two projects are worth mentioning, both of which concern media.

The first research topic concerned the structure and character of the experiences of a cinemagoer. Blaustein's interest in the film experience can be seen as early as his 1927/28 fellowship in Berlin. While there, Blaustein observed that scholars at the Berlin Psychological Institute used a camera to design and plan experiments; for him, the following question was more fundamental: how should one describe the cinemagoer's experiences? In one of his letters to Twardowski, he wrote that he planned to explore the structure of the presentations involved in these types of lived

¹²⁹ Blaustein, O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej, 33–57. For an overview of Blaustein's account of humanistic psychoogy, see Sect. 3.4.

¹³⁰ A list of Blaustein's talks at that time can be found here: Jadczak, *Uczeń i nauczyciel*, 26.

¹³¹ See a summary of the 28th plenary meeting of the society published by an unknown author in *Ruch Filozoficzny* in 1935 as: *Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne*, 163b.

¹³² On Blaustein's translation, see Gruber, *Alfred Tarski and the "Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,"* 1–7.

¹³³ "One can roughly distinguish two trends in Blaustein's work. On the one hand, the *theoretical* work focuses on the problem of intuition in the sense of immediate, evident knowledge, as well as on the typology of mental states. On the other hand, he published on *applied* topics, in the philosophy of arts and the philosophy of media and on questions of education—liberally commenting, among other things, on the laziness and the lack of discipline among high school pupils." Miskiewicz, *Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology*, 182–183.

experiences.¹³⁴ As already shown, after his return to Lvov, he published a few theoretical works, including the 1928 book on Husserl, the 1930 *Przedstawienia imaginytywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*], and the 1931 *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*]. In these books, Blaustein formulated the basics of his general theory of presentations. In a few fragments, he refers to film or to watching movies in the cinema as examples to explain the nuances of his insights.¹³⁵ However, his project concerning the experience of film was formulated later, namely, in 1933, in *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*]. The study contained a detailed analysis of the structure of the movie experience. It should be mentioned that Blaustein informed Twardowski about his work on the psychology of the cinema experience even before publication of the book: in a letter to his teacher from July 17, 1933, he wrote that he was working on a manuscript that he had started in December 1932.¹³⁶ He attached a short summary and a table of contents. Kotarbiński invited him to talk about the cinema experience at a meeting of the Warsaw Philosophical Society.¹³⁷ Later, in 1936/37, he also published a series of articles in the Polish journal *Ruch Pedagogiczny* [*The Pedagogical Movement*] that explored the educational role of cinema.¹³⁸

The second project concerned the experience of radio. The 1930s was a period in which radio was growing in popularity. Polish Radio was founded in 1925, and the regional station in Lvov started broadcasting in 1930.¹³⁹ In 1936, Blaustein started paying more attention to the experience of radio by considering, among other things, whether the term “theater of imagination”—used by Polish scholars at that time—was fully justified.¹⁴⁰ This topic was discussed by Blaustein on October 15, 1936, during Ingarden’s seminar on aesthetics. The talk concerned the question of the radio experience, but the text has since been lost.¹⁴¹ During the discussion, Blaustein’s account was extensively criticized by Ajdukiewicz, who asked about the linguistic framework of this type of experience. In 1938, Blaustein published a book that summarized his explorations: *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*]. The book contained insights into the structure of the radio phenomenon and concrete practical instructions on how to improve the reception of a broadcast. It should be noted that this book was published by the Research Bureau of Polish Radio. This was probably why Blaustein attached a list of practical

¹³⁴ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 13.02.1928, 116r.

¹³⁵ See, e.g., Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginytywne*, 25, fn. 1, 32–33, 39, 43, 45, 47; Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 73, 79, 92, 107, 139. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 55–56, fn. 22, 61, 66. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 222, fn. 25, 227, 232.

¹³⁶ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 17.07.1933, 127r.

¹³⁷ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 17.07.1933, 128r.

¹³⁸ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*. See also Szoska, *Trudna obecność*, 43–45.

¹³⁹ See, e.g., Pleszkun-Olejniczakowa, *Słuchowiska Polskiego Radia w okresie piętnastolecia 1925–1939*, 86–90.

¹⁴⁰ Blaustein, *Czy naprawdę “teatr wyobraźni”?*, 5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 197–200.

¹⁴¹ See the protocol: Ulicka (ed.), *Lwowskie czwartki Romana W. Ingardena 1934–1937*, 254–259.

suggestions at the end of the book. A French translation of a shorter version of the text, without the attachment devoted to the radio audience or the list of practical advice, was also published later in *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* [*The Psychological Quarterly*] as “Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques.”¹⁴²

As shown, Blaustein’s explorations in the 1930s were dominated by aesthetic studies on concrete phenomena such as the experiences of a cinemagoer or a radio listener. His growing interest in aesthetics was finally planned to be summarized in a longer study, *Die ästhetische Perzeption*, written in German, which was completed in 1939 just before the outbreak of World War II.¹⁴³ The topic of the role of perception in aesthetic experiences was present in Blaustein’s studies in the 1930s; for instance, he presented a paper on perception in the aesthetic experience in 1936 at the Polish Philosophical Congress in Krakow; this paper was published later in 1937 in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* [*The Philosophical Review*].¹⁴⁴ Moreover, in 1937, he participated in *Deuxième Congrès International d’esthétique et de science de l’art*, which took place in Paris. On this occasion, Blaustein presented a paper titled “Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise,” which summarized his aesthetics.¹⁴⁵ If one follows these texts and Blaustein’s other theoretical and applied (cinema, radio, etc.) studies from the 1930s, one can get an impression of how Blaustein’s *Die ästhetische Perzeption* may help scholars understand how he developed his main arguments. Unfortunately, the only copy of the manuscript (which was sent for publication in the third volume of *Studia Philosophica*) was lost during the war.¹⁴⁶ Despite this, one can conclude that Blaustein’s philosophical explorations in the 1930s enabled him to formulate his original account of aesthetics. Ingarden summarized Blaustein’s contribution to philosophy as follows:

During the outbreak of the war, he was a mature man and a mature researcher who could have left a permanent mark on Polish intellectual life. The fact that this did not happen was due to the hard fate that befalls his generation. However, even if his life’s work did not acquire the form it certainly would have if he had survived the war, his research achievements are not without significance and should not be forgotten or wasted.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴²See Blaustein, *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 105–161. I will explore Blaustein’s contribution to the phenomenology of the experience of media later on in Chap. 9.

¹⁴³Blaustein explicitly announced the book in a footnote attached to the French text “Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques.” See Blaustein, *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 106–107, fn. 2.

¹⁴⁴Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399–408. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 136–144. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 235–243.

¹⁴⁵Blaustein, *Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise*, 245–249.

¹⁴⁶The manuscript was kept in Ingarden’s house (Ingarden was one of the editors of the journal), which was bombed and destroyed during the war. Ingarden, *Leopold Blaustein—teoretyk radia i filmu*, 87; Dąbrowski, *Bibliografia prac Leopolda Blausteina*, 245.

¹⁴⁷Ingarden, *Leopold Blaustein—teoretyk radia i filmu*, 88: “W chwili wybuchu wojny był dojrzałym człowiekiem i dojrzałym uczonym, który mógł pozostawić trwale ślady swej działalności w umysłowości polskiej. Że do tego nie doszło, sprawił to ciężki los, jaki przypadł jego pokoleniu w udziale. Ale jeżeli nawet dzieło jego życia nie uzyskało tej postaci do jakiej z pewnością by było dojrzało, gdyby był przeżył wojnę, to i tak dorobek jego naukowy nie jest bez znaczenia i nie powinien być zapomniany, ani zmarnowany.”

Blaustein's exact date of death is unknown. Scholars note that he died (together with his wife and their son) in the Jewish Ghetto in Lvov in 1942 or 1944.¹⁴⁸ It is known that German Nazis entered Lvov on June 30, 1941, and Janowska Ghetto was established a few months later.¹⁴⁹ The German authorities decided to relocate Jews there in December 1941. In 1942 and later, the Germans organized a few large-scale deportations and (in 1943) mass shootings. In 1943, the Ghetto was reorganized as the Janowska Street labor camp, though all the Jews had already been deported or killed before this happened. With this in mind, one might hold that it is unlikely that Blaustein died in 1944, but again, the exact date of his death is unknown.¹⁵⁰

The aim of this chapter was to show the development of Blaustein's research activity in the context of the main philosophical movements in Poland and abroad, given his fellowship stays. My further aim was to present the central ideas of selected scholars that were later elaborated by Blaustein. This was necessary since, as shown above, his thought developed across different fields. Of course, Twardowski and the Lvov–Warsaw School played dominant roles. Blaustein's writings adopted the meta-philosophical rules of rigorous analysis that were used and promoted by Twardowski and his students in Lvov; however, the value of these writings did not lie in following Twardowski's meta-philosophical enterprise.

Blaustein's main contribution to philosophy lies in his detailed descriptive analyses of different types of mental phenomena. While tracking the background of Blaustein's philosophy, I have suggested that this very context inspired Blaustein to favor Husserl's view on phenomenology understood as descriptive psychology (in light of the first edition of *Untersuchungen*). This held true despite Blaustein being familiar with Husserl's phenomenological psychology project, as he had participated in 1925 in Husserl's lectures on this topic. His stay in Germany enabled him to juxtapose phenomenological tools with descriptive-psychological tools. Later, he traveled to Berlin, where he had exchanges with Dilthey's students and members of the Berlin School of Gestalt psychology. Certainly, both stays in Germany are important if one is to understand Blaustein's reformulations of both descriptive psychology and phenomenology. Ultimately, it may be argued that the complex legacy of nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology and philosophy determined his original explorations of aesthetics in the 1930s. His aesthetics can also be read in the framework of Ingarden's philosophy. In light of the elements of Blaustein's intellectual biography discussed above, it is clear that the examination of his philosophy has to account for all of these different contexts, including the psychological trends of his method, his view on descriptive psychology, his criticism of phenomenology, and the use of these divergent methods in aesthetics. I will follow this line in the following chapters.

¹⁴⁸ See, e.g., Jadacki, *Życiorysy niedokończone*, 161; Rosińska, *Blaustein. Koncepcja odbioru mediów*, 16; Rosińska, *Leopold Blaustein—Styk psychologii i estetyki*, ix.

¹⁴⁹ More on this, see Kulke, *Lwów*, 802–805.

¹⁵⁰ See also Kuliniak, Pandura, “*Jestem filozofem świata*” (*Κόσμον φιλόσοφος εἰμι*). *Roman Witold Ingarden (1893–1970). Część druga*, 103–104.

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Chapter 3

Psychological Themes in Blaustein's Philosophy



In his works, Blaustein used a complex analytical method to describe psychic life. He explicitly called this approach “descriptive psychology” (*psychologia deskryptywna*),¹ and he noted on many occasions that he did research “on the borderline of psychology.” This should come as no surprise, as he was trained in philosophy by Twardowski, a direct student of Brentano. The presence of Brentano’s thought in the school of Twardowski is well described by, for instance, Liliana Albertazzi,² Arianna Betti,³ Jan Woleński,⁴ and others.⁵ Indeed, after his arrival in Lvov in 1895, in his early writings, Twardowski developed—as I attempt to show in this chapter—a Brentanian notion of philosophy based on psychology and focused on “mental phenomena.”⁶ By claiming that philosophy examines mental phenomena, Twardowski set the psychological trend of the Lvov–Warsaw School, which included, in addition to Blaustein, Władysław Witwicki (1878–1948), Bronisław Bandrowski (1879–1914), Ludwik Jaxa-Bykowski (1881–1948), Stefan Baley (1885–1952), Stefan Błachowski (1889–1962), Salomon Igel (1889–1942), Mieczysław Kreutz (1893–1971), and Walter Auerbach (1900–1942 [?]).⁷ In this chapter, I discuss Teresa Rzepa’s idea that

¹Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 210.

²Albertazzi, Brentano, Twardowski and Polish Scientific Philosophy, 11–40.

³Betti, Twardowski and Brentano, 305–311; Betti, Brentano and the Lvov–Warsaw School, 334–340.

⁴Woleński, Brentanian Motives in Kazimierz Twardowski and his Students, 47–64.

⁵See, e.g., *Actions, Products and Things. Brentano and Polish Philosophy*, ed. by Chrudzinski and Łukasiewicz; Plotka, *From Psychology to Phenomenology (and Back Again)*.

⁶Twardowski, *Wykład wstępny w Uniwersytecie Lwowskim (z 15. listopada 1895 r.)*, 228. Trans. Chybińska, in: *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 36–37.

⁷For more on the psychological tradition of the Lvov–Warsaw School, see Citlak, *The Lvov–Warsaw School*, 105–124; *The Problem of Mind and Mental Acts in the Perspective of Psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 1049–1077; *Psychology of Religion in the Theories and Research of the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 95–116; *Brentano’s Psychology and Kazimierz Twardowski School*, 1665–1681; Schaar, *Kazimierz Twardowski*, 21–24; Rzepa, *Psychologiczne poglądy Kazimierza*

Blaustein can be considered a part of this group of scholars.⁸ Psychology was still a popular field of research in Lvov during Blaustein's studies in the 1920s. Following Twardowski, Blaustein indeed used a variety of descriptive-psychological tools in his investigations. Nonetheless, his view of psychology cannot be reduced only to the Brentano–Twardowski legacy. After all, he referred to Gestalt psychology or to the conception of psychology put forward by Dilthey, not to mention Husserl's phenomenological psychology. Whereas I will discuss Blaustein's polemic against Husserl's method in Chap. 5, here I attempt to show that he combined a variety of detailed ideas and procedures that had been developed by, for instance, Brentano, Twardowski, Stumpf or Dilthey. By claiming this, I will argue against Krzysztof Wieczorek, who holds that Blaustein overcame Brentano's heritage by adapting Husserl's phenomenology.⁹ If Wieczorek was right, Blaustein's *descriptive psychology* was a mere introduction to his *phenomenology*. Accordingly, the latter can be understood in Blaustein's writings without the former, which—as I will show in this chapter—is false. In this regard, I will argue that philosophical psychology is one of the cornerstones of Blaustein's method; as such, it cannot be excluded from Blaustein's writings or reduced to his account of phenomenology.

3.1 Brentano and Blaustein on Psychology and Its Object

3.1.1 Brentanian Inspirations in Blaustein's Writings

At first glance, Blaustein's references to Brentano are rather rare and often not explicit. He accepted, for instance, the thesis that psychic acts are presentations or are based upon presentations,¹⁰ yet he did not argue for this thesis, nor did he characterize presentations in more detail. To explain this, one must take into account

Twardowskiego, 163–175; Psychologia w szkole lwowsko–warszawskiej, 35–45; Development of Psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School, 47–48; On the Lvov School and Methods of Psychological Cognition, 141–158; Rzepa, Stachowski, Roots of the Methodology of Polish Psychology, 233–250; Domański, *Historia psychologii w Europie Środkowej*, 222–234, 248–256.

⁸Rzepa, Psychologia w szkole lwowsko–warszawskiej, 38; Development of Psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School, 47–48.

⁹“Szybko jednak [Blaustein] odkrył trudności, nieścisłości, a nawet aporie w wywodzących się od Franza Brentana, a tworzonych przez jego uczniów, teoriach przedmiotu [...] i w naturalny sposób poszedł dalej tropem fenomenologii, pojmowanej przezeń jako naukowa metoda badania i opisu aktów psychicznych, danych w doświadczeniu wewnętrznym podmiotu poznania.” Wieczorek, Leopolda Blausteina interpretacja świata zjawiskowego, 157–158. English trans.: “However, [Blaustein] soon discovered difficulties, inaccuracies and even aporias in the object theories derived from Franz Brentano and developed by his students [...] and naturally he followed the trail of phenomenology, understood by him as a research method of describing mental acts which are given in the immanent experience of the subject of knowledge.” My translation.

¹⁰Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 61; Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 123. In this regard, see also Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 126–127. Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 74–75.

the wider context of the Lvov–Warsaw School, which was noticed by Roman Ingarden as early as 1936 during his Lvov lectures on Brentano. For him, Brentano’s thought was, as he put it, a kind of *opinio communis* for generations of philosophy students educated in Lvov by Twardowski.¹¹ From Ingarden’s point of view, scholars simply accepted many of Brentano’s ideas without further ado, but this meant that they were accepted uncritically. Certainly, Ingarden’s opinion addresses the case of Blaustein who did not provide any thorough analysis of the method used by Brentano or its different formulations. For instance, he did not notice the divide between the 1874 book and the 1880s descriptive psychology project¹² (after all, Twardowski did know the 1880s project as he participated in Brentano’s Vienna lectures). For this reason, it is more relevant to speak of Brentanian *inspirations* or *themes* in Blaustein.

In “Book One” of his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, Brentano famously declared that psychology is a science. This thesis, of course, followed from his early belief that “[t]he true method of philosophy is none other than that of the science of nature.”¹³ The claim that the method of philosophy is “none other” than the method of natural sciences is, however, ambiguous, as it can be read either as an attempt to reduce philosophy to (natural) sciences or as a project of adapting general scientific procedure to philosophy. In this regard, Ion Tănăsescu rightly argues for the latter by showing that Brentano adopted the methodology of (natural) science in his empirical psychology. As Tănăsescu explains, “[...] the core of the method of natural science consists of observation and explanation understood as the subsumption of phenomena under general laws and reduction of these laws to more general laws.”¹⁴ Next, Tănăsescu divides the procedure worked out in the 1874 book into *eight* steps: (1) experience on the basis of inner perception, (2) determination of the characteristic features of mental phenomena, (3) determination of the classes of mental phenomena, (4) investigation of the most basic mental elements (sensations) from which more complex phenomena arise, (5) inductive determination of the general laws of succession, (6) deduction of more specific laws, (7) testing of these laws in inductive procedures, and (8) determination of definitive psychological laws from which general mental laws will be derived.¹⁵ This being said, psychology was also a science (*nauka*) for Blaustein.¹⁶ Additionally, he used a method that resembled the procedure used by Brentano. Let me highlight the overlapping elements using the

¹¹ See Ingarden, *Die Auffassung der Philosophie bei Franz Brentano*, 1–2. For discussion, see Miskiewicz, *Réalisme gnoséologique contre réalisme sceptique*; Ingarden et la réception de Brentano en Pologne, 84–85.

¹² More on the methodological differences between both projects, see Tănăsescu, *Monism and Particularism*.

¹³ This is the fourth habilitation thesis of Brentano. See Brentano, *Über die Zukunft der Philosophie*, 136: “Die wahre Methode der Philosophie ist keine andere als die der Naturwissenschaft.” Trans. Krantz Gabriel, in: *Habilitation Theses*, 433. For discussion see Huemer, “Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est.”

¹⁴ Tănăsescu, *Monism and Particularism*, 398.

¹⁵ Tănăsescu, *Monism and Particularism*, 402.

¹⁶ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40.

example of his 1930 book, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*: (1) Blaustein described exemplary experiences on the basis of inner perception (§ 8), (2) he determined some characteristic features of presentations (§§ 1–2), (3) he discussed (Twardowski's) classification of presentations (§ 7), (4) he explicitly investigated sensations as the basis of complex phenomena (§§ 4–5), (5) he determined the laws of succession (in the field of presentations) (§§ 25–28), (6) he deduced more general laws regarding presentations (§§ 35–40), (7) he confronted these laws with descriptions of further phenomena, such as suppositions (§§ 41–49), and finally (8) he formulated general laws that enabled him to formulate a classification of presentations (§§ 47–58). Again, these affinities are still general, and without Blaustein's clear self-commentary, it is unjustified to hold that he explicitly adapted Brentano's procedure.

Nevertheless, Blaustein had another theme that came from Brentano's *Psychologie*. In the 1874 book, Brentano argued that psychology is based upon inner perception, which provides evident knowledge and presents its objects as true in themselves; next, its objects are "more beautiful and sublime," and they are "mostly our own."¹⁷ Consequently, he adopted the thesis that psychology is a fundamental science, and as such, it has to precede natural sciences. This holds, of course, for philosophy too. In the book, Brentano referred to philosophy, as he put it, "merely in passing" ("*nur ganz flüchtig*"):

Let me point out merely in passing that psychology contains the roots of aesthetics, which, in a more advanced stage of development, will undoubtedly sharpen the eye of the artist and assure his progress. Likewise, suffice it to say that the important art of logic, a single improvement in which brings about a thousand advances in science, also has psychology as its source. In addition, psychology has the task of becoming the scientific basis for a theory of education, both of the individual and of society. Along with aesthetics and logic, ethics and politics also stem from the field of psychology.¹⁸

Philosophy, including aesthetics, logic or ethics, is comprehended as rooted in psychology, which, in turn, becomes "the scientific basis" for other disciplines. Brentano's position, which consisted in the claim that a philosophical explication could be based on psychology, can be viewed as *methodological psychologism*.¹⁹ Blaustein seemed to accept this position by holding, e.g., that aesthetics is rooted in psychology; after all, he argued that aesthetic experiences are combinations of

¹⁷ See Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 24–25. Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 14–15.

¹⁸ Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 26: "Nur ganz flüchtig weise ich darauf hin, wie in der Psychologie die Wurzeln der Aesthetik liegen, die unfehlbar bei vollerer Entwicklung das Auge des Künstlers klären und seinen Fortschritt sichern wird. Auch das sei nur mit einem Worte berührt, dass die wichtige Kunst der Logik, von der ein Fortschritt tausend Fortschritte in der Wissenschaft zur Folge hat, in ganz ähnlicher Weise aus der Psychologie ihre Nahrung zieht. Aber die Psychologie hat auch die Aufgabe, die wissenschaftliche Grundlage einer Erziehungslehre, des Einzelnen wie der Gesellschaft, zu werden. Mit Aesthetik und Logik erwachsen auch Ethik und Politik auf ihrem Felde." Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 15–16.

¹⁹ See Pandit, Two Concepts of Psychologism, 86–87.

presentations which are viewed as psychic phenomena.²⁰ However, Blaustein went a step further and held that psychology is also the basis of non-philosophical disciplines such as pedagogy,²¹ penitentiary science,²² film studies,²³ or even military ethics.²⁴ He stated that the general approach of psychology illustrates its practical significance for non-philosophical disciplines. In this case, Blaustein's belief mirrors Brentano's conviction that the future of psychology lies in its practical application.²⁵

3.1.2 Reinterpreting Brentano's Notion of Presentations

On a few occasions, Blaustein refers to the idea that psychic phenomena are presentations or are based upon presentations.²⁶ Roughly, he used the term "presentation" in accordance with Brentano, for whom a presentation was understood as a mental phenomenon or the basis of such a phenomenon. As such, it is defined in *Psychologie* in the context of physical phenomena as follows:

First of all, we illustrated the specific nature of the two classes by means of *examples*. We then defined mental phenomena as *presentations* or as phenomena which are based upon *presentation*; all the other phenomena being physical phenomena. Next we spoke of *extension*, which psychologists have asserted to be the specific characteristic of all physical phenomena, while all mental phenomena are supposed to be unextended. [...] Further we found that the *intentional in-existence*, the reference to something as an object, is a distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything similar. We went on to define mental phenomena as the exclusive *object of inner*

²⁰ See, e.g., Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 5–6 [Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 210]; *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 4; *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399 [Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 236]. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40–41, 71–72, 136.

²¹ See, e.g., Blaustein, *Lenistwo u dzieci i młodzieży; O ocenie samego siebie w wieku młodzieńczym; Psychologiczne podstawy oświaty pozaszkolnej*.

²² See, e.g., Blaustein, *Karność w nowoczesnym wydaniu; Przyczynki do psychologii i pedagogiki karności*.

²³ See, e.g., Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 92–127. Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmu*. For discussion, see Haltof, *Film Theory in Poland Before World War II*, 76–77.

²⁴ See Blaustein, *Z psychologii wojskowej*, 290–298.

²⁵ Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 31–32: "Wir könnten sie, wie auch Andere es gethan, in diesem Sinne als die Wissenschaft der Zukunft bezeichnen, als diejenige nämlich, der vor allen anderen theoretischen Wissenschaften die Zukunft gehört, die mehr als alle die Zukunft gestalten, und der alle in ihrer praktischen Verwendung sich in Zukunft unterordnen und dienen werden." Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 19: "In this sense we could characterize psychology, as others have already done, as the science of the future, i.e. as the science to which, more than any other, the future belongs; the science which, more than any other, will mould the future; and the science to which, in the future, other sciences will be of service and to which they will be subordinate in their practical application."

²⁶ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 61; *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 123.

perception; they alone, therefore, are perceived with immediate evidence. Indeed, in the strict sense of the word, they alone are perceived. On this basis we proceeded to define them as the only phenomena which possess *actual existence* in addition to intentional existence. Finally, we emphasized as a distinguishing characteristic the fact that the mental phenomena which we perceive, in spite of all their multiplicity, *always* appear to us *as a unity*, while physical phenomena, which we perceive at the same time, do not all appear in the same way as parts of one single phenomenon.²⁷

On this basis, according to Brentano, presentations (as a class of mental phenomena) have *four* distinctive features. (1) They are *non-extended*. (2) They are defined by *intentionality*, which is understood as the mental inexistence of an object. "Mental inexistence of an object" means that every mental phenomenon *refers* to a content and *is directed* toward an object.²⁸ (3) All mental phenomena and thus presentations are perceived in *inner perception*. Inner perception, in turn, is characterized by immediate, i.e., infallible, self-evidence. (4) Finally, any mental phenomenon or presentation is given as a whole, which for Brentano means that consciousness is given as a *unity*. Accordingly, he drew a sharp distinction between unity and simplicity. The former is given as a complex whole and thus does not appear as a simple object. Therefore, various acts are, as Brentano put it, "[...] parts of one single phenomenon in which they are contained, as one single and unified thing."²⁹ In this regard, Brentano specified that "[...] the parts which can be distinguished in [a presentation] are to be regarded as mere divisions of a real unity."³⁰ In other words,

²⁷ Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 126–127: "Wir machten zunächst die Besonderheit der beiden Classen an Beispielen anschaulich. Wir bestimmten dann die psychischen Phänomene als Vorstellungen und solche Phänomene, die auf Vorstellungen als ihrer Grundlage beruhen; alle übrigen gehören zu den physischen. Wir sprachen darauf von dem Merkmale der Ausdehnung, welches von Psychologen als Eigenthümlichkeit aller physischen Phänomene geltend gemacht wurde; allen psychischen sollte es mangeln. [...] Wir fanden demnächst als unterscheidende Eigenthümlichkeit aller psychischen Phänomene die intentionale Inexistenz, die Beziehung auf etwas als Object; keine von den physischen Erscheinungen zeigt etwas Aehnliches. Weiter bestimmten wir die psychischen Phänomene als den ausschliesslichen Gegenstand der inneren Wahrnehmung; sie allein werden darum mit unmittelbarer Evidenz wahrgenommen; ja sie allein werden wahrgenommen im strengen Sinne des Wortes. Und hieran knüpfte sich die weitere Bestimmung, dass sie allein Phänomene seien, denen ausser der intentionalen auch wirkliche Existenz zukomme. Endlich hoben wir als unterscheidend hervor, dass die psychischen Phänomene, die Jemand wahrnimmt, ihm trotz aller Mannigfaltigkeit immer als Einheit erscheinen, während die physischen Phänomene die er etwa gleichzeitig wahrnimmt, nicht in derselben Weise alle als Theilphänomene eines einzigen Phänomens sich darbieten." Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 74–75.

²⁸ For discussion, see Chrudzinski, *Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano*; Crane, Brentano and Intentionality; Taieb, *Relational Intentionality*.

²⁹ Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 126: "[...] für Theilphänomene eines einheitlichen Phänomens, in dem sie enthalten sind, und für ein einziges einheitliches Ding zu nehmen." Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 74.

³⁰ Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 216: "[...] nur werden die Theile, welche es unterscheiden lässt, als blosse Divisive einer realen Einheit zu betrachten sein." Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 128.

mental phenomena are conceived as mereological objects, i.e., as wholes which can be decomposed into their parts.³¹

Blaustein seemed to agree with Brentano in claiming that “[a] presentation is a specific, simple, intentional psychic act.”³² Blaustein accepted the thesis (1) that presentations are *non-extended*; following Brentano, in his 1928 book, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia* [*Husserl’s Theory of the Act, Content and the Object of Presentation*], Blaustein explicitly claimed that psychic acts are not spatial.³³ In addition, Blaustein accepted theses (2)–(4). However, it is too hasty to identify Blaustein’s account with that of Brentano. A subtle difference lies, for instance, in regard to thesis (2). Blaustein rejected the definition of intentionality as “the mental inexistence of the object” since this confuses the object with the act’s content.³⁴ This criticism, of course, followed from Twardowski’s account of the act-content-object structure. In any case, according to Blaustein, Brentano’s emphasis on “immanent” objects can be understood as an attempt to exclude metaphysical issues and to conduct research only in the field of empirical psychology. These differences, however, are not decisive. Blaustein reinterpreted Brentano’s thesis by holding that presentations are based on sensations, which, in turn, are understood as the simplest nuclei of psychic life. In this regard, he stated that “[...] every presentation is a sensation (the act of sensation) or is based upon a sensation or sensations.”³⁵ Thus, Blaustein agreed with Brentano that presentations serve to present their objects to us. Nonetheless, presentations are based upon sensations, which, in turn, are non-intentional.

There are two additional differences between Brentano and Blaustein. In “Book Two” of his *Psychologie*, Brentano argued for a three-part classification of mental phenomena: presentations (*Vorstellungen*), judgments (*Urtheile*) and emotions (*Gemüthsbewegungen*).³⁶ In short, by “presentation,” Brentano understood a phenomenon in which something appears to us. Next, “judgment” means acceptance (as true) or rejection (as false). Finally, “emotions” refer to the phenomena of love and hate. The last class encompasses both emotions and volition since, in Brentano’s view,³⁷ (1) desire consists in experiencing something as good or bad and, as such, it

³¹ On Brentano’s understanding and use of mereology in his project of psychology, see Brentano, *Deskriptive Psychologie*, 79–83; Trans. Müller, in: *Descriptive Psychology*, 83–87. See also Curvello, Franz Brentano’s Mereology and the Principles of Descriptive Psychology; Dewalque, Brentano and the Parts of the Mental; Libardi, Franz Brentano (1838–1917), 38–40.

³² Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 7: “Przedstawienie jest swoistym, prostym, intencjonalnym aktem psychicznym.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 41. My translation. Differently translated by Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 210.

³³ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 69–70.

³⁴ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 5–6.

³⁵ Blaustein, O niektórych nastawieniach na świat nas otaczający. Autoreferat, 193b. See also Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 62.

³⁶ See, e.g., Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 346. Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 206.

³⁷ For an overview, see Montague, Brentano on Emotion and the Will, 110–123, esp. 112–116.

is an emotion, and (2) there is no clear-cut divide between them, but they are related. It seems that Blaustein did not accept this three-class taxonomy and preferred a four-part division in which emotions and the will are separated. He claimed, for instance, that aesthetic experiences combine (1) presentations, (2) judgments, (3) emotions and (4) volitional acts. He specified that presentations are the basis of aesthetic experiences, are dominated by emotions and are often associated with judgments; however, as he put it, they are “very rarely” associated with the will.³⁸ This description makes it evident that emotions and the will are separate and build different classes of mental phenomena. In Blaustein's writings, however, one finds no argument for the four-class taxonomy. It can be argued that here he followed Twardowski, who—as we will see in Sect. 3.2—did not accept Brentano's solution. However, to reiterate, this is only a hypothesis.

In the very last, ninth chapter of “Book Two” of Brentano's *Psychologie*, one finds the important psychological law that “[...] phenomena of the three fundamental classes are most intimately intertwined,” and “[...] the three classes are of the utmost universality; *there is no mental act in which all three are not present*. There is a certain ubiquity pertaining to each class in all of our conscious life.”³⁹ Hence, in every mental act, all three phenomena are present; of course, they are united and are structured hierarchically, but one can always draw descriptive differences between them. The simplest phenomena here are presentations, followed by judgments and finally emotions since, following Brentano, “[...] it seems inconceivable that a being should be endowed with the capacity for love and hate without possessing that of judgment.”⁴⁰ Contrary to Brentano, Blaustein held that *not* every mental act encompasses all classes of phenomena. This difference arises in regard to presentations and judgments. In his 1931 book, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*], he described inadequate presentations, such as interpreting a symbol or a schema (e.g., a map). Symbols or schemata present corresponding objects which are not present in relevant acts. These objects are manifested in unique and irreducible presentations that are referred to by Blaustein as “symbolic” and “schematic” presentations, respectively. In both cases, intuitive contents such as shapes and colors are apprehended, but they refer to non-intuitive

³⁸Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399 [Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 235]; *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 4. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 4, 136.

³⁹Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 346: “Phänomene der drei Grundclassen auf's Innigste sich miteinander verflechten;” “[...] die drei classen von äusserster Allgemeinheit sind; *es gibt keinen psychischen Act, bei welchem nicht alle vertreten wären*. Jeder Classe kommt eine gewisse Allgegenwart in dem ganzen Seelenleben zu.” Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 206. My italics.

⁴⁰Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 349: “So scheint es in der That undenkbar, das sein Wesen mit dem Vermögen der Liebe und des Hasses begabt wäre, ohne an dem der Urtheils Theil zu haben.” Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 208.

objects.⁴¹ In this context, Irena Filozofówna, who criticized this element of Blaustein's theory,⁴² stated that this description follows from the analysis of judgments and *not* presentations as such. For her, when judging, one "ascribes" features to an object or "interprets" the object as being such and such. Therefore, Blaustein's confusion stems from the vague way in which judgments are described as "presenting" their objects. In contrast to Blaustein, Filozofówna held that intending objects as such and such, i.e., the intentional directedness of presentations, is possible not due to the matter of the act but to judgments. To be precise, Filozofówna referred here to the phenomenon of "vague judgments" (*sądy niewyraźne*), which are *always* present at the borders of mental life. As a result, she accepted Brentano's thesis that both presentations and judgments are present in a mental act; therefore, Blaustein's mistake followed from his confusion of different phenomena.

In his reply to Filozofówna, Blaustein held that her argument that symbolic and schematic presentations are founded on judgments does not take into account differences in experiencing different objects. He held that if one accepts Filozofówna's view, one cannot understand the difference in experiencing, among others, a painting, a sculpture, a movie or a theater play; Blaustein stated that the differences here are unique (*swoiste*), suggesting that they lie in different ways or modes of experiencing. These different ways of experiencing are evident and, as Blaustein puts it, intuitively unquestionable (*intuicyjnie niewątpliwe*).⁴³ When referring to the clearness of inner perception, he added that it is unjustified to claim that symbolic or schematic experiences contain judgments since there are *no judgments* at all in such aesthetic experiences. In his view, one does not accept or reject anything while experiencing a symbol or a schema. More precisely, he questioned the need to comprehend "vague judgments" as necessary elements of the psychic life. If this is indeed the case, there are psychic acts which contain presentations but not judgments. Consequently, Blaustein rejected Brentano's general idea that presentations and judgments are intertwined and are present in every mental act. To claim this, however, one has to generalize his view of "vague judgments" as necessary or unnecessary elements of the psychic life.

Importantly, there is another point which requires a reference to Alexius Meinong⁴⁴ and seems to prove the hypothesis that Blaustein rejected Brentano's idea that "[...] the three classes [of mental phenomena] are of the utmost

⁴¹ See, e.g., Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 2. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 69–70.

⁴² Filozofówna, W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych, 64; Filozofówna, Leopold Blaustein. *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne. Badania z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki*. Lwów 1931. Str. 144 + VIII. Rycin 6. Nakładem Przeglądu Humanistycznego. Studja Humanistyczne. Tom I, 76.

⁴³ Blaustein, W sprawie przedstawień schematycznych i symbolicznych. 366.

⁴⁴ More on the Twardowski–Meinong correspondence, see Jadczak, *Inspirations and Controversies*, 43–52. More on Meinong's presence in Polish philosophy, see Jadacki, *Alexius Meinong and Polish Philosophy*, 241–266. Unfortunately, Jadacki does not analyze the references to Meinong made by Twardowski's psychologically-oriented students, including Blaustein; the only reference concerns Witwicki.

universality.” In his *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*], Blaustein considered whether watching a theater play can be described as experiencing an illusion⁴⁵; if this is indeed the case, the viewer's experience can be divided into presentations and judgments, but no one comprehends an actor's performance as true or false. To describe this phenomenon, Blaustein explicitly referred to Meinong's idea of assumptions (*Annahmen*). For Meinong, assumptions are fantasy experiences that are placed between presentations and judgments⁴⁶; the idea that Blaustein coined in accordance with Meinong is that whereas judgments are object-directed and are accompanied by conviction, assumptions lack conviction. With this in mind, according to Blaustein, a theatergoer does not have any convictions and does not judge whether the world represented on the stage is true; instead, she comprehends a play in relation to her *assumptions*. More precisely, due to these assumptions, a theatergoer is distanced from her emotions. In this regard, Blaustein claimed that a theatergoer does not judge a theater play as true or false but *assumes* that it is fictional.⁴⁷ With these clarifications in mind, Blaustein's position undermines Brentano's idea that judgments are present in *every* experience; the case discussed by Blaustein shows that there are experiences, for instance, the experiences of theatergoers, which do not contain judgments.

3.2 Twardowski's Descriptive Method in Blaustein's Texts

As shown above, Blaustein's references to Brentano are rather indirect; even when they are more direct, they are still rather general. As a result, it is often difficult to define the details of his opinions on the descriptive method he formulated in *Psychologie* or on his original re-examinations and applications of the descriptive method. It was also suggested above in Sect. 3.1.1, following Ingarden,⁴⁸ that Brentano's theory—due to Twardowski's teaching activities—was common but implicit ground for the Lvov scholars. It is of course true that Twardowski, who studied in Vienna from 1885 to 1889, was strongly influenced by Brentano. As one reads in Twardowski's *Selbstdarstellung*, his studies in Vienna “[...] bore the mark of [...] Brentano,” and he testified that “Brentano became for me the model of a philosophical researcher.”⁴⁹ Twardowski was certainly a careful reader of his teacher's works; moreover, because of his teaching in Lvov, he popularized Brentano's

⁴⁵Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 38–40. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 65–67. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 231–233.

⁴⁶Meinong, *Über Annahmen*, 3. Trans. Heanue, in: *On Assumptions*, 12.

⁴⁷Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 39. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 66. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 232.

⁴⁸Ingarden, *Die Auffassung der Philosophie bei Franz Brentano*, 1–2.

⁴⁹Twardowski, Kazimierz Twardowski: *Selbstdarstellung*, 5. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 20.

theories within the circle of his students,⁵⁰ but it would surely be a mistake to hold that his concept of descriptive psychology is reducible to Brentano. In Ingarden's opinion, "[...] Twardowski was a pupil of Brentano and always remained in close relations with the so-called Austrian school. In many points, however, he parted with his master and was independent, thus outdistancing numerous Brentanists."⁵¹ Even if one finds the basically Brentanian concept of psychology in Twardowski's early works, later, in approximately 1910–13, he introduced important changes, which, in turn, inspired Blaustein in his own research. In the following, I will first examine Twardowski's early view of psychology, then his later account of it, and, finally, Blaustein's references to Twardowski's method of psychology.

3.2.1 *Twardowski's Early Account of Psychology and Its Method*

Twardowski's early account of psychology, which was elaborated in his Lvov lectures on psychology,⁵² was fully expressed in his article, "Psychologia wobec fizyologii i filozofii" ["Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy"],⁵³ which was originally published in Polish in 1897. Like Brentano's philosophy,⁵⁴ his early account can be read in the context of the late nineteenth-century disputes on the possible methodological autonomy of psychology and its relation to philosophy. Twardowski's general claim, which connects him with Brentano, Beneke, Elsenhans, Fechner, Krüger and Stumpf, is that philosophy as a scientific enterprise can be

⁵⁰As Guillaume Fréchette rightly observes, Brentano's ideas were present in the nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy because his students who "[...] had copies of Brentano's lectures notes and used them extensively for their own courses and publications." Fréchette, Introduction: Brentano's Impact, 9. Fréchette's remark seems to hold also for Twardowski and his students.

⁵¹Ingarden, *Main Directions of Polish Philosophy*, 96.

⁵²In the period of 1895–1906, Twardowski lectured on: "Psychologia uczuć" ["Psychology of Feelings"] (SS 1897), "Zasadnicze pojęcia psychofizyki" ["The Fundamental Concepts of Psychophysics"] (SS 1898), "O złudzeniach wzrokowych" ["On Visual Illusions"] (WS 1898/99), "Psychologia" ["Psychology"] (WS 1900/01), "Psychologia powonienia i smaku" ["The Psychology of Smell and Taste"] (SS 1901/02), "Psychologia pożądań i woli" ["Psychology of Desires and Will"] (SS 1903/04), "Psychologia uczuć" ["Psychology of Feelings"] (WS 1903/04), "Wstęp do psychologii eksperymentalnej" ["Introduction to Experimental Psychology"] (WS 1904/05), and "Psychologia supozycji" ["Psychology of Assumptions"] (SS 1905/06). Between 1907 and 1912, Twardowski had a circular lecture on "Zarys psychologii" ["The Outline of Psychology"] and in 1908/09 on "Psychologia myślenia" ["Psychology of Thinking"]. The last course on psychology was given by him in 1929/30 on "Wstęp do psychologii" ["The Introduction to Psychology"].

⁵³Twardowski, *Psychologia wobec fizyologii i filozofii*, 17–41. Reprint in: *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, 3–32; reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 92–113. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 41–64.

⁵⁴See Feest, *The Continuing Relevance of Nineteenth-Century Philosophy of Psychology*, 693–709.

developed only as psychology since, as he put it, “[...] psychology supplies philosophy not only with its method, but also with its subject-matter.”⁵⁵ As a result, Twardowski took the stance of methodological psychologism, which naturally connects his position with Brentano.

In his text, Twardowski critically discussed Comte's classification of psychology as a subdiscipline of physiology instead of a subdiscipline of philosophy. Comte's position is justified, following Twardowski,⁵⁶ only if mental phenomena are a subdivision of physiological phenomena. Nonetheless, even if mental phenomena are, to some extent, dependent on the nervous system, this dependence is not sufficient for the possible identification of both phenomena. In contrast to Comte, and following Brentano,⁵⁷ Twardowski argued that psychology is irreducible to physiology since both disciplines have different objects: whereas psychology concerns *mental phenomena*, physiology investigates the *physiological processes of the nervous system*.⁵⁸ The difference between the two is twofold: (1) the former is non-spatial, i.e., mental phenomena are not determined by spatial relations, whereas (2) the latter are grasped by the outer senses. What is at stake here is that mental phenomena are only directly given in inner experience. In brief, Twardowski's differentiation resembles Brentano's distinction between mental phenomena (*psychische Phänomene*) and physical phenomena (*physische Phänomene*). After all, for Brentano, mental phenomena are perceivable only in inner perception or inner consciousness, which is described as immediate and infallible self-evidence. When Twardowski referred to Brentano's idea of inner perception, he disagreed with Comte not only with regard to the question of the autonomy of psychology; more importantly, he rejected Comte's devaluation of the introspective method. Indeed, Twardowski, like Brentano, accused Comte's refutation of both inner perception and observation as being unjustified. Even though Comte comprehended both as identical, for Twardowski, inner perception is different (in terms of structure) from inner observation. For him, inner perception or introspection is the simple experience of an object in the sense of direct perception, and for this reason, inner perception is infallible.⁵⁹ In turn, inner observation is a complex act which binds the original experience of a

⁵⁵Twardowski, *Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii*, 37: “Psychologia zatem dostarcza filozofii nie tylko metody, lecz także przedmiotów.” Reprint in: *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, 26; reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 109. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 59.

⁵⁶Twardowski, *Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii*, 19. Reprint in: *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, 5–6; reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 97. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 43–46.

⁵⁷Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 39. Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 24.

⁵⁸In his lectures on “Psychology of Feelings” (SS 1897), Twardowski offers to comprehend mental phenomena as psychic phenomena, manifestations, states, functions, actions and as facts of consciousness. After 1910, however, Twardowski used the last notion—“facts of consciousness”—instead of the Brentanian “mental phenomena.” See Twardowski, *Psychologia uczuć*, 002r.

⁵⁹More on Twardowski's method of introspection, see Jadczyk, *Rola introspekcji w ogólnej teorii nauk Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, 3–19.

mental phenomenon with a higher-order act of attention. However, if this is the case, due to the complex structure of the actual observation and the observed or original phenomenon, observation simply fails in comprehending original experiences and is thus fallible.⁶⁰ Moreover, mental phenomena are experienced in a permanent flow and are thus given only momentarily. It is precisely because of this “briefness” (*krótkotrwałość*),⁶¹ as Twardowski called this feature of mental phenomena in the “Psychology” lecture series, that observation is impossible. As he wrote:

Consequently, we must deem Comte's expositions correct insofar as they pertain to the *observation* of mental phenomena. It seems to me that we are in fact incapable of tracing attentively the course of mental phenomena. We force them out of our mind in virtue of the very decision to observe them. But Comte went decidedly too far in rejecting along with inner experience, does not after all necessarily require *observation*, but may exist as long as a simple *perceiving* of one's own mental state is possible.⁶²

Nonetheless, even if inner perception is infallible, it has some flaws. Like Brentano before him,⁶³ Twardowski was aware that inner perception limits infallible and evident cognition to a mere subjective (personal) life, which means that introspection is a subjective method. In other words, psychologists can introspect only their own psychic life.⁶⁴ This limitation results in accepting *memory* as a reliable source of psychological cognition. Twardowski formulated this postulate in the 1897 article,⁶⁵

⁶⁰In a lecture on “Psychology” (WS 1900/01), Twardowski notices that whereas outer experience can be the object for observation, inner experience cannot be observed “if not at all, only very rarely.” See Twardowski, *Psychologia*, 007r.

⁶¹Twardowski, *Psychologia*, 007r–008r.

⁶²Twardowski, *Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii*, 24–25: “Trzeba zatem przyznać słusność wywodom Comte'a, o ile odnoszą się do obserwacji zjawisk duchowych; zdaje się, iż rzeczywiście nie jesteśmy w stanie śledzić uważnie przebiegu objawów duchowych; postanawiając obserwować je, tem samem wypieramy je z umysłu naszego. Ale Comte posunął się stanowczo za daleko, zarzucając razem z obserwacją wewnętrzną także metodę introspekcyjną wogóle, która przecież, jako metoda doświadczenia wewnętrznego, nie wymaga koniecznie obserwacji, lecz istnieć może, skoro tylko możliwe jest proste spostrzeganie własnych stanów duchowych. Psychologia zatem dostarcza filozofii nie tylko metody, lecz także przedmiotów.” Reprint in: *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, 12; reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 98–99. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 48. On Comte's criticism of introspective method, also in the context of later Mill's replies, see Wilson, Mill and Comte on the Method of Introspection, 107–129.

⁶³Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 45: “Was immer wir innerlich wahrnehmen und nach der Wahrnehmung in Gedächtnisse beobachten mögen, sind psychische Erscheinungen, die in unsere, eigenen Leben aufgetreten sind. Jede Erscheinung, welche nicht zu, Berlaufe dieses individuellen Lebens gehört, liegt ausserhalb des Gesichtskreises.” Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 27: “All that a person apprehends in inner perception and subsequently observes in memory are mental phenomena which appear within that person's own life. Every phenomenon which does not belong to the course of the life of this individual lies outside of his sphere of knowledge.”

⁶⁴More on this issue, see Rzepa and Stachowski, *Roots of the Methodology of Polish Psychology*, 237.

⁶⁵Twardowski, *Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii*, 26–27. Reprint in: *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, 14–15; reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 100. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions*,

and he repeated it in his 1900/01 lectures on psychology.⁶⁶ Twardowski's conclusion mirrors the considerations of Brentano, for whom memory supports psychological methods of investigation. Consequently, Twardowski accepted Brentano's thesis that inner perception is the primary source of psychology and that memory enables individual experiments to reactivate certain mental phenomena more than only once. Due to these experiments, one is able to describe mental phenomena as the unity of mental life.

To conclude, it should come as no surprise that Twardowski's early account of psychology was deeply rooted in Brentano.⁶⁷ Twardowski followed his Vienna teacher by adopting the following points: (1) mental phenomena, which are understood as objects of inner perception, are the proper objects of psychological inquiry, (2) the introspective method is the basis of psychology, and (3) the aim of psychology is the description of mental phenomena; however, (4) mental phenomena are given only momentarily; for this reason, (5) introspection has to be supplemented by memory; consequently, (6) memory is the basis of mental experiments, which help to overcome subjective limitations of introspection by repeating some experiences; and finally, (7) Twardowski criticized Comte, who, although correct in rejecting observation as a method of psychology, still failed to accept introspection as the basis of psychology.

3.2.2 *Twardowski's Later Readings in Psychology: A Reexamination of Brentano*

Thus far, in his early account of psychology, Twardowski followed Brentano. However, as early as 1903, he broke with the three-part classification of mental phenomena as presented in Brentano's 1874 book. Namely, in the 1903/04 Lvov lectures on "Psychologia pożądań i woli" ["Psychology of Desires and Will"],⁶⁸ Twardowski discussed Brentano's theory that emotions and volition are to be comprehended as *one* class of mental phenomena. As Twardowski argued, there are some situations in which one decides to do something even though one has no desire to do so.⁶⁹ In addition, some desires contain emotions. To justify his view, Twardowski sketched a mereological view of desires as a whole that encompasses (1) a presentation of the object; (2) a belief that the existence, *resp.* non-existence, of the object requires a certain emotion; (3) a belief or supposition that the object exists or not; and, finally, (4) a corresponding positive or negative emotion as a

Products and Other Topics in Philosophy, 50.

⁶⁶Twardowski, *Psychologia*, 008r.

⁶⁷Dąbbska, François Brentano et la pensée philosophique en Pologne, 117–129.

⁶⁸Twardowski, *Psychologia pożądań i woli*, 203–248.

⁶⁹Twardowski, *Psychologia pożądań i woli*, 220–221.

response to (2) and (3).⁷⁰ Twardowski attempted to show that desires have to be comprehended as mereological entities of the whole-parts structure, and as such, they are wholes with their (possible but unnecessary) parts, i.e., emotions. With this in mind, Twardowski held that emotions are parts of desires, but they cannot be reduced to desires. For this reason, Twardowski concluded that it is necessary and justified to comprehend emotions as a different class of mental phenomena than the will.⁷¹ Thus, contrary to Albertazzi,⁷² it is more appropriate to hold that Twardowski adopted the four-class taxonomy of mental phenomena.

Despite this difference, it is worth noting that Twardowski modified his early project of descriptive psychology. Initially, clearly influenced by Brentano, he went on to introduce major changes in the years 1910–13. In 1911, he published an important article titled “O czynnościach i wytworach” [“Actions and Products”].⁷³ In the same period, in 1910 and later in 1913, he published two substantial texts, both of which adopted the action–product distinction to describe the phenomenon of psychic life: *O metodzie psychologii. Przyczynek do metodologii porównawczej badań naukowych* [On the Method of Psychology. An Introduction to the Comparative Methodology of Scientific Research]⁷⁴; he also wrote an entry for an encyclopedia, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju* [On Psychology, its Subject-Matter, Aims, Method, Relation to Other Sciences and on its Development].⁷⁵ Although both psychological studies incorporated many Brentanian themes,⁷⁶ they slightly redefined or radicalized Brentano's position; nonetheless, there are also a few points which mark a clear break with his psychologism. First, we focus on the differences.

⁷⁰Twardowski, *Psychologia pożądań i woli*, 230–231.

⁷¹Twardowski, *Psychologia pożądań i woli*, 235.

⁷²Albertazzi holds that “Twardowski took from Brentano the triple division of psychic phenomena—that is, the three ways in which we can refer to an object.” Albertazzi, Brentano, Twardowski and Polish Scientific Philosophy, 14.

⁷³Twardowski, *O czynnościach i wytworach*, 1–33. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 217–240. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 103–132.

⁷⁴Twardowski, *O metodzie psychologii*. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 205–216. Trans. Chybińska, in: *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 61–72.

⁷⁵Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju*. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 241–291.

⁷⁶Twardowski's later project of psychology still contains clearly Brentanian motives. For instance, (1) Twardowski emphasis introspection as the proper and infallible method of psychological inquiries; (2) introspection is defined in the context of the perception–observation division as a simple perceptive noticing of what is experienced; (3) introspection cannot be developed as psychological observation; (4) memory is the source of psychological knowledge, which enables the psychologist to reconstruct primordial experiences; what follows, (5) Twardowski accepts the so-called historical method as a psychological device, which consists, first, in the induction of the empirical laws and, second, in the deduction of the inductively established laws from the more general laws that are not perceptually given; (6) he holds that descriptive and genetic psychology are connected and can support their own findings; (7) the general aim of psychology is to classify the diversity of psychic life.

To begin with, (1) in his later project, Twardowski consequently wrote about “psychic facts” instead of “mental phenomena” as the subject matter of psychology.⁷⁷ Of course, he defined the general object of psychology as the psychic life, but as a whole, it is analyzed as a set of particular *facts* and *dispositions* (i.e., conditions in which a certain fact exists). I think that this is not a mere terminological change; rather, it followed from a more general attempt to unify the methodological approach of psychology and the natural sciences. If psychology attempts to be a science, it has the same object, i.e., facts, yet comprehended from an introspective point of view. (2) This central change led to an important redefinition of Brentano's⁷⁸ late division between psychognosy and genetic psychology as a division between exact and inexact sciences, respectively. Contrary to Brentano, Twardowski called both disciplines *exact*, as they are *sciences*. According to Twardowski, descriptive and genetic psychology support each other, and neither is a dominant science.⁷⁹ Rather, as he put it, descriptive psychology is a *supplementary* discipline in relation to genetic psychology. This position is a clear revision of Brentano's position, for whom psychognosy was regarded as the basis of genetic psychology.⁸⁰ (3) This leads to another radicalization of Brentano in regard to his view of experiments as methodological tools for psychology. Experiments were understood by Twardowski in a twofold manner: (a) as *introspective* experiments, i.e., attempts to reactivate *ex post* someone's own experience and, on the basis of mutual repetitions, to collect them as a unitary image of the type of certain psychic facts⁸¹; (b) as *psychophysiological* experiments, i.e., experiments designed in analogy to physics and physiology.⁸² Whereas Brentano would seemingly accept (a), he would probably reject (b). On the other hand, Twardowski said that the experimental method is objective, in contrast to the subjective method of introspection, which has serious limitations because of this subjective background. Therefore, it is true that:

⁷⁷ Twardowski, *O metodzie psychologii*, 7. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 206, 244. Trans. Chybińska, in: *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 62.

⁷⁸ See Brentano, *Deskriptive Psychologie*, 1–5, esp. 5. Trans. Müller, in: *Descriptive Psychology*, 3–7, esp. 7.

⁷⁹ Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju*, 25. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 263.

⁸⁰ See Brentano, *Deskriptive Psychologie*, 6. Trans. Müller, in: *Descriptive Psychology*, 8.

⁸¹ It can be noted that Twardowski referred to Oswald Külpe (1862–1915) in regard to the idea of introspective experiments. He met Külpe when he was a *Privatdozent* in Leipzig as early as 1891; at that time, Külpe gave lectures on psychology. See Twardowski, Kazimierz Twardowski: Selbstdarstellung, 8. Trans. Szylewicz in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 22. On Külpe's view on experiments in psychology, see Külpe, *Grundriss der Psychologie*, 8–13. Trans. Titchener, in: *Outlines of Psychology*, 8–12.

⁸² Twardowski, *O metodzie psychologii*, 17–18. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 214–215. Trans. Chybińska, in: *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 71–72. See also Twardowski's short text on “Filozofia a psychologia eksperymentalna” [“Philosophy and Experimental Psychology”] originally published in 1913 and reprinted in: *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, 324–329. In the text, Twardowski notices Wundt's revision of his strict division between (descriptive) psychology and physiological approach. More on Twardowski's view of experiments, see Rzepa, *On the Lvov School and Methods of Psychological Cognition*, 149–155.

Twardowski does not agree with Brentano that there is a strict distinction between empirical and experimental psychology or between descriptive and genetic psychology, as Brentano calls it. The method of inner perception needs to be supplemented by results of, for example, Wundt's experiments, which have the advantage of being repeatable and being accessible not only to the agent who has the perceptions.⁸³

Next, (4) psychic facts were understood by Twardowski as wholes that include *psychic actions* or *functions* and *psychic products*.⁸⁴ As Jerzy Bobryk explained, psychic actions are acts such as “believe” or “perceive,” whereas psychic products are non-durable products such as “belief” or “perception,” where the product merges with the action.⁸⁵ This distinction is absent in Brentano. (5) Given, however, that some psychic products can become durable,⁸⁶ e.g., a belief can become a series of written sentences, a psychologist such as Twardowski⁸⁷ assumes that one can investigate the product and—by way of abstraction—one can indicate a founding psychic action understood as a *disposition*. But, if this is the case, Twardowski substituted (or rather supplemented) the Brentanian intuition for *abstraction*; thus, the abstracted object, e.g., disposition, has a *hypothetical* character, which means that it is not given directly. More importantly, the action–product division is crucial for understanding Twardowski's method of analyzing cultural entities as psychic products, which are comprehended as durable results of psychic actions or functions. For instance, Twardowski's method serves to interpret a novel or a poem (products in his terms) as *an expression* of a writer's psychic life (actions in his view). Teresa Rzepa calls this “the method of psychological interpretation,” and she characterized it in the following way:

The key to this method is collecting and examining all human products as symptoms of mental life. The collected products are then the objects of the psychologist's psychological interpretation. When interpreting products, the psychologist, so to speak, perceives psychic phenomena from a certain time distance, and these phenomena are the basis of products as symptoms [of mental life]. On this basis, one can draw conclusions about someone's (including his or her own) mental life. [...] Having collected an adequate amount of information about the relevant mental phenomenon on the basis of psychological interpretation

⁸³ Schaar, *Kazimierz Twardowski: A Grammar for Philosophy*, 21–22.

⁸⁴ Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju*, 6. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 243.

⁸⁵ Bobryk, *The Genesis and History of Twardowski's Theory of Actions and Products*, 36–37.

⁸⁶ Durable products are distinct from the action. As Twardowski explains, “[t]he capacity of certain products to endure after the action that yields them has ended in based on the fact that these actions are applied to something, that is, they are effected on something that already exists prior to implementing the action and continues to exist after the action is performed and in general this [pre-existing] something can be termed the ‘material’ of the action.” [Twardowski, *O czynnościach i wytworach*, 16–17: “Możność trwania pewnych wytworów po dokonaniu czynności, dzięki której powstają, polega na tem, że czynności te przechodzą na coś czyli dokonywują się na czymś, co istnieje już przed rozpoczęciem czynności i istnieje też dalej po dokonaniu czynności, a co można najogólniej nazwać materyałem czynności.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 228–229. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 118].

⁸⁷ Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju*, 25. Reprint in: Twardowski, *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 263.

of products, the psychologist formulates general laws and concepts for the scope of the studied phenomenon. One argues for them logically. [...] Finally, one provides a series of examples, thereby supplementing [the research] with strict and reliable protocols containing a description of the given mental phenomenon.⁸⁸

This method was also used by Blaustein. In any case, (6) if the psychic product was indeed different from the psychic action, Twardowski adopted ontological anti-psychologism.⁸⁹ In addition, he did not adopt methodological psychologism; for Twardowski, psychology is no longer a *fundamental* science but an *auxiliary science* (*nauka pomocnicza*).⁹⁰ All in all, in his later account of psychology, Twardowski reexamined Brentano's project in regard to the points discussed above. Nonetheless, these differences are far-reaching and justify the thesis about Twardowski's original explorations in descriptive psychology.

3.2.3 Blaustein's Use of Twardowski's Method

Given the results of Sects. 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, it should come as no surprise that Blaustein's view of Brentano was determined or even dominated by Twardowski's readings on the method of psychology. After all, Twardowski adopted many theoretical and methodological results that had been formulated by his Vienna teacher. Notably, Blaustein used the term "descriptive psychology" (*psychologia deskryptywna*)⁹¹ instead of "empirical psychology" after the 1874 *Psychologie*; this seems to go back to Twardowski, who had the opportunity to hear Brentano's 1887/88 and 1888/89 lectures on descriptive psychology.⁹² Given this, it can be argued that the presence of Twardowski in Blaustein's writings is all-pervasive, and

⁸⁸Rzepa, *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*, 41: "Kluczowe dla tej metody jest gromadzenie i badanie wszelkich wytworów ludzkich jako objawów życia psychicznego. Zebrane wytwory poddaje psycholog interpretacji psychologicznej. Interpretując wytwory, niejako przygląda się z pewnego czasowego dystansu danym zjawiskom psychicznym, których te wytwory mogą być objawami. Na tej podstawie wnioskuje o cudzym (również własnym) życiu psychicznym. [...] Zebrawszy odpowiednią 'porcję' informacji na temat danego zjawiska psychicznego na drodze psychologicznej interpretacji wytworów, psycholog formułuje prawa i pojęcia ogólne dla zakresu badanego zjawiska. Uzasadnia je logicznie. [...] Wreszcie, opatruje wieloma przykładami, tzn. uzupełnia ścisłymi i rzetelnie sporządzonymi protokołami zawierającymi opis danego zjawiska psychicznego." My translation.

⁸⁹For discussion of Twardowski's view on anti- and psychologism, see, e.g., Paczkowska-Łagowska, *Psychika i poznanie*, 55–79; Cavallin, *Content and Object*, 34–42; Kleszcz, Twardowski a problem psychologizmu, 13–26.

⁹⁰Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju*, 31. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 269.

⁹¹Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40.

⁹²The list of Twardowski's lectures held in Vienna, see Dąmbska, François Brentano et la pensée philosophique en Pologne, 117–129. More on Twardowski in Vienna, see Brożek, *Kazimierz Twardowski. Die Wiener Jahre*.

for this reason, it is difficult to decide which particular ideas stem directly from Brentano or indirectly from the Brentanian writings of Twardowski.

Indeed, Blaustein accepted many of Twardowski's ideas, which were also present in Brentano. (1) He was aware that mental phenomena are given in inner perception; for this reason, (2) he accepted *introspection* as the infallible source of psychological knowledge.⁹³ Next, (3) Blaustein emphasized memory as a reliable tool in psychology; against this background, (4) he wrote about the method of *retrospection* as being just as important as introspection.⁹⁴ This requirement followed Twardowski's worry that mental phenomena are subjective and are characterized by their "briefness" (*krótkotrwałość*)⁹⁵; if lived experiences cannot be remembered, a psychologist is unable to describe them. Of course, (5) Blaustein agreed with Twardowski (and Brentano) that psychological tools serve to *describe* psychic life and that (6) the aim of this description is to *classify* mental phenomena, although Blaustein focused on the classification of presentations.⁹⁶ In addition, (7) he accepted introspective experiments as a tool in psychological research.⁹⁷ All the listed elements are seemingly common for Blaustein, Twardowski and Brentano. This list could also include (8) the method used in the analytical procedure, but let us shed more light on this last point.

In Sect. 3.1.1, it was claimed that Blaustein used a method which is generally comparable to Brentano's procedure. One might follow Tadeusz Czeżowski⁹⁸ in calling the method used by Blaustein was "the method of analytic description."⁹⁹ In the 1953 text, Czeżowski stated that this method serves to analyze empirical objects, i.e., mental phenomena, and to formulate general propositions about objects. He divided the procedure into a few phases. To begin with, (1) of a given phenomenon, it is necessary to identify a *typical* example or *type* which is different from a genus and a species; by a "type," Czeżowski understood an exemplar which is the basis of

⁹³ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 7, 33, 50. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 42, 61–62. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 210–211, 228.

⁹⁴ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 79, 82, 89, 98. Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii* (autoreferat), 165b.

⁹⁵ Twardowski, *Psychologia*, 007r–008r.

⁹⁶ See, e.g., Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 58.

⁹⁷ Blaustein explicitly calls introspection "experimental method" in: Blaustein, [Review of] Henryk Ormian. "Wyniki badań testowych a szacowanie inteligencji przez nauczyciela," 121. In addition, in the review he emphasized that the method can give "valuable results."

⁹⁸ Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981) was Polish philosopher and logician, who was a fellow of the Lvov–Warsaw School. He was educated at the Lvov University by, among others, Twardowski and Łukasiewicz. Czeżowski received a doctoral degree in 1914 on the basis of his dissertation on the *Theory of Classes*. In ethics he was a proponent of intuitionism. More on Czeżowski, see Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 8, 68–74; Brożek, *Axiological Intuitionism in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 49–72.

⁹⁹ Czeżowski explicitly claims that Blaustein adapted the method in: Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne*, 142. Additionally, he claims that the method was used by Brentano and Twardowski. See Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne*, 136.

a description and which serves to define the relevant species.¹⁰⁰ Next, (2) one *describes* the chosen exemplary case by ascribing typical features to the object. Czeżowski was clear that a description is not based on a gradual induction; rather, as he put it,¹⁰¹ it is based on the act of intuition (*akt swoistej intuicji*).¹⁰² Interestingly, he stated that this phase corresponds with, among others, Husserl's method of eidetic intuition (*Wesensschau*), but the act that serves to generalize the description is *fallible*, and for this reason, one proceeds by trial and error. (3) Czeżowski held that a description—because of the act of intuition—leads one to an analytical and real definition of the analyzed object. This phase is crucial since, according to Czeżowski,¹⁰³ it makes one's description general and apodictic. As a result, the described object becomes determined *ex definitione*. This, however, means that the analyzed object is no longer an exemplar but rather a definition of the object itself. Finally, (4) one confronts the definition with other exemplars of the relevant species and genus to verify or confirm the definition. Here, one can define *atypical* cases which do not fit the definition. Czeżowski held that the method has a dual aim since it serves (a) to determine basic terms and (b) to classify relevant objects. Czeżowski's method was examined and discussed by, for instance, Rzepa,¹⁰⁴ Dariusz Łukasiewicz,¹⁰⁵ and, more recently, Maciej Zinkiewicz¹⁰⁶ and Anna Brożek,¹⁰⁷ all of whom seem to accept that Czeżowski's exposition holds for Twardowski. However, is Czeżowski right in claiming that Blaustein used the same procedure?

In general, Blaustein's method seems to fit Czeżowski's position. To claim this, one might refer, for instance, to a fragment of "Chap. 2" of Blaustein's *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*, in which he analyzed the intentional

¹⁰⁰ Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne*, 137. For Brożek, Czeżowski's definition is unclear and ambiguous. She suggests that—at least in regard to artifacts—Czeżowski could understand by "type"—a prototype. See Brożek, *Opis analityczny jako metoda filozoficzna*, 71.

¹⁰¹ Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne*, 138.

¹⁰² In his later text on "Czym jest tzw. psychologia deskryptywna" ["What is so-called Descriptive Psychology"], written in 1968, Czeżowski introduced some changes to his early theory by claiming, for instance, that eidetic intuition does not have a justificatory function, but rather—*heuristic*. See Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne*, 231–232. In this regard, Brożek holds that it is inadequate to speak about a breakthrough in Czeżowski's philosophy, but rather about a more detailed discussion of early theories. See Brożek, *Opis analityczny jako metoda filozoficzna*, 79.

¹⁰³ Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne*, 138–139.

¹⁰⁴ Rzepa claims that the method described by Czeżowski and ascribed to Twardowski comprises four phases: the researcher "[...] (a) arrives at analytical definitions on the basis of a small number of simple examples; (b) based on these definitions, [the researcher] defines the objects under study not as specific phenomena but as certain types; (c) [the researcher] uses the definitions to advance analytical claims and then (d) verifies the claims in practice." See Rzepa, *Psychologiczne poglądy Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, 171: "a) poszukuje się na niewielu prostych przykładach definicji analitycznych; (b) przez te definicje analityczne definiuje się badane przedmioty; ale nie jako zjawiska konkretne, lecz jako pewien typ; (c) na podstawie tych definicji formułuje się twierdzenia analityczne, po czym (d) stwierdzenia te sprawdza się w praktyce." My translation.

¹⁰⁵ Łukasiewicz, *Filozofia Tadeusza Czeżowskiego*, 111–117.

¹⁰⁶ Zinkiewicz, *Metoda opisu analitycznego Tadeusza Czeżowskiego*, 53–103, esp. 58–69.

¹⁰⁷ Brożek, *Opis analityczny jako metoda filozoficzna*, 57–87, esp. 69–70.

object of imaginative presentations.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, (1) he began with an identification of typical examples or exemplars of relevant presentations: (a) an example of looking at yourself in the mirror and (b) Shaw's *Caesar and Cleopatra* drama performed in a theater (§ 8). Next, (2) Blaustein ascribed some features to this type of presentation, for instance, a perspective orientation of perception as embedded in the viewer's lived body (§§ 9–10). On this basis, (3) he confronted the preliminary description with further typical experiences; as a result, for example, he drew a parallel between spatial and temporal perspectives (§§ 11–14) or he investigated the problem of the causal relation between intentional objects or their relation to judgments (§§ 16–18). Furthermore, (4) he generalized his descriptions to formulate a thesis about the *quasi*-real character of intentional objects (§ 15); finally, (5) he formulated a definition of the intentional objects of imaginative presentations (§§ 19–21). Elsewhere, Blaustein explicitly held that the subject matter of description is types,¹⁰⁹ and he seemed to agree with Czeżowski's thesis that definitions are not fixed but are open for further verification. Contrary to Czeżowski's claim, Blaustein did not accept eidetic intuition (*Wesenschau*) as a satisfactory procedure and instead accepted abstraction and inverse deduction as more reliable.¹¹⁰ All in all, despite the detailed differences, I think that Czeżowski was right in claiming that Blaustein used a version of Twardowski's methodological procedure.

As already noted, Twardowski's division between psychic products and actions or functions is the basis of the method of *psychological interpretation*. To reiterate, this method serves to interpret selected (cultural) artifacts as products of related mental phenomena. This method was used by some members of the Lvov–Warsaw School, seemingly including Blaustein. According to his 1937 text on social psychology, the subject matter of psychological research is defined as mental phenomena, but it also includes psychic dispositions and products related to relevant psycho-physical actions. He wrote that “[p]sychology is the study of mental phenomena and dispositions and it also takes into account human behavior and its products if they are related to mental phenomena.”¹¹¹ Thus, psychology explores psychic products. In this regard, one might refer to Blaustein's short 1929 book, *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*,¹¹² or to the 1932 text, “Goethe jako psycholog” [“Goethe as a Psychologist”].¹¹³ The book on Christian Friedrich Hebbel's dramas

¹⁰⁸ See Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 15–31. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 48–60. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 215–227.

¹⁰⁹ Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii* (autoreferat), 165a.

¹¹⁰ Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii* (autoreferat), 165b.

¹¹¹ Blaustein, *Psychologia w służbie pracy społecznej*, 114: “Psychologia jest nauką o zjawiskach i dyspozycjach psychicznych, przy czym bierze ona pod uwagę również zachowanie się człowieka i jego wytwory, o ile łączą się ze zjawiskami psychicznymi.” My translation.

¹¹² Blaustein, *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*. On the reception of Blaustein's book, see, e.g., Barschak, *Leopold Blaustein: Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*. Berlin 1929. Verlag Reuther & Reichard, 396–397; Fels, *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*. Von L. Blaustein. Berlin 1929, Reuther und Reichard, 127.

¹¹³ Blaustein, *Goethe jako psycholog*, 349–364.

begins with a discussion of Brentano's thesis on the intentional structure of conscious acts: Blaustein explicitly claimed that this thesis is commonly accepted.¹¹⁴ Given that the act is intentional and has an object, Blaustein's aim was to analyze acts which are intentionally directed toward God. He emphasized the dual direction of this research: acts and their objects. He even stated that the noematic perspective deepens noetic investigations.¹¹⁵ To explain this dual research direction, he used Twardowski's language of actions or functions and products. His general aim was to describe the lived experience of God on the basis of Hebbel's dramas. To do this, Blaustein interpreted the "psychological basis" (Twardowski's term) and motives of the characters presented by Hebbel in his works. For instance, he analyzed Hebbel's 1848 drama *Herodes und Mariamme* and asked how Mariamme's trust in God determines her actions in the play.¹¹⁶ To be precise, for Blaustein, Hebbel's dramas only provide typical examples of God experiences, and he aimed to describe these experiences as such. His aim was *not* to interpret Hebbel's works as such or his personal faith. This was noticed by Hermann Schuster, who, in his review of Blaustein's book, emphasized that he did not fall into a naïve psychologism which would consist in deducing Hebbel's personal worldview on the basis of his works.¹¹⁷

Blaustein used a similar interpretative procedure in his later text on Goethe. In the article "Goethe jako psycholog" ["Goethe as a Psychologist"], he analyzed and interpreted fragments of Goethe's poetry as examples of descriptions of complex lived experiences. In his view, "[...] in his poetry, Goethe had [...] an extraordinary gift of subtle expression of experienced and imaginary psychic lived experiences and the ability to poetically shape dramatic or fictional characters with a clear psychological profile and a rich psychological life."¹¹⁸ Once again, Goethe's writings were of interest for Blaustein as the basis of the psychological description of complex psychic structures—not because of Goethe's private life. On the basis of his writings, while juxtaposing fragments of his poems, Blaustein formulated, for instance, laws and claims of developmental psychology regarding the process of educating youths.¹¹⁹ Blaustein's concrete ideas are not important here. Instead allow

¹¹⁴Blaustein, *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*, 1: "Es ist eine in der Psychologie allgemein anerkannte Tatsache, daß sich die psychischen Erlebnisse durch ein für sie konstitutives Merkmal auszeichnen, welches 'Intentionalität' genannt wird. Es beruht darauf, daß allen psychischen Erlebnissen eine Intention auf etwas, nämlich auf ihren intentionalen Gegenstand innewohnt."

¹¹⁵Blaustein, *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*, 2: "Diese noematische Untersuchung vertieft die der Erlebnisse selbst. Denn eben die Art, wie sich das Objektive im Subjektiven darstellt, wie sich Gott in den einzelnen Individuen spiegelt, begründet die Unterschiede der Gotteserlebnisse untereinander."

¹¹⁶Blaustein, *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*, 21.

¹¹⁷Schuster, [Review of] Blaustein, Dr. Leopold: *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard 1929, 560.

¹¹⁸Blaustein, *Goethe jako psycholog*, 349: "Goethe posiadał [...] niezwykły dar subtelnego wyrażania w swych poezjach przeżytych i wymaginowanych przeżyć psychicznych oraz zdolność poetyckiego kształtowania postaci dramatycznych lub powieściowych, posiadających wyraźny profil psychologiczny i bogate życie psychiczne." My translation.

¹¹⁹Blaustein, *Goethe jako psycholog*, 353–354.

us to note that here he followed Twardowski's method of psychological interpretation because he analyzed human or cultural products as expressions of psychic life, and on this basis, he attempted to formulate more general psychological laws.

3.3 Blaustein and Gestalt Psychology

3.3.1 *Sensations and Gestalt Qualities*

At the turn of 1927 and 1928, Blaustein spent a few months in Berlin, where he held a scholarship. At that time, the Berlin Psychological Institute was one of the leading research centers in Gestalt psychology.¹²⁰ In Ryszard Jadczak's opinion, Blaustein's works after his return to Lvov bore the mark of his intensive studies on Gestalt theories and the inspirations he drew from them.¹²¹ Among the courses he took in Berlin at that time, he listed, for instance, Stumpf's "Hauptprobleme der Philosophie" ["Main Problems of Philosophy"], Wertheimer's "Logik" ["Logic"], Lewin's "Kinderpsychologie" ["Child Psychology"], and Köhler's "Die philosophische Lage der Gegenwart" ["The Philosophical Position of Presence"] and "Biologische Psychologie" ["Biological Psychology"].¹²² This list shows that Blaustein was indeed well trained in Gestalt psychology. In addition, he mentioned personal exchanges with Stumpf (with whom he discussed, for instance, Husserl's phenomenology)¹²³ and Köhler and Wertheimer (the latter was interested, e.g., in Ajdukiewicz's axiomatization of traditional logic).¹²⁴ Taking this into account, it comes as no surprise that he referred to the Gestaltists on various occasions in his writings, not only in theoretical or methodological contexts.¹²⁵ In the following, I examine several elements of Blaustein's theory and his method, which are derived from Gestalt psychology.

In his posthumous memory of Stumpf, published in 1937, Blaustein noticed that he was one of the leading thinkers in twentieth-century psychology.¹²⁶ For Blaustein, Stumpf preferred concrete research rather than developing a philosophical system. Of course, he was interested in different disciplines; yet, according to Blaustein,

¹²⁰For an overview, see Murray, *Gestalt Psychology*, 473–489.

¹²¹Jadczak, *Uczeń i nauczyciel*, 24.

¹²²Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 11.12.1927, 095r.

¹²³Unfortunately, in his letter to Twardowski, Blaustein did not write about the details of the discussion. Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 11.12.1927, 095v.

¹²⁴Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 19.12.1927, 097r. See also Jadczak, *Uczeń i nauczyciel*, 21.

¹²⁵For instance, Blaustein refers to Lewin in his writings on the organization of education or on discipline. See Blaustein *Karność w nowoczesnym wydaniu*, 19, fn.; *Lenistwo u dzieci i młodzieży (Źródła i sposoby leczenia)*, 13–14; *Przyczynki do psychologii i pedagogiki karności*, 226, fn.

¹²⁶Blaustein, Karl Stumpf, 34: "Dzięki bogactwu swych poważnych i owocnych poczynań badawczych zajął [Stumpf] jedno z czołowych miejsc w rozwoju psychologii XX wieku." My translation.

psychology and phenomenology are dominant in his writings. Of course, the question of Stumpf's account of phenomenology is complex. Initially, Stumpf developed his conception under the influence of Brentano, but he then argued with Husserl because he suggested a different account of phenomenology.¹²⁷ Thus, Stumpf followed Brentano in claiming that psychology is the foundation of all sciences, including the philosophical sciences¹²⁸; accordingly, Stumpf followed Husserl in claiming that *a priori* laws cannot be reduced to lived experiences. In doing so, he combined methodological psychologism with ontological anti-psychologism. Stumpf shared with Brentano the thesis about two types of perceptions (external and internal) but differed from him in that he considered the observation (*Beobachtung*) of internal life to be a reliable method of psychological investigation.¹²⁹ Stumpf's understanding of psychology and phenomenology is clearly expounded in two treatises: *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen* [*Phenomena and Psychic Functions*] and *Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften* [*On the Division of Sciences*], written by Stumpf for *Königlich-Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. In the former, Stumpf identified two types of objects: (1) phenomena (*Erscheinungen*) that are interrelated (*Verhältnisse*) and are accounted for as the content of sensory impressions (*Inhalte der Sinnesempfindungen*) and (2) psychic functions, which are described as acts or lived experiences and which integrate phenomena into certain compounds, developing concepts about them and exciting the will.¹³⁰ Both elements are dependent on one another and make up a real unity (*reale Einheit*), although they do enjoy "relative independence" as it is possible to describe their differences.

In *Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften*, Stumpf made use of this distinction to develop a classification of sciences, two of which are of interest here: *descriptive psychology* examines psychic functions or, more precisely, *elementary* psychic functions and *phenomenology* examines phenomena.¹³¹ Consequently, Stumpf suggested an understanding of phenomenology that is different from Husserl's.¹³² His phenomenology is less interested in investigating internal experiences, i.e., acts, than it is focused on the content of impressions themselves. In his *Ideen I*, Husserl mentioned this difference and suggested that Stumpf's phenomenology may be equated to hyletics, albeit not entirely as there are methodological differences

¹²⁷ Stumpf, Carl Stumpf, 205–265. For an overview of Stumpf's discussion with Brentano and Husserl see Fissette, Stumpf and Husserl on Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology, 175–190; Heinämaa, Phenomenological Responses to Gestalt Psychology, 263–284; Harrison, 'At Arm's Length': The Interaction Between Phenomenology and Gestalt Psychology, 1–21.

¹²⁸ Stumpf advanced this thesis when arguing with Kant's criticism, showing that *a priori* investigations do not have objective value *per se*. Hence, "[...] psychological studies are indispensable for the epistemologist." Stumpf, *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, 490: "[...] psychologische Untersuchungen für den Erkenntnistheoretiker unentbehrlich sind." My translation.

¹²⁹ Stumpf, Carl Stumpf, 243.

¹³⁰ Stumpf, *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*, 4–5.

¹³¹ Stumpf, *Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften*, 21, 27.

¹³² Stumpf, *Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften*, 35, fn. 2; Carl Stumpf, 40–41.

between the two: Husserl's position is transcendental,¹³³ while Stumpf's is psychological. Blaustein was aware of these conceptual and methodological differences.¹³⁴ It can be argued that the conception outlined in Stumpf's two lectures—where transcendental claims were abandoned—was close to him. This is for two reasons. First, Blaustein accepted that pure *a priori* psychology is not possible, which means that observations and experiments are necessary; Stumpf has the same opinion.¹³⁵ I will discuss this issue later on. Second, in his doctoral thesis, published later as *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]*, Blaustein claimed that the world is composed of two parts, namely, material and phenomenal¹³⁶; furthermore, he attributed impressions to the phenomenal world. The very expression “phenomenal world” originated with Stumpf's philosophy, where he wrote about “*Erscheinungswelt*”¹³⁷; similarly, phenomena are accounted for as the content of sensations and are attributed to the layer of the world that is external to the psyche. It seems that Blaustein took this argument from Stumpf, even though he did not refer to him explicitly in this part of his work. This, however, is a mere hypothesis.¹³⁸

What connects Blaustein with Stumpf and, more broadly, the Berlin school of *Gestaltpsychologie* is the approach to perception as something focused on certain wholes. The very concept of “*Gestalt*” is not clear-cut and may denote a form, a structure or an aspect.¹³⁹ Gestaltists used this concept to emphasize that, rather than being only aspect-based, experiences capture their objects holistically. Wertheimer introduced the concept by pointing out the ordered nature of perception. In his early work entitled “*Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt*” [“*Laws of Organization in Perceptual Forms*”]—originally published in 1923—he wrote as follows: “When we are presented with a number of stimuli we do not as a rule experience ‘a number’ of individual things, this one and that and that. Instead larger wholes separated from and related to one another are given in experience; their arrangement and division are concrete and definite.”¹⁴⁰ Hence, Gestalts present objects that are already ordered to a certain degree and are experienced by the subject as higher-order wholes. Blaustein's account of perception is similar. When writing about perception in *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*, he emphasized that in

¹³³ Stumpf, *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, 210.

¹³⁴ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 2, fn. 2; Karl Stumpf, 34.

¹³⁵ Stumpf, Carl Stumpf, 214. On this topic, see also Martinelli, *A Philosopher in the Lab*, 23–43.

¹³⁶ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 74, 76–77.

¹³⁷ Stumpf, *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*, 11.

¹³⁸ I will discuss Blaustein's view on the phenomenal world in Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.2.

¹³⁹ Murray, *Gestalt Psychology*, 475.

¹⁴⁰ Wertheimer, *Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt*. II, 302: “Ist eine Anzahl von Reizen zusammen wirksam, so ist für den Menschen im allgemeinen nicht eine entsprechende (‘ebenso große’) Anzahl einzelner Gegebenheiten da, die eine und die andere und die dritte und so fort; sondern es sind Gegebenheiten größeren Bereichs da, in bestimmter Abhebung, bestimmtem Zusammen, bestimmter Getrenntheit.” Trans. Ellis, in: *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, 72.

addition to colors, we also experience Gestalt qualities (*jakości postaciowe*),¹⁴¹ meaning the entirety of specific qualities that are experienced in perception in a certain order. Importantly, however, perception does not capture elements of the Gestalt but rather the entirety of their arrangement precisely *as* they are arranged. In *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*], one also finds a relevant thesis, albeit formulated in regard to presentations: for Blaustein, presentations are founded on sensations which, in turn, are associated with Gestalt qualities; only such a complex phenomenon indicates its object.¹⁴² Blaustein stressed that the subject *anticipates* such wholes. He understood this “anticipation” as a psychic disposition of referring to complexes of psychic facts.¹⁴³ Thus, a given object may be accounted for in different ways, depending on the attitude of its perceiver. Blaustein also used a similar description to explain changes in the attitude of a subject to an object that, although unchanged, is captured differently depending on the attitude. One example of this type of perception is accounting for a person in a theater first as an actor and then later as, for instance, Shakespeare's Hamlet or Othello.¹⁴⁴

3.3.2 *Experiments in Psychology*

As mentioned above, Blaustein was aware of the function ascribed to experiments by Gestaltists, and he was impressed by how they designed them and how helpful they could be. In one of his letters to Twardowski that was written during his stay in Berlin, Blaustein reported that he had read Lewin's *Gesetz und Experiment in der Psychologie* [*Law and Experiment in Psychology*], a short book published in 1927, which he assessed as “well thought out.”¹⁴⁵ More importantly, however, he was able to observe how experiments are used in concrete research. After Köhler's invitation, during his scholarship stay, he had an occasion to participate in meetings organized at the Berlin Psychological Institute. For instance, he appreciated the way in which Lewin or Wertheimer used a film camera to illustrate concrete objects of research or to control an ongoing experiment; he explicitly wrote that “I truly would like to

¹⁴¹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 33. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 61. Bokiniec in her translation uses the phrase “formal qualities.” See Trans. Bokiniec in: *Imaginary Representations*, 228.

¹⁴² Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 14.

¹⁴³ Blaustein, *O niektórych nastawieniach na świat nas otaczający*, 192b.

¹⁴⁴ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 39. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 66. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 232.

¹⁴⁵ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 26.01.1928, 113r. More on Lewin's early account of the method of psychology, see Brown, *The Methods of Kurt Lewin in the Psychology of Action and Affection*, 200–221.

contribute to popularizing this among us [in Lvov].”¹⁴⁶ In this vein, he noticed that the lectures he had an occasion to attend at the Institute were convincing and clear:

The last time a student of Müller referred to his research on lighting or on the perception of lighting, a professor from Oslo was also present as a guest. A day later, Köhler invited me to a lecture by Katz from Rostock about his own research and that of Dr. Engelmann on acoustic localization in animals. This lecture was one of the best in Berlin, and it confirmed my intention to do experimental work.¹⁴⁷

Indeed, after Blaustein returned to Lvov, he regularly referred to or used experiments in much of his work. This, however, does not mean that he abandoned the project of descriptive psychology or became an experimental psychologist. Instead, he tried to combine both approaches. He already saw a comparable intention in Stumpf, who contributed to experimental psychology yet trained his students—as Blaustein¹⁴⁸ put it—“in the spirit of Brentano,” since he was skeptical of understanding experiments as “the only salutary method of psychology.” To explain this, he also referred to Köhler and Wertheimer. At the very beginning of his 1930 *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative presentations]*, he wrote:

I do not oppose descriptive and experimental psychology—in line with the intentions of eminent experimental psychologists such as Köhler, Wertheimer and others. Descriptions and experiments are two methods of one discipline and the same discipline. This is not to say that there are no areas in psychological research that are available only for descriptive or experimental methods. In the great majority of cases, however, descriptions and experiments are two phases of psychological investigation. Although experiments sometimes verify the results of descriptive psychology, they are usually used to study specific problems on the basis of fundamental concepts that are analyzed and defined within the framework of descriptive psychology.¹⁴⁹

Accordingly, for Blaustein, experiments—in addition to descriptions—are among the methods of psychological research. They enable one to investigate topics which

¹⁴⁶ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 19.12.1927, 098v.

¹⁴⁷ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 19.12.1927, 098r: “Ostatnim razem jakiś uczeń Müllera referował o swych badaniach o oświetleniu, a raczej o spostrzeżeniu oświetlenia. Obecny był również jako gość jakiś Profesor z Oslo. Dzień później zaprosił mnie Köhler na referat Katza z Rostocku o badaniach własnych i ucznia dr. Engelmana o akustycznej lokalizacji u zwierząt. Odczyt ten miał być jednym z najlepszych, wygłoszonych w Berlinie i utwierdził mnie w zamiarze pracy eksperymentalnej.” My translation.

¹⁴⁸ Blaustein, Karl Stumpf, 33.

¹⁴⁹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 5, fn. 1: “Psychologii deskryptywnej nie przeciwstawiam eksperymentalnej—zgodnie zresztą z intencjami wybitnych psychologów eksperymentalnych, jak np. Köhlera, Wertheimera i innych. Opis i eksperyment są dwiema metodami jednej i tej samej nauki. Nie wyklucza to, iż wśród przedmiotów badań psychologicznych istnieją dziedziny dostępne bądź tylko metodzie opisowej, bądź tylko eksperymentalnej. W przeważnej może jednak części opis i eksperyment są dwiema fazami badań psychologicznych. Eksperyment niekiedy weryfikuje rezultaty psychologii deskryptywnej, zazwyczaj jednak bada swoiste zagadnienia, opierając się na podstawowych pojęciach, zanalizowanych i określonych w ramach psychologii deskryptywnej.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40, fn. 1. My translation. Differently translated by Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 209, fn. 1.

are inaccessible to descriptions. Next, they can either verify certain descriptions or can be a method that is used independently of these descriptions.

Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that Blaustein's use of experimental methods has a *dual* reference: (1) to *introspective* experiments and (2) to *non-introspective* experiments. In a short but important article from 1931, "Z zagadnień dydaktyki psychologii" ["On the Issues of Psychology Didactics"], Blaustein juxtaposed two trends in psychology: the focus on either *intuition* (*naoczność*) or *verbalism* (*werbalizm*).¹⁵⁰ The former consists in an attempt to *indicate* or *make* relevant psychological laws *evident*; a psychologist attempts here to evoke experiences which are related to objects described by relevant laws. This can be accomplished with a certain *lived experience* as a form of intuition of the object, its apprehension in perception, in memory or in imagination. The latter account, i.e., verbalism, in turn, emphasizes *verbal* ways of presenting the objects of psychology; as such, it consists in *conceptual thinking* and is based on non-concrete, signitive and non-intuitive presentations. In this regard, Blaustein held that, of course, one cannot exclude verbalism from psychology, but a reliable psychology should accentuate the intuitive trend in the process of teaching since, due to intuition, one knows the basis of relevant psychological concepts.¹⁵¹ To do this, a psychologist has to use an introspective experiment which aims to induce someone to have relevant lived experiences. In "Z zagadnień dydaktyki psychologii" ["On the Issues of Psychology Didactics"], Blaustein discussed an example of an experiment that aimed to show what introspection is. First, a psychologist asked a participant to think, for instance, about a certain story. This, however, meant that the participant experiences something. Next, the participant was asked to name the lived experience; by doing so, the participant had to describe the lived experience accurately.¹⁵² Finally, the psychologist indicated that one internally experienced what is called introspection. This simple experiment described by Blaustein functions as an indication of a certain law or object of research. This type of experiment can be regarded as a supplement or further elaboration of a certain description. More precisely, at least in the example discussed above, due to intuitive indications, one can determine what introspection is. Hence, description and experimentation are designed as elements of one procedure, but Blaustein also referred to non-introspective experiments. This reference is evident in Blaustein's object-directed or systematic studies on concrete phenomena;

¹⁵⁰ Blaustein, *Z zagadnień dydaktyki psychologii*, 327.

¹⁵¹ As Blaustein wrote: "[t]he point of intuitive science is precisely to make the verbalistic form of the truth acquired by the student the last, not the first, phase in acquiring this truth and the first, but not the last, phase in recalling this truth." Blaustein, *Z zagadnień dydaktyki psychologii*, 327: "Rzeczą nauki pogładowej jest właśnie dążenie do tego, by forma werbalistyczna nowo zdobytej przez ucznia prawdy była ostatnią a nie pierwszą fazą przy przyswajaniu sobie tej prawdy, a pierwszą lecz nie ostatnią fazą przy przypominaniu sobie tej prawdy." My translation. It may be suggested that Blaustein's postulate is in line also with Twardowski, for whom concepts are formed by intuitions.

¹⁵² Blaustein, *Z zagadnień dydaktyki psychologii*, 329–330.

for instance, in his analysis of hearing a radio drama¹⁵³ or watching a movie in the cinema.¹⁵⁴ In his research, Blaustein referred to psychological experiments, e.g., acoustic experiments, which prove that acoustic experiences are less intense than visual experiences, or he used a survey method that can be applied to a certain group and used as the basis for experiments. According to Blaustein, the survey method is based on the observation and analysis of talks, personal interviews and surveys held by other scholars. Overall, Blaustein's ideas here followed those of the Gestaltists to some extent.

3.4 The Project of Humanistic Psychology

In addition to the Gestaltists, in Berlin, Blaustein also met Spranger, a proponent of humanistic psychology (*geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie, psychologia humanistyczna*).¹⁵⁵ Spranger, who studied under Dilthey in Berlin, developed his teacher's descriptive psychology project by adopting his method yet expanding its thematic scope.¹⁵⁶ In one of his letters to Twardowski that was written during his stay in Berlin, Blaustein noticed that, in 1927/28, Spranger did not hold lectures but only classes on the culture account in research and on the concept of objective spirit (*Gesit*).¹⁵⁷ In addition, he mentioned some personal exchanges with Spranger, e.g., on Twardowski's habilitation book.¹⁵⁸ Although Blaustein did not sympathize with Spranger's nationalism, which was "exaggerated" (*przesadny*)¹⁵⁹ in his view, he valued his studies on the psychology of adolescence, and he referred to him in this regard in his own writings.¹⁶⁰ After his return to Lvov in 1928, Blaustein did not discuss Spranger's or Dilthey's projects in depth. Instead, he focused on analyzing Husserl's theory of content, as well as on his original studies on presentations. Nonetheless, a few years later, in 1933–36, he presented a series of talks and studies on Spranger and Dilthey in which he explored the method of humanistic psychology, its object, and its basis in the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*). As a result,

¹⁵³ Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 26, 43. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 165, 177.

¹⁵⁴ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 146.

¹⁵⁵ Blaustein formulates an explicit hypothesis that the term "humanistic psychology" was coined by Spranger in: Blaustein, *O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej*, 33, fn. 1.

¹⁵⁶ The thesis that Spranger developed Dilthey's psychology comes from Richard Müller-Freienfels, who is quoted by Blaustein. See Müller-Freienfels, *Die Hauptrichtungen der gegenwärtigen Psychologie*, 125–132, esp. 128.

¹⁵⁷ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 11.12.1927, 095v.

¹⁵⁸ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 11.01.1928, 107v. See also Jadczak, *Uczeń i nauczyciel*, 24.

¹⁵⁹ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 26.01.1928, 112r.

¹⁶⁰ Blaustein, *Karność w nowoczesnym wydaniu*, 33; Blaustein, *O ocenie samego siebie w wieku młodości*, 29; Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii i pedagogiki karności*, 235.

the method used by Blaustein also incorporated themes present in the writings of both Berlin scholars.

To begin with, Blaustein's definition of the subject matter of psychology as a psychic life resembles not only Twardowski's account but also that of Dilthey. In his work, *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie* [*Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology*], published originally in 1894, Dilthey opposed the explanatory and descriptive kinds of psychology. The former adopts different hypotheses about the nature of psychic life, such as the existence of impressions, and integrates them into cause-and-effect sequences to *explain* a given phenomenon.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, descriptive psychology presents elements and interdependencies of different forms of psychic life, such elements being not inferred or added but specifically and vividly experienced (*erlebt*).¹⁶² This method is

¹⁶¹ Dilthey, *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*, 140: "Die erklärende Psychologie kann ihr Ziel nur durch eine Verbindung von Hypothesen erreichen. Der Begriff einer Hypothese kann verschieden gefasst werden. Jeder einen Erfahrungsbegriff durch Induktion ergänzende Schluss darf zunächst als eine Hypothese bezeichnet werden. Der in einem solchen Schluss enthaltene Satzsatz enthält eine Erwartung, welche sich über das Gegebene hinaus auch auf das Nichtgegebene erstreckt. Solche ergänzende Schlüsse sind in jeder Art von psychologischer Darstellung selbstverständlich enthalten. Ich kann nicht einmal eine Erinnerung auf einen früheren Eindruck ohne einen solchen Schluss zurückführen. Es wäre also töricht, aus der Psychologie hypothetische Bestandteile ausschließen zu wollen. Es wäre unbillig, der erklärenden Psychologie aus der Benutzung solcher Bestandteile einen Vorwurf machen zu wollen, da die beschreibende sie ebenso wenig würde entbehren können." Trans. Zaner, in: *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding*, 24: "Explanatory psychology can achieve its aim only by means of a combination of hypotheses. The concept of hypothesis can be conceived in different ways. To begin with, every inference or conclusion which supplements or adds to the contents of an experience through induction can be termed an hypothesis. The conclusion of such an inferential process implies an expectation which goes beyond what is given and extends to what is not given. Such supplementary inferences are naturally encountered in every kind of psychological exposition. I cannot connect a memory to a previous impression without the aid of such an inference. It would therefore be foolhardy to want to exclude every hypothetical ingredient from psychology. It would also be unjust to reproach explanatory psychology for the use it makes of these hypothetical ingredients, since descriptive psychology cannot dispense with them either."

¹⁶² Dilthey, *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*, 152: "Ich verstehe unter beschreibender Psychologie die Darstellung der in jedem entwickelten menschlichen Seelenleben gleichförmig auftretenden Bestandteile und Zusammenhänge, wie sie in einem einzigen Zusammenhang verbunden sind, der nicht hinzugedacht oder erschlossen, sondern erlebt ist. Diese Psychologie ist also Beschreibung und Analysis eines Zusammenhangs, welcher ursprünglich und immer als das Leben selbst gegeben ist. Hieraus ergibt sich eine wichtige Folgerung. Sie hat die Regelmäßigkeiten im Zusammenhange des entwickelten Seelenlebens zum Gegenstand. Sie stellt diesen Zusammenhang des inneren Lebens in einem typischen Menschen dar. Sie betrachtet, analysiert, experimentiert und vergleicht. Sie bedient sich jedes möglichen Hilfsmittels zur Lösung ihrer Aufgabe." Trans. Zaner in: *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding*, 35: "By descriptive psychology I understand the presentation of the components and continua which one finds uniformly throughout all developed modes of human psychic life, where these components form a unique nexus which is neither added nor deduced, but rather is concretely live [*erlebt*]. This psychology is thus the description and analysis of a nexus which is originally and continuously given as life itself. An important consequence follows. This psychology has for its object what one regularly finds in the nexus of adult psychic life. It describes this nexus of the inner life of a typical

also based on the internal experience and aims to account for psychic life as a whole; thus, it may be called holistic. Although Dilthey, as opposed to Twardowski, did not reject psychologism and claimed that psychology is a fundamental science, he put greater emphasis on a holistic account of psychic life than did Twardowski. Of course, Twardowski employed the term “psychic life” when writing about the subject matter of psychology,¹⁶³ but he immediately added that it can be treated as a conglomeration of psychic facts. Dilthey took the opposite view, consistently underlining that the relationships that shape our psychic life are incomprehensible outside their overall contexts. As he wrote:

In the human studies [...] the nexus of psychic life constitutes originally a primitive and fundamental datum. We explain nature, we understand psychic life. For in inner experience [*innere Erfahrung*] the processes of one thing acting on another and the connections of functions or individual members of psychic life into a whole are also given. The experienced [*erlebte*] whole [*Zusammenhang*] is primary here, the distinction among its members only comes afterwards. It follows from this that the methods by means of which we study psychic life, history and society are very different from those which have led to the knowledge of nature. As for the question which we are here considering, it follows from the difference we noted that hypotheses do not all play the same role in psychology as in the study of nature. In the latter, all connectedness [*Zusammenhang*] is obtained by means of the formation of hypotheses; in psychology it is precisely the connectedness which is originally and continually given in lived experience [*Erleben*]: life exists everywhere only as a nexus or coherent whole. Psychology therefore has no need of basing itself on the concepts yielded from inferences in order to establish a coherent whole among the main groups of mental affairs.¹⁶⁴

In light of the passage quoted above, it seems that for Dilthey the object of psychological research is primarily a whole understood as the psychic life, which is composed of mental affairs or facts. This whole is decomposed into or analyzed as a set of these facts. Analysis of mental facts, in turn, is held in inner experience, which

man. It examines, analyzes, experiments and compares. It makes use of all the possible devices in order to resolve its problem.”

¹⁶³Twardowski, *O metodzie psychologii*, 7. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 206. Trans. Chybińska, in: *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 62.

¹⁶⁴Dilthey, *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*, 143–144: “Für die Geisteswissenschaften folgt dagegen, dass in ihnen der Zusammenhang des Seelenlebens als ein ursprünglich gegebener überall zu Grunde liegt. Die Natur erklären wir, das Seelenleben verstehen wir. Denn in der inneren Erfahrung sind auch die Vorgänge des Erwirkens, die Verbindungen der Funktionen als einzelner Glieder des Seelenlebens zu einem Ganzen gegeben. Der erlebte Zusammenhang ist hier das Erste, das Distinguieren der einzelnen Glieder desselben ist das Nachkommende. Dies bedingt eine sehr große Verschiedenheit der Methoden, vermittelt deren wir Seelenleben, Historie und Gesellschaft studieren von denen, durch welche die Naturerkenntnis herbeigeführt worden ist. Für die Frage, welche hier erörtert wird, ergibt sich aus dem angegebenen Unterschied, dass Hypothesen innerhalb der Psychologie keineswegs dieselbe Rolle spielen als innerhalb des Naturerkenntens. In diesem vollzieht sich aller Zusammenhang durch Hypothesenbildung, in der Psychologie ist gerade der Zusammenhang ursprünglich und beständig im Erleben gegeben; Leben ist überall nur als Zusammenhang da. Die Psychologie bedarf also keiner durch Schlüsse gewonnenen untergelegten Begriffe, um überhaupt einen durchgreifenden Zusammenhang unter den großen Gruppen der seelischen Tatsachen herzustellen.” Trans. Zaner, in: *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding*, 27–28.

presents its object directly, namely, the psychic life. For this reason, a psychologist can refer to the mental object directly without unnecessary hypotheses. Dilthey's understanding of psychology and its object is, of course, close to that of Blaustein's. For instance, both thinkers seemed to emphasize inner experience, and they explicated its object as psychic life. There are, however, clear differences as Blaustein—*contra* Dilthey—accepted experiments as a reliable basis for psychology, or he explicitly criticized the metaphysical framework of Dilthey's psychology.¹⁶⁵ Despite this critique, there are a few themes in Blaustein's philosophy which seem to be rooted in Dilthey and Spranger.

First, Blaustein defined the object of psychology as a “primarily natural psychological whole”¹⁶⁶ or as the psychic life. The point here is not that the psychic life or a given lived experience are a whole (in the sense of an object composed of its parts). In his opinion, a description of a lived experience as a composition of presentations, emotions and judgments, i.e., decomposition of the psychic life into its elementary parts, is paradoxically far from being direct since it does not account for the relevant experience *as a whole*.¹⁶⁷ For Blaustein, this meant that a lived experience also includes its product (in Twardowski's sense), which arises as a result of the relevant psychophysiological action. In this sense, psychic wholes can include (1) some psychophysiological products, (2) someone's attitude toward a certain object and (3) a social relation which determines someone's lived experience.¹⁶⁸ In addition, a psychologist often comprehends a person from an abstract point of view; for example, if one claims that lived experiences are intentional, one does not take into account that the person stands in concrete relation to the surrounding world. In this context, Blaustein wrote about the “anonymity” of psychological research.¹⁶⁹ But, again, this approach is partial and does not account for psychic life as a whole. Rather, psychic life is always given in a wider context which binds the mental with the biological basis of a person. Following Dilthey, Blaustein showed that a holistic account of the psychic life requires that its analysis includes other areas that shape it, such as religion, politics, etc. Given this, in Blaustein's view, the psychic life is a whole which includes smaller wholes, which are products of a person. This kind of psychology, which studies thus-defined wholes, is called “humanistic” because it includes man in “the scope of humanistic reality.”¹⁷⁰

Blaustein employed a broad notion of human reality. In his talk “O rzeczywistości badanej przez nauki humanistyczne” [“On Reality Studied by the Humanities”],

¹⁶⁵ See Blaustein, O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej, 34; Psychologia humanistyczna. 3. See also Sekreta's review of Blaustein's approach to humanistic psychology, as opposed to Dilthey's metaphysical approach: Sekreta, Leopold Blaustein: “O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej” Odbitka z XXXVIII rocznika Przeglądu Filozoficznego. Warszawa 1935, Str. 27, 275.

¹⁶⁶ Blaustein, O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej, 34.

¹⁶⁷ Blaustein, O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej, 35–36.

¹⁶⁸ Nawrocki, Sześćdziesięciolecie Polskiej Psychologii Humanistycznej. Koncepcja Leopolda Blausteina, 140.

¹⁶⁹ Blaustein, O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej, 36

¹⁷⁰ Blaustein, O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej, 44.

given on October 30, 1933, during the meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society, Blaustein claimed that the reality studied by the humanities is *identical* to the reality studied by natural sciences, i.e., the real world, yet it is regarded from an anthropocentric point of view.¹⁷¹ This means that reality is studied here insofar as it is the product of man's actions. In general, Blaustein held that the humanist reality includes (1) human individuals, (2) (organized or unorganized) groups of human individuals, (3) products of human individuals, (4) products of groups of human individuals and, finally, (5) sets of such products.¹⁷² Group (5) includes (a) everyday objects, e.g., tools; (b) meaningful products, e.g., poems, theories, paintings; (c) aesthetic (non-practical) products, e.g., a musical work of art; (d) customs, which are understood as types of actions of human individuals; and (e) structures of social organizations, e.g., political systems.¹⁷³ Arguably, Blaustein accepted the general claim of humanistic psychology that one has to study concrete lived experiences in a wider cultural context than the mere abstract structure of lived experiences. After all, Blaustein's studies concern phenomena such as watching a movie or listening to the radio, both of which can be comprehended as a specifically human reality. As we will see later in Chaps. 8 and 9, he described these phenomena as correlated with certain attitudes and, curiously enough, as embodied. For Blaustein, the object of psychology is not only spiritual but also, if not primarily, embodied. Blaustein used this claim in his analyses of the aesthetic perception of, for instance, a theatre play. The theatregoer is always seated in a specific location in the audience, which determines the way he perceives the show. One's perception is further shaped by other factors that are not psychological in nature, such as the behavior of other audience members who are seated around the theatregoer. Naturally, the theatregoer's perception will also be influenced by factors that are related to his individual biography, which, in turn, is rooted in culture and society. Hence, to be able to understand a simple act of perception, one must take into account all those elements which, as a whole, shape a complex lived experience in a given moment of psychic life.

Blaustein presented his view of Spranger and Dilthey on October 6, 1934, at the 335th plenary meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society. Twardowski noted that the discussion was intense and that the audience was interested in Blaustein's talk. Although "[...] the talk was well prepared," in Twardowski's view, "it was misleading in regard to its content."¹⁷⁴ It can be assumed that Twardowski saw in Blaustein's humanistic psychology a project that could be reduced to his own descriptive psychology. After all, to define the subject matter of psychology, Blaustein adopted his teacher's division between actions and products. In addition, Blaustein's anti-metaphysical attitude seemed to be directly rooted in Twardowski's philosophy. In

¹⁷¹ Blaustein, *O rzeczywistości badanej przez nauki humanistyczne* (autoreferat), 143a–143b.

¹⁷² Blaustein, *O rzeczywistości badanej przez nauki humanistyczne* (autoreferat), 143b.

¹⁷³ Blaustein, *O rzeczywistości badanej przez nauki humanistyczne* (autoreferat), 143b–144a.

¹⁷⁴ Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część II 1928–1936*, 365: "[...] Blaustein miał odczyt 'O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej.' Ludzi dużo, odczyt porządnie zrobiony, ale moim zdaniem co do treści właściwie chybia. Dyskusja ożywiona." My translation.

his writings (apart from a few in 1933–36), Blaustein never declared that he adopted the tools of humanistic psychology. One can argue that Blaustein suspended the project he had discussed and left it in his writings as a mere research idea that was never developed; at best, it was applied in a limited scope, e.g., in regard to the cinema experience or to observing a theatre play. In this vein, Twardowski's concerns that his descriptive approach was insufficient to analyze humanistic reality seem understandable. However, in the talk, which was published later in 1935 in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* [*The Philosophical Review*], one finds an original synthesis of Twardowski's approach with that of Spranger or Dilthey. As such, this original approach can be regarded as the very beginning of the tradition of humanistic psychology in Poland, which anticipated the 1960s project of Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers.¹⁷⁵

The aim of this chapter was to identify the psychological themes in Blaustein's method. It was motivated by the need to address the problem of divergent interpretations of his thought. In this context, at the very beginning of the present chapter, I proposed the hypothesis that Blaustein can be viewed as a member of the psychological division of the Lvov–Warsaw School. With these ideas in mind, I outlined selected elements of the descriptive psychology of Brentano, Twardowski, Dilthey, and Gestalt psychology. In this regard, I attempted to show that Blaustein developed an original project of *philosophical psychology*. It turns out that Blaustein leaned on these traditions when defining the object of his analyses and the elements of his method. He understood the object of psychology as “psychic life” (Twardowski, Dilthey) and its method as introspection and retrospection (Brentano, Twardowski), thus enabling a descriptive analysis of *types* of lived experiences (Twardowski). In this regard, a psychologist's task is to clarify the basic concepts of descriptive psychology (Twardowski) and, consequently, to classify mental phenomena. However, Blaustein did not accept the three-part division of mental phenomena (Brentano) and instead preferred a four-part taxonomy (Twardowski). In addition, it is important to note that he mainly developed the classification of presentations and did not elaborate a thorough argument for the four-part classification. Next, for Blaustein, any investigation must be multi-dimensional, i.e., it must focus on acts (Brentano), contents or impressions (Stumpf), and psychic products (Twardowski). His methodological approach did not exclude experiments (Twardowski, Stumpf, Wertheimer). It accounts for perception as an act directed at certain Gestalt forms (Wertheimer), and it refers to humanistic reality as its subject matter (Spranger).

It would be difficult, however, to call Blaustein an uncritical interpreter of the heritage psychology of nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology. Proof of this is that—unlike some scholars operating in this tradition (early Twardowski, Dilthey,

¹⁷⁵The thesis was formulated by Nawrocki in: Nawrocki, *Sześćdziesięciolecie Polskiej Psychologii Humanistycznej. Koncepcja Leopolda Blausteina*, 141–142. More on the project of humanistic psychology, see Giorgi, *Humanistic Psychology and Metapsychology*, 19–47.

Stumpf)—he did not accept ontological psychologism, even though he seemed to accept methodological psychologism (Brentano). After all, he claimed that philosophical inquiry, e.g., in aesthetics, is preceded by psychological research. In his method, Blaustein focused on its practical impact for non-philosophical disciplines (Brentano). He also employed the method of psychological interpretation of cultural objects (Twardowski, Spranger). Overall, one can argue that the plurality of psychological themes in the method of Blaustein followed from his life-long quest for adequate methodological tools to describe the richness of psychic life. Although his method seemed to be rather eclectic, I think he contributed to the redefinition of philosophical psychology, for instance, in his (unfinished) project of humanistic psychology. By claiming this, I disagree with Wiczorek, who held that Blaustein overcame Brentano's heritage by adopting Husserl's phenomenology.¹⁷⁶ In light of the present chapter, this thesis has yet to be verified. It is evident that the descriptive, Gestalt, or humanistic themes in his psychology were cornerstones of the method he used, and as such, they cannot be ignored in his writings or reduced to his account of phenomenology. As we will see in Chap. 5, Blaustein was skeptical about Husserl's method. I think the impact that descriptive and Gestalt types of psychology had on Blaustein is also visible in his understanding of phenomenology not as *a priori* eidetics but as an empirical discipline. Prior to this, however, in Chap. 4, I will examine Blaustein's theory of presentations, which was formulated as an implementation of the methodological tools discussed here.

¹⁷⁶Wiczorek, Leopolda Blausteina interpretacja świata zjawiskowego, 157–158.

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Chapter 4

The Basics of Blaustein’s Descriptive Psychology in the Context of Twardowski’s Theory of Presentations



Blaustein’s project of philosophical psychology, for which he used the term “descriptive psychology” (*psychologia deskryptywna*),¹ was—as already stated in Chap. 3—deeply rooted in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century heritage of psychology; however, Blaustein was a critical reader of this rich legacy. He elaborated different approaches and sought efficient tools to analyze psychic life. Psychology was, for him, a descriptive method which accounted for mental phenomena as wholes that ought to be analyzed or described as a combination of the simplest parts. The general purpose of this discipline was to classify mental phenomena. Nonetheless, whereas Brentano or Twardowski attempted to address a unified and complete taxonomy of mental phenomena, including presentations, judgments, emotions and (eventually defined as a separate class) will, Blaustein instead focused solely on *presentations*. Of course, in his writings, one finds some clues that he preferred Twardowski’s four-class taxonomy over Brentano’s three-part division²; however, again, there is no in-depth discussion of this categorization. Instead, Blaustein formulated an interesting and original analysis of different classes of presentations. With these ideas in mind, the present chapter aims to introduce the basics of Blaustein’s descriptive psychology by discussing the sources, main ideas, arguments, and development of his theory of presentations. By doing so, I will explore the *theoretical* background of his philosophy,³ but a few remarks are necessary here.

¹Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 209.

²Cf. Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399 [Trans. Bokinić, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 235]; *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 4. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 4, 136.

³Miskiewicz, *Leopold Blaustein’s Analytical Phenomenology*, 182–183: “One can roughly distinguish two trends in Blaustein’s work. On the one hand, the *theoretical* work focuses on the problem of intuition in the sense of immediate, evident knowledge, as well as on the typology of mental states. On the other hand, he published on *applied* topics, in the philosophy of arts and the philosophy of media and on questions of education—liberally commenting, among other things, on the laziness and the lack of discipline among high school pupils.”

As Barry Smith noted, “[t]he influence of [...] Twardowski on modern Polish philosophy is allpervasive and almost all important Polish philosophers in the early decades of the present [i.e., twentieth] century went through the hard training of his courses in Lvov.”⁴ Smith’s comment also seems to hold for Blaustein, whose theory of presentations bears the mark of Twardowski’s philosophy. In general terms, by “presentation” Blaustein understood—like his Lvov teacher—a term for mental phenomena which intend an object.⁵ He also explicitly accepted Twardowski’s taxonomy of presentations divided into images⁶ and concepts. He referred to this general idea on a few occasions, mainly in his early texts, such as in his book on Husserl (1928),⁷ in a talk given at the 289th plenary meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov (1929),⁸ in two books, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]* (1930)⁹ and *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations]* (1931),¹⁰ and in the text “O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień” [“On Intuition as a Feature of Some Presentations”] (1931).¹¹ In spite of these general remarks, Blaustein also referred to detailed theses and observations formulated by his teacher, chiefly to Twardowski’s theory of images but less to the theory of concepts. This being said, I will proceed in the present chapter as follows: first, I will analyze Twardowski’s theory of presentations (also in the context of Brentano’s and Meinong’s accounts of presentations); next, I will discuss Blaustein’s assessment of Twardowski’s theory; finally, I will consider Blaustein’s original taxonomy of presentations.

⁴Smith, *Austrian Philosophy*, 155.

⁵E.g., Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 23.

⁶The English term “image” refers to the Polish term “wyobrażenie,” which is used by Twardowski to translate the German term “Anschauung.” Lekka-Kowalik translates “wyobrażenie” as “imagery.” See Twardowski, *Imageries*, 79–104. In turn, Szylewicz (see, e.g., Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 69, fn. 7, 70, 76), Janeczek and Chybińska (see, e.g., Twardowski, *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 102–112, 141–159) offer to translate “wyobrażenie” as “image.” In this chap. I follow Szylewicz, Janeczek and Chybińska in writing about “images” where Twardowski refers to “wyobrażenie.” See also Brożek & Jadacki, *Kazimierz Twardowski’s Achievements in the Lvov Period*, 15–18.

⁷Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 24.

⁸Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii przedstawień schematycznych i symbolicznych*, 169b.

⁹Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 12. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 43–44. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 212.

¹⁰Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 90–91, fn. 1.

¹¹Blaustein, *O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień*, 121: “[...] wedle [Twardowskiego] każde nienaoczne (niepoglądowe) przedstawienie czyli każde pojęcie jest na naocznym (poglądowym) przedstawieniu jako na swem wyobrażeniu podkładowem oparte.” Trans.: “[...] according to [Twardowski] every non-intuitive (non-manifested) presentation, thus every concept is founded on the intuitive (phenomenal) presentation understood as its basic imaginary.” My translation. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 21.

4.1 Twardowski on Presentations

4.1.1 Twardowski's Viennese Theory of Presentations

In Twardowski's early philosophy, one finds a Brentanian notion of presentation (*Vorstellung*) as a basic mental phenomenon whose function consists in intending an object.¹² In his earliest works, Twardowski struggled with the ambiguity of this general definition. For instance, his habilitation thesis, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* [*On the Content and Object of Presentations*], began by emphasizing an important ambiguity of the term "presentation." He wrote:

When one talks about "presentations," one can sometimes understand by this expression the act of presenting; sometimes, however, one can mean by it what is presented, the content of the presentation. And hence it has become customary to use instead of the expression "presentation" one of the two expressions "act of presenting" and "content of presentation" whenever the smallest possibility of a misunderstanding exists.¹³

As the text above indicates, the term "presentation" designates, according to Twardowski, either (1) "the act of presenting" (*Vorstellungsakt*)¹⁴ or (2) "the content of a presentation" (*Vorstellungsinhalt*). However, the latter is ambiguous since—as Twardowski explained, following Alois Höfler and Alexius Meinong in this context¹⁵—the term "content of a presentation" can refer to "what is presented"

¹²Different phases in Twardowski's psychology were discussed in Chap. 3. See also Cavallin, *Content and Object*, 35–39; Cavallin, *Contents, Psycho-Physical Products and Representations. Some Notes on the Theories of Kazimierz Twardowski, 185–208*; Rollinger, *Brentano's Psychology and Logic and the Basis of Twardowski's Theory of Presentations*, 1–23.

¹³Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 3: "Wenn man von 'Vorstellungen' spricht, so kann man damit bald die Vorstellungsacte, die Thätigkeit des Vorstellens, verstehen, bald jedoch mit diesem Ausdruck das Vorgestellte, den Vorstellungsinhalt, meinen. Und so ist es üblich geworden, überall, wo nur die geringste Möglichkeit eines Missverständnisses vorliegen konnte, sich statt des Ausdrucks 'Vorstellung' eines der beiden Ausdrücke 'Vorstellungsact' und 'Vorstellungsinhalt' zu bedienen." Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 1.

¹⁴Cf. Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 103: "[...] und ich verstehe hier unter Vorstellung nicht das, was vorgestellt wird, sondern den Act des Vorstellens. Also das Hören eines Tones, das Sehen eines farbigen Gegenstandes, das Emfinden von Warm oder Kalt, so wie die ähnlichen Phantasiezustände sind Beispiele, wie ich sie meine." Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 60: "By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term."

¹⁵Höfler, *Logik*, 7: "1. Was wir 'Inhalt der Vorstellung und des Urteils' nannten, liegt ebenso ganz innerhalb des Subjectes, wie der Vorstellungs- und Urtheils-Act selbst. 2. Die Wörter 'Gegenstand' und 'Object' werden in zweierlei Sinne gebraucht: einerseits für dasjenige an sich Bestehende, 'Ding an sich,' Wirkliche, Reale [...], worauf sich unter Vorstellen und Urtheilen gleichsam richtet andererseits für 'in' uns bestehende psychische mehr oder minder annähernde 'Bild' von jenem Realen, welches Quasi-Bild (richtiger: Zeichen) identisch ist mit dem unter 1. Genannten Inhalt. Zum Unterschiede von de, als unabhängig vom Denken angenommenen Gegenstand oder Object

(*Vorgestellte*), which denotes either (3) an “immanent” (*immanente*) or (4) a “non-immanent object” (*nicht immanente Objekt*). In a strict sense, then, “content of a presentation” refers to “immanent object,” understood as a “mental image” or “idea.” “Content of a presentation,” thus defined, does not in a strict sense refer to a “non-immanent” or “transcendent object,” which, in turn, is “the object of presentation.”

Smith summarized Twardowski's position in opposition to Brentano, for whom “contents” and “objects” seem to be identical; in contrast to Brentano, Twardowski attempted to show that both elements are distinct.¹⁶ If Brentano was right, one falls into ontological psychologism as the non-immanent object is reduced to a mere psychic entity. To avoid this consequence, Twardowski offered to understand content as mental “images” which play a role of mediating objects, which in turn refer to the object itself, i.e., the non-immanent object. Accordingly, any act of presentation has both content and its object, even if the object does not exist in the real world.¹⁷ However, if the existence of the object of a presentation is *not* necessary for the act itself to present its immanent object (i.e., the content), Twardowski solved Bolzano's paradox of objectless presentations.¹⁸ It is noteworthy that Twardowski's theory influenced not only Polish philosophers, e.g., Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Stanisław Leśniewski, who built their ontologies as reactions to Twardowski's rich ontology,¹⁹ but also Alexius Meinong and Husserl.²⁰

nennt man den Inhalt eines Vorstellens und Urteilens (desgleichen: Fühlens und Wollens) auch das ‘immanente oder intentionale Object’ dieser psychischen Erscheinungen [...]; dieses ist immer in Logik und Psychologie gemeint, solange die Untersuchung von metaphysischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Lehren über das an sich Seiende unabhängig bleiben soll.”

¹⁶Smith, *Austrian Philosophy*, 157.

¹⁷Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 36: “Ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob ein Gegenstand existiert oder nicht, wird von ihm gesagt, er sei etwas Reales oder nicht—eben so wie man über die Einfachheit oder Zusammengesetztheit eines Gegenstandes sprechen kann, ohne darnach zu fragen ob er existiert oder nicht. Worin nun die Realität eines Gegenstandes bestehe, lässt sich mit Worten nicht beschreiben; aber darin sind heute wohl Meisten miteinander einig, das Gegenstände wie schriller Ton, Baum, Trauer, Bewegung, etwas Reales seien, während Gegenstände wie Mangel, Abwesenheit, Möglichkeit u. dgl. Den nicht realen zuzuzählen seien. Wie nun ganz wohl ein realer Gegenstand einmal existieren kann, das anderemal nicht, so kann etwas Nichtreales auch bald existieren, bald nicht.” Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 33–34: “An object is said to be something real or not real, regardless of whether or not it exists, just as one can talk about the simplicity or complexity of an object, without asking whether or not it exists. That in which the reality of an object consists cannot be expressed in words; but most philosophers seem to agree nowadays that objects like piercing tone, tree, grief, motion, are something real, while objects like lack, absence, possibility, etc. are to count as *not* real. Now, just as a real object may at one time exist and at another time not exist, so, too, can something non-real now exist, now not exist.”

¹⁸More on Bolzano in this respect, see Fréchette, *Gegenstandlose Vorstellungen. Bolzano und seine Kritiker*.

¹⁹E.g., Smith *Austrian Philosophy*, 162, 170–171; Łukasiewicz, *Polish Metaphysics and the Brentanian Tradition*, 22–25.

²⁰On Twardowski's influences on Meinong, see Grossman, *Meinong*, 53–54. Twardowski influenced Husserl in regard to the theory of acts and, as a result, in regard to the critique of psycholo-

The basis of Twardowski's theory of presentations can be traced back to his doctoral dissertation, which was written under Brentano in Vienna but was defended in 1891 under Robert von Zimmermann: *Idee und Perception. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung ans Descartes* [*Idea and Perception. An Epistemological Study of Descartes*]. In this early work—in a Brentanian fashion²¹—Twardowski interpreted Descartes from a descriptive-psychological point of view and defined two distinct types of knowledge: ideas and perception.²² According to Twardowski, Descartes famously defined the criterion of truth as “clear and distinct perception,” but at the same time, he referred to “clear and distinct ideas,” which seemed to suggest that both types of knowledge, i.e., perception and ideas, were different. Given this apparent epistemological dualism, Twardowski's main purpose was to determine whether perception and ideas have something in common or rather present two irreducible types of knowledge.²³ To do this, Twardowski first introduced an important distinction, namely, a sentence (*Satz*) and a proposition (*Urteil*). Next, he held that a sentence is a linguistic object correlated with a proposition on the side of the psyche; yet, they both refer to a clear and distinct perception,²⁴ so it is impossible to identify a proposition with perception itself.²⁵ Whereas a proposition can be true or false, perception cannot be true or false. In this context, Twardowski noted that an idea should be understood as a presentation (*Vorstellung*), i.e., as the content of what is presented in an act; however, for Descartes, this definition is unjustified:

For Descartes, “idea” means presentation, he calls it “tanquam imago rei” [...] and “res ipsa cogitate, quatenus est objective in intellectu” [...]. If an idea is tantamount to a presentation and indeed in the presented fragments, it is understood in the meaning of the content of a presentation; then, following Arnauld, perception is understood as the act of presenting. However, this also fails if one accepts that there exist contents of presentations which are

gism. See Husserl, *Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910)*, Husserliana 22, 349–356; Schuhmann, Husserl and Twardowski; Cavallin, *Content and Object*. On Husserl's interpretation of Twardowski, see also Woleński, *Szkola lwowsko-warszawska w polemikach*, 15–24.

²¹ See Fisette, Le “cartésianisme” de Franz Brentano et le problème de la conscience.

²² On Twardowski's reading of Descartes, see Paczkowska-Łagowska, *Psychika i poznanie*, 19–22; Hickerson, Twardowski & Representationalism; Starzyński, *Percepcja i idea*.

²³ Twardowski, *Idee und Perception*, 6.

²⁴ Twardowski, *Idee und Perception*, 10: “Die Perception ist entweder eine ‘perceptio sensu’ oder eine ‘perceptio ab intellectu.’ Nur letztere kommt für das Kriterium der Wahrheit in Betracht. Was soll nun ‘ab intellectu’ percipiert werden? Descartes stellt das Kriterium auf Grund der klaren und deutlichen Perception seines Denkens auf. Aber was heisst, genauer besehen, ich percipiere mein Denken? Nichts anderes, als: ich percipiere, dass ich denke, dass mein Denken ist, existiert. Das klar und deutlich Percipierte ist demnach in sprachlicher Beziehung ein Satz, in psychologischer ein Urteil.”

²⁵ Twardowski, *Idee und Perception*, 13–14: “Nach dem Gesagten ist es unmöglich, Urteil und Perception zu identifizieren. Die Perception ist nach Descartes' ausdrücklichem Zeugnis nur Vorbedingung des Urteils. Zum Urteil ist nach Descartes viererlei notwendig: Ideen, Perception, Willensentschluss, Bejahung oder Verneinung. Was den Willen determiniert, ist entweder die Klarheit und Deutlichkeit der Perception, oder der durch göttliche Gnade bewirkte Glaube.”

presented by the senses, while for Descartes, presentation is an action of the soul but not of the senses.²⁶

From reading this passage, one might hold that Twardowski already struggled with the ambiguity of the word “presentation” in his doctoral dissertation. However, if an idea cannot be the object of perception, Twardowski concluded that perception is not the same as ideas and is irreducible to a mere presentation.²⁷ Thus, the “clear and distinct” Cartesian criterion of truth also has to be differentiated as follows: whereas “distinctness” concerns both ideas and perception, “clearness” holds for perception only; ideas can at least be adequate. For the most part, the relation between perception and ideas is intentional, and they are not identical. In this attempt at a clear distinction between ideas and perception, Twardowski later connected images more with intuition than with ideas or conceptual content.

4.1.2 Twardowski's Account of Images as Concrete Presentations

The latter idea, which was expressed for the first time as early as 1892, led to Twardowski's major idea, which was thoroughly elaborated by him a few years later (in 1898) in an important book, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts]*. While commenting on his own work, Twardowski emphasized that its purpose was to build a unified theory of presentations which encompasses both concepts and intuitions or images.²⁸ As such, of course, this work developed the Brentanian heritage, i.e., Brentano's theory of presentations: after all, the thesis that presentations encompass both concepts and images is implicitly present in Brentano's

²⁶Twardowski, *Idee und Perception*, 14–15: “Idea bedeutet bei Descartes Vorstellung; er nennt sie ‘tamquam imago rei’ [...], auch ‘res ipsa cogitata, quatenus est obiective in intellectu’ [...]. Wenn nun die Idee gleichbedeutend mit Vorstellung, und zwar gemäss den angeführten Stellen im Sinne von Vorstellungsinhalt ist, so liegt thatsächlich nichts näher, als die Perception mit Arnauld als Vorstellungsact aufzufassen. Aber auch dies geht nicht an, da man sonst annehmen müsste, es gebe Vorstellungsinhalte, welche mittelst der Sinne vorgestellt werden, während das Vorstellen auch nach Descartes eine Thätigkeit der Seele, und nicht der Sinne ist.” My translation.

²⁷Twardowski, *Idee und Perception*, 37–38: “Mit Bezug auf die Erkenntnislehre fallen der klaren und deutlichen Idee einerseits und der klaren und deutlichen Perception andererseits verschiedene Rollen zu. Wol haben beide einen Einfluss auf die Richtigkeit des Urteils. Abe0072 die klare und deutliche Idee ist für das Urteil—soll es ein richtiges sein, nur Bedingung (conditio), während die klare und distincte Perception die Ursache für die Richtigkeit des Urteils, die causa, oder wie Descartes sagt, die ratio des richtigen Urteils ist.”

²⁸Twardowski, *Mysł, mowa i czyn. Część I*, 135.

*Psychologie*²⁹ and was explicitly elaborated in the 1884/85 course on logic.³⁰ It is important to note that in the latter course, Brentano introduced the theory of concepts in the context of the phenomenon of judgments, which, in turn, he conceived of as psychic phenomena that are based upon presentations. In “Lecture VII,” Brentano recalled the notion of psychic phenomena already known from the 1874 book, i.e., as something given in inner perception, non-spatial, and intentional.³¹ Next, he classified presentations as (1) intuitions (*Anschauungen*), i.e., the presentations of outer perception, (2) the presentations of outer imagination (*Phantasie*), (3) those of inner perception (*Wahrnehmung*), and (4) those of inner imagination.³² In this context, Brentano defined abstract presentations and concepts; according to Hillebrand’s notes, the definition is as follows:

By abstract presentations one has in mind presentations that have been obtained by a kind of simplification from other ones, and we include these among the presentations from experience, whereas the a priori presentations are independent of experience. They are either individual, and then they are a priori intuitions, or general, and then one calls them a priori concepts.³³

Thus, concepts were regarded by Brentano as a sub-class of abstract presentations; these presentations arise on the basis of “simplification” of other presentations. If the presentation is individual and independent of experience, it is an *a priori* intuition; if the presentation is general yet independent of experience, it is an *a priori* concept. Brentano also discussed the characteristics of intuitions which contain the following elements in their content: sensory quality, intensity, location, and time.³⁴ In his lectures, Brentano examined how one can construct abstract concepts, such as the concepts of continuum, direction, and angle. He showed that concepts are constructed in a series of generalizations of intuitions on the basis of noticing *relations of equality and difference*. For instance, one can construct the concept of a concrete color in contrast with the concept of another color or the concept of spatiality. To have a concept of a concrete color, one has to have a concrete intuition of this very color. As I will argue later, many of Brentano’s ideas from the 1884/85 course on logic, in which Twardowski took part, can also be found in the latter’s early text on *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts]*.

²⁹E.g., Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 103: “Ein Beispiel für die psychischen Phänomene bietet jede Vorstellung durch Empfindung oder Phantasie. [...] ebenso aber auch das Denken eines allgemeinen Begriffes.” Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 60: “Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon. [...] I also mean by it the thinking of a general concept.”

³⁰See Franz Hillebrand’s notes on Brentano’s lectures published in Rollinger, *Concepts and Judgment in Brentano’s Logic Lectures*, 144–281. See also the discussion of Brentano’s lectures in Rollinger, *Concepts and Judgment in Brentano’s Logic Lectures*, 3–138.

³¹Rollinger, *Concepts and Judgment in Brentano’s Logic Lectures*, 230.

³²Rollinger, *Concepts and Judgment in Brentano’s Logic Lectures*, 161–162, 233.

³³Rollinger, *Concepts and Judgment in Brentano’s Logic Lectures*, 233–234.

³⁴Rollinger, *Concepts and Judgment in Brentano’s Logic Lectures*, 235–239.

Twardowski's 1898 book is clearly structured: in Sect. 1–2, Twardowski introduced basic terminological divisions; next, in Sect. 3–10, he examined the main features of images and their scope, and he addressed the question of the limits of imaginability; in Sect. 11–16, he examined different types of concepts; finally, in Sect. 17, he concluded his train of thought, and he summarized his main arguments.³⁵ In his work, Twardowski connected image–concept division with a dual mode of presenting objects. This idea originated from Aristotle's opposition between an imagined object (φαντάσματα) and a mere thought (τὰ νοητά). Later, in Twardowski's opinion, this opposition was reestablished by Descartes, who differentiated imagination (*imaginatio*) and pure cognition (*pura intellectio*).³⁶ Both modes of presentation have different characteristics, since the former presents the object of presentation as somehow sensorially present as, speaking metaphorically, flickering in front of the mind's eye, while the latter is not sensory present at all. In other words, Twardowski drew a sharp distinction between *imagining* and *thinking*. Indeed, there are objects that cannot be imagined, yet one thinks of them by using concepts. One can *imagine*, e.g., a triangle; however, one cannot *imagine* more complex mathematical figures, e.g., a myriagon, i.e., a polygon with ten thousand sides (Descartes's example), even if one *understands* what such an object is supposed to be like. Both phenomena, however, function as presentations. With this in mind, Twardowski referred to German philosophical terminology and introduced an important differentiation: whereas images (*Anschauungen*) are concrete and direct presentations, concepts (*Begriffe*) are general and indirect.³⁷ Thus, (1) presentations (*Vorstellungen*) are mental phenomena which intend their objects, yet they can function as either (2) images (*Anschauungen*), i.e., concrete, direct, and intuitive presentations (*anschauliche Vorstellungen*), or as (3) concepts (*Begriffe*), i.e., general, indirect, and non-intuitive presentations (*unanschauliche Vorstellungen*).

Twardowski's distinction is based on descriptive-psychological differences drawn in the contents of presentations. In this regard, his ultimate aim is to show that images are a necessary condition for concepts, as they both, i.e., images and concepts, have the same content which, however, is experienced differently. Nonetheless, before examining this issue, Twardowski critically assessed some popular views on images. First, he rejected Hume's thesis that images are the *results* of impressions. Twardowski noted that "[...] we speak of color or sound *impressions* when they reach our consciousness through the effect of stimuli. On the other hand,

³⁵ See Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 114–197. The text was partly translated in Twardowski, *Imageries*, 79–104. The translation encompasses Sect. 1 and 3–9 of the original text.

³⁶ Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 1–2. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 114. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 79.

³⁷ Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 8–9. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 118–119. This fragment of the Polish edition is omitted in the English translation. See Twardowski, *Imageries*, 82, fn. 8.

we speak of color or sound *images* realized without any stimuli.”³⁸ Twardowski’s point here is that images do not consist in recollecting stimuli or restoring impressions. Moreover, Twardowski denied that an image in consciousness can be viewed as a statement or a judgment; after all, as he argued, the imagined object can be given without a belief which affirms its object as existing, and thus it can be experienced without a judgment (in Brentano’s sense). Finally, images cannot be described as the recollection of certain perceptions since the imagined object is given as a whole, e.g., as a table, and not as a set of given colors and shapes. Twardowski was clear here: a whole *cannot* be understood as a sum in a mathematical sense; instead, parts of images are integrated into a whole.³⁹ Given this criticism, Twardowski stated that images consist neither in restoring impressions nor in recollecting perceptions but rather can be understood—at least as a provisional definition—as a *synthesis of impressions*. Twardowski explained this as follows:

As a synthesis of impressions, image still remains distinct from impressions. The difference between images and impressions, however, is not that an impression occurs under the influence of external stimuli and without such stimuli. It consists in the fact that describes wholes which are combined from elements, and impressions are just these elements. The relation of image to impressions is that of a whole to its parts.⁴⁰

For him, images are therefore wholes composed of impressions, wherein impressions are parts of certain wholes. As he put it, parts are unified into one whole or they conjoin with each other. Thus, the whole, which is composed of its parts, has a different character, as wholes are different than their parts and cannot be comprehended as a mere sum (in a mathematical sense) of their parts. One might rephrase Twardowski’s point here in mereological language as follows: impressions are inseparable from images, yet they are still distinguishable (as identified due to a description). On the basis of this preliminary definition, Twardowski formulated a key insight into his theory of presentations: if images are indeed syntheses of impressions, it is possible to define different *types* or *classes* of images depending on the status of the constituent impressions. After all, as already stated, impressions build the contents of presentations, and they can be experienced differently while presenting their objects. With this idea in mind, we can examine Twardowski’s classification of images.

³⁸Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 16: “Mówimy więc o *wrażeniach* barw, dźwięków itd., o ile barwy, dźwięki itd. Dochodzą do naszej świadomości wskutek działania podniet; o *wyobrażeniach* barw, dźwięków itd. Mówimy natomiast, ilekroć uświadamiamy sobie barwy, dźwięki itd. Bez podniet.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 122. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 83.

³⁹Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 15–19. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 121–124. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 83–85.

⁴⁰Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 23: “Jako synteza wrażeń wyobrażenie i nadal pozostaje czymś od wrażeń odmiennem. Różnicy między wyobrażeniami i wrażeniami nie należy jednak upatrywać w tem, że wrażenia powstają pod wpływem podniet zewnętrznych a wyobrażenia bez podniet. Polega ona na tem, że wyobrażenia są całością złożoną z pierwiastków, a wrażenia są temi pierwiastkami. Wyobrażenie ma się zatem do wrażenia jak całość do części.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 126. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 87, transl. Modified.

To begin with, (1) the first class of images is connected to impressions directly caused by stimuli; Twardowski called this class of images *perceptive* and states that they are the most original images in regard to other classes of images, as here a synthesis of impressions refers directly to what is actually experienced.⁴¹ This class of images clearly resembles Brentano's classification of intuitions (*Anschauungen*) as the presentations of outer perceptions where the synthesis of impressions takes place. (2) Images included in the second class synthesize impressions which are not directly caused by stimuli but refer to restored impressions which were originally directly experienced; this class of images is called *reproductive*, and here a synthesis of impressions refers indirectly to what was actually experienced, i.e., it consists in the synthesis of restored impressions. (3) The third class of images is also based on indirect impressions, but unlike images included in the second class, restored impressions here do not refer to original experiences which took place in the past; rather, the combination forms *new* images which were never experienced. Twardowski called this class of images *creative*, and he held that these syntheses of impressions refer indirectly to what was actually experienced; however, they do not reproduce restored impressions, and they consist in a new combination of original impressions.⁴² It is worth noting here that both classes of images just described, i.e., *reproductive* and *creative*, refer in the end to the first class of images, i.e., the

⁴¹Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 24: "Określenie wyobrażenia, upatrujące w niem syntezę wrażeń zmysłowych, nie pozwala nazwać nadal wyobrażeń 'ślądami,' które w umyśle, czy w mózgu pozostają po zaniknięciu wrażeń i spostrzeżeń. Będąc pierwotnie częścią składową spostrzeżenia, wyobrażenie istnieje już równocześnie z niem. Kto więc spostrzega ołówek lub książkę, posiada już w chwili gdy przedmioty te spostrzega, wyobrażenie ołówka i książki. Tak samo ma się rzecz przy każdym innym spostrzeżeniu. Wyobrażenia, powstające w umyśle przy sposobności spostrzeżeń, nazywają się spostrzegaczymi (*Wahrnehmung-Vorstellungen, sense-images, presentations*) dla odróżnienia od wyobrażeń innych." Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 127. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 87–88, transl. Modified: "A definition attributing to an image the synthesis of sensory impressions does not allow us to see images as traces of vanished impressions or perceptions remaining in the mind or the brain. An image already exists simultaneously with perception, as an original part thereof. One who perceives a pencil or a book already has an image of a pencil or a book from the moment he perceives one; this is just as true of any other perception. An image appearing in the mind in the moment of perception, as distinguished from other images, is called presentation (*Wahrnehmung-Vorstellungen, sense-images*)."

⁴²Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 25: "Synteza tych wrażeń przypomnianych może być dwojaką. Albo jest podobną do syntezy, w którą się złączyły wrażenia wtedy, gdy wystąpiły wskutek działania podnieć zewnętrznych, albo też może być odmienną od pierwotnej syntezy. W pierwszym wypadku, synteza wrażeń odtworzonych jest odnowioną syntezą wrażeń pierwotnych i nosi miano wyobrażenia odtwórczego (*Erinnerung-Vorstellung, memory image, representation*); w drugim wypadku synteza przedswia się jako coś nowego, jako mimowolny lub dowolny wytwór fantazji i nazywa się wyobrażeniem wytwórczym." Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 127. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 88, transl. Modified: "A synthesis of such recollected impressions can take two forms, either like unto or differing from the synthesis in which they were originally integrated, as effects of external stimuli. In the first case, the synthesis of restored impressions renews that of the primary original impressions and is called a 'reproductive image' (*Erinnerung-Vorstellung, memory image, representation, wyobrażenie odtwórcze*); in the other case, the synthesis appears as something new, as a spontaneous or intended product of fancy and is called a creative image."

perceptive ones. After all, whether dealing with reproductive or creative images, one still has to use restored impressions, only in a different way: whereas *reproductive* images restore what was perceived, *creative* images combine what was perceived, even though it was never experienced. Finally, (4) the fourth class of images refers not to impressions as such but to mental phenomena which are innerly perceived. Twardowski called this class of images *introspective*, and he stated that here a synthesis of impressions does not happen, the object is given in inner perception. This last class of images includes images which are directed toward mental objects. By holding this, Twardowski agreed with Brentano, who, in his analysis of Aristotle's φάντασμα, identified presentations which are founded on inner perceptions.⁴³ Twardowski held that these images are less adequate or distinct than other classes of images.⁴⁴ However, it is difficult to deny the possibility of presenting, for example, an image of one's own joy (a mental object); if this is indeed the case, according to Twardowski, there are images which are *not* understood as a synthesis of impressions.

In light of Twardowski's four-partite taxonomy, the preliminary definition of image as a synthesis of impressions has to be revisited since it holds only for classes (1), (2), and (3). This does not hold for class (4). To show what is common across *all* classes of images, Twardowski noted that introspective images are still a *synthesis* of multiple relatively simple elements. On this basis, he offered the following *general definition of images*:

Thus, one can say that all imagery, of mental and physical objects alike, is an integration, synthesis, complex of numerous elements, in which the objects imagined are given to us in their parts. For physical objects, these elements are called impressions; for the corresponding elements in mental object imagery, we have no name.⁴⁵

⁴³Brentano, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, 102: "Auch Phantasmen von der Eigenthümlichkeit jenes inneren auf die Sensationen selbst gerichteten Sinnes gibt es, und namentlich haben wir bei jeder Erinnerung Phantasmen dieser Art, denn man erinnert sich, etwas früherer gesehen oder gehört zu haben u. dgl., also eines früheren Sehens oder Hörens, und ohne dass diese Acte jetzt wirklich bestehen und empfunden werden können, haben wir die Vorstellung von ihnen in uns." Trans. George, in *The Psychology of Aristotle*, 151.

⁴⁴Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 27: "Przyznać należy, że wyobrażenia przedmiotów psychicznych są zwykle znacznie mniej wyraźnymi od wyobrażeń fizycznych. Okoliczność ta niezawodnie przyczynia się do trudności w uznawaniu wyobrażeń przedmiotów psychicznych. Jest ona zresztą następstwem faktu, że spostrzeżenia wewnętrzne są mniej dokładne niż zmysłowe, co się objawia także w niemożliwości obserwacji wewnętrznej. Ale ćwiczenie i wprawa mogą wyrobić uzdolnienie do bardzo dokładnych spostrzeżeń wewnętrznych i do bardzo wyraźnych wyobrażeń własnych zjawisk psychicznych." Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 131. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 91, transl. Modified: "We must admit that images of mental objects are usually less distinct than those of physical objects; this fact surely contributes to a disinclination to accept images of mental objects. As it happens, inner perceptions are less adequate than sensory perceptions; this manifests itself e.g. in the impossibility of inner observation. With practice, however, one may develop a skill for very adequate inner perceptions and clear images of one's mental phenomena."

⁴⁵Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 38: "Można zatem powiedzieć, że wszystkie wyobrażenia, zarówno przedmiotów psychicznych jak fizycznych, są zjednoczeniem czyli syntezą, kompleksem mniej lub więcej licznych czynników, w których uświadamiają się nam części wyobrażonego przedmiotu. Gdy chodzi o przedmioty fizyczne, czynnikami tymi są wrażenia; nazwy, któreby

As a result, in his theory of presentations, Twardowski accepted that the following features are common to all classes of images: (1) *concreteness* (*konkretność*), i.e., a compact integration of elements synthesized in an image; (2) *manifestness* (*Anschaulichkeit, pogładowość*), i.e., “[...] the relation of any image, concrete as it is, to experience (perception) as the primary source of imagery”⁴⁶; and (3) *sketchiness* (*ogólnikowość*), i.e., “[t]he property by which an image brings out some features of imagined objects more vividly, others less vividly.”⁴⁷ The last feature means that an image is always a sketch which cannot present its object absolutely adequate; to phrase it differently, one cannot refer to every aspect or all of the features of the presented object, since the object is presented only in a vague way. For Twardowski, then, images consist in unifying or synthesizing features or aspects of the presented object. To explain this, Twardowski referred to Meinong's view of *abstraction*.

4.1.3 *An Excursus on Meinong on Presentations and the Question of Twardowski's Representationalism*

Meinong, who studied in Vienna in the 1870s, was influenced by Brentano. Under Brentano's guidance, Meinong focused on Hume's philosophy.⁴⁸ In 1877, Meinong wrote his *Habilitationsschrift* on Hume's nominalism, and in 1882, he wrote another text on Hume's theory of relations. Both texts resonated in Twardowski's theory of images.⁴⁹ Meinong stayed in Vienna until 1882, when he was appointed at the University of Graz. Under Brentano's guidance, Meinong used descriptive

oznaczała odpowiednie czynniki wyobrażeń przedmiotów psychicznych, nie posiadamy.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 134. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 94.

⁴⁶Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 43: “[...] stosunek, w jakim każde wyobrażenie, będąc konkretnym, pozostaje do doświadczenia (spostrzeżeń) jako pierwotnego źródła wyobrażeń.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 137. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik in: *Imageries*, 96, transl. Modified. Twardowski emphasized a close connection between concreteness and manifestness in opposition to Meinong for whom manifestness did not require concreteness. According to Meinong, a concrete and manifest object can be the object of abstraction, e.g., one can abstract a certain feature at the basis of the concrete object; however, the abstracted feature is at once manifest and non-concrete (abstract). Meinong, *Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie*, 214: “Es gibt abstrakte Anschauungen und vielleicht auch anschauliche Begriffe.” Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, 243. On Meinong's theory of phantasy-presentations, see Raspa, *Phantasie, Phantasieerlebnisse und Vorstellungsproduktion bei Meinong*. Twardowski argues that if Meinong is right and one can abstract some parts from an imagery, what is abstracted is *not* an image, but a concept which, in turn, is an abstract presentation.

⁴⁷Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 48: “Właściwość, dzięki której każde wyobrażenie uwydatnia jedne cechy wyobrażonego przedmiotu wyraźniej, inne mniej wyraźniej.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 139. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 98.

⁴⁸Jacquette, *Alexius Meinong*, 2.

⁴⁹See Twardowski's letter to Meinong from May 1, 1898 in: Meinong, Twardowski, *Der Briefwechsel*, 100–101.

psychology as a methodological tool in the object theory he developed.⁵⁰ However, diverging from Brentano, Meinong opted for a two-class classification of experiences into intellectual and emotional.⁵¹ Twardowski also influenced Meinong. For instance, Meinong reinterpreted Brentano's idea of immanent objects, reading this theory in light of the Twardowskian object–content divide.⁵² Meinong and Twardowski corresponded from 1893 for more than two decades, informing each other about their new developments in philosophy.

In general, Meinong understood presentations as a class of elementary lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*), which are part of intellectual experiences. Like Brentano, Meinong held that presentations are given in immanent and thus direct perception; he also claimed that all lived experiences are based upon presentations. There is, however, an important difference between Brentano and Meinong in regard to the claim that experiences are intentional. According to Marek, “Meinong is not completely sure whether ‘being directed to something, to an object’ is common to all experiences. But Meinong stresses the point that experiences like representations [...] are usually directed to an object.”⁵³ For Meinong, presentations are always given as parts of other, more complex experiences, e.g., judgments, assumptions, emotions; presentations directly (*unmittelbar*) indicate their object.⁵⁴ Presentations thus described are purely passive and immediate.⁵⁵ In his early studies on Hume, Meinong blurred (at least in regard to terminology) the content–object division by stating that the term “object” (*Objekt*) is equivocal, as it can refer either to an “immanent object” (*immanentes Objekt*) or to an “object of presentation” (*Vorstellungsobjekt*).⁵⁶ Nonetheless, already in *Logik*, written together with Höfler, Meinong suggested that intentionality cannot be understood in terms of mental inexistence but rather in terms of a transcendent relation to an object; what is immanent is content (*Inhalt*), not objects.⁵⁷ In his later texts, especially in the treatise “Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung”⁵⁸ [“On Objects of Higher Order and Their Relationship to Internal Perception”] or in *Über Annahmen*⁵⁹ [“On Assumptions”], Meinong explicitly accepted the distinction between the mental content (*Inhalt*) and the object (*Gegenstand*) within presentations (*Vorstellungen*). Following Dale Jacquette,⁶⁰ one may hold that

⁵⁰ Schubert Kalsi, *Meinong's Theory of Knowledge*, 4.

⁵¹ Dewalque, Natural Classes in Brentano's Psychology, 111–142.

⁵² Jacquette, *Alexius Meinong*, 11.

⁵³ Marek, Alexius Meinong.

⁵⁴ Raspa, Phantasie, Phantasieerlebnisse und Vorstellungsproduktion bei Meinong, 96.

⁵⁵ See Meinong, *Über Annahmen*, 233–246, § 38. Trans. Heanue, in: *On Assumptions*, 170–178, § 38. See also the summary in: Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, 5–6.

⁵⁶ Meinong, Hume-Studien I, 234. Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, 48.

⁵⁷ Höfler, *Logik*, 6–7. See also Jacquette, *Alexius Meinong*, 10.

⁵⁸ Meinong, On Objects of Higher Order and their Relationship to Internal Perception, 141–143.

⁵⁹ Meinong, *Über Annahmen*, 233–246. Trans. Heanue, in: *On Assumptions*, 170–178.

⁶⁰ Jacquette, *Alexius Meinong*, 11.

Meinong owed the more precise language of the content/object distinction in his later texts to Twardowski, though, to reiterate, the distinction is also present in his earlier texts.

Meinong used two basic pairs of attributes to describe presentations: (1) the *concrete*–or–*abstract* category and (2) the *particular*–or–*general* division. For him, a presentation is *concrete* if it presents all of the qualities of its object; otherwise, it is *abstract*. Next, a presentation is *particular* if it refers to an individual object; otherwise, it is *general*. Against this background, Meinong described different classes of presentations. To begin with, he described the presentations of outer perceptions as *concrete* and *particular*; as such, they are also described as *intuitive* (*anschaulich*).⁶¹ By contrast, concepts are to be described as *abstract* presentations; curiously enough, Meinong denied that all abstract presentations are *per definitionem* non-intuitive (*unanschaulich*) since there are abstract intuitions and intuitive concepts. What makes concepts intuitive is how they are composed of partial presentations in relation to a unified complex (*Komplexion*). As early as the 1880s, more precisely in his *Hume-Studies II*, Meinong claimed that the essence of concepts lies in their content (*Inhalt*); presentations, including abstract presentations, i.e., concepts, are built in the associative process of combining partial presentations that, in turn, indicate different attributes in their content.⁶² A partial presentation arises as abstract due to *abstraction*, which consists in focusing on some features (or a feature) of an object and omitting other features.⁶³ Thus, a concept is a complex presentation of different presentations combined into one mental unity. Importantly, complexes are produced on the basis of a concrete subject which unites partial presentations. As such, concepts are produced, similar to fantasy presentations.⁶⁴ If the synthesis or combination fails, i.e., partial presentations are not united and cannot be intuitively given, the produced complex is non-intuitive (*unanschaulich*).⁶⁵ All in all, Meinong distinguished *four* classes of concepts: (1) *abstract* concepts, (2) *concrete* concepts, (3) *general* concepts, and (4) *particular* concepts.

I will not discuss Meinong's classification here⁶⁶; instead, it suffices to recall that Twardowski explicitly declared in his studies on images and concepts that he was inspired by Meinong's theory.⁶⁷ Indeed, as shown in Sect. 4.1.2, Twardowski referred to Meinong's idea of abstraction, which consist in highlighting some features of the imagined objects while other features of those very objects are omitted.

⁶¹ See, e.g., Meinong, *Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie*, 213–214. Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, 242–243. Meinong, *Über Annahmen*, 247–251. Trans. Heanue, in: *On Assumptions*, 179–181.

⁶² Meinong, *Hume-Studien II, Zur Relationstheorie*. *Akademie der Wissenschaften* 101, 660. Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 2, 86.

⁶³ More on Meinong's idea of abstraction and a critical assessment of this theory, see Chudzinski, *Gegenstandstheorie und Theorie der Intentionalität bei Alexius Meinong*, 55–64.

⁶⁴ Meinong, *Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie*, 165–166. Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, 199.

⁶⁵ Meinong, *Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie*, 210–211. Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, 240.

⁶⁶ For a summary of Meinong's classification of concepts, see Grossmann, *Meinong*, 19–20.

⁶⁷ Meinong, Twardowski, *Der Briefwechsel*, 100–101.

In general, Twardowski agreed with Meinong that some features of the imagined object are presented as more vivid than others, but he denied the consequences of Meinong's idea that *all* images should be comprehended as more or less abstract. In contrast to Meinong, Twardowski held that even if an image combines features, thus produced unity is concrete, even though it is sketchy; in any case, it is not abstract. An image is sketchy in the sense that it presents a certain object without referring to a certain defined and individual object but rather to *any* object which generally resembles the imagined one. In this regard, Twardowski drew an analogy between imagining and painting: the relation between *sketchy* images (which do not present *all* of the features of a certain object, e.g., in memory) and *ideal* (Twardowski's phrase) images (which present *all* of the features of a certain object equally) is analogous to the relation of a sketch to a completed painting which presents all of the details of the depicted objects.⁶⁸

It can be argued that in order to describe the relationship between content and objects, Twardowski argued for a sort of mereological view of both elements which resulted in his *resemblance representationalism*. In this regard, one follows Ryan Hickerson, who holds that in his *Habilitationschrift* Twardowski formulated the basics of *resemblance representationalism*, which holds that "[...] a representational content represents in virtue of a specific sort of representational relation holding between that content and the represented object, viz. resemblance."⁶⁹ Generally, Hickerson differentiates *two* types of representationalism: (1) *proxy-percept representationalism*, which classifies immanent percepts as representations of extra-mental objects, and (2) *mediator-content representationalism*, which classifies contents as representations of extra-mental objects, although contents are not percepts.⁷⁰ Hickerson argues that Twardowski was a representationalist in the latter sense; however, his version of this doctrine was unique, as he held that "[c]ontents were supposed to represent objects in exactly the way that pictures represent landscapes." Hickerson applies his thesis to Twardowski's *Habilitationschrift*; however, given Twardowski's doctrine just sketched, Hickerson's thesis can be extended and applied to Twardowski's *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [*Images and Concepts*] as well. All in all, when presenting something, one creates an object (image) that presents (on the basis of resemblance) something due to its content. Of course, Twardowski's point was not that contents are *the same as* pictures—he drew a parallel or an analogy by suggesting that contents are *quasi*-pictures and function as symbols of extra-mental objects. The resemblance relation is the basis of images, as they are founded on an image which, as Twardowski clearly stated, should present an object that resembles the object which should be produced in imagining. Some features can be added to other parts united in a new image, but the resemblance relation is still the

⁶⁸Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 48. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 139. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 98.

⁶⁹Hickerson, *Getting the Quasi-Picture*, 468. See also Hickerson, *Twardowski & Representationalism*, 1–19.

⁷⁰Hickerson, *Getting the Quasi-Picture*, 465–466.

basis. In other words, Hickerson's thesis holds for Twardowski's 1898 doctrine of images.

4.1.4 *Twardowski on Concepts as Compound Presentations*

In § 10 of his *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [*Images and Concepts*], Twardowski clearly stated that one's ability to imagine something is limited.⁷¹ Given the analogy between imagining and painting discussed in the previous section, Twardowski held that *perceptive* and *reproductive* images have clear limits: only perceivable (i.e., representable) parts can be combined into one unity. More nuanced cases are *creative* images. According to Twardowski, creative images are produced in a *three-phase* process: (1) one invokes perceptive or reproductive images of an object *resembling* the object one is attempting to create imaginatively; next, (2) one mentally ascribes a feature (or features) to the imagined object that it initially does not have—and, finally, (3) one combines this feature with the imagined object to create a concrete unity.⁷² By claiming this, Twardowski accepted Meinong's view on the process of creating images.⁷³ However, Twardowski slightly changed Meinong's example of a red chalk board, described in his text on fantasy presentations; instead, Twardowski described the phenomenon of imagining a green ball as large as a billiard ball.⁷⁴ To have a creative image of this very object, one invokes two sketchy reproductive images of a billiard ball and a certain green object. Next, one abstracts the green color as a feature and strictly combines it with the imagined ball. As a result, one creatively imagines an object that is concrete and manifested in one's experience as a green ball as large as a billiard ball. In this regard, Twardowski determined the limits of creative images; if the combination of features with an initial reproductive image cannot be accomplished, one does not have a creative image at all. For instance, if one wishes to imagine (in the sense of creative images) a round square, one fails, as it is not possible to unify the features of being-round and being-square as a whole.

Against this background, in § 10 of his *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [*Images and Concepts*], Twardowski put forward the thesis that *concepts* are presentations which arise on the basis of images which cannot be unified as wholes. By claiming this, Twardowski followed in the footsteps of Meinong, who held that presentations can lose the feature of manifestness if there is incompatibility (*Unverträglichkeit*) between parts, which should be unified as a whole.⁷⁵ In any case, for Twardowski, if

⁷¹Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 58. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 144–145.

⁷²Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 64. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 148.

⁷³Meinong, Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie, 204–207. Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, 234–237.

⁷⁴Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 61–62. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 146.

⁷⁵Meinong, Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie, 210. Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, 240.

an attempt to imagine a round square fails, one can still refer to the very object with a concept. It is precisely in this sense that images are necessary conditions of concepts. Twardowski understood the image of a round square as a unity of a basic presentation which, together with a presenting judgment, builds a unified whole. The whole thus defined is a concept.⁷⁶ In what follows, I will look closer at Twardowski's theory of concepts and his classification of different types of concepts.

At bottom, Twardowski introduced his idea of concepts in the context of the three-phase process of producing creative images; however, in the case of concepts, the last phase, i.e., unification, is crucial: if unification fails, a presentation cannot be manifested, and thus, it is not an image. Like in the case of creative images, concepts are first formed on the basis of reproductive images in which an object *resembling* the object of the concept is presented. Next, one mentally adds an abstracted feature to the imagined object. This mental operation is instantiated by a *judgment* in which it is stated that the imagined object has (or does not have) a relevant feature. In a strict sense, one does not have to *judge* that the object has this very feature; one can merely *present* to oneself this very judgment.⁷⁷ To ascribe a certain feature to an object means for Twardowski that one presents to oneself a judgment which states that the object has the relevant feature. Twardowski described the presented judgment as the *imagined judgment* and in this context holds that concepts are compound wholes which are composed of (1) a *basic image*, more precisely, a reproductive image in which an object that resembles the object of the concept is presented, and (2) an *imagined judgment* (or judgments) which states that the imagined object has a relevant feature (or features). In short, a concept is a compound of two presentations, i.e., a *basic image* and an *imagined judgment*.

Twardowski was clear that *abstraction* plays a central role in producing concepts. Generally, he agreed with, among others, Meinong that abstraction is connected with the phenomenon of attention in which one is unable to present *all* of the features of the object in one moment. As shown in Sect. 4.1.3, this phenomenon suggests that images are general. Twardowski held, however, that this idea requires further examination. Thus, for him, abstraction consists in breaking down a unified set of features and comprehending them as distinguishable.⁷⁸ However, as he proceeded, to perceive a difference between two features means to judge this relation. Abstraction is therefore a mental action (of judging) that produces a concept with abstracted features; the produced concept is composed of two parts: (1) the general image of an object which has the feature one wants to present and (2) the imagined judgment that this very feature is separate. In the end, Twardowski concluded, “[m]ental phenomena [...] in which we present *in abstracto* to ourselves features of objects have distinguished characteristics of concepts and thus they cannot be

⁷⁶Schaar, *Kazimierz Twardowski*, 81–83.

⁷⁷Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 69. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 150.

⁷⁸Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 80–81. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 157.

regarded as images.”⁷⁹ Against this background, it is worth drawing a contrast between images and concepts: whereas the former are sketchy, though non-abstract, the latter present their objects *in abstracto*. Here, then lies a sharp distinction between Twardowski and Meinong: whereas the former saw abstraction *sensu stricto* as limited to concepts alone, the latter adopted a broader conception of abstraction beyond concepts, e.g., in regard to fantasy presentations.⁸⁰

All things considered, concepts are for Twardowski mental (compound) objects. To make the use of concepts more efficient, however, one does not have to constantly invoke the mental operation of producing relevant concepts; one can use *names* instead. Names are linguistic expressions that are correlated with relevant concepts. As such, they enable one to omit the problem of recurring identification of concepts (understood as mental objects).⁸¹ In this context, Twardowski defined *two* types of conceptual presentations: (1) a *symbolic* presentation if one combines a basic image of the feature and an image of the concept's name and (2) a *semi-symbolic* presentation if one has an imagining of the name without basic images. Thus, the process of producing concepts ultimately leads to the efficient use of relevant names and, more generally, language. According to Twardowski, one can think without words;⁸² however, this approach would be inefficient.

In his *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts]*, Twardowski used two (partly overlapping) classifications of concepts: (1) *analytic–or–synthetic* concepts and (2) *particular–or–general* concepts. Whereas the former uses the criterion of the type of mental action that produces relevant concepts (analysis or synthesis), the latter is based on different referential functions of concepts (particular or general objects). First, a concept is *analytic* if it presents an abstracted feature or relation belonging to a certain object; this type of concept arises in a mental analysis or abstraction that consists in identifying parts of an imagined unity.⁸³ In turn, a concept

⁷⁹Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 83: “Zjawiska umysłowe zatem, w których przedstawiamy sobie cechy przedmiotów *in abstracto*, posiadają istotne znamiona pojęć, przeto nie mogą być uważane za wyobrażenia.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 158–159. My translation.

⁸⁰Meinong, Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie, 174–201. Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, 206–230.

⁸¹Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 88: “Nazwa nadana wyodrębnionej cesze, usuwa właśnie tę niedogodność. Zaopatrzona w nazwę i ściśle z nią skojarzona, cecha różni się tem samem od wszystkich innych cech. Wedle nazwy łatwo ją poznajemy w przyszłości, ilekroć pragniemy przedstawić ją sobie w oderwaniu. Niema już odtąd obawy, aby po ustąpieniu z umysłu pojęcia, cecha utonęła znowu w konkretnej całości wyobrazonego przedmiotu; nazwa bowiem ułatwi nam jej odnalezienie.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 161. Trans.: “The name given to the abstracted feature removes this inconvenience [of new identification of concepts]. Provided with the name and closely associated with it, the feature thus differs from all other features. Due to the name we can easily recognize it [i.e., the feature] in the future, whenever we wish to present it to ourselves in isolation. Henceforth there is no fear that, after the concept has disappear from the mind, the feature will again be drowned in the concrete whole of the imagined object; the name will make it easier for us to find it.” My translation.

⁸²Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 95. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 165–166. For a critical assessment of this thesis, see Brożek, *Myślenie a mówienie*, 45–60.

⁸³Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 96. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 165–166.

is *synthetic* if it presents a synthesis of two or more abstracted features or relations ascribed to the basic image; this type of concept arises in a mental synthesis or combination that does not produce a concrete unity. Among this class of concepts, Twardowski listed the following sub-classes: (a) regular *synthetic* concepts that combine basic images with analytic concepts (e.g., the concept of a feudal system),⁸⁴ (b) *negative* concepts that combine basic images with imagined negative judgments, i.e., judgments that state that an object does not have the abstracted feature (in this regard, Twardowski referred to the example of a geometrical point, i.e., a concept of a point without extension),⁸⁵ (c) *contradictory* concepts which combine basic images with imagined judgments that ascribe abstracted features to one impossible (in Meinong's sense) object (e.g., the concept of a round square), (d) *relational* concepts which combine basic images with imagined judgments that ascribe abstracted relations to an object,⁸⁶ and (e) *logical* concepts which are fixed combinations of basic images and relevant analytic concepts; at the linguistic level, logical concepts are ideally expressed by *definitions*.⁸⁷

Regarding the second classification, i.e., *particular-or-general* concepts, in his book, Twardowski argued against the widespread conviction that concepts should be understood as general in contrast to images which are traditionally comprehended as particular. He held that, from a psychological point of view, not all

⁸⁴Twardowski does not use the phrase “regular synthetic concepts,” but he refers to the ordinary use of synthetic concepts which cannot be subsumed under other sub-classes.

⁸⁵Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 99. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 167.

⁸⁶In regard to relational concepts, Twardowski disagreed with Meinong for whom—at least according to Twardowski—synthetic concepts only require relations, without imagined judgments. He wrote as follows: “Synthetic concepts, which include analytical concepts of relations, were compared by *Meinong* with arithmetic proportion with the general formula $a: b = b: x$; here x is the object to be presented in the concept; a combined with b are the objects of the basic image on the basis of which one forms the analytic concept of the relation $a: b$. [...] An image (perceptual or reproductive) of a certain object (a) which is on the table (b) gives one due to abstraction the analytic concept of a certain relation called being on table ($a: b$). In this very relation (identity is expressed by the equality sign) stands to table (b) the object x , which I should present to myself and I present it precisely due to the very relation” (Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 104: “Pojęcia syntetyczne, w skład których wchodzić analityczne pojęcia stosunków, porównał *Meinong* z proporcją arytmetyczną, której ogólną formułą jest $a: b = b: x$; w niej x jest przedmiotem, który mamy sobie przedstawić w pojęciu; a w połączeniu z b są przedmiotami wyobrażenia podkładowego, na podstawie którego urabiamu pojęcie analityczne stosunku $a: b$. [...] Wyobrażenie (sposstrzegawcze albo odtwórcze) jakiegokolwoeik przedmiotu (a) leżącego na stole (b) dostarcza mi za pośrednictwem abstrakcyi pojęcia analitycznego pewnego stosunku zwanego leżeniem na stole ($a: b$). W tym samym stosunku (tożsamość znajduje wyraz w znaku równości) pozostaje do stołu (b) przedmiot x , który mam sobie przedstawić i przedstawiaam też sobie właśnie zapomocą owego stosunku.” My translation. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 170). See also Meinong, *Hume-Studien I*, 231–232. Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, 45–47.

⁸⁷Generally, for Twardowski, definitions are linguistic expressions which serve one to list parts of synthetic concepts. In regard to the classical view on definitions, i.e., a combination of *genus* and *differentia specifica*, a *genus* refers to basic images or concepts related to it, whereas the *differentia specifica* refers to the imagined judgments. Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 122. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 180.

concepts are general, as there are also particular concepts. First, Twardowski understood *particular* concepts as concepts that refer to one and only one defined object. Next, he determined *general* concepts to be concepts that refer to more than one object or to undefined objects. He inquired into the difference in content of both types of concepts and, to address this question, he described the phenomenon of producing a general concept of a triangle as such.⁸⁸ Basically, he determined two phases in producing this presentation. First, one establishes a synthetic presentation in which there is a basic image of a triangle and the imagined judgments regarding features of the imagined triangle. This, however, is a *particular* concept, as features are ascribed to the triangle that is currently imagined. Second, among the imagined judgments, one focuses only on those that ascribe features common to all triangles, and by doing so, one also rejects judgments that ascribe defined and particular features; as a result, one establishes a *general* concept of a triangle. In short, general concepts are defined as concepts in the content of which there are no judgments ascribing particular features and thus as compound presentations which combine basic images with imagined judgments and with an additional judgment that states that the features ascribed to the object are general. By contrast, particular concepts are those which ascribe (in their content) features to one and only one object and thus are compound presentations which combine basic images with imagined judgments and with an additional judgment which states that the features ascribed to the object are particular. An example of such a concept is the concept of “the tallest tree in the world.” Importantly, among general concepts, one can list both synthetic and analytic concepts; in the latter case, one has a concept of an abstracted feature that is common to a few or many objects.⁸⁹

In § 17 of his book, Twardowski juxtaposed images with concepts by highlighting the main differences between them and their functions for the mind. He held that concepts cannot substitute images which are characterized by their manifestness; however, images are not general, and for this reason, the mind is rendered inefficient if only particular images are used. Accordingly, “[...] concepts comprehended *in extenso* are a transitional phase between direct imaging of objects and symbolic imaging.”⁹⁰ Concepts therefore gain an advantage over images, and ultimately, they are substituted by imagined terms that refer to the concepts they initially denoted. Although linguistic expressions are non-mental, both images and concepts are, for Twardowski, mental phenomena.

⁸⁸ Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 124–125. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 181–182.

⁸⁹ Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 133. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 186–187.

⁹⁰ Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 141: “[...] pojęcia, pomyślane *in extenso* są fazą przejściową pomiędzy bezpośrednim wyobrażaniem przedmiotów i wyobrażaniem symbolicznym.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 191.

4.1.5 *A Remark on Twardowski's Account of Presentations as Actions and Products*

To date, Twardowski's theory of presentations has rested on the sharp contrast between the presenting act and "what is presented," including both immanent and non-immanent objects. This division can also be found in Twardowski's later analysis, namely, in the 1911/12 essay "O czynnościach i wytworach. Kilka uwag z pogranicza psychologii, gramatyki i logiki" ["Actions and Products. Some Remarks from the Borderline of Psychology, Grammar and Logic"]. Twardowski began his essay with some general, non-controversial remarks. He noted that some words form specific pairs, e.g., "to walk" and "the walk," "to think" and "the thought," or "to lie" and "the lie" etc.⁹¹ The words "to walk," "to think," "to lie" etc., designate an activity, whereas "the walk," "the thought," "the lie" etc. designate a product of the related activity. On a linguistic level, then, the distinction between activities and products rests on the distinction between verbs and nouns. Actions and products are divided into three main classes: (1) *physical* (e.g., "to walk" and "the walk," etc.); (2) *psychical or mental* (e.g., "to think" and "the thought"); and (3) *psychophysical*⁹² (e.g., "to lie" and "the lie"). Products of different actions can be either *enduring* or *non-enduring*. The former products last longer than the respective action which originated the product, e.g., a painting as a product of the action of painting. The former products, in turn, endure only if the corresponding actions endure and stop existing with the actions themselves, e.g., the walk happens only if one is walking. Twardowski claimed that there are no enduring psychic products, yet "[...] the psychophysical product becomes the external *expression* of the mental product."⁹³ Thus, the products of psychophysiological actions—which connect the psyche with non-mental objects⁹⁴—can be either durable (e.g., a drawing as the product of drawing) or non-durable (e.g., a judgment as the product of judging). To adapt this theory

⁹¹ See Twardowski, O czynnościach i wytworach, 3. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 217. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 104.

⁹² Twardowski, O czynnościach i wytworach, 7: "Psychofizyczną jest czynność fizyczna, jeżeli towarzyszy jej czynność psychiczna, wywierająca jakiś wpływ na przebieg czynności fizycznej a tem samym na powstający dzięki niej wytwór; powstający zaś w ten sposób wytwór nazywa się także psychofizycznym." Reprinted in *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 221. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 109: "A physical action is *psychophysical* if it is accompanied by a mental action and exerts some sort of influence on the course of the physical action and therewith on the resultant product; now, the product that originates in this way is also called *psychophysical*."

⁹³ Twardowski, O czynnościach i wytworach, 18: "[...] wytwór psychofizyczny staje się zewnętrznym wyrazem wytworu psychicznego." Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 230. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 120.

⁹⁴ Woleński summarized Twardowski's argument here as follows: "Such products are manifestations of psychic products in the sense that, first, a psychic product together with the corresponding action is the partial cause whereby a psychophysical product comes into being; second, a psychophysical product is perceivable by the senses which a psychic one is not and third, a psychophysical product itself becomes a cause of the existence of psychic products analogous to the psychic

to the field of presentations, one can argue that while the presenting act is a psychophysiological action, “what is presented” is a product of this action; in addition, “what is presented” can be either a durable product (an external or non-mental object) or a non-durable product (an immanent or mental object). This reformulation of Twardowski's theory of presentation later inspired Blaustein in his original research.

4.1.6 Further Developments of Twardowski's Theory of Presentations in 1924

As shown in Sects. 4.1.2 and 4.1.4, Twardowski formulated the basics of his classification of presentations in the 1898 *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [*Images and Concepts*]. On the basis of this book, in 1902, he gave a talk—“Über begriffliche Vorstellungen” [“On Conceptual Presentations”]—at the University of Vienna.⁹⁵ On this occasion, however, he “[...] presented the theory of concepts set forth in this [1898] book, boiled down to the most essential points.”⁹⁶ Subsequently, the German text of his talk was translated into Polish and published as a separate book in 1924. Twardowski stated that he did not publish the new edition of the 1898 text for a reason, as “[p]reparing a second edition of this book would have involved numerous changes in the arguments that serve to introduce the exposition of the theory of concepts proper, even though the theory's essential content, as put forth in that book, and subsequently in the essay, seems to me to have retained its soundness.”⁹⁷ Arguably, the changes referenced in this note may have concerned the clarity of some of theses, and it is hard to say whether they imply a revision of the early theory of presentations. Certainly, Twardowski claimed that the essential points of the theory of concepts, i.e., non-intuitive presentations, are still correct. The 1924 edition is entitled *O istocie pojęć* [*The Essence of Concepts*] and is important for another reason.

product which was the partial cause of a given psychophysical product.” Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 42.

⁹⁵Twardowski, Über begriffliche Vorstellungen, 145–163. Twardowski also adopted the 1898 classification of images and concepts in his lectures given at the Lvov University. For instance, in the 1908–1909 lectures on the phenomenon of thinking, Twardowski referred to these two types of presentations and he presented a classification of images elaborated in the 1898 book. See Twardowski, *Psychologia myślenia*, 127–149. Trans. Janeczka, in: *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 133–159, in particular 141–147.

⁹⁶Twardowski, *O istocie pojęć*, v: “Wyłożoną w tej książce teorię pojęć przedstawiłem następnie w zwięzłym i ograniczonym do najistotniejszych myśli odczycie.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 292. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 73.

⁹⁷Twardowski, *O istocie pojęć*, v: “Chcąc bowiem sporządzić drugie wydanie tej książki, musiałbym dokonać licznych zmian w wywodach, tworzących wstęp do wykładu właściwej teorii pojęć, gdy tymczasem istotna treść tej teorii w postaci, podanej w książce a następnie w odczycie, wydaje mi się po dziś dzień słuszna.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 292. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 73.

It became a point of reference for Twardowski's students, who also commented on the book and, more importantly, on the theory of presentations, e.g., Czeżowski⁹⁸ or Blaustein.

Indeed, in *O istocie pojęć* [*The Essence of Concepts*], one finds the basic division between intuitive (images) and non-intuitive (concepts) presentations. However, the main problem of the text is limited to the latter: "[...] how [...] non-intuitive, or 'conceptual,' presentation comes about, how the mental fact of non-intuitive presenting something to oneself ought to be described."⁹⁹ In this context, Twardowski referred to Meinong's (discussed in Sect. 4.1.3 above) theory of presentations, and he discussed the example of the mental phenomenon of presenting a red chalk board. This example concerns the production of a new image on the basis of two others, i.e., a presentation of any board and a presentation of redness. The former is an instance of a reproductive image of a regular black board that was ultimately seen in the past, while the latter is a more complex presentation in which one presents to oneself first a red ball and second one understands that the red color of the ball should be ascribed to the board. This complex presentation refers in the end to redness as an *abstractum*, i.e., to the color red as such. Against this background, a presentation of a red board arises as a combination (*Zusammenfassung*) of two presentations into one complex (*Komplexion*) which combines concrete and abstract presentations into one whole. For Meinong, this new presentation can be either intuitive or non-intuitive depending on the connection between basic presentations. If the connection is more coherent, the new presentation is intuitive; otherwise, it is non-intuitive or conceptual.

In Twardowski's view, Meinong's idea is basically true, i.e., conceptual presentations are established as complex mental states which combine different presentations and which have a character dependent on the connection of these basic presentations.¹⁰⁰ However, Meinong's terms of "more" or "less coherent" connections are, in Twardowski's assessment, enigmatic and thus require more thorough analysis. For example, Meinong wrote about "consummated" and "indicated" combinations to express different stages of fullness of presentation. To overcome the confusion that arises with Meinong's theory, Twardowski descriptively analyzed these presentations by identifying three parts of these phenomena: (1) the *basic presentation*, (2) the *change* made in it, and (3) the emergent *intuitive presentation*, which is the *result* of combining parts (1) and (2). Part (1) is described as the "material" of the new combination. Usually, this material is a concrete presentation, e.g., a reproductive presentation (a remembered image). Within the material, one aims at changing one or more parts by subsuming them with other parts. In Meinong's

⁹⁸Czeżowski, *Teoria pojęć* Kazimierza Twardowskiego, 106–110.

⁹⁹Twardowski, *O istocie pojęć*, 3: "[...] w jaki sposób dokonywa się owo nienaoczne, czyli 'pojęciowe' przedstawienie, w jaki sposób należy opisać psychologiczny fakt nienaocznego przedstawiania sobie czegoś." Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 293. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 75, transl. Modified.

¹⁰⁰Twardowski, *O istocie pojęć*, 3–4. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 293–294. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 75–76.

example, discussed above, the material is the reproductive presentation of a black board, and the color is the very element that one wants to change. Part (2) is based on the judgment that one or more parts of the basic presentation have to be changed. Twardowski followed Meinong in describing the phenomenon as one realizing that one or more changes have to be introduced and thereby holding that one presents to oneself a corresponding judgment, i.e., one presents to oneself *that* an object has to have different features.¹⁰¹ For Twardowski, this is *not* a judgment that is actually made by someone, but it is precisely a mere presented judgment. On a linguistic level, the presented judgment is preceded by the term “that,” and as such, it is a nominalized expression. In the example discussed above, one realizes *that* the board is red. Twardowski claims that, on the basis of parts (1) and (2), an intuitive presentation can emerge, more precisely, a new productive image. However, if the combination of (1) and (2) does not emerge, a non-intuitive or conceptual presentation arises. Consequently, Twardowski defined a concept (in the broadest sense) as “[...] a presentation of an object which is composed of a (basic) presentation of an object that is similar to the object at issue and of presentations of judgments that pertain to that similar object.”¹⁰²

In Part 3 of *O istocie pojęć* [*The Essence of Concepts*], Twardowski differentiated three classes of non-intuitive presentations: (1) *analytic concepts*, (2) *synthetic concepts*, and (3) *negative concepts*. To begin with, *analytic concepts* emerge by means of analysis or abstraction if one presents to oneself characteristics, properties, or relations which are instantiated by objects but which cannot be presented by themselves.¹⁰³ For this reason, one has to combine an intuitive presentation of a concrete object which has the characteristic, property, or relation to be presented and a presented judgment that the concrete object does not possess these characteristics, properties, or relations. In consequence, one produces the non-intuitive presentation or concept of that very characteristic, property, or relation. In turn, *synthetic concepts* arise by combining new characteristics, properties, or relations with intuitive basic presentations. In this case, one can synthesize or add new properties to the presented object that are not presented in the basic presentation. Twardowski classified *negative concepts* as intermediate between analytic and synthetic concepts. For him, “[...] negative concepts are always characterized by the presence of one or several presented negative judgments which deny certain specific characterizations of the object of the basic presentation.”¹⁰⁴ In this case, one presents

¹⁰¹ Twardowski, *O istocie pojęć*, 13–14. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 299. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 82.

¹⁰² Twardowski, *O istocie pojęć*, 15: “[...] takie przedstawienie przedmiotu, które składa się z przedstawienia (podkładowego) przedmiotu do tamtego przedmiotu podobnego i z przedstawień sądów, dotyczących się owego podobnego przedmiotu.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 300. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 83, transl. Modified.

¹⁰³ Twardowski, *O istocie pojęć*, 17. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 301. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 84.

¹⁰⁴ Twardowski, *O istocie pojęć*, 21: “Zawsze jednak pojęcia negatywne znamionuje obecność jednego lub kilku przedstawionych sądów przeczących, odmawiających przedmiotowi przedstawie-

to oneself an object and combines this presentation with one or more negative judgments that the object should not have certain characteristics, properties, or relations. An example of such a negative concept (discussed also in the 1898 book) is the concept of a mathematical point, i.e., the concept of a point with no extension at all. Of course, negative concepts can be viewed as a sub-class of synthetic concepts, only with exclusively negative judgments. Twardowski stated that there is no clear-cut division between negative and synthetic concepts.

In that same work, Twardowski formulated more general psychological laws concerning the nature of thinking. He was aware that his theory of concepts did not describe a common view of concepts. After all, it is hard to imagine that every use of any concept should be preceded by a complex series of mental operations which consist in producing basic presentations and presented judgments.¹⁰⁵ Instead, one uses speech and symbolic and semi-symbolic thinking, which is rooted in language and is more economical for using concepts. For instance, abstract concepts, including concepts of properties, have their respective names. One can use these names instead of performing a sequence of mental operations. In this regard, Twardowski put forward the hypothesis that one can use presentations of the correlated *names* of abstract concepts instead of a presentation of a given concept's object. This, as Twardowski emphasized, direct presentation of words is possible due to the very concept that is correlated with the word. This way of thinking is more economical because it establishes rigid connections between words, presentations, and presented judgments. However, symbolic thinking has a different structure than non-intuitive presentations, as symbolic thinking consists of three parts: (1) a presentation of words or verbal expressions, (2) a basic presentation, and (3) the presented judgment.¹⁰⁶ In thinking, one can use symbols, i.e., the parts included in group (1), which connect the whole sequence of all three elements. In the end, as Twardowski held, symbols can also substitute for all presented judgments, which are parts of the contents of concepts. Thus, as shown, a descriptive analysis of non-intuitive presentations led Twardowski to formulate more general laws of thinking. Importantly, Twardowski's idea from his *O istocie pojęć* [*The Essence of Concepts*] that we can use symbols as distinct presentations was used by Blaustein in his aesthetics. This topic will be discussed later in Chap. 8.

nia podkładowego pewnych określonych cech." Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 303. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 87, transl. Modified.

¹⁰⁵Twardowski writes: "[...] it might appear that the formation of even a relatively simple concept would require such a long sequence of mental operations that the human mind would be incapable of carrying them out, especially in the short time required for forming a concept" (Twardowski, *O istocie pojęć*, 22: "Mogłoby się [...] wydawać, jakoby utworzenie chociażby nawet nie bardzo skomplikowanego pojęcia wymagałoby tak długiego szeregu czynności psychicznych, iż umysł ludzki nie mógłby ich dokonać zwłaszcza w tak krótkim czasie, jakiego potrzeba na utworzenie pojęcia." Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 304. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 87).

¹⁰⁶Twardowski, *O istocie pojęć*, 23. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 305. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 88.

4.2 Blaustein on Twardowski's Theory of Presentations

4.2.1 *References to Twardowski in Blaustein's Writings*

As mentioned before, Blaustein's theory of presentations bore the mark of Twardowski's theory of presentations. Blaustein seemed to follow his teacher in comprehending any presentation as a mental phenomenon which intends its object or, on many occasions, he referred to Twardowski's taxonomy of presentations as divided into images and concepts. These general references, however, were connected in Blaustein's writings to more detailed formulations of Twardowski, chiefly to his theory of images; they were less connected to the theory of concepts. First of all, Blaustein broadly used the Twardowskian schema of the act–content–object by claiming that a mental phenomenon or an act intends an object through content, which he referred to as “presenting content.”¹⁰⁷ Presentations, then, present their objects because presenting contents intend a certain intentional object. Given that presentations can be either intuitive (in the case of images) or non-intuitive (in the case of concepts), this division is possible because of the different functions of the presenting content. According to Twardowski,¹⁰⁸ Blaustein, for instance, ascribed manifestness to intuitive presentations that are founded on perceptual images. Here, the presenting content is understood as sensory content. However, even if presentation is a complex act, it is given as a whole that unites its parts. For this reason, one sees, say, a table and not the sensory contents which present the table. In this case, contents are to be understood as the appearance (*wygląd* or *widok*) of the object. Blaustein wrote:

Presenting contents have a variety of shapes and sizes; they are colored in different planes, and they rest or move at different speeds in various directions. Depending on what the presentation content is and what is happening with it, one says about the object that it is black or blue, round or square, large or small, that it rests or moves at a higher or lower speed in one or another direction. Of course, it is not only what the presentation content is and what is happening with it that determines the attribution of such or other features to the object. Past experience also plays a major role here; however, the content of a presentation is one of the decisive factors.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷E.g. Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 11 and O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień, 122. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 22, 45. Trans. Bokinieć, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 213.

¹⁰⁸Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 43: “Nazywając [...] wyobrażenia poglądowni, zaznaczamy, iż każde z nich albo jest wprost spostrzegawczem, albo przypomina nam spostrzegawcze, albo jest przynajmniej takim, jak gdyby było przypomnieniem spostrzegawczego.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 137. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik in: *Imageries*, 96: “[...] when we call imagery ‘manifest’ or ‘apparent,’ we stress how each imagery is either directly perceptual or recalls perceptual imagery to us or at least behaves as if it were a recollection of perceptual imagery.”

¹⁰⁹Blaustein, O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień, 133: “Treści prezentujące posiadają rozmaity kształt i rozmałą wielkość, są rozmaicie zabarwionemi płaszczyznami, spoczywającemi lub poruszającemi się z rozmałą szybkością w rozmaitych kierunkach. Zależnie

Therefore, if presenting content indicates objects, one can also speak of “adequacy” or “inadequacy” in relation to the object. A presentation of an object as a perceptual presentation is adequate only if the parts of the content refer to corresponding parts of the object. This idea also originates from Twardowski's idea that images are combinations of parts. I will discuss this problem later on. For now, let me add that Blaustein also accepted Twardowski's thesis that image presents its object only if the parts synthesized in the image are united as a whole.¹¹⁰ Last but not least, Blaustein claimed—again following Twardowski—that the presenting content does not refer directly to a sensory basis in the case of recollecting something or imagining something. By claiming this, Blaustein generally accepted his teacher's taxonomy of images as divided into perceptual, reproductive and creative (although he omits introspective images). He also referred to the thesis that there is a difference within the presenting content in perceptual and other images. The crucial fragment of Blaustein's 1930 *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]* is as follows:

The differences between the two types of content are introspectively given to everyone, although their conceptual recognition is a very difficult task. However, one of the differences is easily noted. The sensory content of perceptive images is given whether we want to see it or not: its shape, size, type of coloring, and the company in which it appears are independent of us; the conditions of its appearance are beyond us. The sensory content of secondary images, in principle, does not possess these features: it is more subjective and dependent on us in regard to both its appearance and disappearance as well as its size, shape and color. These terms are obviously not enough. The difference we are looking for is—as Twardowski emphasizes—a qualitative one and belongs to the order of elementary differences that are noticeable in [someone's] experience but which cannot be described or determined. Despite this, we are easily aware of whether we are dealing with sensory content of perceptive or secondary imagination (see the script of the lecture on “Psychology of Thinking” from 1908/9).¹¹¹

od tego, jaka jest treść prezentująca i co się z nią dzieje, mówi się o przedmiocie, że jest czarny czy też niebieski, okrągły lub kwadratowy, wielki lub mały, iż spoczywa lub porusza się z większą lub mniejszą szybkością, w tym lub innym kierunku. Oczywiście nie wyłącznie to, jaka jest treść prezentująca i co się z nią dzieje, decyduje o przypisywaniu przedmiotowi takich lub innych cech. Ogromną bowiem rolę odgrywa w tem również uzyskane już dawniej doświadczenie; niemniej treść prezentująca jest jednym z decydujących czynników.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 31. My translation.

¹¹⁰ Blaustein, O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień, 136. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 31–32. Antoni B. Stępień commented in this context that Blaustein's idea that presenting content corresponds with the element of the object should be understood as the relation of consistency. See Stępień, Rola doświadczenia w punkcie wyjścia metafizyki, 32–33.

¹¹¹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 33–34: “Różnice pomiędzy obu rodzajami treści każdemu są introspekcyjnie dane, chociaż pojęciowe ich ujęcie jest zadaniem bardzo trudnym. Jedną jednak z różnic łatwo wskazać można. Treści zmysłowe wyobrażeń spostrzegawczych pojawiają się bez względu na to, czy je ujrzeć pragniemy, czy też nie; ich kształt, wielkość, rodzaj zabarwienia, towarzystwo, w którym się zjawiają, są od nas niezależne, przyczyny ich pojawienia się leżą poza nami. Treści zmysłowe wyobrażeń wtórnych w zasadzie cech tych nie posiadają, są bardziej subiektywne, od nas zależne, zarówno co do swego pojawienia się i zniknięcia jak i co do swej wielkości, kształtu i zabarwienia. Określenia te są oczywiście niewystarczające. Różnica bowiem, o którą nam chodzi, jest—jak podkreśla Twardowski—jakościową oraz należy do rzędu

Blaustein referred here to Twardowski's lectures from the winter and summer semesters of 1908/09. In these lectures, Twardowski attempted to question the quantity approach to images by showing that it fails to describe clear differences between primary and secondary images. According to his approach, the difference between both types of images lies in a property of their "vividness" (*żywość*). Twardowski showed that this approach is false since one cannot properly describe the difference in content; the reason for this lies in the fact that the difference is rather qualitative, given in introspection, and thus direct. It cannot be grasped indirectly, e.g., by words. In this context, Twardowski mentioned an example of a *fortissimo* sound, once actually heard, later just recollected: the latter cannot be different in terms of quantity since this would amount to an absurd thesis that the recollected sound is a *pianissimo* sound. For this reason, the difference between both types of images is rather qualitative.¹¹²

Blaustein's other clear references to Twardowski's theory of presentations can be found in his original theory of schematic and symbolic presentations. First, Blaustein referred to the Twardowskian idea that mental phenomena are based upon presentations; he described the genesis of schematic and symbolic presentations as a synthesis of basic images and presentational judgments, yet these phenomena—taken as a whole—do not constitute an intuitive presentation.¹¹³ Second, he held that the object of such presentations can be understood as a product (*wytwór*) in Twardowski's sense.¹¹⁴ To be precise, they are psychophysical products produced by psychophysiological actions or acts. Schemas and symbols thus defined arise in corresponding acts, but they do or at least can exist independently of these acts. For instance, if one draws a map (Blaustein's example), the act of drawing is founded on one's thinking (mental or psychic act), yet the act causes physical actions, i.e., movements of one's

różnic elementarnych, znanych z doświadczenia, ale nie dających się opisać lub określić. Mimo to łatwo zdajemy sobie sprawę z tego, czy mamy do czynienia z treściami zmysłowemi wyobrażenia spostrzegawczego, czy wtórnego (por. Skrypt wykładu pt. 'Psychologia myślenia' z r. 1908/9).” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 61–62. My translation. Translated differently by Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 228.

¹¹²Twardowski, *Psychologia myślenia*, 137: “Tak tedy teoria ilościowa w każdym znaczeniu, które można jej nadać, natrafia na trudności, a nadto sprzeciwiają jej się fakty, gdy np. zechcemy ją zastosować do dźwięków danych pierwotnie i pochodnie. Czyż bowiem istotnie między jakimś spostrzeżonym dźwiękiem *fortissimo* a tym samym dźwiękiem odtworzonym zachodzi tylko ta różnica, że drugi przedstawia się jako mniej intensywny? Może jako dźwięk *pianissimo*! Czy w takim razie nie musiałaby zniknąć różnica między słyszonym *pianissimo* a odtworzonym *fortissimo*? A przecież różnicę tę doskonale zauważyć możemy. Należy więc zarzucić teorię ilościową.” Trans. Janeczek, in: *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 144: “Therefore, the quantitative theory, whatever the meaning ascribed to it, encounters difficulties, and additionally, it goes contrary to facts, for instance, when it is applied to sounds provided primarily and derivatively. After all, is the only difference between a perceived *fortissimo* sound and the same sound reproduced that the latter presents itself as less intense? How about a *pianissimo* sound? In that case, would the difference between a heard *pianissimo* and a replayed *fortissimo* have to vanish? However, this difference is easy to notice. Thus, the quantitative theory must be discarded.”

¹¹³Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 90–91, fn. 1, 96–97.

¹¹⁴Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 70.

hand; moreover, the product of these acts, i.e., a map, is a durable product of this complex psychophysiological process.

4.2.2 *A Critical Assessment of Twardowski's Theory of Presentations*

To date, Blaustein has seemed to follow Twardowski. Like his teacher, Blaustein maintained that presentations are mental phenomena which encompass both images and concepts and can be both intuitive and non-intuitive; he also referred to Twardowski's idea of content: he accepted and used a tripartite taxonomy of images, and he adapted the product–action dichotomy, not to mention that he also adapted Twardowski's qualitative approach to images. Given the variety of listed continuations and borrowings, one might have the impression that Blaustein's reading of Twardowski is uncritical, but this impression is misleading. An interesting criticism of Twardowski's theory of presentations can be found in Blaustein's *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*.¹¹⁵ In § 7 of his book, Blaustein referred to Twardowski's taxonomy of presentations as divided into concepts and images; next, images are divided into primary and secondary images, whereas secondary images are divided into reproductive and creative images. However, Blaustein asked, what is the criterion of these divisions? To put it differently, how, if at all, did Twardowski argue for this taxonomy? To address these questions, Blaustein referred to the general thesis that every act is composed of two non-self-sufficient parts, i.e., quality and matter. However, Twardowski's taxonomy rests on neither quality nor matter. It cannot be quality because, for instance, concepts and images are—according to Twardowski—presentations. In other words, if quality were the criterion of the division, both concepts and images should be included in two different and distinct *classes* of mental phenomena. Blaustein argued:

As far as quality is concerned, one can refer to introspection, which shows that the quality of, e.g., reproductive image, and a concept do not differ. We see no difference in the way these two types of acts relate to the object. Both make the object present. If the difference between perceptive, reproductive and creative images and concepts were in their quality, the listed types of presentations would not form a uniform, idiogenic class of mental acts, while each of these types would be classified in the classification of mental acts as classes of mental acts equal to judging, experiencing feelings, presenting, etc.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 12–14. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 46–47. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 214–215.

¹¹⁶Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 12–13: “O ile chodzi o jakość, powołać się można na introspekcję, która stwierdza, iż jakością np. wyobrażenie odtwórcze i pojęcie nie różnią się. Nie spostrzegamy bowiem żadnej różnicy w sposobie odnoszenia się tych dwu rodzajów aktów do przedmiotu. Jeden i drugi tylko uobecnia przedmiot. Gdyby różnica pomiędzy wyobrażeniami spostrzegawczemu, odtwórczemu, wytwórczemu oraz pojęciami tkwiła w jakości, wymienione gatunki przedstawienia nie tworzyłyby jednolitego idiogenicznego rodzaju aktów psychicznych, natomiast każdy z tych gatunków byłby w klasyfikacji aktów psychicznych rodzajem aktów psy-

As the text above indicates, neither quality nor matter are criteria of Twardowski's taxonomy. After all—as Blaustein argued¹¹⁷—different images can have the same matter. The same matter can be present in perceptual images, recollection, and creative imagination. The matter is the same in the sense of an identical object to which different images refer: in every act, the object is composed of the same features, e.g., one sees a table as brown and tall (the perceptual presentation); later, one recollects the previously perceived table as brown and tall (the reproductive presentation); finally, one presents the table as brown and tall in a different environment (the creative presentation).

Blaustein maintained that if neither quality nor matter is the criterion for Twardowski's taxonomy, one can find it in the presenting content or the intentional object or in their mutual relations. Despite this hypothesis, the taxonomy is more complex, and for this reason, it has to be decomposed into three more specific divisions: (1) a division of presentations into images and concepts; (2) a division of images into perceptual (primary) and non-perceptual (secondary) images; and (3) a division of non-perceptual (secondary) images into reproductive and creative images.¹¹⁸ Blaustein's key insight in this context is the thesis that in each of these divisions, Twardowski should have used a different criterion. In § 7 of his *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*], he stated:

The first division is made at the basis of the different relation of the presenting content to the intentional object in images and concepts. In the former, the presenting content is adequate in relation to the object; in the latter, it is inadequate. [...] The second division is made at the basis of the variety of elements of the presenting content, which are sensory contents. [...] The third division is made at the basis of the diversity of intentional objects in reproductive and creative images. Here, we come across a source of very difficult issues, hitherto not sufficiently explained. An important fact for reproductive images is that their object is recognized as identical to the object of some past presentation.¹¹⁹

In sum, although Blaustein referred to many elements of Twardowski's theory of presentations and used them in a different framework, he also found the theory

chicznych równouprawnionym obok sążdenia, doznawania uczuć, postanawiania itp.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 46. My translation. Translated differently by Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 214.

¹¹⁷ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 13. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 46. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 214–215.

¹¹⁸ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 13. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 47. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 215.

¹¹⁹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 13–14: “Podział pierwszy dokonany jest ze względu na różny stosunek treści prezentującej do przedmiotu intencjonalnego w wyobrażeniach i w pojęciach. W pierwszych bowiem treść prezentująca jest w stosunku do przedmiotu adekwatna, w drugich nieadekwatna. [...] Drugi podział dokonany jest ze względu na różnorodność elementów treści prezentującej, któremi są treści zmysłowe. [...] Trzeci podział dokonany jest ze względu na różnorodność przedmiotów intencjonalnych w wyobrażeniach odtwórczych i wytwórczych. Napotykamy tu na źródło trudnych bardzo zagadnień, dotychczas dostatecznie niewyjaśnionych. Istotną dla wyobrażeń odtwórczych jest okoliczność, iż ich przedmiot ujęty jest jako identyczny z przedmiotem jakiegoś przeszłego przedstawienia.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 47. My translation. Translated differently by Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 215.

problematic. The Twardowskian taxonomy of presentations lacks clear criteria that can be used to differentiate types of presentations. In this context, Blaustein's main goal was to define such criteria. Therefore, Blaustein's critical assessment can be read as an attempt to build a unified theory of presentations, i.e., a theory that adapts clear criteria for its taxonomies.

4.3 Toward a Unified Theory of Presentations

Blaustein's criticism of Twardowski's theory of presentations has shown the need for clear criteria to define different classes of presentations. Of course, as stated above, Blaustein adopted and used Twardowski's basic classification of presentations as divided into images and concepts; he seemed to be perfectly aware that the classification of images and concepts is widely accepted by descriptive psychologists since it is intuitive; however, the criteria of the classification are again unclear.¹²⁰ To show this, he accepted Twardowski's idea that whereas images are intuitive, concepts are non-intuitive. Next, he stated that the feature of intuitiveness is basic and, as such, seems to be connected to sensations, which are intuitively given in an experience. But, as he pointed out, there are presentations which are based on sensations but which are non-intuitive at the same time. In this context, Blaustein referred to the example of the word "God": even if one reads the word and, for this reason, one experiences sensations as presenting content, i.e., black marks printed on white paper, it is unjustified to claim that the intended object is intuitively given.¹²¹ Other examples which show the need to enlarge Twardowski's classification come in Blaustein's works¹²² from the field of aesthetics: (1) while perceiving a statue made of marble, one *sees* not the marble as such but the character represented by the statue¹²³; (2) while perceiving a theater play, one *sees* not the actor as herself but the character played by her¹²⁴; (3) while watching a movie in the cinema, one *sees* not the phantoms displayed on the screen but the action which is happening "in" the movie¹²⁵; (4) while hearing a radio broadcast, one *hears* voices which represent

¹²⁰ See Blaustein, O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień, 120. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 20.

¹²¹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 53–54; O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień, 130. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 29. See also Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii przedstawień schematycznych i symbolicznych*, 170a–170b; *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 3–5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 71–72.

¹²² For an overview, see Rosińska, *The Model of Aesthetic Experience*.

¹²³ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 19–20. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 51–52. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 218–219.

¹²⁴ Blaustein, O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień, 8–9. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 6–7.

¹²⁵ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 10–11. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 97.

non-present objects;¹²⁶ and finally, (5) while perceiving a painting, one *sees* not sensations of chaotic shapes and colors but what is represented in the painting or “on” the canvas.¹²⁷ In all these cases, perceptual presentations (in Twardowski's sense) are at play, though they intend non-present objects, which seems to suggest that reproductive or creative presentations are also at play. In this regard, Blaustein claimed that these examples show that there are also other presentations *sui generis* that are non-reducible to Twardowski's classes. This holds especially for aesthetics. Blaustein's point was that if one attempts to describe the aesthetic experience, one should enlarge Twardowski's taxonomy by adding other types of presentations. For this reason, Blaustein postulated enlarging and reformulating Twardowski's classification. To do this, his taxonomy was based on the criterion of *how the presenting content is correlated with the presented object*. In his works, while investigating the basic criteria for the class of presentations, he wrote about the adequacy or inadequacy of the presenting content (in relation to the intentional object).

In 1930, in *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]* and in “O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień” [“On Intuition as a Feature of Some Presentations”], Blaustein referred to the Twardowskian understanding of how presenting content does intend its object: certain elements of presenting content refer to certain corresponding elements of the intentional object.¹²⁸ An example of this relation that was provided by Blaustein is perceptual presentation, in which the presenting content functions as if it were an image or an appearance (*wygląd*) of the presented object. In this regard, Aleksandra Horecka clarified as follows:

The presenting contents of the presentation of an object present the object of this presentation. When we are looking at a board we have a perceptual presentation of the board. The presenting content of the board presents a real board. This content makes up the appearance (view) of a real board. Therefore the appearance of an object presents this object.¹²⁹

However, this clarification still seems to be incomplete. Admittedly, at least in the case of perception, the presenting content is an appearance, and as such, it combines the sensory content, e.g., color marks, and—according to Blaustein—Gestalt qualities.¹³⁰ But, one could still ask what Blaustein meant by stating that the presenting content *refers to* or *corresponds with* the presented object. To phrase it differently: what are the relata of this relation? In the text “O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień” [“On Intuition as a Feature of Some Presentations”], Blaustein

¹²⁶ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 3. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 147. See also Blaustein, *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 107–108.

¹²⁷ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 2–3. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 70–71.

¹²⁸ Blaustein, *O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień*, 133. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 31–32. Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 53–54.

¹²⁹ Horecka, *The Concept of Iconic Sign in the Works of Selected Representatives of the Lvov–Warsaw School: Kazimierz Twardowski, Tadeusz Witwicki, Stanisław Ossowski, Mieczysław Wallis and Leopold Blaustein*, 288–289.

¹³⁰ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 33. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 61. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 227.

considered this question and—while commenting on how to understand the presenting content in perceptive, reproductive (both, as already stated, discussed by Twardowski) and imaginative images—he held the following:

Presenting contents have a variety of shapes and sizes, and they are surfaces of various colors which rest or move at various speeds in various directions. Depending on what the presenting content is and what is happening to it, the object is said to be black or blue, round or square, large or small, that it rests or moves at a greater or lesser speed in this or that direction.¹³¹

This passage is supposed to show that presenting content functions as if it had phenomenal qualities which are experienced in a certain phenomenon. Blaustein ascribed phenomenal qualities or features to content, such as “having a shape,” “having a size,” “being colored,” “moving,” or “resting.” As already stated, phenomenal qualities can be formed in a certain way, so they can be combined with certain Gestalt qualities. Taken as a whole, these qualities are formed as the appearance (*wygląd*) of what they present. In any case, they are all terms which determine or indicate their relatum, i.e., the presented object. More precisely, they determine the qualities or features of the object as presented in the relevant presentation. Thus, to address the above question (what are the relata of the relation between the presenting content and the presented object?), on the one hand, one has to indicate (1) the experienced qualities *as* experienced, and on the other hand, (2) the qualities or features ascribed to the object. These are then the relata or elements of the relation discussed by Blaustein.

With these ideas in mind, according to Blaustein, the relation between the presenting content and the intentional object can be either *adequate* or *inadequate*. As he claimed, “[...] the presenting content is adequate to the object if every (or almost every) element of the content corresponds to a certain element of the object.”¹³² Blaustein explained that the phrase “almost every” is necessary since there are elements of presenting content which are ascribed to content *as content*, and for this reason, the elements do not correspond to elements of the object *as an object*. For example, the feature of “being a mediatory entity in a mental act” is a feature of the content *as content* which does not correspond to any similar or analogical feature of the object *as an object*.¹³³ Blaustein stated that any perceptual presentation should be described as adequate. However, adequacy can be either *absolute* or *relative*:

¹³¹ Blaustein, O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień, 133: “Treści prezentujące posiadają rozmaity kształt i rozmałą wielkość, są rozmaicie zabarwionemi płaszczyznami, spoczywającemi lub poruszającemi się z rozmałą szybkością w rozmaitych kierunkach. Zależnie od tego, jaka jest treść prezentująca i co się z nią dzieje, mówi się o przedmiocie, że jest czarny czy też niebieski, okrągły lub kwadratowy, wielki lub mały, iż spoczywa lub porusza się z większą lub mniejszą szybkością, w tym lub innym kierunku.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 31. My translation.

¹³² Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 54: “[...] treść prezentująca jest adekwatna przedmiotowi, jeśli każdemu (*resp.* prawie każdemu) elementowi treści odpowiada pewien element przedmiotu.” My translation.

¹³³ This idea of Blaustein seems to refer to Ingarden’s ontology. For Ingarden, so-called purely intentional object has a twofold formal structure since it contains features ascribed to it by the fact

Content is absolutely adequate if every (or almost every) element of the content corresponds to a certain element of the object and each (or almost every) element of the object [corresponds to] a certain element of the content. Content is relatively adequate if indeed every (or almost every) element corresponds to a certain element of the object, but not vice versa.¹³⁴

To be precise, adequacy is absolute if the dyadic or two-place relation between the elements of the presenting content and the elements of the object are symmetrical; in turn, adequacy is relative if the relation is asymmetrical. In this context, Blaustein held that, for instance, sensations are absolutely adequate presentations, while images of physical objects are only relatively adequate presentations. Sensations are the experienced elements as such, e.g., the sensation of a black and white surface which is flickering in someone's experience while reading this sentence. Blaustein held that here, the content and the object are strictly connected. In other words, all the elements of the presenting content correspond with all the elements of the presented object. In turn, images of physical objects, e.g., an image of a human head seen in profile, contain only the elements of the presenting content which correspond to the actually given side of the object, whereas the object as such also includes other elements which are not actually presented but are merely apperceived. Simply stated, one does not see a physical thing from all sides at once. Thus, someone's perceptual image is admittedly adequate, yet only relatively so.

Furthermore, in contrast to adequate presentations, "[t]he presentation is inadequate if at least some (and only a few) elements of the content correspond to certain elements of the object."¹³⁵ The presentation is inadequate if it is not an objectless presentation; Blaustein is clear that any inadequate presentation always has its intentional object, but there is no strict correspondence of elements between the presenting content and elements of the object. However, as with adequate presentations, an inadequate presentation can be either *absolute* or *relative*. A certain

of being a the object, e.g. being a mediatory element that is actualized by the ideal content and by features inherent in it, e.g. a feature of the fictional character, say, being a child. For this reason, the object can have certain feature *qua* object or *qua* content. Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 121: "Der betreffende rein intentionale Gegenstand als solcher hat eben für sich selbst einen Träger und zwar einen Träger seiner Beschaffenheiten bzw. Merkmale, die von denjenigen Beschaffenheiten, die in seinem Gehalt auftreten und dem vermeinten 'Tisch' zukommen, verschieden sind." Reprint in 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 124. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 119: "The given purely intentional object as such has its own carrier, i.e., a carrier of its properties or features, which are different from properties that appear in its content and pertain to the intended 'table.'" See also Ingarden, *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, II/1, 174–210. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, vol. II, 171–206.

¹³⁴ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 54: "Absolutnie adekwatna jest treść, jeśli każdemu (*resp.* prawie każdemu) elementowi treści odpowiada pewien element przedmiotu, a każdemu (*resp.* prawie każdemu) elementowi przedmiotu pewien element treści. Relatywnie adekwatna jest treść, jeśli wprawdzie każdemu (*resp.* prawie każdemu) elementowi treści odpowiada pewien element przedmiotu ale nie naodwrot." My translation.

¹³⁵ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 57: "Nieadekwatnem jest przedstawienie, jeśli conajwyżej niektórym (i to nielicznym) elementom treści odpowiadają pewne elementy przedmiotu." My translation.

presentation is absolutely inadequate if no element of the presenting content corresponds to any element of the object; in turn, a certain presentation is relatively inadequate if some (and only a few) elements of the presenting content correspond to certain elements of the object. An example (yet only indirect) of an absolutely inadequate presentation is the process of reading: if the presenting content consists only of words—which do not imitate a sound, so which are not onomatopoeias—the object of the presentation is presented absolutely inadequately.¹³⁶ In turn, an example of a relatively inadequate presentation is the presentation of a triangle in general; in this case, some elements of the presenting content correspond to certain elements of a particular triangle which can be drawn in a notebook.

In his classification of adequate and inadequate presentations, Blaustein wanted to include presentations such as a symbol, a schema,¹³⁷ or the perception of an actor who is performing a fictional character. In all these cases, the content *quasi*-presents its object: one sees a symbol but its object is not given due to the presenting content, which rather corresponds with its closer or proper object; a symbol refers rather to another object, as in the case of a sandglass, which can represent the passage of time. Next, if one sees a schema, e.g., a map, she or he perceives the lines which present its object (say, a city) in *modi quasi*. Finally, if one watches an actor, one sees the actor and the fictional character performed by the actor; nonetheless, the fictional character can be presented not directly but in *modi quasi*. Therefore, the function of content can be understood in two ways: it functions either as the *presenting* content or as the *quasi-presenting* content. Blaustein held that a unified classification of presentations has to refer to both divisions: (1) adequate or inadequate and (2) presenting or *quasi*.¹³⁸ The latter pair of content corresponds with Blaustein's general idea—taken from Brentano and Twardowski—of founding mental life on intuitive or experienced elements. As presented above, for Twardowski, concepts arise if one fails to present the object in intuition. Therefore, phenomenologically speaking, concepts are unfulfilled intentions. Analogically, for Blaustein, even if

¹³⁶ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 57.

¹³⁷ The term “schematic presentations” comes from Théodule-Armand Ribot, French psychologist, lecturer at the École Normale Supérieure and the Sorbonne, professor at the College of France. In his *Essai sur l'imagination créatrice* (published in 1900), however, these presentations are described in the context of incomplete imageries. Ribot, *Essai sur l'imagination créatrice*, 15–16: “Le groupe des images *incomplètes*, selon le témoignage de la conscience elle-même, provient de deux sources distinctes: d'abord, des perceptions insuffisantes ou mal fixées; ensuite des impressions d'objets analogues qui, trop souvent répétées, finissent par se confondre. Ce dernier cas a été très bien décrit par Taine. Un homme, dit-il, qui, ayant parcouru une allée de peupliers, veut se représenter une peuplier, ou, ayant regardé une basse-cour, veut se représenter une poule, éprouve un embarras: ses différents souvenirs se recouvrent. L'expérience devient une cause d'effacement; les images s'annulant l'une l'autre tombent à l'état de tendances sourdes que leur contrariété et leur égalité empêchent de prendre l'ascendant. [...] Ce groupe nous conduit à celui des images *schématiques*, totalement dépourvues de marques individuelles: la représentation vague d'un rosier, d'une épingle, d'une cigarette, etc.” In Blaustein writings, in turn, its meaning seems to correspond rather with Ingarden's understanding of a purely intentional object as a schematic object.

¹³⁸ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 53.

one uses concepts, one presents *something* but only *quasi*-inadequately. In a review of Blaustein's *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*] that was published in *Przegląd Humanistyczny* [*The Humanistic Review*] in 1931, an unknown reviewer rightly pointed out that Blaustein's key insight into the nature of psychic phenomena is that there is a tendency toward intuitive fulfillment:

In addition to the tendency to think economically, which produces signitive thinking that is carried out with the help of signs, e.g., words in speech, the opposite tendency—according to the author—is also present in our thinking, namely, the tendency to be intuitive. The desire for intuitive presentation is clear in relation to objects which are abstract or at least difficult to imagine for some reason. This tendency creates artifacts of concreteness and intuitiveness in the form of diagrams and symbols.¹³⁹


Hence, inadequate presentations have a tendency to present their objects as intuitively present; however, the object cannot be presented in its essence since it is abstract. In this context, Blaustein's idea is to include *quasi*-inadequate presentations, i.e., presentations which intend an object; even if the object cannot be intuitively given, one presents to oneself an artifact with which to intend the object. In this case, the artifact becomes a concrete and intuitively given surrogate of what is unrepresentable.

As a result, Blaustein's classification of presentations is divided into at least four cases: (1) adequate presentations, (2) *quasi*-adequate presentations, (3) inadequate presentations, and (4) *quasi*-inadequate presentations. On this basis, in § 53 of his *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*], Blaustein formulated the following classification of presentations¹⁴⁰ (Schema 4.1):

Clearly, Blaustein's classification, which adopted the criteria described above, as formulated in his *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*], was richer than Twardowski's taxonomy. Whereas Blaustein identified eight classes of presentations, Twardowski indicated only three (or, at best, four). Twardowski omitted inadequate presentations in general, suggesting that if a presentation fails to present its object, it becomes a concept, i.e., an abstract presentation. Nonetheless, Twardowski's classes are included in the schema as types of adequate presentations; more precisely, they are—to employ Blaustein's language—(1) relatively adequate presentations (i.e., perceptual presentations), (2) *quasi*-adequate reproductive presentations (i.e., reproductive presentations) and (3) *quasi*-adequate creative presentations (i.e., creative presentations). In a review of Blaustein's book, Adam Wiegner

¹³⁹Unknown author, Blaustein Leopold, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 225: “Obok tendencji do ekonomji myślenia, której wytworem jest myślenie sygnitywne, dokonywujące się przy pomocy znaków, np. wyrazów mowy, zaznacza się—wedle autora—w naszym myśleniu również tendencja przeciwna, mianowicie tendencja do unaocznienia. Dążność do unaocznienia zaznacza się w odniesieniu do przedmiotów z natury abstrakcyjnych lub conajmniej z pewnych względów trudnych do wyobrażenia. W stosunku do tych przedmiotów dążność ta tworzy artefakty konkretności i naoczności w postaci schematów i symbolów.” My translation.

¹⁴⁰Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 58.



Schema 4.1 Blaustein’s classification of presentations in *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*]

explicitly stated that the theory discussed in *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*] is a significant elaboration of Twardowski’s ideas formulated in the 1898 book *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [*Images and Concepts*] and later summarized in the 1924 book *O istocie pojęć* [*The Essence of Concepts*]; in this context, he added that Blaustein’s main contribution lies in the concept of imaginative presentations and their use in aesthetics.¹⁴¹ Indeed, by enlarging Twardowski’s taxonomy, Blaustein was able to describe a wider scope of aesthetic experiences, e.g., watching a theater play (imaginative presentation) or contemplating a symbolic painting (symbolic presentation). Blaustein’s key insight consists in showing that presenting content plays different roles in different types of art. If one watches a theater play, the presenting content seems to function in the same way as in the case of perceptual presentation since it functions as an image of the object; however, the proper object is *not* what one sees on the stage. Therefore, presenting content does not present its object adequately. Analogically, if one contemplates a painting with

¹⁴¹ Wiegner, Leopold Blaustein: *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 104.

a symbolic meaning, the presenting content once again finds one's experience, but the object of what one sees is *beyond* what is given. Here, the presenting content also does not present its object adequately. As Blaustein put it, the presenting content functions here *quasi*-inadequately. All these issues, however, do not concern me here. I will discuss Blaustein's aesthetics later in Chap. 8.

Blaustein's theory of presentations is complex. In general, it can be summarized as follows: (1) a presentation is a simple intentional act, i.e., an act which intends its object; (2) it includes two inseparable parts (quality and matter); (3) quality, however, determines a certain act precisely by being a presentation which is different from, say, a judgment; and (4) matter determines the directedness of the act, i.e., its intention as directed toward a certain object. These general theses came from the Brentanian heritage, not only from Brentano but also from Twardowski and (less) from Husserl. Therefore, following Miskiewicz, it is true that "[...] what's most interesting about Blaustein's theory is the fact that his theory of direct presentations is based on a development that can clearly be traced back to Brentano's original theory."¹⁴² Nonetheless, these theses do not justify Twardowski's taxonomy of presentations divided into two main classes, i.e., (1) concepts and (2) images, while images are divided into four subclasses: (a) perceptive, (b) reproductive, (c) creative and (d) introspective.¹⁴³ Blaustein held that neither matter nor quality is the criterion of clear divisions. On this basis, his central idea was to ask about the relation between contents and objects; more precisely, between the presenting content and the intended object. Consequently, he differentiated (1) adequate and (2) inadequate presentations and (3) presenting and (4) *quasi*-presenting acts. Blaustein's taxonomy of presentations was richer than that of Twardowski; it can also be used in aesthetics since it enables one to describe a broader scope of aesthetic experiences. However, even if the Brentanian framework of this theory is clear, it is unjustified to claim that Blaustein's theory was reducible to Brentano or Twardowski. In fact, the opposite is true since there were new elements in Blaustein's theory which were absent in both Brentano's and Twardowski's theories. What also differentiated Blaustein from this tradition was his phenomenological tendencies. After all, his

¹⁴²Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 183.

¹⁴³Of course, Twardowski's theory is nuanced. However, it can be summarized as follows: (1) presentations are a class of mental phenomena in which the object is intentionally presented. (2) There are concrete and abstract presentations, and (3) this division follows from differences in contents which refer to objects. (4) Concrete presentations are images understood as wholes composed of parts, incl. Impressions. (5) Images are characterized by (a) concreteness, (b) manifestness and (c) sketchiness. (6) The class of images has four sub-classes: (a) perceptive, (b) reproductive, (c) creative, and (d) introspective images. (7) Abstract presentations are concepts, and (8) they arise on the basis of images which cannot be unified as wholes. (9) Concepts are compounds of (at least) two presentations: (a) a basic image and (b) one or more imagined judgments. (10) Concepts arise due to the mental activity of abstraction (of relevant features). (11) This class covers four main sub-classes: (a) abstract, (b) synthetic, (c) general, and (d) particular concepts. Finally, (12) concepts can be substituted by (a) symbolic or (b) semi-symbolic thinking.

theory of presentations is not a Brentanian-style theory *per se*, i.e., it is not focused on acts. Blaustein always referred to the object and asked for the *ways of givenness* or *modes of manifestation* (*Gegebenheitsweisen*) of the object. The phenomenological viewpoint adopted by Blaustein in his philosophy was therefore an emphasis placed on experience, its specific object, and, even more importantly, on how the object is constituted: how does one understand an object which is presented in an experience? What is the structure of this experience, and what is someone's subjective way of experience? These questions refer to his account of the method of phenomenology, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

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Chapter 5

Analysis of Blaustein’s Critique of the Phenomenological Method



The psychological themes in the method employed by Blaustein are pervasive, as shown in Chap. 3. In my analysis of these themes, I put forward the hypothesis that this attachment to psychology determined his view of phenomenology as an empirical discipline, rather than *a priori* eidetics or transcendental philosophy. Basically, Blaustein assumed that if phenomenology indeed concerns essences, this would mean that it abandons its proper object, i.e., lived experiences. For this reason, according to him, phenomenology ought to become, *contra* Husserl, an empirical discipline, which seems to suggest that it is possible only as a Brentanian-style descriptive or empirical psychology. Accordingly, Blaustein’s struggles with the phenomenological method can be viewed from a broader perspective. After all, as shown by, e.g., Theodore De Boer,¹ Herbert Spiegelberg,² or, more recently, by Andreea Smaranda Aldea³ and Denis Fisette,⁴ phenomenology emerged in a dispute with and in a critical assessment of the heritage of Brentano. Some may claim that Husserl’s break from Brentano was the cornerstone of his original philosophical project, i.e., transcendental phenomenology, which justified its claims as opposed to descriptive psychology. This, it seems, inspired Krzysztof Wiczeorek to draw a parallel between Husserl and Blaustein; like Husserl, Blaustein discovered difficulties, inaccuracies, and even aporias in Brentano, and he “naturally” took the position of phenomenology.⁵ However, contrary to Wiczeorek, I have argued that the psychological themes in Blaustein’s method are irreducible, and it is precisely for that reason that he was a proponent of descriptive psychology.

¹De Boer, *The Development of Husserl’s Thought*, 125–301.

²Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry*, 3–124.

³Aldea, Husserl’s Break from Brentano Reconsidered: Abstraction and the Structure of Consciousness, 395–426.

⁴Fisette, Stumpf and Husserl on Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology, 175–190; Fisette, Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology: Brentano, Stumpf, Husserl, 88–104.

⁵Wiczeorek, Leopolda Blausteina interpretacja świata zjawiskowego, 157–158.

Against this background, one may ask: if Blaustein indeed favored descriptive psychology over phenomenology, is it appropriate to think of him as a phenomenologist instead? It is true that his understanding of phenomenology is highly critical and often went beyond a simple repetition of Husserl's train of thought or ideas—indeed, so much so that he definitely cannot be called a mere epigone of Husserl. This is precisely why opinions in the secondary literature are divided about whether Blaustein's philosophy should be classified as a form of phenomenology. Such a classification is called into question by, for example, Mieczysław Andrzej Dąbrowski⁶ and, more recently, Marek Pokropski.⁷ Conversely, scholars such as Stanisław Pazura,⁸ Barry Smith,⁹ and Maria van der Schaar¹⁰ unequivocally classify Blaustein as a phenomenologist. Wioletta Miskiewicz goes even further, claiming that he was the founder of “an entirely new branch of phenomenology” that is “analytic, descriptive and interdisciplinary.”¹¹ The present chapter is an attempt to take stock of these divergent views. My fundamental aim in this chapter is to define and explore Blaustein's original reformulation of Husserl's method in more detail. I will argue, first, that a category that is more adequate here is that of a *phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology* rather than phenomenology *sensu stricto*. Blaustein's project seems to be related but not equivalent to the project presented (yet later abandoned) by Husserl in the first edition of his *Logische Untersuchungen*.¹² Second, and more importantly, I will attempt to show that Blaustein's criticism of the method of phenomenology paradoxically adapted some elements of Husserl's 1925 lectures devoted to phenomenological psychology, in which Blaustein had an occasion to participate during his stay in Germany. Thus, Blaustein used in his method some elements of Husserl's phenomenological psychology which cannot be derived from the legacy of Brentano, Twardowski, or Dilthey. Overall, I argue that Blaustein's method incorporates both *descriptive-psychological* and *phenomenological* tools.

⁶Dąbrowski, Bibliografia prac Leopolda Blausteina, 244.

⁷Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 94.

⁸Pazura, Blaustein, Leopold, 90.

⁹Smith, *Austrian Philosophy*, 157.

¹⁰Schaar, *Kazimierz Twardowski*, 12.

¹¹Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 182.

¹²Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 24, fn. 1. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 176–177.

5.1 Blaustein's Main Arguments Against Husserl's Method

Blaustein engaged in a polemic against selected elements of the phenomenological method primarily in the first, theoretical period of his research activity, i.e., in 1928–31. The polemic was usually,¹³ but not always,¹⁴ preceded by a reconstruction of Husserl's position, which is a testament to Blaustein's familiarity with his writings.¹⁵ In this part of the chapter, I will analyze this polemic by first outlining Blaustein's understanding of Husserl's method and then reconstructing the critique and, equally importantly, his positive proposal of how phenomenology should be understood.¹⁶

At the very beginning of his doctoral thesis, Blaustein took note of both the continuity of Husserl's philosophical project and a major shift that occurred within it.¹⁷ Initially, in *Untersuchungen*, the project was focused on descriptive psychology, but beginning with *Ideen I*, it clearly moved away from these early premises. However, as Blaustein observed, although Husserl retained the originally developed terminology, he changed the method. Thus, the aim of descriptive psychology in *Untersuchungen* was to describe the basic elements, i.e., inseparable parts, of the act of consciousness, as well as the way this act was related to its content and object. The act of consciousness and its properties, such as intentionality, are not accounted for as an object that is separable from a lived experience but, according to Blaustein, as a "purely descriptive" element, i.e., as a "quality of certain lived experiences" or, more precisely, an "essential property of psychic phenomena."¹⁸ A descriptive analysis abstracts from genetic relations. This enabled Husserl (in Blaustein's interpretation) not only to present a classification of psychic acts based on differences in species but also to formulate specific *psychological laws* (*prawa psychologiczne*) which, however, were already well known prior to Husserl's studies.¹⁹

¹³E.g., Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*; Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia, 233–242. Reprint in 2013: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia tekstów*, 223–233.

¹⁴E.g., Blaustein, Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii (autoreferat), 164b–166b.

¹⁵Tadeusz Kotarbiński, who was Twardowski's student, called Blaustein "an expert in Husserl," (Kotarbiński, *Garść wspomnień*, 11), while Ajdukiewicz wrote about him as follows: "He [i.e., Blaustein] wrote a thesis about 'Act, Content, and Object' in Husserl and did it very thoroughly. He read the entire pre-Husserlian and post-Husserlian literature devoted to the topic and fell in love with Husserl." Ajdukiewicz, A letter to Roman Ingarden from June 14, 1925: "Pisał na pracę o 'Akcje, Treści i Przedmiocie' u Husserla, i zrobił ją bardzo porządnie. Poznał całą literaturę przedhusserlowską i pohusserlowską w tej sprawie i zakochał się w Husserlu." My translation.

¹⁶This and the following sections incorporate some materials previously published in Płotka, A Critical Analysis of Blaustein's Polemic against Husserl's Method. The original material was edited and enlarged.

¹⁷Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 2–3; Blaustein, Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia, 235–236. Reprint in 2013: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia tekstów*, 226–227.

¹⁸Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 28, 56.

¹⁹Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 33–34.

The project was changed considerably in *Ideen I*, where Husserl developed and used the method of phenomenological reduction (*epoché*). As a result of applying this method, consciousness becomes *pure* consciousness, that is, the *residuum* of reduction,²⁰ while psychological laws are understood to be a “purely phenomenological state of affairs” (*czysto fenomenologiczny stan rzeczy*).²¹ This is possible by breaking the connection with empirical experience, i.e., with psycho-physical individuals, and focusing on the *essence* of a given act. In Blaustein's interpretation, “[t]he phenomenological method consists in changing the natural attitude,”²² that is, bracketing the “general thesis” and accounting for it as a lived experience. Thus, phenomenology is a descriptive psychology that employs the method of phenomenological reduction, which is equivalent to treating it as descriptive eidetics of pure experiences of consciousness based on seeing essences or eidetic intuition (*Wesensschau*).²³ As we shall see in the following section, Blaustein's interpretation of Husserl's method has serious limitations.

Both in his doctoral thesis²⁴ and the later article entitled “Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia” [“Edmund Husserl and His Phenomenology”],²⁵ Blaustein mentioned that he had assessed the method critically in two lectures he delivered on April 28 and May 5, 1928, during the meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society. Already in the first lecture, Blaustein repeated the definition of phenomenology he had developed in his doctoral thesis whereby it was a “[...] descriptive discipline concerning the ideal essences of lived experiences in pure consciousness”²⁶ and linked the method of phenomenological reduction (*epoché*) with the analysis of essences. In other words, Blaustein seemed to be focused on the later version of phenomenology presented in *Ideen I*. Questioning the unclear understanding of essences as general objects, he formulated five different objections and doubts. To begin with, (1) in regard to *logical* doubts, Blaustein believed that to construct a real definition—that is, one that concerns the *quid rei* instead of a mere expression in a given language—one must assume the existence of a *definiendum* with specific properties; this would mean that one would have to begin with solving a problem that goes beyond logic and concerns ontology. (2) From an *epistemological* point of

²⁰ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 25, fn. 2, 60, fn. 3; Blaustein, *Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia*, 237. Reprint in 2013: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia tekstów*, 228.

²¹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 32, fn. 2.

²² Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 60: “Metoda fenomenologiczna polega na zmianie naturalnego nastawienia.” My translation.

²³ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 60, fn. 3; Blaustein, *Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia*, 236. Reprint in 2013: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia tekstów*, 226.

²⁴ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 60–61, fn. 3.

²⁵ Blaustein, *Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia*, 238. Reprint in 2013: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia tekstów*, 229.

²⁶ Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii (autoreferat)*, 164b: “[...] deskryptywną nauką o idealnych istotach przeżyć czystej świadomości.” My translation.

view, knowing essences requires the application of a specific method of seeing essences or eidetic intuition (*Wesensschau*), but the method turns out to be, as he put it, a schematic presentation.²⁷ This kind of presentation cannot be used to prove anything because, being schematic, its presenting content cannot represent all the properties of the presented object, which means that “[...] one can never be sure whether the choice is right, nor can one differentiate clearly between the right choices and the rest.”²⁸ As shown earlier in Sect. 4.3, schematic presentations were classified by Blaustein as relatively *quasi*-inadequate, i.e., they meet the following conditions: (a) they intend their object, but (b) the object *cannot* be intuitively given; for this reason, (c) they intend an artifact which refers to the object and, moreover, (d) only a few properties of the artifact are correlated with relevant properties of the object. For Blaustein, a schematic presentation enables one to comprehend a schema as a representation of the schematized object, whereas the schema presents *typical* features of the schematized object. By claiming that seeing essences or eidetic intuition (*Wesensschau*) is in fact a schematic representation, he undermined Husserl's idea that this act is direct and presents its object as actually present.

(3) Blaustein also had *ontological* doubts, claiming that it is not clear how general objects “exist” given that the self-givenness (*Selbstgegebenheit*) of an object can be understood intuitively only through perceptual acts, and he did not believe *Wesensschau* is an act of perception. (4) Approaching the issue of essences from the perspective of *psychology*, Blaustein acknowledged the existence of lived experiences that are directed toward general objects and postulated that the way such objects are given should be described further²⁹; he also suggested that general objects were at best intentional objects of acts. Finally, (5) Blaustein expressed a *methodological* doubt when he argued that although the existence of general objects is assumed at the outset, the question of whether they truly exist remains to be answered. In other words, contrary to Husserl and Ingarden,³⁰ he believed phenomenology is not free of the *petitio principii* fallacy.

In light of these doubts, Blaustein claimed that the sciences may address general objects only as *types* rather than as an essence (existing as an ideal entity). By “type,” Blaustein understood the lowest species (individuals) abstracted from

²⁷According to Blaustein's general description, a schematic representation is a *quasi*-adequate representation, i.e., a representation in which only a few elements of the content are related to the object. See Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 57. A more precise definition states that “A schematically represents B for X if A naturally represents (reproduces intuitively) B for X, A is intuitively given and B is not, i.e., if A reproduces B intuitively for X and the presenting content of A is not included as the appearance of B.” Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 107: “A reprezentuje [...] schematycznie B dla X, jeśli A reprezentuje naturalnie (odtworza naocznie) B dla X, A jest naocznie dane, B zaś nie, czyli jeśli A odtwarza naocznie B dla X, a treść prezentująca A nie jest ujęta jako wygląd B.” My translation.

²⁸Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii* (autoreferat), 165a: “[...] nigdy niema pewności, że dobór jest trafny, ani też niema możliwości ścisłego odróżnienia trafnych wyborów od innych.” My translation.

²⁹Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii* (autoreferat), 165a.

³⁰Ingarden, *Über die Gefahr einer Petitio Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie*, 545–568.

incidental properties.³¹ Types are identified through a series of *observations* (instead of seeing essences) by skipping certain properties. In other words, they are achieved through *abstraction*. Thus understood, a type is a correlate of a specific methodological process which does not require hypostasis in the form of an essence and does not entail necessitating an acknowledgment of its existence. Blaustein described the process as inductive reasoning from one case to a type (he also used the German phrase: *Schluss vom Einzelnen auf Gesetzmässigkeit in einer Menge*).³² Thus, to account for higher species, one should apply the method of gradual generalization, i.e., the inductive method. The essences addressed by phenomenology, being higher species, are therefore simple generalizations, *not* general objects. This is why, according to Blaustein's conclusion, "[...] phenomenology is possible only as an empirical, descriptive science of types (the lowest species) of experiences in pure consciousness, not as an *a priori*, descriptive science of higher essences as ideal objects."³³ Hence, in Blaustein's opinion, phenomenology should use the method of inductive generalizations to ensure the level of certainty that is required of science.

In the lecture delivered on May 5, 1928, Blaustein considered the consequences of rejecting essences as general entities. He stressed that the step would not result in rejecting ontology itself (formal and material) but only the "categorical nature" of ontological findings, which are replaced by *hypotheses*. Therefore, science, including phenomenology, should ultimately put forward general propositions about individual objects of certain types instead of propositions about those very types (essences). To a limited extent, seeing essences may be retained to present states of affairs expressed by axioms but not to obtain axioms themselves.³⁴ This is because research should focus on what is individual, i.e., experienced, rather than on what is essential, i.e., general and existing in the "world of ideas" (*świat idei*) (Blaustein's phrase, which refers to Plato's theory of ideas). He stated that the phenomenologist makes too many unjustified assumptions, and for this reason, the approach is questionable. As he wrote:

The view that the eidetic sciences are the basis of the empirical sciences presupposes, from a realistic viewpoint, firstly the existence of certain unchanging states of affairs in the world of ideas, qualities, and other ideal objects, as well as their knowability, and, secondly, some necessary correlation between what occurs and what we know about the world of ideal beings and what happens and what we know about the world of empirically existing concretizations of these beings. There are more of these assumptions than a cautious scholar would be willing to accept.³⁵

³¹ Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii* (autoreferat), 165a.

³² Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii* (autoreferat), 165a, fn.

³³ Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii* (autoreferat), 165b: "[...] fenomenologia jest możliwa tylko jako empiryczna, deskryptywna nauka o typach (najniższych gatunkach) przeżyć czystej świadomości a nie jako aprioryczna, deskryptywna nauka o wyższych istotach jako idealnych przedmiotach." My translation.

³⁴ Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii* (autoreferat), 166a.

³⁵ Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii* (autoreferat), 166a: "Pogląd, iż nauki eidetyczne są podstawą empirycznych, zakłada na stanowisku realistycznym po pierwsze istnienie

Furthermore, according to Blaustein, experience is not shaped by ideas but the other way around. He concluded that this is precisely why phenomenology cannot serve as a foundation for other material sciences, although it may provide them with some basis in formal ontology. Finally, in Blaustein's view, the fundamental difference between Husserl's approach from *Untersuchungen* and that from *Ideen I* has to do with applying the method of reduction (what is *psychic* is taken as *pure consciousness*). One might be surprised that Blaustein did not discuss this difference at length, as it seems to be fundamental for distinguishing *descriptive psychology* (as defined in the first edition of *Untersuchungen*) from *transcendental phenomenology* (e.g., *Ideen I*). Instead, he seemed to take for granted that he proved that, first, essences are questionable and, second, seeing essences does not have any epistemic value; consequently, transcendental phenomenology seems to be simply false.

5.2 A Critical Analysis of Blaustein's Reading of Husserl

5.2.1 *Blaustein's Position in Light of Husserl's and Ingarden's Early Theory of Ideas*

Blaustein's understanding of Husserl's method and his critique of it may be summarized as the following train of thought: (1) at first—in *Untersuchungen*—Husserl defined phenomenology as descriptive psychology whose aim was to describe essential properties, i.e., types, of psychic phenomena; (2) next—from the publication of *Ideen I* onward—descriptions are made subject to phenomenological reduction that enables accounting for what is psychic as pure consciousness, which leads to the understanding of phenomenology as descriptive eidetics using the method of seeing essences or eidetic intuition (*Wesensschau*); (3) the problem is that the method of eidetic analysis makes use of the unclear concept of *eidōs* as a general object, which is why it must be suspended or restricted to the benefit of the descriptive psychology from *Untersuchungen*. This critique, however, is questionable. Thus, in this section, I will show its limitations, drawing on the two early works by Husserl that Blaustein cited. By juxtaposing both propositions and showing the limitations of the polemic, I arrive at the thesis that the critique formulated by him does not so much concern Husserl as Ingarden.

In the first edition of *Untersuchungen*, Husserl indeed described phenomenology as descriptive psychology, which he opposed to explanatory or genetic

pewnych niezmiennych stanów rzeczy w świecie idei, jakości i innych przedmiotów idealnych i ich poznawalność, a po drugie jakąś konieczną korelację pomiędzy tem, co zachodzi i co poznajemy w świecie idealnych istot, a tem, co się dzieje i co poznajemy w świecie empirycznie istniejących konkretyzacji owych istot. Założeń tych jest więcej, aniżeli ostrożny uczony skłonny byłby przyjąć.” My translation.

psychology.³⁶ Its aim was to carry out an initial study of lived experiences by describing them within the framework of general structures to provide a basis for psychological or logical investigations. However, in the second edition of the work published in 1913, Husserl firmly said that phenomenology is *not* descriptive psychology, as it makes use of “pure” descriptions that have nothing to do with empirical ones³⁷; thus redefined, phenomenology uses “[...] its contemplation of pure essence on a basis of exemplary individual intuitions of experience (often freely *imagined* ones).”³⁸ In fact, Husserl moved away from descriptive psychology much earlier than 1913, having stressed in 1903 that phenomenology should not make assumptions about its object (as is the case of descriptive psychology) but rather focus on what is given as it is given.³⁹ Equally importantly, in *Untersuchungen* Husserl developed the method of eidetic analysis in discussion with the modern theory of abstraction, rejecting the view of hypostasizing ideas as general objects.⁴⁰ What is captured in ideation is not so much a general object as the moment of a given lived experience. Although in the secondary literature some authors, e.g., David Woodruff Smith and Roland McIntyre,⁴¹ interpreted this element as an ideal entity, namely, an ideal meaning, John Drummond⁴² demonstrated that this interpretation is questionable, as Husserl ultimately understands the ideal as *irreal* rather than *ideal* (i.e., not as something opposed to what is real).

³⁶Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 24, fn. 1. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 176–177.

³⁷Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 23. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 175–176.

³⁸Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 23: “Behält das Wort Psychologie seinen alten Sinn, so ist Phänomenologie eben nicht deskriptive Psychologie, die ihr eigentümliche ‘reine’ Deskription—d.i. die auf Grund exemplarischer Einzelanschauungen von Erlebnissen (sei es auch in freier Phantasie fingierten) vollzogene Wesenserschauung und die deskriptive Fixierung der ersichteten Wesen in reinen Begriffen—ist keine empirische (naturwissenschaftliche) Deskription, sie schließt vielmehr den natürlichen Vollzug aller empirischen (naturalistischen) Apperzeptionen und Setzungen aus.” Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 175.

³⁹Husserl, *Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910)*, Husserliana 22, 206–207: “Daher ist die Phänomenologie nicht ohne weiteres als ‘deskriptive Psychologie’ zu bezeichnen. Sie ist es nicht im strengen und eigentlichen Sinn. Ihre Deskriptionen betreffen nicht Erlebnisse oder Erlebnisklassen von empirischen Personen; denn von Personen, von Ich und Anderen, von meinen und anderer Erlebnisse weiß sie nichts und vermutet sie nichts; über dergleichen stellt sie keine Fragen, versucht sie keine Bestimmungen, macht sie keine Hypothesen. Die phänomenologische Deskription blickt auf das im strengsten Sinn Gegebene hin, auf das Erlebnis, so wie es in sich selbst ist.” See also Zahavi, *Husserl's Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics and Transcendental Philosophy*, 42.

⁴⁰Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 127. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 248. On the question of essence in Husserl, see also Hopkins, *Phenomenological Cognition of the A Priori: Husserl's Method of “Seeing Essences” (Wesenserschauung)*, 151–178.

⁴¹Smith, McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning and Language*, 112, 116–119.

⁴²Drummond, *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object*, 26.

To avoid misunderstandings when interpreting what is ideal, in *Ideen I* Husserl introduced the procedure of reduction. Naturally, the theory of reduction is complex and, historically speaking, dates back to Husserl's reflections from the first years after the publication of *Untersuchungen*.⁴³ In the context that is of interest here, the procedure suspends all theses about existence or non-existence and thus does not solve the problem of the existence of ideas either. An essence is understood in *Ideen I* as the "what" of a given object. One reads that:

At first "essence" designated what is to be found in the very own being of an individuum as the What of an individuum. Any such What can, however, be "put into an idea." Experiencing or intuition of something individual can become transmuted into eidetic seeing (ideation)—a possibility which is itself to be understood not as empirical, but as eidetic. What is seen when that occurs is the corresponding pure essence or Eidos, whether it be the highest category or a particularization thereof—down to full concretion.⁴⁴

The account of essences is objective, but, following Husserl, what is given in such an act is *not* accounted for as existing (*daseiend*).⁴⁵ In any case, when investigating the essence, a phenomenologist develops the ontology of a given domain, an ontology which Husserl divided into formal (dealing with the object in general) and material (investigating material essences). At the same time, Husserl was opposed to "Platonic hypostatization," i.e., accounting for ideas as real beings.⁴⁶ For him, an essence is a correlate of corresponding acts whilst seeing essences is an originary presentive act; an essence cannot of course be reduced to these acts, being their correlate.

In light of this brief presentation, it is perhaps surprising that Blaustein was so determined to criticize Husserl. It turns out that Blaustein not only did not reflect upon but also did not accept Husserl's arguments in favor of moving away from descriptive psychology. Moreover, he consistently accused Husserl of hypostatizing ideas, which was plainly not the case. One might even say that Blaustein misinterpreted Husserl. The fundamental difference between Husserl and Blaustein is that the latter did not accept the method of reduction that neutralizes or brackets the question about the existence of ideas. With this in mind, it could be at best argued that Blaustein attacked a specific interpretation of the phenomenological method that accounts for ideas as existing general objects. But why did he write about Husserl *expressis verbis*? To answer this question, one needs to consider the broader

⁴³Lavigne, *Husserl et la naissance de la phénoménologie (1900–1913)*, 287–306.

⁴⁴Husserl, *Ideen I*, *Husserliana* 3/1, 13: "Zunächst bezeichnete 'Wesen' das im selbsteigenen Sein eines Individuum als sein Was Vorfindliche. Jedes solches Was kann aber 'in Idee gesetzt' werden. Erfahrende oder individuelle Anschauung kann in Wesensschauung (Ideation) umgewandelt werden—eine Möglichkeit, die selbst nicht als empirische, sondern als Wesensmöglichkeit zu verstehen ist. Das Erschaute ist dann das entsprechende reine Wesen oder Eidos, sei es die oberste Kategorie, sei es eine Besonderung derselben, bis herab zur vollen Konkretion." Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideen I*, Edmund Husserl: Collected Works 2, 8.

⁴⁵Husserl, *Ideen I*, *Husserliana* 3/1, 18. Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideen I*, Edmund Husserl: Collected Works 2, 13.

⁴⁶Husserl, *Ideen I*, *Husserliana* 3/1, 47. Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideen I*, Edmund Husserl: Collected Works 2, 41.

context of both lectures. My hypothesis is that, in the lectures, Blaustein did not argue with Husserl (even though the philosopher was expressly cited) but with Ingarden or at least with his early interpretation of the problem of essence in phenomenology. Twardowski writes in his journal that Ingarden was the only one to take the floor after Blaustein's lectures.⁴⁷ This should come as no surprise given that already a year before, i.e., on April 30, 1927, Ingarden and Blaustein discussed the concept of consciousness on the occasion of another lecture delivered for the Polish Philosophical Society, accusing each other of the *petitio principii* fallacy.⁴⁸ The accusation relates directly to the epistemic value of seeing essences or eidetic intuition and the method of reduction: can seeing essences be the source of fully justified knowledge if it assumes *a priori* the value of a different kind of cognition—for example, scientific cognition? Radosław Kuliniak, Dorota Leszczyna and Mariusz Pandura emphasize that Blaustein's lectures were targeted directly at Ingarden, with the aim of weakening his position after he returned to Lvov or even preventing him from holding a chair at the university. Indeed, the fact that the focus of Blaustein's lectures is eidetic cognition and the question of essences suggests that he wanted to attack a particular understanding of phenomenology, made popular in Poland by Ingarden,⁴⁹ whereby the discipline is the study of the content of ideas in the act of immanent seeing essences (*immanente Wesensschauung*). Ingarden's understanding of ideas is not fully clear, which leaves some room for interpretation.⁵⁰ Nonetheless, his exposition does contain a quasi-Platonic account of ideas as "ideal objects" which do not exist in time or any real space and, as such, are invariable.⁵¹ Real objects are *embodiments* of ideal objects. Contrary to Husserl, in the case of Ingarden, the act of direct cognition results in the *affirmation of the ideal existence* of the object.⁵² Ingarden also wrote about the "world of ideal objects"⁵³—and it is worth noting that Blaustein used a similar expression when we wrote about the "world of ideas," even though there is no equivalent expression in Husserl's writings. Responding to Blaustein's criticism, Ingarden delivered a lecture entitled "Idealizm transcendentalny E. Husserla" ["Husserl's Transcendental Idealism"] at

⁴⁷ Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część II: 1928–1936*, 30.

⁴⁸ Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część I: 1915–1927*, 305.

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Ingarden, *Logische Untersuchungen von Edmund Husserl, zweite, umgearbeitete Auflage*; Halle a. d. S. Max Niemeyer 1913. (I Band u. I Teil d. II Bandes), 306 (Trans. Szylewicz, in: Szylewicz, Roman Ingarden's Review of the Second Edition of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*); Ingarden, *Dążenia fenomenologów*, 118–156; Ingarden, *Dążenia fenomenologów (Dokończenie)*, 315–351 (German trans. Galewicz as: *Die Bestrebungen der Phänomenologen*, in: Ingarden, *Schriften zur frühen Phänomenologie*, 92–217). On Ingarden's method of analyzing the content of an idea, see Chrudzinski, *Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden*, 29–31; on Ingarden's reading of Husserl's *Untersuchungen*, see Byrne, *Ingarden's Husserl*, 513–531.

⁵⁰ See Chrudzinski, *Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden*, 25–29.

⁵¹ Ingarden, *Dążenia fenomenologów (Dokończenie)*, 322.

⁵² Ingarden, *Dążenia fenomenologów (Dokończenie)*, 324.

⁵³ Ingarden, *Dążenia fenomenologów (Dokończenie)*, 338.

the meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society on December 6, 1928.⁵⁴ In the lecture, Ingarden focused on the problem of reduction, trying to demonstrate that pure consciousness does not exist in the same way as the world does. This being the case, it requires a methodological approach that is different from the one applied in natural sciences, i.e., an approach different from gradual inductive generalization. We know that Blaustein did not accept this response and later spoke against Ingarden's concept of essence on several occasions, postulating the application of Ockham's razor to essences treated metaphysically as existing general objects.⁵⁵

Summing up these arguments and the discussion presented thus far, it may be observed that, for Blaustein, the phenomenological method worked by inductive generalizations which yield or at least are intended to yield reliable results. This critique, which in fact misinterprets Husserl, seems to be targeted at Ingarden's account of phenomenology. As a result of his critique, Blaustein assumed that phenomenology should be understood as a descriptive psychology that abandons the method of phenomenological reduction. The solution is undoubtedly questionable, if not simply wrong. This, however, does not end the discussion of his criticism of phenomenology. As it turns out, the proposal put forward by Blaustein shares some common elements with the project of phenomenological psychology that Husserl worked on in 1925. One proof of this affinity is that, in his polemic, Blaustein uses the term "*Wesenschau*," which is absent in Husserl's early works but does appear in his 1925 lectures.

5.2.2 *Psychology and the Method of Seeing Essences in Husserl's 1925 Lectures*

Blaustein, who attended Husserl's lectures entitled *Einleitung in die phänomenologische Psychologie* in the summer term of 1925, took note of the fact that Husserl attached great importance to them.⁵⁶ The focus of the lectures was to provide a phenomenological foundation for psychology and establish its place among the humanities.⁵⁷ Following Dilthey,⁵⁸ Husserl assumed that psychology had its proper method, which gave access to psychic life as a unity of lived experiences; he wrote:

⁵⁴Ingarden, *Idealizm transcendentalny E. Husserla*. 167a–168a.

⁵⁵See Blaustein, [Review of] Ingarden Roman: *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft*, Halle, Max Niemeyer Verlag 1931, s. XIV + 389, 454; Blaustein, [Review of] Roman Ingarden. *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik, und Literaturwissenschaft*, Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1931, 101a.

⁵⁶Blaustein, Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia, 235. Reprint in 2013: *Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia tekstów*, 225.

⁵⁷For an overview of Husserl's lectures from 1925, see Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Freiburg Years 1916–1938*, 336–366.

⁵⁸For more on Dilthey's view on descriptive psychology, see Sect. 3.4 above.

The great significance of Dilthey's expositions lay above all in what he said positively about the unity of psychic life as a unity of lived experience and in the demand derived therefrom for a descriptive psychology drawing purely upon intuition: a psychology which, in spite of being 'mere' description, should accomplish its own species of the highest performance of clarification, i.e., that which Dilthey expressed with the word *understanding*.⁵⁹

Dilthey termed the method "understanding," while Husserl, analyzing Dilthey's position and highlighting the connection between phenomenology and his project of descriptive psychology, believed that it was intuitive and based on seeing essences.⁶⁰ The method was also the subject of Husserl's investigations later, be it in *Erfahrung und Urteil*,⁶¹ published posthumously in 1939 or in a series of research manuscripts on the method of variation.⁶² In this part of the chapter, I want to reconstruct selected elements of this method—such as its general properties and the procedure of seeing essences—solely on the basis of Husserl's 1925 lectures to then be able to decide whether Blaustein's critique discussed above was justified.

At the very beginning of his lectures, Husserl analyzed selected forms of late nineteenth-century psychology, opposing "explanatory" and "descriptive-analytic" kinds of psychology as developed by Brentano and Dilthey.⁶³ The former used a hypothetical-constitutive procedure which consists in taking certain elements, such as sense data, and then combining them in causal relations; the latter worked through pure intuition. After he analyzed the two projects critically, Husserl concluded that "new psychology" is *a priori*, *eidos*-oriented, intuitive or purely descriptive and interested in intentionality.⁶⁴ Husserl expanded on this general description in the following way: (1) the *a priori* nature is to be understood as a striving for essentially universal and necessary elements without which psychic life cannot be comprehended. (2) The source of *a priori* thus understood is intuition or description, i.e., "seeing" what is essential. (3) The procedure shows intentionality because, as

⁵⁹Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 10: "Die große Bedeutung der Diltheyschen Ausführungen lag vor allem in dem, was er positiv über die Einheit des Seelenlebens als einer Erlebniseinheit sagte, und in der daraus gezogenen Forderung einer rein intuitiv schöpfenden deskriptiven Psychologie: einer Psychologie, die trotz 'bloßer' Deskription doch eine eigene Art höchster Erklärungsleistung vollziehen sollte, nämlich diejenige, die Dilthey mit dem Worte Verstehen ausdrückte." Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 6.

⁶⁰Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 34. Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 24–25.

⁶¹Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, 409–443. Trans. Churchill and Ameriks, in: *Experience and Judgement*, 339–364.

⁶²Husserl, *Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1891–1935)*, Husserliana 41. On Husserl's method of variation, see also De Santis, "Self-Variation": A Problem of Method in Husserl's Phenomenology, 255–269; De Santis, *Husserl and the A Priori*, 15–35, 55–152.

⁶³Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 14. Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 9.

⁶⁴Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 46–51. Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 33–37.

Husserl wrote, “[p]sychic life is the life of consciousness; consciousness is consciousness of something.”⁶⁵ Importantly, (4) the procedure described by Husserl makes it possible to adopt a transcendental attitude which would provide a radical, i.e., philosophical, grounding for the knowledge of consciousness, but the attitude is not necessary for psychology, as it can function on the basis of the natural attitude. Nonetheless, (5) psychology, as “the pure essential theory of the mental” (*die reine Wesenslehre des Geistigen*),⁶⁶ provides a more reliable kind of knowledge than inductive sciences because it investigates essential laws which precede what is truly accidental. (6) At the same time, psychology cannot be a deductive science such as mathematics, as its aim is not so much to explain a finite set of axioms but rather to account for an intuitive and descriptive *a priori*. Thus, Husserl explicitly links description with intuition, claiming that the intuitive procedure consists in studying what is given in experience in “exemplary forms” and “inquiring after what is typically universal.”⁶⁷

In the “Systematic Part” of the lectures, Husserl explained the basic elements of the eidetic method. He has shown that individuals and the world itself have proper forms that can be filled with particular content. These forms can be studied in pure fantasy where “[...] factual experience gives me only an exemplary beginning for the style of free fantasies which I shape from it, without otherwise employing it as something to be accepted.”⁶⁸ Hence, according to Husserl, pure fantasy allows for an *a priori* which is understood as “the invariable” in a free variation of experience.⁶⁹ Notably, *a priori* in this context is not something general, i.e., something that can be known *regardless* of experience. Husserl often stressed that the process of variation begins with the experience of the world. Thus, *a priori* makes sense only when it concerns what is given in experience.⁷⁰ Husserl described this procedure of reaching an *a priori* as “the seeing of an *a priori*,” adding “[t]his universal essence

⁶⁵Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 47: “Psychisches Leben ist Bewußtseinsleben, Bewußtsein ist Bewußtsein von etwas.” Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 34.

⁶⁶Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 49. Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 35.

⁶⁷Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 65: “Wir überblicken alle ihre exemplarischen Gestalten, die uns aus unserem erfahrenden Leben her bekannt sind, und fragen nach dem typisch Allgemeinen, und zwar von so weitgehender Allgemeinheit, daß wir es in jeder Welterfahrung finden.” Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 48.

⁶⁸Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 71: “[...] das Faktum ganz beliebig umzufingieren, die Phantasie dabei frei schalten zu lassen, und in jeder Weise nach Maßgabe des Faktums Ding- und Weltfiktionen als reine Phantasien zu erzeugen.” Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 53.

⁶⁹See Kersten, *On Understanding Idea and Essence in Husserl and Ingarden*, 56–57. Recently, Sowa interprets Husserl's *eidōs* or the invariant from the 1925 lectures as “what is in common,” meaning, “what is in common for the many,” and he claims that his definition comes from Aristotle. See Sowa, *The Universal as “What is in Common,”* 537–538.

⁷⁰More on this issue, see De Santis, *Husserl and the A Priori*, 185–204.

is the *eidos*, the 'idea' in the Platonic sense, but apprehended purely and free from all metaphysical interpretations, therefore, taken precisely as it becomes given to us in immediate intuitiveness in the seeing of ideas which arises in that way."⁷¹ In Husserl's view, the world of essences is the world of pure fantasy, i.e., the world of pure possibilities. It must be stressed, however, that the *eidos* is understood without "metaphysical interpretations," thanks to which it may be accounted for as "pure kind" (*reine Art*).⁷² As Husserl writes, "[...] the genus can become seen as pure *eidos* only if we do not ask about something real and thus not about actualities, but raise all actuality to pure possibility, to the realm of free optionality."⁷³ It bears emphasizing that, in the passage quoted above, Husserl uses the German word "*die Gattung*," which was later adopted and translated into Polish by Blaustein as "*gatunek*."

In any case, in Husserl's thought, eidetic variation is given in the *modi* of "and so on optionally," showing that the *eidos* is *not* a fixed and invariable structure that *exists* in an abstract "world of ideas" (as suggested by Blaustein) but is known through a complex procedure as a "*synthetic unity*," i.e., as something that is

⁷¹Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 73: "Dieses allgemeine Wesen ist das Eidos, die 'idea' im platonischen Sinn, aber rein gefaßt und frei von allen metaphysischen Interpretationen; also genau sogenommen, wie es in der auf solchem Wege entspringenden Ideenschau uns unmittelbar intuitiv zur Gegebenheit kommt." Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 54.

⁷²Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 74. Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 55.

⁷³Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 75–76: "Die Gattung aber als reines Eidos kann nur zur Erschauung kommen, wenn wir nicht nach Realem fragen und somit nicht nach Wirklichkeiten, sondern alle Wirklichkeit hinaufheben in reine Möglichkeit, in das Reich des freien Beliebens." Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 56. It should be noted that also in his *Ideen III*, Husserl connects "eidetic seeing" with "species" and "genra." Husserl, *Ideen III*, Husserliana 5, 47: "Wenn der Phänomenologe also sagt, es gibt Erlebnisse, es gibt seelische Zustände wie Wahrnehmungen, Erinnerungen u.dgl., so sagt sein 'es gibt' genau so viel wie das mathematische 'es gibt,' z.B. eine Reihe von Anzahlen, es gibt relative Primzahlen, es gibt keinen regelmäßigen Zehnflächner. Begründet ist dieses 'es gibt' beiderseits nicht durch Erfahrung sondern durch Wesensschauung. Erfahrung ist ein Titel für Dasein aufweisende, als Wahrnehmung originär erfassende Akte. Was aber die Wesensschauung zur originären Erfassung bringt, das sind nicht Einzelheiten des Daseins, sondern Wesen von niederster Allgemeinheit oder als Arten und Gattungen von höherer Allgemeinheit, ihnen entsprechendes Einzelnes braucht es nicht zu geben, und soll es so etwas geben, so kann nur aktuelle Erfahrung es aufweisen." Trans. Klein, Pohl, in: *Ideen III*, Edmund Husserl: Collected Works 1, 41: "Therefore, whenever the phenomenologist says there are lived-processes, there are psychic states such as perceptions, rememberings and the like, his 'there are' says exactly as much as the mathematical 'there are;' for example, a series of numbers: there are relative prime numbers; there is no regular decahedron. This 'there are' is established in both cases not through experience, but through eidetic seeing. Experience is a tide for acts exhibiting factual existence, acts originarily grasping as perception. But what the eidetic seeing brings to originarily grasping are not particulars of factual existence but rather essences of lowest universality or, as species and genera, of higher universality; there does not need to be a particular corresponding to them and if there should be something like that, then only actually occurring experience can exhibit it."

“singularized.” This is important to the extent we bear in mind that the entirety of the procedure is accounted for metaphorically as seeing. Literally speaking, nothing is “seen” there. It is not “sensuous seeing” because variation in pure fantasy is given in the *modi* of “and so on optionally,” i.e., in the mode of consecutive changes and apprehended coincidences. The “seeing” mentioned here refers to consciousness in which a new kind of object is constituted, namely, the universal but given as itself. Thus, according to Husserl, “[...] the idea seen is here said to be seen because it is not meant or spoken of vaguely, indirectly, by means of empty symbols or words, but is precisely grasped directly and itself.”⁷⁴ In a nutshell, “seeing” is a mental operation that consists in forming an open multiplicity of variants which, modeled on a given experience, becomes independent of empirical determinations in pure fantasy. Husserl allows for a possibility of further generalization of the achieved results through, as he writes, the method of “pure induction” (*die Methode der reinen Induktion*).⁷⁵ The method works by deriving a more general cognition from individual “seen” types, provided that all references to what is natural are suspended (hence *pure* induction). It is worth noting that, further on in the lecture, Husserl did not expand on the method, writing about natural induction as a method of natural sciences (in contrast to pure sciences).

5.3 Phenomenology and Blaustein's Psychology: Parallels and Differences

5.3.1 A Juxtaposition of Both Approaches: An Overview

As I noted at the end of Sect. 5.2.1, when criticizing the method of seeing essences or eidetic intuition, Blaustein used the term “*Wesensschau*,” which cannot be found either in *Untersuchungen* or in *Ideen I*. In each of these works, Husserl employed a different expression, namely, “*Wesenserschauung*.”⁷⁶ I believe that Blaustein intentionally opted for a term that did not truly refer to Husserl's early work but rather to his 1925 lectures in phenomenological psychology, which he had attended during

⁷⁴Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 83: “[...] die geschaute Idee heißt hier geschaut, weil sie nicht vage, indirekt, mittels leerer Symbole oder Worte gemeint oder beredet ist, sondern eben direkt und selbst erfaßt.” Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 62.

⁷⁵Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 90–91. Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 68. John Scanlon who translated the 1925 lectures into English, notices that instead of “induction” Husserl probably meant “ideation.” Cf. Husserl, *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 68, fn. 1. However, in the manuscript Husserl indeed uses the word “Induktion.” I would like to thank Jagna Brudzińska for checking the relevant fragment of Husserl's research manuscripts.

⁷⁶See, e.g., Husserl, *Ideen I*, Husserliana 3/1, 6–7, 13–17, 144–145; Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 23.

his stay in Germany. However, taking into account some elements of the “new psychology” method—presented in more detail above in Sect. 5.2.2—one may identify further limitations of the critique formulated by Blaustein. Here, I will also consider the differences and similarities between these two approaches by juxtaposing them.

I will start with the limitations. Regarding the polemic presented above in Sect. 5.1, it may be observed that the most unjustified objection is that Husserl supposedly accounted for *eide* as “general objects” that *exist* in the “world of ideas.” In phenomenology, essences simply do not have a metaphysical nature. This allows us to reject both the *ontological* and *methodological* doubts raised by Blaustein. An idea should rather be understood in a methodological and thus technical sense as a result of applying a certain research procedure. This is why an essence is not a real object with its own real definition but a synthesis of what is given in the act of variation. Therefore, one may also reject Blaustein's *logical* doubts. This dovetails with the fact that seeing essences (*Wesensschau*) does not have to do with “seeing” in the sense of sensory perception, even though one does see the analogy between these two types of acts. In spite of the fact that the two acts are not equated, seeing essences is not a schematic representation (as understood by Blaustein) because it enables accounting for an *a priori* as “this here” (*Dies-da*).⁷⁷ Hence, one may also reject the *epistemological* objection formulated by Blaustein. On the other hand, what seems to remain valid is Blaustein's *psychological* observation that an essence is a correlate, i.e., an intentional object, of relevant acts. However, the fact that it is a correlate does not mean that an essence is nothing more than a psychic entity. In Husserl's account, essences are unreal. Thus, in the end, Blaustein's critique is again exposed in its limited scope.

Paradoxically, however, in his critique, Blaustein borrowed many elements from the method described by Husserl. Thus, like Husserl, Blaustein stressed a strong connection between the psychological method and the experience of what is individual. Additionally, they both wrote about types and species (or genera) to explain the status of ideas (even though Blaustein eventually called for replacing the word “idea”—which he deemed to be unclear—with the more adequate “type”).⁷⁸ Both philosophers assumed that seeing essences or eidetic intuition does not prove axioms but can at best account for the state of affairs expressed by an axiom. Furthermore, they objected to the hypothetical-constitutive procedure in

⁷⁷As Mohanty explains: “[...] terms ‘perception’ or ‘intuition’ and the correlative term ‘object’ are used with equal justification. In empirical perception what is revealed is the individual spatio-temporal fact; so is an essence revealed, given, ‘bodily’ presented in eidetic perception. Eidetic perception is also an original mode of perception in the sense that it has its own specific type of objects that are primarily given through it.” Mohanty, *Individual Fact and Essence in Edmund Husserl's Philosophy*, 222.

⁷⁸Incidentally, it must be underlined that, later, Husserl accounted for types primarily as empirical generalizations different from essential generality. See, e.g., Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, 381–386. Trans. Churchill and Ameriks, in: *Experience and Judgement*, 317–322. See also Schuetz, *Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy*, 153–154.

psychological descriptions.⁷⁹ They both distanced themselves from accepting induction at the beginning of an analysis, although they allowed for the possibility of introducing induction (pure induction in Husserl's case), understood in a specific way, at further stages of research.⁸⁰ They both accounted for psychic life as a unity of lived experiences.

In sum, the analyses presented thus far lead to several conclusions. In spite of being targeted *expressis verbis* at Husserl, Blaustein's arguments are limited and rather misinterpret his position. Considering the question of why Blaustein referred to Husserl in the first place, I defended the thesis that Blaustein was in fact aiming at a specific interpretation of the phenomenological method made popular in Poland by Ingarden, one that acknowledges the existence of essences as general objects. Finally, Blaustein not only refrained from rejecting the detailed procedures and descriptions developed by Husserl in his 1925 lectures in phenomenological psychology but also used them in his own original version of the rudiments of descriptive psychology. Considering these similarities, one should not forget that Blaustein's descriptive psychology cannot be equated with Husserl's phenomenology, even though, due to these analogies, it is clearly *phenomenological* in character. The two must remain separate because Blaustein did not accept the procedures of eidetic or transcendental reductions. If that is the case, how can Blaustein's descriptive psychology be understood? To address this question, I first refer to the discussion between Blaustein and Irena Filozofówna⁸¹; the aim of psychology, thus understood, is to describe what is experienced and so to *directly* account for moments of lived experiences. We can look at the debate from a methodological point of view to read it as an illustration of Blaustein's phenomenologically-oriented descriptive psychology.

⁷⁹As a side note, it is worth pointing out that Blaustein allowed for hypotheses that are adopted, as he wrote, "on the basis of direct experiential data." The hypotheses are then used to describe given phenomena more fully. Thus, hypotheses are functional concepts. As examples of such concepts, Blaustein cites the quality and matter of the act. I will discuss this problem later on. For now, see Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 8, fn. 1. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40, fn. 1.

⁸⁰However, one needs to bear in mind that, even though Husserl noticed the possibility of using induction within the framework of eidetics, the latter was a discipline that could ground the generalizations of the former, but not the other way around. It was well put by Lohmar, *Phänomenologische Methoden und empirische Erkenntnisse*, 213: "Bei aller richtigen und gut begründeten Abgrenzung der eidetischen Methode von der induktiven Methode ist doch mit der Bestimmung des phänomenologischen *apriori* zugleich eine Bewegung auf die empirischen Wissenschaften hin getan: Es ist der Anspruch, eine Struktur festzuhalten, die bei *allen* empirischen und *allen weiter möglichen* Fällen gleich ist. Dieser Anspruch auf die Bestimmung *aller* Fälle bildet daher eine 'Brücke' zwischen der empirischen Naturwissenschaft und der Phänomenologie. Das heisst: Beide Erkenntnisansprüche sind sinnverschieden, aber es gibt Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen zwischen beiden. So sollte z.B. eine eidetische Einsicht nicht der empirischen Erkenntnis widerstreiten, umgekehrt können eidetische Einsichten die empirische Forschung auf neue Wege bringen." On the difference between induction and eidetic method in Husserl, see Smith and McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality*, 100–101 and Aldea, *Husserl's Break from Brentano Reconsidered*, 418.

⁸¹The discussion was published by two important academic journals in Poland, i.e., *Przegląd Filozoficzny* [*The Philosophical Review*] and *Polskie Archiwum Psychologii* [*Polish Archive of Psychology*] in 1931 and 1932.

5.3.2 *The Blaustein–Filozofówna Debate: A Phenomenological Account*

Filozofówna's dispute with Blaustein can be read from two perspectives. More precisely, one may understand it either as an attempt to describe the structure of certain types of aesthetic experiences, e.g., watching a theater play, or as a discussion on the basics of a method that is relevant to consciousness studies. Regarding the former, Filozofówna's main argument consists in arguing for judgments as necessary moments of every lived experience. She seemed to claim that Blaustein comprehends acts as intentional, i.e., as presenting their objects as "such and such"; in her opinion, however, by doing so, he confused presentations with judgments. I will discuss this part of the Blaustein–Filozofówna debate in Chap. 9. Here, I will focus on attempting to analyze Filozofówna's argument that Blaustein adopted an ineffective method, as he was too hasty in accepting unjustified hypotheses. In other words, Filozofówna undermined how Blaustein's method should be implemented.

In an interesting comment on the Blaustein–Filozofówna debate, Adam Wiegner rightly observed that both scholars indeed discuss the structure of aesthetic experience, yet their polemics also address methodological issues. For Wiegner, they attempt to define basic methodological claims in studies on consciousness.⁸² After a few decades of constant development of the descriptive or—as he put it—*functional* psychology of Brentano, Twardowski, and Husserl, it was evident that the descriptive approach had proven its claims and its advantage over the *phenomenal* psychology formulated by Mach. Whereas functional psychology is focused on *acts*, phenomenal psychology investigates the *contents* of consciousness. Wiegner remarked that both Filozofówna and Blaustein advocated for the former since they accepted that acts are intentional phenomena. According to Wiegner, the main disagreement between them arose in the question of *how* to describe acts: either descriptions are always partial and therefore have to be supplemented by hypotheses (Filozofówna) or they address a unity or a whole that is given directly, and for this reason, a phenomenologist should accept as few hypotheses as possible, if any (Blaustein).⁸³

In her criticism, Filozofówna indeed accused Blaustein of putting forward too many unjustified hypotheses to describe imaginative presentations. First of all, she criticized the concept of matter as an inseparable part of lived experience. From Filozofówna's point of view, Blaustein introduced this hypothetical element to explain the phenomenon of grasping or apprehending presenting content.⁸⁴ In her reply to Blaustein, she even referred to matter's function as a "hypothetical function

⁸²Wiegner, W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych, 131–132. Trans. Paprzycka, in: *Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection*, 191–192.

⁸³Wiegner, W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych, 133. Trans. Paprzycka, in: *Observation, Hypothesis, Introspection*, 194.

⁸⁴Filozofówna, W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych, 64.

of hypothetical matter" (*hipotetyczna funkcja hipotetycznej materii*).⁸⁵ In contrast to Blaustein, she stated that matter functions like judgments, and only judgments can be the basis of lived experience. She went even further by claiming that there is simultaneously a variety of clear and unclear judgments in every experience, and it is impossible to count them all.⁸⁶ If one accepts judgments as moments of lived experiences, the phenomenon of the directedness of lived experiences is *explained*, and no further descriptions are necessary. However, the description has to be, as she put it, as "simple" as possible. Filozofówna wrote:

The boundary between description and explanation is fluid, especially in the field of psychology. Mental phenomena are such an elusive reality that if one tries to put them into words, one is condemned to use metaphors. In such conditions, it is still doubtful whether there are "accurate" descriptions or unjustified hypotheses, and it is impossible to decide which is the case on many occasions. Perhaps the simplicity of the description, which often serves here as an explanation, should be decisive.⁸⁷

Given the claim of "simplicity," Filozofówna finally postulated the use of "Ockham's razor" against Blaustein's imaginative presentations since such presentations can be described more simply, i.e., as a combination of perceptual presentations and judgments. This argument does not concern us here. The postulate raised by Filozofówna also plays another role. For her, the descriptions formulated by Blaustein bear the mark of *subjectivism* or *latitude*. Filozofówna stated that even if Blaustein held that *he* sees imaginative presentations, *she* does not see them at all.⁸⁸ To get around this problem, one has to accept a theory that *explains* a whole group of lived experiences in the *simplest* way. If Filozofówna's criticism is correct in the context of phenomenology, it can be rephrased as follows: (1) a phenomenological description is (too) often hypothetical instead of essential or actual; (2) as such, it falls into subjectivism, and for this very reason (3) it should be guided by the rule of simplicity, which is objective, rather than the rule of adequacy, which seems to be subjective. How does Blaustein respond to this criticism?

Before addressing this question, it should be noted that Filozofówna was right in claiming that Blaustein comprehended hypotheses as being necessary when describing phenomena. In his *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*, he explicitly described the matter of an act as a hypothetical element which has been ascribed the function of apprehending the object.⁸⁹ However, again, the Filozofówna–Blaustein debate did not address the problem of *whether* hypotheses are necessary:

⁸⁵ Filozofówna, Odpowiedź [1931], 187.

⁸⁶ Filozofówna, Leopold Blaustein. Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne, 77.

⁸⁷ Filozofówna, Odpowiedź [1932], 367: "Granica między opisem a wyjaśnieniem jest płynna, zwłaszcza w psychologii. Przeżycia psychiczne są tak nieuchwytną rzeczywistością, że, próbując je ująć w słowa, skazanym się jest na operowanie przenośniami. W takich warunkach wciąż się ma wątpliwości, czy powstają 'wierne' opisy, czy nieuprawnione hipotezy, a niesposób tego w wielu wypadkach rozstrzygnąć. Może więc prostota opisu, który tu często pełni rolę wyjaśnienia, decydować powinna." My translation.

⁸⁸ Filozofówna, Odpowiedź [1931], 188.

⁸⁹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 64.

it addressed *how* they may be verified and justified in consciousness studies. Blaustein held that hypotheses are “absolutely essential and useful” (*nieodzowne i bardzo pożyteczne*), but they are justified *only* on the basis of rigorous description.⁹⁰ For him, a description elucidates a phenomenon which can be *explained* only by a hypothesis. In other words, a description has to be adequate; if it is insufficient, one has to put forward a hypothesis, but this has to follow from or be based on the description. If the description is indeed insufficient and one has to ask about the functions or causes of a phenomenon, one has to overcome the descriptive level to accept a hypothesis.⁹¹ For Blaustein, any hypothesis is justified *on the basis* of a concrete *description*, whereas for Filozofówna, a *theory* is sufficient to accept a hypothesis. In other words, according to Blaustein, descriptions are the ultimate justificatory factor in phenomenology. For this reason, he did not accept Filozofówna's postulate to use “Ockham's razor,” since this tool is useless in the field of phenomena; rather, one has to describe the richness of phenomena.⁹² By claiming this, Blaustein questioned charges (1) and (3), as defined above. Thus, in contrast to Filozofówna, to justify hypotheses, a description should be as rigorous as possible, and the simplicity rule is inconsistent with the phenomenological demand that phenomena are accounted for in their fullness.

To omit the problem of subjectivism, i.e., charge (2), as defined above, Blaustein attempted to show that description is direct and addresses the requirement of what one may call *psychological reduction*, which consists in suspending the subjective perspective. Husserl did not use this phrase much. In a text written on January 28, 1926, he explicitly comprehended transcendental reduction as being preceded by psychological reduction, which consists in grasping “my pure subjectivity” as part of “this human being.”⁹³ Thus, psychological reduction is a procedure which allows one to bracket one's personal, concrete, psychic life to comprehend it as pure subjectivity. Admittedly, Blaustein did not use this phrase, but his arguments seemed to accept this phenomenological tool. For him, the fundamental task of any consciousness study is to describe what is experienced and thus to *directly* account for moments of lived experience. The description is based on introspection and retrospection by taking note of what is currently experienced.⁹⁴ Blaustein understood introspection as clear and explicit seeing, and he considered it infallible.⁹⁵ Retrospection also allows ongoing lived experiences to be captured. Due to the direct nature of both forms of cognition, descriptions should be free of (unnecessary) hypotheses and should focus on what is given. Of course, one may notice that the reference to introspection and retrospection led Blaustein back to the

⁹⁰ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 8, fn. 1. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 42, fn. 5. The fragment is only partly translated by Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 211, fn. 5.

⁹¹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 144.

⁹² Blaustein, *W sprawie przedstawięń schematycznych i symbolicznych*, 366.

⁹³ Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, *Husserliana* 9, 455.

⁹⁴ Blaustein, *W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych*, 184, 185, fn. 1.

⁹⁵ Blaustein, *W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych*, 183.

descriptive-psychological path. However, the general idea here mirrors, for instance, Husserl's aim to clarify the phenomenon of experience using a reference to introspection that abandons psychologistic consequences; in Husserl's view, introspection exceeds someone's concrete psychic life.⁹⁶ With this in mind, one may read the emphasis that Blaustein put on introspection and retrospection in the same manner. If this reading is indeed right and Blaustein's reference to introspection is analogous to Husserl's idea, for Blaustein, as for Husserl, describing the psyche reveals structures of consciousness which are not mere psychic entities of an individual person; by doing so, description based on introspection transcends the particular life of an individual. This last point is evident in Blaustein's discussion with *Filozofówna*, where he implicitly formulated the postulate of the universality of psychological description. For him, this means that universality entails the analysis of *types* of experiences instead of *essences* of phenomena. The procedure makes it possible to reject the charge of subjectivism, according to which the object is reduced to mere concrete psychic experiences. It may be added that the description postulated by Blaustein is based on whether it is adequate for the investigated object and is "fertile," i.e., whether it can be applied to "numerous related problems."⁹⁷ By contrast, for *Filozofówna*, the description is "simple" if it entails a hypothesis which enables one to exclude vague notions and reduce (*via* "Ockham's razor") unnecessary phenomena.

5.3.3 *A Return to Descriptive Psychology?*

As shown above, Blaustein's method can be read from a phenomenological point of view. However, this interpretation still demands a far-reaching compromise, i.e., rethinking the basic terms of descriptive psychology. One alternative way of interpreting Blaustein consists in treating his philosophy not as phenomenology but in terms of only descriptive psychology. Thus, one may hold that Blaustein indeed studied Husserl's writings, but he was dissatisfied with their methodological value or even their thematic scope, and for this reason, he ultimately returned to descriptive psychology. A proponent of this interpretation could argue that, for Blaustein, descriptive psychology presents a more promising research program. By holding this, one in fact rejects Wiczorek's thesis; as shown in Chap. 3, for Wiczorek, Blaustein "naturally" adopted phenomenology because he was dissatisfied with

⁹⁶Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 473: "Es ist klar, daß, wenn die Aufgabe einer eidetischen Psychologie und dann notwendig auch die Aufgabe einer rein 'introspektiven' Phänomenologie erkannt ist, die Voraussetzung für sie die universale Betrachtungsweise ist, die an mir, dem Psychologen, für mein universales Seelenleben, und dann in der Einfühlung in Hineinversetzung in die fremden Subjekte in ihnen genau dieselbe nur etwas modifizierte Reduktion übt, und so in jeder beliebigen fiktiven Umgestaltung eines gesamten Seelenlebens zu einem möglichen in reinem Eigensein."

⁹⁷Blaustein, *W sprawie przedstawień schematycznych i symbolicznych*, 366.

descriptive psychology.⁹⁸ Contrary to Wieczorek, Blaustein appears to be a strong critic of Husserl and a loyal student of Twardowski. Elsewhere, I have argued that a comparable thesis should be supported, and Blaustein's position should be read as a reappraisal or renewal of descriptive psychology in the context of Twardowski's students.⁹⁹ After a thorough re-examination of my early arguments, however, I would prefer to revise my radical interpretation. In short, I would now contend that it is not entirely right to think of Blaustein exclusively as a descriptive psychologist. To show this, it is worth discussing a few points.

First of all, one cannot ignore the clear parallels mentioned in Sect. 5.3.1. The fact that Blaustein's theory resembles, to some extent, the project of phenomenological psychology as discussed by Husserl in his 1925 lectures suggests that he was inspired by Husserl's project. It can also be argued that as Blaustein was trained in descriptive psychology by Twardowski in Lvov, after his arrival in Freiburg im Breisgau, he did not notice the important shifts in methodology that had been introduced by Husserl. To justify this claim, it must be mentioned that in one of his letters to Twardowski, he listed the name of his Lvov teacher, together with Husserl and Stumpf, as "descendants (*potomkowie*) of Brentano."¹⁰⁰ I think that this was no mere *façon de parler*. This means that Blaustein saw all three scholars as having developed philosophical projects in line with Brentano's. For this reason, the differences between their respective theories are dominated by overlapping parallels. After all, they agreed that one has to employ *description* rather than *explanation* in analysis; next, they emphasized what is *concrete*, e.g., experiences given in introspection (Brentano), directly introspected psychic facts (Twardowski), psychic functions (Stumpf), or phenomena (Husserl). They took rather non- or even anti-metaphysical positions; finally, they spoke of evidence as the epistemic basis of knowledge and the guiding rule of research. The list of further parallels is much longer, but the point is that Husserl's phenomenology could present a reformulation of descriptive psychology for Blaustein. If so, Husserl's psychological reduction, in Blaustein's eyes, could be equivalent to Twardowski's rejection of subjectivism; moreover, the role that Husserl ascribes to a "pure kind" (*reine Art*)¹⁰¹ (or a genus¹⁰²) seems to be parallel to the role that "types," understood as lower species, play in the method of descriptive analysis employed by Twardowski¹⁰³ and Blaustein.¹⁰⁴ Of

⁹⁸Wieczorek, Leopolda Blausteina interpretacja świata zjawiskowego, 157–158.

⁹⁹See Płotka, *From Psychology to Phenomenology (and Back Again)*, 141–167, esp. 157–161, 164–165.

¹⁰⁰Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 19.12.1927, 097r.

¹⁰¹Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 74. Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 55.

¹⁰²Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana 9, 75–76. Trans. Scanlon in: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, 56.

¹⁰³Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne*, 137.

¹⁰⁴Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii (autoreferat)*, 165a.

course, there are differences,¹⁰⁵ yet in Blaustein's comment on Twardowski, Husserl, and Stumpf, he attempted to emphasize continuations.

In Blaustein's writings, there are also a few themes which stem from Husserl and which cannot be found in Brentano or Twardowski. Just after declaring that "[...] phenomenology is possible only as an empirical, descriptive science," in his lecture (discussed in more detail in Sect. 5.1) on the phenomenological method, Blaustein noted that lived experiences are given in "pure consciousness."¹⁰⁶ It is hardly possible that he understood *pure* consciousness exactly as Husserl did, i.e., as the result of using phenomenological reduction; rather, he operated with the general idea that the subject matter of psychological inquiry is consciousness grasped "purely," i.e., despite causal relations. In any case, the term "pure consciousness" is not present in Brentano's or Twardowski's writings, but it is present in Husserl's texts. More importantly, Blaustein seemed to be inspired by Husserl when he redefined the subject matter of his psychology: Blaustein investigates not only content (like Stumpf) or acts (like Brentano) but also objects of consciousness. This type of psychology could be labeled "object-oriented psychology." However, what is crucial here is not Twardowski's distinction between actions and products. In his *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*, Blaustein was clear that the noematic, i.e., object-directed, perspective deepens a mere noetic, i.e., act-oriented, investigation.¹⁰⁷ The use of noetic-noematic language here refers to Husserl. Blaustein developed this idea in his later text, "Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise" ["The Imaginative Work of Art and Its Way of Manifestation"], written in German; there he held *expressis verbis* that one has to study—as is announced in the title of the text—the *ways of manifestations (Gegebenheitsweisen)* of the objects given in lived experiences.¹⁰⁸ He showed that the experienced object has specific ways of manifesting which are correlated with relevant presentations. Thus, to study lived experiences adequately, one has to describe the presented object *as* it is presented. Importantly, the problem of ways of manifestation (*Gegebenheitsweisen*) is Husserl's original idea. It seems that this step, which accounts for the object of psychology in a specific *modus*, i.e., "*as*," determines the *phenomenological* nature of Blaustein's descriptive psychology.

However, despite this and the many other similarities discussed above, two fundamental differences between the two projects still remain: while Blaustein treated the method of psychology as auxiliary, Husserl firmly claimed that phenomenology provides a foundation for other sciences. Both claims assume different functions with respect to experiments in psychology: whilst Husserl believed that eidetic-descriptive findings precede any empirical-explanatory findings, Blaustein

¹⁰⁵ For the discussion, see Stachewicz, *Opis analityczny a redukcja ejdetyczna*, 675–686.

¹⁰⁶ Blaustein, *Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii (autoreferat)*, 165b.

¹⁰⁷ Blaustein, *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*, 2: "Diese noematische Untersuchung vertieft die der Erlebnisse selbst. Denn eben die Art, wie sich das Objektive im Subjektiven darstellt, wie sich Gott in den einzelnen Individuen spiegelt, begründet die Unterschiede der Gotteserlebnisse untereinander."

¹⁰⁸ Blaustein, *Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise*, 245–249.

sympathized with the claim that descriptions should be corrected through experiments. Indeed, when describing specific experiences, he himself used experimental methods and psychological interviews.¹⁰⁹ These differences indicate that, regardless of the similarities mentioned above, Blaustein's project remains distinct. Both differences seemingly follow not from Brentano or Twardowski but from the heritage of Gestalt psychology. After all, Blaustein formulated his critique of the phenomenological method—as discussed in two lectures he delivered on April 28 and May 5, 1928, during meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society—under the influence of Gestaltists. In his letter to Twardowski, written on February 13, 1928, he noted that he had almost finished the text of the lecture that would later be presented at the meeting:

Frequent conversations about phenomenology with Stumpf, Hoffmann, Lewin, Baumgardt, etc. forced me to be increasingly precise about my own position. I have already written to the beloved professor that some of these scholars agreed with some of my theses and have taken a similar position. Now, I have systematically described them and presented them to Köhler. I received lively approval and encouragement to publish [this text]. For now, however, I will limit myself to delivering a lecture at the meeting of the epistemological section [of the Polish Philosophical Society] and initiating a substantive discussion on phenomenology at home [i.e., Lvov]. In this lecture, I try to discover and criticize the basic dogmatic assumptions of phenomenology.¹¹⁰

Blaustein's words shows the background of his polemics against Husserl, i.e., exchanges with Gestaltists. Importantly, in his opinion, phenomenology is “dogmatic” since it accepts unjustified assumptions, and by doing so, it falls into the *petitio principii* fallacy. Admittedly, his criticism is rather misleading, as shown in Sect. 5.2; however, it can be argued that Blaustein was actually attacking a particular interpretation of phenomenology which comprehends ideas as general objects that exist as timeless entities. More importantly—given that his critique was coined in dialog with Gestaltists—his rejection of essences can be understood as a declaration that phenomenology should be developed as a non-transcendental project. This would mean that phenomenology would be open to experiments, although it would stop being the basis of all sciences and become an auxiliary science in Blaustein's philosophical psychology.

Blaustein's position is well illustrated by his commentary on Kurt Schneider's text “Die phänomenologische Richtung in der Psychiatrie” [“The Phenomenological

¹⁰⁹ See Sect. 3.3.2.

¹¹⁰ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 6.02.1928, 116r: “Częste rozmowy o fenomenologii z Stumpfem, Hoffmannem, Lewinem, Baumgardtem itd. Zmusiły mnie do coraz dokładniejszego sprecyzowania mojego stanowiska. Pisałem już Kochanemu Panu Profesorowi o tem, że ten lub ów z tych uczonych zgodził się na pewne me tezy, zajmując analogiczne stanowisko. Obecnie systematycznie rzecz ująłem i przedstawiłem Köhlerowi. Spotkałem się z bardzo żywą aprobatą i zachętą do druku. Ograniczę się jednak chwilowo do wygłoszenia odczytu na sekcji epistemologicznej, przy tem zainicjowania u nas rzeczowej dyskusji o fenomenologii. Staram się w tym odczycie wykryć podstawowe dogmatyczne założenia fenomenologii i poddać je krytyce.” My translation.

Trend in Psychiatry”], which was originally published in 1925/26 in *Philosophischer Anzeiger*. Blaustein's commentary was published in 1930/31 in *Ruch Filozoficzny* [*The Philosophical Movement*]. He wrote:

The author sketches the history of psychiatry in the last century and the main research results in the field of phenomenology. This trend [i.e., phenomenological psychiatry] arose under the influence of new tendencies in psychology, especially under the influence of the psychology of acts (intentional lived experiences), psychoanalysis, characterology, and Dilthey's humanistic psychology. Only the term connects him [i.e., Schneider] with Husserl's pure phenomenology because he deals with the description of real experiences, not their ideal essences. Instead, it [i.e., phenomenological psychiatry] is influenced by the descriptive psychological phenomenology of Scheler's works. Using a number of examples, the author tries to show that the direction of psychology as a method of psychiatry is indispensable for this science.¹¹¹

From reading this passage and the self-commentary quoted above, one might well conclude that Blaustein's "phenomenology" also had nothing to do with Husserl's transcendental project. At least, to paraphrase Blaustein's own words, "[o]nly the term connects him with Husserl's pure phenomenology." One may claim that Blaustein's position is in fact close to that of Schneider. Blaustein used a method which critically elaborates "pure" phenomenology; as a result, he rejected eidetic and transcendental forms of reduction. Paradoxically, however, this radical step broadens the scope of phenomenology and enables one to adopt it in psychology. If one reads the phenomenological theme in Blaustein's philosophy in this way, it appears that he anticipated today's attempts to *apply* phenomenology in non-philosophical disciplines, first and foremost by suspending the claim of reduction.¹¹² Certainly, Blaustein's phenomenology does not repeat the path of Husserl's ideas.

It can be concluded that descriptive psychology and Gestalt psychology shaped Blaustein's concept of phenomenology not as an *a priori* eidetic or transcendental project but as an empirical and descriptive psychology. Here, the term "empirical" denotes no form of sensualism of any kind but refers to the postulate of the rigor and absolute adequacy of descriptions of experiences. Thus understood, the "empirical" is the opposite of the "abstract" rather than—as it might seem—"a priori" or "transcendental." Blaustein's shift in understanding the method of phenomenology can be seen as an attempt to bridge the gap between the Twardowskian descriptive

¹¹¹ Blaustein, *Philosophischer Anzeiger* I. (1925/6), 65a: "Autor szkicuje w głównych zarysach historię psychiatrii w ostatnim stuleciu i główne rezultaty badań kierunku fenomenologicznego. Kierunek ten powstał pod wpływem nowych prądów w psychologii, zwłaszcza pod wpływem psychologii aktów (przeżyć intencjonalnych), psychoanalizy, charakterologii, psychologii humanistycznej Diltheya. Z czystą fenomenologią Husserla łączy go tylko nazwa, zajmuje się bowiem deskrypcją realnych przeżyć, a nie ich idealnych istot. Pozostaje natomiast pod wpływem opisowej, psychologicznej fenomenologii prac Schelera. Na szeregu przykładów stara się autor wykazać, że kierunek psychologiczny jako jedna z metod psychiatrii jest dla tej nauki nieodzowny." My translation.

¹¹² See, e.g., Zahavi, *Applied Phenomenology*, 259–273.

method and Husserl's reduction. In this vein, Krzysztof Stachewicz holds that both methods admittedly have some parallels, but there are also irreducible differences; for him, whereas Twardowski emphasized empirical verification, Husserl was focused on non-empirical or *a priori* conditions.¹¹³ When he rejected Husserl's apriorism, Blaustein bridged the gap. Of course, this understanding seems to allude to Brentano and his psychological project. However, a significant difference should be kept in mind. In a description, a psychologist, as understood by Blaustein, analyzes phenomena and psychic life by noting moments, i.e., the dependent parts, of an experience; thus, his method allows one to experience what is experienced *as* experienced. In the present chapter, I have argued that the idea of accounting for the subject matter of psychological inquiry in a specific *modus*, namely, "as," ultimately constitutes a clearly *phenomenological* dimension of Blaustein's philosophical psychology. Overall, it can be concluded that the method used by Blaustein is related (as it rejects transcendental reduction) but not identical (as it accepts experiments as correlated with descriptions) to the project presented by Husserl in the first edition of his *Untersuchungen*. Both psychological and phenomenological trends build a "double root" of his original methodological proposal.¹¹⁴

Finally, it is worth posing the straightforward question of whether, given the findings of the present chapter, Blaustein was indeed a phenomenologist. Is it appropriate to speak of *his* phenomenology? Dąbrowski emphasizes that "Blaustein was never a phenomenologist in the full sense of the word, although the impact of phenomenology on his research results is clear."¹¹⁵ I do not think this opinion gives justice to the complexity of Blaustein's philosophy. Scholars who consider him to be a "famous phenomenologist," such as Schaar, or those who describe his method as "quasi-phenomenological," such as Pokropski, probably go too far. Although Blaustein did not use the tools of *epoché*, imaginative variation (like Husserl), or investigation of the content of ideas (like Ingarden), he followed the basic intuition that analysis should be focused on an object as it is presented or manifested in experience. This is why it may ultimately be concluded that—due to the borrowing from and references to Husserl's philosophy—Blaustein's project of descriptive psychology is *phenomenological*. Walter Aurbach, a colleague of Blaustein, coined the term "a phenomenologist in a broad sense" to refer to scholars who, as he put it, are not

¹¹³ Stachewicz, *Opis analityczny a redukcja ejdetyczna*, 682–686.

¹¹⁴ The idea that Blaustein's philosophy has a "double root" comes from Wojciech Chudy. He divides it into the school of Twardowski and Husserl's phenomenology. Chudy notices that there is no clear-cut affiliation between Blaustein and any of these schools, but Twardowski's approach seems to be closer to Blaustein. Chudy, *Zagadnienie naoczności aktów poznawczych*, 185. I use Chudy's phrase but interpret it differently. I think that it is pointless to refer to Twardowski's descriptive psychology alone, since in doing so one passes over the Gestaltists or humanistic psychology. Moreover, as shown in the present chapter, Blaustein in fact misreads Husserl, and he refers to non-Husserlians as well (e.g., Schneider).

¹¹⁵ Dąbrowski, *Bibliografia prac Leopolda Blausteina*, 244: "Blaustein fenomenologiem w pełnym znaczeniu tego słowa nigdy jednak nie był, chociaż wpływ fenomenologii na wyniki jego badań jest wyraźny." My translation.

happy to accept Husserl's phenomenology as a whole.¹¹⁶ Blaustein was seemingly a "phenomenologist in a broad sense" who did not follow Husserl uncritically and who applied phenomenology in psychology. It should therefore not be surprising that, at the beginning of his book on Husserl, he emphasized that "[a] phenomenologist [...] may interpret these thoughts as an application of phenomenological claims in descriptive psychology, [whereas] a psychologist [may interpret these thoughts] as an analysis that is independent of any phenomenology."¹¹⁷ We must always bear this statement in mind if we are to understand Blaustein correctly. His philosophy is at once *phenomenological* (in a broad sense) and *descriptive-psychological* (also including the heritage of the Gestaltists and humanistic psychology).

¹¹⁶Auerbach, *Zagadnienie wartości poznawczej sądów przypomnieniowych*, 58.

¹¹⁷Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 3: "[f]enomenolog [...] może w poniższych wywodach widzieć zastosowanie twierdzeń fenomenologicznych w psychologii deskryptywnej, psycholog deskryptywny—analizę, niezależną od jakiegokolwiek fenomenologii." My translation.

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Chapter 6

An Examination of Husserl's Theory of Content



This chapter is an attempt to analyze the main ideas presented and developed by Blaustein in his early work, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia* [*Husserl's Theory of Act, Content and Object of Presentation*], which was originally published in 1928. The book is a revised version of Blaustein's doctoral thesis and is important for several reasons. First, it seems that the arguments and at least some of the theoretical solutions put forward in it provided the basis for Blaustein's later reflections. This can be illustrated with two clear examples. One has to do with Blaustein's use of the tripartite structure of content (which can be understood as quality, matter and presenting content) that he developed in discussion with Husserl and that laid the ground for his original classification of presentations.¹ Another example is his 1930s study on the structure of perception in cinemagoers, in which he reflected on whether a cinemagoer's experiences are the objects presented on the screen or rather sensations.² In direct reference to the results of his previous work, Blaustein eventually opted for the latter. Thus, the book is an important step on the way to understanding how the concepts he used evolved. It is also worth mentioning that, in the global literature, it was perhaps the first extensive monograph devoted to Husserl's theory of content, a conception which is well known to be very complex.³ In his interpretation, Blaustein advanced an interesting thesis whereby the conceptions from *Logische Untersuchungen* and the idea of the matter of an act presented therein are best understood within the framework of a tradition that can be traced back to Bolzano's and Brentano's philosophies. This tradition related the issue of content to the understanding of psychic phenomena or, more precisely, to the problem of their structure and the objects to

¹E.g., Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 11; O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień, 122. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 22, 45. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 212.

²Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 9. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 96.

³For a presentation of Husserl's theory of content, see Szanto, *Bewusstsein, Intentionalität und mentale Repräsentation*, 208–251.

which they refer: what is the relationship between the intentional object and the content of lived experience?⁴ Could it be that the object of psychic phenomena is just content? Additionally, how should the content of lived experience be understood here? According to Blaustein, when grappling with these questions, Husserl formulated an original conception of content. However, saying that the main intention of *Husserlowska nauka...* [*Husserl's Theory...*] is to ground phenomenology in the tradition of Brentano would not do full justice to the complexity of the arguments developed in the book. Therefore, what was the novelty of its approach?

By Blaustein's admission, his analysis was limited to Husserl's two works: *Ideen I* and the second edition (1913) of *Untersuchungen*.⁵ In the opinion of Marek Pokropski, Blaustein's interpretation was "[...] original and interesting,"⁶ although, as he added, "[...] the weakest parts of it are superficial and insufficient analyses of *Ideen*."⁷ To a certain extent, the limitation noted by Pokropski stemmed from the framework that Blaustein adopted. As I have observed, Blaustein placed Husserl in the tradition of Brentano, but this tradition is less present, if at all, in *Ideen I*. What is crucial is that Blaustein's point of reference was not so much Brentano but rather Kazimierz Twardowski's interpretation of Brentano's theory, as formulated in Twardowski's habilitation thesis on the object and content of presentations.⁸ In this early work, Twardowski juxtaposed some elements of the theory developed by Brentano, his teacher from Vienna, against the theory of Bolzano, a philosopher who was somewhat forgotten and little discussed at the end of the nineteenth century. According to Blaustein,⁹ when Husserl learned about Twardowski's proposal, he formulated his own conception of the act as a combination of quality and matter in the form of a critical reinterpretation of Brentano in the spirit of Twardowski and taking into account Bolzano's distinction between subjective and objective presentations.¹⁰ In other words, *Husserlowska nauka...* [*Husserl's Theory...*] discussed the hypothesis that to understand Husserl's position, it must be interpreted in the context of the philosophies of Bolzano and Brentano and of the latter's students, including Twardowski. This approach anticipated contemporary interpretative

⁴For an overview of these discussions, see Baumgartner, *Act, Content and Object*; Betti, *We owe it to Sigwart!*

⁵Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 1–2, 23, fn. 1.

⁶Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 100.

⁷Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 101.

⁸Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*. Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*.

⁹Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 22.

¹⁰Here I do not address the question of the potential influence that Twardowski had on Husserl. On this topic, see, e.g., Cavallin, *Content and Object*; Woleński, *Szkola lwowsko-warszawska w polemikach*, 15–24.

efforts, preceding them by several decades,¹¹ hence the need for discussion concerning the value of this early interpretation. One of the objectives of the present chapter is to address this question.

Given these interdependencies, in this chapter, I want to pursue several aims that correspond to three consecutive parts of Blaustein's work: historical, reconstructive, and critical. The first part aims to outline the historical context of Husserl's theory of content. The second part is primarily a reconstruction of Husserl's position, while the last part contains a summary and critique of it. Referring to this division, I first want to ask, like Blaustein, about the sources of Husserl's theory of content in the traditions of Brentano and Bolzano. Next, I offer an analysis of Blaustein's reconstruction of Husserl's theory of content, reading his book in light of relevant fragments from *Untersuchungen* and *Ideen I*. My aim is to approach the work of both philosophers critically to identify potential limitations of Blaustein's critique.

6.1 The Brentanian Context of Husserl's Theory of Content

6.1.1 *Blaustein Reads (Twardowski's) Bolzano*

Blaustein started his interpretation of Husserl by adopting the thesis that phenomenology was founded on Bolzano's theory, as he noted in *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]*.¹² Widely discussed and largely accepted in the current literature on *Untersuchungen*,¹³ this thesis was put forward by Blaustein in the late 1920s, thus anticipating later analyses. Therefore, what are the aspects of *Wissenschaftslehre* that he highlighted and that would later determine the development of phenomenology? To understand Blaustein's account of Bolzano, it is worth examining the paper he presented on March 5, 1938, during the 336th meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society. This meeting took place under extraordinary circumstances. February 11—barely a month before the meeting—saw the death of Twardowski, who founded the Society in 1904 and acted as its president, and after his retirement, he became an honorary fellow in 1929. The proceedings were intended to commemorate him. Blaustein presented a paper entitled “Rola Kazimierza Twardowskiego w filozofii niemieckiej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku” [“The Role of Kazimierz Twardowski in German Philosophy at the Turn of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century”], claiming that Twardowski was the first student of Brentano who combined his teacher's philosophy with Bolzano's theory. Blaustein wrote expressly about

¹¹ See, e.g., Cavallin, *Content and Object*; George, Bolzano and the Problem of Psychologism; Rollinger, *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*; Varga, Brentano's Influence on Husserl's Early Notion of Intentionality.

¹² Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 8.

¹³ See, e.g., Cavallin, *Content and Object*, 23–24; George, Bolzano and the Problem of Psychologism; Rollinger, *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*, 69–82; Sebestik, Husserl Reader of Bolzano.

Bolzano being “discovered” by Twardowski.¹⁴ This made it possible for Twardowski to differentiate between the content and the object of presentation, and this division subsequently influenced Husserl when he worked on his theory of content. Importantly, Blaustein understood Bolzano as mediated by Twardowski's interpretation.

Regardless of Blaustein's main thesis, i.e., regardless of whether, historically speaking, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* [*On the Content and Object of Presentations*] was indeed the first synthesis of Brentano's and Bolzano's theories, there is no doubt that, for Twardowski, the clues on how to discriminate between content and objects are to be found precisely in the conception from *Wissenschaftslehre*. As he underlined in § 4 of *Zur Lehre...*, “Bolzano used to emphasize this difference [between the content and the object of presentations] and clung steadfastly to it.”¹⁵ However, the terminology used by Bolzano was different as, in the words of Twardowski, “[i]nstead of the expression ‘content of a presentation,’ Bolzano uses the term ‘objective presentation,’ ‘presentation as such,’ and he distinguishes from it the object on the one hand and on the other the ‘experienced’ or ‘subjective’ presentation by which he means the mental act of presentation.”¹⁶ Hence, for Twardowski, the “content” of presentation equates to “objective presentation” (in the sense of Bolzano), which is distinguished both from the object of presentation and the act itself, i.e., “subjective presentation” (in the sense of Bolzano).

Blaustein followed in the footsteps of Twardowski, focusing in his book on Bolzano's theory of presentations, expounded primarily in § 48 and § 49 of *Wissenschaftslehre*, which—as he claimed—answered the problems raised by objectless presentations:¹⁷ how is it even possible to present nothing or $\sqrt{-1}$ to oneself (Bolzano's examples repeated by Blaustein¹⁸)? In other words, how can there be presentations with no object? To solve this paradox, Bolzano suggested

¹⁴Blaustein, Rola Kazimierza Twardowskiego w filozofii niemieckiej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku, 138a. Reprint in 2018: Rola Kazimierza Twardowskiego w filozofii niemieckiej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku (autoreferat), 87. See also Rollinger, *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*, 73.

¹⁵Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 17: “Daneben aber ist auf den Unterschied, der zwischen dem Inhalte einer Vorstellung und ihrem Gegenstande besteht, öfters mit Nachdruck hingewiesen worden. Bolzano hat es gethan und mit grosser Consequenz an dieser Unterschiede festgehalten.” Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 15.

¹⁶Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 17, fn. 2: “Bolzano gebraucht statt des Ausdruckes ‘Inhalt einer Vorstellung’ die Bezeichnung ‘objective’ Vorstellung, ‘Vorstellung an sich’ und unterscheidet von ihr einerseits den Gegenstand andererseits die ‘gehabe’ oder ‘subjective’ Vorstellung, worunter er den psychischen Act des Vorstellens versteht.” Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 15, fn. 5.

¹⁷Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 8–11. See also Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 20–21. Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 18–19. On Bolzano and the problem of objectless presentations, see Fréchette, *Gegenstandlose Vorstellungen*.

¹⁸Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, 220. Trans. Terrell, in: *Theory of Science*, 80.

distinguishing between two meanings of the term “idea”: subjective presentation and objective presentation. In the first sense, an “idea”—also referred to as a thought or “what is thought” (*gedacht*)—assumes the existence of a subject and is thus described as “something real” (*etwas Wirkliches*),¹⁹ i.e., an object with real existence at the time it came into being or was thought. This is in contrast to objective presentation or presentation as such (*Vorstellung an sich*). Such a presentation does not truly exist and constitutes the “direct and immediate *material* of the subjective idea” (*unmittelbaren Stoff der subjektiven Vorstellung*). Next, Bolzano made a clear distinction between an objective presentation or material and the object of presentation. He defined it in the following way: “[b]y the object of an idea I understand that (sometimes existent, sometimes non-existent) something we are accustomed to saying the idea *represents* or is an idea of.”²⁰ Blaustein concluded that Bolzano assumed a tripartite structure of presentation where in addition to subjective and objective presentation, there was also the object of presentation (both objective and subjective).

The popularity of Bolzano's thought in Poland should come as no surprise. Twardowski was educated at Theresianum in Vienna, where Robert Zimmermann's *Philosophische Propädeutik* was used as a textbook.²¹ First published in 1853, this book summarized Bolzano's conception in its section on logic, but the terminology used there was different. For instance, Zimmermann assumed that logical concepts (*logische Begriffe*) (objective presentations in Bolzano) are ideal in nature and are the object of psychic presentations (*psychische Vorstellung*) (subjective presentations in Bolzano), whereas content (*Inhalt*) is what is meant by a concept such as This-here (*Dieses*). Zimmermann eventually claimed that what a concept is directed toward is its object (*Gegenstand*).²² Thus, strictly speaking, Zimmermann distinguished between the content and object of concepts but did not introduce a more general division into the act, content and object of presentation. In this context, Blaustein accused Zimmermann of being vague and overly general. He wrote: “Zimmermann's definition of content is so broad that almost all authors of later

¹⁹ Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, 217: “Jede Vorstellung in dieser Bedeutung des Wortes setzt irgend ein lebendiges Wesen als das Subject, in welchem sie vorgehet, voraus; und deßhalb nenne ich sie subjectiv, oder auch gedacht. Die subjective Vorstellung ist also etwas Wirkliches; sie hat zu der bestimmten Zeit, zu der sie vorgestellt wird, in dem Subjecte, welches dieselbe sich vorstellt, ein wirkliches Daseyn; wie sie denn auch allerlei Wirkungen hervorbringt.” Trans. Terrell, in: *Theory of Science*, 78: “In this sense every idea presupposes a living being as the subject in which it occurs; consequently I call it *subjective* or *thought*. The subjective idea is thus something real; at the particular time at which it is present, it has a real existence in the mind of the subject for whom it is present. As such, it also produces all sorts of *effects*.”

²⁰ Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, 219: “Ich verstehe aber unter dem Gegenstande, einer Vorstellung jenes (bald existirende, bald nicht existirende) Etwas, von dem wir zu sagen pflegen, daß sie es vorstelle, oder daß sie die Vorstellung davon sey.” Trans. Terrell, in: *Theory of Science*, 79.

²¹ On Twardowski's education in Theresianum, see Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 17–18. See also Smith, *Austrian Philosophy*, 155–156; Kasimir Twardowski, 313–334.

²² Zimmermann, *Philosophische Propädeutik*, 18–19.

conceptions of presentation content, however different, may claim him as their predecessor.”²³ This is why, as Blaustein underlined, the value of Zimmermann's work rested not so much on his definitions of basic terms as on sensitizing Twardowski to Bolzano's conception.²⁴ Whatever the case may be, the fact that Bolzano remained one of the fundamental points of reference for Blaustein when the latter interpreted Husserl's theory of content validates the thesis that the scope of the impact of *Wissenschaftslehre* on Polish philosophers extended beyond the domain of logic. This was mentioned by Wolfgang Künne, who wrote about Bolzano's influence not only on Twardowski but also on Jan Łukasiewicz, Maria Frankłówna, and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (and thus, indirectly, on Quine).²⁵ Similarly, Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* also contributed to Polish descriptive psychology, not to mention the reception of phenomenology.

6.1.2 *Struggles with Brentano's, Höfler's, and Twardowski's Concepts of Content*

Although Bolzano's theory provided grounds for assuming a tripartite structure of presentations, it lacked a clear definition of the relationship between content and objects. In light of Blaustein's work, this definition was partly attributable to Brentano and his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* [*Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*]. Admittedly, *Wissenschaftslehre* did mention that presentations present something,²⁶ but it was only Brentano who called this relationship intentional. Blaustein claimed that in Brentano's philosophy, the relationship is not so much between content and object as between an act and its object.²⁷ This is because Brentano, as emphasized by Twardowski, identified objects with content.²⁸ In any case, the object is defined as “immanent,” and it is assumed that it does not need to exist in reality. In the reconstruction presented by Blaustein, who did not

²³ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 4. My translation.

²⁴ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 12, fn. 1.

²⁵ Künne, Bernard Bolzano's 'Wissenschaftslehre' and Polish Analytical Philosophy Between 1894 and 1935.

²⁶ Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, 219. Trans. Terrell, in: *Theory of Science*, 79.

²⁷ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 5.

²⁸ Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 18, fn. 1: “Denn während Brentano als primäres Object den Gegenstand der Vorstellung bezeichnet, so wie dies hier geschehen ist, versteht er unter dem secundären Gegenstand einer Vorstellung den Act und Inhalt zusammengenommen, insofern beide während des Vorstellens eines Gegenstandes durch das ‘innere Bewusstsein’ erfasst werden und die Vorstellung dadurch zu einer bewussten wird.” Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 16, fn. 8: “For, although Brentano calls the object of a presentation its primary object, just as we have, he understands by the secondary object of a presentation the act and content taken together, as far as they are both grasped through ‘inner consciousness’ when the presentation of an object occurs and this presentation, therefore, becomes conscious.”

seem to go beyond Twardowski's exposition in this respect, Brentano defined psychic phenomena through the quality of intentionality and differentiated them from natural phenomena. Blaustein claimed that accounting for the object of an act as something "immanent" has consequences that are primarily methodological. The aim is to separate the immanent object from the transcendent object and thus make the point that the nature of immanent objects is not metaphysical. This issue was taken up by Alois Höfler in his *Logik*—written together with Alexius Meinong—and then, later, by Twardowski.

In his analyses, Höfler referred to the content of both presentations and judgments, claiming that content exists within the object. In Höfler, the expressions "object" (*Gegestand*) and "item" (*Objekt*) were fraught with ambiguity, as they can mean both something that exists in reality, a "thing in itself" (*Ding an sich*), and something that exists "within" us. The latter may be considered an "image" (*Bild*) of what is real or as a *quasi*-image or sign.²⁹ Blaustein considered these definitions of content and object to be "unclear," saying that we do not truly know what an intentional object is.³⁰ More importantly, Höfler spelled out the consequences of Brentano's conception, as he equated an intentional (immanent) object with content and a transcendent object with what is not psychic. However, such consequences are absurd because—as Blaustein argued—Höfler reduced things such as colors, smells, or landscapes to the psyche of the subject. Another problem has to do with the "image" theory of content, which, it should be mentioned, was subsequently criticized by Husserl. Hence, in both Brentano and Höfler, it is impossible to make a sharp distinction between objects and content.

The above remarks show that Bolzano lacked a clear definition of the relationship between content and object, while Brentano and Höfler—wanting to ensure the metaphysical neutrality of philosophy—blurred the boundary between the two elements because they effectively reduced objects to content. Blaustein suggested that Twardowski's theory of content should be interpreted precisely in this context. Hence, referring to Bolzano, Twardowski assumed that each presentation has its own object. This, however, requires a more precise definition of the relationship between content and object, which, following Brentano and Höfler, should be done without metaphysical and reductionist implications. To that end, Twardowski moved away from the account of objects as things in themselves, talking about phenomena

²⁹Höfler, *Logik*, 7: "Was wir oben 'Inhalt der Vorstellung und des Urteils' nannten, liegt ebenso ganz innerhalb des Subjektes, wie der Vorstellungs- und Urteilsakt selbst. 2. Die Wörter 'Gegenstand' und 'Objekt' werden in zweierlei Sinn gebraucht: einerseits für dasjenige an sich Bestehende, 'Ding an sich,' Wirkliche, Reale, worauf sich unser Vorstellen und Urteilen gleichsam richtet andererseits für das 'in' uns bestehende psychische, mehr oder minder annähernde 'Bild' von jenem Realem, welches *quasi*-Bild (richtiger Zeichen) identisch ist mit dem unter 1. genannten 'Inhalt.' Zum Unterschied von dem als unabhängig vom Denken angenommenen Gegenstand oder Objekt nennt man den Inhalt eines Vorstellens und Urteilens (desgleichen Fühlens und Wollens) auch das 'immanente oder intentionale Objekt' dieser psychischen Erscheinungen; dieses ist immer in Logik und Psychologie gemeint, solange die Untersuchung von metapsychischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Lehren über das an sich Seiende unabhängig bleiben soll."

³⁰Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 7.

(*Phänomene* or *Erscheinungen*) as the proper objects of intentional reference.³¹ In turn, justifying the distinction between object and content, in *Zur Lehre...* Blaustein identified three fundamental arguments in favor of such a distinction:

- 1) Whenever we make a negative-true proposition, the content of presentation exists, while the object does not. 2) An object has properties that content cannot have. (The object of the presentation of a golden mountain is extensive, golden, as well as higher or lower than other mountains). Obviously, these properties and relations do not apply to the content of the presentation of a golden mountain. 3) One object may be presented by many types of content.³²

In his theory, Twardowski described the relationship between object and content, and he did make a clear distinction between them; in Blaustein's view, however, Twardowski did not define the relationship between content and act. This has to do with the ambiguity with which the problems of content were analyzed in *Zur Lehre...* In his work, Blaustein discussed three main interpretations:³³ (1) in line with Höfler's position, which was a point of departure for the analyses in *Zur Lehre...*, according to which content may be understood as an image; (2) content means the appearance of the given object; and (3) the Bolzanian interpretation in Twardowski (that content is presentation in itself³⁴) was borrowed from Paul Ferdinand Linke, a student of Theodor Lipps and Wilhelm Wundt. Each of these interpretations was problematic. (1) "Content" is indeed defined in § 1 of *Zur Lehre...* with reference to Höfler,³⁵ but, as Blaustein observed, Twardowski later modified that account and eventually abandoned it. (2) Interpreting content as

³¹Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 35: "Danach ist der Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, etwas vom Ding an sich Verschiedenes, falls unter demselben die unbekannte Ursache dessen verstanden wird, was unsere Sinne affiziert. In dieser Hinsicht deckt sich die Bedeutung des Wortes Gegenstand mit jener des Ausdrucks 'Phänomen' oder 'Erscheinung'." Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 33: "According to our view, the object of presentations, of judgments, of feelings, as well as of volitions, is something different from the thing as such [*Ding an sich*], if we understand by the latter the unknown cause of what affects our senses. The meaning of the word 'object' coincides in this respect with the meaning of the expression 'phenomenon' or 'appearance'."

³²Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 13: "1) Ilekroć wydajemy sąd przeczący prawdziwy, treść przedstawienia istnieje, podczas gdy przedmiot nie istnieje. 2) Przedmiotowi przysługują własności, których nie może posiadać treść. (Przedmiot przedstawienia złotej góry jest rozciągliwy, złoty, większy lub mniejszy od innych gór. Własności te i stosunki nie przysługują oczywiście treści przedstawienia złotej góry). 3) Jeden przedmiot może być przedstawiony za pomocą wielu treści." My translation.

³³Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 14–16.

³⁴Linke writes about the "Bolzanian-Twardowskian" concept of content which comprehends content as identical in relation to a variety of acts. See Linke, *Grundfragen der Wahrnehmungslehre*, 84. On another occasion, he writes: Linke, *Grundfragen der Wahrnehmungslehre*, 81: "Bolzanos 'Vorstellung an sich,' die er auch 'objektive' Vorstellung nennt im Gegensatz zur 'subjektiven' oder 'gedachten' Vorstellung, deckt sich der Hauptsache nach mit dem 'Inhalt' im Twardowskischen Sinne."

³⁵Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 3–4. Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 1–2.

appearance was equally problematic, as Twardowski did not attribute to content qualities that are characteristic of appearance, e.g., extension or colorfulness.³⁶ Moreover, such an interpretation did not allow for non-intuitive presentations, e.g., concepts, which contradicted the findings from *Zur Lehre...* (3) It seems that Linke's interpretation was the most accurate, as Twardowski himself wrote about the links with Bolzano's theory. According to Blaustein, however, this interpretation did not hold up. While Linke justified his position with the thesis from *Zur Lehre...*, whereby content is not real,³⁷ Blaustein pointed out the ambiguous nature of "reality" in Twardowski. According to Blaustein, Linke suggested that content does not exist (like a lack of something, absence or possibility), whereas in *Zur Lehre...* content does exist but not in the same way as an act does. Things became complicated when Twardowski accounted for content as an inseparable part of an act, i.e., as something "[...] that cannot exist without an act, combining with the latter to create one psychic reality."³⁸ Hence, Linke's interpretation was wrong.

It was difficult to establish the relationship between content and act because, as Blaustein concluded, "[...] the author [i.e., Twardowski] understood the act—the whole lived experience—[as] the whole presentation (similarly to Brentano), so that content, which was also something psychic, and which was not an intentional act or a physical phenomenon, was in a way suspended in the air."³⁹ Thus, if Twardowski

³⁶Twardowski refers in this context to Kerry and writes: Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 30: "Ein goldener Berg z.B., hat unter anderem die Eigenschaft, räumlich ausgedehnt zu sein, aus Gold zu bestehen, grösser oder kleiner zu sein als andere Berge. Diese Eigenschaften und das Grössenverhältnis zu anderen Bergen kommen offenbar dem Inhalt der Vorstellung eines goldenen Berges nicht zu." Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 28: "For example, a golden mountain has among others the properties of being spatially extended, of consisting of gold, of being larger than other mountains. These properties and the relation to other mountains obviously do not belong to the content of the presentation of a golden mountain; for the latter is neither spatially extended, nor does it consist of gold, nor do propositions about relations of magnitude apply to it."

³⁷Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 31: "Und dieses Bindeglied, der Vorstellungsinhalt in dem von uns angenommenen Sinne, ist nicht ein und dasselbe wie der Act. Wohl bildet er mit diesem zusammen eine einzige psychische Realität, aber während der Vorstellungssact etwas Reales ist, fehlt dem Inhalt der Vorstellung die Realität immer; dem Gegenstande kommt bald Realität zu, bald nicht. Auch in diesem verschiedenen Verhalten gegenüber der Eigenschaft real zu sein, drückt sich der Unterschied zwischen Inhalt und Gegenstand einer Vorstellung aus." Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 29: "And this link, the content in our sense, is not the same as the act. It does form together with the act one single mental reality, but while the act of having a presentation is something real, the content of the presentation always lacks reality. The object sometimes has reality, sometimes not. This different behavior in regard to the property of being real, too, reflects the difference between the content and the object of a presentation."

³⁸Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 15: "[...] co nie może istnieć bez aktu, ale co razem z aktem tworzy jedną psychiczną rzeczywistość." My translation.

³⁹Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 16: "[...] autor rozumiał przez akt, całe przeżycie—całe przedstawienie (podobnie jak Brentano), więc treść, będąca również czymś psychicznym, a nie będąca aktem intencjonalnym, ani zjawiskiem fizycznym, zawieszona była poniekąd w powietrzu." My translation.

accepted Brentano's distinction between intentional psychic acts and non-intentional physical phenomena, he could not categorize content as something intentional because, as a psychic object, content is not an act. Consequently, Blaustein's book put forward the thesis that, whether discussing late Meinong or—what is more interesting for us here—Husserl, their theories were developed in response to the difficulties inherent in the tradition of Brentano, which pushed Twardowski to rediscover Bolzano's theory at the end of the nineteenth century. We focus briefly on Meinong's proposal. In "Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung" ["On Objects of Higher Order and Their Relationship to Internal Perception"], which was originally published in 1899 and made extensive use of Twardowski's reflections,⁴⁰ Meinong refined some theses from *Zur Lehre*.... He understood presentation to be the moment which defines acts precisely as presentations despite the multitude of possible objects. However, distinct presentations may remain the same when relating to the same object. The moment which differentiates one presentation from another is the content. As Meinong wrote: "[p]resentations of different objects may be congruent concerning the act, but they differ in something else which can be called 'content of presentations.' The content exists, is real and present, it is also psychic, naturally, even if the object of which an idea is had by means of the content, does not exist, is not real, not present and not psychic."⁴¹ Thus, content exists in reality as a moment (an inseparable part) of an act, even though the object does not need to exist.

6.1.3 *The Brentanian Legacy Reconsidered: Husserl's Theory of Content*

In his book, Blaustein adopted an interesting point of view, suggesting that Husserl's theory of content responded to the difficulties inherent in the tradition of Brentano. The difficulties became even more pronounced if—following Bolzano and Twardowski—one adopted a tripartite structure of presentations: what is the relationship between an act (subjective presentation), content (objective presentation), and the object of an act? Blaustein identified both differences and similarities between these thinkers and Husserl, focusing on Brentano in particular.

⁴⁰On Twardowski-Meinong relationships and discussions, see Jadczak, *Inspirations and Controversies*; Dale, *Alexius Meinong*, 25–32.

⁴¹Meinong, *Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung*, 187: "Das nun, worin Vorstellungen im Akte voneinander verschieden sind, das ist dasjenige, was auf die Bezeichnung 'Inhalt der Vorstellung' Anspruch hat: dieser existiert, ist also real und gegenwärtig, natürlich auch psychisch, mag der sozusagen mit seiner Hilfe vorgestellte Gegenstand auch nicht-existierend, nicht-real, nicht-gegenwärtig, nicht-psychisch sein." Reprint in: *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 2, 384. Trans. Schubert Kalsi, in: *On Objects of Higher Order and Husserl's Phenomenology*, 143. Translation slightly modified.

As already noted in Sect. 3.1.2 above, in his 1874 *Psychologie*, Brentano accounted for presentations as psychic phenomena that (1) are non-extensive, (2) are intentional, (3) are the object of inner perception, and (4) create unity.⁴² As Blaustein argued,⁴³ Husserl accepted that acts should be defined as intentional, but he understood them differently. In Brentano, what is psychic had a broader scope than Husserlian acts. This is because psychic life encompasses not only acts but also other elements, such as sensations. Following Husserl, Blaustein showed that Brentano used the ambiguous term “phenomenon” (*Phänomen*) to distinguish between psychic and natural phenomena on the basis of two different criteria. Psychic and physical phenomena are divided into either acts or non-acts or according to whether they belong to consciousness.⁴⁴ Therefore, because of potential equivocations, the term “phenomenon” should be replaced by the term “act.” It is worth adding that Blaustein noticed the difference between Husserl and Brentano in the way they treated inner perception, the former replacing this term with “apperception of experiences.”⁴⁵ The combined effect of all these differences was that Husserl rejected Brentano’s (and Höfler’s) concept of the object as something “immanent.”⁴⁶ In Husserl, what is immanent seems to belong to the domain of acts and consciousness; hence, objects transcend acts.

This last thesis linked Husserl to Bolzano (objects are distinct from presentations). To reiterate, according to Blaustein, phenomenology was founded on Bolzano’s theory.⁴⁷ First and foremost, the discussion with Brentano brought Husserl’s theory closer to Twardowski’s solutions. Thus, Husserl understood the term “object” to mean “[...] everything that a psychic act can turn toward, whether it is real or unreal, possible or impossible, existing or non-existent, and that is designated by a name.”⁴⁸ This broad concept of the object as “something” can also be found in Twardowski.⁴⁹ Although Husserl made use of a different conceptual

⁴²Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 126–127. Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 74–75.

⁴³Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 30.

⁴⁴Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 35.

⁴⁵Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 37.

⁴⁶Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 5–6, 16.

⁴⁷Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 8.

⁴⁸Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 17: “[...] wszystko, ku czemu może się zwracać jakiś akt psychiczny, a co jest realne lub nierealne, możliwe lub niemożliwe, istniejące lub nieistniejące i co oznaczone jest jakąś nazwą.” My translation.

⁴⁹Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 37–38: “Der Gegenstand ist etwas anderes als das Existierende; manchen Gegenständen kommtneben ihrer Gegenständlichkeit, neben der Beschaffenheit, vorgestellt zu werden, (was der eigentliche Sinn des Wortes ‘essentia’ ist), auch noch die Existenz zu anderen nicht. Sowohl was existiert, ist ein Gegenstand (*ens habens actualem existentiam*) als auch, was nur existieren könnte (*ens possibile*), ja selbst was niemals existieren, sondern nur vorgestellt werden kann (*ens rationis*), ist ein Gegenstand, kurz alles, was nicht nichts, sondern in irgend einem Sinne ‘etwas’ ist, ist ein Gegenstand.” Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 35: “The object is something different from the existent; some objects have existence in addition to their object-

apparatus and did not expressly adopt the terminology known from *Zur Lehre...* (e.g., the differentiation between act, content, and presentation), Blaustein believed that he borrowed the general idea that act and content create a “single psychic reality” from that work, i.e., that content is an inseparable part of the act.⁵⁰ Therefore, what are the parallels and references that link Husserl's account of content to the tradition of Brentano (and Bolzano)?

Husserl did not adopt a narrow understanding of acts either from Bolzano (as subjective presentations) or from Twardowski (as psychic acts). Nor did he write about presentations, instead replacing them with a broader concept of lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*). Of course, Blaustein did notice that Husserl grappled with the ambiguous nature of the term “presentation” (e.g., as an act and as an object) in his works, and he referred to the commentary from *Ideen I* that mentioned the need to make the concept of presentation more precise.⁵¹ However, he claimed that this concept was never developed in full. Even so, Husserl had the basic intuition that acts comprise a real element of experience. Thus, in Blaustein's interpretation, Husserl broadened Bolzano's and Twardowski's understanding of acts in the sense that, in phenomenology, acts are made of two inseparable parts: quality and matter. Quality corresponds to Bolzano's subjective presentation and Twardowski's act; it relates to the moment of an act which defines it as a presentation, judgment, etc. In turn, matter corresponds to Bolzano's objective presentation and Twardowski's content;⁵² it concerns the moment of an act which differentiates it from other acts of a given type. It is matter that determines the specific objective direction. It follows that Husserl's solution consists in accounting for an act as a combination of two inseparable elements, subjective and objective presentation (in Bolzano), and as a combination of act and content (in Twardowski). As has been said, according to Blaustein, Twardowski highlighted the problem of combining content with the act or with the object: “[...] content, which was also something psychic, and which was not an intentional act or a physical phenomenon, was in a way suspended in the air.”⁵³ Husserl's theory of content addressed this problem: therein, content is part of the act—it is its matter and, as such, is different from the act's quality.

hood [*Gegenstaenlichkeit*], that is, in addition to their property of being presented (which is the real sense of the word ‘*essentia*’); others do not. What exists is an object (*ens habens actualem existentiam*), as is also what merely could exist (*ens possibile*); even what never can exist but what can only be conceived of (*ens rationis*) is an object; in short, everything which is not nothing, but which in some sense is ‘something,’ is an object.”

⁵⁰ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 16.

⁵¹ Husserl, *Ideen I*, *Husserliana* 3/1, 265–266, fn. 2: “Die feste und wesentliche Umgrenzung des weitesten von den bezeichneten Sphären ausgehenden Vorstellungsbegriffes ist natürlich eine wichtige Aufgabe für die systematische phänomenologische Forschung. Für alle solche Fragen sei auf.” Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideas I*, 276, fn. 62: “The firm and essential delimitation of the broadest concept of presentation which arises from the spheres designated is, naturally, an important task for systematic phenomenological research. For all such questions we refer to prospective publications. The present investigations briefly indicates the findings derived from the theoretical content of those future publications.” Translation slightly modified.

⁵² Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 13.

⁵³ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 16: “[...] treść będąca również czymś psychicznym, a nie będąca aktem intencjonalnym, ani zjawiskiem fizyc-

Blaustein also noted the continuity between Husserl's and Twardowski's theory of meaning. As he wrote, "[a] name expresses [...] an act, [it] means content (meaning) and denotes an object. We find a similar theory in Husserl, yet the crucial difference is that content (meaning) is, according to Husserl, something ideal and not psychic."⁵⁴ Speaking about meaning as something ideal, Husserl seemed closer to Bolzano than to Twardowski. However, for Blaustein, this solution raised serious difficulties: how can something ideal be the moment of an act? However, for now, this problem is not important. More importantly, Blaustein's studies show Husserl's affinity with the tradition of Brentano (and Bolzano). In this regard, the idea of accounting for acts as a combination of two inseparable parts seems to represent an attempt to overcome the problems of that tradition, thus making an important contribution to the discussion about the structure of acts of consciousness. Although undoubtedly interesting, Blaustein's proposal ignored many of the nuances in Husserl's theory. In pursuit of the mutual references and the continued themes that link phenomenology with the tradition of Brentano (and Bolzano), Blaustein blurred crucial differences or brushed them aside with hasty generalizations. He was aware of this because he believed that showing the interdependencies between the two traditions did not mean that Husserl could be reduced to the tradition of Brentano: Husserl's theory of content can be understood in its complexity only by taking into account the original conceptual apparatus that enabled a more precise outline of the relationship between a given act, content, and the object of the act. Regarding Blaustein's interpretation of Husserl's theory of content, it is therefore necessary to take a closer look at it, basing not so much on the terminology used by Brentano and his students as on his original nomenclature.

6.2 On Husserl's Structures of Consciousness

In the "Introduction" to his book, at the very beginning of the part where he reconstructed Husserl's position, Blaustein openly declared that he would solely focus on *Untersuchungen* and *Ideen I*.⁵⁵ That being said, references to the latter work were scant, and their purpose was often to show the continuity of reflections on the problems developed in the former. It was Ingarden who, when reviewing the work of Blaustein, his student from Lvov, observed that reducing *Ideen I* to a mere reiteration of the main themes from *Untersuchungen* is problematic.⁵⁶ As I want to cover reactions to Blaustein's publication and the discussions it sparked elsewhere, I will

znym, zawieszona była poniekąd w powietrzu." My translation.

⁵⁴Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 17: "Nazwa oznajmia [...] akt, znaczy treść (znaczenie), a oznacza przedmiot. Podobną teorię spotykamy u Husserla, z tą jednak istotną różnicą, że treść (znaczenie) jest wedle Husserla czymś idealnym, a nie psychicznym." My translation.

⁵⁵Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 1–2, 23, fn. 1.

⁵⁶Ingarden, LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN, 315. Reprint in: *Polska fenomenologii przedwojenna*, 220.

leave Ingarden's comment aside for now in order to discuss it later in Chap. 7. In any case, the order of analyses in *Husserlowska nauka...* [*Husserl's Theory...*] undoubtedly followed the intuitions and the framework developed by Twardowski, for whom the theory of presentations concerned three elements: act, content, and object. As shown by Blaustein's research into Husserl's position and the tradition of Brentano (and Bolzano), the phenomenological theory of content was related to the question of the relationship between the act on the one hand and the object on the other. Thus, to clearly define Husserl's understanding of content, it was necessary to examine his account of the act and the object. Starting from this observation, in the second part of his book, Blaustein first analyzed how Husserl understood acts and objects, focusing in particular on topics such as consciousness, lived experiences, intentional acts, inner experience, objects, and the intentional relation. He then considered the problem of content by examining, among other things, the concepts of descriptive and intentional content, as well as an act's quality and matter. He also asked questions about intuition, the theory of adumbration and, finally, the account of content as noematic sense. It is necessary to bear in mind the Brentanian background of these investigations and, not least, their specific methodology: Blaustein was more interested in analyzing the meaning of concepts in Husserl's philosophy than in carrying out descriptive studies of specific mental phenomena. However, as he testified in his later book from 1931, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*], his 1928 analysis of Husserl's position was an attempt to formulate "a general theory of presentations" (*ogólna nauka o przedstawieniach*).⁵⁷ Indeed, as we will see in the following, in his discussions with Husserl, Blaustein presented an original theory of presentations.

6.2.1 Acts and Their Objects

6.2.1.1 Consciousness as a Unity of Lived Experiences: The Question of Sensations

In his analysis of Husserl's position, Blaustein focused primarily on the "First" and "Fifth Logical Investigation" from *Untersuchungen* and some fragments of *Ideen I*, though he mentioned that consciousness is understood differently in the latter work, i.e., as pure consciousness, which is a result of applying the method of phenomenological reduction (*epoché*).⁵⁸ As suggested by Pokropski,⁵⁹ Blaustein truly failed to fully distinguish between the two concepts of consciousness—from *Untersuchungen* and *Ideen I*. Of course, this misunderstanding stemmed from relating Husserl primarily to the tradition of Brentano. However, the relation was not uncritical. The

⁵⁷ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 14.

⁵⁸ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 25, fn. 1.

⁵⁹ Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 101.

reflections from *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]* showed Husserl to be a rather critical interpreter of the writings of Brentano. The differences between the two often pertain to terminology, which was not yet sufficiently precise in the 1874 *Psychologie*. One such fundamental difference concerned the account of consciousness as a set of psychic phenomena. In Blaustein's interpretation, Husserl suggested that, instead of phenomena, one should talk about lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*). This is because the term "phenomenon" (*Phänomen*) is fraught with ambiguity. Blaustein identified three meanings of the term: (1) as a lived experience itself, (2) as an object which appears or manifests, and (3) as real components of a lived experience.⁶⁰ In this context, Blaustein's aim was to narrow down the concept of consciousness to a unity of lived experiences.

Following Husserl, Blaustein pointed to the "[v]aried ambiguity of the term 'consciousness'"⁶¹ when he wrote about the three fundamental meanings of the term: (1) as the entire, real (*reelle*) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, (2) as inner awareness, and (3) as any mental act. According to Blaustein, definitions (1) and (3) assume the concept of a lived experience as an *explanans*, while definition (2) assumes a specific account of inner awareness. He added that definition (2) is the *source* of definition (1), which dominates in *Untersuchungen*. A lived experience, in turn, should be understood as currently experienced *content*, which Blaustein accounted for as events. He did not mention, however, that Husserl attributed the account of lived experiences as events (*Ereignisse*) to Wundt and considered the object of phenomenology to be *not* real events but *pure* lived experiences, i.e., experiences that are not related to empirically real existence.⁶² This, however, was not crucial in Blaustein's analysis. More importantly, he devoted a great deal of attention to Husserlian analysis of the sensational moment of outer perception:

The sensational moment of color, e.g., which in outer perception forms a real constituent of my concrete seeing (in the phenomenological sense of a visual perceiving or appearing) is as much "experienced" or "conscious" content, as is the character of perceiving or as the full perceptual appearing of the colored object. As opposed to this, however, this object, though perceived, is not itself experienced nor conscious and the same applies to the coloring perceived in it.⁶³

Blaustein believed that the fragment of *Untersuchungen* just quoted separate the elements of perception—or, more broadly, consciousness—that are lived from those

⁶⁰ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 35.

⁶¹ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 355–356. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 81–82.

⁶² Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 357. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 82.

⁶³ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 358: "Beispielsweise ist also im Falle der äußeren Wahrnehmung das Empfindungsmoment Farbe, das ein reelles Bestandteil eines konkreten Sehens (in dem phänomenologischen Sinn der visuellen Wahrnehmungserscheinung) ausmacht, ebensogut ein 'erlebter' oder 'bewußter Inhalt' wie der Charakter des Wahrnehmens und wie die volle Wahrnehmungserscheinung des farbigen Gegenstands. Dagegen ist dieser Gegenstand selbst, obgleich er wahrgenommen ist, nicht erlebt oder bewußt; und desgleichen auch nicht die an ihm wahrgenommene Färbung." Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 83.

that are only perceived or experienced.⁶⁴ While the content of consciousness is lived, an object is not. In the example discussed by Husserl, it is sensations that are lived, while objects are only perceived. Hence, what corresponds to the perceived is a real part, e.g., a color sensation (*Farbenempfindung*). This part is, in turn, interpreted (*Auffassung*) in perception. Thus, following Blaustein, Husserl distinguished color as a property of an object from color as the content of consciousness, i.e., a lived experience. Husserl justified the divide in the following way:

Here it is enough to point to the readily grasped difference between the red of this ball, objectively seen as uniform and the indubitable, unavoidable projective differences among the subjective color-sensations in our percept, a difference repeated in *all* sorts of objective properties and the sensational complexes which correspond to them.⁶⁵

Blaustein did not deny that Husserl consistently separated objects from lived experiences. After all, object properties are not identical to the properties of sensations. The importance of the analysis from *Untersuchungen* cited above lies in its attempt to account for *the way in which* an object becomes an object in consciousness. It is through the process of “apprehending” a complex of sensations that an object “appears” or “manifests” in consciousness or precisely becomes a “phenomenon.”

Adopting a critical attitude toward Husserl's proposal, Blaustein underlined that, in line with the arguments advanced in *Untersuchungen*, sensations are the real parts of lived experiences, but he thought this conclusion was problematic. The point was that Husserl did not consistently distinguish between a *lived experience* and *living* an experience.⁶⁶ This objection was also mentioned by Magdalena Gilicka, who discussed the merit of Blaustein's interpretation.⁶⁷ However, Gilicka did not develop the interpretation further and did not inquire into the background of the differentiation. Interestingly, its origin is not only Brentanian but also strictly phenomenological, at least to the extent discussed in the book. Here, Blaustein referred to Ingarden's reflections on the intuition of lived experiences.⁶⁸ In his 1921 work “Über die Gefahr einer *Petitio Principii* in der Erkenntnistheorie” [“On the Danger of *Petitio Principii* in the Theory of Knowledge”], Ingarden considered the problem of the possibility of direct knowledge of such experiences. If this direct knowledge originates with reflection, which consists in turning toward an act, the very act of reflection is an act which would have to be founded on another. In other words, the objection is that knowledge based on reflection would lead to the *petitio*

⁶⁴ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 26–27.

⁶⁵ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 359: “Es genügt hier aber der Hinweis auf den leicht fasslichen Unterschied zwischen dem objektiv als gleichmässig gesehenem Rot dieser Kugel und der gerade dann in der Wahrnehmung selbst unzweifelhaften und sogar notwendigen Abschattung der subjektiven Farbenempfindungen, ein Unterschied, der sich in Beziehung auf alle Arten von gegenständlichen Beschaffenheiten und die ihnen korrespondierenden Empfindungskomplexionen wiederholt.” Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 83.

⁶⁶ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 26.

⁶⁷ Gilicka, Leopolda Blaustein krytyka fenomenologii, 111.

⁶⁸ Blaustein contrasts Ingarden with Husserl explicitly in regard to the question of sensations. See Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 29, fn. 1.

principii fallacy. Responding to this difficulty, Ingarden wrote about intuition (*Intuition*), which is not so much an act (in the proper phenomenological sense of the word) as a way of someone experiencing the act itself. Here, Ingarden distinguished objects of consciousness, which are only *experienced* (*erlebt*), from consciousness or intuition *living* itself or *lived through* (*durchlebt*).⁶⁹ Thus, what is experienced are objects, whereas what is lived through is the specifically subjective nature of apprehending what is present in consciousness. Sensations are also experienced as foreign to the experiencing subject or ego (*ichfremd*),⁷⁰ although, as Ingarden believed, they are experienced through “living” them. In the end, sensations are *content* rather than *acts* of consciousness. Ingarden wrote:

[...] sense data [...] are contents which in a specific way are different than conscious acts and which are not (in themselves) conscious. This means that they exist by being experienced and not lived. However, the way in which experiencing (*Erlebens*) sense data exists lies in “living through” (*Durchlebens*).⁷¹

Interestingly, Ingarden also derived the problematic status of sensations from Brentano. He expressed this most clearly in his later lectures on the meaning of philosophy in Brentano's thought (delivered originally in Polish in 1936), where he said that Brentano used the ambiguous concept of sensory data. The point was that Brentano inadequately accounted for the difference between what is experienced and experience understood as a mental action in the context of defining physical and psychic phenomena. The former applies to things, while the latter belongs to the domain of lived experience. Blurring this difference may lead to excluding sensations from the scope of consciousness, but it also obscures their essence, i.e., being the necessary definition or correlate of a property of the experienced or perceived thing. As Ingarden stressed, only those sensations that are understood as experienced may be considered to be psychic phenomena.⁷²

In any case, in “Über die Gefahr...” and in many other works,⁷³ Ingarden emphasized that he distinguished between “lived” acts and “experienced” sensations following Hedwig Conrad-Martius. In her “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der

⁶⁹ Ingarden, Über die Gefahr einer *Petito Principii* in der Erkenntnistheorie, 556: “Indem es andere Gegenstände ‘erlebt,’ bzw. sie ‘gegeben’ hat, durchlebt es sich selbst und ist nichts anderes, als dieses Sich-selbst-durchleben selbst.” For more on Ingarden's understanding of the intuition of experience, also in the context of Husserl's idea of reflection, see Chrudzimski, *Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden*, 37–71.

⁷⁰ Ingarden, Über die Gefahr einer *Petito Principii* in der Erkenntnistheorie, 558.

⁷¹ Ingarden, Über die Gefahr einer *Petito Principii* in der Erkenntnistheorie, 562: “Jedenfalls sind die Empfindungsdaten [...] Inhalte, die den Bewußtseinsakten auf bestimmte Weise gegenüber treten und selbst (in sich) nicht bewußt sind. D.h. ihre Seinweise ist die des Erlebtwerdens und nicht die des Durchlebens. Die Seinsweise des Erlebens der Empfindungsdaten dagegen ist die des ‘Durchlebens’.” My translation.

⁷² Ingarden, Die Auffassung der Philosophie bei Franz Brentano, 31–32.

⁷³ Ingarden, Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl, 131, fn.: “Damals im Jahre 1916 verfügte ich noch nicht über die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Durchleben der Akte, dem Erleben der ursprünglichen Empfindungsdaten und dem gegenständlichen Vermeinen, welche ich erst im Winter 1918/19 bei der Redaktion der Arbeit ‘Über die Gefahr einer *Petito Principii* in der

realen Außenwelt" ["On Ontology and the Theory of Appearing of the Real Outer World"], this student of Husserl's and Adolf Reinach's from Göttingen reflected on the problem of how material properties of things appear in consciousness. Conrad-Martius wrote about "experiencing" (*Erleben*) the presentation of the sensual thing's property, such as color or tone.⁷⁴ Admittedly, presentation is possible in contact with the ego, but if it is experienced, what is presented in a way "penetrates" the thing itself. The thing itself remains in the domain of "real transcendence" (*reale Transzendenz*), as it is different from the act itself and stays autonomous in its existence.⁷⁵ Obviously, sensations are given *in* consciousness, but they are different from the way in which the act appears *for* the ego. Włodzimierz Galewicz commented on this idea of Conrad-Martius by claiming that she overcame here the classical act-object model of consciousness and operated with a new model instead; more specifically, she suggested that consciousness changed lived experiences by giving them a new property, i.e., the property of being conscious.⁷⁶ Even if Conrad-Martius discussed this new model as a mere possibility, for Ingarden, it seemingly became convincing. Thus, for Conrad-Martius, sensations are *alien* to the ego (*ich-fremd*), even though they are presented *in* consciousness. In the ontological perspective, the ego is not the ontic foundation of sensory data. In the phenomenological account, this is visible in the different *mode* of the data's presentation given that it appears on the fringe of consciousness. In short, sensations are experienced *differently* by the ego. Ingarden used Conrad-Martius's observations to show that sensations cannot be characterized as acts either: the ego does not carry them out, although, as has been mentioned above, sensations exist in consciousness through being "lived," even if they are not truly experienced.

In his book, Blaustein approved and made use of Ingarden's (and Conrad-Martius's) solutions while undermining Husserl's thesis that lived experiences cover acts *and* sensations. Moreover, he claimed that this position can also be found in *Ideen I*.⁷⁷ In § 36 of *Ideen I*, Husserl considered accounting for lived experience as consciousness of something, and he acknowledged that intentionality belongs to the pure essence of consciousness. He added that a given lived experience is defined "in the broadest sense" as everything that is present in the stream of lived experiences; thus, it encompasses not only intentional experiences but also all real (*reell*) moments of a lived experience.⁷⁸ An example of such a real non-intentional moment is *sensory data* or a *sensation*. In this context, Husserl analyzed the case of perceiving a white sheet of paper:

Erkenntnistheorie,' z.T. unter dem Einfluß von Frau Conrad-Martius, durchgeführt habe." On Ingarden's reading of Conrad-Martius, see Galewicz, *Einleitung*, xxviii–xxxii.

⁷⁴ Conrad-Martius, *Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt*, 429.

⁷⁵ Conrad-Martius, *Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt*, 439–440.

⁷⁶ Galewicz, *Einleitung*, xxx.

⁷⁷ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 29.

⁷⁸ Husserl, *Ideen I*, *Husserliana* 3/1, 74. Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideas I*, 74–75.

Within the live experience of perceiving this sheet of white paper, more precisely, within those components of the perceiving which relate to the quality, whiteness, belonging to the sheet of paper, we find, by a suitable turning of regard, the data of sensation, white. This white is something which belongs inseparably to the essence of the concrete perception and belongs to it as a *really inherent* concrete component. As the content that is “presentive” with respect to the appearing *white* of the paper, it is the bearer of an intentionality; however, it is not itself a consciousness of something. The very same thing obtains in the case of other really inherent data, for example, the so-called *sensuous feelings*.⁷⁹

Blaustein interpreted this passage as an attempt at distinguishing between (non-intentional) sensations and (intentional) acts that are founded on sensations, the latter being “carriers” of intentionality. He concluded that “[s]ensations are labeled by Husserl as sensual $\lambda\eta$, acts as intentional $\mu\omicron\rho\rho\eta$.”⁸⁰ It may therefore be said that Blaustein saw a clear relationship between Husserl's reflections from *Untersuchungen* and *Ideen I*. He even claimed that this parallel is supported by methodological arguments: both publications maintain that acts and sensations (i.e., non-intentional moments of lived experiences) are given as adequate and obvious in immanent perception.⁸¹ I will discuss this argument, as well as the idea of excluding sensations from the domain of lived experiences, in Chap. 7.

6.2.1.2 The Object(s) of Consciousness: The Question of Transcendence

In the literature devoted to Husserl's phenomenology—e.g., in texts by John J. Drummond, George Heffernan, Dermot Moran, Peter Simons or, more recently, Dan Zahavi⁸²—his idea of intentionality was often juxtaposed with Brentano's proposal to show its unique qualities and the novelty of its approach. It is claimed that Brentano accounted for objects as mentally “in-existent,”⁸³ which suggests that the relationship between consciousness and its object is a real element of the psychic

⁷⁹Husserl, *Ideen I*, Husserliana 3/1, 75: “Im Erlebnis der Wahrnehmung dieses weißen Papiers, näher in ihrer auf die Qualität Weiße des Papiers bezogenen Komponente, finden wir durch passende Blickwendung das Empfindungsdatum Weiß vor. Dieses Weiß ist etwas dem Wesen der konkreten Wahrnehmung unabtrennbar Zugehöriges, und zugehörig als reelles konkretes Bestandstück. Als darstellender Inhalt für das erscheinende Weiß des Papiers ist es Träger einer Intentionalität, aber nicht selbst ein Bewußtsein von etwas. Eben dasselbe gilt von anderen Erlebnisdaten, z.B. den sog. sinnlichen Gefühlen.” Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideen I*, 75. Translation slightly modified.

⁸⁰Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 30. My translation.

⁸¹Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 38.

⁸²Drummond, *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism*, 14–17; Heffernan, *The Paradox of Objectless Presentations in Early Phenomenology: A Brief History of the Intentional Object from Bolzano to Husserl, With Concise Analyses of the Positions of Brentano, Frege, Twardowski and Meinong*, 68–69; Moran, *Husserl and Brentano*, 299–301; Simons, *Franz Brentano*, 22; Zahavi, *Husserl's Legacy*, 84–85.

⁸³Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 126–127: “Wir fanden demnächst als unterscheidende Eigenthümlichkeit aller psychischen Phänomene die intentionale Inexistenz, die Beziehung auf etwas als Object.” Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an*

experience. The novelty of Husserl's theory, according to the researchers mentioned above, consisted in the strict separation of object and consciousness. It is worth noting in this context that some scholars, e.g., Arkadiusz Chrudzimski or Hamid Taieb,⁸⁴ challenged the validity of this sharp opposition between the two theories, arguing that Brentano had an object-oriented theory of intentionality. To see this dispute in a different light, one may ask whether both thinkers—Brentano and Husserl—considered intentionality to be relational and, if so, how one should understand the *relata* of this relationship. Are objects only mental or are they transcendent in relation to consciousness?

Blaustein believed that intentionality in Husserl's philosophy is indeed relational—he wrote about an “intentional relation” (*stosunek intencjonalny*)—and defined the properties of acts as focused on the *transcendent* object. To explain this, it should be stressed that Blaustein accounted for the theory of consciousness in phenomenology as a theory of lived experiences that ranges over intentional acts as well as non-intentional sensations. Acts themselves should be understood as *apprehensions* or *interpretations* of sensations. Blaustein claimed that this description is viable because, in an act of perception, one sees not sensations but the perceived object.⁸⁵ This corresponds to Husserl's observations. Therefore, the experienced content is not identical to the object: content is composed of the sensations that present the object, while the object itself appears through interpreted content. Therefore, it is by virtue of interpreting sensations (Blaustein also used the German term “*Deutung*” for “interpretation”)⁸⁶ that an object appears, for instance, as a perceived object. Commenting upon this general theory, Blaustein observed that Husserl's approach is more complex than Brentano's. The point is that, in the case of the former, the object is not given in lived experience *simpliciter* but rather is *due to* the interpretation of a non-intentional element, i.e., sensations. But how should “interpretation” be understood here?

According to Blaustein, the relationship between consciousness and its object is best described as intended, “going toward something,” or simply “being conscious of something.”⁸⁷ Thus, consciousness intends toward an object through sensations. In this context, “interpretation” should be understood as a kind of “living through” (*durchleben*) (in the sense described above in Sect. 6.2.1.1) sensations that are not, however, presented in experience *as* sensations but *as* a given object. The fact that an act intends toward an object does not mean that, in an experience, one interprets (“lives through”) a complex of impressions that presents an object. Blaustein accused Husserl of obscuring the extension of the term “intentionality” by defining it across problematically distinct frameworks. In *Untersuchungen*, intentionality

Empirical Standpoint, 74: “Further we found that the *intentional in-existence*, the reference to something as an object, is a distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena.”

⁸⁴ Chrudzimski, *Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano*, 13–26; Chrudzimski, *Von Brentano zu Ingarden*, 186–187; Taieb, *Relational Intentionality*, 82–97.

⁸⁵ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 33.

⁸⁶ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 31–32.

⁸⁷ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 38.

was considered not only in relation to consciousness but also in relation to meaning. In this context, Blaustein cited the following fragment from the “First Logical Investigation”: “[t]he word ‘intentional’ is so framed as to permit application both to the meaning and the object of the *intentio*.”⁸⁸ However, if meaning is the content of lived experience, it cannot be finally established “[...] whether the intention of an act intends content or the object or both.”⁸⁹ The aim of this objection is to show that objects are transcendent in relation to both the act and the content. Even if the object is intended, it should not be reduced to a merely physical object or to a metaphysically understood thing in itself. In his 1928 book, Blaustein wrote:

Writing about the transcendental of objects in relation to acts, Husserl underlines that the former are not to be treated as transcendent in the sense of physics or metaphysics. He understands the object as something that is as it seems to appear in perception and as something that one has inside one's mind. The object of a perceptual idea of a sphere is a sphere with all its sides and properties, such as color, shape etc., and not a complex of atoms and electrons or a thing in itself.⁹⁰

Blaustein added that the reason why Husserl stressed the transcendence of the object so strongly⁹¹ was that he wanted to reject any misleading interpretation that would reduce the object to the act, whether as an object that is immanent (as in Brentano) or that is made present by the act (as in Twardowski). Therefore, the transcendence of the object means that it has its own properties (such as color) with their corresponding (but not identically equivalent) sensations (located also on the side of lived experience). However, as was observed earlier, if sensations are interpreted and objects are only intended, Husserl must ultimately accept the two fundamental meanings of “object” that are mentioned in the context of intentionality: (1) the intended object (*der Gegenstand, welcher intendiert ist*) and (2) the object as it is

⁸⁸Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 102, fn.: “Das Wort *intentional* lässt seiner Bildung gemäss, sowohl Anwendung auf die Bedeutung, als auf den Gegenstand der *Intention* zu.” Trans. Findlay in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 322, fn. 1.

⁸⁹Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 39. My translation.

⁹⁰Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 39–40: “Mówiąc o transcendentności przedmiotu w stosunku do aktu, Husserl podkreśla, że przedmiotowi nie należy przypisywać transcendentności w znaczeniu fizyki lub metafizyki. Przez przedmiot rozumie on coś, co jest takim, jakim się w spostrzeżeniu być wydaje i co jest takim, jakim mamy je na myśli. Przedmiotem wyobrażenia spostrzegawczego kuli jest kula wraz ze swoimi stronami i własnościami np. barwą, kształtem itp., a nie jakiś kompleks atomów, elektronów lub rzecz sam a w sobie.” My translation.

⁹¹Blaustein noted that Husserl's radical emphasis on the transcendence of the object also inspired other scholars who took over his arguments. See Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 46. He mentions in this context Stephan Witasek, a member of the Graz School. Witasek adapted the tripartite structure of presentations as act–content–object. Witasek, *Grundlinien der Psychologie*, 74: “Die Vorstellung weist auf den Gegenstand hin, sie bringt ihn uns zu Bewußtsein, sie trifft oder betrifft ihn—oder wie man sonst jene eigentümliche Beziehung, die zwischen Vorstellung und Gegenstand besteht, ausdrücken mag [...]. Der Inhalt der Vorstellung ist also stets ein—freilich nicht abtrennbare—Teil der Vorstellung selbst, also wie diese immer etwas Psychisches. Er ist wohl zu unterscheiden von dem Gegenstande der Vorstellung.”

intended (*der Gegenstand, so wie er intendiert ist*).⁹² This distinction accounts for the possibility of various presentations of the same object, which also refer to two types of intentionality: *de re* and *de dicto*.⁹³

Blaustein went even further, claiming that the intended object may have more properties than the actual presentation. Hence, only some properties may be intended in lived experience, whilst others may be ignored. This does not mean, however, that the object is reduced to nothing more than how it is intended at a given moment. Quite the contrary: Blaustein emphasized that “[a]ll intentional objects exist [...] outside presentation.”⁹⁴ That being said, it is worth bearing in mind that, here, “existence” is not understood physically or, more broadly, metaphysically. Rather, it refers to the nature of presentations as directed toward something. The object does not have to exist either in lived experience itself or outside of it. Importantly, directedness toward the object is the necessary element of the act which turns toward the intentional object. Consequently, according to Blaustein, *there is no* parallel in Husserl between immanent objects (or objects as they are intended), which exist in consciousness as if in a box, and transcendent (or intended) objects, which exist outside of consciousness. Consciousness has only one object, and it is intentional. To prevent misleading interpretations, Blaustein suggested that “[...] the intentional object of a presentation is identical to its real object, if it exists,” because, as he argues, “[a] transcendent object would not be the object of such and such [a] presentation if it were not its intentional object.”⁹⁵ Contrary to what it might suggest, the term “intentional” in the expression “intentional object” does not refer to existence in consciousness (existence that is “only” intentional) but to the existence of the act in which the object is intended.

In light of the analyses carried out thus far, Blaustein's interpretation may be summarized as follows: (1) Husserl used a relational concept of intentionality, where (2) the intentional relation is understood as intending, “being directed toward,” or “turning toward”; (3) intending is carried out in the act through the interpretation of sensations; (4) the thing which is intended is not sensations but the intentional object; and (5) as such, the object is the *proper* object of the act, i.e., the necessary element of the act if the latter is indeed an act. Put simply, Husserl adopted an object-theory of intentionality, and what made his position different from Brentano's position was that he stressed the *radical* transcendence of the object.⁹⁶

⁹² Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 40.

⁹³ Cf., e.g., Mohanty, *Husserlian Phenomenology and the De Re and De Dicto Intentionalities*; Drummond, *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism*, 19–20.

⁹⁴ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 41: “Wszelkie przedmioty intencjonalne istnieją [...] poza przedstawieniem.” My translation.

⁹⁵ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 42: “[...] intencjonalny przedmiot przedstawienia jest identyczny z jego rzeczywistym, o ile taki istnieje. Transcendentny przedmiot nie byłby bowiem przedmiotem tego a nie jakiegoś innego przedstawienia, gdyby nie był jego intencjonalnym przedmiotem.” My translation.

⁹⁶ Smith and McIntyre hold that Brentano is a proponent of an object-theory of intentionality, yet the object is mind-dependent, i.e., immanent, rather than transcendent. See, Smith & McIntyre,

As Blaustein emphasized, this theory is characteristic of *Untersuchungen* and is considerably reformulated in *Ideen I*, where the intentional relation is mediated by the noema. According to his interpretation,⁹⁷ Husserl understood the noema to be the object of presentation as it is presented (*der Gegenstand, so wie er vorgestellt ist*). To elucidate this, Blaustein cited an example from *Ideen I*: when we regard an apple tree with a natural attitude, we apprehend it as existing in the external world, whereas when we approach it with a philosophical attitude, there is “[...] a radical modification of sense”⁹⁸ because the apple tree is apprehended as sense or noema, i.e., an apple tree as it presents itself. Next, Husserl wrote:

The tree *simpliciter*, the physical thing belonging to Nature, is nothing less than this *perceived tree as perceived* which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree *simpliciter* can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements etc. But the sense—the sense of *this* perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence—cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.⁹⁹

Blaustein saw *Ideen I* as a radicalization of the position from *Untersuchungen*. Thus, in addition to two real parts—hyletic data and the noetic moment—lived experience also contains the *ideal* moment, i.e., the noema. The noema itself is also a complex object and, in addition to content—noematic sense or core (*Kern*)—it also comprises its *own* object, i.e., the identical *X* that guarantees the unity and identity of the noema.¹⁰⁰ If the noema has its *own* object, which, like the entire noema, is part of a lived experience, then Husserl in fact seemed to opt for the conception of *two* intentional objects: immanent (noema) and transcendent (the object apprehended with the natural attitude). The former object is ideal and abstract, while the latter is actual and concrete. Blaustein's interpretation brought Husserl closer to an account of the noema in the spirit of the so-called West Coast interpretation of the noema, where the noema is understood as a generalization of meaning and an intermediary element in an intentional relation.¹⁰¹ One may assume that this interpretation of the noema theory was influenced by Blaustein's account of the

Husserl and Intentionality, 48. On Husserl's object-theory of intentionality, see Smith, *Husserl's Philosophy of Mind*.

⁹⁷ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 61.

⁹⁸ Husserl, *Ideen I*, *Husserliana* 3/1, 205: “[...] eine radikale Sinnesmodifikation.” Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideas I*, 216.

⁹⁹ Husserl, *Ideen I*, *Husserliana* 3/1, 205: “Der Baum schlechthin, das Ding in der Natur, ist nichts weniger als dieses Baumwahrgenommene als solches, das als Wahrnehmungssinn zur Wahrnehmung und unabtrennbar gehört. Der Baum schlechthin kann abbrennen, sich in seine chemischen Elemente auflösen usw. Der Sinn aber—Sinn dieser Wahrnehmung, ein notwendig zu ihrem Wesen Gehöriges—kann nicht abbrennen, er hat keine chemischen Elemente, keine Kräfte, keine realen Eigenschaften.” Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideas I*, 216.

¹⁰⁰ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 62.

¹⁰¹ The West Coast interpretation was formulated by Dagfinn Føllesdal's account of the noema as a generalization of the notion of linguistic meaning. Cf. Føllesdal, *Husserl's Notion of noema*; Føllesdal, *Noema and Meaning in Husserl*; Smith & McIntyre, *Intentionality via Intentions*; Smith & McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality*. For discussion see, e.g., Drummond, *An Abstract Consideration*; Drummond, *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism*; Benchetti,

noema as an *ideal* element of lived experience. It seems, however, that the relational theory from his earlier book may also be applied—with the necessary clarifications and modifications—to the noema. Blaustein closed this avenue of research for himself due to his previously mentioned critical attitude toward the technique of reduction.

6.2.2 *Manifold Levels of Content*

Analyzing Husserl's theory of content, Blaustein considered selected fragments of the "First," "Fifth," and "Sixth Logical Investigation" from the second volume of *Untersuchungen*. It is worth noting that the "Fifth Logical Investigation" is the only one to refer directly to the problem of intentional lived experiences and their content in the scope mentioned by Blaustein; on the other hand, the "First Logical Investigation" focuses on the relationship between expressions and meanings, while the "Sixth Logical Investigation" pinpoints the topic of cognitive acts and objectifying acts. By combining these different perspectives, Blaustein wanted to present a *complete* theory of content in Husserl's philosophy of mind. In the context of the reception of phenomenology, this may seem problematic because—as argued by, for example, J. N. Mohanty¹⁰²—due to the theory of fulfillment, the research perspective adopted in the "Sixth Logical Investigation" is fundamentally different from that used earlier in that book. However, Blaustein followed not this way but that of Brentano. For him, each of these parts ultimately applied to *presentations*. This assumption originated with Twardowski. The thesis Blaustein borrowed from Twardowski is that there are two fundamental types of presentations: (1) concrete, thus intuitive (images or imageries), and (2) abstract, thus non-intuitive (concepts).¹⁰³ Accordingly, when in the "First" or "Sixth Investigation" Husserl addressed questions about meaning and signitive acts, Twardowski saw this as a continued analysis of the problem of presentations, albeit ones that are non-intuitive, i.e., concepts. In his interpretation of Husserl's theory of content, Blaustein attributed intentions to Husserl that were similar to those voiced by Twardowski: the aim of the theory of presentations was to explain both images and concepts. This in turn means that content works *in the same way* in both types of presentations. With this in mind, we can now ask about the nature of content in Husserl.

As mentioned above, Blaustein claimed that Husserl put forward his theory of content to solve the problem of intentional relations: for him, content is part of the act or, more precisely, its matter; as such, it is separate from the act's quality.¹⁰⁴ An

Føllesdal on the Notion of the Noema; Zahavi, *Husserl's Phenomenology*, 58–59; Zahavi, Husserl's Noema and the Internalism-Externalism Debate.

¹⁰² E.g., Mohanty, Husserl's Concept of Intentionality, 106–107.

¹⁰³ More on this distinction, see Sect. 4.1.2. See also Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 1–2. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 114. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 79.

¹⁰⁴ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 16.

act comprises two inseparable parts: (1) quality and (2) matter. While the former defines the nature of the act, e.g., presentation *as* presentation or judgment *as* judgment, the latter defines the objective direction of the act toward an object. In this respect, Blaustein adhered to Husserl's intentions and research results.¹⁰⁵ He also seemed faithful to Husserl's thought when he explained why the German philosopher incorporated matter into acts in the first place. As he emphasized, the identity of the object of reference is not enough to describe the differences between acts that might be directed toward the same object but present it differently.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, as has been shown above, the object is transcendent and thus cannot determine the act's direction. After all, "going toward" is a quality of acts and not objects.

As regards matter, Blaustein attributed it to the descriptive content of the act, which means that he accounted for it as an effective yet abstract part that can be identified only through description. Matter is the property of the act thanks to which the latter "[...] establishes an object to which the act intends and defines the object as attributed with certain properties and relations."¹⁰⁷ The fact that matter is an abstract part of the act also means that it cannot be considered in isolation from the other inseparable part, i.e., quality. By formulating this interdependence in the language of ontology, Blaustein held that the two parts of the act are indeed inseparable. On the other hand, Husserl referred to the combination of quality and matter as the intentional essence of presentation. Blaustein commented that this description of quality and matter is supposed to emphasize that their combination is an *essential* element of the act.¹⁰⁸ Although it follows the text of *Untersuchungen* to the letter,¹⁰⁹ this explanation does not seem to reflect Husserl's theory in its entire complexity. For him, talking about "essence" guarantees the specificity of a given act, which, in its "essence," may be matched with another act that is "the same." Thus, as has also

¹⁰⁵ Blaustein cites the following fragment of Husserl's *Untersuchungen*: Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 429: "Danach muss uns die *Materie*, als dasjenige im Akte gelten, was ihm allererst die Beziehung auf ein Gegenständliches verleiht, und zwar diese Beziehung in so vollkommener Bestimmtheit, dass durch die *Materie* nicht nur das Gegenständliche überhaupt, welches der Akt meint, sondern auch die Weise, in welcher er es meint, fest bestimmt ist." Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 121: "The matter, therefore, must be *that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object and reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant.*"

¹⁰⁶ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 45.

¹⁰⁷ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 46: "[...] ustanawia przedmiot, do którego akt intencjonuje, oraz określa ten przedmiot jako posiadający pewne cechy i stosunki." My translation.

¹⁰⁸ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 47.

¹⁰⁹ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 431: "Sofern uns nun [...] Qualität und *Materie* als die durchaus wesentlichen und daher nie zu entbehrenden Bestandstücke eines Aktes gelten müssen, würde es passend sein, die Einheit beider, die nur einen Teil des vollen Aktes ausmacht, als das *intentionale Wesen* des Aktes zu bezeichnen." Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 122: "In so far as quality and matter now count for us [...] as the wholly essential and so never to be dispensed with, constituents of an act, it would be suitable to call the union of both, forming one part of the complete act, the act's *intentional essence.*"

been observed by Walter Hopp,¹¹⁰ the “signitive essence” in Husserl is individual. In Blaustein, on the other hand, the “intentional essence” seems to be a general entity that, in *Ideen I*, is supposed to be the object of eidetic investigation.¹¹¹ In Blaustein's opinion, therefore, Husserl's struggle to achieve generality was marked by essentiality, i.e., the general and abstract nature of content. However, it seems that Blaustein deviates from Husserl's thought by making this statement.

According to Blaustein, the subset of the “intentional essence of the act” is the “signitive essence,” i.e., a combination of matter and quality in the case of objectifying acts. Husserl defined the signitive essence as an *in concreto* experience of the meaning of a word. As such, signitive essence implements meaning *in abstracto*, i.e., ideal meaning.¹¹² Blaustein offered a short summary of Husserl's theory of meaning: “[a] name expresses [...] an act, [it] means content (meaning) and denotes an object.”¹¹³ He believed that this theory of meaning referred directly to the conception advanced by Twardowski, for whom meaning was realized *in concreto* in the content of presentations and thus pointed to the object of a given word.¹¹⁴ In Blaustein's opinion, Husserl's conception falls into the important problem of the relationship between the signitive essence and the act itself. He asked what it means

¹¹⁰ Hopp, *Perception and Knowledge*, 31.

¹¹¹ To justify his view, Blaustein quotes the following fragment of Husserl's *Ideen I*: Husserl, *Ideen I*, *Husserliana* 3/1, 70: “Es wird dann evident, dass jedes Erlebnis des Stromes, das der reflektive Blick zu treffen vermag, ein eigenes, intuitiv zu erfassen des Wesen hat, einen ‘Inhalt,’ der sich in seiner Eigenheit für sich betrachten lässt. Es kommt uns darauf an, diesen Eigengehalt der cogitatio in seiner reinen Eigenheit zu erfassen und allgemein zu charakterisieren, also unter Ausschluss von allem, was nicht in der cogitatio nach dem, was sie in sich selbst ist, liegt.” Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideen I*, 69: “It then becomes evident that every mental process belonging to the stream which can be reached by our reflective regard has an *essence of its own* which can be seized upon intuitively, a ‘content’ which allows of being considered *by itself in its ownness*. Our concern is to seize upon and to universally characterize this own content of the cogitatio in its pure ownness by excluding everything which does not lie in the cogitatio with respect to what the cogitatio is in itself.”

¹¹² Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 48–49.

¹¹³ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 49.

¹¹⁴ Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 32: “Solche Wechselvorstellungen sind z.b. die an Stelle des römischen Juvavum gelegene Stadt und: der Geburtsort Mozarts. Die beiden Namen bedeuten etwas Verschiedenes, aber sie nennen beide dasselbe. Da nun, wie wir gesehen habe, die Bedeutung eines Namens mit dem Inhalte der durch ihn bezeichneten Vorstellung zusammenfällt, das durch den Namen Genannte aber der Gegenstand der Vorstellung ist, so lassen sich die Wechselvorstellungen auch definieren als Vorstellungen, in welchen ein verschiedener Inhalt, durch welche aber derselbe Gegenstand vorgestellt ist.” Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 29: “An example of equivalent presentations is: *the city located at the site of the Roman Juvavum* and *the birthplace of Mozart*. These two names have a different meaning, but they both designate the same thing. Now, since the meaning of a name, as we saw, coincides with the content of the presentation designated by the name and since what the name names is the object of the presentation, we can also define equivalent presentations as presentations in which a different content, but through which the same object, is presented.” On Husserl's view of Twardowski's theory of meaning, see Rollinger, *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*, 145–147. On a development of Twardowski's early theory of meaning in the context of judgment, see Betti, *The Road from Vienna to Lvov*, 1–20.

for ideal content to be found in (*einwohnen*) a psychic act. In doing so, he assumed that what is ideal is not necessarily psychic and so cannot be part of an act: "Intentional essence or just the act's matter is then, according to Husserl, a meaning which belongs to the intention of the word. Since intentional essence or matter are psychic and real, this definition raises doubts regarding the ideal character of meanings."¹¹⁵ This intuition provides the basis for one of Blaustein's arguments against Husserl's theory of content.

Husserlowska nauka... [*Husserl's Theory...*] devoted a good deal of attention to the problem of the intuitive fullness (*Fülle*) of acts, which was analyzed by Husserl in the "Sixth Logical Investigation." Blaustein also argued that Husserl's analyses introduced a new concept of content. It is worth mentioning that, in Husserl, the problem of intuitive fullness is related to the fact that even if acts have the same quality and matter, they may still be different: *one and the same thing* can be *presented* now in the imagination, now in perception or in a judgment. Following Husserl,¹¹⁶ he accounted for intuitive fullness as the "fulfillment" of matter, although—as he expressly emphasized—the moment is separate from matter. To explain this, Husserl wrote in *Untersuchungen* about signitive acts and the fulfilling intuition.¹¹⁷ Through intuition, the intention of an act *adequately presents* its object. Accordingly, intuition confers upon acts the status of *relation to features of the objects* presented in these acts. In other words, it is due to intuitive fullness that acts can *adequately* relate to the object, *present* it or, as Husserl wrote, *represent it through* content.¹¹⁸ Blaustein underlined that "[d]ue to its function of presenting the object and its properties in the act, Husserl refers to intuitive fullness as presenting content or a representative."¹¹⁹ The relation between presenting content and the object it presents is that of an *analogy* or *imaging*. Thus understood, content *shows* appearance. In the case of perception, such content is sensations (*Empfindung*),

¹¹⁵ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 50–51: "Istota intencjonalna resp. tylko materia aktu jest więc według Husserla znaczeniem przynależnego do intencji wyrazu. A ponieważ istota intencjonalna resp. materia są czymś psychicznym i rzeczywistym, wówczas definicja ta nasuwa pewne wątpliwości odnośnie do idealnego charakteru znaczeń." My translation.

¹¹⁶ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, *Husserliana* 19, 600–601: "die 'Fülle' wird sich als ein gegenüber der Qualität und Materie neues, in der Weise einer Ergänzung speziell zur Materie gehöriges Moment der intuitiven Akte herausstellen." Trans. Findlay in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 229: "'Fullness' must take its place as a new 'moment' in an intuitive act alongside of its quality and its matter, a moment specially belonging to the matter which it in some manner competes."

¹¹⁷ Cf., e.g., Bernet, *Desiring to Know through Intuition*, 155–156; Byrne, *Husserl's 1901 and 1913 Philosophies of Perceptual Occlusion: Signitive, Empty and Dark Intentions*, 123–139; Byrne, *Husserl's Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions*.

¹¹⁸ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, *Husserliana* 19, 609. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 234–235.

¹¹⁹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 52: "Ze względu na funkcję prezentowania przedmiotu i jego własności w akcie, Husserl nazywa pełnię naoczną treścią prezentującą lub reprezentantem." My translation.

while in the case of fantasies, it is sensory phantasms (*sinnliche Phantasmen*). Blaustein generalized these comments made by Husserl,¹²⁰ claiming that presenting content should be understood as “[...] the totality of sensations belonging to the act as content that intuitively presents the object and its properties.”¹²¹ This is why, when talking about different types of acts, Husserl only suggested different functions of sensations in specific acts: impressions in perception or reproducing sensations in fantasies.

Although Blaustein did not mention this, this interpretation from *Untersuchungen* referred directly to Twardowski's idea that presentations are based on sensations and that their classification is made possible by the fact that sensations behave differently in different *types* of presentations.¹²² In any case, the *analogy* between different types of presenting content (which Blaustein also referred to as *representatives* [*reprezentanci*]) consists in the fact that elements of content have their equivalents in the object, and it is for this very reason that they are intuitive. To conclude, Blaustein reiterated Husserl's¹²³ words that all presentations have a tripartite structure, being comprised of quality, matter, and presenting content. This division is justified by the different functions performed by each element. While the function of matter is identifying (pointing to), presenting content “fulfills” this identification, enabling the act to *adequately* present its object. To explain the relationship between content and objects, Blaustein also referred to Husserl's idea of adumbrations (*Abschattungen*): he claimed that a representative identifies an object as its shades or adumbrations. Obviously, the entire act refers to the intentional object, but individual moments of presenting content refer to the parts and properties of the object.¹²⁴ This idea was also present in Twardowski, for whom an image referred to

¹²⁰ It can be noted that in the “First Logical Investigation” (§ 23), Husserl explicitly claims that the basis for intuitive presentations are complexes of sensations which are lived through. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 79: “Die verstehende Auffassung, in der sich das Bedeuten eines Zeichens vollzieht, ist, insofern eben jedes Auffassen in gewissem Sinne ein Verstehen oder Deuten ist, mit den [...] objektivierenden Auffassungen verwandt, in welchen uns mittels einer erlebten Empfindungskomplexion die anschauliche Vorstellung (Wahrnehmung, Einbildung, Abbildung usw.) eines Gegenstandes (z.B. ‘eines äußeren’ Dinges) erwächst.” Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 213: “The grasp of understanding, in which the meaning of word becomes effective, is, in so far as *any* grasp is in a sense an understanding and an interpretation, akin to the divergently carried out ‘objective interpretations’ in which, by way of an experienced sense-complex, the intuitive presentation, whether percept, imagination, representation etc., of an object, e.g. an external thing, arises.”

¹²¹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 51: “[...] całokształt wrażeń, przynależnych do aktu w charakterze treści intuitywnie prezentujących przedmiot i jego własności.” My translation.

¹²² More on this idea, see Sect. 4.1.2. See also Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 217–240. Partly trans. Lekka-Kowalik in: *Imageries*.

¹²³ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 620–621. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 242. Cf. Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 55.

¹²⁴ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 57.

an entire object with different properties, whilst specific moments of the image referred to these properties.¹²⁵

As I have already observed, Blaustein's analyses presented in his 1928 book came in the form of conceptual analysis. The aim of his question about content was to identify the different *meanings* of the term "content," in particular "intentional content," based on Husserl's writings. According to Blaustein,¹²⁶ there are *six* such meanings: intentional object, act's matter, intentional essence, signitive, ideal meaning, and fulfilled ideal meaning. In turn, Husserl understood the term "act" in two ways: as a dual structure (quality and matter) or as a tripartite structure (quality, matter, and a representative [presenting content]). Although it might seem exhaustive, Blaustein's exposition did not give a full account of the complexity of Husserl's theory. Blaustein was undoubtedly right to attribute the aforementioned meanings of the term "content" to Husserl. However, it is important to observe that, for example, the description of matter as *content* is different from the description of ideal meaning. Treating these meanings as equivalent would create problems when formulating a *holistic* theory of content, something that Blaustein did not fail to attack. Bearing this in mind, we may now proceed with a closer examination of the arguments levelled against Husserl in the Third Part of *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]*.

6.3 Blaustein's Assessment of Husserl¹²⁷

Blaustein's critical reading of Husserl consisted in discussing, one by one, the main theses of his theory of content, as reconstructed in Sec. 6.2. He summarized Husserl's theory of the act and object of presentations with the following five theses: (1) consciousness is the source of psychic lived experiences as a coherent and continuous stream or flow; (2) lived experiences comprise both intentional acts and non-intentional moments, i.e., sensations; (3) intentional acts are apprehensions or interpretations of sensations; (4) differentiation between a sensation as apprehended as the determination of an object and a sensation as the content of an act is unjustified; and finally, (5) differentiating between sensations and an object's properties is necessary.¹²⁸ His critique went through each point and took the form of an elaboration of Husserl's arguments.

¹²⁵ See Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 66–136. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 148–189.

¹²⁶ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 64.

¹²⁷ This section uses material previously published in Płotka, Leopold Blaustein's Descriptive Psychology and Aesthetics in Light of His Criticism of Husserl, 169–172. For the purpose of this book, the text was enlarged and rewritten.

¹²⁸ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 65.

According to Blaustein,¹²⁹ the first claim which defines consciousness in terms of “lived experiences” is invalid. He, of course, acknowledged that this claim is only partly adequate since lived experiences are united as conscious.¹³⁰ However, Husserl's definition falls into a vicious circle since lived experiences are defined as consciousness, but consciousness is defined as (a set of) lived experiences. Immanent perception does not help us to solve this problem since, for Husserl, this notion—following Blaustein¹³¹—is also based on the notion of lived experience: immanent perception enables one to perceive the lived experiences of the very consciousness which performs the act of perception. It should be noted that Blaustein used the term “immanent (or inner) perception” here more in the Brentanian sense than in the Husserlian sense. For him, as for Brentano¹³² and Twardowski,¹³³ immanent perception unfolds or manifests mental phenomena, and this unfolding or manifestation is accompanied by self-awareness that this unfolding or manifestation is taking place. Here, immanent perception is characterized—to employ Brentano's words¹³⁴—by its immediate, infallible self-evidence (*unmittelbare, untrügliche Evidenz*). This means that the object of inner perception is evident and exists as the object of perception. In contrast to the Brentanian tradition (and Blaustein's suggestion), however, Husserl was skeptical about the scope of immanent perception.¹³⁵

¹²⁹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 66.

¹³⁰ Although Blaustein questions Husserl's definition of “consciousness” as “a set of lived experiences,” he does not reject the view that consciousness is a whole comprehended as a continuous flow. Blaustein held this position throughout his entire career. Cf. Blaustein, *Les tâches de la psychologie humaniste*, 443.

¹³¹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 66–67.

¹³² Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 35: “Und zwar ist es vor Allem die innere Wahrnehmung der eigenen psychischen Phänomene, welche für sie eine Quelle wird. Was eine Vorstellung, was ein Urtheil, was Freude und Leid, Begierde und Abneigung, Hoffnung und Furcht, Muth und Verzagen, wan ein Entschluss und eine Absicht des Willens sei, davon würden wir niemals eine Kenntniss gewinnen, wenn nicht die innere Wahrnehmung in den eigenen Phänomenen es uns vorführte.” Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 22: “Above all, however, its source is to be found in the *inner perception* of our own mental phenomena. We would never know what a thought is, or a judgement, pleasure or pain, desires or aversions, hopes or fears, courage or despair, decisions and voluntary intentions if we did not learn what they are through inner perception of our own phenomena.”

¹³³ Twardowski, *Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii*, 8: “Znajomość objawów psychicznych zawdzięczamy tzw. doświadczeniu wewnętrznemu. Wiemy, co się w naszym umyśle w danej chwili dzieje, chociaż zmysły nic nam w tym względzie nie mówią; posiadamy świadomość bezpośrednią o odbywających się w nas zjawiskach duchowych, świadomość, która stanowi właśnie podstawę doświadczenia wewnętrznego.” Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 95. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 44: “Our acquaintance with mental manifestations is due to so-called ‘inner experience.’ We know what is happening in our mind at a given moment, even though the senses tell us nothing in this regard. We possess immediate awareness of the mental phenomena occurring in us, an awareness that constitutes the very basis of inner experience.”

¹³⁴ Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 119. Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 70.

¹³⁵ Aldea, *Husserl's Break from Brentano Reconsidered*, 421–422.

In any case, when discussing the second thesis, Blaustein used the general idea that immanent perception presents its objects as evident. In general terms, he held that Husserl was wrong to include sense data among lived experiences since, for him, sensations are non-intentional moments, which cannot be included in the group of intentional acts. He claimed that Husserl's arguments are not conclusive and that one is able to formulate counterarguments which show the absurd consequences of Husserl's thesis. According to Blaustein,¹³⁶ lived experiences cannot be comprehended as both intentional acts and sensations, since whereas intentional acts are characterized by their reference to the ego (Husserl characterizes them as "*ichlich*"),¹³⁷ the latter are alien to the ego ("*ichfremd*"). In other words, sense data do not belong to the ego; hence, they do not belong to consciousness.¹³⁸ Blaustein even held that Husserl's thesis was unacceptable because there was no agreement among scholars as to whether sensations are indeed evident. He noted that Husserl's inclusion of sensations in lived experiences follows certain *arguments* rather than from evidential descriptions of consciousness.¹³⁹ Sensations are then, as Blaustein put it, *outside* consciousness. To describe the relationship between sensations and acts, he referred to Ingarden's (and Conrad-Martius's) distinction—discussed above in Sect. 6.2.1.1—according to which intentional acts are lived through (*durchlebt*), while sense data or sensations are just experienced (*erlebt*).¹⁴⁰ In Blaustein's opinion, Husserl did not adopt this distinction; moreover, he identified intentional acts with sensations, and for this very reason, he could not exclude sensations from lived experiences.

¹³⁶ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 66.

¹³⁷ Blaustein—and following him, Pokropski—connects this description with Husserl, though it does not appear in either *Untersuchungen* or *Ideen I*. Cf. Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 66, 71; Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 97. Blaustein refers here rather to Husserl's lectures on phenomenological psychology, given in the summer semester of 1925, in which Blaustein participated. Cf. Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, *Husserliana* 9, 130, 136, 140, 168, 210, 212–214, 242. On the juxtaposition of Blaustein with Husserl in this context, see Sect. 5.2.2.

¹³⁸ It is worth noting that the argument—which refers to the distinction between "*ichlich*" and "*ichfremd*" in the context of sense data—was not originally formulated by Blaustein. Blaustein takes it from Ingarden, who formulated the argument as early as 1916 during his exchange with Husserl. See, e.g., Ingarden, *Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl*, 130–131; see also Ingarden's talk on Husserl's eidetic method given on February 21, 1970: Ingarden, *Poznanie ejdetyczne u Husserla a Kantowskie poznanie apriori*.

¹³⁹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 67.

¹⁴⁰ As Ingarden puts it, "[j]edenfalls sind die Empfindungsdaten—und in noch höherem Maße die Ansichten verschiedener Stufen—Inhalte, die den Bewußtseinsakten auf bestimmte Weise gegenüber treten und selbst (in sich) nicht bewußt sind. D.h. ihre Seinweise ist die des Erlebtwerdens und nicht die des Durchlebens. Die Seinweise des Erlebens der Empfindungsdaten dagegen ist die des 'Durchlebens'." Ingarden, *Über die Gefahr einer Petitiō Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie*, 562. See also Conrad-Martius, *Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt*, 429, 439–440.

The second thesis does not hold even if one—following Husserl—were to argue that intentional acts and sensations fall under the single category of “lived experience” because they both exist in subjective time (he referred to German phrases: “*subjectives Strömen*,” which is understood as “*Stromzeit*”). In response, Blaustein stated that the relation between lived experiences and time is questionable: it is not clear whether something is a lived experience because it is in subjective time or whether time is subjective if it comprises lived experiences.¹⁴¹ In brief, it is impossible to define subjective time without lived experiences. As already claimed, Husserl's second thesis (as defined above) is also wrong because of possible counterarguments that expose the absurd consequences of this standpoint. According to Blaustein, Husserl ascribed time to lived experiences on the one hand and space to sense data on the other.¹⁴² However, if lived experiences are psychic phenomena, they cannot include the non-psychic component of space, i.e., physical phenomena. Otherwise, lived experiences would be spatial, but that conclusion would be absurd.¹⁴³ While discussing this argument of Blaustein, Pokropski notices:

One may defend Husserl using his distinction between spatiality understood as extension (*Ausdehnung*) and spreading out (*Ausbreitung*) [...]. Sensations would have only the latter, whereas the former would be used to describe material objects localised in space. This however, according to Blaustein, would still lead to the absurd consequence that psychic phenomena are spatial, even in the most primitive way.¹⁴⁴

Blaustein's point was then that sensations are not parts of lived experiences but also that they are not spatial. To describe the specific status of sensations—non-mental and non-spatial—he later refers to the idea of the phenomenal world.

According to Blaustein, the third thesis is valid but imprecise.¹⁴⁵ Here, intentional acts serve as the interpretation or apprehension of sensations, and in doing so, acts intend the object. Sensations are understood in this context as the presenting content. However, Blaustein argued, one can be directed toward the content itself without aiming at the object, as happens in simple experiences or the perception of color marks. Here, the presenting content is just experienced and not interpreted—as, for instance, in the case of perceiving without consciousness of *what* one is actually perceiving. In the latter example, sensations are just apprehended. If this is the case, simple apprehension can occur without interpretation. As a result, Blaustein proposed limiting Husserl's apprehension (*Auffassung*) to simple experiences, whereas the interpretation (*Deutung*) of sensations only arises in higher-order acts which aim at an object.¹⁴⁶ By interpretation (*Deutung*), Blaustein offered to

¹⁴¹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 69.

¹⁴² Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 69–70.

¹⁴³ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 71.

¹⁴⁴ Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 97. This argument is considered also by Blaustein himself. See Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 70–71.

¹⁴⁵ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 73.

¹⁴⁶ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 74.

understand only such acts which *refer to* or *intend* their object; these acts are held as an interpretation of the presenting content as a set of moments that *analogously* corresponds with the relevant moment (properties) of the intentional object. This redefinition, however, misses Husserl's point, for whom *Deutung* is indeed connected with interpreting sensations that correspond with an object's properties.¹⁴⁷ Given this, Blaustein's argument should be read rather as a postulate of a strict differentiation of both meanings; indeed, Husserl used them both interchangeably.¹⁴⁸ Nonetheless, even if one reads Blaustein in this way, his understanding of interpretation (*Deutung*) as a higher-order act is problematic. I will discuss this issue later in Chap. 7.

Blaustein's critique of the fourth thesis follows from his view of sensations as alien to the ego. For Husserl—at least from Blaustein's viewpoint—differentiating between a sensation as an element of apprehension and a sensation as content is unjustified because one cannot differentiate living-through (*Durchleben*) a sensation and experiencing (*Erleben*) a sensation. For Blaustein, by contrast, sensations are not a part of consciousness; instead, they belong to the phenomenal world.¹⁴⁹ Blaustein developed the latter notion in his discussion of the fifth thesis. Husserl's distinction between sensations and objects is based on the second thesis that sensations are included in lived experiences; if so, objects are intended via sensations. Blaustein's counterargument here is complex. He stated that sensations do not belong to lived experiences but to the world understood as the *phenomenal world*. According to Blaustein, the world is divided into two parts: the phenomenal and the material world.¹⁵⁰ The former is defined as a set of presenting content that is interpreted as a visible part—at a certain moment in time—of the material world, i.e., a set of material things. The phenomenal world, then, is the world of sense-contents, colors, sounds, smells, etc., which are placed in a two-dimensional space. Contents do not remain here in causal relations. One experiences the phenomenal world as complexes of presentational contents which are interpreted as objects and visible phenomenal things (*Sehdinge*), which, in turn, are distinct from material things since, as Blaustein put it, “[p]henomenal objects exist not in the material world but

¹⁴⁷ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 79–80: “Die verstehende Auffassung, in der sich das Bedeuten eines Zeichens vollzieht, ist, insofern eben jedes Auffassen in gewissem Sinne ein Verstehen oder Deuten ist, mit den [...] objektivierenden Auffassungen verwandt, in welchen uns mittels einer erlebten Empfindungskomplexion die anschauliche Vorstellung (Wahrnehmung, Einbildung, Abbildung usw.) eines Gegenstandes (z.B. ‘eines äußeren’ Dinges) erwächst.” Trans. Findlay in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 213: “The grasp of understanding, in which the meaning of word becomes effective, is, in so far as *any* grasp is in a sense an understanding and an interpretation, akin to the divergently carried out ‘objective interpretations’ in which, by way of an experienced sense-complex, the intuitive presentation, whether percept, imagination, representation etc., of an object, e.g. an external thing, arises.”

¹⁴⁸ E.g., Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 81. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 214.

¹⁴⁹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 78.

¹⁵⁰ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 74, 76–77.

in the phenomenal world which presents the material world."¹⁵¹ Sensations for Blaustein are adumbrations of a material object's properties, and simultaneously, they are elements of phenomenal objects which represent material objects.¹⁵² As Pokropski emphasized, "Blaustein does not elaborate the further metaphysical consequences of this claim and restricts his investigations only to the phenomenological and descriptive level."¹⁵³ One can try to defend Blaustein's position by stating that his thesis does not concern *real existence* but rather that he attempted to describe different attitudes toward the world which one adopts. After all, he wrote about changing one's attitude. I will discuss this line of reasoning later. In any case, if sensations belong to the phenomenal world, Husserl's last thesis is false.

As stated above, the fact that Blaustein completed his dissertation under Twardowski is important if one is to understand the Brentanian framework of his reading of Husserl. When considering the relationship between the content and the act of presentation, Twardowski drew an analogy between presentations and painting: the content can be understood as both the picture and the depicted object—the subject matter which is put on the canvas. In his habilitation thesis, Twardowski wrote:

In comparing the act of presenting with painting, the content with the picture and the object with the subject matter which is put on canvas—for example, a landscape—we have also more or less approximated the relationship between the act on the one hand and the content and the object of the presentation on the other. For the painter, the picture is the means by which to depict the landscape; he wants to picture, paint, a real or merely imagined landscape and he does so in painting a picture. He paints a landscape in making, painting, a picture of this landscape. The landscape is the "primary" object of his painting activity; the picture is the "secondary" object. Analogously for presentations. A person presents to himself some object, for example, a horse. In doing so, however, he presents to himself a mental content. The content is the copy of the horse in a sense similar to that in which the picture is the copy of the landscape. In presenting to himself an object, a person presents to himself at the same time a content which is related to this object. The presented object, that is, the object at which the presenting activity, the act of presentation, aims, is the primary object of the presenting. The content through which the object is presented is the secondary object of the presenting activity.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 76. My translation.

¹⁵² Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 77.

¹⁵³ Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 97.

¹⁵⁴ Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 17–18: "Indem wir den Vorstellungssact mit dem Malen, den Inhalt mit dem Bild und den Gegenstand mit dem auf der Leinwand fixierten Sujet, etwa einer Landschaft, verglichen haben, ist auch das Verhältnis, in welchem der Act zum Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung steht, annähernd zum Ausdruck gelangt. Für den Maler ist das Bild ein Mittel, die Landschaft darzustellen, er will eine—wirkliche oder ihm in der Phantasie vorschwebende—Landschaft abbilden, 'malen,' und er thut dies, indem er ein Bild malt. Er malt eine Landschaft, indem er ein Bild dieser Landschaft anfertigt, malt. Die Landschaft ist das 'primäre' Object seiner malenden Thätigkeit, das Bild das 'secundäre' Object. Analog ist es beim Vorstellen. Der Vorstellende stellt irgend einen Gegenstand, z.B. ein Pferd vor. Indem er dies thut, stellt er einen psychischen Inhalt vor. Der Inhalt ist in ähnlichem Sinne das Abbild des Pferdes, in welchem das Bild das Abbild der Landschaft ist. Indem der Vorstellende einen Gegenstand vorstellt, stellt er zugleich einen sich auf diesen Gegenstand beziehenden Inhalt

Blaustein addressed this idea of Twardowski's by claiming that his teacher ultimately rejected a pictorial concept of content: he did not attribute properties of spatiality, e.g., extension, color, etc., to content.¹⁵⁵ What is crucial here is that Blaustein adapted the entire intentional structure of the act and the general idea that the content can be understood *as if* it were a painting,¹⁵⁶ as described by Twardowski. The content, then, is an inseparable part of the psychic phenomenon, by virtue of which the presentation refers to or intends an object, which, in turn, is transcendent in relation to the act of presenting. The content is understood as a *mental entity* or *vehicle* that mediates the mind's directedness toward the object. In Blaustein's view, Husserl's concept of content was ambiguous, and as such, it lacked the clarity of Twardowski's distinctions. Accordingly, a general notion of content includes, following Blaustein, all "lived experiences, i.e., everything that is a real part" of consciousness.¹⁵⁷ According to Blaustein, Husserl operated with three specific notions of "content": (1) intentional content, (2) presenting content, and (3) descriptive content. However, intentional content has—as shown above in Sect. 6.2.2—six different meanings: (1) intentional object, (2) the act's matter, (3) intentional essence, (4) meaning essence, (5) ideal meaning and, finally, (6) fulfilled ideal meaning.¹⁵⁸ Blaustein stated that the most important notion of content is intentional content understood as the act's matter. He disagreed with the view that matter can be identical (*identisch, dieselbe*) in different acts; at most, one can say that the matter is *the same*.¹⁵⁹ After all, the act's matter is a *psychical entity*, and for this reason, it is particular, not something universal, that could be instantiated in different acts. Otherwise, one would have to comprehend matter as an ideal part of the act, but that would mean that ideal matter cannot be a real part of the psychic phenomenon.

Blaustein held that Husserl's notion of presenting content obscured the distinction between matter and quality.¹⁶⁰ Understood as presenting content, sensations are supposedly parts of the act, but they are non-intentional at the same time. To avoid this confusion, Blaustein again suggested excluding the notion of sensations from the domain of acts of consciousness. In this context, Blaustein proposed keeping only the distinction between matter and quality because it is sufficient to define the descriptive content of the act. Finally, Blaustein defined the act as a composite of

vor. Der vorgestellte Gegenstand, d.h. der Gegenstand, auf den sich die vorstellende Thätigkeit, der Vorstellungsact richtet, ist das primäre Object des Vorstellens; der Inhalt, durch welchen der Gegenstand vorgestellt wird, das secundäre Object der vorstellenden Thätigkeit." Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 15–16.

¹⁵⁵ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 14–15.

¹⁵⁶ It is worth noting that Twardowski's idea was widespread in the group of his students. For example, Władysław Witwicki held that the view of the world one has is *as if* a painting. Cf. Witwicki, *Psychologia*, 76.

¹⁵⁷ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 26. My translation.

¹⁵⁸ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 64.

¹⁵⁹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 82.

¹⁶⁰ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 84–85.

quality and matter (i.e., intentional content) that is associated with the presenting content, which in turn is part not of the act but of the phenomenal world and which refers to the intentional object.¹⁶¹ Here, the presenting content seems to serve as a mediating entity that gives the mind a directness toward an object. Nonetheless, the concept of the phenomenal world is, as we will see in the next chapter, problematic and requires elaboration.

To conclude this chapter, the order of analyses from *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]* undoubtedly followed the framework developed by Twardowski, for whom the theory of presentations concerns three elements: act, content, and object. In the first, historical part of his work, Blaustein traced the meaning and context of the theory of content, going back to Bolzano and Brentano. He identified problems related to reducing content to the object and, citing Twardowski's thought, pointed out the need to further investigate the relationship between content and act. According to Blaustein, the theory of content presented in *Untersuchungen* responded to these problems by accounting for content as an inseparable part of an act, namely, the act's matter. Taking such observations as his starting point, in the second reconstructive part of his paper, Blaustein first analyzed how Husserl understood acts and objects, focusing in particular on topics such as consciousness, lived experiences, intentional acts, inner experiences, objects, and the intentional relation. He then considered the problem of content by examining, among other things, the concepts of descriptive and intentional content as well as moments of act's quality and matter. He also asked questions about intuition, the theory of adumbrations and, finally, the account of content as noematic sense. Finally, in the critical part of his book, Blaustein raised a number of terminological doubts, believing that the theses advanced by Husserl were not sufficiently precise. This critical section is important because it provides the basis for Blaustein's original proposals of how content and its relation to the act and the object should be understood. As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, it is precisely these results that make *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]* important for understanding the total body of Blaustein's philosophy, in particular his aesthetics. However, before identifying the themes that resonate with his aesthetic theory, one should first point out certain limitations that stem from the interpretation of *Untersuchungen* presented above. I will discuss these limitations in Chap. 7.

Finally, it is worth stressing that Blaustein developed complex research tools that he applied for methodical descriptions of experiences and psychic phenomena. However, focused on a critique of Husserl's theory of act, content, and the object of presentations, *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]* is mainly an analytical work which examines *concepts* by formulating their definitions and verifying them from an increasingly closer perspective. He also examines the arguments put forward by Husserl, asking about the evidence behind them. His approach is therefore

¹⁶¹ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 90.

metaphilosophical, meaning that it is focused rather on *definitions* and *arguments*. This strategy is understandable in light of the general goal of the dissertation, which is to analyze Husserl's position. It is worth remembering this, especially when noticing the contrast between the discussed book and the other books and articles by Blaustein, in which he studies specific psychic phenomena. Nonetheless, as already noted, following Blaustein's self-description, his 1928 book on Husserl's theory of content is the basis of his "general theory of presentations" (*ogólna nauka o przedstawieniach*).¹⁶² How should one understand this comment? As we will see in Chap. 8, he refers in his aesthetics to the basic idea that the key to understanding aesthetic experiences lies in the way in which the presenting content refers to its object. However, the idea to focus on the presenting content and its functions follows directly from *Husserłowska nauka...* [*Husserl's Theory...*]. Therefore, although the 1928 work seems to contain no object-oriented analysis that studies the concrete structures of consciousness, it can be argued that it contains the basics of his "general theory of presentations."

¹⁶² Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 14.

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Chapter 7

A Reappraisal of Blaustein's Exposition of Husserl's Theory of Content



Blaustein's analyses contained in *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]* took a wide perspective on the problems discussed in the book. This enabled Blaustein to clearly define the value of Husserl's theories compared to the traditions of Bolzano as well as Brentano and Twardowski. However, rather than stopping at the presentation and discussion of the theory of content, Blaustein raises interesting objections to it. As I have stressed in the preceding chapter, these objections resulted in part from his original findings that he later used in other object-oriented and systematic research. In the present chapter, I want to ask to what extent his critique of the theory of content in Husserl may be considered valid. I want to define the elements in Blaustein's interpretation that seem to diverge from Husserl's position. What comes to the fore in this context is the issue of psychologism and the related problem of understanding reduction. I want to address these two problems at the beginning of the chapter. Next, I will try to formulate a phenomenological, i.e., metaphysically neutral, interpretation of the phenomenal world to which Blaustein referred, as he analyzed the theory of content in Husserl. Finally, I will assess the interpretative proposal made by Blaustein, identifying its strong and weak points.

7.1 Blaustein's Misreading of Husserl's Method and the Problem of Psychologism¹

Although Husserl knew of Blaustein's book, he did not respond to Blaustein's critique. Ingarden's short review of Blaustein's book provided us with some clues as to how Husserl might have reacted. For Ingarden, Blaustein confused two Husserlian

¹This section incorporates some materials previously published in Plotka, Leopold Blaustein's Descriptive Psychology and Aesthetics in Light of His Criticism of Husserl, 172–175. The materials are presented here as a revised edition.

theories, one from *Untersuchungen* and one from *Ideen I*.² For this reason, according to Ingarden, Blaustein failed to take Husserl's theory of constitution into account. It is false that Husserl comprehended perceptual sense-data as two-dimensional and that he wanted to include sense-data in consciousness. At the same time, Blaustein went too far in claiming that sense-data are inherent to the world. That the object is constituted means that it is established in correlation with consciousness according to the object's essence. Blaustein, then, failed to recognize the constituted character of the world. He viewed the world as divided into phenomenal and material parts. Ingarden's critique also concerned Blaustein's reading of Husserl's notion of the noema; he showed that Blaustein did not take this element into his consideration of Husserl's theory of content.³ If Ingarden was right—and I think that his core argument effectively addresses the better part of Blaustein's critique—one can conclude that Blaustein's misreading of Husserl's theory of constitution followed from two different but intertwined issues, i.e., from his understanding of Husserl's method and his misinterpretation of immanent content. Both issues concern the question of how phenomenology overcomes the charge of psychologism and ceases to be merely descriptive psychology.

Blaustein was right in defining the phenomenological method as a change of attitude, but he failed to recognize the status of essences. This issue was discussed at length in Chap. 5, so here, I can indicate only a few points. If Blaustein defined essences as general objects and as timeless objectivities, he omitted Husserl's description of the correlative structure of consciousness as directed toward ideal, though unreal, objectivities, which he clearly expressed in his 1925 lectures on psychology that Blaustein attended.⁴ Essences are rather constituted in a dynamic process Husserl called "eidetic variation." One can, of course, comprehend the concept of variation as an elaboration of the concept of eidetic intuition as defined in the "Sixth Logical Investigation,"⁵ but that continuity does not justify the claim that Husserl held a Platonic concept of essences throughout his entire career.⁶ It is just the opposite. Husserl rejected a naïve concept of static essences in favor of a dynamic concept centering on constitution.

A few remarks are necessary here. First, an essence is not a separate object, distinct from the real object it corresponds to; rather, as Husserl put it, the real object is the object of its essence.⁷ Here, essences are given as "invariants" of possible changes, which means that essences are "general" not by virtue of abstraction from real objects, as Blaustein suggested, but rather because essences concern the

²Ingarden, LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN, 315. Reprint in: *Polska fenomenologii przedwojenna*, 220.

³See, e.g., Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 101.

⁴Cf. Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, Husserliana 9, 21–25. Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology*, 14–17.

⁵This thesis was formulated by Tugendhat and repeated by David Woodruff Smith. See Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, 145; Smith, *Husserl*, 329.

⁶Cf., e.g., Kockelmans, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology*, 137–138.

⁷Husserl, *Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation*, Husserliana 41, 33.

possible structures of objects.⁸ This means that an essence is given as a set of possible variations of the phenomenon; that being said, the phenomenologist does not need to present all of the possibilities at issue. What is crucial here is rather the phenomenologist's awareness that *all* possible variations are essential to the given phenomenon. Therefore, essences are constituted by consciousness and given in the *modi* of the "and so on" or "and so on optionally" (*und so weiter*),⁹ i.e., one does not have to present *every* variation. What is presented in eidetic variation is not an abstract and timeless object but a possibility. Thus, eidetic variation yields a general character not due to its object but because of the character of the presentation of the object. It is not the case that essences are transcendent timeless objects; rather, they are constituted in possible repetitions or variations. Finally, the object of variation is given as evident since one is able to constitute it "again and again" (*immer wieder*)¹⁰ in the operation of variation.¹¹ Here, then, essences do not have the metaphysical status of general objects, as Blaustein suggested; they are purely descriptive objects instantiated by eidetic operations. In short, they are constituted and do not simply exist—neither real nor ideal.

Blaustein's misreading of Husserl's method—as focused supposedly on timeless essences—enables one to raise another objection. For him, as stated in Sect. 6.2.2, the notion of "content" which can be found in *Untersuchungen* is ambiguous and contains at least six meanings. Among them, Blaustein criticized the notion of "ideal meaning" which—as intentional content—was thought to be part of lived experience. He questions Husserl's claim that such moments are indeed part of psychic phenomena. One reads:

Adopting an ideal matter next to the psychic [matter], which would be miraculously stuck in the psychic [matter] and thus be an unreal component of real consciousness, would be the only possible justification for accepting the identity of matter in various acts. However, the concept of such ideal, timeless matter, inherent in a whole series of acts, raises considerable doubts. [...] In my opinion, the problem is resolved by the fact that a psychological analysis can fulfill its task completely without adopting such an irreal implication of an ideal matter in a mental and real act.¹²

⁸More on Husserl's eidetics, see Sowa, *The Universal as "What is in Common"*; *Eidetics and Its Methodology*.

⁹Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, *Husserliana* 9, 77. Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology*, 57.

¹⁰Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, *Husserliana* 9, 73. Trans. Scanlon, in: *Phenomenological Psychology*, 55. Husserl, *Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation*, *Husserliana* 41, 101, 110, 224, 258–259, 365.

¹¹See also Welton, *The Other Husserl*, 187.

¹²Blaustein, *Husserłowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 82–83: "Przyjęcie jakiejś idealnej materii obok psychicznej, która by w cudowny sposób tkwiła w psychicznej i tym samym była nierealnym składnikiem realnej świadomości byłoby jedynym możliwym uzasadnieniem przyjęcia identyczności materii w różnych aktach. Ale pojęcie takiej idealnej nieczasowej materii, tkwiącej równocześnie w całym szeregu aktów budzi niemałe wątpliwości. [...] Wedle mnie, kwestię rozstrzyga fakt, że analiza psychologiczna może spełnić swe zadanie zupełnie bez przyjęcia takiej irrealnej implikacji materii idealnej w psychicznym i realnym akcie." My translation.

Blaustein questioned Husserl's idea that an ideal meaning or, more generally, content can be part of any act at all. The problem is that he operates with a naïve notion of the ideal as a timeless object. Again, the ideal meaning is constituted. Moreover, Blaustein confused the descriptive level with the intentional one: he argued that ideal content cannot be part of an act since it is *not* real *ex definitione*. However, Husserl was clear that ideal meaning or content is *not* a real part of an act; rather, it is intentional through and through. In § 16 of the "Fifth Logical Investigation," Husserl clarified that intentional analysis is not concerned with the question of the existence or non-existence of content, whereas analysis of real content examines *real* elements of consciousness.¹³ Blaustein's paradox—the ideal as part of lived experience—can be easily solved: intentional content, thus ideal meaning or content, is *instantiated* by the act, where the content is the act's intentional property.¹⁴ Therefore, ideal meaning is not necessarily conceived as a non-real part of a real act, but rather as a property, i.e., as an abstract part of an act.

It may be argued that Blaustein's misreading of Husserl's method and his doctrine of essences is connected to his view of content and its role in Husserl's *Untersuchungen*. Blaustein explicitly defined the aim of his dissertation as an attempt to "[...] expound Husserl's theory of act, content, and object of presentations, which he presented for the first time in 1900 in his *Logische Untersuchungen*."¹⁵ One can explain this with the fact that the *Untersuchungen* was a popular book in Twardowski's seminars. Nonetheless, Blaustein neglected important changes that Husserl introduced in the second edition of the book from 1913, which resulted in a misinterpretation of phenomenology's relation to psychology. After all, phenomenology is an eidetic discipline that describes essences, primarily the essence of consciousness. However, what is the object of phenomenological description? Blaustein, as stated above, listed three notions of "content": (1) intentional content, (2) presenting content, and (3) descriptive content. However, he did not mention "real" or "phenomenological" content. In the "Fifth Logical Investigation," Husserl defined the real content of experiences as their phenomenological content, and as a result, he defined phenomenology as an eidetic discipline that does not inquire into empirical relations.¹⁶ However, when Husserl defined phenomenology in the first edition of his book as descriptive psychology,¹⁷ he in fact suggested that it was concerned

¹³Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 411–413. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 112–113.

¹⁴This solution was formulated by Hopp. See Hopp, Husserl on Sensation, Perception and Interpretation, 32.

¹⁵Blaustein, *Husserłowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 1: "Zadaniem tej pracy jest wyłuszczenie Husserłowskiej nauki o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawień, którą autor ten wyłożył po raz pierwszy w roku 1900 w swym dziele *Logische Untersuchungen*." My translation.

¹⁶Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 382. Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 97.

¹⁷Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 24, fn. 1. Trans. Findlay in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 176–177.

with real content. To avoid contradiction in this regard, one can argue that phenomenology investigates *intentional* content, which is not a real part of a given act. If this is the case, however, the consequence seems to be that the object is beyond the limits of phenomenological description and is placed in the ideal sphere.¹⁸ What is lacking in the first edition of *Untersuchungen* is a clear breakthrough in comprehending real content as a subject matter of phenomenology. In short, *Untersuchungen* requires phenomenological reduction. Finally, in the second edition (from 1913) of his *Untersuchungen*, Husserl replaced the word “psychic” in the phrase “psychic content” with the word “phenomenological.”¹⁹ This change is not merely a terminological one. It is rather connected with the deeper problem of how to understand phenomenology itself. If phenomenology concerns real content, it is nothing but descriptive psychology. Only from a transcendental point of view can one interpret the act as a noetic-noematic correlation. Husserl stated this explicitly in a footnote in the second edition of *Untersuchungen* that comments on a fragment from the first edition where he claimed that he overcame psychologism by distinguishing real and intentional content. It reads as follows:

In the First Edition I wrote “real *or* phenomenological” for “real.” The word “phenomenological” like the word “descriptive” was used in the First Edition only in connection with *real (reelle)* elements of experience and in the present edition it has so far been used predominately in this sense. This corresponds to one’s natural starting point with the psychological point of view. It became plainer and plainer, however, as I reviewed the completed *Investigations* and pondered on their themes more deeply—particularly from this point onwards—that the description of intentional objectivity as such, as we are conscious of it in the concrete act-experience, represents a distinct descriptive dimension where purely intuitive description may be adequately practiced, a dimension opposed to that of real (*reellen*) act-constituents, but which also deserves to be called “phenomenological.” These methodological extensions lead to important extensions of the field of problems now opening before us and considerable improvements due to a fully conscious separation of descriptive levels.²⁰

¹⁸ For discussion, see Drummond, *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism*, 38.

¹⁹ Cf. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 48, 67, 134, 167, 201–202, 222, 237, 353, 358, 374, 386, 392, 411–412.

²⁰ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 411, fn.: “In der ersten Ausgabe d. W. hieß es ‘reeller oder phänomenologischer Inhalt.’ In der Tat war das Wort ‘phänomenologisch,’ wie auch das Wort ‘deskriptiv,’ in der ersten Ausgabe des Buches ausschließlich in Beziehung auf reelle Erlebnisbestände gemeint und auch in der vorliegenden Ausgabe war es bisher vorwiegend in diesem Sinne gebraucht. Das entspricht dem natürlichen Ausgang von der psychologischen Einstellung. Es wird aber im wiederholten Durchdenken der vollzogenen Untersuchungen und bei tieferer Erwägung der behandelten Sachen—insbesondere aber von hier ab—empfindlich und immer empfindlicher, daß die Beschreibung der intentionalen Gegenständlichkeit als solcher (genommen so, wie sie im konkreten Akterlebnis selbst bewußt ist) eine andere Richtung rein intuitiv und adäquat zu vollziehender Beschreibungen darstellt gegenüber derjenigen der realen Aktbestände und daß auch sie als phänomenologische bezeichnet werden muß. Geht man diesen methodischen Andeutungen nach, so ergeben sich notwendige und wichtige Erweiterungen der hier zum Durchbruch kommenden Problemsphären und durch die vollbewußte Scheidung der deskriptiven Schichten erhebliche Verbesserungen.” Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 354, fn. 24.

Contra Blaustein, then, content is available not only to descriptive psychology but also to purely descriptive phenomenology, which comprehends lived-experiences in terms of noetic-noematic correlation and not as real experiences. Blaustein, it seems, was unable to recognize this aspect of Husserl's phenomenology, as he interpreted intentional content to be real content. By contrast, Husserl's second edition of *Untersuchungen* made it clear that this differentiation is necessary to go beyond the descriptive level of psychology and to do pure phenomenology. To be clear, Blaustein failed to ascribe intentional content to the essence of the act and instead joined it with the real part or component of the act (as correlated with the phenomenal world).

7.2 The Content-Apprehension Schema in Husserl vs. the Phenomenal World in Blaustein

7.2.1 *Blaustein on Husserl's Sensations and Their Function in the Act*

The critical assessment of the theory of content in Husserl presented by Blaustein in *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]* focused on the following question regarding the understanding of sensations in the intentional context: are sensations parts of acts? Arguing against Husserl, Blaustein claimed that sensations are not part of lived experiences and defended his position by introducing the concept of the "phenomenal world." It can even be said that he developed this concept to solve problems stemming from what he believed to be the unjustified practice of including sensations (understood as presenting content) in lived experiences. In his opinion, lived experiences comprise acts, but not sensations, the latter being presenting content (differentiated from descriptive content and intentional content). The situation is different in *Untersuchungen*, where the real or effective (*reell*) content of consciousness includes both acts and "sense-material" (*Empfindungsmaterial*).²¹ According to Husserl, each real part of lived experience is "experienced" (*erlebt*), which means that lived experience is essentially consciousness. In commenting on this proposal, Blaustein said that it is inadequate. If it is true that sensations are not a real part of lived experience, how should they be described? To address this question, Blaustein advanced *three* types of arguments. The *first* refers to the differentiation between what is experienced (*erlebt*) and what is lived through (*durchlebt*),

²¹Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 361–362: "Was es [das erlebende Bewußtsein] in sich findet, was in ihm reell vorhanden ist, das sind die betreffenden Akte des Wahrnehmens, Urteilens usw. mit ihrem wechselnden Empfindungsmaterial, ihrem Auffassungsgehalt, ihren Setzungscharakteren usw." Trans. Findlay in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 84–85: "What is [the experiencing ego] finds in itself, what are present in it as realities, are the relevant acts of perceiving, judging etc., with their variable sense-material, their interpretative content, their assertive characters etc."

which was made popular in phenomenology by Conrad-Martius and developed anew by Ingarden²²; this argument may be spelled out as follows: (1) lived experiences cover only what is lived through; (2) however, one can talk about “living through” in two ways: something is either “experienced” (*erlebt*) or “lived through” in the proper sense of the term (*durchlebt*); (3) the former meaning relates to sensations, the latter to acts, which is why (4) lived experiences *sensu stricto* cover *only* acts.²³ The *second* argument, the role of which is to strengthen the first one, addresses a pair of concepts: “*ichlich*” and “*ichfremd*.” It can be summarized as follows: (1) lived experiences cover only those elements that are characterized by a “specific affiliation” with the ego (*ichlich*); (2) sensations, however, are “alien” to the ego (*ichfremd*). It follows that (3) sensations do not belong to lived experiences.²⁴ The *third* argument concerns immanent perception and can be summarized as follows: (1) lived experiences are given as obvious in immanent perception; (2) however, sensations can be located in the body and thus are objects of external perception as well; therefore, (3) sensations do not belong to lived experiences.²⁵ Again, if sensations are not a real part of lived experience, how should one describe them? Blaustein responded that sensations are part of the phenomenal world. To understand this proposal, it is worth juxtaposing it with Husserl and his idea of the content-apprehension schema.

Husserl used the schema to describe different types of acts, modifying it over the years and even abandoning it, as in the case of imagination.²⁶ In *Untersuchungen*, i.e., the work to which Blaustein referred, the schema was used to describe the status of sensations. The point is that, in lived experience, the same sensations may be apprehended differently. In § 14 of the “Fifth Logical Investigation,” Husserl considered the following example: “[I]et us imagine that certain arabesques or figures have affected us aesthetically and that we then suddenly see that we are dealing with symbols or verbal signs.”²⁷ In this case, the sensations remain the same, but the way they are apprehended changes. The objective reference—to the symbol or to the verbal sign here—constitutes itself on the basis of sensations, that is, in presenting content, which is the carrier of intentionality, strictly speaking. Therefore, the act of apprehending content is founded on sensations. However, there is an important difference. While the act of apprehension cannot be separated from sensations,

²² See Sec. 6.2.1.1.

²³ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 68.

²⁴ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 66.

²⁵ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 71–72.

²⁶ See, e.g., Lohmar, Die Entwicklung des Husserlschen Konstitutionsmodells von Auffassung und Inhalt; Synthesis in Husserl's Phänomenologie. On Husserl's elaboration of the content-apprehension schema in regard to imagination, see Plotka, A Controversy over the Existence of Fictional Objects, 38–45.

²⁷ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 398: “Denken wir uns z. B., es hätten gewisse Figuren oder Arabesken zunächst rein ästhetisch auf uns gewirkt und nun leuchte plötzlich das Verständnis auf, daß es sich um Symbole oder Wortzeichen handeln dürfte.” Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 105.

sensations themselves may well exist without apprehension. This is why, in Husserl's philosophy, apprehension is inseparable from content. However, in a given act, one does not experience sensations but objects. As one reads in *Untersuchungen*:

I see a thing, e.g., this box, but I do not see my sensations. I always see *one and the same box*, however, *it* may be turned and tilted. I have always the *same* "content of consciousness"—if I care to call the perceived object a content of consciousness. But each turn yields a *new* "content of consciousness," if I call experienced contents "contents of consciousness," in a much more appropriate use of words. Very different contents are therefore experienced, though the same object is perceived, the experienced content, generally speaking, is not the perceived object.²⁸

As the text above indicates, the act for Husserl points to a certain object, but this pointing is made possible by sensations which are apprehended in a specific way. The nature of content here is presenting, which is why content does not present itself. In short, it is transparent. Nonetheless, it is the part of lived experiences precisely as content, because sensations are lived through as they are apprehended or interpreted.

As this short exposition shows, Blaustein accepted the main thrust of Husserl's idea that the object is related to through apprehending sensations. However, he did not agree to have sensations included in lived experiences. In Gilicka's reading of this juxtaposition of Blaustein and Husserl, the status of feelings in *Untersuchungen* is non-intentional. Thus, contrary to Blaustein, Husserl indeed accepted—according to Gilicka²⁹—non-intentional elements in his theory. In doing so, she cited the following fragment of § 15 of the "Fifth Logical Investigation":

Every sensory feeling, e.g., the pain of burning oneself or of being burnt, is no doubt after a fashion referred to an object: it is referred, on the one hand, to the ego and its burnt bodily member, on the other hand, to the objects which inflicts the burn. In all these respects there is conformity with other sensations: tactual sensations, e.g., are referred in just this manner to the bodily member which touches and to the external body which is touched. And though this reference is realized in intentional experiences, no one would think of calling the referred sensations intentional. It is rather the case that our sensations are here functioning as presentative contents in perceptual acts or (to use a possibly misleading phrase) that our sensations here receive an objective "interpretation" of "taking-up."³⁰

²⁸Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 396: "Ich sehe ein Ding, z. B. diese Schachtel, ich sehe nicht meine Empfindungen. Ich sehe immerfort diese eine und selbe Schachtel, wie immer sie gedreht und gewendet werden mag. Ich habe dabei immerfort denselben 'Bewußtseinsinhalt'—wenn es mir beliebt, den wahrgenommenen Gegenstand als Bewußtseinsinhalt zu bezeichnen. Ich habe mit jeder Drehung einen neuen Bewußtseinsinhalt, wenn ich, in viel passenderem Sinne, die erlebten Inhalte so bezeichne. Also sehr verschiedene Inhalte werden erlebt, und doch wird derselbe Gegenstand wahrgenommen. Also ist weiter der erlebte Inhalt, allgemein zu reden, nicht selbst der wahrgenommene Gegenstand." Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 105. For an interpretation of this fragment of Husserl's work in the context of Brentano, see Moran, Husserl and Brentano, 301.

²⁹Gilicka, Leopolda Blausteina krytyka fenomenologii, 110.

³⁰Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, Husserliana 19, 406: "In gewisser Weise wird nun freilich jedes sinnliche Gefühl, z.B. der Schmerz des sich Brennens und Gebranntwerdens, auf Gegenständliches bezogen; einerseits auf das Ich, näher auf das gebrannte Leibsglied andererseits

This does not prove that Husserl excluded sensations—as a non-intentional part—from the intentional act. At best, he claimed that sensations are indeed non-intentional, but they still function as presenting content. Admittedly, one might find Gilicka’s criticism misleading and wonder whether her argument holds at all. I believe that Gilicka deviated from Blaustein’s argument. The main line of his argument is based on the thesis that sensations are separate from all lived experiences and not only from intentional acts. The point is that the dispute between Blaustein and Husserl was not so much about the potential *intentionality* of sensations and acts, as about the question of whether sensations are lived experiences at all. Certainly, Blaustein was aware that sensations are not intentional, but his critique—contrary to what Gilicka contended—was not about whether Husserl understood sensations as an intentional or non-intentional element of lived experience but whether he wanted lived experience to comprise *both* intentional acts and non-intentional sensations. The fragment quoted above from *Untersuchungen* says only that sensations are not *intentional* lived experiences, but the fact that they are lived experiences all the same is not challenged. Blaustein’s interpretation becomes problematic—as we will see in the following—rather in the context of his analyses of intuitive fullness (*Fülle*).

As mentioned above, the concept of intuitive fullness (*Fülle*) is supposed to be one of the meanings attributed to the concept of content in Husserl’s philosophy. However, strictly speaking, the concept is discussed in the context of a specific type of act, namely, objectifying acts in which the signitive intention is “fulfilled” by the act that adequately presents its object, i.e., the fulfilling act. Importantly, the model whereby the act is fulfilled through a synthesis of empty intention and intuition—not introduced until the “Sixth Logical Investigation”—is different from the content-apprehension schema which the “Fifth Logical Investigation” primarily uses.³¹ The fundamental difference is that, whereas the former model talks about *two acts* (a signitive act and a fulfilling act), the latter assumes only *one act*—apprehension or interpretation—directed toward something without the act-character, i.e., sensations. This is why Husserl wrote about either the act-act model (“Sixth Logical Investigation”) or the act-content (sensations) model (“Fifth Logical Investigation”). Blaustein ignored that difference and seemed to understand the concept of intuitive fullness as a way to make the content-apprehension schema more specific. Hence, he effectively treated both models as one. Like he argued that sensations are not part of the act in the content-apprehension schema, he upheld that fullness is not part of

auf das brennende Objekt. Aber darin zeigt sich nun wieder die Gleichförmigkeit mit anderen Empfindungen. Genau so werden ja beispielsweise die Berührungsempfindungen auf das berührende Leibesglied und den berührten Fremdkörper bezogen. Obwohl sich diese Beziehung in intentionalen Erlebnissen vollzieht, so wird darum doch niemand daran denken, die Empfindungen selbst als solche Erlebnisse zu bezeichnen. Die Sachlage ist vielmehr die, daß die Empfindungen hier als darstellende Inhalte von Wahrnehmungsakten fungieren oder (wie es nicht ganz unmißverständlich heißt) daß die Empfindungen hier eine gegenständliche ‘Deutung’ oder ‘Auffassung’ erfahren.” Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 109.

³¹ More on this issue, see Lohmar, *Die Entwicklung des Husserlschen Konstitutionsmodells von Auffassung und Inhalt*; Liu, *Prinzipien und Grundlagen der Wahrnehmungsauffassung bei Husserl*.

the act in the case of the intuitive fullness model. However, the analogy does not apply to the two models but simply describes one of them. Blaustein wrote:

Again, I believe that intuitive fullness is not part of the act but something outside of it; however, because of its specific relation to matter, it serves as a representative of the intentional object of this act. Therefore, each presenting act is accompanied by certain sensory content that is apprehended and interpreted by the act. Apprehended and interpreted, sensory content, together with gestalt qualities, creates presenting content of the presenting act that is different from its intentional content (act-matter). The intentional content of the act is its inseparable part, whilst the presenting content accompanies it and belongs to it, but not as its part.³²

This fragment clearly shows that Blaustein in fact equated intentional fullness with sensations, and as a result, he interpreted them both in the context of the content-apprehension model: the act (apprehension) interprets some sensations (intuitive fullness) that, according to him, are separate from the act. This misunderstanding probably stems from the fact that Blaustein failed to see that the theory of intuitive fullness does not relate to presentations as such but only to a specific type of act, i.e., objectifying acts that constitute knowledge about the object. Blaustein overlooked that, in Husserl, fulfilled acts seemed to correspond to Twardowski's image presentations and thus only to a certain type of presentation. However, this is not what ultimately justifies the concept of the phenomenal world.

7.2.2 *Beyond Metaphysical Interpretation*

In line with the argument developed thus far, presenting content (sensations) should be described as follows: (1) presenting content is *experienced* (*erlebt*), and (2) it exists in the form of lived experience separately from the ego (*ichfremd*). (3) It is also given in presentations that are absolutely adequate yet *transcendent* (or, negatively, it is not the object of immanent perception). (4) It operates as a representative of the object, which means that (5) its apprehension refers to the relevant properties of the object. (6) Presenting content points to properties but does not have them. (7) As such, it is not part of act matter (intentional content), but, as Blaustein observed, (8) it "accompanies" the act. Given this account of presenting content (sensations), the following problem becomes clear: if presenting content is neither a real nor effective nor the intentional part of lived experience, and if it is not even part of the object at issue, *how* should one understand its status in the structure of the

³² Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 89–90: "Wystarczy raz jeszcze zaznaczyć, że pełnia naoczna nie jest według mnie częścią aktu, ale czymś poza aktem, co jednak dzięki swemu specyficznemu stosunkowi do materii, funguje jako reprezentant przedmiotu intencjonalnego tego aktu. Każdemu więc aktowi przedstawiania towarzyszą pewne treści zmysłowe ujęte i zinterpretowane przez akt. Ujęte i zinterpretowane treści zmysłowe tworzą wraz z jakościami postaciowymi treść prezentującą aktu przedstawiania, różną od jego treści intencjonalnej (materii aktu). Treść intencjonalna aktu jest jego niesamoistną częścią, treść prezentująca towarzyszy mu, przynależy doń, ale nie jako jego część." My translation.

act–content–object intentional relation? According to Blaustein, to do justice to the above description, one should assume that presenting content belongs to the so-called phenomenal world—already discussed in Sect. 6.3—that is, the world of sensory content located in a two-dimensional space. The world is made of surfaces that combine with one another, change locations, etc. It is apprehended by and interpreted through acts. Owing to acts, the surfaces of this world are interpreted *as* facets of material objects and appear as visual, phenomenal objects (*Sehdinge*).³³

As I have already observed in Chap. 6, Marek Pokropski interpreted this as a theory of two worlds and accused it of problematic metaphysical implications.³⁴ Krzysztof Wieczorek also interpreted the proposal in a metaphysical context, showing that Blaustein’s fundamental intention was to avoid Husserl’s idealistic implications when sensations—and, consequently, the real existence of the world—are reduced to the act of consciousness; contrary to this tendency, it is enough to assume that sensations and appearances are *outside* the subject to justify the existence of transcendent objects.³⁵ Unlike Pokropski and Wieczorek, I think that Blaustein’s proposal may be interpreted while maintaining metaphysical neutrality. He emphasized that the phenomenal world, i.e., a set of presenting content elements, is given in a certain *attitude*. If presenting content is apprehended in the naïve attitude, *what is seen becomes identified with the qualities or features of the object*.³⁶ However, even then, changes in presenting content should not be referred to the object as such: “[a]lthough a colored surface, which I have interpreted as a side of a table, is shrinking and growing, I do not believe that the table is shrinking or growing.”³⁷ On the other hand, if my attitude is exclusively directed toward the phenomenal world, *I apprehend what I see precisely as presenting content*. In the paper entitled “O niektórych nastawieniach na świat nas otaczający” [“On Some Attitudes Toward Our Surrounding World”] that he presented on November 19, 1927, during the 276th meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov, Blaustein identified five different attitudes (with the caveat that the list is not exhaustive): (1) toward an uninterpreted phenomenal world (the world of sensory contents), (2) toward an interpreted phenomenal world (the world of views, appearances), (3) toward the material world (the world of three-dimensional blocks), (4) toward a physical world (the world of atoms, electrons, etc.), and (5) toward the world of things in themselves (totally undefined).³⁸ He added immediately: “[o]ne speaks here about layers of the surrounding world not in an objective, ontological sense, but rather as intentional

³³ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 75–76.

³⁴ Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein’s Critique of Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 97.

³⁵ Wieczorek, Leopolda Blausteina interpretacja świata zjawiskowego, 161.

³⁶ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 76.

³⁷ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 76: “Choć powierzchnia barwna, którą zinterpretowałem jako pewną stronę tablicy, zmniejsza się lub zwiększa, nie sądzę, jakoby tablica się zmniejszała lub zwiększała.” My translation.

³⁸ Blaustein, O niektórych nastawieniach na świat nas otaczający, 192b.

correlates of our possible attitudes toward the world.”³⁹ Hence, talking about attitudes is an attempt to describe how a given layer of the world is *made present*, i.e., *how presenting content appears in experience*. Blaustein's focus was therefore not problematic metaphysical theory, as Pokropski and Wieczorek suggested. Rather, he emphasized that the issue of the existence or nonexistence of objects is not decisive for studies into acts, content, and objects. Paradoxically, the idea of the phenomenal world is phenomenological to the core because it relates to *the way in which sensations appear in consciousness*, which they do *as* colorful surfaces, *as* appearances, etc. Blaustein believed that presenting content (sensations) appears under a specific attitude toward the world. Thus, analyses of attitude and the problem of “how” presenting content is experienced aim to address the question of *how objects* (and not consciousness) *appear in experience*.

This interpretation has an important advantage which becomes clear in the framework of Husserl's theory—in which it is difficult to explain how presenting content or intuitive fullness *fulfills* the empty intention.⁴⁰ If presenting content is part of lived experience (as Husserl suggested), then it is not possible to obtain a clear grasp of what makes such experience “full.” The difference between an “empty” and “fulfilled” lived experience relates to “fullness” itself; however, it is not determined how the transition from the former to the latter takes place. In turn, if presenting content or intuitive fullness is the third element of lived experience, in addition to matter and quality, its status becomes problematic. Husserl rejected this possibility. Blaustein's proposal consisted in noticing a subtle phenomenological difference that Husserl—as it seems—did not describe adequately: indeed, presenting content is not intentional; thus, it is not a real or effective moment of lived experience, but at the same time, it is different from the intentional object. Rather, it should be said that it *accompanies* act-matter and is available in a certain attitude, i.e., an attitude turned toward an uninterpreted phenomenal world. Thus understood, presenting content does not relate to lived experiences but to objects. Therefore, how should one define presenting content described as an element of the phenomenal world? I think that it is *a way in which something appears*. This description takes into account the fact that sensations (as interpreted by Blaustein) are transcendent in relation to lived experience, but if they were not apprehended, they would not present the properties of objects at all. By accounting for this way of appearance or manifestation, one can return to the object, i.e., focus on the interpreted phenomenal world. Phenomenologically speaking, the subject is directed toward the object *through* the ways in which the object is presented in experience.

In the already mentioned paper focused on attitudes toward the world—“O niektórych nastawieniach na świat nas otaczający” [“On Some Attitudes Toward Our Surrounding World”]—Blaustein emphasized that the phenomenal world requires a “non-naïve” and “unnatural” attitude which, as he wrote, can be adopted by “[...] a

³⁹Blaustein, *O niektórych nastawieniach na świat nas otaczający*, 192b: “O warstwach świata nas otaczającego mowa tu nie w sensie obiektywnym, ontologicznym, lecz tylko jako o intencjonalnych korelatach możliwych naszych nastawień na ten świat.” My translation.

⁴⁰On this criticism, see Hopp, *Husserl on Sensation, Perception and Interpretation*, 224–228.

psychologist, a phenomenologist (in the sense of Stumpf), a hyletic (in the sense of Husserl), or an impressionist painter.”⁴¹ This comment is important for defining the theoretical framework of the analyzed concept and its sources. This is important because, in addition to Brentano and Twardowski, another point of reference in the present context seems to be the philosophy of Carl Stumpf.⁴² It is only when analyzing Blaustein’s idea of the phenomenal world and his polemics with Husserl’s theory of content that one can see clear connections. Thus, the very expression “phenomenal world” is to be found already in Stumpf (*Erscheinungswelt*), for whom it referred to the world separate from the so-called psychic functions but, as in Blaustein, including sensations.⁴³ For Stumpf, this world is a set of phenomena by which, it is important to add, he understood the content of sensations (*Inhalte der Sinneempfindungen*).⁴⁴ I think that presenting content in Blaustein may be understood precisely as the content of sensations in the sense of Stumpf. Among other points, this is justified by the fact that Blaustein accounted for sensations as absolutely adequate presentations.⁴⁵ As understood by Blaustein, phenomenology should focus as much on intentional and descriptive content as on presenting content that only “accompanies” lived experience. In other words, the object of phenomenology is phenomena. There are obvious differences between the approaches of Stumpf and Husserl, whether in relation to describing feelings as intentional or in the scope of phenomenological study,⁴⁶ but Blaustein was, as it seems, aware of them.⁴⁷ Failing to reconcile the description of sensations as foreign to the ego (*ichfremd*) with the nature of lived experiences, he suggested, albeit not *expressis verbis*, adopting certain solutions developed by Stumpf for whom phenomena (sensory content) are separate from psychic functions (acts). Let me emphasize that contrary to Pokropski and Wieczorek, this solution does retain metaphysical neutrality and makes it possible to supplement Husserl’s descriptions with the way in which an object appears as an element that cannot be reduced to an act.

⁴¹ Blaustein, O niektórych nastawieniach na świat nas otaczający, 193a: “[...] fenomenolog (w znaczeniu Stumpha) lub hyletyk (w znaczeniu Husserla) oraz malarz impresjonista.” My translation.

⁴² I have suggested this already in Sect. 3.3.1.

⁴³ Stumpf, *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*, 11.

⁴⁴ Stumpf, *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*, 4–5.

⁴⁵ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 54. On this issue, see more in Sec. 5.3.2.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Rollinger, *Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano*, 83–123; Fiset, Stumpf and Husserl on Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology; Fiset, *Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology*.

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 2, fn. 2; Karl Stumpf, 34.

7.3 A Critical Assessment of Blaustein's Reading of Husserl

The theory of content in Husserl's philosophy is complex and, following Hopp,⁴⁸ full of "internal tensions." Bearing this in mind, when assessing Blaustein's doctoral thesis, later published as *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]*, Twardowski appreciated the attempt to offer a holistic account of this theory against the backdrop of how the problem of act is developed in the tradition of Brentano.⁴⁹ He underlined the author's efforts to account for the analyzed theories as clearly as possible, even though the theories themselves are far from expressing their core object—i.e., the description of the act–content–object relation—comprehensively and lucidly. As a result, Twardowski recommended the reviewed thesis for publication and, as we know, helped his student prepare it for printing.⁵⁰ In his review of Blaustein's already published book, Walter Auerbach also appreciates the clarity with which the author advances his theses.⁵¹ Although it would be difficult to agree with Twardowski's and Auerbach's assessments of the indisputable accessibility of the work, we should not ignore its cost.

First, Blaustein all too often simplified Husserl's theories, eventually reducing them to the act–content–object structure developed by Twardowski.⁵² Consequently, he failed to notice nuances that are important from a theoretical perspective, as well as the changes Husserl made in his philosophy. What is striking, if not outright wrong, is the attempt to disparage the modifications that resulted from the critique of the position from *Untersuchungen* and the major reformulation of the phenomenological project in *Ideen I*. Despite the fact that he was aware of those changes, reformulations, and even revolutions (including those in Husserl's unpublished manuscripts⁵³), he ignored glaring differences between the two models of intentionality developed in both works. In Blaustein's opinion, the overall structure of both of these models of intentionality is fundamentally the same, the only differences being in the terminology. Thus, (1) intention (from *Untersuchungen*) is to correspond to the object of the noema (from *Ideen I*), (2) matter to the content of the noema, i.e., noematic sense, (3) intuitive matter to the core of the noema, (4) sensations to hyletic data, and (5) act quality to act "character."⁵⁴ The two projects are also linked by the theory of adumbrations that has gradually developed over the years.

⁴⁸Hopp, Husserl on Sensation, Perception and Interpretation, 235.

⁴⁹Twardowski, *Ocena rozprawy doktorskiej dotyczącej filozofii E. Husserla*, AKT=P-18-7=007r.

⁵⁰In his journals, Twardowski noted that he encouraged Blaustein to publish the dissertation as a separate book. See, e.g., Twardowski, *Dzienniki. Część I: 1915–1927*, 315, 329.

⁵¹Auerbach, Blaustein Leopold, 210. Reprint in: *Polska fenomenologii przedwojenna*, 215–216.

⁵²Blaustein formulates this hypothesis explicitly in the "Introduction" to his book by claiming that in *Ideen I* Husserl adopts the vocabulary used in the theories of act–content–object. See Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 2.

⁵³Just after noticing that Husserl had introduced important changes to his project, Blaustein adds that because these changes are formulated in research manuscripts, they cannot be accounted for in his book. See Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 65.

⁵⁴Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 30, 71–72, fn. 1.

The only difference—of which, by the way, Blaustein was critical—concerns the fact that the noema is the object of an act and at the same time differs from the proper object of an intentional act. However, this reading is problematic. It is important to bear in mind that the theory of intentional content from *Untersuchungen* faced a fundamental difficulty when defining the scope of phenomenological analyses, limiting itself to the strictly immanent boundaries of acts, which, in line with the discussion above in Sect. 7.1, may lead to psychologism; as for objects, the theory treats them as equivalents of content. In turn, the analysis from *Ideen I* addressed both moments—noesis and noema—simultaneously and outlined a framework for transcendental research thanks to reduction. Since such nuances are missing in Blaustein, he cannot recognize the novelty of the investigations carried out in *Ideen I*. One should therefore agree with Pokropski when he said that Blaustein failed to sufficiently develop the concepts of pure consciousness or noema and reduced the position from *Ideen I* to a mere continuation of the project launched in *Untersuchungen*.⁵⁵ One may defend Blaustein against this objection, as Twardowski did, by saying that he was critical of the theory under discussion and, right from the outset, did not aim at simply reconstructing it, which is true even of the “Second Part” of his book, which was explicitly intended to take stock of Husserl's work.⁵⁶ This argument weakens Pokropski's criticism, showing that Blaustein did not set out to merely reconstruct Husserl's position, including its subsequent reformulations and possible revolutions, but rather to propose an adequate theory of content. Adopting this point of view, one may agree with Wieczorek, who claims that Blaustein “[...] does not therefore want to be a faithful orthodox propagator or continuator of Husserl's theory, but an explorer of new problem areas, as well as new applications of those phenomenological methods and terms that will prove acceptable and useful in his own analytical work.”⁵⁷ One should not forget that, in line with Blaustein's own declarations, the theory of content developed in *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]* lays the foundation for his later aesthetic theory. If so, why was his reading of Husserl's philosophy so reductionist?

In light of the analyses carried out thus far, one is justified in suggesting that Blaustein looked at phenomenology from the point of view of the tradition started by Brentano. Recall that in Sect. 5.3.3, I mentioned that in one of his letters to Twardowski, Blaustein calls Husserl a “descendant of Brentano.”⁵⁸ Blaustein outlined the links between Husserl and the Brentanian tradition, confronting it at the same time with Bolzano's ideas. In this context, the idea from *Untersuchungen* to account for the act as a combination of two inseparable parts seemed to be an interesting and quite successful attempt to solve problems by defining the status of content in relation to the act and the act's object. Blaustein showed that Husserl's solution, though basically correct, does not adequately account for the status of presenting content, i.e., sensations. As has been shown above, Blaustein drew on

⁵⁵ Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 101.

⁵⁶ Twardowski, *Ocena rozprawy doktorskiej dotyczącej filozofii E. Husserla*, AKT=P-18-7=009r.

⁵⁷ Wieczorek, *Leopolda Blausteina interpretacja świata zjawiskowego*, 156.

⁵⁸ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 19.12.1927, 097r.

Stumpf's idea of the phenomenal world and his concept of phenomena to better define what Husserl could not cope with (in his opinion). This interpretation seems to have several strengths. Blaustein followed Husserl, showing that there are differences between direction toward an object (act), the intentional content of the act, and the transcendent object (the act's intentional object). However, Blaustein resisted including presenting content (sensations) in the real or effective (*reell*) part of the act, and he thus highlighted the *ways in which objects appear in experience*, a step that is arguably his greatest contribution to the development of Husserl's phenomenology. He expressed this idea in his theory of the phenomenal world, which seems to maintain metaphysical neutrality.

Despite the advantages outlined above, Blaustein's theory posed certain problems that might be attributed to his lack of consistency. It is important to bear in mind that he based his conception of the phenomenal world on the theses advanced by early Husserl and Twardowski,⁵⁹ arguing that sensations are not spatial because this quality applies to things rather than sensations. If sensations were spatial, it would be difficult to maintain the thesis that they are separate from things. To rephrase this concern in the Brentanian language, if sensations were spatial, they would be physical phenomena. However, since they are not spatial, they are not physical phenomena (Brentano); rather, they are lived experiences (Husserl) and are definitely not reducible to things (Blaustein). Nonetheless, neither Husserl nor Blaustein are consistent in this respect. We know that in his later studies, for example, those on the phenomenon of passive syntheses started in the early 1920s, Husserl abandoned this thesis and allowed for the possibility of describing sensations as colorful surfaces, i.e., in spatial terms.⁶⁰ In turn, when Blaustein set out to describe the phenomenal world, he understood it directly as *two-dimensional colorful surfaces* that are apprehended in a given act and that, thanks to this interpretation, relate to the object.⁶¹ Blaustein's description leads to the problem of the ambiguity of the term "spatiality," because—as Blaustein wrote in *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl's Theory...]*—the term may denote a property of material objects as well as sensations that are described as "[...] elements of the two-dimensional, phenomenal world."⁶² If the phenomenal world is indeed two-dimensional *ex*

⁵⁹Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 30. Trans. Grossmann, in: *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, 28.

⁶⁰Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, Husserliana 11, 17: "Die in jedem Jetzt neu auftretende Dingerscheinung, sagen wir, die optische Erscheinung, ist, wenn wir nicht auf den erscheinenden Dinggegenstand achten, sondern auf das optische Erlebnis selbst, ein Komplex so und so sich ausbreitender Flächenmomente, die immanente Daten sind, also in sich selbst so original bewußt wie etwa Rot oder Schwarz." Trans. Steinbock, in: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 54: "When we do not regard the appearing thing-object, but the optical lived-experience itself, the thing-appearance that arises anew in each Now—as we say, the optical appearance—is a complex of surface color moments that are extended in this way or that; these surface color moments are immanent data. and we are thus conscious of them in themselves just as originally as, say, red or black."

⁶¹Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 74–75.

⁶²Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 77. My translation.

definitione, it is attributed to the quality of spatiality. However, Blaustein did not explain the difference between the two meanings of “spatiality.” Is the spatiality of the phenomenal world (a set of sensations) something different from the spatiality of the material world (a set of things)? If that is the case, what is the difference between them? Does the difference lie in the fact that the former is two-dimensional and the latter three-dimensional? Leaving these questions aside, the concept of the spatiality of the phenomenal world raises other doubts. Thus, Blaustein did not show how elements that *are not spatial* (sensations, which are two-dimensional) combine to become *spatial* (the phenomenal world, which is three-dimensional). Do sensations “acquire” this property through their combination? If so, how is that even possible? Blaustein did not provide definitive answers.

Equally important, albeit left unanswered, are questions about sensations that cannot be precisely located, as in the case of an omnipresent sound. *Where* can such sensations be found on the two-dimensional surface of the world? Blaustein's conception here needs to be deepened, if not verified, in the context of embodied sensations. He was aware of the importance of this problem and mentioned the need to reflect upon the relationship between experiences from two- and three-dimensional spaces, the latter being related to the body and constituted in movement.⁶³ What Blaustein did not mention, let alone consider, was an issue that seems to raise serious problems for the suggested model—namely, auto-affective sensations that can be located not so much “on” as “within” the body. If the phenomenal world does appear as a two-dimensional surface, *where* are the sensations that are experienced bodily? Describing the phenomenal world as two-dimensional, Blaustein eventually put emphasis on perceptual experiences, omitting bodily experiences. This is also reflected in his aesthetic theory—as I will show in Chap. 8—where aesthetic experiences are (mostly) reduced to those of perception. Therefore, the inconsistency that I have mentioned (sensations are described as non-spatial while the world is described as spatial) ultimately leads to major problems that seem to undermine the value of Blaustein's proposal. In my opinion, this conception of the phenomenal world can be defended only if it is first interpreted as a phenomenological analysis of *the ways in which things appear*; describing this aspect of experience in spatial terms is misleading and limiting.

⁶³ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 74, fn. 1: “Możliwość stosunku pomiędzy ciałem naszym, jako trójwymiarową bryłą a wrażeniami, spostrzeganymi [...] w dwuwymiarowej przestrzeni wymaga rozpatrzenia. Łączy się to z ogólną kwestią możliwości stosunków przestrzennych między dwu- a trójwymiarową przestrzenią. W związku z tym pozostaje też kwestia, czy ciało nasze ma dla stosunków przestrzennych w dwuwymiarowej przestrzeni, również takie centralne znaczenie, jakie ma dla stosunków przestrzennych w trójwymiarowej przestrzeni.” Trans.: “A possible relationship between our body as a three-dimensional object and sensations which are perceived [...] in a two-dimensional space requires a further consideration. This is connected with a general question of the possibility of spatial relations between two- and three-dimensional space. In this regard, there is also the question of whether our body has a central meaning for spatial relations in two-dimensional space, as it does for spatial relations in three-dimensional space.” My translation.

Other limitations arise with Blaustein's decision to adopt the point of view of Brentano and, more importantly, Twardowski. When Blaustein adopted the thesis that mental phenomena are presentations or are based upon presentations,⁶⁴ all he saw in *Untersuchungen* is a version of this conception. He did not see that Husserl used a theory of act constitution that cannot be reconciled directly with Brentano's thesis, whereby lived experiences are merely a combination of presentations, which, it should be noted, resulted in a revised classification of lived experiences known from the 1874 *Psychologie*.⁶⁵ What is also problematic in this context is accounting for objectifying acts from Husserl's "Sixth Logical Investigation" as simple presentations; doing so, Blaustein ultimately included concepts and sensations (in the sense of Twardowski) in one category and failed to notice that the theory of intuitive fullness did not concern one presentation but rather a synthesis of two acts. In line with Twardowski's findings, signitive intention should be understood rather as a concept (a non-intuitive presentation), while fulfillment should be interpreted as an image (an intuitive presentation). *Mutatis mutandis*, the "Sixth Logical Investigation" talked about different types of presentations. Yet, in Blaustein, signitive intentions and intuitive fullness are *the same* presentation. These are major terminological shifts that do not correspond fully to Husserl's reflections. However, important as they are, I believe that they are superseded by methodological consequences. Blaustein consistently accounts for phenomenology as a variant of descriptive psychology,⁶⁶ which is why he stripped it of all references to what is eidetic (as discussed above in Chap. 5). This is the source of his critique of intentional and signitive essences and, no less importantly, his rejection of the eidetic nature of Husserl's analyses. As already shown above, Blaustein did not want philosophy to address the essences of phenomena but rather their types. Thus, when he eliminated all of the essential elements from the act, he complied with the method of describing psychic phenomena developed by Brentano and Twardowski. The problem with this aversion to eidetic studies is that it prevented him from noticing the complex nature of Husserl's theory of the *eidōs* as an unreal (or irreal) element of a phenomenon that constitutes itself as a correlate of relevant acts of variation. More importantly, without differentiating between what is essential in the act and the act as lived experience, Blaustein failed to see the difference between the phenomenological content and the real content of lived experiences, which leads to secondary psychologism: here, phenomenology is supposed to address instances of lived experiences and their real contents. Paradoxically, when Blaustein followed Twardowski and opposed Brentano's psychologism, pointing to the radical transcendence of the

⁶⁴Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 126: "Wir bestimmten dann die psychischen Phänomene als Vorstellungen und solche Phänomene, die auf Vorstellungen als ihrer Grundlage beruhen; alle übrigen gehören zu den physischen." Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 74: "We then defined mental phenomena as *presentations* or as phenomena which are based upon *presentation*; all the other phenomena being physical phenomena." More on this issue, see Sect. 3.1.1.

⁶⁵See, e.g., Aldea, Husserl's Break from Brentano Reconsidered.

⁶⁶See, e.g., *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 3.

intentional object in relation to the act, he did not identify this thesis as an eidetic principle but rather as a descriptive principle, albeit one that is not strictly universal.

In conclusion, it may be said that—in spite of their novelty and the interesting theses they advanced—the analyses from *Husserlowska nauka...* [*Husserl's Theory...*] are embroiled in a number of difficulties, such as the problem of psychologism. Another problem arises in the context of Husserl's theory of reduction. It would be difficult to defend Blaustein's approach by adopting a metaphysically neutral (i.e., phenomenological *sensu stricto*) interpretation of the phenomenal world. Exploring the reasons behind these difficulties, one may arrive at the surprising conclusion that they result from the very element that makes Blaustein's approach innovative, namely, its grounding in the tradition of Bolzano and, more importantly, Brentano. This conclusion is more general in nature. Blaustein's reference to the tradition of Brentano in his interpretation of Husserl's theory of content served a dual purpose. On the one hand, it had heuristic value, as it made it possible to outline the continuity of reflections on the problem of content in that tradition and thus recognized the importance of the solution from *Untersuchungen* (content as an inseparable part of the act), as well as to develop the final version of this solution (sensations as elements of the phenomenal world) in the spirit of Stumpf's philosophy. I believe that this line of argument eventually led Blaustein to identify the problem of the *ways* in which things appear. On the other hand, it reduced other innovative aspects of Husserl's theory of content (e.g., the complex theory of the noema), narrowed the scope of research to perceptual experience, and did not fully reflect the nuances of his method (e.g., the exclusion of eidetics), all of which ultimately seemed to result in a kind of psychologism. As I will show in the following chapters, both tendencies are continued in Blaustein's aesthetics. The former reverberates in his studies into the different media of artistic expression, including cinema and radio. In my opinion, these studies were enabled by this sensitivity to the different ways in which things appear or different types of artistic creation. As for the latter tendency, it prevented Blaustein from making a sufficiently clear distinction between works of art and aesthetic objects, which exposed him to Ingarden's accusation of psychologism.⁶⁷

⁶⁷Ingarden, *Przedmowa do polskiego wydania*, 15.

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Chapter 8

Aesthetic Experiences and Their Objects



This chapter discusses the basics of Blaustein's aesthetics, which is seemingly one of the main fields of his original philosophical project. Some scholars, e.g., Roman Ingarden,¹ Stanisław Pazura,² Bohdan Dziemidok,³ or, more recently, Wioletta Miskiewicz⁴ and Zofia Rosińska,⁵ have claimed that Blaustein should be regarded first and foremost as an aesthetician. Indeed, aesthetics is not so much the *terminus a quo* of his philosophy but rather its *terminus ad quem*. In this regard, in Chap. 4, it was suggested that Blaustein redefined Kazimierz Twardowski's theory of presentations to address the question of diverse aesthetic experiences. Moreover, Chap. 6 proposed the 1928 book on Husserl as the key to understanding Blaustein's aesthetic theory, since in this book he argued that sensations are the basis of lived experiences, including aesthetic experiences. On the whole, aesthetics denotes a philosophical theory or theories concerning beauty and, for the most part, art. More specifically, it raises questions about, among other things, aesthetic values, taste, the aesthetic object and its relation to artworks, particular experiences that are described as aesthetic, or the attitude employed in such experiences; finally—starting from Immanuel Kant and his legacy—it asks about aesthetic judgment. Blaustein referred to a variety of traditional aesthetic topics,⁶ but all the listed topics were not equally important to him precisely because of the different traditions that inspired him. Whereas the question of aesthetic experience was central in his writings, the problems of aesthetic values or taste were rather marginal. Additionally, the issues of aesthetic objects and the specific attitude are important for understanding his

¹Ingarden, Leopold Blaustein—teoretyk radia i filmu, 87.

²Pazura, Blaustein, Leopold, 90.

³Dziemidok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*, 5.

⁴Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 187.

⁵Rosińska, Leopold Blaustein—Styk psychologii i estetyki, xvii–xviii; Leopold Blaustein's Aesthetics, 200.

⁶For an overview of Blaustein's aesthetics, see Rosińska, The Model of Aesthetic Experience, 74–94.

approach. In turn, the topic of aesthetic judgment is simply absent in his writings. This clear shift in focus from beauty (as in the classic definition of aesthetics) and judgment (as in Kant's philosophy) to an emphasis on *experience* seemingly followed from Blaustein's theoretical background. The list of authors to whom he referred in his aesthetic writings is rich and diverse; in addition to Husserl, Ingarden, and Twardowski, he also mentioned, among others, Karl Bühler,⁷ Max Dessoir,⁸ Moritz Geiger,⁹ Karol Irzykowski,¹⁰ Konrad Lange,¹¹ Zofia Lissa,¹² Alexius

⁷Blaustein referred to Bühler's theory of symbolism of speech and the "field of representation" (*Darstellungsfeld*) which were discussed in Bühler's "Die Symbolik der Sprache," published in *Kant-Studien*. See Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 114–119.

⁸For instance, in the 1938 text, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio-Drama*], one reads about Dessoir to emphasize a unity of aesthetic experience which cannot be held in a momentary sensation. See Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 25. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 164.

⁹Geiger's theory was discussed by Blaustein in his text on a cinema experience (from 1933), e.g., in regard to the idea of "organic aesthetics," or to his idea of "dilettantism" in aesthetic experience; Blaustein understood this theory as "non-psychologicistic," and he referred first of all to Geiger's main work, *Zugänge zur Ästhetik* originally published in 1928. See Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 6, 28, 39. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 93, 111, 120.

¹⁰Irzykowski was a pioneer of studies on cinema and film in Poland. His writings on cinema were published as early as 1913, but his main work, *X Muza. Zagadnienia estetyczne kina* [*The Tenth Muse. The Aesthetic Problems of Cinema*], was published in 1924. On Irzykowski, see Haltof, *Film Theory in Poland Before World War II*, 71–74. Blaustein discussed Irzykowski's theory in his studies on cinema, e.g., in regard to the emphasis put on perception. See Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 35. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 117.

¹¹Blaustein cited Lange's *Wesen der Kunst*, originally published in 1901, to show that music is an important element of a cinema experience and to describe the role of an actor. However, he disagreed with Lange in regard to the thesis that film can be experienced as a simple presentation of nature; by contrast, film was for Blaustein a basis of aesthetic experience. See, e.g., Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 15, 39–40. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 101, 120. He also discussed with Lange in regard to the question whether aesthetic experience can be understood as a form of illusion. See Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 40. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 67.

¹²Blaustein referred to Lissa's *Muzyka a film* [*Music and Film*] (from 1937) in his studies on the experience of listening to radio; he held that Lissa's theses regarding music in film could be adopted in studies on the experience of radio. See Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 31, fn. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 169, fn. 14.

Meinong,¹³ Stanisław Ossowski,¹⁴ Wilhelm Schapp,¹⁵ Emil Utitz,¹⁶ Johannes Volkelt,¹⁷ Mieczysław Wallis-Walfisz,¹⁸ Stefan Witasek,¹⁹ and Tadeusz Witwicki.²⁰ More generally, Blaustein's account of aesthetics was shaped in a critical discussion with different traditions: the Gestaltists (Bühler, Dessoir), German aesthetics (Lange, Utitz, Volkelt), the Graz School (Meinong, Witasek), phenomenology (Geiger, Husserl, Ingarden, Schapp), Polish aesthetics (Irzykowski) and, of course, the Lvov–Warsaw School (Lissa, Ossowski, Twardowski, Wallis-Walfisz, Tadeusz Witwicki).²¹ Admittedly, the contexts are varied, but two traditions seemed to be dominant: his references to the Brentanian tradition and the phenomenological heritage. The Brentanian line in his thought leads—through Twardowski and his students—to the theory of presentations as the basis of aesthetics.²² In turn, the

¹³ On a few occasions, Blaustein discussed the idea that assumptions (*Annahmen*) are un- or necessary elements of aesthetic experiences. I will discuss this issue in detail later on.

¹⁴ Blaustein used, for instance, Ossowski's idea—presented in the 1933 *U podstaw estetyki* [*At the Basis of Aesthetics*—of “living in the moment” (*życie chwili*) or the theory of so-called “aesthetic daltonism.” See Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 3, 28. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 3, 19.

¹⁵ Blaustein referred to Schapp's 1910 *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung* to describe the world given in experience as a colorful set of surfaces; Blaustein used this account to examine the cinema experience. See Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 8. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 94.

¹⁶ Blaustein quoted, e.g., Utitz's thesis that the fact that lights are turned off in the cinema helps the viewer to focus on the film and to his idea that while watching a movie one lives its sensations in a vibrant way. See, e.g., Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 15, 46. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 101, 125.

¹⁷ Blaustein examined Volkelt's theory of empathy (*Einfühlung*), as described in *Das ästhetische Bewußtsein* (from 1920) or his account for aesthetic perception. See, e.g., Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 405; Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 15, 46. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 101, 125, 142.

¹⁸ Blaustein referred, for instance, to Wallis-Walfisz's broad understanding of the aesthetic object. See Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 21. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 105.

¹⁹ Witasek's *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik*, originally published in 1904, was extensively discussed by Blaustein in his 1930 *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*]. Blaustein also engaged with the Meinongian idea, developed by Witasek, that assumptions (*Annahmen*) are necessary elements of aesthetic experiences. See, e.g., Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 40, 45–46. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 67.

²⁰ Blaustein referred to Tadeusz Witwicki while discussing the problem of the “representing function” of aesthetic experiences. See Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 101, fn. 1

²¹ More on the position of Blaustein in the context of Polish aesthetics and the Lvov–Warsaw School, see Dziemidok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*; Horecka, *The Concept of Iconic Sign in the Works of Selected Representatives of the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 254–300; Horecka, *Obiekty semiotyczne w pracach Stanisława Ossowskiego, Tadeusza Witwickiego, Mieczysława Wallisa, Leopolda Blausteina, Izdory Dąbskiej i Janiny Kotarbińskiej*, esp. Chapter 4, 183–214.

²² More on this issue, see Sect. 3.1.1.

phenomenological inspiration that came from Husserl and Ingarden covers the question of the ways of givenness (*Gegebenheitsweisen*) of the aesthetic object. Against this background, the aim of the present chapter is to discuss Blaustein's aesthetics as a descriptive analysis of aesthetic experiences that are correlated with their object or objects. My ultimate task is to present his general model of aesthetic experience. I begin with the question of how Blaustein used descriptive psychology in his aesthetics. Next, I address the problem of understanding aesthetic objects. Before considering whether they are purely intentional or real, I analyze Blaustein's a few exemplary descriptions of aesthetic experiences. Finally, I examine some detailed problems discussed by Blaustein, including the phenomena of perception, attitudes, the body, intersubjectivity, and judgments. In doing so, I attempt to present a model of aesthetic experience in Blaustein's philosophy.

8.1 Remarks on the Use of Descriptive Psychology in Blaustein's Aesthetics

In his philosophy, Blaustein developed aesthetics, as he put it, on the "border with psychology."²³ It seems that this self-description is the key to understanding the basics of his theory of aesthetic experience and its object. Broadly speaking, Blaustein conceived this form of experience through the lens of his general theory of presentations. He comprehended the aesthetic experience as (1) intentional, (2) given in inner perception, and (3) as a whole or as a unity of different mental phenomena. Consequently, it was understood as a flow of complex acts or a combination of different presentations.²⁴ However, it is not just a mere collection or set of presentations; rather, it is a lived experience (*Erlebnis*), i.e., a whole of a higher order. While experiencing, one lives in relevant presentations, which are in turn based on sensations. In the field of aesthetics, sensations are apprehended by the act and thus function as the presenting content which intends its intentional object. Content, however, can present the act's object in different ways, i.e., adequately, *quasi*-adequately, inadequately, or *quasi*-inadequately. This means that aesthetic experience is a combination of intuitive and non-intuitive elements. As a result, the aesthetic object has its unique "ways of givenness," or "ways of manifestation." One can, for instance, see something, think of it, or want it, but what makes these experiences aesthetic is "how" the object is presented. In aesthetics, this implies that while

²³E.g., Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 136. See also subtitles of Blaustein's main books as "Studies on the Border Between Psychology and Aesthetics"; Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne; Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40, 69.

²⁴See Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399; *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 4. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 4, 136. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 235.

perceiving, say, a work of art, one perceives or perceptually presents the perceived object in a specific or unique way.

One of the key features of this type of experience is that it is founded on an adequate (intuitive) presentation, but it is further realized in the form of *quasi-adequate* and *quasi-inadequate* (unintuitive) presentations. According to Chap. 4, Blaustein enlarged Twardowski's taxonomy of presentations by adding so-called imaginative, symbolic, and schematic presentations. Imaginative presentations are *quasi-adequate*, whereas symbolic and schematic presentations are *quasi-inadequate*. A presentation is *quasi-adequate* if it intends an object that is intuitively given, but the intention intends the object not as intuitively given but as distinct from the intuitively given object. As we will see in this chapter, Blaustein calls the former the "closer" or "proper" object, whereas the latter is referred to as "distant" or "improper." In turn, a presentation is *quasi-inadequate* if it intends an object, but the object cannot be intuitively given; thus, it presents an artifact to intend the object. All these types of presentations are important in aesthetic experience and can also be at play in one's everyday experience.

In this regard, in the 1930 *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*], one finds an interesting description of how one experiences his or her mirror image. Blaustein wrote:

Looking in the mirror I can adopt different attitudes. I can intend either objects that are outside me or my body or objects that are as if inside the mirror, in some peculiar world manifesting itself in the mirror in front of me. The first attitude is present when, for example, looking in the mirror I realize that my eyes are red; the other, when I jokingly wag my finger at my lookalike, who reciprocates the gesture. In the latter case, I do not see myself, but some other man, very similar to me, but not identical.²⁵

In this passage, Blaustein indicated two different attitudes which can be adopted by the viewer. Generally, if one looks in a mirror, one experiences something. In brief, this act is intentional. The first form of perception described by Blaustein is an intentional experience which intends its object—the body or the object reflected in the mirror. This form of perception seems to be founded on perceptual images which intend their objects adequately. The mirror image is here an appearance of the viewer standing in the front of the mirror. In this case, all of the elements of the presenting content refer to elements of the presented object; for instance, a blond color manifested on the mirror's surface relates to the viewer's blond hair, whereas green surfaces relate to the viewer's eyes, etc. The second form of perception, however, enables one to apprehend the object in a different way: it does *not* intend the

²⁵ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 15: "Patrząc w lustro, mogę się w dwojaki sposób nastawić. Mogę bowiem intendować bądźto do przedmiotów, znajdujących się poza mną lub do mego ciała, bądźto do przedmiotów, znajdujących się jak gdyby w lustrze, w jakimś swoistym świecie, który mi się w lustrze objawia. Pierwsze nastawienie ma miejsce np. wówczas, gdy, patrząc w lustro, stwierdzam, że mam zaczerwienione oczy, drugie, gdy żartobliwie grozę palcem memu sobowótrowi w lustrze, który mi się pięknie za nadobne odpląca. Nie widzę wówczas siebie w lustrze, ale jakiegoś drugiego człowieka zupełnie do mnie podobnego, lecz nie identycznego ze mną." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 48. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 216.

object adequately. One sees not oneself but a look-alike. The mirror image here becomes a different object than the viewer: it is “distant” from the viewer. By claiming this, Blaustein referred to a more general idea—discussed in Chap. 4 and Chap. 6—that acts intend their objects thanks to presenting content, which in turn functions as the appearance of the intended object. The first case described by Blaustein shows that the mirror image *adequately* presents its object, i.e., the body of the viewer. One may say that the mirror image here *represents* the person looking in the mirror. The second case, in turn, shows that there are elements in the mirror image (e.g., playing a role in front of the mirror) which do not correspond to the object or person presented in the mirror. Accordingly, the mirror image represents *not* the viewer but a character performed by the viewer. According to Blaustein’s theory of presentations, this kind of presentation is called *imaginative*: it is constituted on the basis of what is intuitively given (the mirror image which is actually perceived), but its object is *not* actually given—it is “distant” or “improper” (namely, no one threatens me). It is presented, as Blaustein put it, *quasi-adequately*. In addition, the look-alike is given only in a specific attitude.

Blaustein claimed that this form of perception, which is founded on imaginative presentations, is characteristic of aesthetic experience. He held that such presentations are the “psychic basis” of these experiences.²⁶ As such, they are *non-self-sufficient* (*niesamoistny*) in relation to perceptual images, meaning they are founded on perceptual experience.²⁷ In these experiences, one constitutes a relevant object, i.e., the aesthetic object; the viewer comprehends it as being equipped with aesthetic qualities. The example discussed above shows that aesthetic experiences can concern everyday life and indicate non-artistic objects such as a mirror image or a landscape.²⁸ However, Blaustein focused mainly on art. That said, the theory of presentations, including imaginative, symbolic, and schematic presentations, is used by Blaustein to describe the aesthetic experiences involved in, for instance, contemplating a painting, a sculpture, watching a movie, or observing a theater play. I will discuss these examples later since I first have to develop Blaustein’s theory of the aesthetic object. After all, according to the intentionality thesis, aesthetic experience “has” its unique object. For this reason, descriptive differences in lived experience are correlated with relevant differences in the aesthetic object.

²⁶ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 34. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 62. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 228.

²⁷ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 9. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 75.

²⁸ Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 3. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 3.

8.2 The Object(s) of Aesthetic Experience

8.2.1 *Blaustein on Psychic Representations*

Blaustein held that different types of aesthetic experiences are *intentional*. Thus, they indicate relevant objects, and they can also indicate either artistic or non-artistic objects. The former group encompasses works of art, such as paintings, sculptures, theater plays or films. The latter group encompasses objects which are not artworks, such as landscapes, natural events, actions, a bird's song, technical tools, or a beautiful dress.²⁹ Therefore, one can aesthetically experience, for instance, a painting exhibited in an art gallery or a beautiful view of mountains during a walk. However, the object intended in the aesthetic experience, whether artistic or non-artistic, is not the only object involved here. Blaustein held that there are different types of objects involved in this form of experience. In general terms, he wrote about (1) *reproducing* (*odtwarzający*), (2) *imaginative* (*imaginatywny*), and (3) *reproduced* (*odtworzony*) objects. Group (1) includes objects such as paint on canvas, a piece of marble, phantoms displayed on the cinema screen, actors on the stage, outlines of lands on a map, and black shapes printed in a book. Group (2) includes objects such as persons in a painting, figures represented in marble, characters seen on the cinema screen, and characters performed by actors on the stage. Group (3) includes objects such as persons represented “in” a painting, someone who is represented by a sculpture, events presented in a movie, fictional or real persons described by the author of a theater play, real lands presented on a map, characters described in a novel, etc. While group (1) includes real objects, group (3) includes both real and non-real objects (e.g., fictional characters and historical figures). Blaustein explained:

Regarding the reproduced objects indicated by our intention when looking at portraits, photographs, film magazines, science films, etc., an explanation is unnecessary. They are, of course, people, things portrayed, photographed, etc. These objects are now or used to be objects that actually exist—elements of the real spatiotemporal world that surrounds us. It would be entirely wrong to suppose, however, that this is characteristic of or at least common to all reproduced objects. I can also focus on the reproduced object with my thoughts when I see a picture of a knight's castle that has never existed but was painted by an artist solely out of fantasy.³⁰

²⁹Blaustein refers in this context to Wallis-Walfisz and his broad understanding of the aesthetic object. See Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 21. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 105. See also Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 4–5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 4,

³⁰Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 14: “O ile chodzi o przedmioty odtworzone, do których zmierza nasza intencja przy oglądaniu portretów, fotografii, tygodników filmowych, filmów naukowych itp. jakiegokolwiek wyjaśnienia są zbędne. Są nimi oczywiście osoby, rzeczy portretowane, fotografowane itd. Przedmioty te bowiem są obecnie lub były ongiś przedmiotami rzeczywistości istniejącymi, elementami otaczającego nas przestrzenno-czasowego świata realnego. Przymuszenie jednak, iż jest to cechą charakterystyczną lub conajmniej wspólną wszystkich przedmiotów odtworzonych, byłoby zgoła mylne. Do przedmiotu bowiem odtworzonego mogę zmierzać myślą również wówczas, gdy oglądam obraz przedstawiający zamek rycerski, który nig-

The objects included in group (2) have a different status compared to the objects in groups (1) and (3): they are *quasi-real* objects. *Quasi-real* objects have features *as if* they were real, but they are not elements of the real spatiotemporal world.³¹ They form a distinct world which Blaustein called the “imaginative world,” which refers to a combination of imaginative objects; the “imaginative world” thus defined is inherent to the world of an artwork. In this context, he used the phrases “world of an artwork” and “imaginative world of art” interchangeably.³²

In general, Blaustein stated that the objects included in groups (2) and (3) are *intentional objects* of their *basic images* (*wyobrażenia podkładowe*) (Twardowski’s term).³³ Thus, *imaginative* and *reproduced* objects are given only on the basis of *reproducing* objects. In turn, reproducing objects can be either *static* or *dynamic*; the former encompasses such objects as buildings, mountains, paintings, or sculptures, whereas the latter encompasses such things as someone’s body while dancing, a piece of music, a film, or a radio drama.³⁴ Although static objects are given momentarily, they can require complex observation to comprehend their aesthetic qualities. In any case, static and dynamic artworks are given to the subject of aesthetic experiences, who adopts a relevant attitude. I will discuss the question of attitude later in Sect. 8.5.1. Now, let us turn to the relation between (1), (2), and (3), which is described by Blaustein as the relation of *representation*.

The concept of “representation” was widely discussed in Lvov by, for instance, Ingarden, Twardowski, and Tadeusz Witwicki (son of Władysław Witwicki,³⁵ who analyzed the function of representation);³⁶ however, even if Blaustein referred, for

dzie i nigdy nie istniał, namalowany przez artystę wyłącznie z fantazji.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 10. My translation.

³¹ More on the ambiguity of this description, see Horecka, *The Concept of Iconic Sign in the Works of Selected Representatives of the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 289; Horecka, *Obiekty semiotyczne w pracach Stanisława Ossowskiego, Tadeusza Witwickiego, Mieczysława Wallisa, Leopolda Blausteina, Izdyory Dąmbskiej i Janiny Kotarbińskiej*, 189–190.

³² Blaustein, *O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki*, 243–249. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 128–135.

³³ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 9. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 75.

³⁴ Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 5; *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 400. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 4, 136–137.

³⁵ On Władysław Witwicki’s contribution to the discussion on the method of psychology and phenomenology in the group of Twardowski’s students, see Płotka, *From Psychology to Phenomenology (and Back Again)*, 10–14.

³⁶ In a talk given on November 13, 1926, at the 265th meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov, Tadeusz Witwicki analyzed the notion of “psychic representation” as a spontaneous apprehension of the represented object without apprehending the representing object as such. See Witwicki, *O funkcji reprezentującej przedmiotów ogólnych i niektórych szczegółowych*, 67a. Later Witwicki enlarged and summarized his theory in a book, published in 1935, entitled *O reprezentacji, czyli o stosunku obrazu do przedmiotu odtworzonego* [*On Representation, so on the Relation of the Image to the Reproduced Object*]. See Witwicki, *O reprezentacji, czyli o stosunku obrazu do przedmiotu odtworzonego*. On Blaustein’s polemics with Witwicki, see Blaustein’s reviews of Witwicki’s book published in 1934/35 in *Polskie Archiwum Psychologii* and *Kwartalnik*

instance, to Tadeusz Witwicki,³⁷ he reformulated Witwicki's ideas to incorporate them into the framework Blaustein was developing; in this vein, he used the notion of representation to address, for instance, the question of actors *representing* characters in a theater play. This, however, is not crucial here. The theory formulated in Blaustein's *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]* and *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations]* addresses aesthetic phenomena such as watching a theater play, reading a map, seeing a painting, or reading a book. In all these phenomena, different presentations are involved which function on their own as the basis of *psychic representations*. However, one may ask, what is the object intended by these presentations? Blaustein claimed that, here and in similar cases, aesthetic objects are *indirectly* intended via presentations (as their basis), i.e., they are *represented*.

In his books, Blaustein referred to the phenomenon of contemplating a woodcut by Hans Holbein the Younger, known as "The Abbot" (c. 1538) from the "Dance of Death" series: one sees or perceptually presents a skeleton, but the skeleton is not the proper object of the artwork since the skeleton *symbolically presents* its own death.³⁸ Put differently, shapes and colors are apprehended by the act in which the skeleton is intuitively given; nonetheless, death is non-intuitively experienced *due to* what is intuitively experienced. For Blaustein, the relation between the skeleton (a symbol) and death (the object indicated by the symbol or the symbolized object) is a relation of *symbolic representation*. Of course, the example of "The Abbot" is only one of the cases discussed in the book that exemplifies a symbolic representation. Blaustein's *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations]* contains a systematic account of the theory of so-called psychic representations. To be precise, a psychic representation is different from a logical representation, which occurs as a semiotic relation between the sign and its object. Blaustein was clear that the relation between the presenting content and the intended object is a relation of *presentation*, rather than *representation*. For him, the term "representation" is *terminus technicus*, which denotes a relation between two objects, whereas "presentation" denotes a relation between content and its object.³⁹ Blaustein discussed different examples of this relation: (1) the actor on stage in a theater play *represents* a character performed by him, (2) the globe *represents* the Earth, (3) the skeleton in "The Abbot" *represents* death, and (4) the word "God" *represents* God. These examples show four types of objects: (1) an imaginative object that *represents* the imagined object, (2) a schema that *represents* the schematized object, (3) a symbol that *represents* the symbolized object, and (4) a sign that

Psychologiczny. See Blaustein, Tadeusz Witwicki; Blaustein, Tadeusz Witwicki: O reprezentacji, czyli o stosunku obrazu do przedmiotu odtworzonego.

³⁷E.g., Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 101, fn. 1.

³⁸Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 2. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 70.

³⁹Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 10, fn. 1. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 75–76, fn. 5.

represents the indicated object.⁴⁰ All of these examples show that the object is actually Janus-faced or divided into two objects, labeled by Blaustein as *closer* (*bliższy*) or *proper* (*właściwy*), and *distant* (*dalszy*) or *improper* (*niewłaściwy*).⁴¹ Therefore, strictly speaking, one *presents* what is intuitively given, i.e., the reproducing object that is the “closer” or “proper” object of the intentional experience; however, the object *represents* another object that is the “distant” or “improper” object of the intentional experience. The object is *closer* or *proper* (e.g., an actor, a globe, a skeleton, or a word) since it serves as a representation of the *distant* or *improper* object (e.g., a fictional character, Earth, death, or meaning). For this reason, as Blaustein wrote:

In all of the examples given, however, two things should be distinguished—a skeleton and death, the globe and Earth, [...], etc. Similarly, the skeleton must be distinguished from the representation of death and the globe from the representation of Earth, etc. Since, as we have seen, we represent death or Earth with the help of a skeleton or a globe—apparently, the representation of death or Earth is based on the representation of the skeleton or the globe.⁴²

For Blaustein, then, the relation of representation occurs between two objects; however, from the point of view of the subject, representation is possible due to corresponding acts. These acts are named *psychic representations*.⁴³ Some presentations function as the basis for psychic representations; this means that their function consists in representing for someone the represented object *via* the representing object. Therefore, the phrase “*A* represents [...] *B* for *X*, if *X* presents [...] him or herself *B* due to *A*” should be read in Blaustein’s works as “*X* presents to himself or herself *B* using *A* in such a way that *A* is given (mostly intuitively) to *X* [...] and that *X* comprehends *B* through the presenting content of *A*.”⁴⁴ In short, the fact that one object is represented by another is realized in a psychic act in which both objects are presented.

The relation of representation always has a basis or foundation. In this regard, Blaustein used the technical term “*tertium comperationis*,” which refers to the

⁴⁰For a summary, see Blaustein, O przedmiotach przedstawień symbolicznych i schematycznych.

⁴¹Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 26–28.

⁴²Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 3: “W wszelkich jednak podanych przykładach odróżnić należy dwie rzeczy—kościotrupa od śmierci, globus od kuli ziemskiej [...] itd. Podobnie odróżnić należy przedstawienie kościotrupa od przedstawienia śmierci i przedstawienie globusu od przedstawienia kuli ziemskiej itd. A skoro, jak widzieliśmy, przedstawiamy sobie śmierć czy też kulę ziemską przy pomocy kościotrupa *resp.* globus—widocznie przedstawienie śmierci lub kuli ziemskiej oparte jest na przedstawieniu kościotrupa *resp.* globusu.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 71. My translation.

⁴³See also Blaustein, O rodzajach reprezentacji psychologicznej.

⁴⁴Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 101–102: “*A* reprezentuje [...] dla *X*—*B*, jeśli *X* uobecnia (przedstawia) sobie *B* przy pomocy *A*. [...] *X* uobecnia sobie *B* przy pomocy *A* w ten sposób, iż *A* jest *X* (zazwyczaj naocznie) dane (przez *X* przedstawione) oraz, iż *X* ujmuje *B* poprzez treść prezentującą *A*.” My translation.

feature of the representing object that conditions its relation to the represented object.⁴⁵ Next, he stated that this foundation of the relation can be either *natural* or *conventional*. The foundation of the representation is *natural* if there is a similarity (in terms of appearance) between two related objects.⁴⁶ More precisely, the representation is *natural* if the representing object has features which can be intuitively given and which constitute a similarity to the represented object.⁴⁷ Blaustein offered to also use a technical term, “image” (*obraz*), in this context, but in the broad sense of the term.⁴⁸ Aleksandra Horecka explains that the natural representation between reproducing and imaginative or reproduced objects consists in the fact that “[...] the appearance of the reproducing object becomes for the subject the appearance of the imaginative or reproduced object.”⁴⁹ If this does not occur, i.e., if the reproducing object is not an image of the reproduced object, the foundation is *conventional*. In other words, if there is no natural correlation between two objects, there has to be a convention or a rule which binds these objects.

On this basis, Blaustein formulates *four* definitions of the different types of relations of psychic representations (i.e., the relation for a subject, *X*) between two objects, *A* and *B*:

- (1) “*A* imaginatively represents *B* for *X* if *X* grasps the content that presents *A* as an appearance of *B*; i.e., if *B* is intuitively given through the presenting content of *A*.”⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 10. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 76.

⁴⁶ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 103.

⁴⁷ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 104–105.


⁴⁸ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 107, fn. 1: “Przedmiot odtwarzający można ze względu na jego podobieństwo z przedmiotem reprezentowanym nazwać również ‘obrazem’ tego przedmiotu, przyczem oczywiście wyraz ‘obraz’ użyty jest w znaczeniu obszerniejszym, niż to się zazwyczaj dzieje, obejmuje bowiem obok obrazów na ekranie, w lustrze, obrazów malowanych itp. również rzeźby, modele, mapy, rysunki schematyczne itd.” English trans.: “Due to its similarity with the reproduced object, the object that reproduces can also be called an ‘image’ of that object, since, of course, the word ‘image’ is used in a broader sense than is usually the case, as it includes, apart from images on the screen, in a mirror, painted images, etc. also sculptures, models, maps, schematic drawings etc.” My translation.

⁴⁹ Horecka, *Obiekty semiotyczne w pracach Stanisława Ossowskiego, Tadeusza Witwickiego, Mieczysława Wallisa, Leopolda Blausteina, Izdory Dąmbskiej i Janiny Kotarbińskiej*, 197: “[...] wygląd przedmiotu odtwarzającego stał się dla podmiotu wyglądem przedmiotu imaginatywnego lub odtworzonego.” My translation. See also Horecka, *The Concept of Iconic Sign in the Works of Selected Representatives of the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 290–291.

⁵⁰ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 106: “*A* reprezentuje imaginatywnie *B* dla *X*, jeśli *X* ujmuje treść prezentującą *A* jako wygląd *B*, czyli jeśli *B* dane jest naocznie poprzez treść prezentującą *A*.” My translation.

- (2) “A schematically represents *B* for *X* if *A* naturally represents (reproduces intuitively) *B* for *X*, *A* is intuitively given and *B* is not, i.e., if *A* reproduces *B* intuitively for *X* and the presenting content of *A* is not included as the appearance of *B*.”⁵¹
- (3) “A symbolically represents *B* for *X*, if *X* presents *B* through *A* with the help of some foundations of representation, among which there are none that would be intuitively given and that would constitute a relation of similarity.”⁵²
- (4) “A signitively represents *B* for *X*, if *A* represents *B* for *X* and there is no foundation for representation.”⁵³

In conclusion, Blaustein stated that whereas imaginative and schematic representations are *natural*, symbolic and signitive representations are *conventional*. Neither conventional types of representation indicate intuition as its basis. For this reason, they require a certain rule or—as Blaustein put it⁵⁴—a directive as a feature which connects the reproducing object to the reproduced object. Overall, Blaustein formulated his theory of psychic representation in the following schema⁵⁵ (Schema 8.1):



Schema 8.1 Blaustein’s classification of representations in *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations]

To date, a representation in a strict sense is a two-term relation between objects, but it is experienced in corresponding (psychic) presentations: (1) imaginative, (2) schematic, (3) symbolic, and (4) signitive. In all these presentations, one constitutes closer or proper objects: (1) the imaginative object, (2) the schematizing object (or, in short, a schema), (3) the symbolizing object (or, in short, a symbol), and (4) the signifying object (or, in short, a sign). Through closer or proper objects (intuitively

⁵¹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 107: “A reprezentuje [...] schematycznie *B* dla *X*, jeśli *A* reprezentuje naturalnie (odtwarza naocznie) *B* dla *X*, *A* jest naocznie dane, *B* zaś nie, czyli jeśli *A* odtwarza naocznie *B* dla *X*, a treść prezentująca *A* nie jest ujęta jako wygląd *B*.” My translation.

⁵² Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 108: “A reprezentuje symbolicznie *B* dla *X*, jeśli *X* uobecnia sobie *B* przy pomocy *A* ze względu na jakieś fundamenty reprezentacji, wśród których brak takich, które byłyby naocznie spełnione i konstytuowały stosunek podobieństwa.” My translation.

⁵³ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 108: “A reprezentuje zaś sygnitywnie *B* dla *X*, jeśli *A* reprezentuje *B* dla *X*, a brak wszelkich fundamentów reprezentacji.” My translation.

⁵⁴ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 113.

⁵⁵ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 109.

or non-intuitively given), one constitutes distant or improper objects: (1) the imagined object, (2) the schematized object, (3) the symbolized object, and (4) the signified object. From a descriptive-psychological point of view, what connects closer objects to distant ones are psychic representations *lived through* the subject of the experience. In more general terms, objects of such experiences can be understood (as mentioned in Sect. 4.1.5) as products (*wytwory*) in Twardowski's sense—more precisely, as products of relevant psychophysiological actions or acts. Blaustein formulated this description while commenting on the objects of schematic and symbolic presentations.⁵⁶ Thus, these objects are psychophysical products which are produced by psychophysiological acts, i.e., corresponding psychic representations. Thus-defined schemas and symbols arise in certain acts, but they do (or at least can) exist independently of these acts. For instance, if one sees Hans Holbein the Younger's "The Abbot," one comprehends the skeleton as a symbol of death due to the psychophysiological act of perceiving; however, the product of this act, if constituted, can become either a non-durable or durable product: the former could be a verbal statement that the skeleton symbolizes death; the latter could be a written note that Holbein used as a symbol of death. If this is the case, the objects of such presentations are constituted due to the features or properties ascribed to distant or improper objects relating to the features or properties lived through while experiencing closer or proper objects.

8.2.2 *Blaustein's Analysis of Husserl's Account of Dürer's "Knight, Death and the Devil"*

The theory of psychic representations provided Blaustein with a conceptual framework for the systematic description of different aesthetic experiences. After all, if an aesthetic experience, like any experience, is a presentation or a combination of presentations, one can describe how, say, a symbol or a schema is constituted. According to Blaustein's theory, the phenomenon of reading a novel, for instance, can be described as living through signitive presentations which have found meaning due to the words or printed shapes one sees. Blaustein was perfectly aware that perceptual presentations ground or found whole complexes of presentations. Therefore, he was able to argue that, on the basis of reading a novel, one constitutes not only meaning but also symbols. This descriptive strategy functioned well in Blaustein's analysis of Husserl's interpretation (formulated in *Ideen I*) of Albrecht Dürer's engraving "Knight, Death and the Devil" (1513).

In § 111 of *Ideen I*, Husserl discussed the question of different modes of presentation. He contrasted perception with fantasy: while the former grasps its object as "what exists," the latter "neutralizes" the existential claim. Perception is an example of an act in which the object is given as something "existing"; here, the object is a

⁵⁶Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 70.

correlate of the “positing” consciousness. In contrast to perception, fantasy does not “posit” anything; rather, it constitutes an object which is grasped in the neutrality modification of a “positioning” presentation. However, so-called pure fantasy *cannot* be identified with a neutrality modification. To explain this difference, Husserl distinguished between a *mere fantasy* (*bloße Phantasie*) and the *neutrality modification* that is exemplified in a *neutralized memory* (*neutralisierte Erinnerung*).⁵⁷ Here, a mere fantasy is a universal reflection which grasps experiences as such. In turn, a neutrality modification is a property of some conscious acts, e.g., memory and negation. In the context of a neutrality modification, Husserl stated that “[w]e can persuade ourselves by an example that the *neutrality modification of normal perception*, positing in unmodified certainty, is the *neutral picture–Object–consciousness* which we find as component in normally considering the perceptually presentive depicted world.”⁵⁸ Against this background, he also referred to Dürer’s “Knight, Death and the Devil.” Husserl wrote:

In the first place, let us distinguish the normal perceiving, the correlate of which is the *physical thing*, “engraved print,” this print in the portfolio. In the second place, we distinguish the perceptive consciousness in which, within the black, colorless lines, there appear to us the figures of the “knight on his horse,” “death,” and the “devil.” We do not advert to these in aesthetic contemplation as Objects; we rather advert to the realities presented “in the picture”—more precisely stated, to the “*depicted*” realities, to the flesh and blood knight, etc. The consciousness of the “picture” (the small, grey figures in which, by virtue of founded noeses something else is “depictively presented” by similarity) which mediates and makes possible the depicting, is now an example for the neutrality modification of perception. This *depicting picture–Object* is present to us *neither as existing nor as not existing*, nor in any other *positional modality*; or, rather, there is consciousness of it as existing, but as quasi-existing in the neutrality modification of being.⁵⁹

The quoted fragment of *Ideen I* has to be read with context. From early on, when writing about acts of imagination, Husserl struggled to distinguish the internal form of pure imagination or mere fantasy from perceptually founded imagination, which is prototypically at work, e.g., with non-mental, physical pictures. In the quoted

⁵⁷ Husserl, *Ideen I*, Husserliana 3/1, 251. Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideas I*, 261.

⁵⁸ Husserl, *Ideen I*, Husserliana 3/1, 251–252: “Wir können uns zum Beispiel davon überzeugen, daß die Neutralitätsmodifikation der normalen, in unmodifizierter Gewißheit setzenden Wahrnehmung das neutrale Bildobjektbewußtsein ist, das wir im normalen Betrachten einer perzeptiv dargestellten abbildlichen Welt als Komponente finden.” Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideas I*, 261.

⁵⁹ Husserl, *Ideen I*, Husserliana 3/1, 252: “Wir unterscheiden hier fürs Erste die normale Wahrnehmung, deren Korrelat das Ding ‘Kupferstichblatt’ ist, dieses Blatt in der Mappe. Fürs Zweite das perzeptive Bewußtsein, in dem uns in den schwarzen Linien farblose Figürchen ‘Ritter auf dem Pferde,’ ‘Tod’ und ‘Teufel’ erscheinen. Diesen sind wir in der ästhetischen Betrachtung nicht als Objekten zugewendet; zugewendet sind wir den ‘im Bilde’ dargestellten, genauer, den ‘abgebildeten’ Realitäten, dem Ritter aus Fleisch und Blut usw. Das die Abbildung vermittelnde und ermöglichende Bewußtsein von dem ‘Bilde’ (den kleinen grauen Figürchen, in denen sich vermöge der fundierten Noesen ein anderes durch Ähnlichkeit ‘abbildlich darstellt’) ist nun ein Beispiel für die Neutralitätsmodifikation der Wahrnehmung. Dieses abbildende Bildobjekt steht weder als seiend, noch als nichtseiend, noch in irgendeiner sonstigen Setzungsmodalität vor uns; oder vielmehr, es ist bewußt als seiend, aber als gleichsam-seiend in der Neutralitätsmodifikation des Seins.” Trans. Kersten, in: *Ideas I*, 261–262.

fragment, as in his early phenomenology of imagination, Husserl considered non-mental objects the basis for imagined objects. He basically distinguished three elements of the structure of image consciousness,⁶⁰ writing in his manuscripts:

[...] what stands over against the depicted subject is twofold: 1) The image as physical thing, as this painted and framed canvas, as this imprinted paper and so on. In this sense we say that the *image* is warped, torn or hangs on the wall, etc. 2) The image as the *image object* appearing in such and such a way through its determinate coloration and form. By the image object we do not mean the depicted object, the *image subject*, but the precise analogue of the *phantasy image*; namely, the appearing object that is the representant for the *image subject*.⁶¹

Thus, Husserl distinguished between (1) the image as the *physical thing*, e.g., the painted and framed canvas, (2) the *image object*, i.e., the image which appears through a certain constellation of colors and forms, and (3) the *image subject*, i.e., the object which is depicted. If one looks at the physical image, however, one experiences a “conflict” (Husserl’s term) or a significant difference between the apprehended image as an image object and the physical thing. The physical thing is a set of colors and shapes, but what one sees is *not* colors; rather, it is a child depicted *in* the image. In Blaustein’s language, colors are closer or proper objects, whereas a child is a distant or improper object *represented* by colors. For Husserl, what one experiences is in fact *nothing*. Therefore, although “[t]he surroundings are *real* surroundings, the paper, too, is something actually present,” the image object “conflicts with what is actually present. It is therefore merely an ‘image’; however much it appears, it is *a nothing* [*ein Nichts*].”⁶² To explain how the apprehension of the depicted object is possible, Husserl referred to the content–apprehension schema and claimed that due to a certain, i.e., imaginative, apprehension of contents, the image object is meaningful; i.e., it is indeed given, even if one experiences it as truly nothing.

In Blaustein’s view, Husserl was too hasty in claiming that Dürer’s copperplate represents, among other things, death since the decomposed body represents death only symbolically and not directly; nonetheless, symbolic presentation occurs *on*

⁶⁰ See Jansen, *On the Development of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology of Imagination and its Use for Interdisciplinary Research*, 123; Plotka, *A Controversy over the Existence of Fictional Objects*, 33–54.

⁶¹ Husserl, *Phantasie, Bildbewußtsein, Erinnerung*, *Husserliana* 23, 18–19: “Der abgebildeten Sache steht nämlich ein Doppeltes gegenüber: 1) Das Bild als physisches Ding, als diese bemalte und eingerahmte Leinwand, als dieses bedruckte Papier usw. In diesem Sinn sagen wir, das Bild ist verbogen, zerrissen, oder das Bild hängt an der Wand usw. 2) Das Bild als das durch die bestimmte Farben- und Formgebung so und so erscheinende Bildobjekt. Darunter verstehen wir nicht das abgebildete Objekt, das Bildsujet, sondern das genaue Analogon des Phantasiebildes, nämlich das erscheinende Objekt, das für das Bildsujet Repräsentant ist.” Trans. Brough, in: *Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory (1898–1925)*, 20.

⁶² Husserl, *Phantasie, Bildbewußtsein, Erinnerung*, *Husserliana* 23, 46: “Die Umgebung ist wirkliche Umgebung, auch das Papier ist wirkliche Gegenwart; das Bild erscheint, aber es streitet mit der wirklichen Gegenwart, es ist also bloss ‘Bild,’ es ist, wie sehr es erscheint, ein Nichts.” Trans. Brough, in: *Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory (1898–1925)*, 50.

the basis (Blaustein speaks of “psychological foundation” or “basis” in this regard) of perceptual and imaginative presentations.⁶³ According to Blaustein, the particular experience described by Husserl in the context of Dürer’s “Knight, Death and the Devil” goes as follows: (1) one directly *experiences* sense data, which (2) is *apprehended* in perception as a shape. Nonetheless, (3) one sees not the shape (the closer or proper object) but *through* the shape one sees other objects, i.e., the decomposed body (a distant or improper object), possibly because imaginative presentations produce the improper object of intention. Finally, (4) one realizes that the decomposed body (the closer or proper object, or a symbol) *symbolically represents* death (the distant or improper object, or a symbolized object), and this is possible because of symbolic presentations. Levels (3) and (4) are connected to different presentations: whereas (3) concerns the imaginative presentation, and (4) is connected to the symbolic presentation as its foundation or basis. Here, (3) is founded on intuitively given elements (shapes and colors), and for this reason, it is an example of a *natural* psychic representation. In turn, (4) is founded on non-intuitively given elements (a convention or a cultural rule), and for this reason, it is an example of a *conventional* psychic representation.

Given Blaustein’s assessment of Husserl’s interpretation of the phenomenon of contemplating “Knight, Death and the Devil,” he drew a parallel between depicting picture-objects (*abbildende Bildobjekt*) and visual or phenomenal objects (*Sehdinge*), i.e., objects which can function as representations. However, Blaustein disagreed that these objects should be comprehended as imaginative objects, as defined in his theory of psychic representation.⁶⁴ The reason for this was that what constitutes the entire sense of aesthetic experience here is a different type of presentation than the imaginative one, namely, symbolic presentation. Paradoxically, however, Blaustein’s conclusion seems to correspond with Husserl’s criticism of the “image–theory” of immanent objects that was formulated by Husserl in his *Logische Untersuchungen*,⁶⁵ to which Blaustein referred in *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*⁶⁶ [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*] but not in *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*]. Husserl was clear that resemblance between two objects is possible not because one is an image or an appearance of the other but only because a subjective act—in Blaustein’s words, a certain

⁶³ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 23–24, fn. 3. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 54–55, fn. 20. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 221–222, fn. 23.

⁶⁴ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 23, fn. 3. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 54, fn. 20. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 221–222, fn. 23.

⁶⁵ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, *Husserliana* 19, 436: “Erst durch die Fähigkeit eines vorstellenden Ich, sich des Ähnlichen als Bildrepräsentanten für ein Ähnliches zu bedienen, bloß das eine anschaulich gegenwärtig zu haben und statt seiner doch das andere zu meinen, wird das Bild überhaupt zum Bilde.” Trans. Findlay, in: *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 125: “Only a presenting ego’s power to use a similar as an image-representative of a similar—the first similar had intuitively, while the second similar is nonetheless *meant* in its place—makes the image *be* an image.”

⁶⁶ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 107–108, fn. 1.

presentation—establishes or comprehends a representation or a correlation of both objects. Overall, Blaustein's theory of psychic representations enlarges the perspective discussed by Husserl, at least in *Ideen I*.

8.3 Analysis of Blaustein's Descriptions of Aesthetic Experiences

As already noted in Sect. 8.1, Blaustein used his general theory of presentations, especially imaginative, symbolic, or schematic presentations, when describing aesthetic experiences such as (1) contemplating a painting, (2) seeing a sculpture, (3) watching a movie, or (4) observing a theater play. I will analyze these descriptions in the present section by also taking into account the results of Sect. 8.2, namely, Blaustein's view on the aesthetic object or objects constituted in these kinds of experiences. As we will see in what follows, Blaustein's descriptive terms are efficient tools for drawing detailed nuances, as they add the kinds of subtleties that make his observations philosophically fruitful. However, his approach led to another theoretical problem regarding the ontological status of the aesthetic object, but this will be discussed later.

(1) Therefore, at the beginning of his *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*], Blaustein considered an example of contemplating Hans von Marées' painting "Die Lebensalter (Orangenbild)" (1877/87). He described the painting in the following way:

Against the background of a group of trees, we see a number of naked figures. To the far left, there is a pond or a lake; to the right, one sees a hill. A boy is sitting on the ground. Nearby, an old man sitting on a tree trunk is trying to pick up a piece of fruit that must have fallen from the tree. Behind the child is a pensive young man in a semi-walking posture. Right next to him is a female figure following him closely. Behind the old man, a mature man is looking seriously at the fruits of the tree; he is holding [fruits] in his upturned hands. If we abstract from the female figure watching the young man, none of the persons accepts the existence of the others; each behaves as if they were alone in the grove.⁶⁷

The basis of the aesthetic experience is perceptual presentations which adequately present their objects, i.e., color figures, marks, and shapes painted "on" canvas. In the strict sense, one intuitively sees only objects that are presented in perceptual images. Blaustein's point is that the "naked figures," "the pond," "the hill," "the

⁶⁷ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 5: "Na tle grupy drzew widzimy szereg nagich postaci. W głębi na lewo znajduje się staw lub jezioro, na prawo wznosi się pagórek. Na ziemi siedzi dziecko płci męskiej. Obok starzec, siedzący na pniu drzewa, wyciąga dłonie za owocem, który zapewne spadł z drzewa. Za dzieckiem znajduje się zamyślony młodzieniec w nawpół kroczącej postawie. Tuż przy nim stoi śledząca go uważnie postać kobieca. Za starcem dojrzały mężczyzna obserwuje z powagą owoce na drzewie, które trzyma w wzniesionych ku górze dłoniach. Jeśli abstrahujemy od postaci niewieściej, obserwującej młodzieńca, żadna z osób nie przyjmuje do wiadomości istnienia innych, każda zachowuje się tak, jak gdyby była sama w gaju." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 72. My translation.

male child," etc. are not presented adequately: due to imaginative presentation, they are presented as objects "in" the painting. What is presented imaginatively, then, are objects "in" the painting. In other words, a group of colors, figures, marks, and shapes (which are given intuitively) are apprehended by the viewer as intending non-intuitive objects, i.e., "naked figures," etc. For Blaustein, this means that in addition to perceptual presentations, imaginative presentations are also at play here. As a result, constellations of colors, marks, and shapes become, for the viewer, the appearance of the figures "in" the painting. Therefore, there is a natural representation between both objects. Nonetheless, the structure of the aesthetic experience is incomplete without noting that imaginative objects refer to reproduced objects, i.e., fictional characters. Therefore, Blaustein's description mirrors the three-part structure of (a) reproducing objects (paint on canvas), (b) imaginative objects (presented "in" the painting), and (c) reproduced objects (characters represented by the objects "in" the painting).

To contemplate the painting, however, one must consider its symbolic meaning, which is announced by the title of the artwork. To do this, the phenomenon just described becomes a "psychic foundation" or "basis" for symbolic representation. Only by referring to the symbolic aspect of the painting does one see that the child *symbolizes* childhood age, which is free of any worries, the young man *symbolizes* mature age, which is full of strength, and the old man *symbolizes* a reflective summary of one's life. Simply put, the painting contains symbolizing objects (or symbols), i.e., a child, a young man, and an old man, which function to represent symbolized objects, i.e., a carefree childhood, the strength of mature age, or a reflective summary of someone's life. Overall, the lived experience here encompasses perceptual, imaginative, and symbolic presentations which build a whole lived experience as an aesthetic experience. Of course, every presentation has "its" object, which in the discussed example means that (at least) *three* objects are indicated: (a) a perceptual presentation indicates canvas and painted marks "on" it; (b) an imaginative presentation indicates the imaginative object "in" the painting; and (c) a symbolic presentation indicates a symbolized object "beyond" or "outside" the painting. Even if the symbol is accessible on the basis of the imaginative presentation, its distant or improper object is non-intuitive and thus abstract. For Blaustein, the described aesthetic experience is constituted in the form of overlapping presentations and objects.

(2) Blaustein also described the phenomenon of contemplating a sculpture. In his *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*, as well as in *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations]*, he noted that sculptures are unique objects which represent real figures. Of course, sculptures are made of different materials, e.g., bronze, wood, or marble. For instance, if one sees a marble statue of a young man walking, one strictly speaking *sees* marble composed in a certain way. Therefore, the perceptual presentations adequately present only this closer or proper object of the intention. However, one *also* sees a young man "in" the marble. This young man is distinct from what is intuitively given; it is the improper object of the intention. Blaustein would say that

the young man is presented in the relevant imaginative presentation and as such is constituted in the relevant aesthetic experience as the imaginative object. The difference between both objects (closer and distant) is clear. After all, it is inadequate to hold that the person in the sculpture is going in a direction which can be placed in the same world that surrounds the sculpture or statue.⁶⁸ Rather, the young man is going in a direction inherent to the world represented by the artwork. Blaustein was clear that one does not see marble here; one sees the young man or the character *represented* by the marble. He added that the plinth serves to emphasize that even if the marble is part of the same surrounding world as the world of the viewer, the figure *represented* in the marble is not part of the same world. The young man is part of the imaginative world that is represented by the statue. It is important to note that the young man is constituted as the imaginative object in the relevant imaginative presentation, which in turn establishes a natural representation between the reproducing object (marble) and the imaginative object (the young man “in” the marble). Here, the marble becomes for the viewer the appearance of the young man. Of course, the young man represents an object, which is either real (say, a real living person) or fictional (say, Achilles). All of these elements build a whole aesthetic experience.

In this vein, in *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*], Blaustein considered two other examples of sculptures: Constantin Meunier's “The Smith” (1886) and Auguste Rodin's “The Thinker” (1880).⁶⁹ These examples are important because they do not refer to concrete characters. He held that while looking at the former, one feels that the figure does not present an individual but rather a *typical* representative of smithing. In turn, the latter represents a *typical* thinker. How is this possible? For Blaustein, in both cases, one is directed toward typical rather than individual features. Of course, the characters represented by both sculptures are individuals, and as such, they are constituted as imaginative objects (as discussed above), but they have *typical* features. Blaustein stated that imaginative intuition becomes a psychic foundation or basis for another presentation, namely, schematic presentation. In Blaustein's view, both of the discussed sculptures *represent* schematic meanings, i.e., schematized objects that are inherent to objects that represent typical features (e.g., the efforts of physical work, greatness of thought). In general, the schematizing object (or schema) is a representation of the schematized object (“typical” features). Both examples show that the three types of presentations (perceptual, imaginative, and schematic) build a whole aesthetic experience.

(3) In the 1933 book, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*], Blaustein descriptively analyzed the lived experiences of a cinemagoer. Of course, he was aware that a movie can be viewed as a non-aesthetic object, as in the case of a documentary. Contrary to this, he mainly

⁶⁸ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 19. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 51. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 218.

⁶⁹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 44–45.

analyzed, as he put it, “aesthetically valuable” movies which arouse “strong aesthetic feelings.”⁷⁰ He held that while watching a movie in the cinema, one sees groups of colors, lights, and marks on the cinema screen that are generally understood as *phantoms*,⁷¹ which are adequately presented in perceptual presentations. The phantoms, however, are apprehended as objects “on” the screen. Together with voices, the phantoms indicate objects which are inherent to the world represented “in” the movie. Here, phantoms and voices represent objects “in” the movie, since one apprehends reproducing objects (phantoms) as appearances of imaginative objects. The latter objects are distinct from the perceived colors, lights, and marks. For Blaustein, these objects are indicated in imaginative presentations, and as such, they are called imaginative objects, which are grouped in and ascribed to the world represented in the movie. Here, again, Blaustein used the idea of the imaginative world to refer to what is “on” the cinema screen.⁷² Phantoms and voices are reproducing objects, whereas the imaginative world is a set of reproduced objects, and as such, it is constituted on the basis of imaginative objects. In turn, the world represented in the movie binds perceptual, reproduced, and non-intuitive images. After all, the cinemagoer sees whole sequences of action, but these have gaps. For example, one sees a character driving a car in the movie, yet before that, there was no scene in which she got into the car. This shows that fantasy plays an important role by filling such gaps in the work. This analysis can be carried out in the case of symbolic or schematic presentations, which may be founded on imaginative ones. Despite this, once again, Blaustein accounted for the aesthetic experience as a combination of presentations which intend their objects.⁷³

(4) In *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*, Blaustein considered another example from the field of theater. More precisely, he analyzed an exemplary experience of watching Shaw’s *Caesar and Cleopatra*.⁷⁴ During play, what one directly or perceptually experiences is something that is happening on stage. One sees someone talking to another person, moving in a certain direction, etc. These objects are adequately presented in perceptual presentations. However, when Caesar is talking with Cleopatra, one sees not meaningless events but, say, actors’ performances; here, the different roles are constituted not as objects which surround us in our everyday life. Strictly speaking, they are not real. One can touch

⁷⁰Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 48. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 126–127.

⁷¹Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 6–7. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 94.

⁷²Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 14. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 100.

⁷³I will analyze Blaustein’s view on the experience of cinema in Chap. 9. For an overview, see Rosińska, *The Model of Aesthetic Experience*, 88–91.

⁷⁴Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 15. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 48. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 216.

an actor, but one cannot touch Caesar or Cleopatra. Blaustein described such objects as *quasi*-real or imaginative. In this example, the imaginative object (e.g., Caesar) is constituted in the imaginative presentation and is given at once as intuitive (the real movements and words happening on stage) and non-intuitive (Caesar meeting Cleopatra). Whereas the former is the closer or proper object of the perceptual intention, the latter is the distant or improper object of the imaginative intention. The difference arises at the descriptive-psychological level: the intuitive object has properties that are truly ascribed to it by the act (e.g., being a man or woman, having blond or dark hair), and the non-intuitive object has properties ascribed in the *modus "quasi."* From a subjective viewpoint, Blaustein compared this experience with illusion; however, what differentiates the imaginative experience from the illusory experience is the lack of a belief that the object exists at all (in the case of an illusion, according to Blaustein, one has to believe that the illusory object is there). In addition to the perceptual object and the imaginary object, there is also Caesar who lived as a historical figure in ancient times. In this context, Blaustein referred to his three-part division of objects. Therefore, what is intuitively or perceptually given is only the reproducing object (events occurring on stage; an object or objects which have "truly" ascribed properties); this is the basis of a *quasi*-adequate presentation, i.e., a presentation which intends the imaginative object, which is non-intuitively given (actor apprehended as Caesar; object or objects which have *quasi*-ascribed properties). However, both refer to the reproduced object, either the real or the fictional one (Caesar as a historical person or, say, Pegasus; these objects can be situated "somewhere" and "sometime" in the real or fictional world).

With this in mind, Blaustein noted an important nuance: perceptual acts found imaginative acts but only inasmuch as the presenting content in perceptual acts presents its reproducing objects adequately; the contents of imaginative acts cannot adequately represent the imaginative object.⁷⁵ If one sees the actor playing Caesar, the presenting content of this act refers adequately to the person *as* the person, but can we then say it represents the actor *as* Caesar either adequately or inadequately? As Blaustein put it, presenting content only *quasi*-adequately presents the object in imaginative presentations. The difference seems to be clear: the reproducing object is present in the same surrounding world as the viewer, namely, in the theater; the imaginative object is present in the world inherent to the work of art, such as Cleopatra's Egypt. The reproduced object is not real, but it used to be real in the past. For example, Caesar's conversation with Cleopatra is performed on stage not in a theater but in front of the Sphinx in Egypt, as Shaw wrote in his play. To explain how imaginative objects are given, Blaustein wrote of *quasi*-real objects.⁷⁶ For him, imaginative intuition is the act that creates *quasi*-real objects if the subject adopts an

⁷⁵Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 14–15. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 10–11.

⁷⁶Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 23–24. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 54–55.

imaginative attitude. Blaustein characterized the object as being *quasi*-spatial and *quasi*-temporal.⁷⁷ In other words, what a viewer is looking at is simultaneously the stage in the surrounding world and the *quasi*-world, which Blaustein also calls the imaginative world. While being directed toward the imaginative world, one “forgets” about the real world; for Blaustein, this means that the imaginative presentation and the reference to the reproduced object are possible because the aesthetic experience does not contain the belief that the object of this presentation exists. In other words, the aesthetic experience distances one from the real world and enables one to “see” (only *quasi*-adequately) the non-real (imaginative) world. If so, the aesthetic experience distances one from one’s “natural” life; it enables one to “take a rest” from everyday life.⁷⁸

On the basis of different descriptions of aesthetic experiences, Blaustein introduces a threefold function of perception: (1) *perceiving* sensations, (2) *presenting* imaginative objects due to *quasi*-intuitive presentations, and (3) *intending* signitive objects. In “Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise” [“The Imaginative Artwork and Its Way of Manifestation”], Blaustein bound these three functions of perception with different aspects of the constituted object and consequently with different types of art. He wrote:

In the *receptive* aesthetic experience, there are three modes of the givenness of objects. Natural phenomena, products of the arts, architecture, “non-object-like” plastic and most musical works are *perceived* and aesthetically enjoyed due to this type of perception. Paintings, sculptures, stage plays, films, radio plays, etc., are presented *imaginatively*. Literary works of art, on the other hand, are objects of *signitive* perception.⁷⁹

The same division can be found in the 1937 article, “Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym” [“The Role of Perception in the Aesthetic Experience”].⁸⁰ The function of perceptual presentations consists in apprehending the properties of the representing object. For instance, one sees the actual movements of an actor on stage. This form of perception provides adequate presentations of the so-called closer or proper object. The function of the imaginative presentations that are given in imaginative perception consists in ascribing new properties to the represented object. Blaustein held that psychic representation (as described above in Sect. 8.2.1) plays

⁷⁷ Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 13. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 10. See also Rosińska, *Blaustein. Koncepcja odbioru mediów*, 70–71.

⁷⁸ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 46. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 125.

⁷⁹ Blaustein, *Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise*, 245: “Im *rezeptiven* ästhetischen Erleben gibt es drei Arten der Gegebenheitsweise der Gegenstände. Naturerscheinungen, Produkte des Kunstgewerbes, der Architektur, der ‘gegenstandslosen’ Plastik und die meisten Musikwerke werden *wahrgenommen* und auf Grund dieser Art der Perzeption ästhetisch genossen. Die Kunstwerke der Malerei und der Plastik, das aufgeführte Bühnenschauspiel, der Film, das Radio-Hörspiel usw. sind *imaginativ* vorgestellt. Die literarischen Kunstwerke sind dagegen Gegenstand *signitiver* Perzeption.” My translation.

⁸⁰ Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 400. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 137. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 236.

a crucial role here. This form of perception provides *quasi*-adequate presentations of the distant or improper object. The object constituted in this form of perception is *quasi*-given, which means there is intuitive content which is apprehended and serves to ascribe properties not given in perceptual perception. Thus, a *new* object is constituted. Finally, the function of signitive presentations, which are constituted in signitive perception, consists in ascribing new properties to the represented object. Here, the new object is given non-intuitively; however, if perception is intuitive in general, is it at all appropriate to speak of signitive perception?

Blaustein considered this problem explicitly in the 1931 book, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*], in which he accepted the hypothesis that aesthetic experiences can be founded on the basis of not only intuitive images but also non-intuitive presentations, e.g., schematic and symbolic presentations. In the aforementioned book, he considered the example (already discussed above) of the phenomenon of contemplating "The Abbot" from the "Dance of Death" series. This example shows that one sees or perceptually presents a decomposed body, but the body is not the proper object of the artwork since the decomposed body *symbolically represents* death.⁸¹ To phrase it differently, sensations are apprehended by the act of presenting shapes and colors; they, in turn, present the decomposed body, which is intuitively given. Death, which is symbolized by the body, is non-intuitively experienced *due to* what is intuitively experienced. In this context, signitive perception, which constitutes the meaning of the symbol, constitutes its object, i.e., the symbolized object, *due to* what is perceptually given. The object that is actually given is then the indirect object that mediates the aesthetic experience.

All the discussed examples that were analyzed and described by Blaustein present sophisticated nuances in both aesthetic experiences and their objects. However, they also present a challenge. In general, aesthetic experiences intentionally aim toward aesthetic objects. For Blaustein, however, the latter objects have to be decomposed into diverse but intertwined objects. This would suggest that *one* lived experience refers to *many* aesthetic objects, each of which has a different ontological status. For instance, whereas a painting on a canvas exists, the object "in" the painting and the represented objects can be either real or non-real. Does this mean that the aesthetic object exists and does not exist at once? If so, the consequences seem to be absurd. Next, one can ask what the relation is, according to Blaustein, between the aesthetic object and the art object. Are they identical or different? If they are identical, how should we understand that someone does not constitute the aesthetic value of a certain artwork? Horecka rightly notices that Blaustein explicitly declared that he was not interested in ontological issues.⁸² This, of course, does not mean that Blaustein is lacking the need to address this problem. On the contrary,

⁸¹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 2. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 70.

⁸² Horecka, *Obiekty semiotyczne w pracach Stanisława Ossowskiego, Tadeusza Witwickiego, Mieczysława Wallisa, Leopolda Blausteina, Izydory Dąmbskiej i Janiny Kotarbińskiej*, 191.

his detailed descriptions of aesthetic experiences make the need to address the problem all the more evident.

8.4 Is an Aesthetic Object Real or Purely Intentional?

The question concerning the ontological status of the aesthetic object in Blaustein's aesthetics was commonly discussed by scholars who drew a parallel or even a continuation between him and Ingarden, Blaustein's Lvov teacher. In this regard, in his book on aesthetics during the interwar years in Poland, Dziemidok called Blaustein a "supporter" of Ingarden's theory of the aesthetic object.⁸³ In Dziemidok's opinion, Blaustein adopted the key idea that an aesthetic object is constituted by the subject rather than being ready or complete prior to the experience itself. Indeed, there are some clues which justify this thesis. After all, for Blaustein, an aesthetic object is the object intended in the relevant experience or—to employ the Brentanian language—the object is represented in certain presentations. Horecka, in turn, noted possible borrowings. She wrote:

Notably, the ideas on imaginary objects presented [...] by Blaustein converge with the ideas by [...] Ingarden on intentional objects. However, the treatise by Blaustein *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [...] (1930) was published a year before Ingarden's *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (1931). Blaustein overtly draws upon Ingarden's *Das literarische Kunstwerk* and *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego* (1937) [...] only in the tract *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych* (1938). It is possible, though, that in 1930, Blaustein knew early ideas by Ingarden on the nature of intentional objects and he may have borrowed from these.⁸⁴

Of course, the Blaustein–Ingarden juxtaposition is complex. For instance, Blaustein accepted Ingarden's view of a work of art as a multi-layered object, but he disagreed with the details of this theory.⁸⁵ It is evident that Blaustein was familiar with Ingarden's theory as early as 1926, since he participated in lectures on aesthetics held by him; it was precisely during these lectures that Ingarden presented the basics of his later book.⁸⁶ On November 5, and later on December 3, 1926, Blaustein presented a talk during Twardowski's seminar entitled "Subiektywny element w badaniach literackich" ["The Subjective Element in Literary Studies"], in which he identified three layers of the literary work of art: (1) language, (2) meanings, and (3)

⁸³ Dziemidok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*, 33.

⁸⁴ Horecka, *The Concept of Iconic Sign in the Works of Selected Representatives of the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 286, fn. 4.

⁸⁵ Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 403; *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 18. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 13, 138–139. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 237–238.

⁸⁶ Ingarden, *Leopold Blaustein—teoretyk radia i filmu*, 87.

correlates of meanings.⁸⁷ Ingarden, in turn, adopted a four-layered concept of the literary work of art by including an additional layer, namely, the layer of schematized aspects.⁸⁸ However, even this element of Ingarden's theory—omitted in the earlier talk—was included by Blaustein to some extent in his mature theory. For instance, he used Ingarden's theory of spots of indeterminacy, i.e., formal elements of schematized aspects, to describe the aesthetic experience in general⁸⁹ and the experience of listening to the radio in particular.⁹⁰ In sum, he enlarged the earlier description with the fourth layer of the literary work of art, namely, the schematized aspects of represented objects.⁹¹ This fact and other parallels between both approaches justify asking whether Blaustein followed Ingarden in describing the ontological status of the aesthetic object. In Ingarden, one finds a coherent theory which differentiates the art object and the aesthetic object; whereas the former is real, the latter is a purely intentional object. With this in mind, one can ask: for Blaustein, is the aesthetic object real or purely intentional?

8.4.1 *An Outline of Ingarden's Theory of the Aesthetic Object*⁹²

Ingarden's aesthetics has been extensively discussed in the secondary literature.⁹³ Given this, my aim here is not to reconstruct this complex theory. Instead, I want to highlight Ingarden's account of the relationship between the work of art and the aesthetic object. The latter was famously defined by Ingarden as a so-called purely intentional object. In § 20 of *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, he wrote:

⁸⁷Jadczyk, *Uczeń i nauczyciel*, 20. See also Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 61, fn. 1.

⁸⁸While analyzing the content of the idea of the literary work of art, Ingarden identified the work as a many-layered object which is divided into four layers: (1) word sounds, (2) meaning unities, (3) schematized aspects, and (4) the stratum of represented objects. See Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 25–26. Reprint in 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 26–27. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 30. See also Szczepańska, *The Structure of Artworks*, 21–54.

⁸⁹Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 23–24. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 16.

⁹⁰Blaustein considered, e.g., how one understands a radio broadcast if not all of the required data are present. See Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 14. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 155. See also Blaustein, *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 120.

⁹¹Blaustein, *Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise*, 248. See also Rosińska, *The Model of Aesthetic Experience*, 81.

⁹²This section incorporates some materials published in Płotka, *Beyond Ontology: On Blaustein's Reconsideration of Ingarden's Aesthetics*, 560–565. For the purpose of this edition, the original text was revised.

⁹³See, e.g., Stróżewski, *Program estetyki Romana Ingardena*, 14–20; Takei, *The Literary Work and Its Concretization in Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics*, 285–307; Szczepańska, *The Structure of Artworks*, 21–54; Mitscherling, *Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics*.

By a purely intentional objectivity we understand an objectivity that is in a figurative sense “created” by an act of consciousness or by a manifold of acts or, finally, by a formation (e.g., a word meaning, a sentence) exclusively on the basis of an immanent original or only conferred intentionality and has, in the given objectivities, the source of its existence and its total essence.⁹⁴

A purely intentional object is an object which does not build a whole with the act by which it is “created.” Its existence is dependent on the act, but it is not a part of the act since this would lead us back toward psychologism. Therefore, “creation” does not mean that one produces an object which exists independently of the act: it cannot be “created” outside the act; the object is rather *heteronymous* and exists *only* as an object of the act but *not* as part of it. For instance, if one thinks of Pegasus, this object exists purely intentionally, meaning it has “its source of existence” in the act of thinking; moreover, the imagined Pegasus has features ascribed only in this act, e.g., it has wings like an eagle, etc., but the object is not a psychic part of the act. Rather, it is transcendent as a purely intentional (*not* psychic) entity. This general theory is useful for understanding the existence of the aesthetic object: while contemplating, for instance, a painting, one constitutes this work of art in a purely intentional fashion, and *on this basis*, one can also constitute an aesthetic object, i.e., an object of aesthetic contemplation. Therefore, according to Ingarden, an aesthetic object is non-identical to any real object, such as a painting, sculpture, or literary work of art. One can destroy, for instance, a canvas, but the aesthetic object is different from a material thing. Following Ingarden, the aesthetic object is formed by successive encounters with the art object in a process which he called *concretization*.⁹⁵ This process involves the formation of an aesthetic object which is rendered purely intentional. To better explain the way in which the object exists, I will refer to several elements of Ingarden’s early ontology.

In Ingarden’s ontology,⁹⁶ which was formulated as early as the 1920s, i.e., before *Das literarische Kunstwerk* was published, one finds a precise description of four basic existential-ontological relations: (1) *autonomy* and *heteronomy*, (2) *originality* and *derivativeness*, (3) *self-sufficiency* and *non-self-sufficiency* (or *separability*

⁹⁴Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 119: “Unter einer rein intentionalen Gegenständlichkeit verstehen wir eine Gegenständlichkeit, welche durch einen Bewußtseinsakt bzw. eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Akten oder endlich durch ein Gebilde (z.B. Wortbedeutung, Satz), das die verliehene Intentionalität in sich birgt, ausschließlich vermöge der ihnen immanenten ursprünglichen oder nur verliehenen Intentionalität in einem übertragenen Sinne ‘geschaffen’ wird und in den genannten Soseins hat.” Reprint in 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 121–122. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 117.

⁹⁵On the concept of concretization, see Takei, *The Literary Work and Its Concretization in Roman Ingarden’s Aesthetics*, 285–307; Szczepańska, *The Structure of Artworks*, 32–38.

⁹⁶Ingarden, *Bemerkungen zum Problem “Idealismus-Realismus,”* 165–168. A summary of Ingarden’s theory in Polish: Ingarden, *Zagadnienia tkwiące w problemie idealizmu i realizmu*. See also Ingarden, *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, I, 79–123. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, vol. I, 109–155; Ingarden, *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, II/1, 174–224. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, vol. II, 171–219.

and *inseparability*), and finally (4) *dependence* and *independence*.⁹⁷ Given this, a purely intentional object is (1) *heteronomous*, (2) *derivative*, (3) *self-sufficient*, and (4) *dependent*. Ingarden uses this description in the context of works of art and aesthetic objects. A work of art is constituted purely intentionally in an act that “creates” an object with certain properties, e.g., a painting with the property of presenting a landscape or being a portrait. This object is *heteronomous* because it is constituted by an act of apprehension that represents colors on canvas as a representation of the landscape. It is *derivative* because it is produced by an act of apprehension or as a result of an act of concretization. It is *self-sufficient* because it does not build a whole with the act, and thus, it is a transcendent, non-psychic, yet purely intentional entity, and as such, it is separable from the act. Finally, it is *dependent* because it requires the existence of a certain act, for instance, an act of concretization. To be clear, although the object is heteronomous and derivative, it is *not* reducible to mental experiences; just the opposite, it is transcendent through and through.⁹⁸

Furthermore, if one contemplates a work of art (or a different non-artistic object), one can create an aesthetic object that is a purely intentional object that has ascribed properties, such as *qualitative equipment*, i.e., *qualitative harmony* in the content of the aesthetic object. This object is *heteronomous* because it exists only due to an act of aesthetic contemplation, and without this act, there is no aesthetic object at all. It is *derivative* because it is created by an act of aesthetic contemplation. It is *self-sufficient* because it is a separable part of the entire act of aesthetic contemplation and has features—qualitative harmony—that are ascribed by the contemplating act. Finally, it is *dependent* because it requires for its existence an act of aesthetic contemplation.

To be precise, Ingarden’s description concerns both aesthetic objects (an object with ascribed qualitative harmony) and works of art (an object with ascribed artistic qualities), but his descriptions do not hold for real objects, e.g., the canvas of a painting or the marble of a sculpture. As claimed above, for Ingarden, a work of art or an aesthetic object is non-identical to any material object. An aesthetic object does *not* represent a material object but rather is a new, constituted (or “created”)

⁹⁷ According to Ingarden, to describe an object as (1) existentially *autonomous* means that it has its existential foundation in itself, while it is existentially *heteronomous* if it has its foundation outside of itself. (2) The object is existentially *original* if it is not “produced” by any other object; in turn, the object is *derivative* if it is produced by any other entity. (3) The object is existentially *self-sufficient* if it requires for its being the being of no other entity which would have to coexist with it, while it is existentially *non-self-sufficient* if this is not the case. Finally, (4) the object is existentially *dependent* if it is possible for an entity to be self-sufficient and still require the existence of some other self-sufficient entity; in turn, the object is existentially *self-dependent* if it is self-sufficient and moreover it does not require any other entity for its existence. See also Mitscherling, *Roman Ingarden’s Ontology and Aesthetics*, 90–99; Simons, Ingarden and the Ontology of Dependence; Piwowarczyk, Roman Ingarden’s Early Theory of the Object, 111–126; Piwowarczyk, The Ingardenian Distinction Between Inseparability and Dependence: Historical and Systematic Considerations, 532–551.

⁹⁸ Ingarden, *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego*, 7–8. Trans. Crowley and Olson, in: *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, 14. German edition in: *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks*, 12.

object (like an art object is created by an artist). To expand upon this aspect of Ingarden's aesthetics, we can refer to his analysis, formulated in "Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes," which was originally published in 1935. Ingarden's theory of the individual object refers to Aristotle's *hypokeimenon* (ὕποκειμενον), i.e., an object understood as the subject of properties.⁹⁹ Although the properties of an object are non-self-sufficient or inseparable from the object, the object is a whole that is self-sufficient. As Ingarden stated, "[...] the subject of properties and the endless multiplicity of properties as properties are essentially connected."¹⁰⁰ An individual object (1) is determined in all its properties and as such is self-sufficient, (2) it is a unity, i.e., a whole that cannot be divided, (3) if an individual object is divided, it is destroyed, so it stops existing, (4) two individual objects cannot have the same property, (5) the individuality of an object is undefined as such since it is a specific moment that is inherent to the way in which an object exists, and finally, (6) if an object is individual, everything that is part of this object is also individual, including its properties.¹⁰¹ To adapt this ontological theory to aesthetics, it is instructive to comprehend works of art and aesthetic objects as ontologically founded on an individual object, e.g., a book or a block of marble. A material thing, say a book, a block of marble, etc., is autonomous, but both an artwork and an aesthetic object are heteronomous. As claimed, the formal structure of a real object (say, a canvas) is different from that of an aesthetic object (or an artwork): whereas the former, as an individual object, has all of its properties already determined, the latter contains so-called "spots of indeterminacy."¹⁰² As early as 1925, Ingarden referred to the idea that some objects are to be understood as sketches (*Skizze*) or schemas, and as such, they have properties which cannot be determined.¹⁰³ Spots of indeterminacy, as defined in *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, mirror this early concept. They are understood as gaps in content that cannot be filled by further acts.¹⁰⁴ In this context, an aesthetic experience can be described as an attempt

⁹⁹Ingarden, *Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes*, 33. See also Piwowarczyk, Roman Ingarden's Early Theory of the Object.

¹⁰⁰Ingarden, *Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes*, 68: "[...] das Gegenstandsobjekt und die unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit der Eigenschaften als Eigenschaften gehören wesensmässig zusammen."

¹⁰¹Ingarden, *Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes*, 79–80.

¹⁰²Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 250–259. Reprint in 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 261–270. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 246–254.

¹⁰³Ingarden, *Essentiale Fragen*, 276.

¹⁰⁴The object is schematic, following Ingarden, in the sense that it is not determined in its properties, so it has spots of indeterminacy. Ingarden introduces these ideas while distinguishing the real and purely intentional object. Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 250: "Jeder reale Gegenstand ist allseitig (d.h. in jeder Hinsicht) eindeutig bestimmt. Allseitiges eindeutiges Bestimmtheitsein besagt, daß der reale Gegenstand in seinem gesamten Sosein keine Stelle aufweist, an welcher er in sich selbst überhaupt nicht, also weder durch ein A noch durch ein Non-A, bestimmt wäre, und zwar so bestimmt wäre, daß solange A in einer bestimmten Hinsicht seine Bestimmtheit ist, er zugleich in derselben Hinsicht nicht Non-A sein kann. Oder dasselbe kurz gesagt: er weist in seinem Sosein keine Unbestimmtheitsstelle auf." Reprint in: 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 261.

to fill spots of indeterminacy by concretizing them, i.e., by the act of “creating” a new subject which would be the subject of aesthetic properties, including the qualitative harmony of aesthetically valuable properties. However, if this is indeed the case, concretization—*contra* Janusz Rybicki¹⁰⁵ and Dziemidok¹⁰⁶—is a strictly active aspect of experience since it “creates” a new object. However, these “spots of indeterminacy” form the content of a purely intentional object, so, as Ingarden put it, a work of art also “works on us” (*auf uns wirken*)¹⁰⁷ as it begins the process of the constitution or “creation” of the new, i.e., aesthetic, object.

Ingarden’s aesthetics enables one to draw clear-cut differences between an individual real object and a purely intentional object, such as a work of art (the subject of artistic properties) or an aesthetic object (the subject of aesthetic qualities). For Ingarden, a real individual object exists autonomously and as such can also be an “intentional” object; this means that it is the basis for the constitution of a purely intentional, i.e., heteronomous, object. Ingarden’s thesis that an aesthetic object can be an object of derivative intentionality means here that it is not founded exclusively on mental (or intentional) acts but also on individual, i.e., autonomous, objects: real objects. This is evident in Ingarden’s short analysis of a stage play: the people on the stage are individual and autonomous objects. Ingarden calls them “representing objects,” which “represent” purely intentional objects, i.e., “represented objects,” whereas performance is a certain concretization.¹⁰⁸ Here, the people on stage are ultimately determined to be equipped with relevant properties since they are autonomous and individual objects. Moreover, they are “also” intentional objects, but the objects they represent—the “represented objects”—are *purely* intentional, and as such, they are schematic. A represented object can be, for instance, a represented character’s psychic life or her existential dilemma. For this reason, not *all* of the details of the object represented in the stage play are represented by real representing objects. These clear-cut divisions became blurred in Blaustein’s aesthetics.

Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 246: “[...] every real object is *unequivocally, universally* (i.e., in every respect) *determined*. Unequivocal, universal determination means that in its total essence [*Sosein*] a real object cannot have any spots where in itself it would not be totally determined, i.e., either by *A* or by non-*A*, an indeed where it would not be so determined that as long as *A* was its determination in a given respect, it could not, at the same time, in the same respect, be non-*A*. To put it briefly: its essence does not show any *spots of indeterminacy*.”

¹⁰⁵ Rybicki, *Teorie przeżyć estetycznych*, 95.

¹⁰⁶ Dziemidok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*, 93, 106.

¹⁰⁷ Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 387. Reprint in: 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 397. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 371.

¹⁰⁸ Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 326–332. Reprint in 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 337–343. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 317–323.

8.4.2 *Blaustein on Ingarden's Theory*

In the three reviews of Ingarden's *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, which Blaustein published in different journals from 1930 to 1937, one finds a detailed assessment of the project formulated in Ingarden's book. In general, Blaustein appreciated Ingarden's detailed analysis of the literary work of art, which, in his opinion, was one of the most valuable aesthetic theories in the philosophical literature of that time. More specifically, he seemed to accept the following *five* ideas of Ingarden's theory:

- (1) His refutation of psychologism in the literature, which would reduce the literary work of art to the psychic life of the reader; by showing that the intentional object is transcendent through and through, Ingarden does not fall into psychologism.¹⁰⁹
- (2) His theory of meaning, according to which meaning is irreducible to the psyche or to ideal entities, and as such, it is heteronomous in relation to acts of understanding.¹¹⁰
- (3) A clear division between an act, the content of the act, and the represented object, all of which are key notions in understanding what a literary work of art is.¹¹¹
- (4) As a consequence of point (3), Ingarden's emphasis on intentional objects, which are schematic and purely intentional¹¹²; in this context, although Blaustein did not adopt Ingarden's phrase "purely intentional object," he was aware that the theory of purely intentional objects—understood as *quasi*-real objects—corresponds with his original theory of imaginative objects.¹¹³
- (5) Finally, the Ingardenian view of a literary work of art as a multi-strata object.¹¹⁴

Given these similarities, one might wonder whether Blaustein actually comprehended the aesthetic object as purely intentional, as did Ingarden. At first glance, the

¹⁰⁹ Blaustein, [Review of] Roman Ingarden. *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik, und Literaturwissenschaft*, Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1931, 98b.

¹¹⁰ Blaustein, [Review of] Ingarden Roman: *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft*, Halle, Max Niemeyer Verlag 1931, s. XIV + 389, 454.

¹¹¹ Blaustein, [Review of] Roman Ingarden: *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft*. Max Niemeyer Verlag. Halle (Saale) 1931. Str. X + 389, 346.

¹¹² Blaustein, [Review of] Roman Ingarden: *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft*. Max Niemeyer Verlag. Halle (Saale) 1931. Str. X + 389, 347.

¹¹³ Blaustein, [Review of] Roman Ingarden. *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik, und Literaturwissenschaft*, Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1931, 101b.

¹¹⁴ Blaustein, [Review of] Roman Ingarden. *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik, und Literaturwissenschaft*, Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1931, 99a.

answer to this question seems to be positive. After all, Blaustein referred to Ingarden's general ontological idea that an aesthetic object is a combination of properties; put simply, he comprehended the object as such, following Ingarden, as the subject of properties. For both Blaustein and Ingarden, an aesthetic object is an object constituted in corresponding acts that serve to ascribe certain properties. For Blaustein, some properties of an aesthetic object are ascribed *on the basis* of the experienced object given in an experience (mainly in perceptual experiences). To use the technical vocabulary from Sect. 8.2.1, one can apprehend a distant or improper object (which is constituted by the founding closer or proper object) as an aesthetic object as such. Here, aesthetic objects have different properties than the objects that found them. For instance, the above example of the skeleton from "The Abbot" has the property of a certain organized combination of shapes, and *this* object is the closer or proper object of the intention; however, it founds a distant or improper object, which in this case is death. Here, the property of being a symbol of death is seemingly purely intentional. This property is different from the properties of the initially perceived object. For this very reason, Blaustein was clear that the intended object in an aesthetic experience *does not have to exist*.¹¹⁵ He coined a term for this object, "the imaginative world of art," to emphasize that it is not identical to the world of natural experience. In short, it is a non-real object. "After all," as Blaustein put it, "the imaginative world is in neither the same time nor space in which the experiencing subject is present."¹¹⁶ In the natural attitude, the world is posited as existing, while in the aesthetic attitude, the aesthetic object and the imaginative world are neutralized; to phrase it differently, the aesthetic object is constituted without a belief concerning its existence,¹¹⁷ or without any about the real existence of the object.¹¹⁸ The object, then, is neither real nor ideal. Rather, the aesthetic object is *quasi-real* or fictional. In his *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*, Blaustein claimed that the aesthetic object can indeed be fictional, but it can simulate the existence of a real object, e.g., one sees the character performed by the actor on stage even though the character is fictional: one experiences the appearance of it being real or being *quasi-real*.¹¹⁹

Nonetheless, the positive answer to the above question—of whether Blaustein actually comprehended the aesthetic object as purely intentional as Ingarden

¹¹⁵ Blaustein, *O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki*, 248. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 134.

¹¹⁶ Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 403: "Wszak świat imaginatywny nie jest ani w tym czasie ani w tej przestrzeni, w jakich znajduje się doznający." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 139. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 238: "The imaginary world is not in the same time or in the same space as the perceiver's world."

¹¹⁷ Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 404. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 140. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 239.

¹¹⁸ Blaustein, *Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise*, 247: "Im engen Zusammenhang damit steht der Umstand, dass der wahrgenommene ästhetische Gegenstand durch die Wirklichkeitssetzung der Welt umfasst wird, wenn wir auch beim ästhetischen Erleben kein explicites Urteil über seine reale Existenz fällen."

¹¹⁹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 22. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 53. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 221–222.

did—was misleading. Even though Blaustein used (to some extent) Ingarden's idea of objects as described in *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, including the notion of the non-real, *quasi* way of existing, he in fact confused Ingarden's clear-cut definition of the purely intentional object.¹²⁰ Problems arise mainly with Blaustein's theory of psychic representations. This theory divides the object given in an aesthetic experience into a few distinct yet connected objects. In an aesthetic experience, there is a perceived object, which reproduces or represents another object, i.e., the reproduced object or the represented object; however, this object is *quasi*-real and is given as an imaginative object. Moreover, the represented object can be either real or fictional. For instance, in a historical drama, one assumes that the character performed by an actor *truly lived* in the past; at the same time, there are fictional characters that do not refer to real persons. Overall, *three* theoretical problems seem to arise in this context. First, (1) the object of aesthetic experience is divided by Blaustein into a few parallel objects. Next, (2) Blaustein used the term "*quasi*" to describe the status of the object of an aesthetic experience; however, this term is not discussed in greater detail, and for this reason, his description becomes unclear. Finally, (3) the existential status of the aesthetic object is obscure.

(1) To begin with, in his text "Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym" ["The Role of Perception in the Aesthetic Experience"], just after emphasizing the non-real status of the aesthetic object, Blaustein claimed that the object is also experienced as *real*. He wrote:

In contrast to the widespread view that we do not perceive the object of aesthetic experience as real, I think that this holds only for the imaginative perception of the imaginative world and the signitive perception of the fictional world. In a perceptive experience, I perceive the object of the aesthetic experience as real, which is no different than in the case of imaginative and signitive perception, while I am focused on representing objects; however, I must state my reservation that I do not recognize the representing objects in these last two situations as existing *hic et nunc*.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Dziemidok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*, 34–35.

¹²¹ Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 403–404: "Wbrew rozpowszechnionemu pogładowi, iż nie ujmujemy przedmiotu doznania estetycznego jako rzeczywistego, sądzę, że dzieje się tak tylko przy percepcji imaginatywnej w nastawieniu na świat imaginatywny i przy percepcji sygnitywnej w nastawieniu na świat fikcyjny. Przy percepcji spostrzegawczej ujmuję przedmiot doznania estetycznego jako rzeczywisty, nie inaczej przy imaginatywnej i sygnitywnej w nastawieniu na przedmioty odtworzone, z tym jednak zastrzeżeniem, że nie ujmuję go w tych dwóch ostatnich sytuacjach jako istniejącego *hic et nunc*." My translation. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 140. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 239: "Contrary to the popular belief that we do not apprehend the object of aesthetic experience as real, I claim that this only applies to imaginative perception in the attitude towards the imaginary world and to signitive perception in the attitude towards the fictional world. In observative perception I apprehend the object of aesthetic experience as real and the same applies to imaginative and signitive perception in the attitude towards reproduced objects, with one qualification: in the last two I do not apprehend it as existing here and now."

From reading this passage, one might conclude that according to Blaustein, the object of aesthetic experience is divided into a few distinct but correlated objects. The existential status of these different objects depends on the viewer's attitude toward the object. For instance, the actor is given in perceptual intuition *as* real; moreover, if the represented object does exist now, it is also perceived *as* real. However, if the represented object used to exist in the past, it and the imaginative object are perceived *as* non-real. Here, then, one intends at least *three* different objects. Taking this into account, the following problem arises: which of them is *the* aesthetic object? If one claims that it is the (real or non-real) represented object, this suggests that aesthetic experience is non-intuitive, which is false. In this regard, Blaustein was clear that even non-intuitive images (e.g., symbolic or signitive ones) are psychologically based or founded on intuitive ones. If one claims that the aesthetic object is the (real) representing object, this would mean that the aesthetic object *stops* existing if the representing object stops existing, e.g., if one destroys the canvas. However, if this is indeed the case and there is *no* aesthetic object, one cannot live in the relevant (intentional) act. This consequence, however, is absurd. Rather, the aesthetic experience can be lived even if the (real) representing object stops existing. For instance, if one watches a theater play, the aesthetic experience does not disappear when the actors stop playing their roles. If one claims that the aesthetic object is the (non-real) imaginative object, this means that one cannot perceive it as real because it is non-real. However, this contradicts Blaustein's explicit claim, quoted above, that one perceives the object of aesthetic experience as real. The aesthetic object—as described by Blaustein—seems to combine properties of Ingarden's purely intentional object with an individual autonomous object which can *also* be an intentional object: it is both real and non-real at once. Thus, in contrast to Ingarden, Blaustein's theory blurs clear-cut ontological categories.

(2) To defend Blaustein, one can hold that he understood the terms "real" and "non-real" *not* as features of the object itself but as features *ascribed* to the object by the viewer. Here, both terms seem to refer to the way of experiencing. If so, the terms "real" and "non-real" can be rephrased in terms of "presence for the experiencing subject," and ultimately, they can be replaced with "(intuitive) presence" and "*quasi*-presence," respectively. Accordingly, the phrase "one perceives the object as real" means "the object is (intuitively) present for the viewer." Analogously, the phrase "one perceives the object as non-real" means "the object is *quasi*-present for the viewer." After all, this is imaginative intuition, which is understood as perception, which in turn makes the object *quasi*-present. Blaustein explained that this form of perception enables one to comprehend the imaginative object "as not existing *hic et nunc*," which seems to suggest, for instance, that one does not see the performed character as such but the actor; the character is rather the distant or improper object of perception. Moreover, Blaustein wrote that *quasi*-real objects have features *as if* they were real; in this regard, he wrote about a *quasi*-spatiality and a *quasi*-time which are ascribed to such objects as their properties, which are in

quasi-cause-and-effect relationships.¹²² However, Blaustein's definitions are indirect (i.e., "*quasi*" is understood as *not* "existing *hic et nunc*") and vague (i.e., "*quasi*" is understood as *somehow* similar to "real"). Horecka noted that in Blaustein's aesthetics *quasi-features* were *not* features, and *quasi-relations* were *not* relations; she added that Blaustein mentioned only a few *quasi-features* and left open the question of whether every (real) feature has a *quasi-correlate*.¹²³ For Ingarden, to whom Blaustein seemed to refer in outlining his theory of *quasi-objects*, the difference is clear: whereas some objects are real, others are purely intentional. The former can be an individual object which is determined by all of its properties; the latter is created in a relevant act and, as such, is fully determined by it, i.e., it has the features ascribed by the act. For Ingarden, then, *quasi-objects* are purely intentional. By contrast, Blaustein does not adapt Ingarden's theory of purely intentional objects; however, he refers to the idea of "*quasi*" features. As a result, Blaustein's theory is inconsistent and unclear.

(3) As shown above, the aesthetic object was divided by Blaustein into a few correlated objects that are present only in relation to a certain attitude of the subject. Blaustein addressed the problem of plural objects in the following description: "When I look at 10 photographs of a person I know, there are 10 reproducing objects in front of me, and with their help, I can grasp 10 imaginary objects but only one reproduced object."¹²⁴ In this example, there is one aesthetic experience that is very complex. It includes 10 (real) reproducing objects, 10 (non-real or *quasi-real*) imaginative objects, and only 1 (real) reproduced object. In her commentary on this passage from the 1938 essay *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych* [*On Apprehending Aesthetic Objects*], Horecka attempted to draw a dual parallel between Blaustein and Ingarden. First, she noticed that Blaustein seemed to suggest that the imaginative object corresponds to Ingarden's represented object.¹²⁵ After all, the imaginative object is "in" the world of art. However, I think that Horecka's suggestion is misleading since Blaustein explicitly wrote about represented objects as being different from imaginative ones. Second, Horecka considered understanding the imaginative object as an object constituted in the relevant concretization (Ingarden's term).¹²⁶ As such, it would be equivalent to Ingarden's schematized aspects, which is seemingly

¹²² See, e.g., Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 13. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 10.

¹²³ Horecka, *Obiekty semiotyczne w pracach Stanisława Ossowskiego, Tadeusza Witwickiego, Mieczysława Wallisa, Leopolda Blausteina, Izydory Dąbbskiej i Janiny Kotarbińskiej*, 190.

¹²⁴ Blaustein, *O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki*, 248: "Gdy oglądam 10 fotografii znanej mi osoby, leży przede mną 10 przedmiotów odtwarzających, przy ich pomocy zaś ujmować mogę 10 przedmiotów imaginatywnych, lecz tylko jeden przedmiot odtworzony." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 134. My translation.

¹²⁵ Horecka, *Obiekty semiotyczne w pracach Stanisława Ossowskiego, Tadeusza Witwickiego, Mieczysława Wallisa, Leopolda Blausteina, Izydory Dąbbskiej i Janiny Kotarbińskiej*, 192.

¹²⁶ Horecka, *Obiekty semiotyczne w pracach Stanisława Ossowskiego, Tadeusza Witwickiego, Mieczysława Wallisa, Leopolda Blausteina, Izydory Dąbbskiej i Janiny Kotarbińskiej*, 193.

more accurate than the first interpretation. But even if this reading is correct, for Ingarden, the ontological status of schematized aspects in a literary work of art was well defined, whereas for Blaustein, it was unclear. Are imaginative objects fully determined by the relevant act or by the presenting content? For Ingarden, who used a theory of derivative intentionality, one can explain why purely intentional objects can be determined by both the act in which the object is created and by its real foundation. By contrast, for Blaustein, who emphasized the viewer's attitude, the ontological status of the aesthetic experience became unclear. After all, in the example discussed by Blaustein, in *one* experience, there are 10 reproducing (real) objects, 10 imaginative (non-real or *quasi*-real) objects, and 1 reproduced (either real or non-real) object.

Blaustein's break with Ingarden's theory of purely intentional objects followed from a critical assessment of the eidetic method, as presented in Chap. 5. Blaustein offered to understand phenomenology as a descriptive and empirical discipline rather than as an eidetic discipline. This important shift in methodology had far-reaching consequences for the Ingarden–Blaustein juxtaposition. Whereas Ingarden's aesthetics was developed mainly as the phenomenology and ontology of the aesthetic experience, Blaustein's approach seemed to be descriptive-psychological rather than ontological. As a result, whereas Ingarden spoke of lived experiences and their objects, Blaustein preferred the language of presentations, representations and complexes or combinations of presentations and representations. Thus, although they both referred to the notion of "constitution" to describe the aesthetic experience in relation to the aesthetic object, they understood it differently: for Ingarden, constitution was the "creation" of a purely intentional object; on the other hand, for Blaustein, constitution meant a "combination" of different presentations. Moreover, Blaustein accepted the Twardowskian notion of the aesthetic object as a psychophysiological product which is rendered in a certain act or experience. As such, of course, it is real.

In this regard, one may argue that Blaustein was not fully consistent in following Twardowski's division between the content of presentations and the object of presentations.¹²⁷ As shown above, Blaustein claimed that presenting content can be either adequate or *quasi*-adequate in the sense that it becomes the phenomenal or visual thing (*Sehding*), which in turn represents the distant and improper object. However, if so, the presenting content claims to be the object. Therefore, what is in fact experienced in the aesthetic experience? Are these sensations or rather the object itself? In his 1935 essay, "Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes," Ingarden called the theory which reduces the object to a combination of presentations a "phenomenalistic theory of the object."¹²⁸ He argued against

¹²⁷ This argument was formulated as early as 1931 by Zawadzki. See Zawadzki, Leopold Blaustein. *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 124. It was used later by Stępień. See Stępień, *Rola doświadczenia w punkcie wyjścia metafizyki*, 32–33.

¹²⁸ Ingarden, *Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes*, 35–45.

this theory by claiming that the object here is heteronomous. To use this criticism in the context of Blaustein's aesthetics, one can hold that if any art object, such as a canvas or a book, is presented, it becomes the reproducing object, but at the same time, it loses its existential autonomy since it becomes constituted in relevant presentations. However, this consequence is absurd. To avoid these problems, Blaustein held that aesthetic objects are *not* purely intentional but rather real. However, this solution is only partial. For Blaustein, the aesthetic object is real since it is presented (or represented) in a relevant act; in brief, it is real because of the real act. If so, Ingarden's diagnosis that Blaustein had finally fallen into the fallacy of psychologism as he had reduced the object of consciousness to a mere mental image seems to be accurate.¹²⁹

All in all, Blaustein's central reconsideration—if it is not a misreading of Ingarden's aesthetics—came from a different attitude, namely, reading Ingarden's idea of purely intentional objects in a descriptive-psychological fashion, i.e., understanding these objects as psychologically founded or, in other words, describing *how* one experiences these objects. In contrast to Ingarden, *phenomenology* (in a broad sense) for Blaustein, i.e., the way one experiences an object, *determines the ontological theory* or, to phrase it differently, *presentations determine objects*. In consequence, even if Blaustein provided some indications in favor of interpreting the imaginative object as a purely intentional one that hides or conceals its true nature, i.e., as purely intentional, Blaustein obscured Ingarden's clear relation between three objects: an “also” intentional object, a purely intentional object, and the real object.¹³⁰ By employing the theory of representations, he reduced the real object to a complex of sensations that are absolutely adequate. However, if sensations are indeed the basis of the aesthetic experience, as Blaustein held, the aesthetic object loses its purely intentional status in favor of being real. Therefore, paradoxically, Blaustein's attempt to reexamine Ingarden's aesthetics was only partial since it misread, to some extent, the theory of intentional objects. As a result, it would be wrong to hold that the aesthetic object was purely intentional for Blaustein. Rather, it seems to be real since the psychic presentations that build the relevant aesthetic experience are also real.

¹²⁹ Ingarden, *Przedmowa do polskiego wydania*, 15.

¹³⁰ Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 401. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 138. Trans. Bokinić, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 236–237. See also Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 326–332. Reprint in: 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 337–343. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 317–323.

8.5 Some Developments of Blaustein's Aesthetics

8.5.1 *Perception and Its Role in Aesthetic Experience: The Theory of Attitude*

Our analysis presented in Sect. 8.3 suggests that perception has a threefold function in aesthetic experience: receptive, imaginative, and signitive functions. Generally, according to Blaustein, perception serves to present the intuitive and non-intuitive aspects of an object. In his aesthetics, he struggled with the widespread view that aesthetic experience is mainly passive. Contrary to this view, he argued that perception is active since it enables one to constitute an object as a combination of intuitive and non-intuitive elements. The active role of the subject of a given aesthetic experience is to be understood here as a matter of adopting different attitudes toward what is experienced. Hence, both topics (perception and attitude) seem to be connected. However, what does it mean that perception is active or that attitude directs the subject toward the aesthetic object? I will discuss these questions first.

At the very beginning of the 1937 essay "Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym" ["The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience"], Blaustein attempted to describe the role that perception plays in the aesthetic experience. He wrote:

Analysis of the aesthetic experience demonstrates that its central point is a strongly emotionally tinged perception of the object of experience. This perception and the emotions connected to it are the fundamental components of the aesthetic experience, which itself is an experiential unity of a higher order, whereas judgments and experiences involving volition—if they appear at all in the aesthetic experience—are of secondary importance.¹³¹

In a general sense, receptive perception is the class of experiences that provides intuitive presentations. For Blaustein, perception is an act that serves to apprehend sensations, which in turn are understood as absolutely adequate presentations. Put differently, perception serves to present what is actually experienced, and as such, it does not create its object but is passive or receptive. According to Blaustein, given the passive character of perception, aesthetic experience, which is dominated by perception, is also mainly passive.¹³² Aesthetic experiences seem to be a reaction to what is perceptually given, but this form of experience combines perception with feelings and not so much with judgments or volitional acts; all these elements—perception, feelings, judgments, and volitional acts—constitute the subject's reaction

¹³¹ Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399: "Analiza doznania estetycznego wykazuje, iż jego centralnym ośrodkiem jest silnie uczuciowo zabarwiona percepcja przedmiotu doznania. Percepcja i związane z nią emocje są zasadniczymi i składnikami doznania estetycznego, będącego całością przeżyciową wyższego rzędu, sądy zaś i przeżycia natury wolicjonalnej—o ile w ogóle występują w doznaniu estetycznym—odgrywają w nim podrzędną rolę." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 136. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 235. Translation slightly modified.

¹³² Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399; *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 4. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 4, 136. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 235.

to the aesthetic object. Blaustein stated that perception always co-constitutes aesthetic experience, even if the emotional reaction seems to precede perception.¹³³

More importantly, although aesthetic experiences seem to be mainly passive, the subject who lives in them is, as Blaustein put it, exceptionally active (*wybitnie czynny*).¹³⁴ As a result of this activity, one constitutes the aesthetic object. Therefore, the object is not given *simpliciter*: it arises in correlation with the subject's reaction. However, if a presentation is not a simple reception of what is experienced, then perception seems to be active. In the 1938 essay *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych* [*On Apprehending Aesthetic Objects*], one reads:

Admittedly, the aesthetic experience is first and foremost a passive experience, an apprehension and perception of aesthetic objects. In addition to the perception of an object, we can also find in it a rich source of experience in which we react to what is given to us in perception. We experience feelings in aesthetic experiences; judgments occur rarely, e.g., in the form of aesthetic assessments; acts of will appear very rarely. However, the activity of the aesthetically experiencing human being is manifested not only in these reactive components of the aesthetic experience but also in its perceptive components—in those in which a *seemingly only passive reception* of the aesthetic object is present.¹³⁵

The description of the aesthetic experience as passive must be corrected since perception is an active process. More importantly, Blaustein's view of perception as strictly active is connected with the fact that aesthetic experience is temporal. After all, perception *initiates* the aesthetic experience, which occurs within a period of time. This preliminary receptive perception changes over time, depending on the aspect which is constituted in the experience. The aesthetic object given in the relevant experience happens over time; it is not given as a whole in one moment. Rather, the aesthetic object is constituted *on the basis* of objects that are perceptually given *at the beginning* of the aesthetic experience. Here, perception provides some intuitive presentations. Nonetheless, the object includes different aspects and non-intuitive elements, e.g., a symbolic meaning. For this reason, Blaustein wrote about different "ways of givenness" or "ways of manifestation" (*Gegebenheitsweisen*) of the object.¹³⁶ These modes, however, are not passively given but are constituted

¹³³ Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 53. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 184. See also Blaustein, *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 159. In this context, Blaustein was in discussion with Ingarden, for whom aesthetic experience begins with a preliminary emotion. Contrary to Ingarden, Blaustein held that aesthetic experience cannot be purely emotional since it is always founded on perception.

¹³⁴ Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 6. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 5.

¹³⁵ Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 4: "Co prawda doznanie estetyczne jest przede wszystkim przeżyciem odbiorczym, ujęciem, percepcją przedmiotów estetycznych. Obok percepcji przedmiotu wykryć w nim możemy nadto bogaty zasób przeżyć, w których reagujemy na to, co jest nam w percepcji dane. Przeżywamy wśród nich uczucia, rzadziej występują sądy np. w formie ocen estetycznych, bardzo rzadko pojawiają się akty woli. Ale nie tylko w tych reaktywnych składnikach doznania estetycznego, lecz już w perceptywnych, w tych, w których dokonuje się *na pozór wyłącznie bierny odbiór* przedmiotu estetycznego, objawia się aktywność człowieka przeżywającego estetycznie." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 4. My translation and italics.

¹³⁶ Blaustein, *Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise*, 245–249.

in corresponding experiences. Thus, perception is active because it is involved in the entire process of the aesthetic experience; second, it is ambiguous since it designates different types of perception, which all constitute aesthetic objects. Depending on the relevant attitudes adopted by the subject, these types of perception differ.

The concept of attitude is central to Blaustein's aesthetics. In this context, Miskiewicz wrote, "[...] what is interesting and truly original about Blaustein is his observation that whether an object or one of its determinations is effective or fictive, for instance, is a function of the way in which the matter of the act specifies the qualities of the object, that is, it is a function of the 'grasping attitude'."¹³⁷ In general terms, the function of an attitude consists in apprehending what is experienced: one can adopt different attitudes toward an object. The example analyzed by Blaustein in his *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*] (as was discussed in Sect. 8.2), namely, that a mirror image intends either the real or the imaginative object, shows that what is perceived depends on someone's attitude toward the object. The object of the aesthetic experience, then, is accessible due to a specific attitude. It is true that, following Miskiewicz, "[f]or Blaustein, perceiving an object is always *observing an object with a certain attitude*."¹³⁸ Blaustein differentiates between (1) natural,¹³⁹ (2) imaginative, and (3) signitive attitudes.¹⁴⁰ Here, one comprehends the object (1) as reproducing (or as the closer and proper object), (2) as imaginative, and (3) as reproduced (or as the distant and improper object), respectively. For instance, if one observes Cleopatra in the theater, then one can focus on (1) the actor *as* an actor, (2) the actor *as* Cleopatra, or (3) Cleopatra *as* an entity that does or does not exist in the real world.

The three forms of attitude described by Blaustein are, of course, involved in the aesthetic experience. After all, a certain attitude constitutes the object as perceived in the corresponding aspect. Blaustein noted that "[w]e live through imaginative presentations in the theater, but our attitude can change at any time, which can cause the focus of our attention to shift to the perception of the actor (the reproducing object); this happens when an actor's performance is noticeably poor."¹⁴¹ Here, the change in attitudes enables one to aesthetically evaluate the object as such. Thus, the phenomenon of an aesthetic attitude is crucial to aesthetic experiences. This also shows that what is experienced is constituted by whole complexes of specific

¹³⁷ Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 184–185.

¹³⁸ Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 186.

¹³⁹ The term "natural" comes not from Blaustein who did not coin a separate term to describe the attitude at issue.

¹⁴⁰ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 15–16. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 48–49. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 216.

¹⁴¹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 39: "Przeżywamy w teatrze przedstawienia imaginatywne, nastawienie nasze może jednak zmienić się w każdej chwili i skupić naszą uwagę na spostrzeżeniu aktora (przedmiotu odtwarzającego), co się zawsze dzieje, gdy zła gra aktora nas razi." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 66. My translation. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 232: "What we experience in the theatre is imaginary representations, but our attitude can change at any given moment and focus on observing the actor (the reproducing object), which always happens with bad acting."

qualities. Here, Blaustein referred to the concept of perception as something focused on certain wholes. When writing about perception in *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*], he emphasized that in addition to colors, one is also given “Gestalt qualities.”¹⁴² This means the entirety of specific qualities that are given in perception in a certain order. Importantly, however, perception captures not elements of the Gestalt but the entirety of their arrangement precisely *as* they are arranged. Blaustein stressed that the subject *anticipates* such wholes. Blaustein understood this “anticipation” or “attitude” as a psychic disposition of referring to complexes of psychic facts.¹⁴³ Thus, a given object may be accounted for in different ways, depending on the attitude of its perceiver. Blaustein used a similar description to explain changes in the attitude of a subject to an object that, although unchanged, is captured differently depending on the attitude. One example of this type of perception is accounting for a person on the stage as an actor, another time as, for instance, Shaw’s Cleopatra.

The aesthetic attitude, then, enables one to comprehend some Gestalt qualities, e.g., the harmony of shapes and colors, as the “psychic basis” for aesthetic experience. By claiming this, Blaustein was inspired by Gestalt psychology, but first and foremost, he followed Ingarden, for whom aesthetic experience is directed toward Gestalt qualities.¹⁴⁴ Blaustein also accepted Ingarden’s view that the aim of aesthetic experience is to constitute a “polyphony” or an organized whole of aesthetic value qualities (on different levels or layers of a work of art). However, contrary to Ingarden,¹⁴⁵ Blaustein did not hold that aesthetic experience is possible only due to some initial emotion. For Blaustein, emotion is possible due to a certain attitude which enables one to anticipate or expect an aesthetically valuable object. In his

¹⁴² Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 33. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 61. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 228. In Bokinić’s translation one reads about “formal qualities,” whereas Blaustein uses the Polish phrase “*jakości postaciowe*,” which clearly refers to the legacy of Gestalt psychology.

¹⁴³ Blaustein, *O niektórych nastawieniach na świat nas otaczający*, 192b.

¹⁴⁴ Ingarden, *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego*, 147–148. Trans. by Crowley and Olson, in: *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, 207. German edition in: *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks*, 214–215. See also Ingarden, *Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object*, 307–308.

¹⁴⁵ Ingarden claimed that the phase is “passive” and “fleeting” since one is “struck” with a peculiar quality or with a multiplicity of qualities which focus his or her attention and which are not indifferent to him or her. Ingarden, *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego*, 130. Trans. by Crowley and Olson, in: *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, 188. German edition in: *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks*, 195. See also Ingarden, *Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object*, 296. In sum, one is “excited” about the quality or qualities. This preliminary emotion founds the change of one’s attitude. The preliminary emotion breaks the familiarity of the world or rather it breaks man’s natural, i.e., practical, life. For Ingarden, then, aesthetic experience interrupts the flow of daily life and it situates the subject outside his or her practical interests. The shift of attitudes from the practical to the aesthetic consists in a shift from one’s focus on the fact of the real existence of a particular quality to the qualities themselves. A conviction about the real existence of the world is neutralized, which Ingarden described as the phenomenon of “forgetting the world” or “neutralization.” See Ingarden, *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego*, 137. Trans. by Crowley and Olson, in: *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, 195–196. German edition in: *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks*, 203. See also Ingarden, *Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object*, 300.

analysis of the perception of a radio broadcast, he stated that someone's attitude toward an object determines one's (anticipated or expected) aesthetic experience:

The expected aesthetic experience may or may not appear; it may be incomplete; it may—despite proper perception and constitution of the aesthetic object—lack aesthetic emotion; it may appear at a lower intensity than expected, e.g., when we perceive the same or similar aesthetic object for the tenth time, when an advertisement or an announcement is superstitious, etc. Thus, expectations that are too high determine the appearance of emotions [...].¹⁴⁶

Given that the aim of aesthetic experience is to constitute an aesthetically valuable object, i.e., an object that provides aesthetic pleasure, it is necessary to adopt an adequate attitude. Here, aesthetic perception is possible due to an aesthetic attitude. This attitude situates one *outside* the surrounding world and allows one to focus on certain Gestalt qualities. In this context, Blaustein wrote about the “isolation” of the aesthetic object: the object given as the aesthetic object is perceived as isolated from the world, i.e., the aesthetic experience presents Gestalt qualities which are not directly given in the perceptual experience.¹⁴⁷

In sum, the role of perception in aesthetic experience is *threefold*: it determines the form of perception in regard to what is experienced, e.g., perception can apprehend either intuitive or non-intuitive elements; it determines one's attitude toward the object; and finally, a certain type of perception determines the constitution of the aesthetic object.¹⁴⁸ In contrast to Ingarden, Blaustein held that perception is always


¹⁴⁶ Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 53–54: “Oczekiwane doznanie estetyczne może pojawić się lub nie, może nie być pełne, może w nim—mimo odpowiedniej percepcji i konstytucji przedmiotu estetycznego—zabraknąć wzruszenia estetycznego, może ono pojawić się w mniejszej intensywności niż było oczekiwane, np. gdy percypujemy po raz *X*-ty ten sam lub podobny przedmiot estetyczny, gdy reklama, zapowiedź, były przesądne itp. Zbyt bowiem wygórowane oczekiwania szkodzi pojawieniu się emocji [...]” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 185. My translation. The fragment is missing in the French translation of § 6 of the text. See Blaustein, *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*.

¹⁴⁷ Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 403: “Niekórtzy uważają, że również przy doznaniu estetycznym o percepcji spostrzegawczej np. przy oglądaniu pięknego krajobrazu zimowego zachodzi owa świadomość odrębności przedmiotu doznania, jego nieprzynależności do przestrzenno-czasowego świata, otaczającego osobę doznającą. Na poparcie swego stanowiska powołują się na fakt izolacji przedmiotu doznania estetycznego od otoczenia. Nie ulega wątpliwości, iż taka izolacja zachodzi. Przedmiot doznania estetycznego izolujemy od tła, czasem izolujemy go wraz z tłem najbliższym od dalszego otoczenia, bo najbliższe tło jest nam potrzebne dla wystąpienia pewnych walorów estetycznych głównego przedmiotu doznania.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 140. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 238: “Some believe that this awareness of a different world of the object of experience, a sense that it does not belong to the spatiotemporal world around the experiencing subject, also occurs in aesthetic experience based on observative perception, such as looking at beautiful winter scenery. In support of this belief they evoke the fact that the object of aesthetic experience is isolated from its surrounding. Undoubtedly such isolation takes place. We isolate the object of aesthetic experience from its surroundings, sometimes isolating it together with its immediate surroundings from the background, because we need the immediate surroundings to emphasize certain aesthetic qualities of the main object.”

¹⁴⁸ Blaustein summarized these three functions of perception in aesthetic experience, e.g., in: Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 401. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 138. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 237.

necessary for aesthetic experience. Even preliminary emotions are anticipated or expected on the basis of a certain perceptual experience. For Blaustein, then, there is no aesthetic experience without a kind of perception.

Overall, the model of aesthetic experience discussed here has to take into account its temporal nature. The model has to include a few phases: (1) perceptual anticipation or expectation, (2) preliminary emotion, (3) constitution of Gestalt qualities ascribed to aesthetic objects, and (4) aesthetic pleasure or cognitive pleasure as the aim of the experience. The model is presented in the following schema (Schema 8.2):



Schema 8.2 Blaustein’s phasic (temporal) model of aesthetic experiences

For Blaustein, there is no aesthetic experience without preliminary perceptual anticipation of what is given in this experience. Thus, without perception, there is no aesthetic experience at all. By stating this, Blaustein disagreed with Ingarden’s thesis that emotions are the proper source of aesthetic experiences. By contrast, for Blaustein, emotions arise after perceptual anticipation. The next phase consists in ascribing relevant Gestalt qualities to the object; as a result, a viewer “sees” “polyphony” or an organized whole of the aesthetic qualities of the object. This leads to the final phase of the aesthetic experience, which consists in living through aesthetic or cognitive pleasure. Of course, each phase described here can endure relatively long, depending on many factors, e.g., the viewer’s knowledge of the object or the audience’s reaction to the presented object. As such, the model can refer to non-subjective elements. We now discuss two of these factors: the body and intersubjectivity.

8.5.2 *The Body and Intersubjectivity*

Blaustein’s analysis of the body, its role in aesthetic experience, and its connection to joint or intersubjective experiences is mirrored by the original meaning of “αἴσθησις” (*aisthēsis*). As Jagna Brudzińska remarked, “[t]he Greek concept of *aisthēsis* refers to both phenomena of sensuous perception that relate to the five senses and to sensuousness in general.”¹⁴⁹ Indeed, the Greek noun “αἴσθησις”

¹⁴⁹ Brudzińska, *Aisthesis*, 9.

originates in the verb “αἰσθάνομαι” (*aisthánomai*), which literally means “to perceive.” Brudzińska, then, rightly connected this meaning with perception and sensuousness. However, as she continued, some phenomenologists enlarged the narrow meaning of perception that was formulated by early modern empiricists, who reduced this phenomenon mainly to (passive) sensations. In turn, from a phenomenological point of view, the meaning of “αἴσθησις” also covers the phenomenon of original experience and—as is crucial for aesthetics—phantasmatic and kinesthetic sensations. This description also holds for Blaustein, who understood sensuousness in his aesthetics in the broad context of bodily movements. Blaustein elaborated this general concept at three intertwined levels: (1) the body as the central point of aesthetic perception, which enables the constitution of the aesthetic object by the ongoing perception of it from different perspectives; (2) the body projected into the so-called imaginative world of art; and (3) the body of another subject, which is the basis for empathic perception of the other's psychic life.

Level (1) is connected to the spatiality of perceived art objects and, more generally, to the phenomenon of the perspectivity of perception. Blaustein emphasized that perception involves different perspectives, and this is possible due to the body of the viewer. In *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*, he presented a general description of this phenomenon in the following words:

Whenever I perceive the world around me, I only perceive one part of it. There are other imperceptible parts of this world beyond what I can perceive. The part I am able to perceive, in which I exist at the moment, is filled with a larger or smaller number of spatial objects. My body is, of course, one of these objects. I get bored with the world around me, so I escape from it. After a while I am in a totally different part of it, which is filled with totally different spatial objects. One object in particular was there, however, and must be here too. And that object is my body, which I could not escape from even if I tried. Consequently, my body occupies the central position in the apprehension of any of my spatial relations. Something is behind something else and something is in front of it, something is to the left and something is to the right, depending on the position my body occupies.¹⁵⁰

Blaustein's description concerns a few aspects of perception: (1) the phenomenon of the perspectivity of perception, (2) the spatiality of a perceived object, (3) the

¹⁵⁰ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 17: “Ilekcroć spostrzegam świat mnie otaczający, spostrzegam tylko pewną jego część, poza której granicami zewsząd rozciągają dalsze niespostrzegane teraz przezemnie jego części. Część, którą obecnie spostrzegam, w której obecnie przebywam, zapełniona jest mniejszą lub większą liczbą przedmiotów przestrzennych. Wśród nich znajduje się oczywiście również moje ciało. Znudziło mi się w tej części otaczającego mnie świata. Uciekam z niej. Po pewnym czasie znajduję się w zupełnie innej jego części, zapełnionej zupełnie innymi przedmiotami przestrzennymi. Jeden jednak przedmiot, który był tam, jest i musi być również tu. Jest nim moje ciało i od niego mimo najlepszych chęci uciec nie mogę. Dzięki temu faktowi ciało moje posiada centralne znaczenie przy ujmowaniu przezemnie stosunków przestrzennych. Coś jest za czemś a coś przed czemś, coś jest na prawo a coś na lewo, zależnie od miejsca, które zajmuje moje ciało.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 49. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 217. More on Blaustein's analysis of the spatiality and the body, see Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 71–72 and Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 9–10; *O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki*, 244–245. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 7–8, 128–129.

spatiality of the body, and (4) a strict connection between perception and the body, since spatial objects are given in different orientations (back-front, left-right), thus, (5) the body is the zero-point of different orientations because, as Blaustein put it, “I cannot escape from [my body].” It is striking that Blaustein’s analysis mirrored Husserl’s investigations from his *Ideen II*, in which one reads about the body as the zero-point of spatial orientations¹⁵¹; however, the book had not yet been published in 1930, when Blaustein published his *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*. It is probably not possible that he had an opportunity to read the text during his stay in Germany. It is arguable that this account is his original contribution to aesthetics. In any case, for Blaustein, the body is the zero-point of the perceived orientations of spatial objects. This, of course, also holds for artworks. In this context, Blaustein drew a parallel between the perspectivity of perception in general and the perspectivity of the artist’s perception: the artist has to find an optimal position while perceiving objects to be depicted or presented in an artwork. This is crucial for the painter since, following Blaustein’s *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer]*, “[t]he painter must take a position sufficiently distant from the painted object or objects to capture the

¹⁵¹ Husserl, *Ideen II*, Husserliana 4, 158: “Betrachten wir die Art und Weise, wie der Leib und wie die Dinge sich darstellen, so finden wir folgende Sachlage: jedes Ich hat seinen dinglichen Wahrnehmungsbereich, und notwendig nimmt es die Dinge in einer gewissen Orientierung wahr. Die Dinge erscheinen und tun das von der oder jener Seite, und in dieser Erscheinungsweise liegt unaufhebbar beschlossen die Beziehung auf ein Hier und seine Grundrichtungen. Alles räumliche Sein erscheint notwendig so, daß es näher oder ferner erscheint, als oben oder unten, als rechts oder links. Das gilt hinsichtlich aller Punkte der erscheinenden Körperlichkeit, die nun in Relation zueinander ihre Unterschiede hinsichtlich dieser Nahe, dieses Oben und Unten usw. haben, als welche hierbei eigenartige, sich wie Dimensionen abstufoende Erscheinungsqualitäten sind. Der Leib nun hat für sein Ich die einzigartige Auszeichnung, daß er den Nullpunkt all dieser Orientierungen in sich trägt. Einer seiner Raumpunkte, mag es auch kein wirklich gesehener sein, ist immerfort im Modus des letzten zentralen Hier charakterisiert, nämlich in einem Hier, das kein anderes außer sich hat, in Beziehung auf welches es ein ‘Dort’ wäre. So besitzen alle Dinge der Umwelt ihre Orientierung zum Leibe, wie denn alle Ausdrücke der Orientierung diese Beziehung mit sich führen. Das ‘Fern’ ist fern von mir, von meinem Leibe, das ‘Rechts’ weist auf meine rechte Leibesseite, etwa die rechte Hand zurück etc.” Trans. Rojewicz and Schuwer, in: *Ideas II*, 165–166: “If we consider the characteristic way in which the Body presents itself and do the same for things, then we find the following situation: each Ego has its own domain of perceptual things and necessarily perceives the things in a certain orientation. The things appear and do so from this or that side and in this mode of appearing is included irrevocably a relation to a here and its basic directions. All spatial being necessarily appears in such a way that it appears either nearer or farther, above or below, right or left. This holds with regard to all points of the appearing corporeality, which then have their differences in relation to one another as regards this nearness, this above and below, etc., among which there are hereby peculiar qualities of appearance, stratified like dimensions. The Body then has, for its particular Ego, the unique distinction of bearing in itself the *zero point* of all these orientations. One of its spatial points, even if not an actually seen one, is always characterized in the mode of the ultimate central here: that is, a here which has no other here outside of itself, in relation to which it would be a ‘there.’ It is thus that all things of the surrounding world possess an orientation to the Body, just as, accordingly, all expressions of orientation imply this relation. The ‘far’ is far from me, from my Body; the ‘to the right’ refers back to the right side of my Body, e.g., to my right hand.”

entirety of their shape in a single glance, otherwise the painting will be unclear in terms of spatiality.”¹⁵² Of course, the zero-point of these artistic orientations or perspectives is the body of the painter or, more precisely, the embodied painter. Analogically, someone who perceives a painting, i.e., the subject of a corresponding aesthetic experience, should find an optimal position while contemplating the artwork. Overall, one has to explore a given space with one's body to determine which position of the body is optimal for perceiving the artwork. Of course, sometimes an object does not require such movements, e.g., a panorama of mountains which surround the perceiver; however, this is an example which still shows that the body is the zero-point of all orientations, even if positioning movements are unnecessary.

Level (1) corresponds with the most basic experience of the body. It also determines level (2), i.e., the phenomenon of projecting the body (*rzutowanie ciała*) into the so-called imaginative world of art. In two essays from 1935 and 1938, “O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki” [“On the Imaginative World of Art”] and *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych* [*On Apprehending Aesthetic Objects*],¹⁵³ Blaustein referred to a painting by Jacob van Ruisdael in which one sees a windmill by a river.¹⁵⁴ He claimed that the landscape represented by the painting contains a series of spatial characteristics. “After all, in Ruisdael's painting, some objects are higher, others lower, one behind the windmill, the other in the front of the windmill, one closer, the other far away, one to the right, the other to the left.”¹⁵⁵ In other words, the objects represented by the artwork are oriented *as if* they were in the world that surrounds us. Given, however, that the zero-point of all orientation in the surrounding world is the body, the body is also the zero-point of orientation in the imaginative world, i.e., the world imaginatively presented or perceived by imaginative perception. The objects represented in an artwork are therefore oriented in relation to the body, yet the body here is understood as being projected into the world of the artwork. Therefore, the objects represented “in” the painting are oriented in relation to the ego or to “my body,” i.e., the center of all orientations: objects seem to be placed closer or farther from “me,” meaning “my (projected) body.” The same holds for the experience of watching a movie. The camera occupies a certain point in space, which *seems to be* the zero-point of orientation, i.e., the body of the

¹⁵² Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 12: “Malarz musi zająć stanowisko dostatecznie odległe od malowanego przedmiotu *resp.* przedmiotów, by móc objąć jednym spojrzeniem ich całokształt, inaczej obraz będzie przestrzennie niejasny.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 98. My translation.

¹⁵³ Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 9–10; O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki, 244. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 7–8, 128–129.

¹⁵⁴ Blaustein did not specify the title of the painting, but he was arguably referring to the “Windmill at Wijk bij Duurstede” (ca. 1670).

¹⁵⁵ Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 9: “Wszak na obrazie Ruisdaela pewne przedmioty są wyżej, inne niżej, jedne za wiatrakiem, drugie przed wiatrakiem, jedne bliższe, drugie dalsze, jedne na prawo, drugie na lewo.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 7. See also Blaustein, O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki, 244. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 128–129.

perceiver: some objects move closer to “me” or “my body,” whereas other objects are farther from “me” or “my body.”¹⁵⁶ Thus, as Blaustein wrote:

I shall say that this house, this bridge, these towers and mountains group in front of my body, but not before this [body] here sitting on a chair at a desk, but as if projected into this world, which reveals itself when looking at the painting. I am there, but I am invisible. I can even specify the exact place that I project myself. On that side of the bridge, which I cannot see, where a photographer or painter would stand, wanting to photograph or paint the objects I see.¹⁵⁷

For Blaustein, the objects represented by an artwork have a property of *quasi*-spatiality, i.e., they are interrelated *as if* they were real objects in the surrounding and spatial world. Given this, however, a crucial question arises: how does one experience these *quasi*-spatial objects? Blaustein’s key insight in this regard lies in his description of projecting one’s own body into the *quasi*-world: the objects of the world are organized *as if* oriented in relation to the projected body. However, the body is “invisible,” since—as already shown in the above analysis of level (1)—it is the zero-point of all orientations; as such, it is not given but enables or gives other objects.

Blaustein’s idea of projecting the body describes the phenomenon of the perspectivity inherent to artworks, including paintings, movies, or theater plays. For him, the aesthetic experience is embodied in at least two senses: (1) it is constituted in corporeal movements, and (2) it changes the way one experiences oneself as the embodied subject. The former is clear if one keeps in mind the situation described above. The latter, however, is more complex: while perceiving a certain artwork, one projects the body into the world represented by the artwork, i.e., the imaginative work of art. Here, the experience of the body divides one’s own body into the body of the perceiver of the artwork and the body projected into the artwork *as if* one were “there.” Blaustein went even further by claiming that the body can be divided not only into two objects but also into three or more parts. In this regard, he considered the phenomenon of perceiving a photograph of the photographer himself. He wrote:

¹⁵⁶ See Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 12. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 98.

¹⁵⁷ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 18: “Powieć mianowicie, że ów dom, most, wieże i góry grupują się przed moim ciałem, ale nie przed tem oto siedzącym na krześle przy biurku, lecz jakgdyby rzutowanem w ów świat, który odśłania mi się przy patrzeniu na obraz. Jestem tam, choć niewidoczny. Mogę nawet określić dokładnie miejsce, w które siebie rzutuję. Po tej stronie mostu, której nie widzę, w tem miejscu, gdzie stałby fotograf *resp.* malarz, chcąc fotografować lub malować widziane przezemnie przedmioty.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 50. My translation. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 217–218: “That is, I shall say that this house, the bridge and the mountains are grouped in front of my body, but not the body that is sitting here on a chair by the desk, but the one that is projected onto this world that appears to me while looking at the picture. I am there, but invisible. I can even quite accurately define the place from which I am projecting myself: it is on this side of the bridge that I cannot see, exactly in this place where a photographer or a painter wanting to photograph or paint the objects perceived by me would stand.”

My body can be divided not only into “two objects” but also into “three objects,” etc., for example, when perceiving my own photograph, when I intend to the imaginative object. It is necessary to distinguish here: *a*) my body in real space, *b*) my body as an imaginative object, and *c*) my projected body; *a* is given in the perception, *b* in the imaginative presentation, and *c* is not given to me at all and cannot be given. If I created them in fantasy while determining the imaginary world, I would have to project my body again, but then it [i.e., the body] would go back and this fourth body *d* would no longer be given; *c* would become the subject of creative presentation, but *d* would take the place of *c*, and so *ad infinitum*.¹⁵⁸

Both described levels of experience, (1) and (2), concern the subjective or egocentric mode of embodied experiences, which are focused on “my” body or—to employ Husserl’s language—on a living or subjective body (*Leib*). Level (3) mainly concerns the phenomenon of perceiving the other’s body—in Husserl’s terminology, a physical or objective body (*Körper*)¹⁵⁹—and constituting the other’s psychic life *on the basis* of perceiving a mere physical body. In other words, level (3) concerns the phenomenon of empathy (*Einfühlung*). In general terms, this phenomenon has to do with the problem of understanding others or the question of social cognition.¹⁶⁰ In the context of art, this phenomenon concerns the problem of understanding the characters represented in a work of art. Blaustein claimed that empathy is crucial for describing aesthetic experience. In *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych* [*On Apprehending Aesthetic Objects*], he held:

The objects of aesthetic experience are often psychophysical beings or things which do not have a psyche but which are “spiritualized” by us. The perception of such objects requires, among other things, empathy for the states and mental experiences expressed by these beings. Therefore, understanding the expression of a face “on” a screen, the voice of a radio play character, the utterances produced by a character in a novel, etc., depends on the subtlety of the subject’s empathy for the other’s psyche. The subject of aesthetic experience can have this ability to various degrees, and the accuracy and richness of his or her perception of mental states and experiences depend on it. This is a rich source of its [i.e., subject’s] active influence on the shaping of the object of aesthetic experience, whereby, for example, an oversight or misinterpretation of what the subject expresses is often also an oversight of its aesthetic values.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 18, fn. 1: “Ciało moje może się nie tylko ‘rozdwoić,’ lecz również ‘roztroić’ itd., np. w wypadku oglądania własnej fotografii, gdy intenduję do przedmiotu imaginatywnego. Odróżnić bowiem wówczas należy *a*) moje ciało w rzeczywistej przestrzeni, *b*) moje ciało jako przedmiot imaginatywny, *c*) rzutowane moje ciało; *a* jest dane w spostrzeżeniu, *b* w przedstawieniu imaginatywnym, *c* wogóle dane mi nie jest i dane być nie może. Gdybym utworzył je wytwórczo w fantazyi, uzupełniając świat imaginatywny, musiałbym rzutować ponownie moje ciało, cofnęłoby się ono jakby w tył, a to czwarte ciało *d* nie byłoby już dane; *c* stałoby się bowiem przedmiotem przedstawienia wytwórczego, *d* zaś wstąpiłoby na miejsce *c* i tak w nieskończoność.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 50, fn. 15. My translation. Differently translated by Bokiniec in: *Imaginary Representations*, 218, fn. 16.

¹⁵⁹ On Husserl’s distinction between subjective and objective body, see Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology*, 101–109.

¹⁶⁰ More on this problem, also in a historical context of Lipps, Scheler, Husserl, and Stein: Zahavi, *Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality*, 129–142.

¹⁶¹ Blaustein, *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*, 27–28: “Przedmioty doznania estetycznego są często istotami psychofizycznymi lub rzeczami wprawdzie pozbawionymi psychiki, ale przez

When reading this fragment, it comes as no surprise that for Blaustein the perceived physical or objective body of the other is a “psychophysiological” object which is “spiritualized” by the subject in a given aesthetic experience. If one sees a person depicted in a painting or a person filmed in a movie, this person is apprehended as having his or her own psychic life, i.e., as a “spiritual” being or person. The perception of the body is crucial here. In Blaustein’s writings, one finds dozens of examples of this empathic perception; for example, in *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*], he analyzed Hans von Marées’s painting (discussed earlier in a different context in Sect. 8.3) “Die Lebensalter (Orangenbild)” (1877/78): the body of the child there expresses corporeal inactivity; the body of the young man expresses his work and efforts; and the body of the old man expresses a reverie about life, yet this mental state is *expressed* in the face (i.e., in the body) seen in the painting.¹⁶² Interestingly, Blaustein held that empathy is not limited to psychic life; as a more general ability, it can be useful in describing the phenomenon of feeling the emotional atmosphere of an artwork¹⁶³ or the phenomenon of feeling that one fictional character empathically has for another fictional character’s psychic life. For example, in Shaw’s *Caesar and Cleopatra*, Act I, one sees Cleopatra’s anger at Cesar, who is now dreaming.¹⁶⁴

Blaustein’s description of empathy as founded on the experience of the body was connected with Ingarden’s idea of “spots of indeterminacy” (*Unbestimmtheitsstellen*).¹⁶⁵ Here, the psychic life at issue is not given or determined in its properties on the basis of what is given; rather, it has to be constituted. As already stated, empathy for Blaustein is an important element of a given aesthetic experience; without empathy, some “spots of indeterminacy” (in Ingarden’s sense) would remain empty, and thus, the aesthetic experience would remain unfulfilled. All in all, to use Blaustein’s technical language, one can claim that the phenomenon of empathy is an example of a schematic representation. The perceived body is the representing (or closer and proper) object, whereas the psychic life of

nas ‘uduchowianymi.’ Percepcja takich przedmiotów wymaga m. i., wczuwania się w wyrażone przez nie stany i przeżycia psychiczne. Od stopnia subtelności wczuwania się w obcą psychikę zależy więc zrozumienie ekspresji jakiejś twarzy ‘na’ ekranie, głosu postaci słuchowiskowej, wypowiedzi bohatera powieściowego itd. Doznający estetycznie może tę zdolność wczuwania się posiadać w rozmaitym stopniu i od tego zależy trafność i bogactwo jego percepcji psychicznych stanów i przeżyć. Stanowi to bogate źródło czynnego jego wpływu na ukształtowanie się przedmiotu doznania estetycznego, przy czym np. przeoczenie albo mylna interpretacja tego, co przedmiot ten wyraża jest często zarazem przeoczeniem istotnych jego walorów estetycznych.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 18. My translation.

¹⁶² Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 5–6. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 72–73.

¹⁶³ Blaustein, Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym, 407. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 143. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 242.

¹⁶⁴ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 15. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 48. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 216.

¹⁶⁵ Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 250. Reprint in 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 261. Trans. Grabowicz in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 246–254.

the character animating that body is the represented (or distant and improper) object; the relation between the body perceived in a work of art and the psychic life ascribed to this body is the relation of a schematic representation. The psychic life cannot be given, though it is projected or empathically perceived while perceiving the image of a body. The depicted body itself is understood here as the imaginative object, which is in turn constituted on the foundation of the apprehended sensations. In sum, one “reads” someone’s psychic life, including the characters represented in a work of art, because one emphatically feels that someone’s life. In his 1932 essay on Goethe’s psychological insights, Blaustein called this ability “understanding” psychology (*psychologia* “*rozumiejąca*”), which refers to introspection and understanding other persons.¹⁶⁶

In his 1937 text on the use of psychology in the social sciences, Blaustein was clear that psychology cannot ignore the fact that solitary human psychic life and communal lived experiences are divergent. He explicitly claimed that one *experiences* differently while being alone or in a well-organized community; he referred to the following observations: “[...] a human being thinks less independently and critically in a crowd; one’s beliefs become fairly fluid; their dependence on feelings and wishes becomes greater; affects grow stronger; self-confidence, wildness, sensitivity, courage, self-sacrifice increases, etc.”¹⁶⁷ However, Blaustein did not stop there. He stated that there are unique *common* experiences which are shared by many experiencing subjects. For instance, the phenomenon of a collective panic or an audience’s enthusiasm for a sporting event is not a sum of individual or solitary experiences. Rather, following Blaustein, these experiences shape a new form of collective experience. He described the phenomenon of collective experiences as *living through in the same way as other individuals* (*przeżywa tak jak inne jednostki*), which means—regarding lived experiences—that one has *collective* mental content that connects the individuals at issue.¹⁶⁸ Here, one acts jointly (*działa wspólnie*) and cooperates to produce *joint* products. Thus, for Blaustein, one’s psychic life is co-constituted by others.

In an appendix to the 1938 essay *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*],¹⁶⁹ Blaustein considered the idea of joint or shared aesthetic experiences by focusing on the question about the subject of a radio broadcast: is it a solitary subject who aesthetically experiences the broadcast, or is one justified in considering the audience a group of subjects sharing a “common”

¹⁶⁶ Blaustein, Goethe jako psycholog, 364.

¹⁶⁷ Blaustein, Psychologia w służbie pracy społecznej, 114: “[...] człowiek w tłumie myśli mniej samodzielnie i krytycznie, przekonania jego stają się bardziej zmienne, zależność ich od uczuć i życzeń większa, afekty przybierają na sile, wzrasta pewność siebie, dzikość, wrażliwość, odwaga, ofiarność itd.” My translation.

¹⁶⁸ Blaustein, Psychologia w służbie pracy społecznej, 114.

¹⁶⁹ The essay was published also in French, however, the appendix was not translated. See Blaustein, *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*.

experience?¹⁷⁰ Blaustein accepted that one has, as he put it, an “isolated aesthetic experience,” but these experiences can be determined by a group or community of subjects. Therefore, there are indeed subjective aesthetic experiences, but there are also “joint” (*wspólne*) lived experiences which can be determined by their intensity, quality, or duration. In a radio broadcast, this phenomenon is possible *not* because of a joint aesthetic object which is subjective through and through but because of a joint emotional attitude which is built in joint actions, such as in the applause heard in a radio broadcast. The influence of a community on a solitary subject of an aesthetic experience can be complex: Blaustein noted, for instance, the phenomenon of one’s attention being shaped by others, he stated that young people can shape older people’s contemplation of a work of art, the entire audience can wait for something to be presented in a radio broadcast, or there can be a certain “atmosphere” or “mood” (*nastrój*) that is shaped by the entire audience.¹⁷¹ He emphasized that such aesthetic experiences share a joint intention. He was aware that there is no strict influence or causal link between a community and a solitary subject; however, he noticed strong “suggestions” or “motivations,” which are constituted on the basis of communal or joint experiences:

[...] the influence of the audience can affect the very course of experience and not just its external expressions. It can cause new phenomena, e.g., seeing beauty, or it can change the intensity of experiences, e.g., weaken admiration and even modify the quality of experiences. A viewer who does not like something at first may like it because of a suggestion made by the environment.¹⁷²

Blaustein held that these descriptions are also adequate for an audience in a cinema or theater, where a solitary experience is shaped by joint emotional reactions, such as laughing together at an actor’s joke.¹⁷³ In sum, one can argue that for Blaustein, the subject of aesthetic experience is both embodied and embedded in a community.

¹⁷⁰ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 56–64. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 187–193.

¹⁷¹ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 60–61. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 190–191.

¹⁷² Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 62: “[...] wpływ publiczności może oddziaływać na sam przebieg przeżyć, a nie tylko na ich zewnętrzne wyrazy. Może powodować powstanie nowych zjawisk, np. ujrzenie piękna, zmieniać intensywność przeżyć, np. osłabić zachwyty, a nawet modyfikować jakość przeżyć. Widzowi, któremu się coś pierwotnie nie podoba, może się to podobać pod wpływem sugestii otoczenia.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 191–192. My translation.

¹⁷³ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 58. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 188.

8.5.3 *Judgments in Aesthetic Experience: Blaustein's Disagreement with Filozofówna*

Aesthetic experience consists in a complex act which binds presentations with judgments and volition.¹⁷⁴ This claim seems to correspond to Brentano's general idea that every mental phenomenon includes presentations (as its basis), judgments, and emotions.¹⁷⁵ As already stated in Sect. 3.1.2, in the 1874 book, *Psychologie*, one finds the thesis that "[...] the three classes are of the utmost universality; there is no mental act in which all three are not present."¹⁷⁶ While discussing this thesis earlier, I suggested that Blaustein rejected it and instead held that there are mental acts—*aesthetic experiences*—in which only presentations are at play; of course, a judgment *can* be part of this type of experience, but it is *not necessarily* part of these lived experiences. For him, one can judge, for instance, an aesthetic object as beautiful, yet one may also contemplate it without any judgment; to employ Brentano's language, in Blaustein's aesthetics, one does not accept or reject any presentations in aesthetic experiences. Blaustein presented his position in detail in an interesting polemic with Irena Filozofówna. In Sect. 5.3.2, I discussed their debate as focused on methodological issues. Now, I will discuss the question of the place of judgments in aesthetic experience.

First, however, let me note that Filozofówna's criticism of Blaustein's aesthetics was connected with her descriptive-psychological studies on actors' performances. In her early writings, she referred to Alexius Meinong's idea of assumptions (*Annahmen*), i.e., fantasy experiences placed between presentations and judgments, to describe how an actor performs her role.¹⁷⁷ Filozofówna understood that

¹⁷⁴Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399: "Analiza doznania estetycznego wykazuje, iż jego centralnym ośrodkiem jest silnie uczuciowo zabarwiona percepcja przedmiotu doznania. Percepcja i związane z nią emocje są zasadniczym i składnikami doznania estetycznego, będącego całością przeżyciową wyższego rzędu, sądy zaś i przeżycia natury wolicjonalnej—o ile w ogóle występują w doznaniu estetycznym—odgrywają w nim podrzędną rolę." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 136. Trans. Bokiniec, in: *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience*, 235: "The analysis of aesthetic experience demonstrates that its central point is a strongly emotionally tinged perception of the object of experience. This perception and the emotions connected to it are the fundamental components of aesthetic experience, which itself is an experiential unity of a higher order, whereas judgements and experiences involving volition—if they appear at all in the aesthetic experience—are of secondary importance."

¹⁷⁵See Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 346. Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 206.

¹⁷⁶Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 346: "[...] die drei classen von äusserster Allgemeinheit sind; es gibt keinen psychischen Act, bei welchem nicht alle vertreten wären." Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 206.

¹⁷⁷Filozofówna, *Uwagi o t.zw. "systemie" Stanisławskiego*, 177; Filozofówna, *Próba badań psychologicznych nad grą aktorską*, 179–180. More precisely, Filozofówna refers to the following fragments of *Über Annahmen*: § 16 ("Annahmen in Spiel und Kunst"), § 54 ("Phantasiegefühle und Phantasiebegehrungen. Die Einfühlung") and § 55 ("Phantasiegefühle als Annahmegefühle"). See Meinong, *Über Annahmen*, 110–116, 309–321.

judgments are object-directed mental phenomena which are determined by the relevant conviction that the object exists or not; in turn, assumptions lack that moment of conviction. For her, assumptions are in fact “pretended” (*na niby*) judgments. Filozofówna recognized that her use of the phrase “pretended judgments” (*sądy na niby*) was in accordance with Władysław Witwicki.¹⁷⁸ For the latter, such “pretended” judgments are lived, for instance, by the reader of a novel: while reading a novel, one does not live through beliefs about the existence of the described events; rather, one only lives through judgments regarding these events.¹⁷⁹ Filozofówna stated that the same holds for an actor who does not have to live in real emotions but only in “pretended” judgments. Nevertheless, “pretended” judgments or assumptions are similar to “real” judgments, as they are either affirmative or negative.

In her debate with Blaustein, Filozofówna generalized these claims and held that every experience includes judgments; even if the judgments are not explicit, they are present as “vague” judgments or as assumptions. She used this idea to describe the way in which an actor performs “pretended” emotions on the stage. With this in mind, Filozofówna asserted that Blaustein’s theory of presentations bore the mark of a fundamental mistake: he confused presentations with judgments which—according to Brentano and Twardowski—form distinct classes of mental phenomena. She specified that Blaustein did not extract presentations, i.e., simple intentional acts, from complex acts which combine, among other things, judgments. Consequently, he ascribed features that are typical of judgments to presentations. In her commentary on Blaustein’s *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]* and “W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych” [“On Imaginative Presentations”], she wrote:

Dr. Blaustein claims that in presentations we grasp the presented object as this particular object [*jako ten właśnie*] and as such and such [*jako taki a taki*]; the related judgments or suppositions which are connected in some cases with presentations are the result of this and no other approach to the object due to the matter of the presentation, which already attributes something to the object, yet less clearly. I suppose that this view came from the fact that there were also other elements besides presentations which were used in the analysis of the structure of presentations. They were not extracted from mere complex experiences that included them, and they were not completely separated from their related judgments. As a result, researchers consider pure presentations as attributed with such properties as “ascribing” features to the object, “interpreting” them, “attributing” features to the object, even “thinking” of it as such and such [*jako o takim a takim*]. The use of these expressions to determine the functions of presentations is suspicious to me, even if not done in a literal sense. It is as if I wanted to describe the act of judging in detail and could not say they [i.e., these expressions] describe that in the act of judging, I “present” something to myself. I believe that presentations are qualitatively different from judgments, that they only present something whereas judgments grasp this something as such and such; judgments can grasp something falsely or truly. These are features of psychological facts called judgments.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Filozofówna, *Próba badań psychologicznych nad grą aktorską*, 180, fn. 15.

¹⁷⁹ Witwicki, *Psychologia*, vol. 1, 332.

¹⁸⁰ Filozofówna, *W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych*, 64: “Dr. Blaustein twierdzi, że w przedstawieniach ujmujemy przedstawiany przedmiot, jako ten właśnie i jako taki a taki, a odpowiednie sądy czy supozycje, które się z przedstawieniem w pewnych wypadkach łączą, to wynik takiego a

In light of the passage, one might see that Filozofówna commented on Blaustein's idea that judgments (and assumptions) are based upon presentations. Presentations, in turn, serve to present the relevant object as this particular object (*jako ten właśnie*) and as such and such (*jako taki a taki*). In short, the object is presented as determined by all its properties; thus, it is *already* equipped with an entire set of properties. However, in Filozofówna's view, that presentations have a dual function of accepting or rejecting is questionable; instead, it is typical of judgments, which accept or reject relevant presentations. For her, judgments enable one to accept or reject the relevant object, which is given as being equipped with certain features; while judging, one "ascribes" features to the represented object, or one "interprets" the object as being such and such. Consequently, without this, the object cannot be presented as such and such. Thus, Blaustein seemed to confuse the "presenting" function of presentations with the "ascribing" or "interpreting" function of judgments. In her commentary, Filozofówna held that the function of intending objects as such and such, i.e., the intentional directedness of any presentation, is possible not because of the matter of the act (as Blaustein held) but because of judgments. To justify her view, she referred to the example of mistaken identity: imagine that one sees someone walking down the street and taking them to their friend, but this person later turns out to be a stranger, and one has to recognize the initial belief as false; although the viewer has the same perceptual presentation in both cases, i.e., seeing a person *before* and *after* the mistaken recognition, as well as the same presenting content, the content is apprehended or interpreted differently. Filozofówna claimed that the difference lies in different judgments: the initial affirmative judgment ("I do see a friend of mine") and the final negative judgment ("I do not see a friend of mine").¹⁸¹ All in all, she held that presentations are *about* their objects, whereas judgments interpret or apprehend them.¹⁸² Filozofówna concluded that it is wrong to accept imaginative presentations as a separate class of presentations since Blaustein's idea can equally well be described within Twardowski's (and Brentano's) theory, namely, as a combination of basic presentation and relevant judgment.

nie innego ujęcia przedmiotu przez materję przedstawienia, która już sama coś tam przedmiotowi przypisała, tylko w sposób mniej wyraźny. Przypuszczam, że taki pogląd wziął się stąd, że do badań nad budową przedstawień wzięto coś więcej, niż same przedstawienia. Nie wyłuskano ich samych tylko z przeżyć złożonych, w których skład wchodziły, nie oczyszczono całkowicie z sądów, związanych z nimi. Przez to wzięte pod uwagę badaczy niby czyste przedstawienia obarczone są takimi własnościami, jak 'przypisywanie' przedmiotowi cech, 'interpretowanie' ich, 'wyposażanie' przedmiotu w cechy, nawet 'myślenie' o nim, jako o takim a takim. Podejrzane jest dla mnie używanie tych wyrażeń, wprawdzie niby to nie w dosłownym sensie, dla określenia funkcji przedstawień. To tak, jakbym, chcąc opisać dokładnie akt sądenia, mówiła i nie mogła tego inaczej wypowiedzieć, że w akcie sądenia coś sobie 'przedstawiam.' Uważam, że przedstawienia tem się różnią jakościowo od sądów, że tylko uobecniają coś, a dopiero sądy ujmują to coś, jako to a to i jako takie a takie; sądy ujmować mogą fałszywie albo prawdziwie. To są cechy swoiste faktów psychicznych, zwanych aktami sądenia." My translation.

¹⁸¹ Filozofówna, W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych, 64–65.

¹⁸² Filozofówna, Odpowiedź [1931], 188.

In her review published in *Polskie Archiwum Psychologii* [*Polish Archive of Psychology*] in 1932, Filozofówna formulated an analogical argument against Blaustein's theory, which was discussed in *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*]. She summarized Blaustein's position with the example of looking at a map: initially, one has a perceptual presentation of an undefined object, but after being informed that the object is a map, one has a schematic presentation of the schematized land. These presentations, in turn, may serve as the basis of relevant judgments; however, for Blaustein, judgments are possible only on the basis of presentations and not *vice versa*.¹⁸³ The same holds for

¹⁸³Filozofówna, Leopold Blaustein. *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 75: "Oglądając np. po raz pierwszy mapę, ujmujemy przedmiot swojego wyobrażenia spostrzegawczego jako arkusz papieru, poprzecinany czarnymi, łukowatymi i liniami i ponakładany różnobarwnymi plamami o dziwnych, nieregularnych kształtach. Dopiero czyjaś informacja, że to jest mapa Europy, a później własne obycie z tego rodzaju przedmiotami, uczy inaczej patrzeć. Do pierwotnego spostrzeżenia mapy dołączają się wówczas jeszcze pewne sądy, np. 'to jest Europa,' 'to jest morze Śródziemne,' 'to znów morze Bałtyckie,' albo ściślej ujmujące stan rzeczy przekonania: 'to jest schemat Europy' itd. Przeżycie takich sądów prowadzi do zajęcia właściwej postawy wobec mapy i jest genezą stanów psychicznych, charakterystycznych dla obcowania ze schematami. Patrząc dalej na mapę, myślimy sobie np., że półwysep Apeniński znajduje się na południu Europy, że ma kształt buta i Sycylią gra jakby w pitkę nożną. Dochodzimy do tych myśli nie drogą jakiegoś rozumowania, bo w tej chwili już nie żyjemy wyraźnych przekonań o roli mapy, jako schematu Europy, lecz stwierdzamy to bezpośrednio na podstawie wyglądu oraz wzajemnego położenia pewnych plam na mapie. Możemy to nawet orzekać prawdziwie, ponieważ mapa, jeśli jest dobrym schematem, posiada w wyglądzie pewne, nieliczne zresztą, właściwości schematyzowanego przedmiotu, które ją do roli schematu uprawniają i które jej tę rolę umożliwiają. W przypadku schematu—mapy zachowany jest kształt, proporcje i rozmieszczenie względem siebie różnych części schematyzowanego ładu. Przy pomocy odpowiednich plam na mapie przedstawiamy więc sobie półwysep Apeniński i Sycylię. Te przedstawienia zaś to już nie wyobrażenia spostrzegawcze mapy i jej części, jako przedmiotów samych dla siebie, lecz na nich oparte przedstawienia schematyczne półwyspu Apenińskiego i Sycylii, które z kolei same stanowią podstawę psychologiczną powyższych sądów o półwyspie Apenińskim i Sycylii." Trans.: "For example, when looking at a map for the first time, we perceive the object of our perceptive imagery as a sheet of paper, cut with black, arched lines and covered with strangely irregularly shaped spots of various colors. Only someone's informing us that this is a map of Europe and then one's own familiarity with such objects teaches us to perceive it differently. The original perception of the map is then accompanied by some judgments, e.g., 'this is Europe,' 'this is the Mediterranean,' 'this is the Baltic Sea,' or, to be more precise, the beliefs 'this is the schema of Europe,' etc. Our experience of these judgments leads to the adoption of an adequate attitude toward the map and is the basis of mental states characteristic of dealing with schemata. Looking longer at the map, we think, for example, that the Apennine peninsula is located in the south of Europe, that it has the shape of a boot and it plays with Sicily as if it were a ball. We come to these thoughts not by any reasoning, since at that moment we no longer have any clear belief about the role of the map as a scheme of Europe; rather, we can judge it directly on the basis of the appearance and the relevant position of certain spots on the map. We can even adjudicate this as true, because the map, if it is a good schema, has in its appearance some, though few, properties of the schematized object; this enables the map to play the role of a schema. In the case of the schema, the map, the shape, proportions, and constellation of various parts of the schematized land are preserved. With the help of the relevant spots on the map, we present the Italian Peninsula and Sicily. These presentations are no longer perceptive images of the map and its parts as objects for themselves, but the schematic presentations of the Italian Peninsula and Sicily are based on them [i.e., the perceptive images of the map], which, in

symbolic presentations. For Blaustein, both types of presentations are *sui generis* presentations and are thus irreducible to perceptual presentations or, more importantly, to other types of mental phenomena, including judgments. By contrast, for Filozofówna, schematic and symbolic presentations are *not* simple acts but complex acts which combine perceptual presentations with judgments.¹⁸⁴ For Blaustein, if they were a combination of basic presentations and judgments, one should accept an additional judgment which would indicate a parallel or similarity between the presented (a schema or a symbol) and represented objects (a schematized object or a symbolized meaning). This, however, does not account for the aesthetic experience, in which one presents the symbol and its represented meaning in one act without an additional judgment. Filozofówna disagreed with Blaustein, and she held that judgment is *always* present in such an experience yet as a mere assumption that is not explicitly present. These assumptions are present, as Filozofówna put it, “on the fringe of consciousness” (*obwód świadomości*).¹⁸⁵ This, however, does not mean that they are different from experience; rather, they build a complex experience composed of basic perceptual images and non-intuitive judgments. Therefore, in Filozofówna's view, Blaustein was wrong in claiming that one has to actively judge the similarity; judgment is always present in these experiences, but it is only passive: it is not an actual experience.

In his reply to Filozofówna's criticism, Blaustein held that her reconstruction of his theory put forward in *Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]*, as well as in *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations]*, is inadequate.¹⁸⁶ In this regard, he formulated *six* counterarguments. (1) Her thesis that Blaustein held that matter is the main element which determines the intentional relation was wrong. Blaustein's taxonomy is based instead on different relations between presenting content and the object of presentation. (2) Blaustein's main idea cannot be reduced to the parallel between perception and judgment, understood as the parallel between the functions of presenting and apprehending. In other words, Filozofówna's main argument that Blaustein obscured the nature of imaginative, symbolic, and schematic presentations, all of which, for her ought to be founded on judgments, did not take into account the clear difference in experiencing different objects. He held that if one accepts Filozofówna's view, one cannot understand the difference in experiencing, among other things, a painting, a sculpture, a movie, a theater play, etc. For Filozofówna, they are all combinations of perceptual presentations and judgments. By contrast, Blaustein stated that the differences here are unique (*swoiste*), and he suggested that they are founded in various ways or modes of presentation. These different modes are evident and, as

turn, constitute the psychological basis of the abovementioned judgments about the Italian Peninsula and Sicily.” My translation.

¹⁸⁴ Filozofówna, Leopold Blaustein. *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 76.

¹⁸⁵ Filozofówna, Leopold Blaustein. *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 76.

¹⁸⁶ Blaustein, *W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych*, 180–181; *W sprawie przedstawień schematycznych i symbolicznych*, 366.

Blaustein put it, intuitively unquestionable (*intuicyjnie niewątpliwe*).¹⁸⁷ (3) Filozofówna's position is problematic; if only judgments enable one to ascribe a feature to the object given in a presentation, then one has to make an endless number of judgments before the relevant experience takes place since an object is attributed with all its features at the very beginning of the experience.¹⁸⁸ For this reason, presentations enable judgments, but not *vice versa*. Next, (4) Filozofówna's view that one is initially directed toward something the features of which are undetermined and that only judgments determine these features is problematic. This would suggest that judgments are preceded by undefined or general presentations, but judgments require rather concrete presentations.¹⁸⁹ (5) Presentations cannot be true or false: only judgments can be either true or false. Contrary to Filozofówna, presentations are adequate or inadequate, and they may otherwise be *quasi*-adequate. Finally, (6) Filozofówna's example of illusory experience, i.e., the example of mistaken recognition, presupposes that image does not change what is problematic; moreover, it does not explain the motive for the change in judgment or the change in attitude. Overall, Filozofówna was wrong in claiming that judgments are necessary in aesthetic experience.

Filozofówna's criticism can be clarified in Blaustein's technical language as follows: she confused two forms of representation (described above in Sect. 8.2.1), i.e., logical and psychological representations. Whereas the former is a logical or semi-otic relation between a sign and its object, the latter lies in subjective experience. For instance, the judgment "*S* is *P*" can be either true or false, yet if one does not represent *S* as *P*, the judgment is incomprehensible for the subject; *S* is not given as *P*. Therefore, paradoxically, if Filozofówna is indeed right and experience is determined by judgments, one falls into the fallacy of logical psychologism, which consists in reducing propositions (judgments in a logical sense) to mere (psychic) presentations. Blaustein, in turn, while he emphasized a clear distinction between logical and psychological representations, can abandon the charge of logical psychologism. Judgments, then, are made on the psychic basis of presentations, yet they are irreducible to presentations.¹⁹⁰ In addition, following Blaustein's critical comment on Tadeusz Witwicki's book on representations that was published in *Polskie Archiwum Psychologii* [*Polish Archive of Psychology*], it is false that experiences necessarily include judgments.¹⁹¹ Of course, they can justify judgments, yet they are not possible due to judgments.

Blaustein's discussion with Filozofówna can also be read in the wider context of the Brentanian tradition; namely, it enables one to define his position within the psychological trend of the Lvov–Warsaw School and his view on the Graz School.

¹⁸⁷ Blaustein, W sprawie przedstawień schematycznych i symbolicznych, 366.

¹⁸⁸ Blaustein, W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych, 182–183.

¹⁸⁹ Blaustein, W sprawie wyobrażeń imaginatywnych, 183.

¹⁹⁰ Blaustein, O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień, 141. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 38.

¹⁹¹ Blaustein, [Review of] Tadeusz Witwicki. "O reprezentacji, czyli o stosunku obrazu do przedmiotu odtworzonego," 269.

As already stated, Filozofówna referred to Władysław Witwicki in arguing that judgments are parts of aesthetic experiences. This argument was based on Witwicki's theory of perception. In the first volume of his *Psychologia* [*Psychology*], he adopted the Brentanian idea that perception provides perceptual images, but it is accompanied by the belief that the perceived object exists; as he insisted, the belief is a "new psychic element," which is understood as a judgment.¹⁹² The fact that a perceptual image can be true or false stems from this very part of the mental phenomenon and not from presentations. Consequently, Witwicki understood perceptions (*spostrzeżenia*) as wholes composed of perceptual images and judgments.¹⁹³ In Blaustein, as shown above, one finds the opposite view that perceptions can be composed solely of relevant presentations, with judgments being unnecessary. In his review of the commemorative book that was devoted to Witwicki, Blaustein criticized the view that apprehension of the relevant object given in perception is based on both presentations and judgments; instead, one has to take into account the function of the act's content. More importantly, Blaustein held that judgments are not introspectively given in perception. Furthermore, it is wrong to claim that one comprehends an object in the world as real because of judgments which concern individual objects but because of a general attitude toward the world. Finally, every perceptual act would require an infinite sequence of judgments to comprehend an object.¹⁹⁴ In this regard, it is arguable that Blaustein's assessment of Filozofówna's position can be regarded as a consequence of his critical view of Witwicki's theory. It is worth noting that Witwicki was the supervisor of Filozofówna's doctoral dissertation; therefore, one can draw a line within the psychological trend of the Lvov-Warsaw School, at least in the context discussed here.

As noted above, Filozofówna also referred to Meinong's theory of assumptions. She held that even if one does not explicitly live in relevant judgment, there are assumptions which are always present in one's experience and which function as judgments. Blaustein rejected this view, but his view of Meinong and Witasek (who was a member of the Graz School) is complex. For instance, in *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*], he stated that imaginative presentation can serve as a psychic basis for fantasy emotions, which are understood as emotional correlates of the relevant assumptions in Meinong's sense.¹⁹⁵ In this vein, he held that a viewer in a theater can have assumptions (in addition to imaginative presentations) but not judgments.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, in a cinema, a viewer understands the perceived objects due to assumptions, not judgments.¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, Blaustein

¹⁹² Witwicki, *Psychologia*, vol. 1, 227.

¹⁹³ Witwicki, *Psychologia*, vol. 1, 228.

¹⁹⁴ Blaustein, [Review of] *Księga Pamiątkowa ku czci Władysława Witwickiego*, 160.

¹⁹⁵ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 47.

¹⁹⁶ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 39. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 66.

¹⁹⁷ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 23. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 107.

accepted Meinong's and Witasek's idea of "judgment-feelings" (*Urteilsgefühle*) as feelings based on judgments as their psychological foundation.¹⁹⁸ However, he disagreed with Witasek, who held that assumptions and judgments are *always* present in aesthetic experience.¹⁹⁹ It is worth noting that Witasek, while discussing the example of perceiving a picture of a sphere, identified the following elements in perceptual experience: perceptual presentation (*Wahrnehmungsvorstellung*), assumption (*Annahme*), judgment (*Urteil*), the presented object, and pleasure (*Lustgefühl*).²⁰⁰ In Blaustein's opinion, Witasek's description can be simplified if one includes imaginative presentations instead of combinations of presentations, assumptions, and judgments. With this in mind, one can argue that Blaustein's criticism of Filozofówna incorporated his attitude toward the Graz School; after all, he generally accepted the theory of assumptions, but he disagreed that assumptions should be understood as necessary parts of aesthetic experience. In this regard, he comprehended his original theory of imaginative presentations as being consistent with the theories of Meinong or Witasek. However, if Filozofówna attempted to reduce imaginative (and consequently schematic and symbolic) presentations to combinations of presentations and judgments or assumptions, he questioned this kind of reduction. Therefore, from a broader perspective, the discussion with Filozofówna illustrates to what extent Blaustein accepted the theories of Meinong and Witasek.

Blaustein's aesthetics is, of course, a complex theory. It is based on the general theory of presentations discussed above in Chaps. 4 and 6. According to him, aesthetic experience has to be understood as a complex act which combines different mental phenomena, presentations, judgments, or volitions, yet presentations play a central role here. The subject who lives through (*durchlebt*) relevant presentations constitutes the aesthetic object. Blaustein was clear that although the preliminary phase is passive, the subject is strictly active in adopting adequate attitudes toward the object. Next, the aesthetic object may be constituted on the basis of either artistic (e.g., a painting, a theater play) or non-artistic objects (e.g., a mirror image, a view of mountains). His detailed descriptions of different types of aesthetic experience show that he was sensitive to their complex structures and thus to many purely descriptive nuances.

To conclude this chapter, it should be noted that Blaustein's original contribution to aesthetics consists in his theory of different types of aesthetic experiences—founded on different types of perception—which are correlated with different types of aesthetic objects, including (1) imaginative, (2) schematic, and (3) symbolic


¹⁹⁸ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 9. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 43. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 211.

¹⁹⁹ Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 40–41. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 67–68.

²⁰⁰ Witasek, *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik*, 247.

objects. Blaustein held that all types of aesthetic experiences are founded on unique (1) imaginative, (2) schematic, and (3) symbolic presentations, which are irreducible to either perceptual presentations, or creative or reproduced presentations (in Twardowski’s sense, as discussed in Sect. 4.1.2). To show this, Blaustein analyzed a variety of aesthetic phenomena, such as seeing a painting, contemplating a sculpture, watching a movie, or a theater play, not to mention everyday experiences, all of which intend a dual object: either (1) the closer and proper object that is actually given in the aesthetic experience or (2) the distant and improper object that is indirectly given or represented in the aesthetic experience. The main problem inherent to Blaustein’s idea of representing and represented objects lies in the ambiguous connection to the real and (purely or also) intentional object (in Ingarden’s sense). For Blaustein, a certain object is given to the subject only if she adopts an adequate attitude. The phenomenon of an attitude shows that while adopting an attitude, one grasps the object in a certain way or “as” something.

Overall, the model of the aesthetic experience formulated by Blaustein has to include (1) the act, which synthesizes (2) presenting content which, in turn, is given in a triple attitude toward (a) the real object, grasped “as” (b) the reproducing (closer and proper) object or (c) the reproduced (distant and improper) object. The real object becomes the reproducing object if one adopts an attitude toward, following Blaustein, the “imaginative world of art.” Of course, the character of (b) depends on the type of art: it may be a group of colors and shapes on canvas or phantoms on the silver screen. Therefore, the model of aesthetic experience in Blaustein’s philosophy can be presented in the following schema (Schema 8.3):



Schema 8.3 The model of aesthetic experience in Blaustein’s philosophy

This model, of course, presents a general structure which, again, can vary depending on the artistic (and, consequently, depending on the type of art in question) or non-artistic object that is intentionally given in the aesthetic experience. This model can be found in the background of many of Blaustein’s detailed descriptions, and as such, it presents the theoretical basis of his descriptive aesthetics.

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Chapter 9

Toward a Phenomenology of Media



In his aesthetics, as shown in Chap. 8, Blaustein formulated a sophisticated theory of the aesthetic experience and the aesthetic object. However, the value of his approach was evidenced not only by theoretical examinations but also by detailed and rich descriptions of different aesthetic phenomena. Whereas in the previous chapter I was interested in the basics of Blaustein’s aesthetic theory, the present chapter concerns its concrete applications; more precisely, I will outline his phenomenology of media as an example of the application of descriptive tools in the analysis of cinema and radio experiences. In doing so, I want to discuss Paul Majkut’s thesis that “[p]henomenological media studies begin with Roman Ingarden’s investigations into the ontology of a literary work, but extensions of ideas that were confirmed to print media are easily made to other media.”¹ I attempt to show that Majkut did not take into account Blaustein’s contribution to the field, which was developed in the same period as Ingarden’s theory and which (contrary to Ingarden) directly addressed media (film and radio) experiences. Blaustein’s input was noticed by, for instance, Jan Czerkowski (together with Antoni B. Stępień and Stanisław Wielgus), Zofia Rosińska, Wioletta Miskiewicz, Jagna Brudzińska and, more recently, by Joanna Pluta. Czerkowski et al. called Blaustein “a pioneer in psychology pertaining to film and radio.”² In this vein, Rosińska³ and Pluta⁴ also described him as a “pioneer” in studies on the reception of media and its influence on the human mind. Miskiewicz noted that Blaustein “[...] kept an active interest for research in [...] media communication”⁵ and his research “[...] anticipated (with great subtlety) many theories, such as Wollheim’s ‘seeing-in’ in aesthetic theory and

¹ Majkut, *Media*, 201.

² Czerkowski, Stępień, Wielgus, Poland, philosophy in.

³ Rosińska, *Blaustein. Koncepcja odbioru mediów*, 22–23; *Bierność i aktywność*, 207–218.

⁴ Pluta, *Psychologiczne badania nad mediami—droga do powstania nowej dyscypliny*, 239.

⁵ Miskiewicz, *Leopold Blaustein’s Analytical Phenomenology*, 182.

McLuhan's 'the medium is the message' well known in media study."⁶ In her text on *aisthēsis* and phantasma, Brudzińska identified Blaustein as the author of the "[...] first phenomenological theory of media," in which he analyzed "[...] the mediating function of *imaginative* consciousness."⁷ These views require a brief comment.

The sources of Blaustein's studies on imaginative presentations—and thus on media—can be found in his 1927/28 fellowship stay in Berlin, when he reported to Twardowski that he recognized "[...] differences in the lived experiences of a cinemagoer and a theater viewer"; in this context, he referred to the "rich" structures of the imaginative presentations that are at play here.⁸ These early interests were developed in his 1928 book on Husserl, where Blaustein had already noticed that presenting content can function differently in relevant conscious acts. However, as has already been shown, this content theory was fully developed later in the 1930 *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*] and the 1931 *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* [*Schematic and Symbolic Presentations*]. In these books, Blaustein discussed the basics of his theory of presentations, and on a few occasions he referred to the example of film or watching a movie in a cinema to explain or illustrate the nuances of his views.⁹ A full exposition of his theory of the film experience was subsequently presented in the 1933 *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*]. The study provided a detailed description of the structure and the course of the film experience. Given that the sources of the phenomenology of film can be found in the 1930s, for instance, in Ingarden or Sartre,¹⁰ Blaustein is indeed one of the forgotten pioneers of film phenomenology. It is worth noting that in 1936/37, he also published a series of articles in the Polish journal *Ruch Pedagogiczny* [*The Pedagogical Movement*], which explored the educational role of cinema.¹¹ In any case, in 1936, Blaustein started paying more attention to the radio experience by considering whether the term "theater of imagination," which was used by Polish scholars at that time, was fully justified.¹² In 1938, he published *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*], which contained insightful views on the structure of the radio phenomenon. The book contained concrete practical tips for directors of radio broadcasts that should be applied to

⁶Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 187.

⁷Brudzińska, *Aisthesis*, 11.

⁸Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 13.02.1928, 116r.

⁹See, e.g., Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 25, fn. 1, 32–33, 39, 43, 45, 47; *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne*, 73, 79, 92, 107, 139. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 55–56, fn. 22, 61, 66. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 222, fn. 25, 227, 232.

¹⁰For an overview of the historical context of film phenomenology, see Ferencz-Flatz, Hanich, Editors' Introduction: What is Film Phenomenology?, 23–44.

¹¹Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*. For an overview of Blaustein's position in this context, see Szoska, *Trudna obecność*, 43–45.

¹²Blaustein, *Czy naprawdę "teatr wyobraźni"?*, 5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 197–200. For more on this topic, see Ciccotti, *The Philology and Aesthetics of Radio according to Leopold Blaustein*, 155–156.

improve their reception by audiences. It is important to keep in mind that Blaustein's analysis, which emphasized the imaginative experiences of radio, preceded contemporary studies in the phenomenology of listening that were formulated, for instance, by Don Ihde.¹³ Nonetheless, as we will soon see, Blaustein, in contrast to Ihde, claimed that listening to the radio is more a perceptual experience than a purely imaginative one. Blaustein's 1933 and 1938 publications have already been discussed to some extent in the previous chapter. However, I was interested in them only insofar as they discussed elements of Blaustein's aesthetics. Currently, my ultimate aim is to present his studies in a more systematic fashion, i.e., the main ideas, arguments, and results of both works.

9.1 Blaustein on the Film Experience

According to Blaustein, a study of psychic life can be developed either as a study of *a certain type* of lived experience which is present in different situations or as a study of *all types* of lived experiences that occur in a defined yet typical situation. The former approach consists in analyzing, for instance, aesthetic experience despite the particular situation in which it occurs; the latter approach serves to examine different types of experiences, e.g., presentations, emotions, or the intellectual components involved in a certain situation. In his *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*], Blaustein adopted the latter research strategy to investigate the different types of experiences of a cinemagoer.¹⁴ He believed that a detailed analysis of the various elements of these experiences can enable one to subsequently identify the lived experiences which are specific to a cinemagoer and are different from the experiences of, for instance, a theater spectator, a book reader, or a music listener.¹⁵ He suggested that a cinemagoer has lived experiences that are *sui generis*; it is seemingly precisely for this reason that the phenomenology of a cinemagoer is irreducible to other contexts.

Blaustein began his book with a few technical and methodological restrictions. He first assumed that a film lasts 1.5 to 2 hours. He analyzed both a silent movie and a non-silent movie. Curiously enough, he did not give any concrete examples of movies; instead, he generally referred to movie genres, e.g., to a crime movie *as such*. This fact shows a significant change in relation to his earlier studies, which—as discussed in Chap. 8—were full of concrete examples of works of art. Second, he avoided all questions concerning the *causal* factors that determine someone's perception of a film, e.g., their previous experiences, psychological dispositions, etc. Instead, he explicitly offered to adapt a *descriptive procedure* which serves to

¹³ Ihde, *Listening and Voice*, 103–136, esp. 117–129.

¹⁴ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 92.

¹⁵ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 48, fn. 79. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 127, fn. 79.

analyze the whole set of experiences lived by a cinemagoer while watching a movie, with the emphasis put on this person's pleasure. The central subject matter of his study is "the subjective emotional states of a viewer as a viewer" (*subiektywne stany uczuciowe widza jako widza*).¹⁶ Third, Blaustein noted that the psychology of a cinemagoer thus defined is the basis for the aesthetics of the cinema experience. By claiming this, he declared that he followed Moritz Geiger, for whom aesthetics is based on "scientific psychology" (*wissenschaftliche Psychologie*).¹⁷ However, statements like these strongly suggest that Blaustein's position is actually closer to Franz Brentano's and (early) Kazimierz Twardowski's methodological psychologism, which consists in founding philosophy and thus aesthetics on psychology.¹⁸ This suggestion is even more justified if one takes into account the fact that *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*] refers to the well-known Brentanian three-part division of mental phenomena; after all, the book is divided into two parts, of which the first (§§ 2–5) concerns presentations, while the second (§§ 6–10) concerns judgments (or intellectual functions) and emotions. In light of this, the two following subsections address both directions of Blaustein's studies.

9.1.1 Presentations and Their Objects: The Question of Phantoms

In his descriptions of a cinemagoer's experiences, as discussed in Chap. 4, Blaustein adopted a three-part division of lived experiences: as wholes composed of content, an act, and an object. The presenting contents of this type of experience are visual and auditory sensations, which are presented "on" a cinema screen. Regarding visual sensations, Blaustein held that they are based on changing phantoms, i.e., colorful surfaces or shapes seen "on" the screen.¹⁹ He described this experience as a permanent game of lights and shadows. These phantoms are apprehended in relevant acts, and on this basis, they can have a twofold reference: (1) one can ascribe the game of lights and shadows to imaginative objects seen "on" the screen, namely, as the very objects' feature, or (2) one can comprehend them as phantoms of the objects themselves. The difference arises if (1) the movie is viewed by a cinemagoer as a movie or (2) it is understood as a representation of non-fictional and

¹⁶Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 37. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 118.

¹⁷Geiger, *Zugänge zur Ästhetik*, viii.

¹⁸Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 26. Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 15–16. Twardowski, *Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii*, 37. Reprint in: *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne*, 26; reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 109. Trans. Szylewicz, in: *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 59.

¹⁹Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 6–7. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 94.

non-imaginative objects, as in the case of a documentary movie. Blaustein rejected the idea that one “sees” colorful objects in black and white films if one supplements gray-scale objects with colorful fantasy presentations; he argued that non-intuitive, i.e., signitive, presentations are added to the basic presentations, i.e., gray-scale phantoms.

To describe this basic level of experience, he referred to Wilhelm Schapp’s *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung* [*Remarks on the Phenomenology of Perception*] and attempted to use Schapp’s results. In his treatise, Schapp held that perception is object-directed and direct in its essence; the very object of perception is things (*Dinge*).²⁰ Of course, one first sees colors which are placed in the world, yet as Schapp put it, things are *not* “[...] mere complexes of colors and shapes.”²¹ Colors are rather comprehended as features of things. Schapp even went a step further by claiming that on the basis of visual features, one ascribes further non-visual features which connect different forms of experience. He wrote:

We see out there how the honey sticks to everything with which it comes into contact; how the water falls back, how it flows and is mobile—liquid. We see how elastic the iron of the tuning fork is; we see the lightness of the feather and of the smoke carried away by the wind. We see the consistency and heaviness of the iron weight that digs into the sand. All of this stands before us originally in our perception.²²

This passage shows that, for Schapp, perception is direct or immediate. It serves to ascribe visual and non-visual features to perceived things. Schapp described auditory sensations in an analogous way: voices can present things directly, i.e., as located in the sphere of voices (*Tonraum*).²³ Moreover, according to Schapp, sounds can present non-acoustic features of things; for instance, one hears the “metallicity” of iron.²⁴

Blaustein’s reference to Schapp can arguably be explained if one notices that they both operated with a similar model of perception. For them, perception is an

²⁰ Schapp, *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung*, 16: “In diesem Ausschnitt nun sehen wir Dinge,—Tische, Stühle, Bäume,—kurz, alle Dinge, die nicht durchaus durchsichtig sind, wie die Luft und andere Gase. Diese Dinge sehen wir im Raume neben und hintereinander.”

²¹ Schapp, *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung*, 18: “[...] bloß Komplexe von Farben und Gestalten.”

²² Schapp, *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung*, 20: “Wir sehen dort, wie der Honig kleben bleibt an jedem Ding, mit dem er in Berührung kommt; wie das Wasser sofort zurückfällt, wie es fließt, und leicht beweglich, flüssig ist. Wir sehen, wie elastisch das Eisen der Stimmgabel ist; wir sehen die Leichtigkeit der Feder, des Rauches, die der Wind davonträgt. Wir sehen die Konsistenz und Schwere des eisernen Gewichtes, das sich in den Sand einbohrt. Dies alles steht im Sehen leibhaftig vor uns.” My translation.

²³ Schapp, *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung*, 28.

²⁴ Schapp, *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung*, 29: “Ebenso hört man die Härte eines Gegenstandes, der gegen einen andern gestoßen wird, am Klang und die Weichheit umgekehrt. Die Dumpfheit des Tones, den Holz von sich gibt, der metallene Klang des Eisens gibt die verschiedene Struktur beider Gegenstände unmittelbar wieder. Das Plätschern des Wassers gibt uns das Flüssigsein des Wassers, das Poltern des Donners das Aufeinander schlagen von Luftmauern wieder.”

object-directed and immediate experience that refers to objects. Additionally, they identified a dual structure in the form of content and objects. In this regard, Blaustein understood the former as presenting content and the latter as the intentional object; Schapp, in turn, described them as the presenting (*das Darstellende*) and as the presented (*das Dargestellte*), respectively.²⁵ Blaustein also adopted Schapp's idea that visual and auditory experiences serve to ascribe non-visual and non-auditory features to objects: "[f]or the psychology of a cinemagoer it is important [...] that although one experiences only visual and auditory sensations, objects on the screen are given [...] as smooth, fluid, elastic, wet, etc., that there are objects given to [the cinemagoer], though one does not see them, yet one hears, etc."²⁶ However, Blaustein made three notes on Schapp's view.²⁷ First, a cinemagoer experiences only gray-scale phantoms. Second, one hears only the sounds recorded in the movie; however, this means that one hears only a selection of sounds which are more diverse in comparison to the natural world, i.e., sounds which were not recorded. Third, he questioned the idea that fantasy is a *necessary* element of film experiences; in contrast to Schapp, Blaustein held that this form of experience is strictly *perceptual* in character, and he doubted that someone's experience while watching a movie in a cinema is a fusion of perceptual and fantasy (creative, in Twardowski's sense²⁸) images.²⁹ In sum, Blaustein generally accepted Schapp's ideas, yet he introduced a few modifications to adjust them to the specificity of film.

To date, phantoms have been described as the basis of presenting content which serves to indicate an object. Next, according to Blaustein, a cinemagoer does not see phantoms as such; put differently, phantoms are not apprehended as the reproducing object (the screen together with the phantoms "on" it) but rather as an appearance (*widok*) of the imaginative object or the reproduced object.³⁰ The reference is founded on the cinemagoer's attitude toward the object: if one perceives the movie *as a movie*, one apprehends imaginative objects, but if one focuses on the objects *represented* by the movie, as, e.g., in a documentary, one is directed toward reproduced objects. To describe this phenomenon, which is specific to a cinemagoer, Blaustein used the term "observation," understood as attentive living through

²⁵Laasik, Wilhelm Schapp on Seeing Distant Things, 400.

²⁶Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 9: "Dla psychologii widza kinowego ważną jest [...] ta okoliczność, iż mimo doznawania przez niego tylko wrażeń wzrokowych i słuchowych, dane mu są przedmioty na ekranie również jako gładkie, płynne, elastyczne, mokre itd., iż dane mu są przedmioty, chociaż ich nie widzi, tylko je słyszy itp." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 96. My translation.

²⁷Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 8–10. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 95–96.

²⁸Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 25. Reprint in: *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 127. Trans. Lekka-Kowalik, in: *Imageries*, 88. See also Sect. 4.1.2 above.

²⁹To be precise, he holds that the experience of the cinemagoer *can* be associated with other, reproduced images. However, they are associated with reproduced images and not originally constituted by them. I will discuss this issue later on.

³⁰Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 10. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 97.

relevant imaginative presentations. Therefore, strictly speaking, one watches a movie if one *observes* objects represented on a screen. These objects are characterized by their spatial and temporal relativity. Blaustein held that although objects displayed on a cinema screen can be viewed from many perspectives, the actual point of view is dependent on the point of view of the camera. Next, he added that time perspectives are also relative since time in a movie does not have to correlate with natural time in the world because, e.g., there are time gaps between subsequent scenes. All these relative features are ascribed to the world *represented* in the movie. Blaustein referred to the world that is inherent to the movie as the imaginative world. However, the world filmed in a movie has a specific orientation, i.e., it is presented from the perspective of a camera. Blaustein attempted to explain this with a reference to the phenomenon of projecting (*rzutowanie*) the cinemagoer's body into the imaginative world *as if* they were standing where the camera filmed the reproduced objects.³¹ Interestingly, Blaustein noted that the perception of a movie also depends on the viewer's position in the cinema.

Taking this into account, it is clear that in *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*], Blaustein used and (if needed) rephrased the general ideas formulated in his aesthetic theory. As already shown in Chap. 8, the imaginative world is understood by him as an ordered set of imaginative objects which are perceived by a cinemagoer if he adopts an appropriate attitude toward objects and events represented "in" the movie. In this regard, he claimed that a cinemagoer can present diverse objects to himself: for instance, one sees nature, a moonlit night, the bottom of the ocean, etc.³² In short, in a movie, one can "see" objects that are also present in the natural world. Moreover, the film experience can be even richer since it enables one to "see" non-natural objects, e.g., a minotaur or Pegasus. In addition, a movie that contains music can present general or schematized objects, e.g., human suffering or joy. What connects these different objects is their "alien" character. Blaustein held that the imaginative world manifests itself as "alien" in relation to the surrounding or natural world. The fact that the lights are off in the cinema serves to help the viewer focus their attention on the

³¹ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 14. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 99–100.

³² In this context, Blaustein referred in Wallis-Walfisz's broad understanding of the aesthetic object. Wallis-Walfisz was a student of Twardowski. For more on Wallis-Walfisz's aesthetics, see Dziemidok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*, esp. 240–248, 318–327. On the semiotic framework of his aesthetic theory, see Horecka, *The Concept of Iconic Sign in the Works of Selected Representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School*, 274–285. Rosińska, *The Model of Aesthetic Experience*, 89: "Within the objects presented in the movies Blaustein distinguishes among the beauty of nature, human bodies (in their beauty, their dynamics and power, but also in their humor), architectural and technical artifacts, fantastic events and creatures and works of art. There are also another particular object that plays the most important role: the human character, human fate and its condition."

screen and thus on the movie.³³ Blaustein suggested that darkness in a cinema is not a mere technical factor, as it helps to intensify the viewers' aesthetic experience.

Finally, it is worth noting that the first part (§§ 2–5) of *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*] addressed the question of presentations. Of course, cinemagoers' experiences are dominated by perceptual presentations which are based on both visual and auditory sensations. However, the lived experience *can* be associated with fantasy (or creative) images or memory (or reproduced) images.³⁴ The former is useful for filling gaps between scenes in movies. In this regard, Blaustein analyzed a simple example: a character presented in a movie reads a letter, gets into a car, drives through the night, and arrives at her house; one does not see the moment when she leaves her apartment, nor the entire route, etc. Blaustein held that one can fill these gaps in fantasy, yet this happens rather "rarely." He argued that if there is no clear suggestion in a movie that fantasied elements should be added that were not originally present in the movie,³⁵ fantasy is unnecessary in this type of experience. Additionally, memory can serve as a supplementary factor for a cinemagoer. For instance, remembering previous events enables one to follow the present scene. Blaustein held that a cinemagoer's experiences can also include schematic or symbolic presentations. The former enables one to present *typical* features of certain objects, whereas the latter provides symbols due to the symbolizing objects given in a movie. Again, all these presentations are unnecessary elements of the experience of a cinemagoer.

9.1.2 *Intellectual Functions and Emotions in the Cinemagoer's Experiences*

As stated above, the second part (§§ 6–10) of *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*] addressed the question of the roles played by judgments and emotions in the experiences of a cinemagoer. Judgments are involved in understanding the movie, while emotions are the basis for, among other things, aesthetic experiences. Blaustein first discussed judgments by holding that they serve to help the viewer *understand* the series of images in a movie as parts of larger wholes; more precisely, one comprehends subsequent scenes as parts of the action in a movie.³⁶ Here, understanding an action means judging it yet without believing that this judgment is true or false. In this context,

³³ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 14. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 101.

³⁴ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 17–20. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 102–105.

³⁵ E.g., a scene that is interrupted to encourage the viewer to add further events, or where one sees a shadow but there is no suggestion of whose shadow it is.

³⁶ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 23. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 107.

Blaustein used Meinong's term "assumption" (*Annahme*),³⁷ and he claimed that the process of understanding takes place without further creative or reproduced images. In short, only judgments are necessary to understand the perceived movie. They are also helpful in understanding a character's psychic life. Blaustein referred to the general idea that psychic life can be *expressed* in individuals' facial expressions, gestures, physiognomy, or words.³⁸ The scope of the expressions is dependent on the form of the movie. To begin with, actors in silent films cannot act with the tone of their voice, while subtitles present the mere words that are spoken. In turn, actors in movies with sound can act using the tone of their voice, and music also plays an important role. In this context, Blaustein referred to Ingarden, for whom actors first and foremost express their emotions rather than their intellectual experiences.³⁹ This leads to the thesis concerning the "hegemony of the emotional sphere" in the cinema experience. Of course, intellectual understanding is an important factor in the cinemagoer's experience, but it is overwhelmed by emotions. However, again, emotions can be *understood* by a cinemagoer.

In this regard, Blaustein devoted a separate section (§ 8) to discussing the role of music in the cinemagoer's experience. His emphasis on music was a significant contribution to film studies in Poland before the outbreak of World War II.⁴⁰ The dominant film theory in Poland was formulated by Karol Irzykowski in 1924. In his book, *Dziesiąta muza. Zagadnienia estetyczne kina* [*The Tenth Muse. Aesthetic Topics in Cinema*], Irzykowski argued that the cinema experience is mainly a visual experience; he used a metaphorical phrase by stating that cinema serves to "satisfy the hunger of the eyes."⁴¹ Blaustein explicitly referred to Irzykowski's position, but he claimed that the auditory experience is equally important for a cinemagoer.⁴² Therefore, why are auditory experiences and music important? For Blaustein, music is the main component expressing emotions. He wrote:

The hegemony of the emotional sphere over the intellectual sphere in film makes the viewer's participation in a film's action dependent mainly on his understanding of the emotional states of the characters presented in the cinematic action, on properly empathizing with these feelings, and on co-experiencing these moods and feelings. The music which accompanies a film, if it is properly selected, improves both. Melodies can be happy, sad, lively,

³⁷I discuss Blaustein's view on Meinong in Sect. 8.5.3.

³⁸Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 24. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 108.

³⁹Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 335. Reprint in 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 346. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 325.

⁴⁰For an overview of the history of early film studies in Poland, see Haltof, *Film Theory in Poland Before World War II*, 67–78.

⁴¹Irzykowski, *Dziesiąta muza*, 197.

⁴²Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 40. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 120.

or solemn; while they accompany the acting of the actors, who try to express these moods with their facial expressions and sometimes with their statements, they also make this task much easier.⁴³

Music puts the cinemagoer in a suitable mood. It can emphasize the emotions expressed by an actor, or it can show changes in someone's psychic life. In this regard, the major scale serves to express cheerful moods, whereas the minor scale expresses sad moods. Importantly, music can intensify not only presented emotions but also real, underlying emotions. If one understands someone's emotions, one can present them to oneself due to assumptions. However, music—while introducing a certain mood—can invite someone to *understand* and *experience* real emotions. Blaustein held that the role of music is evident if one first watches a silent movie without any accompanying music and then again with music. He stated that music is often not noticed by cinemagoers because they are focused mainly on visual experiences. This, however, does not mean that music is inessential for the experience; to the contrary, it is an important factor which shapes the cinemagoer's experience.

Blaustein agreed with Ingarden in emphasizing the role which the emotional sphere plays in the film experience. However, unlike Ingarden, who devalued non-aesthetic emotions as insignificant, Blaustein held that non-aesthetic emotions are as important as aesthetic ones. However, this claim of Blaustein—following Marek Haltof—was an original contribution to film studies in Poland.⁴⁴ As Zofia Rosińska explained, “[t]he non-aesthetic elements of the cinemagoer's experience play a much more important role than in experiences based on the contemplation of any other work of art. However, non-aesthetic feelings obviously do not make an aesthetic experience impossible.”⁴⁵ In this respect, in § 9 of his book, Blaustein discussed feelings such as admiration, boredom, and pleasure or erotic and moral feelings such as patriotic enthusiasm or moral disgust, among others. For example, in regard to the phenomenon of pleasure, following Blaustein, there may be two sources. First, it can arise from seeing unknown places. In his comment, Blaustein emphasized that this form of pleasure has its psychic basis in the imaginative presentation, which constitutes the perceptive experience of seeing the imaginative

⁴³Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 28: “Hegemonia sfery emocjonalnej nad intelektualną w filmie sprawia, iż uczestnictwo widza w akcji filmowej zależne jest głównie od rozumienia przez niego stanów uczuciowych osób akcji kinowej, od należytego wczuwania się w te uczucia oraz od współdoznawania w pewnym stopniu tych nastrojów i uczuć. Do jednego i drugiego przyczynia się walenie towarzysząca wyświetlaniu filmu muzyka, o ile jest odpowiednio dobrana. Melodie mogą być wesołe, smutne, skoczne, uroczyste—towarzysząc działaniu osób, które starają się swą mimiką a niekiedy i wypowiedziami wyrazić te nastroje, ułatwiają im znacznie to zadanie.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 111. My translation.

⁴⁴Haltof, *Film Theory in Poland Before World War II*, 76: “Blaustein is interested in perceptual processes and explores the aesthetic and extra-aesthetic feelings accompanying film reception. Contrary to other arts, the extra-aesthetic aspect plays a more important role in film.”

⁴⁵Rosińska, *The Model of Aesthetic Experience*, 90.

object for the first time.⁴⁶ Second, pleasure can arise from understanding the action in a film if one follows a sequence of scenes; in turn, if a movie is “too complicated,” illogical, or full of contradictions, one feels displeasure.

All feelings, both aesthetic and non-aesthetic, are characterized by their intensity; however, in Blaustein’s view, non-aesthetic feelings should not surpass aesthetic feelings in terms of their intensity.⁴⁷ If this is the case, however, and non-aesthetic feelings—called by Blaustein, following Stephan Witasek, “quasi-aesthetic factors of pleasure” (*pseudoästhetische Genussfaktoren*)⁴⁸—dominate in the cinemagoer’s experience, the viewer’s aesthetic experiences are abandoned. Consequently, cinemagoers are dilettantes in regard to aesthetic experiences. This assessment advanced by Blaustein was borrowed from Geiger, who began his *Zugänge zur Ästhetik* [*The Approaches to Aesthetics*] with an attempt at defining the sources of dilettantism, which Geiger stated arises when values are experienced that are ascribed to a work of art yet are inadequate for it, and these inadequate lived experiences are apprehended as aesthetic.⁴⁹ In Blaustein’s opinion, this form of aesthetic dilettantism is widespread among cinemagoers. In this context, another less noticeable problem is that non-aesthetic feelings refocus cinemagoers’ attention on the inner (non-aesthetic) feelings that they live through instead of on the (aesthetically beautiful) objects represented in the movie.⁵⁰ To describe this phenomenon, Blaustein referred once again to Geiger and his differentiation between “inner concentration” (*Innenkonzentration*) and “outer concentration” (*Außenkonzentration*).⁵¹ Whereas the former consists in an attitude toward feelings which arise with the contemplation of a work of art, the latter is completely different and consists in observing the details of art objects. Blaustein held that films make it easier to focus on someone else’s feelings rather than on objects.

The fact that the cinemagoer’s perception involves non-aesthetic feelings, however, does not mean that aesthetic experiences are impossible here. In § 10 of his *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*], Blaustein analyzed the aesthetic and, as he put it, “semi-aesthetic” experiences of a cinemagoer. In general, aesthetic experiences arise with the pleasure of apprehending art objects as beautiful. How is this possible? According to

⁴⁶Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 35–36. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 117.

⁴⁷Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 38–39. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 119.

⁴⁸Witasek, *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik*, 234–235.

⁴⁹Geiger, *Zugänge zur Ästhetik*, 4: “Wir werden überall dann vom Dilettantismus künstlerischen Erlebens reden dürfen, wenn erstens Kunstwerke Erlebnisse auslösen, die nicht aus den Werten der Kunstwerke stammen, sondern anderen Ursprungs sind—die Erlebnisse also den Werten des Kunstwerks inadäquat sind—und wenn zweitens diese inadäquaten Erlebnisse dennoch für echte künstlerische Erlebnisse gehalten werden. Beide Bedingungen müssen zugleich erfüllt sein, damit vom Dilettantismus künstlerischen Erlebens gesprochen werden kann.”

⁵⁰Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 39. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 120.

⁵¹Geiger, *Zugänge zur Ästhetik*, 14–15.

Blaustein, objects presented in a movie are beautiful due to the way (*sposób*) in which they are presented.⁵² This, of course, depends on technical factors, e.g., *how* the camera operator filmed the objects represented in the movie or *how* the operator composed the background. Blaustein emphasized that aesthetic experiences are based on acts of comprehending the appearances (*wyglądy*) of objects seen “on” the screen. The emphasis put on appearances is not accidental here. This means that the aesthetic experience is even more intense for a cinemagoer after adopting a certain attitude toward the film: one has to be focused on the imaginative objects and the imaginative world. Blaustein was clear that this attitude “gives special aesthetic pleasure.” Only due to this attitude does one feel the pleasure which arises in the perception of dynamic sequences or scenes presented on the cinema screen. If one comprehends a series of images as a whole, i.e., the movie is well composed and structured, one also lives through an intense aesthetic experience. From Blaustein’s point of view, the composition can put the viewer in the appropriate mood. Next, the mood becomes a symbol of relevant feelings, but this requires an adequate presentation, i.e., a symbolic presentation which constitutes a relation between the symbolizing object (i.e., the mood) and the symbolized object (i.e., a certain feeling). Of course, as shown above, the mood can be constituted not only on the basis of the beautiful composition of a movie but also by the accompanying music, which serves to amplify feelings.

In his discussion of the structure of the cinemagoer’s experiences, Blaustein also referred to aesthetic experiences based on the pleasure which arises from participating in a movie’s action. In this regard, he explored two forms of subjective states: (1) one *feels* that one can experience in the same way as the movie characters, but only if one is in an analogous situation, or (2) one subjectively *empathizes* with the movie character and feels *as if* one is another person.⁵³ In his discussion of the idea of “empathy” (*Einführung*), Blaustein referred mainly to Johannes Volkelt’s aesthetic studies,⁵⁴ and he stressed that one can adopt this empathic attitude to experience different feelings, such as sympathy, antipathy, compassion, anger, contempt, outrage, respect, or comradery. By doing so, a film can encourage one to think of oneself. This issue, as we will see in the following section of this chapter, will be addressed by Blaustein to explore the educational role of film.

Blaustein held that aesthetic experiences consist in focusing entirely on sensations; this means, however, that one adopts an attitude toward the imaginative world as such. This function consists in giving a rest to the cinemagoer, who can forget about her everyday life and experience intense aesthetic feelings.⁵⁵ In the description of the phenomenon of “taking a rest,” Blaustein explicitly referred to Geiger’s

⁵² Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 40–41. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 121.

⁵³ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 44. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 124.

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Volkelt, *System der Ästhetik*, Bd. 1, 212–299.

⁵⁵ Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 46. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 125.

theory of aesthetic illusion (*Schein*). In his early text “Ästhetik” [“Aesthetics”], Geiger found the sources of a theory of aesthetic illusion in Schiller’s philosophy.⁵⁶ The theory holds that the illusion arises with irreality (*Irrealität*) and with the specific ways of the manifestation (*Gegebenheitsweisen*) of what is presented (*Dargestellten*) in the work of art; more precisely, the illusion is founded on the phenomenon of the pictorial nature (*Bildhaftigkeit*) of what is presented. This gives the impression that one can *experience* the fullness of life (*Fülle des Lebens*) more intensely than in natural life. Geiger held that the psychological basis of this experience is that one comprehends the aesthetic as a “mere” illusion—as a mere “play.”⁵⁷ Again, in Blaustein’s view, Geiger’s theory of aesthetic illusion was adequate for describing the phenomenon of “taking a rest” that is involved in the cinemagoer’s experience. Blaustein, however, was aware that a movie serves to guarantee entertainment to the cinemagoer, and as such, it can be characterized as a source of momentary pleasure rather than a source of authentic happiness.⁵⁸ In the conclusion of his 1933 book, Blaustein claimed that all of the phenomena described by him are unified or merged (*zlane*) into one whole. For this reason, the cinemagoer’s experience is not—to use his phrase—atomic.⁵⁹ If non-aesthetic feelings dominate the sense of sight, the entire lived experience is not aesthetic, and the movie is aesthetically worthless. However, if aesthetic feelings dominate the actual perception, the entire lived experience may be called aesthetic. As shown above, this conclusion is deeply rooted in the analysis of the subjective ways in which objects are manifested in the cinemagoer’s experience.

9.1.3 Remarks on the Educational Role of Film

Whereas the 1933 book *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*] explored the structure and elements of the cinemagoer’s experience, Blaustein’s later study on the educational role of film, which was published in 1936/37, exceeded the borders of descriptive-psychological analysis. This series of three articles, which were originally published in Vol. 26 of *Ruch Pedagogiczny* [*The Pedagogical Movement*], can be regarded as an *application* of his earlier theoretical considerations to address the question of how to organize the educational process to improve the quality of cinemagoers’ experiences. In this 1936/37 study, Blaustein explicitly referred to the main theses of his 1933 analysis. For instance, he showed that if the cinema experience is based on intense

⁵⁶Geiger, *Ästhetik*, 320.

⁵⁷Geiger, *Ästhetik*, 320.

⁵⁸Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 47. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 126. In this context, Blaustein refers to Geiger’s differentiation between two possible impacts of art: “*Amüſementwirkung*,” and “*Tiefenwirkung*.” Geiger, *Zugänge zur Ästhetik*, 47–57.

⁵⁹Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*, 47–48. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 126.

feelings, it can have a much stronger impact on its viewers than, e.g., books have on potential readers; additionally, he used language known from his descriptive psychology, including “the imaginative world,” “symbolic presentation,” etc.⁶⁰ Given, however, that cinema can indeed have a significant impact on cinemagoers, his task was to examine film’s negative and positive impacts. Against this background, he aimed to formulate regulations concerning how to educate young people. Of course, even though Blaustein referred to a series of his 1933 descriptive-psychological ideas, the 1936/37 analysis was mainly pedagogical. Therefore, with this in mind, in the present section, I will reconstruct the main ideas of his study.

Blaustein’s examination is divided into three parts: (1) a discussion of the negative impact of film, (2) an exposition of the positive impact of film, and (3) an attempt to formulate advice on how to design the teaching process to improve young cinemagoers’ perceptions of film. To begin with, he listed *nine* factors which show the negative impact of film. (1) Displaying a movie in a cinema means that the viewer is less involved or less active because she does not have direct contact with the actual actors. In this context, Blaustein contrasted the cinema experience with a theater viewer’s experience, which is more intense and is founded on collective reactions to the play.⁶¹ Next, (2) films often affect sexual instincts (directly, as in erotic movies, or indirectly), yet this can be problematic if young viewers are also present. (3) A movie might involve crimes, or criminals could be represented as positive characters; a film is not long enough to condemn these crimes. (4) Films present a false view of the world and human beings. For instance, movies present human life as a coherent and clear structure, whereas natural life, as Blaustein put it, “[...] manifests itself as a chaos of events.”⁶² Moreover, films reproduce stereotypes by presenting men as active and women as passive, etc. Of course, the cinemagoer’s experience—as shown in Blaustein’s 1933 book—is founded on assumptions, but the goer often believes in the “truth” of the film. In Blaustein’s assessment, “[...] a kitsch and false pathos, so frequently present on screen, can easily instill insincere and exaggerated feelings in young viewers.”⁶³ (5) If a film is banal, i.e., the action and characters are superficial or the composition is irrational, it reduces the intellectual level of the young viewer. (6) For Blaustein, films are designed for a mass audience, but this implies that they are superficial; in turn, one gets a clear message that education is pointless because one feels pleasant in the cinema without receiving any education in the process. (7) Given that it is easier to watch movies, one stops reading books. (8) Films do not stimulate the viewer’s fantasy, as they provide ready-made images. Finally, (9) theater has also become less popular because the cinema experience is less challenging.

⁶⁰ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 147, fn. 2; see also 153, fn. 3.

⁶¹ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 149.

⁶² Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 156.

⁶³ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 160: “Częsty na ekranie kicz i fałszywy patos łatwo zaszczepiają nieszczerę i przesadne uczucia u młodych widzów.” My translation.

As already stated, the second part of Blaustein's study concerns the positive impacts of film. In this regard, he listed *six* factors. (1) He acknowledges that film can increase someone's knowledge about the world—after all, films present to viewers events or objects that are hard to observe in everyday life.⁶⁴ Film creators, then, should guarantee a high level of presented knowledge. Furthermore, (2) film can teach a young viewer, for instance, how to observe objects or the meaning of gestures and facial expressions. By doing so, films can improve one's intelligence. (3) As analysis of the cinemagoer's experience has shown, film isolates aesthetic objects and thus intensifies the aesthetic experience of these objects. This is possible since film induces cinemagoers to perceive the objects in the world of the film “as if they were an image.”⁶⁵ This, in turn, enables one to experience the aesthetic illusion that constitutes the aesthetic experience. (4) Due to the presentation of characters' fates, films can encourage one to think about one's moral life. Blaustein writes that “[f]ilm can [...] inspire the self-confidence or courage to overcome oneself and the awareness that one's sacrifice and efforts are not pointless, that suffering will be meaningful—in a word, that it is worth being noble and even worth living.”⁶⁶ Furthermore, (5) film gives the viewer a rest since it induces her to live through an aesthetic experience; this means that one does not think of the “struggle for existence.” Finally, (6) one experiences pleasant emotions while perceiving imaginative objects for the first time.

Given the negative and positive factors which form the cinemagoer's attitude, in the third part of his study, Blaustein discussed the question of how film can be used by a teacher in the teaching process. In general, teachers should intensify the positive factors listed above and help young viewers understand these negative factors.⁶⁷ Therefore, a teacher—in Blaustein's view—should assess false knowledge presented in a movie and show how films present objects in a certain way. In short, there is no view from nowhere. Next, the teacher can explain the symbolic meaning of relevant scenes or characters.⁶⁸ The teacher should train young cinemagoers to evaluate any film and its particular elements; if the viewers are critical, they will disregard worthless films and watch artistic ones. In this regard, Blaustein held that “[b]y becoming aware of the sources of their aesthetic experiences, young viewers will develop their aesthetic taste and intuitive criteria of beauty and ugliness; they will learn to critically express aesthetic judgments and become capable of justifying

⁶⁴ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 206.

⁶⁵ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 210.

⁶⁶ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 252: “Film może [...] budzić wiarę we własne siły, odwagę do przewyciężenia siebie samego i świadomość, że poświęcenie i trud nie idą na marne, że cierpienia nie będą nadaremne—słowem, że warto być szlachetnym, a nawet, że warto żyć.” My translation.

⁶⁷ More for an overview of Blaustein's proposal, see Szulakiewicz, *Zrozumieć sens wychowania*, 69; Szoska, *Trudna obecność*, 43–45.

⁶⁸ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 260.

them.”⁶⁹ He believed that this task is realistic if the teacher discusses with students films that they have watched. Consequently, this attitude would help to overcome—as he wrote, following Stanisław Ossowski—the “aesthetic impotence”⁷⁰ of young cinemagoers.

To sum up, Blaustein seemed to suggest that the negative impact of films on young viewers stems from the fact that cinema is a form of mass culture. However, his discussion has a rather hypothetical character, and his often radical assessments are poorly argued. In addition, Blaustein referred too often to common knowledge or popular views on cinematic art. Nonetheless, it can be argued that his text was rooted in its historical context, i.e., a discussion of the educational role of film, which he was pioneering in the 1920s and 1930s.⁷¹ With this in mind, one can identify Blaustein’s contribution, but its value is again mainly historical. What is important for us, especially in regard to the question of the phenomenology of the media experience, is that he formulated his study on the basis of his descriptive-psychological analysis of the cinemagoer’s experience. Therefore, even if many of his particular diagnoses are outdated, the idea of applying phenomenological tools (broadly understood) seems to be surprisingly current.

9.2 The Phenomenon of Listening to a Radio Drama

Blaustein’s studies on the phenomenon of listening to a radio broadcast spanned the years 1936–39 and were summarized in his *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*], a French translation of which was subsequently published in *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* [*The Psychological Quarterly*].⁷² In general, the popularity of radio grew in the 1930s. Polish Radio was founded in 1925, and the regional station in Lvov started broadcasting in 1930.⁷³ In the 1930s, Witold Hulewicz, a Polish writer, literary critic, and publisher, became the literary manager of Polish Radio. In 1935, he worked with playwrights to produce radio dramas, which he sometimes called radio broadcasts (*słuchowiska radiowe*), i.e., purely acoustic performances that are an independent form of the literary work of art.⁷⁴ In

⁶⁹ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 260: “Przez uświadomienie sobie źródeł swych przeżyć estetycznych młodzież wyrobi w sobie smak estetyczny, intuicyjne kryteria piękna i brzydoty, nauczy się krytycznie wypowiadać oceny estetyczne i stanie się zdolną do ich motywacji.” My translation.

⁷⁰ Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmy*, 261.

⁷¹ See, e.g., Szoska, *Trudna obecność*, 45.

⁷² See Blaustein, *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 105–161. The translation is partly incomplete since it does not include a short foreword published in the book and an appendix which addresses the question of the radio audience.

⁷³ On the history of Polish Radio in 1925–39 and Blaustein’s contribution, see Pleszkun-Olejniczakowa, *Słuchowiska Polskiego Radia w okresie piętnastolecia 1925–1939*, 86–90.

⁷⁴ For more on the history of this form of art, see Huwiler, *80 Jahre Hörspiel*, 89–93.

his 1935 text on radio drama, Hulewicz used the phrase—originally coined by Zdzisław Marynowski, a Polish writer and former literary manager of Polish Radio—the “Theater of Imagination” (*Teatr Wyobraźni*) for this genre of literature, which was originally devoted to radio.⁷⁵ In Blaustein’s opinion, however, the phrase popularized in Poland by Hulewicz was misleading since it suggested that the experience of listening to the radio is possible as a result of imagination; in contrast to Hulewicz, Blaustein suggested that the radio experience built a specific form of perception which directly presents its objects.⁷⁶ To show this, in his 1938 study, Blaustein focused on the experience of listening to the radio; more precisely, he discussed not a radio report or a running commentary but rather the phenomenon of hearing a radio drama that lasts approximately 30 minutes.⁷⁷ In sum, in *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*], he addressed the following topics: the question of the acoustic content of the radio experience and its apprehension (§ 1); how the imaginative world of radio drama is constituted (§ 2); whether the phrase “the theater of imagination” is appropriate (§ 3); how mental states are expressed in radio drama (§ 4); the perception of radio drama as a dynamic process (§ 5); and to what extent the perception of radio drama constitutes the aesthetic object (§ 6). Given the thematic scope of Blaustein’s work, it comes as no surprise that—as in his studies on film—Blaustein also referred to many elements of his theory of presentations in his study of the phenomenon of the radio experience.⁷⁸ In this regard, however, his research tasks were not purely theoretical, as he aimed to formulate practical rules to improve listeners’ way of perceiving a radio broadcast. In this section, I address Blaustein’s descriptive-psychological account of the phenomenon of listening, as well as the practical application of his descriptive analysis.

⁷⁵ Hulewicz, *Teatr Wyobraźni*, 21.

⁷⁶ Blaustein, *Czy naprawdę “teatr wyobraźni”?*, 5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 197–200. Blaustein’s explicit commentary that his studies on the perception of radio drama followed from the critique of the phrase “the theater of imagination,” which suggested that only imagination is involved in this experience, can be found in the protocol (by Irena Krzemicka) from Ingarden’s aesthetic seminar which took place on October 15, 1936: Ulicka (ed.), *Lwowskie czwartki Romana W. Ingardena 1934–1937*, 254–255. See also Ciccotti, *The Philology and Aesthetics of Radio according to Leopold Blaustein*, 155–156.

⁷⁷ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 9. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 151. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 114.

⁷⁸ Blaustein explicitly declared that he adapted his theory of imaginative presentation in: *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 6, fn. x. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 149, fn. 3.

9.2.1 *The Structure of the Radio Experience*

The main problem discussed by Blaustein in his *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*] was formulated as follows: how does one perceive a radio drama?⁷⁹ In this regard, he made a twofold clarifying restriction. First, he declared that he used the term “perception” (*percepcja*) instead of “observation” (*spozosteganie*) deliberately since the perception of a radio drama is a complex lived experience that includes non-intuitive presentations. In turn, observation is exclusively formed from intuitive presentations. Second, he referred to the Brentanian classification of mental phenomena and clearly limited his analysis to presentations. He explicitly stated that neither emotions nor judgments are included in the perception of a radio drama.⁸⁰ To phrase it differently, the perception of a radio drama is a basic lived experience which includes different—intuitive and non-intuitive—presentations and which can create emotions or judgments. As such, of course, the form of perception at issue has an intentional structure.

In § 1 of his study, Blaustein showed that the presenting content of these experiences, i.e., sensations, are purely auditory and include murmurs (*szmery*) and sounds (*dźwięki*).⁸¹ However, one does not apprehend them as tones in the same way as when listening to music. Rather, one perceives murmurs and voices as sounds made by living creatures or by things. The act, then, apprehends the presenting content, which indicates “its” object. However, from a subjective point of view, one does not perceive content, i.e., sensations, as such but rather as objects. For this reason, Blaustein held that one perceives objects in a radio drama directly or “intuitively” *in propria persona* (*osobiście*); for instance, one perceives the sound *of* the river, the tumult *of* the fight, the clatter *of* the steam machine, etc. Of course, all of the sounds included in a radio drama may be chaotic and, as such, meaningless (or objectless). However, if they are adequately designed (due to effective editing) and the listener is therefore able to apprehend them as correlated with their objects, they can present a defined *quasi-vision* or—as Blaustein puts it—“acousion” (*akuzja*) of the

⁷⁹ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 1. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 145. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 105.

⁸⁰ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 1, fn. x: “Do percepcji słuchowiska nie zaliczam przeżyć, będących uczuciową lub intelektualną reakcją na słuchowisko, wywołaną przez jego odbiór, takich jak wzruszenie estetyczne lub pozaestetyczne (np. religijne albo patriotyczne), sądy oceniające słuchowisko, nasuwające się słuchaczowi refleksje, budzące się w nim pragnienia etc.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 145, fn. 1. English translation: “The perception of radio drama does not cover these lived experiences that are an emotional or intellectual reaction to the radio drama, nor other experiences which are created by its reception, such as an aesthetic and non-aesthetic emotion (e.g., religious or patriotic), judgments assessing the radio drama, thoughts which come to mind of the listener, the desires awakening in her, etc.” My translation. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 105–106, fn. 1.

⁸¹ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 3. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 147. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 107.

represented situation.⁸² This, in turn, enables the constitution of the world of objects represented in the radio drama. I will return to the question of the represented world shortly, but for now, it is important to understand what Blaustein means by the term “acousion.”

The term “acousion,” which was one of Blaustein’s original contributions to the study of the radio experience and which is noticed in today’s media research but is not discussed in detail,⁸³ describes the complex phenomenon of listening to a radio drama. The term was coined in parallel with the term “vision,” which refers to a purely visual experience. If one *sees* an object surrounded by other objects, one has a visual experience of all these objects in terms of experiencing a mental picture or a vision. In turn, if one *hears* a murmur through which an object can be perceived, one has an acoustic experience of the object in terms of experiencing an acoustic space or an acousion. Acousion, then, refers to the specific auditory way of presenting objects heard by the listener. Blaustein’s point here is that one does not “see” the object represented by sounds while listening to a radio drama; rather, one “hears” the represented objects. With this in mind, one should read the following fragment of *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*]: “[...] to perceive a radio drama, one has to have auditory experiences of ambient sounds, such as a ringtone or the wind, as well as an understanding of the words and sentences uttered by the characters of the radio drama.”⁸⁴

Of course, the auditory experience can be accompanied by visual images; however, according to Blaustein, perceptual or intuitive presentations are *unnecessary* for perceiving a radio drama. It is precisely for this reason that he rejected (in § 3 of his book) the suggestion present in the phrase “theater of imagination” that the radio experience consists in fantasy presentations; instead, it is more appropriate to refer to a radio drama with the phrase “acoustic theater” or “radio theater.”⁸⁵ In this regard, Eusebio Ciccotti explained that “[...] ‘radio theater’ is not limited to an elaboration of images produced by the imagination and, thus, perceived by it; but is also presented as a broader aesthetic activity, so broad as to also include non-perceived images that originate from the archives of memory.”⁸⁶ Therefore, again,

⁸² Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 4. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 147. The Polish term “akuzja” was not translated in the French edition; instead, Blaustein translated only the term “wizja” as “la vision.” See Blaustein, *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 108.

⁸³ See, e.g., Łastowiecki, *Rozczarowanie, konsumpcja i niespodzianka—estetyczne uwarunkowania odbioru współczesnego słuchowiska*, 167–185; Mucha, *Głosy do ontologii spektaklu radiowego*, 491; Wójciszyn-Wasil, *Obraz—nie tylko w wyobraźni*, 373–385.

⁸⁴ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 20: “[...] do percepcji słuchowiska radiowego wystarczą słuchowe spostrzeżenia takich dźwięków i szmerów, jak dzwonek telefoniczny, poszum wiatru, wypowiedzane przez postacie słuchowiska słowa i zdania oraz rozumienie tych wyrażeni mowy.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 160. My translation. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 127.

⁸⁵ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 27. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 165–166. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 133. See also Blaustein, *Czy naprawdę “teatr wyobraźni”?*, 5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 197–200.

⁸⁶ Ciccotti, *The Philology and Aesthetics of Radio according to Leopold Blaustein*, 155.

acousion describes a first-person way of presenting heard objects given in apprehended auditory sensations. It is worth noting that Blaustein also included verbal sounds in acousion, such as words or sentences. If one hears a word, however, one apprehends not only its sound but also its meaning. This requires an adequate, i.e., signitive (or non-intuitive), presentation. I will discuss this later on. For now, it should be noted that acousion also ranges over melodies or music, both of which can be useful in presenting, e.g., emotions.

As stated above, according to Blaustein, acousion constitutes the world represented by relevant sounds or murmurs. He addressed this topic in § 2 of his book. To begin with, he noticed that one differently apprehends sounds heard in a radio report and those heard in a radio drama. While listening to the former, one places the represented objects in the same surrounding world as the listener. However, if one listens to the latter, one does not believe that the represented world is identical to the surrounding world. Rather, the world represented in the radio drama is fictional. Therefore, even if one believes that the sounds one hears are authentic, one does not believe in the existence of the world being represented. Blaustein described this phenomenon in the following way:

Hearing the sound of a ringing phone, we do not think that someone is calling in our real world; the background sound of a departing train does not convince us that a train has actually taken off, while listening to a human conversation, we do not feel that we are listening to people speaking “seriously.” The real objects which we consider to be the source of sounds and murmurs, such as people, telephones, etc., are apprehended by us as reproducing objects which represent someone. This is how not only people but also inanimate objects become actors. In this way, new worlds are constituted for the listener that are alien to the real world that surrounds one and are not connected to the real world in time or space.⁸⁷

The quoted fragment of *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*] should be read in the context of Blaustein’s aesthetic theory. Here, presentations have a dual object, i.e., the closer or proper object and the distant or improper one. The former is the representing object, while the latter is the represented object. In the above fragment, Blaustein referred precisely to these elements of his theory. In the case of listening to a radio drama, if one hears (or apprehends) sounds or drones *as* acoustic or auditory content, these sounds or drones are the closer or proper objects which one “truly” hears; as such, they function as representing factors in one’s experience. However, if one hears (or apprehends) sounds or murmurs *as* sounds or murmurs *of* represented objects, e.g., the sound *of* a ringing

⁸⁷ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 5–6: “Słyszac glos dzwonka telefonicznego, nie sadzimy, ze ktos dzwoni w naszym rzeczywistym swiecie, szmery odjezdzajacego pociagu nie przekonuja nas o tym, iz jakis pociag faktycznie ruszil, sluchajac rozmowy ludzkiej nie mamy poczucia podslychiwania mowiacych ‘na serio’ ludzi.—Przedmioty rzeczywiste, ktore uwazamy za zrodlo dzwiekow i szmerow, a wiec: ludzi, telefony itd., ujmujemy jako przedmioty odtwarzajace, reprezentujace kogos innego. Tak staja sie aktorami nie tylko ludzie, ale rowniez przedmioty martwe. W ten sposob konstytuuja sie dla sluchacza nowe swiaty, obce w otaczajacym go rzeczywistym swiecie i nie pozostajace do niego w zadnych stosunkach czasowych lub przestrzennych.” Reprint in: *Wybor pism estetycznych*, 149. My translation. French translation: Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques, 111.

phone or the rumbling *of* a departing train, these sounds or murmurs are distant or improper objects that one does not hear “truly.” He was clear in claiming that “[i]f there are no ‘reproducing objects,’ if there is no representation, then of course no imaginative world is constituted.”⁸⁸ In this regard, Blaustein noticed a shift in focus: one does not hear “mere” sounds, but rather, e.g., a phone ringing or a train departing “directly.” He described this shift as “objectifying” (*uprzedmiotowienie*) heard sounds or drones, and he held that here one hears sounds *as* the sounds *of* some objects.⁸⁹ Stated differently, the listener changes her *attitude* toward what is experienced; she is focused on the reproduced objects instead of the reproducing objects.

According to Blaustein, the represented world is constituted for the listener’s consciousness as the imaginative space of the radio drama. This is possible since the sounds and murmurs one hears are recorded closer to or farther away from the microphone. This gives the listener the impression that some *objects*, i.e., the represented objects, are represented in the fictional space as closer to or farther away from the listener. Therefore, one “measures” these distances in the fictional space, and the listener projects herself into the imaginative world—of course, *not* into the real world, e.g., the radio studio where the microphone is placed. Of course, this space is given originally as a purely auditory space, i.e., it is given in the form of acousion. It seems that Blaustein was right to say that the space is not oriented: there is no left or right side, unless one imaginatively presents the world to oneself in a visual way.⁹⁰ In any case, even if only a few sounds are heard by the listener, they give some suggestions regarding how to represent the imaginative world of the radio drama. Blaustein wrote:

The ticking of a clock, a knock on the door, a window closing: these all inform the listener that she “is” in the apartment; other murmurs and sounds [inform] that she is in an overcrowded café or at the opera house before the performance starts. The content of the dialog may include further suggestions so that the listener immediately operates with a schematic situational plan. The center of the spatial world centered around the microphone has distant parts. The departing train does not fall into an abyss but proceeds along a path; the storm rages somewhere outside the cottage, which is represented only by the rustling of trees swaying in the wind or the noise of rain or hail.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 16: “Gdzie bowiem brak ‘przedmiotów odtwarzających,’ gdzie nie ma reprezentacji, tam nie konstytuuje się oczywiście świat imaginatywny.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 157. My translation. French translation: Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques, 112.

⁸⁹ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 6. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 150. French translation: Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques, 112.

⁹⁰ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 7. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 150. French translation: Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques, 113.

⁹¹ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 7–8: “Tykanie zegara, pukanie o drzwi, zamykanie okna informują słuchacza, że ‘znajduje się’ w mieszkaniu, inne szmery i dźwięki, że jest w przepelnionej kawiarni lub w operze przed rozpoczęciem przedstawienia. Treść dialogu zawiera ewent. dalsze wskaźniki tak, iż słuchacz wnet operuje jak gdyby schematycznym planem sytuacyjnym. Skupiony dookoła centrum ośrodek przestrzennego świata ma swe dalsze domyślne części. Odjeżdżający pociąg nie wpada w przepaść, lecz posuwa się naprzód jakąś drogą,—burza szaleje gdzieś poza obrębem domku, do którego dochodzą tylko szelesty rozkołysanych przez

The imaginative world constituted in the listener's experience therefore has inherent horizons. This also holds for (imaginative) spatiality and for (imaginative) time. Even if a radio drama lasts 30 minutes, this period represents, e.g., weeks, months, or even years in the imaginative world. The sounds or drones one hears, however, do not present the *entire* imaginative world. In the fragment quoted above, Blaustein was clear that the world is a schematic object. By claiming this, he adapted Ingarden's idea that a literary work of art involves *spots of indeterminacy*.⁹² Ingarden—and, following him, also Blaustein—understood these as gaps in content that cannot be filled by further acts.⁹³ In *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*], one reads that a radio drama contains many spots of indeterminacy, and for this reason, it has a schematic structure; however, the listener does not have to intuitively remove these spots. As Blaustein put it, creative images are unnecessary here. For instance, technically, the listener does not have to present to herself the appearance of the characters represented in a radio drama.

Blaustein claimed that the imaginative world can be constituted not only by non-verbal sounds or murmurs. Verbal descriptions or the dialog of the represented characters can also contribute to the imaginative world. As already mentioned, verbal sounds such as words or sentences can be a part of the listener's acousion. However, all of the elements that cannot be "heard" due to non-verbal sounds and that are constituted on the basis of a verbal description (given, e.g., by the narrator of the drama) are represented on the basis of signitive perception. As such, signitive presentations provide non-intuitive representations of meaning.⁹⁴ This topic was discussed by Blaustein on October 15, 1936, as part of Ingarden's aesthetics seminar, during which he presented a talk on the radio experience.⁹⁵ In his critical remark on Blaustein's idea, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz claimed that it is misleading to classify the perception of a radio drama as signitive. In Ajdukiewicz's opinion, this form of perception takes place only if the one listens to a drama which is read by a reader; however, this is comparable to a situation in which one reads a book or a drama oneself. In response, Blaustein held that signitive perception can be a part of the whole lived experience of the listener; e.g., one perceives the action of a radio drama due to signitive representations, i.e., due to words uttered by actors.⁹⁶ Next, Ajdukiewicz clarified that listeners follow the action of a radio drama and do not

wiatr drzew, uderzenia deszczu lub gradu." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 150. My translation. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 113.

⁹² See Blaustein's direct reference to Ingarden and his theory of spots of indeterminacy, in: *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 14. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 155–156. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 120.

⁹³ See Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 250. Reprint in 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 261. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 246.

⁹⁴ Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 15. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 156. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 121.

⁹⁵ See the protocol (by Irena Krzemicka) from the meeting: Ulicka (ed.), *Lwowskie czwartki Romana W. Ingardena 1934–1937*, 254–259. Unfortunately, the text of Blaustein's paper is lost.

⁹⁶ Ulicka (ed.), *Lwowskie czwartki Romana W. Ingardena 1934–1937*, 255.

follow *what* the actors are talking about. The latter is the object one “hears,” and as Ajdukiewicz put it, this is “a second layer,” which is less important than the action itself. Blaustein seemed to agree with this clarification only partially since he held that actors can talk about their inner psychic lives, e.g., about their emotions, and this layer is accessible only due to the actors’ verbal reports. It is for precisely this reason that it is misleading to hold that the perception of a radio drama excludes signitive perception; rather, this perception is the part which builds the complex phenomenon.

The Ajdukiewicz–Blaustein exchange showed that the scope of the intentional objects of the radio experience can include the psychic lives of the characters represented in radio dramas. Blaustein addressed this topic in § 4 of his 1938 book. He noted that radio drama—unlike a theater play or film—presents only a few selected and characteristic situations in which the relevant character reveals her psychic life and her mental states. This limitation is necessary due to time constraints. Blaustein put forward the thesis that technical restrictions mean that a radio drama often presents a character’s inner life explicitly and directly; after all, radio is limited in its capacity to represent the imaginative world.⁹⁷ For this reason, many radio dramas are, as Blaustein put it, “homocentric,” i.e., they are focused on the human being and her inner life. To show someone’s inner life, radio drama operates with the human voice (e.g., its emotional tinge), uttered words, and dialog. The listener can apprehend both *how* characters are talking and the *meanings* of uttered sentences. Of course, clues about a character’s psychic life may take the form of non-verbal sounds, e.g., of hitting a table, a cry, a laugh, etc. However, the main representation of a character’s inner life is the voice. For Blaustein, the voice *expresses* someone’s mental state. As he observed:

A voice may sound as if it is “tired,” “apathetic,” “intense,” “energetic,” “gentle,” or “firm,” it may reveal—regardless of the meaning of what is said, but in connection with the situation—anxiety, depression, excitement, agitation, anger, concern, despair, love, amazement, delight, humility, embarrassment, joy, compassion, contempt, etc. ... A voice also reveals the age, gender, and temperament of the speaker, the way in which they express themselves—their “personal culture.” A voice, which might be “soft” or “hard,” resonant or hoarse, etc., can also cause the listener to like or dislike the speaker.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 28. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 166. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 133–134.

⁹⁸ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 29: “Głos może tak brzmieć, iż wydaje się nam ‘zmęczony,’ ‘apatyczny,’ ‘żywy,’ ‘energiczny,’ ‘łagodny,’ ‘stanowczy,’ może zdradzać—niezależnie od sensu wypowiedzi, ale w związku z sytuacją—niepokój, trwogę, przygnębienie, podniecenie, wzburzenie, gniew, troskę, rozpacz, miłość, zdumienie, zachwyt, pokorę, zawstydzenie, radość, współczucie, pogardę itp. Ekspresywną rolę posiada też wypowiedzianie się krzykiem, szeptem, czy śpiewem, mówienie patetyczne, wyuczone, ‘ciepłe,’ przesadne albo mówienie w sposób normalny, ale tak, jakby to z trudem przychodziło, jak gdyby ‘nienormalny’ sposób był sztucznie pohamowany, stłumiony. Głos zdradza nam też wiek, płeć i temperament osoby, sposób wysławiania się—jej ‘kulturę.’ Głos może również przyczynić się do wzbudzenia sympatii lub antypatii słuchacza, jak np. głos ‘miękki’ lub ‘twardy,’ dźwięczny, ochrypli itp.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 167. My translation. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 135.

The quoted description concerns how a voice can be apprehended to present a character's inner life. Of course, the list of different styles of speaking may include the vocabulary used by the dramatic character; however, again, the way in which acoustic content is presented is an important factor in the listener's experience.

Regarding the question of inner life, it can be noted that Blaustein referred to Volkelt's theory of empathy to describe how the listener *understands* the character's psyche. This empathic attitude consists in experiencing *together* with the character represented in a radio drama. The music that accompanies dramatic actions is a factor in facilitating empathic attitudes. However, according to Blaustein, given that music and verbal sounds are both acoustic, it is difficult to follow them simultaneously.⁹⁹ On this basis, he postulated that music should be comprehended only as a preliminary element which puts the listener in a suitable mood. Music, as Blaustein wrote, "infects" (*zaraża*) the listener with the atmosphere of the setting in which the action takes place and which is represented in a radio drama.¹⁰⁰ All in all, he held that the fact that the listener apprehends only acoustic sensations does not preclude the possibility of presenting someone's inner life.

9.2.2 *The Ontology of a Radio Drama*

In Sect. 8.4.2, I argued that *phenomenology* (in a broad sense) in Blaustein's aesthetics, i.e., how one experiences an object, determines *ontology*. To use the Brentanian-Twardowskian language, one can say that presentations determine objects in his theory. This thesis also holds for his study of the radio experience. Indeed, how one lives through acoustic sensations determines the object represented in said experience; after all, representing objects are correlated with represented ones. This, of course, implies the ontological status of radio drama. First of all, it is a multi-strata object which includes four layers: (1) the acoustic layer, (2) meaning unities (this layer is built from the meanings of uttered sentences), (3) imaginative objects, and (4) the stratum of appearances (*wyglądy*) of these objects.¹⁰¹ Layer (1) includes the acoustic sensations originally experienced by the listener. Layers (2), (3), and (4) are constituted on the basis of layer (1) because they arise in the act of apprehending the presenting content. Thus, layer (2) is accessible if the listener comprehends acoustic content *as* meaningful verbal voices. Layer (3) arises with the listener's active attempt to fill in the spots of indeterminacy that are inherent in the content of radio drama; here, one imaginatively presents to oneself (of course, due to one's acousion) the imaginative world. Layer (4) is accessible due to the

⁹⁹Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 32. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 169. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 137–138.

¹⁰⁰Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 32. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 169–170. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 138.

¹⁰¹Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 59, fn. x. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 182, fn. 18. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 157, fn. 14.

listener's perception of the action of a radio drama without an intuitive presentation of concrete objects; this layer corresponds to the *schematic* structure of radio drama. Again, every stratum is correlated with relevant acts of the listener. Therefore, these strata are accessible because the listener adopts different attitudes toward the presenting content.

In § 1 of his *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*], Blaustein formulated a four-part classification of different genres of radio broadcasts. This classification, as we will soon see, was based on how one experiences the sounds or background sounds heard in radio dramas. Blaustein indicates (1) non-imaginative broadcasts, (2) imaginative broadcasts, (3) imaginative and "homocentric" broadcasts (sometimes called "dramatic broadcasts"), and (4) music broadcasts.¹⁰² Ciccotti explained that "[t]he first category includes reportage, interviews, radio news and educational programs. Here, we follow the editing of sounds, voices and noises from the real world, all of which should be easily recognizable in order to comprehend the message."¹⁰³ Additionally, the perception of these types of radio broadcasts does not constitute the imaginary world; the represented object is located by the listener in the same surrounding world. In short, no imaginative presentations are included in the perception. More precisely, the listener comprehends the reproducing objects (sounds or murmurs) as referring to the represented objects that exist in the real world. The second group includes types of radio broadcasts which require references to represented objects that exist in a fictional or imaginative world. This group covers non-homocentric radio dramas in which non-verbal sounds or murmurs are the main element that constitutes the imaginative world. For instance, the listener "hears" someone knocking, a door creaking, the wind blowing, etc. Here, the listener's fantasy intuitively constitutes the imaginative world present to her. Ciccotti suggested that brief verbal phrases or short musical pieces should be included in these radio dramas.¹⁰⁴ However, again, the work of art cannot be homocentric. In turn, the third group places the human being or one's inner life at the center of the work of art. Therefore, in addition to non-verbal sounds or murmurs, verbal sounds are also present. This group refers to radio broadcasts that constitute the imaginative world (due to the listener's acousion) and are homocentric. As already stated, radio dramas mainly serve to present the character's inner life. In addition to uttered words, music can also serve to present the relevant mood. The fourth group, of course, also includes sounds and murmurs, but they are apprehended as elements of melodies or music. This category includes transmissions of live concerts. Ciccotti held that here a concert is presented without any editing,¹⁰⁵ yet Blaustein himself seemed to leave this issue open. He probably would have argued that music broadcasts can include both live and recorded transmissions. In

¹⁰² Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 4. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 148. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 109.

¹⁰³ Ciccotti, *The Philology and Aesthetics of Radio according to Leopold Blaustein*, 148.

¹⁰⁴ Ciccotti, *The Philology and Aesthetics of Radio according to Leopold Blaustein*, 148.

¹⁰⁵ Ciccotti, *The Philology and Aesthetics of Radio according to Leopold Blaustein*, 148.

any case, the perception of this type of broadcast does not require the constitution of an imaginative world because it refers to real events. The listener can aesthetically experience the musical work of art.

In § 5 of his 1938 book, Blaustein discussed another aspect of the structure of radio drama. He stated that, in contrast to a painting or a monument, a radio drama is a *dynamic* work of art.¹⁰⁶ This implies that radio dramas have a *phasic* (temporal) structure and that the perception of the drama develops over a certain period of time. This, however, requires that the listener focuses for some time on what she hears. In addition, particular sounds are apprehended by the listener in a certain structure. For instance, the listener *first* “hears” someone knocking, *next* a door is creaking, and *finally* the wind is blowing, etc. This temporal order or sequence of sounds is possible to apprehend because one *remembers* what one has heard in previous moments. Therefore, although sounds are originally given at every moment, one lives through them as a whole or as a united object. For this reason, Blaustein held that the perception of a radio drama is not limited to the “present” (*bieżąca*) phase of the drama but also encompasses remembered phases.¹⁰⁷ Here, one notices a strict parallel between the ontological structure of radio drama (as a temporal object) and the way in which it is experienced; given this, it should not come as a surprise that the perception of radio drama also has a phasic structure. To describe this phenomenon, Blaustein referred to Ingarden’s idea of “living memory” (*żywa pamięć*), which determines the listener’s experience as a continuum of subsequent events. Blaustein stated that while listening to a radio drama, “[...] every new ‘now’ is embraced not only by the past but also by the future—not only by past events but also by anticipated events.”¹⁰⁸ Therefore, every moment “now” is accompanied by temporal horizons: one *remembers* what one just heard but one also *anticipates* subsequent sounds. Ingarden’s theory of “living memory,” which resembles Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time consciousness, was formulated by Ingarden in § 36 of *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, where he referred to Bergson when analyzing the temporal structure of experience.¹⁰⁹ Blaustein used this theory to describe the perception of radio drama.

Given the temporal structure just described, Blaustein held that one can adopt a dual attitude toward a radio drama. The listener can be focused either on the current moment or on the expected or anticipated phases. Blaustein called the former

¹⁰⁶ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 39. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 174. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 145.

¹⁰⁷ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 42. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 177. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 149.

¹⁰⁸ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 43–44: “[...] ciągle nowe ‘teraz,’ otoczone stale nie tylko przeszłością, ale i przyszłością, nie tylko wypadkami już dokonanymi, ale też zapowiadającymi się dopiero.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 178. My translation. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 150. The reference to Ingarden is missing in the French version.

¹⁰⁹ Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 235–245. Reprint in 1965: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 247–257. Trans. Grabowicz, in: *The Literary Work of Art*, 233–242.

attitude *contemplative* (*kontemplatywna*) and the latter *expectative* (*ekspektywne*).¹¹⁰ He added that an expectative attitude is adopted by the listener after the action of the drama is presented and not at the very beginning of listening to the broadcast. These subjective methods of presentation enable the director to change the pace of the action. The listener's perception is therefore receptive and depends on the pace of the radio drama. In this regard, pauses are interesting. On the radio, pauses are always very short, and as such, they do not provide enough time to think about dramatic actions. Blaustein stated that silence in radio is ambiguous: it can refer to the structure of the dynamic work of art (e.g., silence at the beginning of a radio drama), or it can refer to silence in the imaginative world (e.g., characters stop talking). Overall, the phasic structure of radio drama implies that the listener experiences it as a continuum or unity.

9.2.3 *The Aesthetic Perception of a Radio Drama*

§ 6 of *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*] is devoted to the aesthetic characteristic of the perception of radio drama. Blaustein begins with the remark that aesthetic perception can concern both artistic and non-artistic objects; simply put, a radio drama does not have to be a work of art to constitute an aesthetic experience. Like in his general aesthetic theory, Blaustein also held that the listener is an active subject of aesthetic experience, which should not be considered a mere passive emotion. He wrote: “[t]he aesthetic experience, however, is not a mere emotion created on the basis of a passive and purely receptive perception of an object; [it is] an experience that actively shapes its object because it depends on the qualities that reach the subject's consciousness and what she overlooks.”¹¹¹ Of course, Blaustein did not reject the idea that an aesthetic experience can be based on qualities that are (objective) properties of an object. In this regard, his key insight was that aesthetic experience depends upon the first-person activity of the listener, i.e., on the ways of perception (*sposoby percepcji*). After all, even a work of art can be a mere “consumable,” i.e., an experience focused on non-aesthetic emotions. However, a shift in the way it is experienced can constitute an aesthetic experience for the listener.

Blaustein explained that the active role of the listener is evident in the constitution of the imaginative world. The constitution of the imaginative world as aesthetic depends on the following factors: (1) relevant *ways* of constituting the imaginative

¹¹⁰ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 44. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 178. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 151.

¹¹¹ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 48: “Doznanie estetyczne nie jest jednak tylko emocją, powstałą na tle biernej, czysto odbiorczej percepcji przedmiotu, ale przeżyciem kształtującym czynnie swój przedmiot, chociażby dzięki temu, iż od niego zależy to, jakie walory dojdą do świadomości doznającego, a jakie on przeoczy.” Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 181. My translation. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 155.

world; (2) relevant *ways* of filling the spots of indeterminacy that are inherent to the structure of radio drama; (3) *ways* of intuitive presentation of the imaginative world (not only visual but also on the basis of acousion); (4) co-empathic experience with the characters of a radio drama; and (5) understanding the inner lives of the represented characters.¹¹² Blaustein also listed further aesthetic qualities of radio broadcasts that can intensify the listener's aesthetic experience: (6) the acoustic layer is well designed and, as such, provides the listener with many clues regarding how to construct the imaginative world; (7) the tone of voice or the uttered words are adequately selected to express the relevant mental states; and (8) dynamic construction of the dramatic action. Blaustein noted that properties (6)–(8) are apprehended not only when the listener is focused on the represented objects but also when one is focused on the representing objects, i.e., on the acoustic layer of the radio drama. However, in his opinion, if one is strongly focused on the latter, the aesthetic character of the experience might fall away. For this reason, the most important factor grounding the listener's aesthetic experience is the listener's attitude toward the imaginative world. This is a necessary yet not sufficient condition. In this context, Blaustein once again referred to the fact that radio dramas can be the object of, as he put it, pure consumption, i.e., perception without aesthetic emotions that contains many "gaps" (*luki*), i.e., spots of indeterminacy that are *not* actively filled by the listener. As Blaustein explained, "[c]onsumption does not require such a full apprehension of the perceived object as aesthetic perception does."¹¹³

It is worth noting that Blaustein's analysis of the aesthetic perception of radio drama showed a clear difference between his approach and Ingarden's view of the aesthetic experience. Three points can be listed here. First, they disagreed on how to understand the aesthetic object. For Ingarden, the aesthetic object does not represent a material object but is a newly constituted (or "created") object; this is possible due to the relevant aesthetic experience which arises together with a preliminary emotion.¹¹⁴ By contrast, Blaustein held that aesthetic perception is a fusion of passive (or receptive) and active elements. He held that the perceived object is "out there" (*zastany*) but is not "created" (*stwarzany*); thus, the perception of a radio drama is based on perceptual and imaginative presentations that are mainly passive, but later, fantasy (creative) or schematic presentations come into play.¹¹⁵ Therefore, for Blaustein, the radio drama, as an object perceived by a listener, is *identical* to the aesthetic

¹¹² Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 49. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 181. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 156.

¹¹³ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 50: "Konsumpcja nie wymaga bowiem tak pełnego ujęcia przedmiotu percepcji, jak percepcja estetyczna." Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 182. My translation. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 157.

¹¹⁴ More on this issue, see Sect. 8.4.1.

¹¹⁵ Blaustein, *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego*, 52. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 183–184. French translation: *Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques*, 159. In the French version of the text, unlike in the original version, Blaustein did not mention Ingarden in this very context.

object; the latter is in fact the original object, yet it is actively changed by the listener. Second, they disagreed on how to understand the first phase of the aesthetic experience. For Ingarden, aesthetic experience is based on a preliminary emotion, while for Blaustein, emotion is not enough since it is always accompanied by a perceptual act. Third, both philosophers assessed anticipation differently. Whereas Ingarden held that anticipation often ruins one's aesthetic experience since it breaks with the current moment, Blaustein stated that anticipation is a significant factor in the aesthetic value of radio drama. Nonetheless, even if Blaustein rejected some of Ingarden's ideas, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*], as we have seen above, adapted and developed other themes from *Das literarische Kunstwerk*.

9.2.4 *An Outline of Blaustein's Application of Descriptive Analysis*

Blaustein clearly stated that his analysis of the perception of radio drama is mainly a theoretical project. Nonetheless, the original Polish version of the book ended with a list of *practical* conclusions, including concrete guidelines regarding how to plan a radio drama to improve its reception. He lists a total of 23 suggestions.¹¹⁶ Importantly, the majority of these are formulated on the basis of his study of radio perception. With these ideas in mind, it can be argued that Blaustein applied his first-person analysis of the phenomenon of the radio experience to a non-theoretical context. In short, he applied phenomenology or descriptive-psychological tools to media studies. Let me look closer at Blaustein's guidelines to show how he used the concrete results of his analysis.

First, (1) Blaustein suggested replacing the phrase "theater of imagination" with "radio theater." The argument for doing so is psychological in nature, as imagination is an unnecessary element of the perception of radio drama. It follows that (2) the structure of a radio drama might encourage the listener to employ her visual imagination to visualize the action, yet the director cannot assume that every listener will do this. (3) The structure should be focused on the acoustic strata of the broadcast since, as shown by Blaustein, the psychological basis of the listener's experience is acousion. (4) Every type of radio drama—as defined in Sect. 9.2.2—can be considered a potential aesthetic object. (5) Descriptions are less important than the acoustic "atmosphere" of a radio drama. (6) It is not recommended to change the setting of a radio drama since broadcasts are too short to present a multitude of places. (7) The time represented in the imaginative world can be different than that in the real world because the imaginative world has inherent temporal horizons. However, (8) the priority in this regard should be the action's dynamism

¹¹⁶ Blaustein, *O percepcji sluchowiska radiowego*, 65–70. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 193–196. The list is not included in the French edition of the text.

to facilitate the dramatic structure of the broadcast. For this reason, (9) a speaker should not comment on or explain the action; otherwise, the dynamism will be lessened. (10) Perception of a radio drama that is focused on the current moment is based on auditory sensations. (11) Every radio drama has its “own” time horizon, which is inherent to the imaginative world and, as such, does not have to be broadcast live. (12) Since the listener cannot focus her attention during the entire broadcast, it is recommended to include a limited number of characters.

Furthermore, (13) due to the perception of radio drama being specific to the medium, the presentation of a character’s inner life is different than in real life. Nonetheless, (14) in homocentric (i.e., centered on human beings) dramas, one has plenty of acoustic tools with which to present the psychic lives of characters. Moreover, (15) acoustic tools are more intense than visual tools; therefore, acoustic tools make it easier to empathically experience the drama’s characters. (16) Verbal words and music cannot be effectively perceived at the same time. Music might be used to sketch the relevant (emotional) “atmosphere.” (17) Given that a listener is often too tired to follow a radio drama’s action in detail, the broadcast should be rather short. (18) The perception of radio drama is focused on the current moment; therefore, reproductive presentations are almost absent. However, a broadcast cannot refer to the listener’s memory too often. (19) As shown, the listener can adopt a dual attitude that is either contemplative or expectative, whereas the former is primarily aesthetic, the latter is focused on non-aesthetic emotions. To improve the listener’s aesthetic perception, one should encourage the listener to listen to the same radio drama again. (20) The whole perceptive lived experience also includes preliminary phases and subsequent phases; any broadcast should take into account this horizontal structure to form relevant acoustic objects while perceiving it. (21) Radio dramas should not focus on the consumption of non-aesthetic emotions; rather, they should improve aesthetic experiences. (22) To do this, the content of a radio drama should be isolated, i.e., the broadcast should not include a radio audience. Finally, (23) the listener’s perceptual abilities and aesthetic sensibilities improve as they engage with the material; given this, different radio dramas can present different levels of the work of art depending on the audiences they are intended for.

Almost all of the listed suggestions are deeply rooted in Blaustein’s descriptive-psychological analysis of the perception of radio drama. He referred to the first-person perspective, i.e., the listener’s experience, to justify even technical recommendations: for instance, limiting the number of characters represented in a radio drama or the time limit. In a nutshell, for Blaustein, descriptive-psychological analysis of the phenomenon of listening to the radio can play an important role in non-philosophical contexts. In conclusion, it can be argued that the 1938 book actually serves to *apply* descriptive tools to formulate concrete practical recommendations for radio drama directors. Therefore, by revealing the structure of the listener’s experience, Blaustein was able to show how a radio drama should be structured and built to improve its reception. Of course, I do not claim that the value of the 1938 book on radio lays in this clear attempt to implement descriptive tools. My point is

that this practical tendency is an important aspect of Blaustein's philosophical enterprise. This conclusion mirrors Wioletta Miskiewicz's general idea of two trends in Blaustein's work: *theoretical* and *applied*.¹¹⁷ Whereas the *theoretical* aspect of his work concerned the main concepts and the methodological basis of describing conscious experience, his *applied* analysis used these theoretical tools to analyze concrete phenomena, such as how to encourage an aesthetic attitude in radio audiences or to determine an artistic practice. It is clear that the 1938 book *O percepcji słuchowska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*] was one of his *applied* works.

The present chapter has discussed Blaustein's phenomenology of media experience as an example of detailed studies of selected aesthetic phenomena, i.e., the cinemagoer's experience or listening to a radio drama. My task was to develop the opinion formulated by many scholars who have claimed that Blaustein was a pioneer in studies on the perception of media.¹¹⁸ I have attempted to show that one may comprehend these studies as *phenomenological* in a broad sense, namely, as an application of descriptive tools in revealing the structure and character of the first-person experience of media. Of course, Blaustein explicitly wrote about the "psychology" of the cinema experience, and he emphasized that his analysis of the listener's experience took place on the border with "psychology." However, he referred in these contexts to his descriptive psychology, which is *phenomenologically* grounded. To phrase it differently, Blaustein was not interested in the cinemagoer's or listener's experiences as natural phenomena; rather, he inquired into the phenomena *as such*. As a result, he explored the ways of givenness or manifestation (*Gegebenheitsweisen*) of mediated objects. Therefore, his analysis was not psychological in a strict sense but philosophical through and through. He descriptively analyzed *how* one experiences film or radio drama.

Given this, his phenomenology of the media experience can be summarized as follows: (1) Media experiences are complex phenomena, i.e., they include different types of mental phenomena, yet they form a unity of a higher order. Therefore, they include presentations, emotions, and judgments. Consequently, (2) every type of media experience is *sui generis*. This means that there is no general structure of media experience as such; instead, it is diverse, depending on different ways of the

¹¹⁷"One can roughly distinguish two trends in Blaustein's work. On the one hand, the *theoretical* work focuses on the problem of intuition in the sense of immediate, evident knowledge, as well as on the typology of mental states. On the other hand, he published on *applied* topics, in the philosophy of arts and the philosophy of media and on questions of education—liberally commenting, among other things, on the laziness and the lack of discipline among high school pupils." Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 182–183.

¹¹⁸See, e.g., Czerkawski, Stępień, Wielgus, Poland, philosophy in; Rosńska, *Blaustein. Koncepcja odbioru mediów*, 22–23; Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 182, 187; Brudzińska, *Aisthesis*, 11; Pluta, *Psychologiczne badania nad mediami—droga do powstania nowej dyscypliny*, 239.

givenness of objects. As shown above, the cinemagoer's experience is based mostly on visual presentations, whereas the listener's experience is based mostly on acou-sion. (3) For Blaustein, media experiences are *direct*, meaning they are perceptual. For instance, one *sees* a train at the station *on* the cinema screen, or one *hears* a train departing from the station *in* a radio drama. Next, (4) the object of a given media experience is accessible due to the relevant attitude that is adopted by the cinemagoer or the listener. Blaustein was clear that one could refer to the closer or the distant object. Therefore, one experiences colorful shapes on the cinema screen or acoustic sensations, but one can apprehend these shapes or sounds as components that represent objects. (5) Media experiences constitute fictional or imaginative worlds which have inherent spatial and temporal properties. (6) As such, they refer to schematic objects which can be filled by the on-going contemplation of the cinemagoer or the listener; their acts fill spots of indeterminacy. (7) Media experience has a temporal or phasic structure. Both film and radio drama are experienced in on-going acts. (8) Moreover, the media experience is also dependent on non-mental factors or contexts, including darkness in the cinema or the dynamism of a radio broadcast. Furthermore, he maintained that (9) a media experience can serve as the basis of an aesthetic experience, but (10) it is more frequently the basis of non-aesthetic consumption. Finally, (11) the phenomenology of the media experience can be applied in non-philosophical contexts, e.g., to reveal the educational role of film or to define concrete recommendations regarding how to improve the listener's perception of a radio drama. With these ideas in mind, it can be concluded that both Blaustein's works discussed in this chapter—*Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [*Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer*] (1933) and *O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego* [*On the Perception of Radio Drama*] (1938)—presented a consistent development of his philosophical enterprise, which was focused on the descriptive and systematic analysis of lived experiences.

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Chapter 10

Conclusion



This book has aimed to present, discuss, and critically analyze Leopold Blaustein's philosophy in different frameworks which determined its thematic scope, main concepts, arguments, and developments. This goal stemmed from the lack of exhaustive studies on the legacy of Blaustein. Some scholars have examined selected topics in his writings, wherein his view on Edmund Husserl's theory of intentionality is probably the most discussed,¹ but there has not yet been a systematic examination of his various contributions to philosophy. This is not to say, of course, that his thought was unimportant. Just the opposite. In the scholarly literature, one can easily find authors who testify that Blaustein was an important and novel thinker whose ideas were ahead of his time.² This opinion is fully justified. I have presented his intellectual biography in the previous chapters, and against this background, I have discussed his theoretical struggles with the question of the methods used in descriptive psychology and phenomenology, as well as his philosophy of mind, his aesthetics, and his pioneering analyses of the experience of media. Considering the results of our analysis, one can agree that Blaustein's explorations were indeed eclectic, but his readings of, among others, Husserl, Kazimierz Twardowski, Moriz Geiger, and Alexius Meinong were marked by careful questioning of the analyzed theories and, as a result, critical assessments. Undoubtedly, Blaustein referred to other theories not so much to repeat their main points but to attempt to achieve original outcomes; for instance, he critically reformulated and enlarged Twardowski's taxonomy of presentations to describe phenomena such as cinemagoers' experiences or embodied perception.

¹E.g., Gilicka, Leopolda Blausteina krytyka fenomenologii, 105–114; Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 181–188; Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 93–103.

²E.g., Brudzińska, Aisthesis, 11; Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 187; Pluta, Psychologiczne badania nad mediami—droga do powstania nowej dyscypliny, 239; Rosińska, *Blaustein. Koncepcja odbioru mediów*, 22–23.

How, then, should one define Blaustein's philosophy? To consider Blaustein's contribution and to address the question of how to understand and assess his philosophy, it is important to realize that his thought was developed at the crossroads of different trends present in nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology and philosophy. Blaustein's references—direct or indirect—make reading his writings challenging. Furthermore, he discussed not only mainstream authors but he often also considered peripheral theories; for example, his readings of Wilhelm Schapp or Geiger are unique not only within the context of Polish philosophy but also rare in regard to the reception of these authors outside Germany in general. Consequently, it is difficult to solve the problem of the novelty of the theories formulated by Blaustein himself; at the same time, it is too easy to underscore only parts of his complex philosophy. Unfortunately, this is often the case for some readings formulated in the scholarly literature. In general, his contribution is commonly regarded as focused only on Twardowski and Husserl, but his references to, e.g., Gestalt theory, the Graz School or humanistic psychology—not to mention seemingly peripheral polemics, such as those with Irena Filozofówna—are often overlooked. As a result, one is unable to define his philosophy properly. An example of such a misleading reading is Jan Woleński's and Marek Pokropski's idea of calling Blaustein a proponent of "analytic phenomenology."³ This label is enigmatic since it does not explain in what sense Blaustein's philosophy is indeed "analytical" or "phenomenological." At the very beginning of the book, I critically elaborated Woleński's and Pokropski's idea by tracking its confusing consequences. In this context, I have suggested that a more adequate classification of Blaustein was formulated by Wioletta Miskiewicz and, in part, by Guido Küng, both of whom situate him within the broad context of the Brentanian tradition.⁴ From Miskiewicz's point of view, the "analyticity" of Blaustein's philosophy consists in his attempts to describe conscious experience, whereas its "phenomenological" nature is rooted in the subject matter, i.e., intentionality. Similarly, Küng emphasized that Blaustein's interest in Husserl's philosophy is just as important as the legacy of descriptive psychology. In general, it is clear that Miskiewicz's and Küng's position is more promising when one is attempting to understand Blaustein's philosophy, even if their idea requires a more detailed discussion. First and foremost, however, Miskiewicz and Küng did not follow Woleński's and Pokropski's puzzling view on "analyticity." By doing so, Miskiewicz and Küng did not fall into a misleading or false reading of Blaustein's philosophy as an example of purely conceptual analysis.

It is important to keep in mind that Blaustein's philosophy is rooted—due to critical elaborations and hidden inspirations—in different traditions. Therefore, one should be careful in categorizing his thought. Thus far, it is clear that one example of such a misleading and oversimplified typology is an attempt to comprehend

³ Pokropski, Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content, 94; Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, 310, fn. 11; Woleński, *Jews in Polish Philosophy*, 77.

⁴ Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 181; Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 262–263, fn. 69.

Blaustein solely as a kind of Husserlian phenomenologist. By claiming this, some argue that Blaustein seemed to overcome Brentano's descriptive psychology (which seemed to be outdated in the 1920s and 1930s) and accepted Husserl's phenomenology (which was much more popular at that time and promised to omit the theoretical dilemmas raised by Brentano's project). Zofia Rosińska, for instance, held that Blaustein's turn toward phenomenology was dictated by the methodological difficulties of combining aesthetics with descriptive psychology. She recalled that aesthetics in Blaustein's philosophy was developed on the "border with psychology,"⁵ but he faced problems with combining both fields. For this reason, according to Rosińska, Blaustein seemed to seek "[...] a research method which allows one to omit, on the one hand, psychologism, i.e., a reductionism of the investigated phenomenon to empirical psychic lived experiences, and, on the other, abstractionism, i.e., a full detachment of research from experience, from the experienced concrete."⁶ Rosińska concluded that "[s]uch a method became for Blaustein a phenomenological method,"⁷ which Blaustein, as she put it, "took" from Husserl. A comparable argument was also used by Krzysztof Wieczorek, who stated that Blaustein "naturally" favored Husserl's phenomenology over descriptive psychology. Wieczorek wrote:

However, [Blaustein] soon discovered difficulties, inaccuracies and even aporias in the object theories derived from Franz Brentano and developed by his students [...] and naturally he followed the trail of phenomenology, understood by him as a research method of describing mental acts which are given in the immanent experience of the subject of knowledge.⁸

Rosińska and Wieczorek were not the only ones who insisted on comprehending Blaustein as a (Husserlian) phenomenologist. This interpretation was also formulated by Barry Smith⁹ or, more recently, Maria van der Schaar.¹⁰ Stanisław Pazura even goes a step further by claiming that Blaustein was an eminent member of, as he put it, the "Polish phenomenological school of aesthetics."¹¹ The fact that Blaustein investigated a phenomenological theory—more precisely, Husserl's

⁵E.g., Blaustein, *Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym*, 399. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 136.

⁶Rosińska, Leopold Blaustein—Styk psychologii i estetyki, xvii: "[...] metody badawczej, która pozwalałaby uniknąć z jednej strony psychologizmu, czyli sprowadzenia badanego zjawiska do empirycznych przeżyć psychicznych, a z drugiej abstrakcjonizmu, czyli całkowitego oderwania rozważań od doświadczenia, od przeżywanego konkretnego." My translation.

⁷Rosińska, Leopold Blaustein—Styk psychologii i estetyki, xvii: "Taką metodą stała się dla Blausteina analiza fenomenologiczna." My translation.

⁸Wieczorek, Leopolda Blausteina interpretacja świata zjawiskowego, 157–158: "Szybko jednak [Blaustein] odkrył trudności, nieścisłości, a nawet aporie w wywodzących się od Franza Brentana, a stworzonych przez jego uczniów, teoriach przedmiotu [...] i w naturalny sposób poszedł dalej tropem fenomenologii, pojmowanej przezeń jako naukowa metoda badania i opisu aktów psychicznych, danych w doświadczeniu wewnętrznym podmiotu poznania." My translation.

⁹Smith, *Austrian Philosophy*, 157.

¹⁰Schaar, *Kazimierz Twardowski*, 12.

¹¹Pazura, *Blaustein, Leopold*, 90.

theory of intentionality—seems to imply that he was a phenomenologist as well, but this line of reasoning is hardly convincing. Contrary to the aforementioned unequivocal acknowledgments, one may point out that they are one-sided. Admittedly, Blaustein discussed and critically elaborated Husserl's philosophy, as examined in Chap. 6, but it is surely too hasty to comprehend him as a follower or a mere epigone of Husserl. Importantly, as we observed in Chap. 5, Blaustein combined Husserl's early view of phenomenology, understood as descriptive psychology, with his 1925 phenomenological psychology project. This fusion shows that one goes too far in claiming that Blaustein's phenomenology can be fully understood only in the context of Husserl and with no reference to descriptive psychology. On the contrary, the topic of descriptive psychology, as shown in Chaps. 3 and 4, is an important and seemingly even dominant trend in Blaustein's thought. Of course, there are clear phenomenological themes—reexamined in light of Gestalt psychology or a clear humanistic approach—in Blaustein's philosophy, yet clearly, there are not enough to agree with Rosińska, Wiczorek and others in claiming that Blaustein was but a (Husserlian) phenomenologist. How, then, should one categorize Blaustein's philosophy?

The outcome of our analysis can be described as follows: admittedly, Blaustein's philosophy has an eclectic character because it combines different trends, but he achieved original results because of his novel method, which was developed by him in the form of *descriptive psychology with phenomenological background*. The value of the method used by Blaustein consists in analyzing not only concrete lived experiences, e.g., embodied aesthetic experiences or cinemagoers' experiences but also the objects which are manifested or present in these experiences, e.g., a work of art or a radio drama. Blaustein himself explicitly called this approach "descriptive psychology" (*psychologia deskryptywna*).¹² Because of the affinities between Blaustein's project and Husserl's 1925 view on psychology, one may call this method phenomenological psychology, but its phenomenological background is understood here in the original framework of the legacy of descriptive psychology. Thus, Blaustein's philosophy is at once descriptive-psychological and phenomenological. With these ideas in mind, one can list the following components of Blaustein's psychology: (1) following Brentano, Twardowski, and Dilthey, Blaustein defined the subject matter of his analyses as psychic phenomena or the psychic life. Next, (2) he emphasized introspection, yet (3) he also accepted retrospection and memory as sources of justified psychological knowledge. (4) He valued psychological experiments, both introspective and based, e.g., on interviews. As a result, (5) Blaustein adopted a naturalistic (in a broad sense) attitude in his psychology; nonetheless, (6) he still accepted a holistic approach when analyzing psychic life, which for him meant—like for Stumpf or Wertheimer—that one should describe experiences as focused not only on concrete and individual objects but also on organized wholes, forms, or Gestalts. (7) The aim of ongoing psychological analyses is

¹²E.g., Blaustein, *Przedstawienia imaginatywne*, 5. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40. Trans. Bokinić, in: *Imaginary Representations*, 210.

to classify presentations in regard to relevant or described types of experiences. Furthermore, (8) Blaustein used some elements of (Twardowski's) analysis of cultural artifacts as psychic products. Finally, (9) he seemed to accept methodological psychologism, even though he rejected ontological psychologism as he attempted (despite some difficulties in his aesthetics) to focus on types of experiences rather than on mere tokens.

In turn, the phenomenological background of Blaustein's philosophy consists in the following factors: (1) Blaustein accepted adequacy as a criterion of descriptive analysis. Moreover, (2) the basis of any psychological description is intuition. (3) Analysis concerns the different attitudes that are adopted by the experiencing subject. (4) Following Ingarden, Blaustein drew a divide between objects of consciousness, which are only experienced (*erlebt*), and intuition, which is living itself or lived through (*durchlebt*). Next, (5) he emphasized the direct givenness of experienced objects. As a result, (6) he was able to analyze different ways of givenness or manifestation (*Gegebenheitsweisen*). To do this, (7) he adopted a metaphysically neutral attitude, which, in turn, allowed him to omit problematic metaphysical presuppositions. (8) Whereas Blaustein did accept a sort of psychological reduction (as he emphasized that descriptive analysis concerns types of lived experiences and, as such, it omits the charge of subjectivism), (9) he rejected both eidetic and transcendental forms of reduction. This rejection should come as no surprise since, as just noted, he accepted a naturalistic approach instead of a transcendental approach. Of course, Blaustein's phenomenology has points in common with Husserl's, but because of its naturalistic or non-transcendental attitude, it is also close to Stumpf's view of phenomenology. To label this kind of phenomenology, in Chap. 5, I mentioned Walter Auerbach's phrase "a phenomenologist in a broad sense," which, according to Auerbach, refers to scholars who do not want to blindly accept Husserl's phenomenology as a whole.¹³ It seems that Blaustein was exactly such a "phenomenologist in a broad sense," choosing not to follow Husserl uncritically but trying to find his own path to "the things themselves." He shared with other phenomenologists, including Husserl, a general intuition that description has to follow experience or be guided by what manifests itself in lived experiences.

However, it should be mentioned that both attitudes present in Blaustein's philosophy—the descriptive-psychological one and the phenomenological one—also share commonalities. To begin with, (1) they emphasize experience and lived experiences (e.g., Brentano, Stumpf, Twardowski, Husserl). Furthermore, (2) they are founded on a descriptive approach, which is often contrasted with an explanatory approach (e.g., Brentano, Dilthey, Husserl). Additionally, (3) they presuppose an understanding of philosophy as a scientific enterprise (e.g., Brentano, Husserl). Finally, (4) they express skepticism about abstract analyses and instead focus on what is concrete (e.g., Dilthey, Ingarden). This summary shows that one may simultaneously define Blaustein as both a descriptive psychologist and a phenomenologist. For him, then, there was no conflict or sharp distinction between the two

¹³Auerbach, *Zagadnienie wartości poznawczej sądów przypomnieniowych*, 58.

attitudes since they present the unity of his descriptive method. With these ideas in mind, it is understandable why he included Twardowski (descriptive psychology), Husserl (phenomenology) and Stumpf (Gestalt theory) in the Brentanian line of philosophy: after all, he called them “descendants (*potomkowie*) of Brentano.”¹⁴ It is precisely in this context that one should read Blaustein’s remark from the beginning of his *Husserlowska nauka... [Husserl’s Theory...]*, where he underlined that “[a] phenomenologist [...] may interpret these thoughts as an application of phenomenological claims in descriptive psychology, [whereas] a psychologist [may interpret these thoughts] as an analysis that is independent of any phenomenology.”¹⁵

A somewhat similar conclusion was reached by Wojciech Chudy, who wrote about the “double root” of Blaustein’s philosophy, which in Chudy’s opinion was developed on the border between the school of Twardowski and Husserl’s phenomenology.¹⁶ Although both trends are present in Blaustein’s writings, as Chudy argued, there is no clear-cut affiliation between Blaustein and any of these schools. Chudy added that Twardowski’s approach seems to be closer to Blaustein’s approach. Chudy’s idea, however, is still fragmentary. Contrary to Miskiewicz and Küng, Chudy did not refer to the Brentanian tradition in a broad sense but only to Twardowski. As we observed in Chaps. 3 and 4, Blaustein referred to Twardowski’s writings and was certainly inspired by his project of descriptive psychology, but it is pointless to refer here only to the school of Twardowski. In doing so, one overlooks Gestaltists or humanistic psychology as other important backgrounds of Blaustein’s philosophy. The emphasis put on Husserl alone is equally misleading. When juxtaposing Blaustein’s criticism of the phenomenological method against Husserl’s *Untersuchungen* in Chaps. 5 and 7, one noticed that Blaustein in fact misread Husserl; moreover, Blaustein also referred to other phenomenologists (e.g., Ingarden, Geiger, Schapp, and Schneider). Thus, if one attempts to simultaneously classify Blaustein as a descriptive psychologist and a phenomenologist, one must consider the divergent yet intertwined contexts that shaped Blaustein’s philosophy.

In Chaps. 8 and 9, I showed that Blaustein used the aforementioned fusion of different methodological devices in the field of aesthetics. Certainly, the Brentanian legacy refers to the theory of presentations as the basis of aesthetics, whereas the phenomenological framework concerns the question of the ways of givenness (*Gegebenheitsweisen*) of aesthetic objects. Blaustein analyzed the structure of different types of aesthetic experiences to pinpoint their intentional character. This was necessary since, according to Blaustein, the objects of aesthetic experiences are represented by other objects, and this representation is realized in a psychic act in which both objects are presented. This theory of psychic representations allowed Blaustein to introduce more detailed descriptive nuances in Husserl’s analysis of

¹⁴ Blaustein, Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from 19.12.1927, 097r.

¹⁵ Blaustein, *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia*, 3: “[f]enomenolog [...] może w poniższych wywodach widzieć zastosowanie twierdzeń fenomenologicznych w psychologii deskryptywnej, psycholog deskryptywny—analizę, niezależną od jakiegokolwiek fenomenologii.”

¹⁶ Chudy, *Zagadnienie naoczności aktów poznawczych*, 185.

Dürer's "Knight, Death and the Devil"; thus, Blaustein drew a parallel between depicting picture objects and visual objects, i.e., objects which can function as representations, but he disagreed that these objects should be comprehended as imaginative objects. This idea, however, is challenging because it seems to lead to ontological psychologism. Of course, for Blaustein, an aesthetic experience intentionally aims toward the aesthetic object, but the object has to be decomposed into diverse but intertwined objects that have different ontological statuses that are at once real and non-real. Because of these difficulties, I have attempted to juxtapose Blaustein with Ingarden to address the question of whether the aesthetic object is real or purely intentional. In this regard, some, e.g., Bohdan Dziemidok¹⁷ and, more recently, Robert T. Ptaszek,¹⁸ held that Blaustein's aesthetics was influenced by Ingarden. Contrary to this, I have shown that despite the evident similarities between both theories, there are still gaps that cannot be bridged. In any case, I have also addressed some detailed topics discussed by Blaustein within his aesthetics, such as the theory of attitude(s), the idea of embodied aesthetic experiences, and his view on the role that judgments play in aesthetic experiences. All of these topics can also be tracked in Blaustein's original "phenomenology" of media. In Chap. 9, I argued—following Jan Czerkowski (together with Antoni B. Stępień and Stanisław Wielgus),¹⁹ Rosińska,²⁰ Miskiewicz,²¹ Jagna Brudzińska²² and Joanna Pluta²³—that Blaustein formulated one of the very first "phenomenological" analyses of the experience of media. In this context, by "phenomenology" I mean the application of descriptive tools in describing the structure and character of the first-person experience of media. Blaustein explored the ways of givenness or manifestation (*Gegebenheitsweisen*) of mediated objects. He descriptively analyzed *how* one experiences film or radio drama. I will not present a detailed description of the outcomes of his analysis of the experience of media here; instead, let me shed light on another feature of Blaustein's philosophy.

In his analysis of the cinemagoer's experience or the phenomenon of acousion (as defined in Sect. 9.2.1), Blaustein attempted to *apply* his findings in practice. For instance, he formulated concrete tips for teachers who wanted to use films in the educational process, and he listed suggestions concerning how to compose a radio drama to improve its reception by the audience. This general approach stemmed from consequent attempts to *apply* descriptive psychology in non-philosophical disciplines. I have argued above that this idea of Blaustein's seems to mirror Brentano's

¹⁷Dziemidok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*, 178.

¹⁸Ptaszek, Blaustein Leopold, 120.

¹⁹Czerkowski, Stępień, Wielgus, Poland, philosophy in.

²⁰Rosińska, *Blaustein. Koncepcja odbioru mediów*, 22–23.

²¹Miskiewicz, Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology, 182.

²²Brudzińska, Aisthesis, 11.

²³Pluta, *Psychologiczne badania nad mediami—droga do powstania nowej dyscypliny*, 239.

conviction that the future of psychology lies in its practical applications.²⁴ With this in mind, one may conclude that Blaustein's contribution to the heritage of philosophy of the twentieth century lays in applying philosophy in new fields. As noted, Blaustein applied philosophy in non-philosophical disciplines, such as pedagogy,²⁵ penitentiary science,²⁶ in film studies,²⁷ and even military ethics.²⁸ This shows that he did not reject interdisciplinary research. To the contrary, he often referred, especially in the 1930s, to results in other disciplines, e.g., developmental psychology, to confront his descriptive psychology with concrete results. This constant transition of Blaustein's research from philosophy to non-philosophical disciplines was clear in his late writings. In this context, one should agree with Miskiewicz, who claimed that Blaustein developed "an entirely new branch of phenomenology" that is "interdisciplinary."²⁹ This interdisciplinarity is, as it seems, an important aspect of Blaustein's philosophy.

In closing, one may summarize Blaustein's philosophy as a complex project rooted in nineteenth- and twentieth-century debates over the methodological status of descriptive psychology, the scope of phenomenology, and the humanistic claims of psychology. His quest for an efficient method can be understood as a careful reexamination of Brentano and his followers' attempt to reawaken philosophy as a scientific enterprise. Blaustein's theory also bore the mark of different polemics with—to mention only the most important contexts—Husserl, Twardowski, Ingarden, Geiger, Schapp, and Filozofówna, all of which shaped his original thoughts. His work can be understood as descriptive psychology that adopted some phenomenological tools but which remained a natural (non-transcendental) project; Blaustein's philosophy was also open to the use of experiments and made interdisciplinary claims. All these aspects contextualize the philosophy of Blaustein and determine its novelty. Although some of Blaustein's concrete views remain controversial, e.g., his assessment of eidetic procedures in phenomenology or his concept of the aesthetic object, it is difficult to deny Ingarden's conviction, who wrote that Blaustein's legacy should not be forgotten.³⁰ Rather, one should reassess Blaustein. Of course, a comprehensive appraisal and assessment of his detailed proposals requires further studies on his contributions to descriptive psychology, phenomenology, Gestalt theory, and humanistic psychology, not to mention non-philosophical developments.

²⁴Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 31–32. Trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, in: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 19.

²⁵Blaustein, *Lenistwo u dzieci i młodzieży; O ocenie samego siebie w wieku młodzieńczym; Psychologiczne podstawy oświaty pozaszkolnej*.

²⁶Blaustein, *Karność w nowoczesnym wydaniu; Przyczynki do psychologii i pedagogiki karności*.

²⁷Blaustein, *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego*. Reprint in: *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 92–127. Blaustein, *Wpływ wychowawczy filmu*.

²⁸Blaustein, *Z psychologii wojskowej*, 290–298.

²⁹Miskiewicz, *Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology*, 182.

³⁰Ingarden, *Leopold Blaustein—teoretyk radia i filmu*, 86.

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