HEGEL ON SINGULAR DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE[*]

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ABSTRACT: The initial one-third of the paper is devoted to exposing the first chapter ("Sense-Certainty") of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a thesis about reference, viz., that singular demonstrative reference is impossible. In the remainder I basically argue that such a view commits one to radically undermining our conceptions of space, time, and substance (concrete individuality), and rests on the central mistake of construing *this* on the model of a predicable (or property).

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Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is about the logical and temporal progression of what he calls "Spirit" (*Geist*) from being primarily potential to being in its essentials most fully actual. Spirit may be understood as fundamental reality, which for Hegel is intrinsically tied up with consciousness. The last stage of this story of development is "Absolute Knowing." Just this much is sufficient to indicate two basic concerns of the work: consciousness, and knowing (in a broad sense). It begins by considering a constituent of these which Hegel appears to take as their most primitive human (or more generally, rational) aspect, that is, the mentality of "sense-certainty." Here, I shall critically explicate this first phase of the first stage of the *Phenomenology*.

Why another analysis of Sense-Certainty?[1] Recent examinations[2] of it reveal a notable lack of sustained evaluation, even in those treatments which purport to be mainly critical assessments[3]—most of what follows is devoted to this task, and to sketching an alternative position in the process. Furthermore, so far as I know, no one has explicitly developed in any depth an interpretation that takes Sense-Certainty as I think it should be taken: primarily as a thesis about *reference*. In the main, I shall argue that Hegel (mistakenly) denies the possibility of singular demonstrative reference, and that such a view commits one to radically undermining our conceptions of space, time, and substance (concrete individuality), and apparently even to denying the possibility of cognitive thought.

I. *The Certainty of Sense-Certainty (Initially Considered)*

It should be made clear from the start that Sense-Certainty is not merely about "*seeing*, *hearing*, and so on" (101), i.e., merely about sensing.[4] Over and above simple animal consciousness *qua* sentience, there is the distinctively human (or rational) element "certainty." I think it is quite evident that we should regard this as principally involving *singular demonstrative* (SD) *reference* (as opposed to 'reference' achieved by, e.g., the use of proper names, 'definite description', denotation or extension, etc.[5]). Sense-Certainty deals with a way of knowing (90) wherein we sense *and* attempt to individuate (e.g., 91, 110) what is sensed by entering into a relation of singular reference to it. And the desired relation is not only

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grammatically demonstrative (when linguistic demonstratives are used), as well as overtly demonstrative (when pointing gestures are employed), it is also epistemically demonstrative or showing in that by it we presume to become sure of individuals or particulars, specifically, sure of their independent existence, their "sheer *being*," which is sense-certainty's would-be "*truth*" (91) or "essence" (92), that to which it aspires. According to sense-certainty,[6] this relation is "certainty as ... an *immediate* pure connection" wherein 'I' or "singular consciousness knows a pure 'This', or the single item" (91). The relation or connection is immediate in that it is simple sensory reception *and* a manner of '*ap*prehension' which is not a '*com*prehension' (90)—it is an apprehension that is not categorizing, not *of* the qualities or properties and relationships of what's sensed (91) (that would minimally be *per*ception); it tries to be *of* independently existing individuals simply as such. It is no accident then, that at one point Hegel indicates that this apprehending can be considered to be "intuiting" (104). As is well known, "intuition" (*Anschauung*) is (also) the topic of the first part (the "Transcendental Aesthetic") of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*; and it seems, equally, that we can't make much sense out of this without taking it as involving SD reference.[7] In addition to treating individuation (and SD reference is a, probably *the*, basic way we single or pick something out, if we can do this at all), the putative SD referring demonstratives `I', 'this', `here', and `now', and a certain presumed *nonqualitative* apprehension of independent existents (and SD reference is supposed[8] to be nonqualitative apprehension *par excellence*; further, it is usually held[9] that in order for reference in general to be successful, the referent must exist (construed tenselessly) in its own right, must not be 'existed' (in the sense of a transitive verb) by the act of reference itself—and clearly, in order for *SD* reference to be successful, unlike, e.g., using proper names, it has to be directed to what *is actually present*), pointing out (*Aufzeigen*), which is surely the paradigmatic nonarticulate overt act of SD reference if there is one, is also discussed in connection with the certainty of sense-certainty (105–108, 110).

I say 'attempt', 'presume', `would—be', etc. *supra* because whether that to which sense-certainty aspires is achieved, indeed, whether it's achiev*able*, is what's at issue in Sense-Certainty. Since its basic aspiration is the relation of SD reference, the central question under consideration then is, is singular demonstrative reference possible? In his own terms, Hegel proposes that "we" (investigating sense-certainty) answer this by considering what happens within sense-certainty itself, within the dynamic ("the dialectic"—109) of this phase of the development of Spirit (93–94).

II. *The Dialectic*

At the outset the dialectic is set up as follows: Two elements or terms are posited in it. On the one hand, there is the 'this' considered as "the 'I'" or the primitive self-sensing consciousness; on the other, there is the 'this' considered as "the *object*." The former is "posited as what is unessential," the latter as what's essential. The 'I' here is unessential insofar as it appears as just a contingent knowing—SD reference which, to be sure, yields the `this', yet this yielding appears as entirely contingent upon or mediated by the self-contained *being there* of what's singled out. On the other side, since "the object *is* ...regardless of whether it is known or not," it is taken as "the essence," which, as has already been indicated, for sense-certainty is independent existence, "immediate being"—existence that does not require the mediation of anything else (93).

Hegel divides the dialectic of sense-certainty (as usual) into three contrapuntal moments or movements. Since in the first the object is seen as essential, it is a version of *realism* (a natural

initial outlook). The second is the reverse of the first—the `I' is taken to be the essential term, the object unessential; so it is a version of *idealism* (a logical reaction to the failure of realism). And in the third, the unity of both terms is considered the essence; this one is the most difficult to decipher, but it seems to be a variety of *solipsism*. In the rest of this part I shall explicate, in turn, the major points Hegel makes about each of these.

Realism

Hegel indicates that if we ask sense-certainty, what is 'this` taken as object anyway?, it answers that it has three aspects: first, 'now', its temporal "shape" or "form," second, 'this' regarded as its concrete being ("sensuous being," "sensuous [content]"), and third, its spatial form 'here' (95, 97, 98).[10] The main thrust of Hegel's argument about this moment, it appears, is that while sense-certainty indeed intends to effect SD references by the use of the language terms `now', 'this', and 'here' it does not succeed insofar as in using these it is not able to, as Hegel puts it, say (*sagen*) what it means (*meinen*); it means something particular, but it says a universal (*ein Allgemeines*) since 'now', `this', and 'here' are universals. What this say *vs.* mean distinction evidently contrasts is the sense (or significance) of what is said, i.e., *articulated* (uttered, written, or thought in *words*), with the sense which is meant or intended (cf., e.g., 110 where Hegel talks about "not letting what is meant *get into words* at all—by *pointing out*").

 In support of the main contention Hegel indicates that 'now' *could* be (or could have been) applied to any time, `this' to any thing, `here' to any place—they are "*preserved*," as he says, over different applications; they are not exhausted by any one use. Take 'now' for instance. Because 'now' is enduring, 'now' could just as easily *be* (to adopt his way of talking) morning, noon, *or* night (etc.), if the time is right; and since it has this generality, 'now' is *not just* any one of these. To see this, suppose, e.g., "Now is Night"; as such, it is "something that *is*." But in, say, the morning, it is negated in that "it proves itself to be, on the contrary, something that is *not*." `Now' is determined, is "mediated" as enduring in general through such negation. Sense-certainty means to fix a singular independent (unmediated) 'now' when it uses 'now' in a would-be SD reference; but it can't because it is always `now', because 'now' is not singular, but is an ever enduring universal. As Hegel says, "a simple thing of this kind which *is* through negation ["and mediation"—99], which is neither This nor That, a *not-This*, and is with equal indifference This as well as That—such a thing we call a *universal*" (95–96).

The same sort of points are made an abbreviated fashion with regard to 'this' and 'here' (97 and 98 respectively). It is worth noting that Hegel comes down hard for his position. For example, concerning `this' he says in language "we ourselves directly refute what we *mean* to say" since we mean a single existing thing, "but we *utter* the universal" ("the *universal* This" or "*Being in general*"). Hence, "it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we *mean*" (97).

Idealism

By going through the first moment sense-certainty discovers that in its own experience the object in its three aspects ('now', `this', and `here') is not what it had 'proclaimed' (—94), i.e., independent singular being; it learns then, that any case of an attempted SD reference, any attempted "*instance*" or "an actual sense-certainty" (—92) using these (universal) terms does not succeed in that it does not succeed in articulating a particular. However, "*our* 'meaning' " (my emphasis) still remains, "left over" (99).

So sense-certainty determines that the object is *relative* to the 'I'. It is always `now', indeed, *to me*; there is always some thing that is or could be 'this' *to me*; *I* am always surrounded by `here'. The relationship between the 'I' and the object of the realism moment thereby becomes

reversed; now the `I' or the knowing is seen as the essential (independent) element, and the object unessential (dependent)—as fundamentally "*my* object…it is, because *I* know it" (100).

Thus enlightened, one tries to prevent "the vanishing of the single Now and Here that we mean.... by the fact that *I* hold them fast." In other words, it seems: I presume to SD refer to myself by using `I'. Thus particularized, I presume to SD refer to and hence to individuate the universalized object on the strength of my singularity—since the object *is* in virtue of being relative to me, and since I am individual, the object cannot but be particularized as "*my* object," as related to (the one and only) *me*. But the problem is, just as 'now', 'this', and 'here', the 'I' too is mediated as universal through negation: I "assert that `Here' is a tree; but another `I'," *not* I, negates my (supposedly) exclusive `I` designation, thereby *my* (supposedly) singular `here', by simply being there (or possibly there) to maintain "that `Here' is not a tree but a house instead." The 'I' is *not just* any *one* person; on the other hand, *everyone* is equally `I'. And so, because the attempted SD reference to myself uses the universal `I', it fails in that it fails to articulate me as individual; and hence, that singularity can't be employed, since it is nonexistent (except insofar as what I *mean* still obtains), to particularize the universal object (101–102).

Before turning to the third moment, we must explicitly delineate the *identifying* dimension of SD reference.[11] It seems that individuating something by an SD reference *ipso facto* identifies it as *the* one singled out. Taking this dimension into account, it appears that in SD referring we assume or presuppose that there is (or could be) more than one particular at hand, an SD reference answers *which one*; we individuate or single out something actual *from* other actual (or possible) particulars, thereby identify (which) one. (Primitively identify, that is. One could give a more sophisticated identification by, e.g., giving a description—but we are not concerned with that since we are (still) concerned with apprehension presumed to be nonqualitative.) This identifying aspect has been lurking in the background from the beginning (e.g., "I, *this* particular I'—91), but it comes to the fore in the third moment where it plays an important role.

Solipsism

Given the failures in the first two moments, neither the object nor the `I' term can be taken as exclusively essential or unessential, so "we reach the stage where we have to posit the *whole* of sense-certainty itself as its *essence*." Sense-certainty now aspires to a unification of both terms in a relation of `self-identity'; it strives to make the "otherness" standing between the object and the `I' drop out; it tries to be "a *whole* which stands firm within itself as *immediacy*." Indeed, it aims to be perfectly, i.e., solipsistically, unmediated or independent as the one and only being or reality. This is manifested specifically by attempting to "stick firmly to *one* immediate relation" such as "the Now is day." One resists comparing it to others, like "Here is a tree," resists thinking that to another 'I', or to oneself at another time, 'now' is night, etc. One tries to *be* a "pure [act of] intuiting," the *only* act of intuiting extant (103–104).

The difficulty however, is that "the Now is day" is only "*asserted*" (my emphasis) and sense-certainty at this stage has learned that as asserted or articulated 'now' (etc.) is a universal; thus, no matter how hard it tries in this way (articulating), it will weaken and, e.g., "direct its attention to a Now that is night"—failing therefore, to achieve in this way the solipsistic relation it wants. So, we in sense-certainty determine that "we must let ourselves *point to it*" ("the Now that is asserted"); we determine that we must "enter the same point of time" and point it "out to ourselves, i.e. make ourselves into the same singular `I' " *which* asserts that "the Now is day." That is, one must single out to identify, from all other actual or possible relations made apparent in one`s wandering attention, *which* actual relation one asserts himself to be self-identical to, (in this case) which 'now', thereby which 'I' is unified with it; that is to say, one must effect an

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individuating, *identifying* apprehension. And in order to attain the certainty it seeks, sense-certainty has to nonqualitatively demonstrate or show; it tried unsuccessfully to do this in the first moment by articulating `now', `this', and `here', and in the second moment `I'; so now it attempts this by (nonarticulately) *pointing out*[12] which relation it asserts itself to actually *be* (105).

So, "the Now is pointed to," which `now'?, "*this* Now"; but the problem is, "it has already ceased to be in the act of pointing to it." Sense-certainty asserted itself to *be a* `now'; in order to show *which* `now', it points to that 'now`—but *now,* when pointing, that `now' which sense-certainty asserted itself to *be* is a "now" which "*has been ... it is not*." It is "superseded" (*aufgehoben*) because time passes. Sense-certainty tried to demonstrate *being* a `now'; yet instead it represented "*having been*," i.e., *not* being one. It attempted a nonarticulate SD reference to its asserted relation, but the reference failed, (for one) because it was directed to what was no longer actual—you can't so-refer to what doesn't presently exist. The pointing intimates that 'now' is passing, ever superseding itself. So Hegel indicates that 'now' is always a dynamic "absolute plurality of Nows"; in other words, it seems, 'now` (and time in general) is not only indefinitely divis*ible* (by, say, an 'atomic clock' mentality), but, as it really *is*, as ever self-superseding, it is always indefinitely (self) divid*ing*. Hence, there is no absolutely singular point of time for one to point out and "enter" (*be*); thus, the attempted nonarticulate SD reference fails on another count—it fails to individuate—sense-certainty wanted *one*, it gets *many*. In general therefore, this "pointing-out is the experience of learning" once again "that Now is a *universal*" (106–107).

Hegel gives in many respects a similar argument about `here' (and as I understand him, `this' and 'I'—see 109). He indicates that precisely *which* 'here', "*this* Here," cannot be pointed out or nonarticulately SD referred to because, as with 'now', "the Here that is *meant* would be the point," but there is no absolutely singular point in space: "*this* Here ... in fact, is *not* this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and Left. The Above is itself similarly this manifold otherness of above, below, etc." As before, he indicates that 'here' (like `now', `this', and 'I') *is* (universal) through negation; presently it is held to be self-negating or self-superseding apparently in the sense that it is always a dynamic "absolute plurality," that is, 'here' (and space in general) is always divisible and dividing into an indefinitely *many*. It is so-divisible because there is no absolutely particular point in space; it is so-divid*ing*, it seems, in that pointing out cannot be perfectly static—one must *move* (oneself, or some appendage) to do it: "the pointing-out shows itself to be ... but a movement from the Here that is *meant* through many Heres into the universal Here" (108).

III. *Conclusions from the Dialectic*

The overarching conclusion, as Hegel may be seen elucidating it in the last section of Sense-Certainty, is that the independent, "*actual*, absolutely *singular*…sensuous This that is meant" (which I construe generically here as the object in its three aspects—`now', `this' as concrete content, and `here`— and the 'I' or the primitive self-sensing consciousness) "*cannot be reached*," that is, represented, either "by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to that which is inherently universal," through the articulation of demonstratives, or by pointing out since the pointing "experience teaches" in the specifics of the third moment that "the sensuous This" pointed out "is a universal." And it seems Hegel thinks that there is no *other* way of representing the independent (etc.) "sensuous This" that is meant open to sense-certainty; it *would* have to be demonstrative in view of its supposed nonqualitative nature (he neither

discusses nor implies that there is any other). Thus, sense-certainty does not achieve the certainty it aims for. But this is not all. In this last section he even rules out the possibility (one which, I take it, is not open to noncategorizing, nonqualitative sense-certainty) of giving a sufficiently complete *description* of "the sensuous This" that is meant, sufficient to, e.g., distinguish or single it out from others that may be meant, seemingly on the grounds that, given the universal nature of language, and the *directly* (demonstratively) "unutterable" and "irrational" nature of such a `this' that is "merely meant," the therefore indirect or roundabout description would have to be so thorough and hence lengthy, so complete, that what's described would change into something else in the course of the describing, and hence, one would "finally have to admit to speaking about something which *is not*," Apparently then, Hegel thinks "the sensuous This" that is meant cannot be represented *at all* (110).

      According to my interpretation, the main thing Hegel is concerned to argue in Sense-Certainty is that singular demonstrative reference is impossible. In the first moment I take him to be advocating that articulate SD referring which employs the demonstratives `now', 'this', and 'here' is impossible. As in this realism moment, one intends an individuating, demonstrating, nonqualitative apprehension of objective, independent reality; one means "the sensuous This" regarded as object, but fails to articulate it, Hegel thinks, basically because the demonstratives used are universals. In the second moment the central idea seems to be that articulate SD referring which employs the demonstrative 'I' is impossible. As in this idealism moment, one again intends an individuating, showing, nonqualitative apprehension—but here it's meant to be of subjective, independent reality, and then of 'objective' reality as dependent on or mediated by the subjective. In using 'I' one means oneself regarded as a self-sensing "sensuous This"; but one fails to articulate what one means, according to Hegel, again basically because the demonstrative used is a universal. Since this covers *the* two possible sorts of SD referents (an abstract `entity', such as a concept or proposition, is not a possible candidate because there is no way to sense and demonstratively *show* such an item), it may be said that Hegel argues that articulate SD reference is impossible. In the third moment the principle idea appears to be that nonarticulate SD referring, i.e., pointing out (in particular, to identify a demonstrative relation which I solipsistically assert myself to *be*), cannot succeed essentially in that it signifies universality. Since this covers both its articulate and nonarticulate forms, I conclude simply that Hegel argues in Sense-Certainty that singular demonstrative reference is impossible.

<center>IV. Evaluation</center>

      I will begin this part by defending Hegel against a possible objection, and deflecting a question, turning thereafter to constructing what I think are legitimate criticisms and sketching an alternative position. But first, I shall reiterate and elaborate on the nature of SD reference.

      Singular demonstrative reference is a two-term *relation*—as opposed to a property or attribute; and of course it is nonsymmetrical, nonreflexive, and nontransitive. While it is clearly, it seems, a relation of *representation*, it's hardly clear exactly what representation is. Nevertheless, I shall try to say a few words on it. Perhaps it is adequate to hold that representation, most broadly construed, is being affected by something and reacting or responding to it; the reaction represents *what* affects. Under this construal, even the warmth of a rock due to the sun, for example, is a representation of the sun. But the representation that is SD reference is a quantum leap, so to speak, more sophisticated than representation as just considered. At least one of the terms (the referrer) of SD reference is always a rational being or

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conscious knower (when I, e.g., use 'you` to SD refer to you, both terms are rational beings), and the affectation involved is *sensation*, which is not open to a rock—nor, it is worthy to note, to a supposed being like the traditional Christian God; He would not be able to SD refer since He, it is held, does not have sense organs (and so, could not have *sensuous* space/time intuition, and hence, as we shall see, apparently would not be able to represent to Himself *the* universe He created at all, because He would not be able to nondescriptively identify it as *that*). And unlike a dog's representing a piece of meat by his salivating, the SD referrer, as rational knower, *intends* to represent; he represents something *to himself* (and very often to others as well)—some form of at least primitive, distinctively human self-consciousness is always involved. The representing that is SD referring (unlike the warming of a rock due to the sun and the salivating of a dog occasioned by a piece of meat) involves convention-dependent artifices, specifically, the use of demonstratives, and a type of act, pointing out, the signification of which is convention-bound (note that it seems a fact that you can't point out something to a dog or cat—they never seem to look the right way except accidently). These (demonstratives and pointing out) are used in SD referring to designate something other than themselves. And the self-conscious element seems very closely tied to their *artificiality*—for if they came as naturally as, e.g., salivating (which they clearly do not, in view of such phenomena as cross-cultural differences in the particular words, and to a lesser extent, the gestures employed), then they would be as unreflective and nonintentional as salivating.

Perhaps pointing out is not as sophisticated a representation as the use of demonstratives in that unlike using demonstratives, it is nonlinguistic; and language is, evidently, a highly sophisticated system of representation. But still, the two are entirely on par insofar as they both involve a rational referrer, sensation, and designating devices the signification of which is convention-bound. (And there are, seemingly, more sophisticated types of representation than SD referring, such as detailed description and abstract art.)

In Sense-Certainty Hegel is concerned to treat what is purported to be individuating, showing, nonqualitative apprehension (or manner of knowing) of existents; he does this via considering articulate and nonarticulate demonstrative representation. It might be argued, therefore, that he neglects what he shouldn't have neglected—another seemingly more basic way of effecting the noted apprehension, that is, kinesthetic-tactile sensing combined with displacing. Surely, kinesthetically-tactually sensing reaching *out* and meeting resistance is the fundamental way we test for external existence; and if we move what's touched relative to something else or all else in our sensory purview, i.e., displace it, since we thereby register it as distinct from something or all else insofar as it may be moved while something or all else stays put, it appears we *individuate* it. And, of course, we may so-*sense our* own existence and so-individuate *our*selves. Such activity is demonstrating or showing not only in that it constitutes, by itself, a *test* for an individual existent, but also in that it is the basic way we *check* our other externally directed senses (determine whether we are *just* seeing things, just hearing things, whether the smell is just 'in my nose' as opposed to there being something really there to produce it, whether an item is just, say, *on* the machine or *is* the machine in the sense that it is a rigid part of it, etc.); hence, it may be said to yield *certainty*. And it is nonqualitative in that it is simply mute with regard to the categories and properties of things. Thus, it seems to come under the general concerns of Sense-Certainty and should have been dealt with there.

But the absence of *designating artifices*, and the apparent lack of a need for a *rational* being, crucially distinguishes SD referring from kinesthetic-tactile sensing combined with displacing—though both kinds of activity may be said to effect individuating, demonstrating or

certifying, nonqualitative apprehension of existents. Though the latter sort of activity could be considered representational in the (most) broad sense delineated *supra*, it is not anywhere near as sophisticated a representation as SD referring; nothing is employed in so-apprehending something to designate or signify that something. It should be noted that these two kinds of activity are not individuating in the same sense: the former presupposes the latter, it seems, in that at root[13] the something labeled `this' or designated by pointing (it) out (or both) is something that *could* (at least in principle) be displaced, i.e., is a *body*. Other types of individuating tests, in addition to physical displacing, seem presupposed when other types of items are singled out in SD referring (e.g., 'now' designating an instant of time). Successful SD referring presupposes the possibility of successfully applying such individuating tests; but is not itself an individuating *test*. In short, while SD referring designates or signifies individuality, displacing is the basic[14] way we test for it. Furthermore, it appears, as indicated, that (e.g.) a dog could in some sense engage in the latter kind of activity: a dog can put his paw out and meet resistance, and displace the item so-encountered, and thereby in some manner nonqualitatively register an individual existent, and be in some way certain of it. But in no way can a dog SD refer, because, e.g., he cannot represent anything *to himself*;[15] he has command of no designating artifices whatsoever.

Therefore, Hegel need not have specifically considered kinesthetic-tactile sensing combined with displacing (though, of course, sensing in general needed to be and was), indeed, *should* not have in the sense that it does not meet the requirements of sense-certainty: without the involvement of designating devices, the certainty would be too indeterminate, too shifting, too uncertain; and Sense-Certainty is evidently about the most primitive distinctively *human* or *rational* aspect of consciousness and knowing.

One might raise the question as to whether such a mentality as sense-certainty could really be embodied as the sum-total of one's mental life. Though perhaps this is an important question, it need not be answered and assessed here because it seems clear that Hegel does not present sense-certainty this way—as a possible mentality which exhausts *in toto* our consciousness at some stage. Rather, sense-certainty seems presented as the most primitive element of distinctively human consciousness in general, of conventional or artificial representation in general—surely, these may profitably be at least logically factored into their constituents.

There seem to be, however, some real problems with Hegel's view in Sense-Certainty. I shall start with what are perhaps the relatively less serious ones. With regard to his discussion of 'now', it appears Hegel equivocated on this idea. Richard Taylor distinguishes three significantly different senses of `now'. We can say of 'now':

> either (1) that *it* is drawing to an end, or growing older, in case "now" is taken to mean an elapsing interval, such as a day, which can more than once be called "now"; or (2) that *it* recedes ever farther into the past, in case "now" is taken to refer to some particular instant of time which ceases to be as soon as it is mentioned; or (3) that all past things are receding in relation to *it*, in case "now" is understood as continuously referring so [sic—should be `to'] some *new* instant each time it is used.[16]

In the realism moment Hegel uses 'now' in sense (1), e.g., in giving the example "'Now is Night'." This 'now', he indicates, "proves" in, say, the morning to be "something that is *not*"; then he indicates 'now` gets "determined as a permanent and self-preserving [i.e., "continuously referring," universal) Now *through*" such negation. But how could a 'now' in sense (1) ever so-`prove` without this 'now' of sense (3) *already* in the picture as that by which we so-judge of the former? The problem is, Hegel seems to have gotten it backwards: only in *relation* to a 'now'

which is *already* presumed to be ever enduring or "continuously referring" could a `now' (1) be considered to be 'negated' or to *not be* any longer—since what *is* (in the present tense sense which Hegel evidently appeals to here), exists *now* (3); what is *not*, does not. Put conversely, it *is* always `now' (3); it is never *not* 'now' (3)[17] (it may be put conversely because 'now' (3) and concrete existence are tightly bound: to be is to be in time, and to be in time is to be). Thus it seems that 'now' (3) determines, makes possible, such negation of a 'now' (1) (or a `now' (2) for that matter); such negation presupposes 'now' as ever enduring ('now' (3)), therefore it doesn't, contra Hegel, so-determine it (95–96).

There are other difficulties with Hegel's treatment of 'now', especially in the solipsism moment. There he clearly equivocates, shifting from `now' (1) as a day or night in 104, to 'now` as an instant (2) in 106, and back and forth in 107. Though a 'now' (2) might, a `now' (1) certainly doesn't 'cease to be in the act of pointing to it' (106). And just because a 'now` (1) may be considered to be indefinitely divisible into instants, and to be indefinitely dividing or self-superseding in that it grows older as its indefinite or infinite number of instants (its "absolute plurality of Nows"—in sense (2)) pass, this does not mean that such a 'now' is categorically a universal as Hegel appears to hold. For as *a* day or *an* hour, e.g., such a `now' is a particular, specific collection of instants, even if an "absolute plurality" of them. On the other hand, we may say, with Hegel, that such an item is not absolutely singular, given this divisibility and dividingness. But I see no way to construe a 'now' (2), an instant of time, in the above way as a universal—such a 'now' couldn't split or be split up into *many*, for then it wouldn't have been an *instant* in the first place. Furthermore, 'now' (3) appears to be crucially singular as well in at least the sense that it is *the* (one and only) ever enduring or persisting instant with reference to which all events approaching it are *future*, all events receding from it are *past*, and all events concurrent with it are *present*. It is precisely this `now' which we *do* seem to be able to "enter" and *be*; indeed, not just are able to, but in fact always *are*, in that, as always in some manner intuiting (it), we live this 'now', are this 'now' so long as we are at all. It is just this 'now' which cannot be escaped, or 'outstripped' as Heidegger might say—one cannot actually "enter," and *be* in, the future or past.

Roughly the same points can be made with regard to 'here', for it too has three senses corresponding to the three for `now': (1) `here' taken as a multi-dimensionally extended place, (2) `here' regarded as a nonextended point, indefinitely or infinitely many of which we pass through or by when we *move*, and (3) `here' taken as our intuited reference point for all items in space (see below), which cannot be 'outstripped', which we, so to speak, always carry around with us.

It seems clear that Hegel should have explicitly distinguished such senses, and indicated how his doctrine would apply to each. It seems that one of his main apparent contentions, that `now' and `here' are categorically universals, would hardly have been as convincing as it is to some if he had. (In what follows I shall indicate these senses when they should be stressed, that is, when I don't mean 'now` or 'here' generically and it's not clear from the context which particular sense is to be understood.)

I think we may safely allow that Hegel *proves*, via a number of approaches, that the demonstratives `now', 'this', `here', and 'I' are universals, and that pointing out has universal signification, in the sense that these devices have a most general applicability. But who would deny this? Surely it is the case that anyone can apply 'I' to himself, and if properly situated, `now' to any time, 'this' to any thing, and 'here' to any place. The question is however, do such considerations entail that in using such terms we cannot SD refer, we cannot, as Hegel repeatedly puts it, say what we mean, that where I, for example, "indeed *mean* a single 'I' ... I say in general

all `Is'; everyone is what I say, everyone is `I', this singular `I' [*meine wohl einen einzelnen Ich ... sage ich überhaupt: alle Ich; jeder ist das, was ich sage: Ich, dieser einzelne Ich*]" (102)? I think not. The mistake(s) Hegel apparently made may be alternately described as: neglecting the force of context, confusing an idea or concept's having general applicability with an idea's being *of* a specific generality of items, and perhaps confusing mention with use, and sense or meaning with reference. On the one hand, we may mention 'I', talk about it and say such true things as: since anyone can apply and re-apply it to himself, it is an idea which has general applicability (is a universal in this sense), it means the speaker or thinker, etc. On the other hand, the fact that 'I' has general applicability does not imply that the idea of 'I' is an idea which is of a certain generality of items, like, e.g., the idea of box or fish—does not imply that it is the idea of, that it means, "everyone" or "all 'Is'" (*alle Ich*). Nor from the fact that `I' does mean the speaker or thinker, together with the fact that *any*one can be that, does it follow that in using `I' one can't be singularly referring, that one must be referring to *alle Ich*. It is simply false that "everyone is what I say" when I use `I'. Normally, in using `I' one means the individual speaking or thinking it, one intends to refer to oneself—if I am speaking to you, I convey just what I intend in that you understand what I *say* to signify exactly what I intended, i.e., a reference to me (only), *the* speaker; clearly I don't convey "everyone" when I so-say `I'; hence, I evidently succeed, contra Hegel, in saying precisely what I mean (the sense and referent of what I say coincide exactly with the sense and referent I mean or intend).[18]

What would communication be like if this were *not* true? Would we always have to divine the demonstrative intentions of others, in order to figure out that an individual is meant and which one is meant, compensating thereby for language's "divine nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said" (110) into the (universalized) opposite of what's intended? But why go that route? It seems we may say that the demonstratives are universals, and that pointing out has universal signification (as a *type* of act), inasmuch as they both have a most general applicability. Yet when such devices occur in *context*, as indeed they do—when demonstratives are *used*, when instances of pointing out take place—they do signify what they are meant to signify: individuals or 'sensuous thises'. That is, singular demonstrative reference is not only a possibility, but is a reality. If this were not the case, as I shall argue shortly, it appears plausible that talk and cognitive thought would be impossible; for then we would have no ultimate devices to fix or determine just what it is we are talking/thinking *about*—ultimate in the sense that it seems likely that all other (e.g., descriptive) reference and identification rests in one way or another on the singular demonstrative variety, likely that it is the foundation of all frames of reference. Surely, I take it, Hegel would not have endorsed this consequence, though it appears to follow from his view presented in Sense-Certainty.

But it might be replied that Hegel is concerned in Sense-Certainty with the question as to whether we can (either articulately or nonarticulately) demonstratively express, represent to ourselves, what we mean when we mean absolutely independently extant, absolutely singular individuals, that he argues here for one of his central ubiquitous doctrines: the idea that there is no absolutely independent or unmediated being. His notion of Spirit, understood as fundamental reality, includes both concrete reality and consciousness, not as starkly separate substances or wholly distinct existences (à la Descartes) which, as such, could only make contact with each other in intractably problematic ways, but as dynamically interwoven, intermediating, in an essential unity-with-difference, i.e., as "infinity" (cf. "Force and the Understanding," 161–63). Further, another of his central doctrines holds that the "substance" or "*actuality*" of Spirit is manifested only in individuals (cf., e.g., the introduction to "Religion," 679–82)—individuals

(including 'I's') construed not as absolute individuals, but as elements interwoven into the fabric of Spirit whose 'deep' ontology reveals them to be self-superseding, indefinitely divisible and dividing—so he certainly doesn't hold that there are no individuals. Thus, surely he would allow that within our artifices of representation we can successfully SD refer, that such referring *does* signify just what we mean where we don't mean or intend such absolute individuals.

Though there is ample evidence for this apologia (as above), the problem is, there is also ample evidence against it (as above). If it is true, then Hegel is at least guilty of repeatedly overstating his case. To take just one instance not already cited, he says categorically, without qualification, if I say " 'this bit of paper', then each and every bit of paper is 'this bit of paper', and I have only uttered the universal all the time [*dieses Stück Papier*, so ist *alles* und *jedes* Papier ein *dieses* Stück Papier, und ich habe nur immer das Allgemeine gesagt]" (110). I think the balance in fact falls against the apologetic interpretation outlined. I think this mainly because it seems Hegel took very seriously the idea that language and conventional representation in general belong "to consciousness, i.e. to that which is inherently universal" (110), and hence was convinced that the individual "sensuous This," however toned down, cannot, in the final analysis, be satisfactorily represented or expressed[19]—specifically arguing in Sense-Certainty that it cannot be satisfactorily represented by SD reference; and thereby, he made the mistake of neglecting context and use and how the universal nature of such representation is particularized in being particularly situated (etc.).

At this point it might be wondered whether there is a problem of identifying context within the mentality of sense-certainty, and thus, whether its presumed SD referring would really be individuating for it. As Hyppolite says:

> Sensuous certainty, indeed, does not have the right to rise above the notions of the this, the here, the now. In saying "the now is daytime" or "the this is a tree," it introduces qualitative determinations into its knowledge which are opposed to the immediateness that it requires for its object.[20]

But as Hyppolite goes on to rather obscurely indicate, it is not exactly sense-certainty which does this introducing; it is *we* (investigating sense-certainty) who do so. This is precisely where an appeal should be made to 'this' considered as concrete or sensuous content, that is to say, `is night', 'is the tree', `is a house', `bit of paper', etc. (passim) in Hegel's examples should be understood for sense-certainty itself simply as `this' or *what* (concrete content) is here and now (3). *We* have to qualitatively identify particular situations or contexts in order to discuss examples naturally, but of course the mentality of sense-certainty could not so-identify them—given its supposed (noncategorizing, nonqualitative) status, only demonstratives and pointing out are available. But that does not mean that in fact someone employing this mentality would not be particularly situated in the world, would not *live* such examples, would not always *be* in *a* context—and indeed, it seems to be precisely because everyone is always in fact so-situated that a demonstrative *use* or appropriation of `this' does succeed in (SD) referring to an *individual*, does in fact and contrary to Hegel express one. One of the things that marks this primitive aspect of human consciousness is its continuously intuited 'now' and `here' in sense (3), its always having them available to it (cf., e.g., the beginning of the idealism moment). Because one is always in a context, one's *use* of one's ever enduring, intuited 'now' (3) and 'here' (3) in intending to expressly individuate, for instance, a 'now' (1) or (2), or a 'here' (1) or (2) in SD referring does in fact succeed, regardless of whether one can *further* (qualitatively or descriptively) represent or identify to himself his situation or that individual (I say 'for instance' because these are involved

in all SD referring since it's limited to what's actually present, and what's actually present is *here* and *now* (3)).

It seems that Hegel holds, correctly I think, that what he calls "the sensuous This" (110) can be factored into " 'This' as 'I'," and " 'This' as object" (92), the three aspects of which are `now', 'here', and 'this' taken as sensuous or concrete content (another way to put this is simply to say *this* = what is here and now to me). 'This' is quite amorphous. It is my contention that our ability to intuit or *mean this* is absolutely foundational to our making sense of anything at all; and our ability to *express* (either articulately by uttering or thinking demonstratives, or nonarticulately by pointing out) just what we so-mean is the rock bottom way we represent to ourselves time, space, and substances. By 'substances` I simply mean concrete subjects of possible predication; I do not need to mean absolutely independent, immediate beings or individuals to fill in the alternative view—they may be roughly understood as Hegelian individuals if one likes.

Suppose we are in a forest of aspen trees, and suppose I intended to call some particular tree to your attention. The simplest way for me to do this would be to say `this one` or `that one', or to point it out—thereby expressing *which* one I mean. This, I take it, falls within the (concluding) restrictions of sense-certainty, except that Hegel would deny that I could so-say what I mean, because he thinks I would say a universal, or the pointing out act would have universal signification. But to expound my point before about 'ultimate devices', and 'absolutely foundational' and 'rock bottom' (immediately above), and go beyond sense-certainty *per se*, in such a situation I might alternatively say '*that* sapling over *there* swaying in the breeze', or in a somewhat different circumstance `the large, leafless and dead aspen that *you* and *I* will reach an hour from *now* if we stay on *this* path'. Such SD references are always ultimately necessary to represent to myself and to you just which tree I mean. Were I only able to strictly describe it, categorize it and list properties or qualities of it, there would be nothing in principle and in fact to prevent many trees from fitting the description (Hegel, in a manner, seems to agree with this; cf. part III)—and if it were a tree that marked our way out of the forest, you and I would be *lost*. The tree as considered in the latter example is not actually present in our sensory purview, so it itself cannot be SD referred to; but it can be related to what *is* in our sensory-intuitive purview, and indeed must be, if it is to be uniquely individuated/identified. As Strawson says about the descriptivist argument to the contrary:

> To meet the argument on its own terms, it is sufficient to show how the situation of non-demonstrative identification may be linked with the situation of demonstrative identification. The argument supposes that where the particular to be identified cannot be directly located, its identification must rest ultimately on description in purely general terms. But this supposition is false. For even though the particular in question cannot itself be demonstratively identified, it may be identified by a description which relates it uniquely to another particular which can be demonstratively identified. The question, what sector of the universe it occupies, may be answered by relating that sector uniquely to the sector which speaker and hearer themselves currently occupy. Whatever the possibilities of massive reduplication in the universe, these possibilities create, from the point of view of identification, no theoretical difficulties which cannot theoretically be overcome in this way.[21]

There would, moreover, hardly be any sense to representing *it* to ourselves in the first place, let alone in describing it, without the presumption of possible successful SD reference. We ultimately represent substances (persons and things), i.e., concrete subjects of possible

predication, to ourselves via demonstratives such as 'I', 'you', `this', and 'that', and by pointing out, that is, by SD referring. So-representing substances is (at least logically) prior to the representation that is describing them, attributing properties to them—the latter presupposes a referent (substance) *for* the predicables, some thing to which they can be ascribed. Furthermore, with regard to space and time, it seems that SD reference founds these conceptions as well via demonstrative designators such as 'this', `here', 'there', and 'now', and the corresponding significations of pointing out (pointing out this, here, there, now). We could make no spatial or temporal sense of anything, it seems, if we could not somehow (however vaguely) relate what's represented as in space and time to here and now. Something would be nowhere, if it were neither *here* (3) nor someplace some measure from *here*; something would be out of time or timeless, if it were neither *now* (3) nor at some time before or after *now*. Our ability to intuit *this* enables us (unlike God) to represent anything as in *the* space-frame (of reference) and *the* time-frame (of reference) we in fact find ourselves in: We are in *the* space-frame which 'contains' *here*, and no other; we are in *the* time-frame which contains *now*, and no other—both of which contain *this* (e.g., tree), *what* is here and now. This is precisely the *difference* between these frames of reference and possible qualitatively perfect duplications of them—and this is precisely what the descriptivist who denies the necessity of SD reference cannot capture, and so, he is utterly lost among infinitely many possible worlds, unable to determine *which* one is actual. In such ways as these, SD referring is vastly more determining or specifying (to put it loosely in terms of degree) than description or the attribution of properties is, contrary to what might at first be thought.[22]

Such considerations seem sufficient to indicate that SD reference is the very heart of the system of representation that is language and conceptualization. Deny it categorically, and you're committed to completely undermining the whole edifice—committed to, I think (for reasons just outlined), the explicitly self-contradictory view (given the denial) that talk, and apparently therefore cognitive thought, are impossible. I see no reason to believe that Hegel either intended or would have endorsed such a radical undermining; it seems in general that he didn't see the true significance of SD reference, like perhaps all philosophers before Kant, and all those after him who fail to appreciate his notion of intuition (Kant's real revolution was to wedge intuition into the sensation/thought dichotomy—what's intuition?—our ability to mean and express *this*, our ability to SD refer). Surely, Hegel argues in Sense-Certainty and throughout his works for a great many changes and innovations in this system (cf. my previous discussion of his `central ubiquitous doctrines'); and I see no reason why the system could not accommodate much of what he advocates in some form, e.g., that the demonstratives have a most general applicability (assuming that it was thought otherwise), that SD referring does not pick out categorically, absolutely independently extant, absolutely singular individuals. There is however, with regard to Sense-Certainty, a principle exception to this, that is, his evident view that SD referring is impossible insofar as in attempting it we cannot express what we mean or intend.

It is significant that Hegel allows that we can at least so-mean; his denial of the possibility of SD reference is in this way importantly qualified. On the other hand, this position, if we are to take it at face value, seems untenable because it appears internally inconsistent in the sense that, in general, meaning and expressing what we mean are conditionally related—you can't as a rule have the former without the latter. To put the point temporally, just how long is it sensible to suppose we could go on intending what we intend in attempted SD referring without ever being able to express our meaning? Hegel seems to think we could go on indefinitely having to cope with language`s "divine nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said" into the

universalized opposite of what's intended. This "what is merely meant [but is not actually expressed]" (110) would quickly become impossible—for this meaning needs to be as a rule actually expressed or represented by the designating devices of SD reference (demonstratives and pointing out) in order for one (including oneself) to be able to tell *that* something is meant, and *what* is meant; it needs to be in this way fixed or determined for it to be possible; for it to be at all, like anything `inner', it can't always be *hidden*[23] as Hegel appears to hold in this case. This is not to deny, of course, that we often don't express our various intentions or meanings for one reason or another; but it is to deny that there could be *systematic* failure of expression of intention in a whole common area of our representational edifice like SD reference: either this (failure) is not the case, or SD reference is without qualification bogus. And the latter position, as I have argued, seems to be in the final analysis self-contradictory.

What may we say is really the gist of the issue between Hegel's view of Sense-Certainty, and the position I've tried to sketch? It seems that Hegel's central mistake was to construe the real "truth" (110)—as opposed to what sense-certainty presumed—of our intuition of *this*, the very root of our idea of individuality (which surely has a most general applicability), on the model of a *predicable* (or property), i.e., that which applies to a specific generality of items. Hence his move to universalization:

> The This is, therefore, established as *not* This, or as something superseded; and hence not as Nothing, but as a determinate Nothing, the Nothing of a content, viz. of the This. Consequently, the sense-element is still present, but not in the way it was supposed to be in [the position of] immediate certainty: not as the singular item that is 'meant', but as a universal, or as that which will be defined as a *property* [*Eigenschaft*]. [113]

But individuality, like existence, is not a predicable. The two are very closely connected in that we cannot SD refer to something except as existing, since we can SD refer only to what`s actually present, what *is* here and now (3). Existence is not a predicable because, as Kant argued for example, "it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing,"[24] or Russell: If existence were a predicable, then nonexistence would be as well. But in that case, by the rule of 'existential generalization', we could infer from the fact that *a* doesn't exist to the absurdity that there exists something which does not exist.

If individuality were a predicable, then individuals could `share' their individuality as they might have any other property or quality in common. But no individual can share its individuality with another because, to argue it one way: Take two individuals, `this' and 'that'. Neither can share its individuality with the other since this would mean that the former's being 'this' could be shared with the latter, and the latter's being 'that' could be shared with the former—which is to hold, it seems, the absurdity that *this* to someone could, at the same time, be *that* to him (and vice versa) (cf. *here* to someone being at the same time *there* to him).

There simply is no such thing as "the abstract quality *common* to all the specimens [of any species], the *quality* of being *this*";[25] if there were, singular demonstrative reference would indeed be impossible.[26]

NOTES

[1]I shall capitalize this when I mean the chapter (*Sinnliche Gewissheit*) of the book, and when uncapitalized, the mentality or phase of the development of Spirit. I will be using A. V. Miller's translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). Section numbers shall be indicated in parentheses.

[2]J. N. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), pp. 89–91 (also see his "Analysis of the Text" in the Miller translation, pp. 507–10); Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), chap. 1; Howard P. Kainz, *Hegel's Phenomenology, Part I: Analysis and Commentary* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1976), pp. 61–64; Quentin Lauer, *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Fordham University Press,1976), chap. 2; J. Loewenberg, *Hegel's Phenomenology: Dialogues on the Life of Mind* (La Salle: Open Court, 1965), dialogue 2; Richard Norman, *Hegel's Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction* (Sussex: Sussex University Press, 1976), pp. 29–38; Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 140–45—this contains some of the same material as his "The Opening Arguments of the *Phenomenology*" in Alasdair MacIntyre, ed., *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 151–68.

[3]E.g., Norman, *op. cit.*, see pp. 7 and 29–38.

[4]As Kainz (*op. cit.*, pp. 62–64) seems to believe. Lauer argues forcefully against this mistake (*op. cit.*, pp. 41–43).

[5]Cf. William P. Alston, *Philosophy of Language* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 12–19.

[6]Hegel frequently animates the mentalities he discusses in the *Phenomenology*. I adopt this way of speaking for convenience of exposition.

[7]See, e.g., Jaakko Hintikka, "On Kant's Nation of Intuition (*Anschauung*)" in Terence Penelhum and J. J. MacIntosh, eds., *The First Critique* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1969); Robert Howell, "Intuition, Synthesis, and Individuation in the *Critique of Pure Reason*," *Noûs* 7 (September 1973).

[8]Cf. R. M. Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," *The Journal of Philosophy* 76 (January 1979), p. 10; also note #7.

[9]See, e.g., P. F. Strawson, "On Referring," reprinted in Charles Caton, ed., *Philosophy and Ordinary Language* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963); John Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), e.g., pp. 77 and 82. Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, B72.

[10]For a similar trichotomy, cf. space and time taken as the forms of appearance (or object—A34) and "that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation" as its "*matter*" in Kant's "Transcendental Aesthetic" (A20–22).

Though some commentators (Kainz, and Norman, both *op. cit.*) seem to neglect 'this' considered as concrete or sensuous content and focus only on 'now' and 'here', given such remarks as those that occur in 97 and 109, Hegel in fact explicitly distinguishes such a `this'. This neglect would be hard to reconcile with Kainz's own apparent view that Sense-Certainty is simply about sensation, for we clearly cannot *sense* 'now' and `here' themselves—only *what* (concrete content) is now and here. More about this 'this' later.

[11]Cf. P. F. Strawson, *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 19ff.

[12]Broadly construed—we symbolically point out *now* by pointing downward. Seemingly at a loss to explain it, all the commentators I have mentioned, with the exception of Loewenberg, either ignore altogether or fail to devote enough attention to the turn to pointing out which, in fact, Hegel makes much of. On the other hand, Loewenberg appears to exaggerate the difference, which I shall take up again later, between nonarticulate and articulate SD reference, saying, e.g.: "Is it possible to experiment with the data of gesticulation without forcing them into the alien mold of discourse? Great indeed is the gulf between objects directly denoted and those verbally communicated" (*op. cit.*, p. 35).

[13]I say 'at root' and 'basic' because it seems that "the conception of a body is fundamental in our actual ways of thinking about the world and presupposed by our ways of thinking about anything else at all—surfaces, visual things, numbers, *et al.*" This is from David Shwayder, "Lectures on Locke's *Essay*," Lecture VIII, p. 71 (unpublished).

[14]*Ibid.*

[15]Cf.: "after the usual optimistic start, the M.I.T. robot arm was stopped cold by just the problem of representing its own body space which I suspected would be its undoing"—from H. L. Dreyfus, *What Computers Can't Do*, revised edition (New York: Harper &Row, 1979), p. 25.

[16]*Metaphysics*, 2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 88.

[17]Or, less naturally: `now' (3) always *is*; 'now' (3) is never *not*.

[18]Alston says: "two expressions can have different meanings but the same referent ...The converse phenomenon—same meaning but different referents—can be demonstrated, not for different expressions, but for different utterances of the same expression. There is a class of terms, sometimes called 'indexical terms', for example, `I', `you', 'here', 'this', which systematically change their reference with changes in the conditions of their utterances." *Op. cit,* p. 13.

[19]To put it mildly; to put it maximally—cannot be conventionally represented *at all*. Perhaps whatever truth there is in the apologetic interpretation indicates that we should put it mildly. The inexpressibility theme is picked up by all the commentators I`ve cited; see, e.g., Hyppolite, p. 87;

Loewenberg, pp. 34, 36, 38; Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the *Phenomenology*," pp. 165–66.

[20]*Op. cit.*, p. 90.

[21]*Individuals*, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–22.

[22]"The sensuous This," Hegel maintains, in fact expresses "sameness with everything rather than ...distinctiveness" (110). Then in "Perception," the next aspect of consciousness he takes up, he says, e.g., "Being" or *this* "is a universal in virtue of its having mediation or the negative within it; when it *expresses* this in its immediacy it is a *differentiated, determinate* property" (113). So Loewenberg, for example, says speaking of the end of Sense-Certainty, "the way is thus clear for the transition from sensory awareness to perceptual cognition; for to perceive an object is to take cognizance of the attributes to which it owes determinateness" (*op. cit.*, p. 40). And Hyppolite, "indeed, the object considered by sensuous certainty is the immediate, the true as immediate, i.e., being, or the universal opposed to determinateness or to specificity. But in perception the object becomes the thing, tied to its properties, the universal combined with the particular" (*op. cit.*, p. 83).

[23]This sort of thing is argued extensively in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations, passim* (e.g., sec. 435 and 580).

[24]*Critique of Pure Reason*, A598 B626.

[25]Loewenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 33 (emphasis added).

[26]For a critique of certain more contemporary views asserting the impossibility of reference in general, see Jack W. Meiland, *Talking about Particulars* (New York: Humanities, 1970), chap. 2.