philosophers of religion looking to think carefully about the intersection of epistemology, identity, and religion, and serves as a rallying cry for those currently marginalized within philosophy of religion. Those who teach will find that most of the essays are written in a clear and easy style that will work well with students. De Cruz notes that those in her focus group, despite their personal commitments to inclusion and their own minoritized identities, still found it difficult to put together diverse syllabi for introductory courses in philosophy of religion. Thankfully, that work just got a little easier. And hopefully the moves toward diversification this volume makes will lead to a wider range of scholars seeing themselves as having a place in analytic philosophy of religion.

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John Pittard, ***Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment*****. Oxford University Press, 2020, 339 pp.**

John Pittard's *Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment* investigates the rationality of religious (or irreligious) commitment given disagreement between informed and thoughtful people. Disagreement-motivated skeptics present a higher-order argument against the reasonableness of religious belief formation, rather than first-order evidence against a religious outlook(s). After expositing what he calls the "master argument" for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, Pittard develops a weak conciliatory argument that religious commitment can be reasonable in cases where a believer has genuine rational insight. While strong conciliationism is committed to strict impartiality, Pittard's conciliationist position is "weak" in the sense that partisan justification is possible in some cases, allowing for a middle path between unbending epistemic impartiality and steadfast deference to oneself. In this way, Pittard's approach offers an interesting contribution to debates about disagreement beyond disputes about the significance of disagreement for religious commitment. As Pittard points out, though, discussions of disagreement in general do not settle questions about religious disagreement in particular. So, his argument is essential reading for those interested in the higher-order troubles that accompany religious disagree-

ment. The book is divided into two parts. Part I pursues Pittard's preferred approach to religious disagreement, wherein one can reasonably commit to a religious stance provided one has genuine rational insight into the relevant issue. Part II examines the plausibility of disagreement-motivated skepticism if one accepts strong conciliationism. To be sure, this review cannot recount and assess every feature of Pittard's excellent contribution, but this fact only commends it more strongly to scholars of disagreement and religion alike.

Chapter 1 refines the "master argument" for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism. Combining elements from pluralistic and secular-humanist accounts, the argument proceeds as follows.[4] Suppose that someone, *S*, is religious and acknowledges widespread religious disagreement. First, *S* admits that her religious outlook is justified only if she has justification for believing that relevant beliefs result from a reliable belief-forming process. Next, given *S's* knowledge of religious disagreement, she should believe that the belief-forming processes of other epistemically-qualified people are unreliable on religious matters. Third, *S* lacks justification that her religious belief-forming processes are more reliable than the collective reliability that other epistemically-qualified people employ to form religious beliefs. If this is so, *S* lacks justification for believing that her religious beliefs arise through a reliable process, indicating that S should adopt an impartial, and skeptical, view. So, *S's* religious outlook is not justified.[5] While Pittard argues that one should accept the first two premises, his account denies the third premise. The remainder of chapter 1 examines three constraints that support premise three. Suppose one's religious belief-forming process is "SUPERIOR" when it is "significantly more reliable than the collective reliability of the processes that (otherwise) epistemically qualified people use to form religious beliefs."[6] According to premise three, if one lacks justification for believing SUPERIOR, she should assign equivalent weight to belief-forming processes. To defend

4 In particular, Pittard pays special attention to the following: John Hick, "The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism," *Faith and Philosophy* 14, 3 (1997): 277–286; Philip Kitcher, *Life after Faith: The Case for Secular Humanism* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2014); John Schellenberg, *The Wisdom of Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism* (Cornell Univ. Press, 2007); Sanford Goldberg, "Does Externalist Epistemology Rationalize Religious Commitment?," in *Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue*, ed. Timothy O'Conner and Laura Frances Callahan (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2014), 279–298.

5 See Pittard, *Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment,* 19.

6 Pittard, *Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment,* 28.

SUPERIOR, disagreement skeptics should accept three constraints on self-trust. First, the *internal reasons constraint* says that one has justification for believing SUPERIOR only if she has a good *internal* reason for belief. A "good internal reason" does not rely on external factors for justification. Second, *agent impartiality* mandates that *S* has good internal reasons for SUPERIOR only if *S* has *agent-neutral* internal reasons to endorse SUPERIOR. Chapter 4 explores this constraint in more detail, where Pittard argues against externalist, agent-centered, and permissivist accounts of partisan justification. Pittard accepts internal reasons and agent impartiality constraints. Finally, a *reasons impartiality constraint* states that if one has a good agent-neutral internal reason for SUPERIOR, then *S* has a good *dispute-independent* reason for SUPERIOR. Dispute independence ensures that one's belief about SUPERIOR is non-question-begging. With these three constraints, disagreement skeptics can argue that religious believers lack good dispute-independent, agent-neutral internal reasons for believing SUPERIOR.

Chapter 2 appraises two defenses of reasons impartiality, viz., David Christensen's conciliationism and John Schellenberg's doxastic minimalism. When one disagrees about *p*, Christensen's conciliationism maintains a principle, INDEPENDENCE, on which one should assess the epistemic credentials of another's belief about *p* independently of one's initial reasoning about *p*.[7] That is, when two people of similar epistemic credentials and symmetrical evidence disagree, they ought to assign equal weight to competing views. To avoid INDEPENDENCE, Pittard foreshadows chapter 3's argument by explaining how internalism and agent-neutrality deliver an equal weight verdict in symmetrical cases. The second defense arises from Schellenberg's argument against appeals to religious experience. For Schellenberg, in the course of inquiry, we should restrict default-trust in a belief-forming process to those that are universal and unavoidable. Amidst various objections to Schellenberg's view, Pittard offers an apt Jamesian reply to doxastic minimalism, arguing that the latter view is implausibly skeptical. At base, the reply notes that there is a balance in avoiding error and pursuing the truth, and that the former need not always trump the latter. Rejecting doxastic minimalism and INDEPENDENCE prepares the way for chapter 3's shift to instrumentalism.

7 See David Christensen, "Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism," *Philosophers' Imprint* 11, no. 6 (2011), 1–22.

Chapter 3 introduces Pittard's preferred weak conciliatory view. Arguably, conciliationists should affirm an instrumentalist stance that treats one's cognitive faculties like readouts of a complex instrument, where those readouts are calibrated by beliefs about reliability. Primarily, this is because instrumentalism explains the rationality of equal weight verdicts in disagreement cases by rendering prior and posterior credences for conditionalization. Pittard argues that the degree of trust in one's cognitive faculties is a function of one's reliability *and* a prior probability about a readout's plausibility. Now, suppose that two equally-reliable instruments deliver different verdicts — for instance, in Hawaii, when one thermometer indicates 89 degrees Fahrenheit while another indicates 20 degrees Fahrenheit. What could justify someone's reliance on the first thermometer? Pittard points out that the first thermometer's readout is antecedently more plausible, and this allows one to assign a higher credence to the first thermometer. While one's confidence should reduce given the divergent readings, this need not require an equal assignment to both views. Simultaneously, one's *fundamental* assessment of a proposition's plausibility, that is, one's *ur-prior* about *p*, cannot be treated instrumentally.[8] According to weak conciliationism, then, it *could* be rational for one to adopt an ur-prior and so favor one's view in a disagreement, *contra* strong conciliationism. This does not mean, however, that one can confidently maintain religious commitment in the midst of disagreement. Because partisan justification could be unavailable for some ur-priors, Pittard contends that one achieves partisan justification just in cases where one has genuine *rational insight* into the plausibility of *p*. This rationalist condition on weak conciliationism brings us to chapters 4 and 5.

Chapter 4 combines weak conciliationism with a rationalist account of partisan justification. The chapter divides into two parts. The first part presents a case for rationalism. The second examines if reformed epistemology can marshal a reply to disagreement-motivated skepticism. To be sure, rationalism is the most controversial component of Pittard's account. According to rationalism, one could have *a priori* insight into the truth or plausibility of *p*, including the evidence or reasoning that supports believing that *p*. Though a priori, rational insight can depend on experiences or processes of reflection to achieve the clarity that accompanies *genuine* (as opposed to confused or

8 Pittard, *Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment,* 108–109.

mistaken) rational insight. Insight amounts to *immediate* awareness of the considerations supporting *p* such that one's ur-prior about *p* is justified. For Pittard, one's own introspective awareness provides the strongest support for rationalism. One natural worry here is whether rationalist weak conciliationism is a preferable strategy to strong conciliationism, if one admits that people imperfectly discern genuine from apparent rational insight.[9] Although Pittard rejects infallibility in cases of direct awareness, one might object that divergent ur-priors could undermine one's confidence about *p*, especially in religious cases. On this point, consider Pittard's example. Suppose that two people, Sierra and Arjun, disagree about the appropriate answer to the Monty Hall problem. Sierra grasps the correct solution, while Arjun reasons incorrectly. When they debate their reasoning, Pittard argues that Sierra's insight into the correct answer justifies a higher confidence in her answer than impartial grounds would allow. Sierra might rightly assign equal confidence to a process of "giving more weight to the seemingly more rationally answer," supposing that she knows that such a process is 50% reliable in disputes with Arjun.[10] But Pittard notes that Sierra could recognize a *narrower* process specific to the case that delivers first-order reasons, justifying her higher credence.

Nevertheless, in cases of *religious* disagreement, an appeal to narrower processes is more controversial. In turn, perhaps advances in reformed epistemology provide a solution. The second part of chapter 4 contends that though reformed epistemology can explain the *initial* justification of religious beliefs, there seems no symmetry breaker in cases of disagreement. As Pittard suggests, those sympathetic to reformed epistemology could address this deficiency by appealing to the place of insight in cases of disagreement, where insightful religious experience contributes to one's recognition of the rational plausibility of a religious (or irreligious) view. To this end, chapter 5 gestures toward such a rejoinder.[11]

9 In chapter 3, Pittard discusses an objection along these lines advanced by Miriam Schoenfield (127–33). The issue reemerges again in chapter 4 (171–72). An important part of this defense of rationalism is that direct awareness epistemically privileges one's position, though not infallibly. In this way, rational cogency can confer justification (see 163–68).

10 Pittard, *Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment,* 171.

11 This is not to say that important differences do not remain. For instance, Pittard's conception of experience here is not primarily perceptual experience, but instead experience that produces insight into religious outlooks, including negative or atheistic religious experiences (e.g., experiences of loneliness or suffering).

Chapter 5 argues that affective experience plays an essential role in the religious insights that facilitate partisan justification. Pittard argues that since most people lack nonevaluative grounds for religious outlooks, rational insight into theism (or atheism) could require insight into evaluative questions. Accordingly, Pittard's rationalist conciliationism allows that affect can play an ineliminable role in facilitating rational insight. This is not to deny that emotional bias is absent from religious matters. What Pittard denies is that "the prevalence of such bias vitiates the justification that may be conferred by genuine affectively mediated insight."[12] If insight is sometimes ineluctably "affectively mediated," distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate mediation would make it clearer how and when justification is conferred. Still, Pittard considers how emotional experience relates to memory, introducing important distinctions for the relationship between religious belief and commitment that emerge in chapter 7. Moreover, applications of rationalist weak conciliationism in section 5.6 show how one could rationally maintain religious belief given disagreement, irrespective of an outlook's insight into the truth.

Chapters 6 and 7 compose part II. While the argument against reasons impartiality in Part I is considerable, Pittard concedes that his argument is less than decisive. Accordingly, Part II explores the compatibility of religious skepticism and strong conciliationism. Chapter 6 presents the view that epistemic impartiality remains elusive in deep disagreements. There are two broad worries about strong conciliationism here. First, in religious disagreements, the conciliatory stance is often disputed such that impartial deference is self-undermining. Second, in specific domains of disagreement, perfect impartiality could require answers to questions that cannot be answered in dispute-neutral ways. For instance, the traditional Buddhist view that seeing through the illusion of the self is necessary for enlightenment arguably conflicts with strong conciliatory deference. Moreover, religious *and* irreligious outlooks frequently concern dispute-relevant epistemic credentials and bias. In this way, Pittard argues that there is no guarantee that impartiality results in religious skepticism, even if ideal impartiality is pursuit worthy.[13] Chapter 7 explores the rationality of religious commitment under disagreement,

12 Pittard, *Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment,* 215.

13 This is directly contrary to views that deploy disagreement skepticism but exempt their own view, such as Kitcher's argument for secular humanism.

arguing that strong impartiality results in deliberative vertigo. One promising response in cases of defeated belief is nondoxastic commitment. While nondoxastic commitment has its value, Pittard argues that it requires beliefs about the practical or functional benefit that a religious outlook could entail. Conjoining this with epistemic impartiality prevents rational commitment to any religious or irreligious way of life, often resulting in the assignment of nontrivial credences to outlooks one finds implausible or undesirable. Strong conciliationism likewise results in practical vertigo, where normative uncertainty undermines religious decision-making. When one lacks a symmetry-breaking rationale for accepting one religious outlook over others, higher-order normative uncertainty leaves one nowhere to stand.

In sum, though I remain skeptical that *all* theists and atheists would see Pittard's conciliationism as decisive, the account is designed for such persistent disagreements. At places, disagreement-motivated skepticism can seem secondary to the broader discussion of disagreement. Yet, the depth and scope of the book's many arguments facilitate a fecund account that clarifies central issues for future disagreements about religious disagreement. It is essential reading for scholars of disagreement and religion alike.

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Peter Furlong, *The Challenges of Divine Determinism: A Philosophical Analysis,* **Cambridge Univ. Press, 2019, 246pp.**

Peter Furlong describes his new book, *The Challenges of Divine Determinism: A Philosophical Analysis*, as "an exploration of philosophical topography" (3) which investigates the most significant objections to divine (or theological) determinism, the possible responses that have been, or might be, made to those objections, and the various "costs" associated with such responses. It is a careful and thorough investigation, turning, as he says, "common and often vague worries into nuanced objections" (3) and leaving no philosophical stone unturned in consideration of replies and counter-replies. Furlong is fair in his analysis, and modest in his conclusions, noting that an ultimate determination of the plausibility of divine determinism lies outside the purview of the book,