Gundissalinus on the Angelic Creation of the Human Soul

A Peculiar Example of Philosophical Appropriation

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Abstract

With his original reflection—deeply influenced by many important Arabic thinkers—Gundissalinus wanted to renovate the Latin debate concerning crucial aspects of the philosophical tradition. Among the innovative doctrines he elaborated, one appears to be particularly problematic, for it touches a very delicate point of Christian theology: the divine creation of the human soul, and thus, the most intimate bond connecting the human being and his Creator. Notwithstanding the relevance of this point, Gundissalinus ascribed the creation of the human soul to the angels rather than God. He also stated that the angels create the souls from prime matter, and through a kind of causality which cannot be operated by God. What are the sources of this unusual and perilous doctrine? And what are the reasons which led Gundissalinus to hold such a problematic position? This article thoroughly examines the theoretical development and sources of Gundissalinus's position, focusing on the correlations between this doctrine, the overall cosmological descriptions expounded by Gundissalinus in his original works, and the main sources upon which this unlikely doctrine is grounded: Avicenna and Ibn Gabirol.

Keywords

soul – angels – Gundissalinus – Avicenna – Ibn Gabirol
1 Introduction

The problem of the origin of the human soul accompanies the history of Christian philosophy at least since Origen and Augustine.1 Acceptation and refusal of different perspectives, such as the traducianist or the pre-existentialist positions, slowly led to an almost shared stance on the origin of the human souls, created directly by God and infused into the body at some point during or after conception. The emergence of a shared position in later medieval philosophy, though, is marked by the formulation of different theories and hypotheses, which have had less success, but yet have appeared to have influenced, sometimes slightly and quietly, the Latin debate. By this point of view, the decades between the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries are among the most fascinating periods of Western philosophy. Circulation and appropriation of fresh new Arabic and Greek knowledge provided the bases for different approaches to the main problems engaged with by the Latin tradition, often producing rather peculiar doctrines.

One of the most striking examples of the cross-cultural pollination which marked those decades is provided by the works of Dominicus Gundissalinus (ca 1125—post 1190). Latin translator of important Arabic works,2 Gundissalinus is a main character of the twelfth-century translation movement which found in Toledo its most eminent venue. Gundissalinus, though, also engaged with philosophical reflection, producing a set of philosophical treatises.3 In these works, the Toledan philosopher realised a rather peculiar theoretical merging among Latin and Arabic sources, directly and crucially contributing to the intricate process of doctrinal appropriation of Arabic philosophy in the central decades of the Middle Ages.

Many of Gundissalinus’s original doctrines are grounded on a syncretic approach: the main characteristic of his speculation, indeed, is Gundissalinus’s attempt at according two opposite philosophical perspectives, that is,

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those elaborated by Avicenna and Ibn Gabirol. Gundissalinus translated the major works of these two thinkers—Avicenna’s *Liber de philosophia prima* and Ibn Gabirol’s *Fons vitae*—and he tried to combine their opposed outcomes, in many ways, to address different problems, from cosmology to ontology and psychology.

This process of theoretical synthesis—whose outcomes are sometimes bizarre—is possibly the most original point of Gundissalinus’s speculation. Nonetheless, its accomplishment required him to profoundly problematize his own reflection. His initial adhesion to Ibn Gabirol’s metaphysics underwent a gradual reassessment through a progressive encounter with Avicenna’s works, through a long and complex process which found its most outstanding point in Gundissalinus’s ontology. Traces of this problematization, though, can be detected throughout Gundissalinus’s philosophical production. The present contribution aims at presenting a non-immediately perspicuous aspect of this theoretical merging of Avicenna’s and Ibn Gabirol’s perspectives: Gundissalinus’s position on the creation of the human souls, performed not by God, but by the angels. Hopefully, this examination will offer a meaningful example of both Gundissalinus’s attitude and his attempt at renovating the Latin philosophical debate.

2 Intelligences, Spheres, and Souls

Possibly the last work authored by Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi* is a curious treatise dealing with metaphysical and cosmological features. Gundissalinus grounds his account of the process of cosmic institution mainly on Hermann of Carinthia’s *De essentiis*, at the same time following quite strictly the ‘metaphysical procedure’ presented in al-Fārābī’s *Catalogue of Sciences* (*Kitāb Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*, or *De scientiis*). In turn, the metaphysical bases of Gundissalinus’s cosmological description are rooted in Avicenna’s and Ibn Gabirol’s perspectives. Divine creation corresponds to the coming into existence of the ontological principles of every created being, which are matter and form. After


coming into existence, matter and form are joined together by God into what Gundissalinus calls the first composition (primaria compositio), which gives origin to three genera of beings: angels, celestial spheres, and elements. These are the first offspring (primaria genitura), caused directly by God, but also, and especially, the agents of an instrumental causality through which the sublunary world is finally originated.\footnote{See Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, 154,5–20. It should be noticed that Gundissalinus’s theory of secondary causation is based on the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms. God’s creative activity is immediate only regarding the highest level of reality, which corresponds to the genera of the first offspring. These entities are hylomorphic beings made of a single matter and at least three forms: unity and substantiality—the components of ‘substance’ in general—which are further specified by the form of spirituality (in the case of the angels) or the form of corporeality (as it is the case for the elements). Since in caused beings complication and multiplication correspond to a higher number of forms joining the hylomorphic compound, the secondary offspring, lower and instituted by the secondary cause, will have a much more compositied being made of a greater number of specific and generic forms, in a progressive degradation into multiplicity of the simplicity of God’s first creation. Consequently, the causation performed by the secondary causes corresponds, implicitly but also evidently, to an ‘imitation’ of God’s creative act, although lacking the ability to perform with equal power in neither causation or efficiency.}

The causation of the sensible world by this secondary cause is enacted through two different kinds of causality: secondary composition (secundaria compositio) and generation (generatio). Through them, the imitative causality of the angels, the perpetual movement of the spheres, and the natural power intrinsic to the elements bring the sublunary world forth into existence, establishing its natural processes and concluding the causative dynamic initiated by the creation of matter and form—which, consequently, is entirely governed by God’s immediate and mediated causality.

Gundissalinus describes the physical causality of natural world as a vertical chain of causes, which is the outcome of the causal interplay among the three first genera of beings:

For the philosophers say that by the service of the angels new souls are created every day from matter and form, and the celestial souls are also moved. Moreover, by the motion of the heavens and higher bodies, many things are produced in these lower bodies. For, because the celestial bodies contain these lower bodies within themselves and are contiguous with them and because the higher bodies are always in motion, it is certainly necessary that these bodies be moved according to the motion of them. For, when some large body is moved, it is necessary that a small body that is united to it within it be moved. Since, however, these lower bodies are
moved, it is necessary that they be mixed among themselves. But because they have contrary qualities, as happens in every mixture, because that which is stronger acts upon the other, it happens that of the bodies that are produced by the mingling one is said to be hotter or colder or wetter or drier than another from the quality that works more forcefully in the mixture; one is said to be brighter, such as sapphire, another darker, such as onyx; and one is prepared to be a receptacle of vegetative life like a plant, another to be receptive of sensitive life like an animal body, and another to be receptive of rational life like a human body. Therefore, because as a result of the motion of the higher bodies these lower bodies are mixed and because from their mixture the different temperaments arise for bodies, the motions of the higher bodies are rightly called a secondary cause. However, the motion of the higher bodies can do nothing in these lower bodies except by the support of nature. For, using the motion of higher bodies, it acts in some by mixing and changing, as, for example, in congealed things; it nourishes some by attracting, retaining, digesting nutriment, by expelling waste, as, for example, in living things; it moves some by generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration, and change with respect to place.\[8\]

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8 Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi*, 214,12–216,14: “Ministerio enim angelorum dicunt philosophi ex materia et forma novas cotidie creari animas, caelos etiam moveri. Item motu etiam caelorum et superiorum corporum multa fiunt in his inferioribus. Quia enim caelestia corpora continent haec inferiora intra se et contigua sunt cum illis, superiora autem semper in motu sunt, profecto necesse est, ut ad motum eorum et ista moveantur. Cum enim quodam magnum corpus movetur, necesse est, ut parvum corpus, quod intra se est sibi coniunctum, moveatur. Cum autem ista inferiora moveantur, necessario et ipsa intra se commiscerunt; sed quia contrariarum qualitatum sunt, (ideo, sicut fit in omni commixtione, quia, quod praevalet, agit in aliud), contingit, ut corporum, quae ex ipsorum permixtione fiunt, a qualitate, quae in permixtione fortius operatur, aliu alio calidius vel frigidius vel humidius vel siccius dicatur et aliu claritatis, ut hyacinthus, aliu obscuritatis, ut onychinus, aliu vitae vegetabilis, ut planta, aliu vitae sensibilis, ut corpus animalis, aliu vitae rationalis, ut humanum corpus, receptibile praeparetur. Quia igitur ex motu superiorum corporum haec inferiora commiscerunt, ex quorum commixtione diversae corporibus complexiones inascuntur; ideo motus superiorum merito secundaria causa appellantur. Motus autem superiorum in his inferioribus nihil operari potest, nisi adminiculo naturae. Ipsa enim motu superiorum utens quaedam agit commiscendo et convertendo, ut in congelatis; quaedam nutrit attrahendo, retinendo, nutrimentum digerendo, expellendo, ut in animatis; quaedam movet generando, corrumpendo, augmentando, diminuendo, alterando et secundum locum mutando.” English translation by John A. Laumakis, *The Procession of the World* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2002), 73–74. It should be noticed that, while Laumakis translates from Bülow’s critical edition, the new edition by Soto Bruna and Alonso Del Real is consistent with the English rendering. I modify Laumakis’s translation whenever necessary.
Through the movement impressed to the celestial spheres, the angels are the remote origin of physical causality. The contiguity among the spheres causes their movement to mingle the mass which lays in the middle of the spheres, the elemental mass of the sublunary world, whose elements are consequently mixed into bodies of different complexions. This celestial intermingling of the elements, though, is neither disordered nor chaotic—a position utterly refused by Gundissalinus, who harshly criticizes Hugh of St Victor's position on primordial chaos in *De processione*. To the contrary, the natural power which is intrinsic to the elements governs the continuous process of generation and corruption in the sublunary world, acting upon the mingling movement impressed by the spheres. In this way, new compositions (and corruptions) of elemental conglomerates (*elementata*) and corporeal bodies are produced by the secondary cause, through the causal modalities of secondary composition and generation mentioned above.⁹

This intriguing theory of *De processione* can be summarised by the following scheme:

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⁹ Aside from the quoted passage, Gundissalinus is rather meagre in giving specific details on the differences between secondary composition and generation, and the modalities through which these causative processes are performed. The absence of a detailed exposition of this point creates a feeble, but crucial tension between the possible interpretations of the text. The reason of that absence might lay in Gundissalinus's application of the *metaphysical* procedure ‘described’ by al-Fārābī, while these features are evidently addressed by *natural philosophy* rather than metaphysics.
At a first glance, Gundissalinus’s account appears to be quite plain and linear. Nonetheless, the excerpt quoted above mentions a second causative function performed by the angels. Beside moving the spheres, indeed, Gundissalinus writes that “the philosophers say that by the service of the angels new souls are created every day from matter and form.”\textsuperscript{10} This assertion evidently complicates the proposed causal scheme. Gundissalinus’s mention of this further angelic action may be referred to Avicenna’s cosmology: indeed, in book IX of his \textit{Philosophia prima}, Avicenna describes the cosmic institution through a threefold causative and gnoseological process operated by the intelligence and giving origin to the cosmic souls and spheres.\textsuperscript{11} For Avicenna, the first intelligence has cognition of the necessary existence of its cause, God, originating another intelligence. At the same time, the intelligence has also cognition of the mediated necessity of its own being as caused by God, cognition which causes the existence of the cosmic soul, and which moves the third entity originated by this process, the celestial sphere, coming forth from the intelligence’s comprehension of its own possible existence. This cosmogonic description surely influenced Gundissalinus, whom evidently refers to this process while stating that:

For it principally moves the intelligence through itself without any means. But, according to the philosophers, the intelligences create the souls that move the heavens. The motion of the elements, however, follows from the motion of the heavens. But from the motion of the elements, there comes the mixing of the elements. Their mixing, however, is the procreator of all the things in this lower world.\textsuperscript{12}

The source of this passage appears to be Avicenna.\textsuperscript{13} Some philosophers, Gundissalinus says, claim that the intelligences, that is, the angels, create the souls

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{10} Gundissalinus, \textit{De processione mundi}, 214,12–13: “Ministerio enim angelorum dicunt philosophi ex materia et forma novas cotidie creari animas, caelos etiam moveri.”
\bibitem{12} Gundissalinus, \textit{De processione mundi}, 220,17–222,5: “Quaedam enim movet per se nullo mediante et quaedam non per se, sed mediantibus aliis. Principaliter enim per se nullo mediante intelligentiam movet. Intelligentiae vero secundum philosophos creant animas, quae movent caelos; ex motu vero caelorum sequitur motus elementorum. Sed ex motu elementorum provenit commixtio eorum; ex commixtione vero eorum per conversionem et generationem procreatur rerum omnium, haec ultima inferius universitas.” English translation by Laumakis, 75.
\bibitem{13} Gundissalinus’s reference to a process of causation “mediante intelligentia” is intriguing. The same reference appears twice in Gundissalinus’s works (see note 22). At a first glance,
quae movent caelos, which move the heavens. These are surely to be identified with the celestial souls which move the planetary spheres. At the same time, though, how can these celestial souls be the souls created cotidie, that is, daily by the angels to which Gundissalinus refers in the excerpt from De processione mundi quoted above? Evidently, any identification of the celestial souls with the everyday created souls would imply a contradiction, since the celestial souls are caused only once, ictu oculi, and before the beginning of time.

Consequently, the only possible solution to this impasse seems to be provided by the identification of the souls created every day by the angels with the individual souls of sensible beings—that is to say, the three species of rational, sensible, and vegetative souls. If this is the correct interpretation of this passage, as it appears to be, two fundamental outcomes are implied by Gundissalinus’s line of reasoning:

1. vegetative and sensible souls which animate, respectively, plants and animals are caused by the angels;

2. human souls, too, are directly caused by the angels: as a result, any direct bond between God and human being is removed in favor of angelic mediation.

Ascribing to the angels the creation of the souls, Gundissalinus neatly distinguishes between the superlunary and sublunary worlds as two realms subject to different kinds of causative institution. On the one hand, the superlunary world is caused directly by God through creation and first composition. On the other hand, the sublunary world is caused by the secondary cause, which performs generation and secondary composition, the latter characterized by a higher ontological complexity in comparison to primary composition.

the mention of a mediated causation of this kind seems to be textually and doctrinally close to the Liber de causis. Although fascinating, the hypothesis that the Liber de causis had been a source of Gundissalinus’s metaphysics finds almost no further textual or doctrinal correspondence beside these two references to a causation "mediante intelligentia," which can be justified by appealing to Avicenna rather than the Liber de causis. In addition, Pattin’s hypothesis that the Liber de causis had been translated by Gerard of Cremona and revised by Gundissalinus has been rejected by most scholars. See Adriaan Pattin, "Le Liber de Causis," Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 28 (1966): 90–203; Adriaan Pattin, "Autour du Liber de Causis: Quelques réflexions sur la récente littérature," Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 41 (1994): 354–88; and Richard C. Taylor, "Remarks on the Latin Text and the Translator of the Kalam fi mahd al-khair/Liber de causis," Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 31 (1989): 75–102. Notwithstanding these limitations, the mystery surrounding the translation and first reception of the Liber de causis is surely worth a global reassessment also in consideration of the events that took place in Toledo in the second half of the twelfth century.
Consequently, the doctrine of the angelic creation of the souls provides sublunary things with a deep homogeneity as for both cause and ontological structure.

3 Angels and Human Souls

Specifically focused on cosmology and metaphysics, *De processione mundi* mentions the doctrine of angelic creation of the souls only in reference to the discussion of the causative functions performed by the secondary cause. A much more detailed treatment of the origin of the soul is presented in Gundissalinus’s *De anima*, a treatise which, as the title suggests, is centered on the discussion of the soul (its origin, composition, and faculties).

The fifth chapter of the treatise is dedicated to the examination of how the souls—vegetative, sensible, and rational—come forth into existence. In the first place, Gundissalinus clarifies that the souls must come to be every day.\(^{14}\) It should be noticed that the daily creation of the souls claimed in *De anima* is a rather peculiar case of ‘creation.’ It is called ‘creation’ only analogically, and it is not the *creatio ex nihilo*, which is proper to God only, and limited to the creation of prime matter and form. Gundissalinus’s acceptation of universal hylomorphism is radical: every caused being is composed of matter and form, since God’s creation from nothing corresponds to the causation of matter and form *from* and *through* which each and every creature comes to be. As a consequence, not only the angels, but also the souls must be composed of matter and form: universal hylomorphism necessarily implies psychological hylomorphism. As a result, the souls are not created from nothing, but from matter:

Consequently, although it is said that new human souls are created every day, nonetheless, they appear to be created not from nothing but from prime matter. If all being comes forth by form, therefore, the rational soul has being only by the form, but the form has being only when it is in matter. Consequently, the form by which the rational soul comes forth into being, is in matter, and therefore, the soul appears to consist of matter and form.\(^{15}\)


\(^{15}\) Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 158,20–160,2: “Quamvis ergo humanae animae cotidie novae creari dicantur, non tamen de nihilo, sed de materia prima creari videntur. Si enim omne
Gundissalinus’s claim of the material origin of the souls is perfectly coincident with the excerpt from *De processione* quoted above: that the creation of the souls, indeed, corresponds to a second phase of the cosmic institution, performed by the secondary cause. The justification of this point in *De anima* is pursued by Gundissalinus expositing how ‘the philosophers’ have proven that the souls are created by the angels rather than by God.

The first demonstration states that, since every creature desires God, there would be no reason why the souls would have abandoned Him to join the bodies, if God were their creator. Consequently, since new souls are evidently created and join the bodies every day, God cannot be their direct cause. At the same time, with the second argument Gundissalinus makes clear that the causation of the souls follows a deliberation of their author, who judged the existence of any given soul as better than its non-existence. Deliberative process, though, implies a change of status of the cause. Since God is completely perfect, nothing new can happen to Him, and therefore He cannot be the cause of the souls.

The third demonstration is focused on the examination of the modalities of causation. God only creates *ex nihilo*, while any further kind of causation acts upon something which already exists. Since the souls are created from matter, therefore, they cannot be the effect of God’s direct causality:

Also, another proof. The first Maker only produces something from nothing. But it will be demonstrated later that the soul comes forth from matter. Consequently, it is not a product of the first Maker. Moreover, being created or coming forth into being corresponds to [the thing] passing from potency into act (*effectus*). Nonetheless, [the thing] passes from potency into act only by virtue of something which is [already] in act. The first Maker, though, is neither in potency nor in act: the soul, indeed, does not pass from potency into act by virtue of Him, and therefore, it is not created by Him.
Consideration of the material origin of the souls implies another demonstration. Acting upon matter, the causation of the soul corresponds to the actualization of a potency which, in turn, can be actualized only by something which is already in act. God, though, is neither potency nor act, therefore He cannot actualize the potency of the soul into its act. In addition to that, the passage from potency into act corresponds to a kind movement: as a result, if God were the cause of the souls, He should be subject to movement, something inadmissible for He is completely perfect, thus immobile.\(^{19}\)

A further proof proposed by Gundissalinus is centered on the difference between mediated and immediate causality. The point of departure of his line of reasoning is that the immediate reception of something is worthier than its mediated appropriation, therefore, the effect of the former is nobler than that of the latter. If this is true, considering that the intelligence is worthier and nobler than the soul, it must be assumed that only the former is caused by God, with no mediation, while the less noble status of the soul is a consequence of being the effect of an intermediary.\(^{20}\)

Finally, the last demonstration is based on the consideration of finite and infinite movement: the movement impressed by something infinite *per se* must be infinite. To the contrary, souls have finite movement due to the limitedness of their substance: therefore, the finite movement of the soul must be performed *sine medio* by something which is finite *per se*, and that entity cannot be God.\(^{21}\)

Touching different aspects of their causation, Gundissalinus’s set of proofs aims at demonstrating that God cannot be said to be the *direct* cause of the souls’ creation. Their direct cause must be a finite and mobile entity, which is in act, has deliberative reason, and performs the intermediary causation of the existence of every single soul following God’s will. Accordingly, these entities are the angels. Acting upon matter to create new souls, the angels do not perform anything but the realization of God’s will, being the instrumental cause of the cosmogonic institution which is utterly governed by God. This relation between God and the angels is marked by the terms of “service” (*ministerium*) and “authority” (*auctoritas*), posited by Gundissalinus in strict (and evocative) analogy to the administration of sacraments:

\[\text{tia nec in effectu; igitur per illum non exit anima de potentia ad effectum. Ergo non creatur ab illo.}^\]

\(^{19}\) See Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 132,1–13.

\(^{20}\) See Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 132,14–19.

\(^{21}\) See Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 134,1–18.
For what the philosophers demonstrate, the souls are not created by God, but by the angels, and you can easily understand this, that is, that they are created by the angel’s service rather than God’s. Nonetheless, when it is said that “God creates the soul,” this sentence must be understood as referred to divine authority, not to His service, as when it is said of Christ that “He is the one who baptizes,” while [it is] the priest [who] baptizes. Christ does so through His authority, not His service, and the priest does so through his service, not his authority. In a similar fashion, also the angels create the souls through their service only, not their authority. Consequently, they are not said to be the creators of the souls, since they do not create by authority, but [by] performing a service. Everything which uses not [its] authority, but [its] service, to act upon something, it necessarily obeys what is superior [to itself] while serving. For this reason, it is not said that the soul is a creature of the angel, but of God, for it is created by His authority, likewise the mighty works made by some of the servants are attributed not to them, but to their masters, for whose order [these works] have been made. Accordingly, as the human body receives some action of the rational soul only through the spirit, as too the rational soul receives the action of the first Maker only through the intelligence (mediante intelligentia), that is, the angelic creature.²²

The angels create the souls following God’s authority and enacting His will, performing the service they are commanded to offer as instruments of God’s will. Consequently, the ultimate cause of the creation of the souls is God Himself. As during baptism, while it is Christ whom baptizes, it is the priest who performs the baptism ministerio Christi; so too the angels every day create new souls ministerio Dei, performing His will and enacting His authority. As Gundissalinus

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²² Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 134,19–136,12: “Hoc autem quod philosophi probant, animas non a Deo sed ab angelis creari, sane quidem potest intelligi, scilicet non Dei ministerio sed angelorum. Et tamen cum dicitur ‘Deus creat animas,’ intelligendum est auctoritate non ministerio, sicut cum dicitur de Christo: ‘hic est qui baptizat,’ cum sacerdos baptizet. Sed Christus auctoritate non ministerio; sacerdos vero ministerio tantum, non auctoritate; sic et angeli creant animas ministerio tantum, non auctoritate. Unde nec creatores animarum dicuntur quia in creando non auctoritate, sed ministerio funguntur. Qui enim in agendo aliquid non auctoritate sed ministerio utitur, in ministrando utique superiori obsequitur. Et ideo anima creatura angelii non dicitur, sed Dei, cuius auctoritate creatur, sicut et magnalia quae aliquorum ministri operantur non ipsis sed dominis suis quorum nutu faciunt imputantur. Sicut ergo corpus humanum non recipit actionem aliquam animae rationalis nisi mediante spiritu, sicut et anima rationalis non recipit actionem factoris primi nisi mediante intelligentia, scilicet angelica creatura.”
remarks, this is the reason why it is commonly said that God creates the souls: indeed, He does so through the angelic service. Grounded upon Augustine’s discussion of baptism, while probably using Peter Lombard’s Sententiae, the reference to the sacrament administered by the priest during baptism allows Gundissalinus to doctrinally ground his peculiar position on the Christian tradition.\(^\text{23}\)

Examination of De anima confirms the correctness of the proposed interpretation of the excerpt from De processione mundi quoted above. The souls created cotidie by the angels are the individual sublunary souls animating plants, animals, and human beings. Grounding psychology upon universal hylomorphism, and positing neat boundaries between the first and the second phase of the cosmic establishment, Gundissalinus offers a quite original doctrine of the origin of human souls.

4 Intelligences and Souls

Following the text of De anima, chapter V, two different thematic sections can be distinguished, engaging respectively with two principal aspects of the origin of the souls: its causation and its agent. The first section is dedicated to the examination of the causal modality by which the souls are created.\(^\text{24}\) Gundissalinus posits the terms of the question on whether the souls are created with the institution of the universe—as if they were stars, created before the bodies and infused into them by God—or whether they are the effect of a daily creation. The former, though, cannot be the case: the soul cannot pre-exist the body.

In the first place, any supposition that the souls were created before the bodies faces a crucial contradiction. In fact, before the union with their bodies, the souls cannot have been a multitude, since all human souls are one in species and definition. Before being joined to their bodies, then, none of them could be identified as numerically different from the others, for there was no alterity or difference among them. As a consequence, it is impossible to suppose a multitude of souls pre-existing their union to the body.\(^\text{25}\) Moreover, Gundissali-
linus remarks, even if that were possible, the souls would have an esse otiosum vel superfluum, they would be useless while nothing is useless or superfluous in nature.\textsuperscript{26}

At the same time, it is also impossible to state the opposite alternative of this supposition, that is, that the souls were created before the bodies not as a multitude, but as one soul. Each living body, indeed, has one soul, and these souls must either be individual souls, or parts of single original souls pre-existing the bodies. The latter, nonetheless, cannot be the case, since the souls have no extension nor magnitude, thus, cannot be divided in potency. Nor it can be assumed that one soul animates two bodies.\textsuperscript{27} As a consequence, the souls do not pre-exist the bodies, and:

For this reason, it follows that new souls are created every day. In fact, when a body suitable to become its instrument and dominion is created, then, the intelligible causes, which are used to provide every soul, create it. Consequently, it is impossible that the soul is created without the body, so that [the soul] is created, but not the body.\textsuperscript{28}

This excerpt clearly states that the souls are created and infused into the bodies by the intelligible causes. It is also a direct quotation from Avicenna’s De anima, V, 4. Actually, the entire discussion of the modality of the soul’s creation is derived from chapters 3 and 4 of the fifth book of Avicenna’s psychological work, but in a way quite characteristic of Gundissalinus’s use of his sources.

For Avicenna, the soul is an immaterial and separated substance which joins the body as its instrument to realize its perfection.\textsuperscript{29} In book V, chapter 3, Avicenna engages with two crucial problems: the interplay of reason and sensation in the rational soul,\textsuperscript{30} and the origin of the soul, whose discussion is further developed in chapter 4, specifically considering the soul’s immortality and the impossibility of metempsychosis.\textsuperscript{31} This last section of the two chapters is the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{26} See Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,7–10.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} See Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,10–17.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,17–21: “Quapropter consequitur ut cotidie creentur novae animae; cum enim creatur corpus quod sit dignum fieri instrumentum et regnum eius, tunc causae intelligibiles quae solent dare unamquamque animam creant eam. Ergo ut anima creetur sine corpore ita ut ipsa creetur et non corpus, hoc est impossibile.”
  \item \textsuperscript{29} For an overall examination of Avicenna’s psychology, see Meryem Sebti, Avicenne. L’âme humaine (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000).
  \item \textsuperscript{30} See Avicenna, Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus, ed. by Simone Van Riet (Louvain—Leiden: Brill, 1972), 102,97–105,39.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} See Avicenna, De anima, 105,40–126,26.
\end{itemize}
source of Gundissalinus's quotations. Since the two chapters have been thoroughly examined by Thérèse-Anne Druart, I will only present their general structure and main position as regards to Gundissalinus's reception.

In the first place, Avicenna discusses and demonstrates that the soul cannot pre-exist the body. Human souls are one in their species and definition: consequently, if they were created before the bodies, they could be neither many nor one in number. Concerning the former, Avicenna states that, being simple and immaterial entities, the souls do not have any essential alterity per se, and their multiplication only happens through their union with their matter, that is, the body. Consequently, if the souls were created before the bodies, they could not be many in number. Nevertheless, they cannot have been one either. In fact, the recognition of a multiplicity of embodied souls would entail that the supposed single soul which they were before joining their matter was divisible in potency, something inadmissible. Therefore, Avicenna concludes, the souls cannot pre-exist their bodies. The soul is created together with the body, or better, when the complexion of the body—its matter—is apt to receive the soul. Through this dynamic, the souls are a multitude of individual entities composing one species, and each soul is joined to one body.

Soul and body, then, are contemporaries, but not essentially related: they come to be at the same moment, but their relation is accidental. Indeed, if it were essential, the destruction of the body would imply that of the soul, since they would be relatives. To the contrary, the accidental nature of their relation manifests the immortality of the soul. At the same time, if the body were pre-existing the soul, it would be its cause, which is impossible considering that the body cannot be any of the four possible causes of the soul (efficient, recipient, formal, and perfective). Therefore, the soul must be created when the bodily matter is apt to receive it as its instrument, and it is created and infused into the body by the separate causes.

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34 See Avicenna, *De anima*, 107,63–69.
35 See Avicenna, *De anima*, 107,75–113,43.
36 See Avicenna, *De anima*, 113,46–114,56.
37 See Avicenna, *De anima*, 114,57–115,79.
38 See Avicenna, *De anima*, 115,80–116,82: “Cum enim creatur materia corporis quod sit dignum fieri instrumentum animae et eius regnum, tunc causae separatae quae solent dare unamquamque animam, creant animam.”
Consequently, for Avicenna it is impossible to suppose that a soul can exist without having previously been joined to a body: everything which begins to be is preceded by a matter which is apt to receive it or have a relation with it, which is witnessed with the souls.\(^{39}\) If the souls were created without their instrument, which is the body, they would be useless, while nothing in nature is superfluous or useless. Consideration of this evidently implies that whenever the bodily complexion is ready, "it follows the creation, by the separate cause, of what is the soul,"\(^ {40}\) in a similar fashion to every form meant to join matter.\(^ {41}\) The soul, indeed, is a simple entity, and its being is not attributed by the body or a bodily virtue, but by the essence of the soul itself, which has neither matter nor extension. Body and soul are independent from each other: "therefore, it remains that none of them depends on the other: the being of the soul, though, depends on other principles which do not change nor can be destroyed."\(^ {42}\)

Being simple and caused by higher causes, the soul is not subject to corruption, a point demonstrated by Avicenna stressing the immateriality of the soul. To be destroyed is only what has the potency to be destroyed (potentia destruendi) and the act of enduring (effectus permanendi), which are typical features of the beings composed of matter and form. Simple and separate substances, though, do not have a potency to be destroyed, since they are not hylomorphic entities and have no matter to bear contraries.\(^ {43}\) Consequently, the soul cannot be corrupted, and is perpetual.

Before concluding chapter 4 with the refutation of metempsychosis,\(^ {44}\) Avicenna summarizes the originating dynamic of the souls as follows:

We have already demonstrated that the souls were created and multiplied only together with the attitude of the bodies, since, according to the attitude of the bodies, it is necessary to assign to the separate cause the coming to be of the souls. It is also evident that this does not happen by chance or fate, as if the created soul were created only because, by virtue of the complexion [of the body], it was required to create a soul to govern

40 Avicenna, *De anima*, 117,93–94: "comitatur tunc creari a causis separatis illud quod est anima."
41 See Avicenna, *De anima*, 117,94–97: "Hoc autem non contingit in anima tantum, sed in omnibus formis habentibus initium quarum esse non praeponderat supra earum non esse, nisi quia materia aptior est quantum ad illas et dignior illis."
42 Avicenna, *De anima*, 120,32–34: "restat ergo ut nullius eorum esse pendeat ex altero; esse autem animae pendet a principiis aliis quae non permutantur nec destruuntur."
43 See Avicenna, *De anima*, 120,35–122,70.
44 See Avicenna, *De anima*, 125,14–126,26.
it. To the contrary, the soul did come forth into being, but only by chance it happened that the body came forth into being together with that [soul] on which it would depend.\footnote{Avicenna,\textit{ De anima}, 124,96–2: “Iam etiam ostendimus quod animae non fuerunt creatae et multiplicatae nisi cum aptitudine corporum, eo quod secundum aptitudinem corporum oportet attribui esse animae a causis separatis. Et patuit etiam quod hoc non fit casu vel fato, ita ut anima creat ea non fuerit creata nisi quia propter complexionem debebat creari anima quae eam regeter: sed anima habuit esse, et casu accidit ut corpus haberet esse cul illa a quo penderet.”}

This separate cause is the giver of forms, which causes and infuses the souls into the bodies apt to receive them, following the different complexions the bodies have, and provides them with the most apt of the three kinds of soul (vegetative, sensible, and rational).\footnote{See Sebti, \textit{Avicenne. L’âme humaine}, 10–15.}

This short examination of the contents exposited in \textit{De anima}, \textit{V}, 3–4, makes clear that the origin of Gundissalinus’s account of the mediated creation of the human souls is Avicenna. Nevertheless, his use of Avicenna is rather peculiar. In the first place, it should be noticed that Gundissalinus cherry-picks passages from \textit{De anima}, \textit{V}, 3–4, re-inventing the articulation of Avicenna’s discussion through the application of that ‘alteration strategy.’ I have already had the occasion to point out regarding Gundissalinus’s use of Avicenna’s \textit{Philosophia prima} in his \textit{De processione mundi}.\footnote{See Nicola Polloni, “Gundissalinus on Necessary Being: Textual and Doctrinal Alterations in the Exposition of Avicenna’s Metaphysics,” \textit{Arabic Sciences and Philosophy} 26.1 (2016): 129–60.} Also in this case, the excerpts are abridged, linguistically modified, and put in a different order than the original one (see Appendix).

In his demonstration that the souls cannot pre-exist their bodies, Gundissalinus mainly relies on the first argument of the second thematic section of \textit{De anima}, \textit{V}, 3. He polishes the Latin text—whether checking it with the Arabic original, or merely adapting it to its own exposition—while he maintains the main aspects of Avicenna’s line of reasoning. From this point of view, the first part of Gundissalinus’s argument on the impossibility of a multitude of souls before being joined to the bodies is parallel to Avicenna’s (Appendix A and B), simplifying it, though, and cutting away the last part which implicitly contradicts Gundissalinus’s psychological hylomorphism (Appendix, C).

Before passing to the exposition of the second part of the argument (before the bodies, the souls cannot be one either), Gundissalinus inserts a modified excerpt from chapter 4, stating that if the souls were existing before the bod-
ies, they would be useless while nothing is useless in nature. The insertion of this passage is evidently aimed at strengthening the argument from chapter 3 with an additional proof (see Appendix, D). After having quoted this passage, Gundissalinus goes back to chapter 3 (see Appendix E), presenting the second part of Avicenna’s argument: as the souls cannot be many in number before joining the bodies (first part), they neither can be one (second part), since they cannot be divisible in potency for they do not have magnitude or extension. After that, Gundissalinus moves on to chapter 4, again, quoting the passage in which Avicenna states that the souls are created by the separate causes when the bodies are apt to receive them. Also in this case, Gundissalinus abstracts the excerpt from its original context to insert it as the logical conclusion of Avicenna’s first argument presented in the second section of chapter 3.

Gundissalinus, therefore, mainly quotes only one of Avicenna’s arguments, strengthening it through textual additions from chapter 4—and inserting slight textual (and, consequently, doctrinal) alterations. The reason of this operation is quite evident: Gundissalinus is trying to merge Avicenna’s argument with his overall doctrine of the origin of the human souls and, thus, with his peculiar reading of Ibn Gabirol. From this point of view, it is all but surprising that Gundissalinus leaves aside every reference to matter found in Avicenna. Their perspectives are opposed. Avicenna’s discussion of corruption as proper only to beings composited of matter and form cannot be integrated into Gundissalinus’s doctrinal construction, where everything aside from God, matter, and form is a hylomorphic compound. Consequently, Avicenna’s arguments engaging the relation between soul and matter are ignored by Gundissalinus, and the excerpts he quotes are duly modified in order to avoid any intrinsic contradiction with the overall theory exposted in his work.

As regards to the doctrine of the angelic creation of the souls, Gundissalinus’s position is rooted on the addition he makes at the end of the argument taken from De anima, V, 3 (Appendix E). Gundissalinus inserts two passages from chapter 4. The first of them is aimed at being an improvement to Avicenna’s argument, while the second provides its logical conclusions: since the souls are neither many nor one before being joined to the bodies, they must have been created together with the bodies, as their instruments, every day and by the separate causes. From Gundissalinus’s systematization of Avicenna’s proof, the creation of the souls by the separate substances appears as a consequence of the impossibility of their pre-existence to the bodies. The justification of this assertion is provided by the set of arguments following this proof, based on a rather different source.48

48 It should be recalled that, in the same years and location in which Gundissalinus was
5 Hypostases, Angels, and Souls

After having demonstrated, by means of Avicenna’s argument, that the souls are created on a daily basis by the separate causes, Gundissalinus clarifies that this statement is valid only ex parte mundi, that is, in consideration of the elapsing temporal dimension of the sensible universe. Indeed, “for Aristotle, time is the measure of space containing before and after, and for others, time is the period of which one part has gone away while another part still has to come.”

Accordingly, only entities having extension are created in time, while the soul, being simple, must be created in a single moment (instans), which is not in time, for it has no prius or posterius. As a result, the souls cannot be caused by nature, since nature only acts in time.

The clarification of the (non-)temporal dimension of the creation of the soul, and the consequent refusal of the hypothesis that nature is the agent of that creation, led Gundissalinus to present the seven proofs demonstrating that the angels are the direct cause of the souls examined above. The source of these proofs is Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae, possibly the most important of Gundissalinus’s sources.

It should be recalled that the Fons vitae exposes a progressive derivation of reality based on different hylomorphic unions realized by divine will and the secondary causes. The first union of universal matter and form gives origin to the hypostatic Intelligence, which contains the forms of everything and radiates them on what is below. In this causative process, the form of the Intelligence becomes matter of the following hypostatical being, the rational

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49 Gundissalinus, De anima, 128,2–4. This reference to Aristotle is one of the few Gundissalinus makes to an actually Aristotelian content, since he tends to refer to the Greek philosopher Arabic material, usually by Avicenna. See Nicola Polloni, “Aristotle in Toledo: Gundissalinus, the Arabs, and Gerard of Cremona’s Translations,” in Ex Oriente Lux: Translating Words, Scripts and Styles in the Medieval Mediterranean World, ed. by Charles Burnett and Pedro Mantas (Córdoba: UCOPress, London: The Warburg Institute, 2016), 179–81. The second part of Gundissalinus’s definition is derived from Pricianus, Institutiones grammaticae, ed. by Heinrich Keil (Leipzig: Teubner, 1855), 414,11.

50 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 128,1–16.

soul, which also radiates its own essential contents without being deprived or impoverished of anything. Again, through the circular functionality of matter and form, the rational soul is followed by the sensible soul, and then by the vegetative soul. The last layer of the vegetative soul is nature, which causes the universal spiritual matter, the boundary between spiritual and corporeal realms. Once the universal spiritual matter is joined to the form of corporeality, while undergoing the manifold process of spiritual radiation, the substance sustaining the nine categories comes to be. This is a corporeal substance constrained by quantity, whose primary and solely function is to bear the corporeal accidental forms of both the super- and sublunary worlds, at the center of this cosmogonic progression.

It is clear that Ibn Gabirol states that the intelligence causes the soul, and in some respects, it can further be said that the intelligence causes the souls, in plural. Nevertheless, these are the hypostatical Intelligence and the three hypostatical souls, instantiations of the flowing of existence that departs from God’s creation of matter and soul. Ibn Gabirol’s cosmological context, therefore, is radically different from Gundissalinus’s, who is referring to individual souls and separate intelligences/angels following Avicenna’s perspective. Regardless, this evident discrepancy of approach and context, the second section of Gundissalinus’s De anima, is textually grounded on Fons vitae.

The modalities by which Ibn Gabirol’s proofs are presented by Gundissalinus is a striking example of the latter’s alteration strategy, but also and more importantly, an outstanding case of philosophical appropriation and transfer of knowledge. Six out of seven proofs presented by Gundissalinus are direct quotations from Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae, duly modified to be inserted in the former’s line of reasoning (see Appendix, G–L).

In a similar fashion to what Gundissalinus does with Avicenna’s De anima, but in a much more pervasive way, the Toledan philosopher cherry-picks six of the fifty-six proofs of the existence of the spiritual substances (that is, the hypostatical intelligence and souls) presented by Ibn Gabirol in the third book of his work. In order to insert them into the overall discussion of his doctrine,


54 See Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, 75.10–102.9.
though, Gundissalinus had to consistently modify not the structure of the arguments, but their terms. The textual comparison is stunning:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ibn Gabirol, <em>Fons vitae</em></th>
<th>Gundissalinus, <em>De anima</em></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>And if the first Maker is the maker of this substance by Himself, then this substance always existed with God. But this substance did not always exist. It, therefore, was not made by the essence of the first maker. Therefore, the first Maker is not the maker of this substance by Himself. And since the first maker is not its maker by himself, it will be necessary that an intermediary exists between them. (55)</td>
<td>If the first Maker is the maker of the souls by Himself, then the soul always existed with Him. But the soul did not always exist with God since new souls are created every day. Therefore, the soul is not made by the first Maker, and the first Maker is not the maker of the soul by Himself. Consequently, between God and the soul, it is necessary an intermediary, which is the maker of the soul. (56)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The making of the first Maker is to create something from nothing. But the substance that sustains the categories is composed from its own simple elements. It is, therefore, not created from nothing. (57)</td>
<td>Also, another proof. The first Maker only produces something from nothing. But it will be demonstrated later that the soul comes forth from matter. Consequently, it is not a product of the first Maker. (58)</td>
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56 Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 128,18–22: “… si factor primus est factor animae per se, tunc anima semper fuit apud eum; sed anima non semper fuit apud Deum quoniam cotidie creantur novae; igitur anima non est facta a primo factore, nec primus factor est factor eius per se. Igitur necesse est ut aliquid sit medium inter Deum et animam, quod sit factor animae.”


The *Fons vitae*’s original version of the first proof claims that the substance bearing the categories (*substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta*) cannot be caused directly by God: indeed, if that were the case, it would have always been by Him and it would have existed eternally, which is not true. Consequently, God is not the maker of the souls, but there is a medium between them. In Gundissalinus’s *De anima*, this proof is developed in reference to the soul rather than the substance bearing the categories: if the soul were created by God, it would never leave Him. Then, Gundissalinus ‘completes’ the ambiguous passage of *Fons vitae* reading “non fuit semper” and “non semper fuit apud Deum,” that is, interpreting the argument in a much more cosmological rather than ontological sense. Consideration of this implies that God is not the maker of the soul, but there must be a medium between them.

The second proof, too, is modified by Gundissalinus in an identical fashion. In *Fons vitae*, the argument states that the substance bearing the nine categories cannot be created by God, since He only creates *ex nihilo*, while the substance is composed of simple entities (matter and form). Gundissalinus quotes this passage changing the substance bearing the categories with the soul, and the reference to the simple entities with matter: since God only creates *ex nihilo* and the soul is created from matter, the soul cannot be a product of His agency.

These are just two examples of Gundissalinus’s attitude. All the six proofs quoted in *De anima*, v, are based on the examination of the substance bearing the nine categories, the first corporeal layer of reality, in order to show that God cannot be the immediate cause of the corporeal substance. Since God cannot be its cause, there must be an intermediary: the spiritual substances, that is, the hypostatical souls and the intelligence. Gundissalinus quotes some of these arguments, but he constantly and consistently substitutes the substance bearing the categories with the individual human soul (see Appendix, G–L). The outcome is clear: since the souls cannot be caused by God, there must be an intermediary creating them, media which are not the hypostatical substances of the *Fons vitae*, but the angels.

This alteration strategy is neither casual nor isolated in Gundissalinus’s *De anima*. To the contrary, it is a part of an overall change of perspective regarding Ibn Gabirol’s *Fons vitae* and the positions previously held by Gundissalinus. In his early work *De unitate et uno*, Gundissalinus indeed eagerly accepts the hypo-
stational cosmology presented in the *Fons vitae*, explicitly referring to the forms of the four spiritual substances and the progressive ontological degradation of matter and form.\(^5^9\)

In *De anima*, Gundissalinus starts to change his mind regarding some main aspects of his previous interpretation of *Fons vitae*. Gabirolian cosmology, and its hypostases, are abandoned, while the doctrine of universal hylomorphism is read through a much more logical interpretation. Gundissalinus, though, does not cease to use Ibn Gabirol as a main source: he just re-interprets and re-shapes arguments and doctrinal points. This is the case of the proofs of the angelic creation of the souls presented in *De anima*, v, but this approach is in place also with the demonstrations of the hylomorphic composition of the soul presented in *De anima*, vii, where Gundissalinus cherry-picks twenty-three arguments from *Fons vitae*, iii and iv.\(^6^0\) In their original Gabirolian context, these arguments are referred to the hylomorphic composition of the hypostases, while in *De anima* they become proofs of the hylomorphic composition of the individual souls.

In other words, Gundissalinus ‘individualizes’ Ibn Gabirol’s psychological hypostases, straining the arguments of the *Fons vitae* into an entirely different perspective. Thanks to this ‘psychologization’ of Gabirolian cosmology, Gundissalinus can insert the set of proofs demonstrating that the individual soul is directly caused by the angelic intelligence and indirectly by God. Through this reduction of the psychological hypostases to the individual souls, Gundissalinus builds up the first part of his account for the creation of the souls: they cannot be created by God, but through some mediation. This is the general outcome of the proofs presented in *De anima*, v.

In Gundissalinus’s interpretation of Ibn Gabirol, this mediating role cannot be pursued by the hypostatical souls: Gundissalinus, indeed, identifies these entities with the individual souls. Neither can this be nature, since Gundissalinus already refuted this possibility. Therefore, in Gabirolian terms, the only remaining spiritual entity which can perform the mediated causation of the souls is the hypostatical intelligence. This is the second part of Gundissalinus’s doctrine of the origin of the souls, that is, the identification between intelligence and angels. The roots of this identification are grounded on Avicenna (and possibly al-Ghazālī and Ibn Daud): indeed, Gundissalinus clearly identifies separate intelligence and angels in *De anima* as well as in *De processione mundi*, where he indifferently uses the two terms to refer to the same

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\(^{59}\) See Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 128,1–5.

\(^{60}\) See Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 148,6–160,24.
being. Moreover, in *De anima*, Gundissalinus explicitly refers to Avicenna’s agent intelligence, stating that the soul will join the agent intelligence after the death of the body:

> But when the soul will be freed from the body and the accidents of the body, it will be able to join the agent intelligence, and then, it will find intelligible beauty and perennial delight in it, as we have said in the right place.\(^ {61}\)

Nevertheless, neither the most characteristic of Avicenna’s psychological doctrines is exempt from Gundissalinus’s eagerness in melting together Avicenna and Ibn Gabirol. In fact, it is worth noticing that the very first explicit reference to the agent intelligence in Gundissalinus’s *De anima* is a direct quotation from a peculiar passage of *Fons vitae*:

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>It is necessary that the lower is <strong>hyle</strong> for the higher, because the higher acts on the lower. Therefore, the wise men wanted to call any of the substances “form” with the <strong>highest certitude</strong> except the <strong>first intelligence</strong>, which is called “the agent intelligence” by them.(^ {62})</td>
<td>It is necessary, indeed, that the lower is <strong>something like matter</strong> (<em>quasi materia</em>) for the higher, for the higher acts on the lower. In fact, the wise men <strong>did not want</strong> to call any of the substances “form” with the <strong>highest simplicity</strong> except the <strong>first intelligence</strong>, which is called “the agent intelligence” by them.(^ {63})</td>
</tr>
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\(^{61}\) Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 288,11–14: “Cum autem anima liberabitur a corpore et ab accidentibus corporis, tunc poterit coniungi intelligentiae agenti et tunc inveniet in ea pulchritudinem intelligibilem et delectationem perennem sicut dicemus suo loco.”


\(^{63}\) Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 118,18–21: “Oportet enim ut inferius sit quasi materia superiori eo quod superius agit in inferius et ideo sapientes noluerunt appellare aliquam substantiarum formam simpliciter, nisi intelligentiam primam quae vocatur ab eis intelligentia agentis.”
It should also be noticed that Gundissalinus’s quotation is slightly different from Ibn Gabirol’s text, in both the letter and the spirit. In the first place, the Toledan philosopher changes the reference to hyle with quasi materia, following his general aim at resolving, in De anima, some fundamental problems of coherence intrinsic to the Fons vitae.64 More importantly, though, through the quotation of this passage Gundissalinus establishes a direct link between the Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae and Avicenna’s De anima. While in Fons vitae that passage finds no development elsewhere in that work, in Gundissalinus’s treatise it performs a kind of first introduction to the discussion of the agent intelligence, which is one of the main features of the last chapter of Gundissalinus’s De anima, where he discusses, through Avicenna, the gnoseological process of intellectual knowledge.65

Furthermore, this passage not only bounds Ibn Gabirol and Avicenna, but also provides a crucial link between Ibn Gabirol’s hypostatical intelligence and Avicenna’s angelic intelligence, which Gundissalinus unifies in his personal development of how the souls are created. All this makes clear that Gundissalinus is identifying Avicenna’s separate intelligences with Ibn Gabirol’s hypostatical intelligence as the direct cause of the creation of the human souls.

6 Conclusion

Gundissalinus’s theory of the angelic creation of the souls is a peculiar and outstanding case of philosophical appropriation, based on a specific hermeneutic of Avicenna and Ibn Gabirol developed through three main steps:

1. the reduction of Ibn Gabirol’s hypostatical souls (rational, sensible, and vegetative) to the individual souls (rational, sensible, and vegetative), which are created by the separated causes, that is, the intelligences;

2. the identification of Avicenna’s separate intelligences moving the spheres—and, in particular, the most important of them, the giver of forms—with, on the one hand, the angelic creatures, as presented by al-Ghazālī, Ibn Daud, and Avicenna himself, and, on the other hand, with Ibn Gabirol’s hypostatical intelligence, the first entity proceeding from God’s creation of matter and form;

3. the radical application of Avicenna’s account of the creation of the souls to Ibn Gabirol’s universal hylomorphism, in base of which the souls can-

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64 See Polloni, Glimpses of the Invisible.
65 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 262,1–266,3.
not be created but by the angels, for they are composed of matter and form, regardless Avicenna’s argument of the impossibility of psychological matter.

The outcome of this interpretative process is the formulation of a doctrine extremely consistent with Gundissalinus’s cosmology and ontology presented in his *De processione mundi*. But it is also a doctrine which, although being textually grounded on two main sources, cannot be resolved in any of them. Gundissalinus’s alteration strategy, presiding his philosophical appropriation of Arabic doctrines and texts, makes enough clear how far Gundissalinus’s works are from being categorised as *collationes*. Thorough textual and doctrinal analyses eminently display that quotation means interpretation, and in philosophy, interpretation usually means an entirely new system which must be assessed and analyzed stressing the relation to its sources, avoiding any temptation to aprioristically resolve it into them.

More importantly, Gundissalinus’s doctrine of the origin of the souls offers a glimpse of the first reception and interpretation of key doctrines of the Arabic tradition within the Latin speculation. Avicenna’s radical (and complex) position on the origin of the human souls would undergo a process of progressive elaboration in the thirteenth century, as well as Ibn Gabirol’s ontology. It is worth noting that, a few decades later, the authors of the *Summa Halensis* would feel the urgency to dissipate any doubt concerning the angelic creation of the souls.\(^6\) According to the *Summa*, it is possible to speak about such a creation only in a weak sense, that is, only in reference to the gnoseological role played by the angels on the human soul. Another sense on which this assertion can be correctly interpreted is in reference to the movement of the spheres which prepares the bodies to the reception of their souls. Also in this second weak sense, it is possible to speak of creation *aliquo modo loquendo* and *valde*...
per accidens. To the contrary, the author underlines that, “if with creation we mean the exact production of a thing from non-being to be, that assertion is false.”

Just a few decades after Gundissalinus’s *De anima*, the doctrine of the angelic creation of human souls was one of the possible outcomes of the reading of Arabic sources and, primarily, Avicenna’s *De anima*. While a study on the actual influence of his thought in the thirteenth century is still a desideratum, the mediated or immediate influence of Gundissalinus’s reflection in the following decades could provide invaluable data to our understanding of the Latin reception of Arabic philosophy in the Middle Ages.

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67 Auctores varii, *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, 594: “... sed prout ‘creare’ dicitur proprie produc-tio rei de non ente in ens, sic est falsum.”
Appendix

Gundissalinus and Avicenna

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avicenna, <em>De anima</em>, v, 3</th>
<th>Gundissalinus, <em>De anima</em>, v</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>Dicerunt enim: licet ponamus animas humanas prius extitisse et non incepisse cum corporibus, eas tamen ante corpora multas fuisset impossibile est. 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multitudo enim rerum aut est ex essentia et forma, aut est ex comparatione quae est ad materiam et originem multiplicantam ex locis quae circundant unamquamque materiam secundum aliquid aut ex temporibus propriis uniuscuiusque illarum quae accidunt illis accidentibus, aut ex causis dividentibus illam. Inter animas autem non est alteritas in essentia et forma: forma enim earum una est. Ergo non est alteritas nisi secundum receptibile suae essentiae cui comparatur essentia eius proprie, et hoc est corpus. 70</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>Multitudo enim rerum vel est ex essentia et forma, vel ex comparatione ad materiam et originem multiplicatam locis circumscribentibus unamquamque materiam secundum aliquid, vel ex temporibus propriis uniuscuiusque illarum quae accidunt illis accidentibus, vel ex causis dividentibus illam. Inter animas autem ante corpora non fuit alteritas in essentia vel in forma. Forma enim earum una est, quoniam omnes humanae animae unum sunt in specie et definitione; ergo non est alteritas inter illas nisi secundum receptibile suae essentiae, cui debetur essentia eius proprie quod est corpus. 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>Ergo si animae fuerunt ante corpora, perfecto una non fuit alia numero ab alia; quia non fuit alteritas vel multitudo inter illas; itaque non fuerunt multae ante corpora. 72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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68 Avicenna, *De anima*, v, 3, 105,40–44.
69 Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 124,10–12.
71 Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 124,12–126,3.
72 Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 126,4–6.
Avicenna, De anima, v, 3

priusquam ingrederentur corpora fuisse multas essentialiter.\(^73\)

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Avicenna, De anima, v, 4

... et propter hoc etiam quod si possibile esset unamquamque animam creari et non crearetur id in quo perficitur et operatur, otiosum esset eius esse (nihil autem otiosum vel superfluum est in natura); quandoquidem ergo hoc est impossibile, tunc in eis quae sunt non est possibilitas huian; sed cum fit aptitudo recipiendi animam et aptitudo instrumentorum, comitatur tunc creari a causis separatis illud quod est anima. Hoc autem non contingit in anima tantum, sed in omnibus formis habentibus initium quarum esse non praeponderat supra eorum non esse, nisi quia materia aptior est quantum ad illas et dignior illis.\(^74\)

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Avicenna, De anima, v, 3

Dicemus etiam esse impossibile ut essentia eius sit una numero: cum enim fuerint duo corpora, acquirentur eis duae animae, quae duae aut erunt partes illius unius animae, et tunc aliq- uid quod non habet magnitudinem nec molem erit divisibile in potentia (huian autem destructio manifesta est ex principis praepositis in naturalibus et in aliis), aut illa anima una numero erit in duobus corporibus, hoc etiam per se patet falsum esse.\(^76\)

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Gundissalinus, De anima, v

Item, si possibile esset unamquamque animam creari ante corpus in quo perficitur et operatur, profecto otiosum esset eius esse; nihil autem otiosum vel superfluum est in natura; ergo non fuerunt creatae ante corpora.\(^75\)

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Gundissalinus, De anima

Sed nec fuit creata una numero. Cum enim generantur duo corpora, infunduntur eis duae animae, quae duae animae vel sunt partes illius unius animae, et sic aliqunid quod non habet molem vel magnitudinem est divisibile in potentia, quod impossibile est; vel illa anima una numero est in duobus corporibus, quod iam superius improbatum est.\(^77\)

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75 Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,7–10.
76 Avicenna, De anima, v, 3, 107,63–69.
77 Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,10–14.
Avicenna, *De anima*, v, 4

Gundissalinus, *De anima*

F  *Cum enim creatur materia corporis quod sit dignum fieri instrumentum animae et eius regnum, tunc causae separatae quae solent dare unamquamque animam, creant animam. Ergo ut animas creant sine corporibus quibus propria sit, creatio unius et non alterius, est impossible; et praeter hoc etiam iam negavimus in praemissis animas ante corpora esse multas numero; et propter hoc etiam quod necesse est ut quicquid incipit esse, praecedat illud materia quae sit apta recipere illud aut apta comparari ad illud, sicut ostendimus alias; ...*

G  *Et si factor primus fuerit factor substantiae per se, tunc haec substantia fuit semper apud deum. Sed haec substantia non fuit semper. Ergo non est facta ab essentia factoris primi. Ergo factor primus non est factor substantiae per se. Et cum factor primus non fuerit factor eius per se, necesse erit ut sit medium inter illa.*

H  *Facere factoris primi est creare aliquid ex nihilo. Et substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta composita est ex suis simplicibus. Ergo non est creatum ex nihilo.*

Gundissalinus and Ibn Gabirol

Ibn Gabirol, *Fons vitae*

Gundissalinus, *De anima*

G  *Probant autem philosophi animas non a Deo sed ab angelis creari hoc modo: si factor primus est factor animae per se, tunc anima semper fuit apud eum; sed anima non semper fuit apud Deum quoniam cotidie creantur novae; igitur anima non est facta a primo factore, nec primus factor est factor eius per se. Igitur necesse est ut aliquid sit medium inter Deum et animam, quod sit factor animae.*

H  *Item alia probatio: factoris primi facere est facere aliquid ex nihilo; sed postea probabitur animam fieri ex materia; igitur non est factura primi factores.*

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80 Ibn Gabirol, *Fons vitae*, 78.7–12.
81 Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 128.17–22.
83 Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 130.20–22.
et omne quod exit de potentia in effectum, non trahit illud in effectu nisi quod habet esse in effectu. Ergo passionem substantiae quae sustinet praedicamenta non trahit de potentia in effectum nisi quod habet esse in effectu, inter quod et illam non est medium. Item praepono hanc et dico: Progressio passionis substantiae quae sustinet praedicamenta de potentia in effectum est a re quae habet esse in effectu, inter quam et illam non est medium. Et factor primus non est in potentia nec in effectu. Ergo progressio passionis substantiae quae sustinet praedicamenta de potentia in effectum non est ex primo factore sine medio, quod sit inter illa.  

Substantia quae movet substantiam quae sustinet praedicamenta non potest esse quin sit aut mobilis aut immobils. Si fuerit immobils, non potest per eam moveri substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta, hoc est, quia haec substantia aut potest moveri, aut non. Si potest moveri haec substantia, esset mobilis. Si non potest moveri in se, non esset possibile ut moveret alium. Probatio autem quod impossibile est ut motor substantiae sit potens eam movere, cum non sit potens se movere, erit hoc modo: Ponamus quod quid quod movetur substantiam non potest se movere. Et omne quod non potest se movere, non potest movere alium. Ergo quod posuimus motorem substantiae sit movens eam et in se non sit mobilis. Ergo non est possibile ut motor substantiae sit movens eam et in se non sit mobilis. Ergo motor substantiae est mobilis. Et probatio etiam quod motor substantiae qui dat substantiae virtutem movendi sit mobilis erit hoc modo: Motor substantiae dat substantiae virtutem movendi. Et quicquid attribuit aliquid aliuis, dignius est ad habendam rem tributam eo quod accipit. Ergo motor substantiae qui

Item creari vel facere est trahere de potentia ad effectum; sed trahere de potentia ad effectum est movere; igitur quaecumque res creat animam movet eam. Sed quicquid creando movet eam, necesse est ut sit mobile vel immobile. Si autem fuerit immobile in se, tunc non poterit moveri; si autem non poterit moveri, tunc nec a se poterit moveri nec ab alio. Quod autem se non potest movere, multo minus et aliud; igitur quod movet animam non est immobile in se; igitur est mobile. Sed Deus est immobiles; igitur non movet eam; et si non movet eam, utique nec eam creat.  

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85 Gundissalinus, De anima, 132,1–4.  
Ibn Gabirol, *Fons vitae*

tribuit substantiae virtutem movendi dignior est ad habendam virtutem movendi quam ipsa substantia quae accepit. Ergo *motor substantiae sine mediante mobilis* est. Et praeponam hanc conclusionem et dicam: substantia quae movet substantiam nullo mediante, mobilis est. Et *factor primus non est mobilis*. Ergo *factor primus non est motor substantiae sine medio*.  

K Omne quod recipit aliquid ex alio nullo mediante, non inventur aliquid aliud dignius eo ad receptionem eius. Si *substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta* recipit substantialitatem a primo factore nullo mediante, tunc non inventur alia substantia dignior ea ad intentionem substantialitatis. Sed substantia simplex, ut anima et intelligentia, dignior est ad intentionem substantialitatis quam substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta. Ergo *substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta* a primo factore non recipit substantialitatem nullo mediante.  

L Quod movet *substantiam quae sustinet praedicamenta* nullo mediante, non potest esse infinitum, quia non potest esse quin moveat aut per se, aut per accidentem. Et si movet illam *per suam essentiam*, et essentia eius est infinita, non est possibile ut mutus qui exit ab ea sit finitus. Sed mutus *substantiae* est finitus. Ergo essentia quae movet eam non est infinita. Et si per accidentem movet, essentia eius etiam non est infinita, quia omne quod est infinitum, non accedit ei accidentem. Et *probatio huius hoc modo fit*: res quae est infinita non mutatur. Et omne cui accedit accidentem mutatur. Ergo rei infinitae non accedit accidentem. Ergo non est possibile ut quod movet *substantiam nullo mediante* sit infinitum. Ergo est finitum. Et praeponimus hanc et dicimus: quod movet *substantiam quae sustinet praedicamenta* nullo mediante est finitum.  

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89 Gundissalinus, *De anima*, 132,14–19.
factor primus est infinitus. Ergo factor primus non est movens substantiam nullo mediante.

Item alio ordine. Si motor substantiae nullo mediante est infinitus, motus substantiae est infinitus. Sed non est possibile ut motus substantiae sit infinitus, eo quod substantia eius finita est. Ergo non est possibile ut motor huius substantiae sine mediante sit infinitus. Deinde adiungamus hanc dictionem, scilicet: factor primus est infinitus. Ergo non est possibile ut factor primus sit motor substantiae nullo mediante. 90

Item si motor animae est infinitus, et motus animae est infinitus; sed motus animae non potest esse infinitus quoniam substantia eius finita est; igitur; motor animae nullo mediante non potest esse infinitus; sed factor primus est infinitus; igitur; factor primus non potest esse motor animae nullo mediante. 91

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